Jesse Acevedo, Do Remittances Contribute to Presidential Instability in Latin America? *Latin American Politics and Society* vol. 65, no. 3 (Fall 2023).

**Appendix**

Table A.1. Remittances and Contextual Factors. Polity and Remittances (%GDP)

|  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | | | | |
|  | Crime | | Corruption | |
|  | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) |
|  | | | | |
| Intercept | 0.712\*\*\* | 0.334\*\*\* | 0.681\*\*\* | 0.158\*\*\* |
|  | (0.020) | (0.015) | (0.021) | (0.015) |
| Remittances | 0.109\*\*\* | 0.018 | 0.100\*\* | 0.016 |
|  | (0.040) | (0.011) | (0.046) | (0.012) |
| Polity Score | -0.035\*\*\* |  | -0.038\*\*\* |  |
|  | (0.001) |  | (0.001) |  |
| Remittances (% GDP) |  | -0.054\*\*\* |  | -0.119\*\*\* |
|  |  | (0.003) |  | (0.003) |
| Age | -0.004\*\*\* | -0.004\*\*\* | -0.004\*\*\* | -0.004\*\*\* |
|  | (0.0002) | (0.0002) | (0.0002) | (0.0002) |
| Female | 0.022\*\*\* | 0.021\*\*\* | 0.012\*\*\* | 0.012\*\*\* |
|  | (0.004) | (0.004) | (0.004) | (0.004) |
| Urban | 0.035\*\*\* | 0.036\*\*\* | 0.033\*\*\* | 0.033\*\*\* |
|  | (0.006) | (0.006) | (0.006) | (0.006) |
| Education | -0.009\*\*\* | -0.009\*\*\* | -0.007\*\*\* | -0.007\*\*\* |
|  | (0.001) | (0.001) | (0.001) | (0.001) |
| Income | -0.101\*\*\* | -0.102\*\*\* | -0.099\*\*\* | -0.101\*\*\* |
|  | (0.013) | (0.013) | (0.013) | (0.013) |
| Ideology | 0.054\*\*\* | 0.051\*\*\* | 0.045\*\*\* | 0.043\*\*\* |
|  | (0.017) | (0.017) | (0.016) | (0.016) |
| Remittances x Polity | -0.009\* |  | -0.008 |  |
|  | (0.005) |  | (0.006) |  |
| Remittances x Remittances (% GDP) |  | 0.012\*\* |  | 0.013\*\* |
|  |  | (0.005) |  | (0.006) |
| N | 101,417 | 99,593 | 101,239 | 99,424 |
| R2 | 0.071 | 0.071 | 0.061 | 0.060 |
|  | | | | |
| \*p < .1; \*\*p < .05; \*\*\*p < .01 | | | | |
| All models control for country-year fixed-effects | | | | |
| Standard errors are clustered at country-year  Remittances (% GDP) is logged. | | | | |

Table A.2. Remittances and Support for Coups by Remittances (%GDP)

|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | | | | | | |
|  | Crime | | | Corruption | | |
|  | 0 - 4.99% | 5 - 9.99% | 10% + | 0 - 4.99% | 5 - 9.99% | 10% + |
|  | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) |
|  | | | | | | |
| Intercept | 0.427\*\*\* | 0.674\*\*\* | 0.687\*\*\* | 0.363\*\*\* | 0.603\*\*\* | 0.570\*\*\* |
|  | (0.020) | (0.056) | (0.021) | (0.021) | (0.053) | (0.023) |
| Remittances | 0.025\*\* | 0.022\*\* | 0.060\*\*\* | 0.016 | 0.037\*\*\* | 0.056\*\*\* |
|  | (0.012) | (0.009) | (0.010) | (0.012) | (0.011) | (0.012) |
| Age | -0.003\*\*\* | -0.004\*\*\* | -0.004\*\*\* | -0.003\*\*\* | -0.005\*\*\* | -0.004\*\*\* |
|  | (0.0002) | (0.001) | (0.0003) | (0.0002) | (0.001) | (0.0004) |
| Female | 0.021\*\*\* | 0.017\* | 0.026\*\*\* | 0.008 | 0.015\*\* | 0.019\*\* |
|  | (0.004) | (0.010) | (0.009) | (0.005) | (0.007) | (0.009) |
| Urban | 0.038\*\*\* | 0.020\* | 0.043\*\*\* | 0.043\*\*\* | 0.028\*\*\* | 0.015 |
|  | (0.008) | (0.012) | (0.010) | (0.008) | (0.009) | (0.013) |
| Education | -0.009\*\*\* | -0.006\*\*\* | -0.010\*\*\* | -0.008\*\*\* | -0.004\*\* | -0.008\*\*\* |
|  | (0.001) | (0.002) | (0.001) | (0.001) | (0.002) | (0.001) |
| Income | -0.121\*\*\* | -0.063\*\*\* | -0.066\*\* | -0.121\*\*\* | -0.073\*\*\* | -0.055\* |
|  | (0.017) | (0.020) | (0.030) | (0.018) | (0.021) | (0.031) |
| Ideology | 0.066\*\*\* | 0.019 | 0.049 | 0.062\*\*\* | 0.023 | 0.018 |
|  | (0.023) | (0.031) | (0.037) | (0.022) | (0.028) | (0.039) |
| N | 60,107 | 18,792 | 20,694 | 60,065 | 18,751 | 20,608 |
| R2 | 0.074 | 0.048 | 0.066 | 0.069 | 0.039 | 0.046 |
|  | | | | | | |
| \*p < .1; \*\*p < .05; \*\*\*p < .01 | | | | | | |
| All models control for country-year fixed-effects | | | | | | |
| Standard errors are clustered at country-year | | | | | | |

Table A.3 Remittances and Contextual Factors. Homicide Rates and Corruption

|  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | | | | |
|  | Crime | | Corruption | |
|  | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) |
|  | | | | |
| Intercept | 0.311\*\*\* | 0.389\*\*\* | 0.253\*\*\* | 0.329\*\*\* |
|  | (0.015) | (0.015) | (0.015) | (0.015) |
| Remittances | -0.008 | 0.025\*\*\* | 0.005 | 0.012 |
|  | (0.026) | (0.008) | (0.028) | (0.008) |
| Homicide Rate | 0.063\*\*\* |  | 0.068\*\*\* |  |
|  | (0.002) |  | (0.002) |  |
| Corruption |  | 0.142\*\*\* |  | 0.151\*\*\* |
|  |  | (0.003) |  | (0.004) |
| Remittances x Homicide Rate | 0.015\*\* |  | 0.011 |  |
|  | (0.008) |  | (0.009) |  |
| Remittances x Corruption |  | 0.029\*\* |  | 0.050\*\*\* |
|  |  | (0.013) |  | (0.012) |
| Age | -0.004\*\*\* | -0.004\*\*\* | -0.004\*\*\* | -0.004\*\*\* |
|  | (0.0002) | (0.0002) | (0.0002) | (0.0002) |
| Female | 0.022\*\*\* | 0.023\*\*\* | 0.013\*\*\* | 0.013\*\*\* |
|  | (0.004) | (0.004) | (0.004) | (0.004) |
| Urban | 0.037\*\*\* | 0.035\*\*\* | 0.034\*\*\* | 0.033\*\*\* |
|  | (0.006) | (0.006) | (0.006) | (0.006) |
| Education | -0.008\*\*\* | -0.009\*\*\* | -0.007\*\*\* | -0.007\*\*\* |
|  | (0.001) | (0.001) | (0.001) | (0.001) |
| Income | -0.097\*\*\* | -0.102\*\*\* | -0.094\*\*\* | -0.099\*\*\* |
|  | (0.012) | (0.012) | (0.013) | (0.012) |
| Ideology | 0.059\*\*\* | 0.054\*\*\* | 0.050\*\*\* | 0.044\*\*\* |
|  | (0.017) | (0.016) | (0.016) | (0.015) |
| N | 97,104 | 106,596 | 96,903 | 106,618 |
| R2 | 0.069 | 0.071 | 0.058 | 0.061 |
|  | | | | |
| \*p < .1; \*\*p < .05; \*\*\*p < .01 | | | | |
| All models control for country-year fixed-effects | | | | |
| Standard errors are clustered at country-year  The homicide rate is measured as a two-year rolling average and logged. | | | | |

Table A.4. Remittances, Crime Victimization, and Perceptions (DV: High Crime)

|  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | High Crime | | | |
|  | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) |
|  | | | | |
| Intercept | 0.440\*\*\* | 0.401\*\*\* | 0.409\*\*\* | 0.430\*\*\* |
|  | (0.016) | (0.016) | (0.018) | (0.016) |
| Remittances | 0.041\*\*\* | 0.049\*\*\* | 0.052\*\*\* | 0.041\*\*\* |
|  | (0.006) | (0.010) | (0.013) | (0.007) |
| Neighborhood Insecurity |  | 0.088\*\*\* |  |  |
|  |  | (0.007) |  |  |
| Corruption Perception |  |  | 0.022\*\* |  |
|  |  |  | (0.009) |  |
| Crime Victim |  |  |  | 0.058\*\*\* |
|  |  |  |  | (0.005) |
| Remittances x Neighborhood Insecurity |  | -0.015 |  |  |
|  |  | (0.016) |  |  |
| Remittances x Corruption Perception |  |  | -0.011 |  |
|  |  |  | (0.017) |  |
| Remittances x Crime Victim |  |  |  | -0.009 |
|  |  |  |  | (0.012) |
| Age | -0.004\*\*\* | -0.004\*\*\* | -0.004\*\*\* | -0.004\*\*\* |
|  | (0.0002) | (0.0002) | (0.0002) | (0.0002) |
| Female | 0.023\*\*\* | 0.020\*\*\* | 0.019\*\*\* | 0.025\*\*\* |
|  | (0.004) | (0.004) | (0.004) | (0.004) |
| Urban | 0.035\*\*\* | 0.028\*\*\* | 0.036\*\*\* | 0.030\*\*\* |
|  | (0.006) | (0.006) | (0.006) | (0.006) |
| Education | -0.009\*\*\* | -0.009\*\*\* | -0.009\*\*\* | -0.009\*\*\* |
|  | (0.001) | (0.001) | (0.001) | (0.001) |
| Income | -0.102\*\*\* | -0.099\*\*\* | -0.112\*\*\* | -0.105\*\*\* |
|  | (0.012) | (0.012) | (0.014) | (0.012) |
| Ideology | 0.054\*\*\* | 0.055\*\*\* | 0.066\*\*\* | 0.055\*\*\* |
|  | (0.016) | (0.016) | (0.017) | (0.016) |
| N | 106,596 | 106,099 | 92,174 | 106,357 |
| R2 | 0.071 | 0.074 | 0.074 | 0.074 |
|  | | | | |
| \*p < .1; \*\*p < .05; \*\*\*p < .01 | | | | |
| Models include country-year fixed-effects | | | | |
| Standard errors are clustered at country-year | | | | |

Table A.5. Remittances, Crime Victimization, and Perceptions (DV: High Corruption)

|  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | High Corruption | | | |
|  | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) |
|  | | | | |
| Intercept | 0.383\*\*\* | 0.348\*\*\* | 0.364\*\*\* | 0.374\*\*\* |
|  | (0.016) | (0.015) | (0.017) | (0.016) |
| Remittances | 0.041\*\*\* | 0.054\*\*\* | 0.049\*\*\* | 0.047\*\*\* |
|  | (0.006) | (0.011) | (0.014) | (0.008) |
| Neighborhood Insecurity |  | 0.080\*\*\* |  |  |
|  |  | (0.007) |  |  |
| Corruption Perception |  |  | 0.026\*\*\* |  |
|  |  |  | (0.009) |  |
| Crime Victim |  |  |  | 0.055\*\*\* |
|  |  |  |  | (0.005) |
| Remittances x Neighborhood Insecurity |  | -0.028 |  |  |
|  |  | (0.018) |  |  |
| Remittances x Corruption Perception |  |  | -0.008 |  |
|  |  |  | (0.018) |  |
| Remittances x Crime Victim |  |  |  | -0.032\*\* |
|  |  |  |  | (0.013) |
| Age | -0.004\*\*\* | -0.004\*\*\* | -0.004\*\*\* | -0.004\*\*\* |
|  | (0.0002) | (0.0002) | (0.0002) | (0.0002) |
| Female | 0.013\*\*\* | 0.010\*\*\* | 0.012\*\*\* | 0.014\*\*\* |
|  | (0.004) | (0.004) | (0.004) | (0.004) |
| Urban | 0.033\*\*\* | 0.027\*\*\* | 0.034\*\*\* | 0.029\*\*\* |
|  | (0.006) | (0.006) | (0.006) | (0.006) |
| Education | -0.007\*\*\* | -0.007\*\*\* | -0.008\*\*\* | -0.008\*\*\* |
|  | (0.001) | (0.001) | (0.001) | (0.001) |
| Income | -0.098\*\*\* | -0.096\*\*\* | -0.118\*\*\* | -0.100\*\*\* |
|  | (0.012) | (0.012) | (0.014) | (0.012) |
| Ideology | 0.044\*\*\* | 0.046\*\*\* | 0.055\*\*\* | 0.045\*\*\* |
|  | (0.015) | (0.015) | (0.017) | (0.015) |
| N | 106,618 | 106,105 | 92,155 | 106,389 |
| R2 | 0.061 | 0.064 | 0.063 | 0.063 |
|  | | | | |
| \*p < .1; \*\*p < .05; \*\*\*p < .01 | | | | |
| Models include country-year fixed-effects | | | | |
| Standard errors are clustered at country-year | | | | |

Table A.6. History of Presidential Removals

|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | | | | | | |
|  | Crime | | | Corruption | | |
|  | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) |
|  | | | | | | |
| Intercept | 0.497\*\*\* | 0.573\*\*\* | 0.354\*\*\* | 0.531\*\*\* | 0.540\*\*\* | 0.277\*\*\* |
|  | (0.019) | (0.020) | (0.034) | (0.019) | (0.020) | (0.032) |
| Remittances | 0.042\*\*\* | 0.034\*\*\* | 0.063\*\*\* | 0.039\*\*\* | 0.030\*\*\* | 0.059\*\*\* |
|  | (0.010) | (0.009) | (0.019) | (0.011) | (0.010) | (0.015) |
| Removals=1 | 0.075\*\*\* |  |  | 0.002 |  |  |
|  | (0.002) |  |  | (0.002) |  |  |
| Removals=2 | 0.181\*\*\* |  |  | 0.125\*\*\* |  |  |
|  | (0.005) |  |  | (0.004) |  |  |
| Removals=3 | -0.067\*\*\* |  |  | -0.150\*\*\* |  |  |
|  | (0.005) |  |  | (0.005) |  |  |
| Years since Last Removal |  |  | 0.009\*\*\* |  |  | 0.009\*\*\* |
|  |  |  | (0.0004) |  |  | (0.0004) |
| Remittances x Removal=1 | -0.014 |  |  | 0.003 |  |  |
|  | (0.014) |  |  | (0.015) |  |  |
| Remittances x Removal=2 | -0.007 |  |  | -0.004 |  |  |
|  | (0.049) |  |  | (0.031) |  |  |
| Remittances x Removal=3 | 0.010 |  |  | 0.011 |  |  |
|  | (0.018) |  |  | (0.021) |  |  |
| Remittances x Years Since Last Removal |  |  | -0.003\*\* |  |  | -0.002\* |
|  |  |  | (0.002) |  |  | (0.001) |
| Age | -0.003\*\*\* | -0.004\*\*\* | -0.004\*\*\* | -0.004\*\*\* | -0.004\*\*\* | -0.004\*\*\* |
|  | (0.0002) | (0.0003) | (0.0004) | (0.0002) | (0.0003) | (0.0004) |
| Female | 0.021\*\*\* | 0.025\*\*\* | 0.020\*\*\* | 0.012\*\*\* | 0.010\* | 0.022\*\*\* |
|  | (0.004) | (0.006) | (0.006) | (0.004) | (0.005) | (0.005) |
| Urban | 0.036\*\*\* | 0.033\*\*\* | 0.039\*\*\* | 0.033\*\*\* | 0.038\*\*\* | 0.041\*\*\* |
|  | (0.006) | (0.008) | (0.011) | (0.006) | (0.008) | (0.010) |
| Education | -0.009\*\*\* | -0.010\*\*\* | -0.007\*\*\* | -0.007\*\*\* | -0.009\*\*\* | -0.006\*\*\* |
|  | (0.001) | (0.001) | (0.001) | (0.001) | (0.001) | (0.001) |
| Income | -0.101\*\*\* | -0.113\*\*\* | -0.082\*\*\* | -0.102\*\*\* | -0.120\*\*\* | -0.073\*\*\* |
|  | (0.013) | (0.017) | (0.022) | (0.014) | (0.019) | (0.019) |
| Ideology | 0.057\*\*\* | 0.093\*\*\* | 0.046\* | 0.047\*\*\* | 0.072\*\*\* | 0.049\* |
|  | (0.017) | (0.027) | (0.024) | (0.016) | (0.025) | (0.025) |
| N | 99,341 | 44,164 | 35,560 | 99,201 | 44,242 | 35,451 |
| R2 | 0.071 | 0.084 | 0.052 | 0.061 | 0.080 | 0.041 |
|  | | | | | | |
| \*p < .1; \*\*p < .05; \*\*\*p < .01 | | | | | | |
| All models control for country-year fixed-effects | | | | | | |
| Standard errors are clustered at country-year | | | | | | |
| Columns 1 and 4 use all observations | | | | | | |
| Columns 2 and 5 are based on cases with no presidential removal | | | | | | |
| Columns 3 and 6 are cases that have experienced at least 1 presidential removal | | | | | | |

Table A.7. Matching Model Results

|  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Match Model | Coup | Estimate | SE | N |
| Country | Crime | 0.0442 | 0.0084 | 6442 |
| Country | Corruption | 0.0353 | 0.0085 | 6429 |
| Country-Year | Crime | 0.0533 | 0.0132 | 2606 |
| Country-Year | Corruption | 0.0434 | 0.0132 | 2602 |
| All models use exact matching on the following variables: gender and urban | | | | |
| Income was matched on deciles | |  |  |  |
| Ideology was matched on quintiles instead of deciles | | | |  |
| Age was matched on 5-year intervals | | |  |  |
| Education was matched on 3-year intervals | | |  |  |
| First column indicates whether observations were matched by country or country-year | | | | |

Table A.8. Balance Test (After Matching) for Country Model (Rows 1-2 in Table A7)

|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | | | | | | | | | |
| DV | Variable | mean.Tr | mean.Co | T.pval | KS.pval | mean.Tr.1 | mean.Co.1 | T.pval.1 | KS.pval.1 |
|  | | | | | | | | | |
| Crime | Age | 4.9382 | 5.3857 | 0 | 0 | 4.3210 | 4.3210 | 1 | 1 |
| Crime | Female | 0.4753 | 0.4825 | 0.1595 |  | 0.4686 | 0.4686 | 1 |  |
| Crime | Urban | 0.6987 | 0.7062 | 0.1064 |  | 0.7336 | 0.7336 | 1 |  |
| Crime | Education | 3.5359 | 3.4565 | 0.000000 | 0 | 3.5846 | 3.5846 | 1 | 1 |
| Crime | Income | 5.8369 | 5.3655 | 0 | 0 | 5.7471 | 5.7471 | 1 | 1 |
| Crime | Ideology | 3.1339 | 3.0718 | 0.000002 | 0 | 3.1627 | 3.1627 | 1 | 1 |
| Corruption | Age | 4.9422 | 5.3857 | 0 | 0 | 4.3175 | 4.3175 | 1 | 1 |
| Corruption | Female | 0.4754 | 0.4822 | 0.1832 |  | 0.4715 | 0.4715 | 1 |  |
| Corruption | Urban | 0.7011 | 0.7068 | 0.2186 |  | 0.7384 | 0.7384 | 1 |  |
| Corruption | Education | 3.5322 | 3.4589 | 0.000000 | 0 | 3.5951 | 3.5951 | 1 | 1 |
| Corruption | Income | 5.8382 | 5.3699 | 0 | 0 | 5.7797 | 5.7797 | 1 | 1 |
| Corruption | Ideology | 3.1340 | 3.0669 | 0.000000 | 0 | 3.1481 | 3.1481 | 1 | 1 |
|  | | | | | | | | | |

Table A.9. Balance Test (After Matching) for Country-Year Model (Rows 3-4 in Table A7)

|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| DV | Variable | mean.Tr | mean.Co | | T.pval | KS.pval | | mean.Tr.1 | | mean.Co.1 | T.pval.1 | | KS.pval.1 |
| Crime | Age | 4.9382 | 5.3857 | | 0 | 0 | | 4.1067 | | 4.1067 | 1 | | 1 |
| Crime | Female | 0.4753 | 0.4825 | | 0.1595 |  | | 0.4563 | | 0.4563 | 1 | |  |
| Crime | Urban | 0.6987 | 0.7062 | | 0.1064 |  | | 0.7602 | | 0.7602 | 1 | |  |
| Crime | Education | 3.5359 | 3.4565 | | 0.000000 | 0 | | 3.6773 | | 3.6773 | 1 | | 1 |
| Crime | Income | 5.8369 | 5.3655 | | 0 | 0 | | 5.8066 | | 5.8066 | 1 | | 1 |
| Crime | Ideology | 3.1339 | 3.0718 | | 0.000002 | 0 | | 3.1769 | | 3.1769 | 1 | | 1 |
| Corruption | Age | 4.9422 | 5.3857 | | 0 | 0 | | 4.1518 | | 4.1518 | 1 | | 1 |
| Corruption | Female | 0.4754 | 0.4822 | | 0.1832 |  | | 0.4570 | | 0.4570 | 1 | |  |
| Corruption | Urban | 0.7011 | 0.7068 | | 0.2186 |  | | 0.7648 | | 0.7648 | 1 | |  |
| Corruption | Education | 3.5322 | 3.4589 | | 0.000000 | 0 | | 3.6729 | | 3.6729 | 1 | | 1 |
| Corruption | Income | 5.8382 | 5.3699 | | 0 | 0 | | 5.8009 | | 5.8009 | 1 | | 1 |
| Corruption | Ideology | 3.1340 | 3.0669 | | 0.000000 | 0 | | 3.1703 | | 3.1703 | 1 | | 1 |
|  | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
|  | | | |  | | |  | |  | | |  | | |

Table A.10. Matching Model Results with Attitudinal Variables

|  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Match Model | Coup | Estimate | SE | N |
| Country | Crime | 0.029 | 0.0181 | 1344 |
| Country | Corruption | 0.0337 | 0.0182 | 1363 |
| Country-Year | Crime | 0.0889 | 0.0324 | 405 |
| Country-Year | Corruption | 0.0758 | 0.0319 | 396 |
| All models use exact matching on the following variables: gender and urban | | | | |
| Income was matched on deciles | |  |  |  |
| Ideology was matched on quintiles instead of deciles | | | |  |
| Age was matched on 5-year intervals | | |  |  |
| Education was matched on 3-year intervals | | |  |  |
| First column indicates whether observations were matched by country or country-year | | | | |

These models also matched on the following attitudinal variables: Presidential approval, democracy support, trust in institutions (index), and trust in military. To avoid small N after exact matching, I recoded these variables to binaries.

Presidential approval was recoded to a binary where 1=good or very good; 0 all else.

Democracy support is originally on a 1-7 scale. Responses 5-7 were recoded to 1; all else recoded to 0.

Trust in military is originally on a 1-7 scale. Responses 5-7 were recoded to 1; all else recoded to 0.

Trust in institutions is based on a mean index from 0 to 6. Values at 3 or greater are coded as 1. Values less than 3 are coded as 0.

Table A.11. Balance Test (After Matching) for Country Model (Rows 1-2 in Table A10)

|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| DV | variable | mean.Tr | mean.Co | T.pval | KS.pval | mean.Tr.1 | mean.Co.1 | T.pval.1 | KS.pval.1 |
|  | | | | | | | | | |
| Crime | Age | 4.8825 | 5.3266 | 0 | 0 | 4.0335 | 4.0335 | 1 | 1 |
| Crime | Female | 0.4700 | 0.4764 | 0.2279 |  | 0.4353 | 0.4353 | 1 |  |
| Crime | Urban | 0.6993 | 0.7145 | 0.0018 |  | 0.7500 | 0.7500 | 1 |  |
| Crime | Education | 3.5445 | 3.4777 | 0.00001 | 0 | 3.6868 | 3.6868 | 1 | 1 |
| Crime | Income | 5.8828 | 5.4267 | 0 | 0 | 5.8244 | 5.8244 | 1 | 1 |
| Crime | Ideology | 3.1360 | 3.0655 | 0.000000 | 0 | 3.2165 | 3.2165 | 1 | 1 |
| Crime | Presidential Approval | 0.4233 | 0.4215 | 0.7402 |  | 0.4137 | 0.4137 | 1 |  |
| Crime | Democracy Support | 0.6436 | 0.6618 | 0.0003 |  | 0.7061 | 0.7061 | 1 |  |
| Crime | Trust in Military | 0.5848 | 0.5701 | 0.0052 |  | 0.6213 | 0.6213 | 1 |  |
| Crime | Trust in Institutions | 0.5300 | 0.5188 | 0.0351 |  | 0.5491 | 0.5491 | 1 |  |
| Corruption | Age | 4.8877 | 5.3295 | 0 | 0 | 3.9861 | 3.9861 | 1 | 1 |
| Corruption | Female | 0.4701 | 0.4767 | 0.2187 |  | 0.4453 | 0.4453 | 1 |  |
| Corruption | Urban | 0.7019 | 0.7153 | 0.0060 |  | 0.7542 | 0.7542 | 1 |  |
| Corruption | Education | 3.5417 | 3.4793 | 0.00002 | 0 | 3.7212 | 3.7212 | 1 | 1 |
| Corruption | Income | 5.8828 | 5.4299 | 0 | 0 | 5.8474 | 5.8474 | 1 | 1 |
| Corruption | Ideology | 3.1378 | 3.0604 | 0.000000 | 0 | 3.1930 | 3.1930 | 1 | 1 |
| Corruption | Presidential Approval | 0.4202 | 0.4198 | 0.9326 |  | 0.3977 | 0.3977 | 1 |  |
| Corruption | Democracy Support | 0.6445 | 0.6605 | 0.0018 |  | 0.7065 | 0.7065 | 1 |  |
| Corruption | Trust in Military | 0.5878 | 0.5682 | 0.0002 |  | 0.6141 | 0.6141 | 1 |  |
| Corruption | Trust in Institutions | 0.5305 | 0.5181 | 0.0205 |  | 0.5466 | 0.5466 | 1 |  |
|  | | | | | | | | | |

Table A.12. Balance Test (After Matching) for Country-Year Model (Rows 3-4 in Table A10)

|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| DV | variable | mean.Tr | mean.Co | T.pval | KS.pval | mean.Tr.1 | mean.Co.1 | T.pval.1 | KS.pval.1 |
|  | | | | | | | | | |
| Crime | Age | 4.8825 | 5.3266 | 0 | 0 | 3.9975 | 3.9975 | 1 | 1 |
| Crime | Female | 0.4700 | 0.4764 | 0.2279 |  | 0.4346 | 0.4346 | 1 |  |
| Crime | Urban | 0.6993 | 0.7145 | 0.0018 |  | 0.7728 | 0.7728 | 1 |  |
| Crime | Education | 3.5445 | 3.4777 | 0.00001 | 0 | 3.7481 | 3.7481 | 1 | 1 |
| Crime | Income | 5.8828 | 5.4267 | 0 | 0 | 6.0222 | 6.0222 | 1 | 1 |
| Crime | Ideology | 3.1360 | 3.0655 | 0.000000 | 0 | 3.2222 | 3.2222 | 1 | 1 |
| Crime | Presidential Approval | 0.4233 | 0.4215 | 0.7402 |  | 0.4222 | 0.4222 | 1 |  |
| Crime | Democracy Support | 0.6436 | 0.6618 | 0.0003 |  | 0.7037 | 0.7037 | 1 |  |
| Crime | Trust in Military | 0.5848 | 0.5701 | 0.0052 |  | 0.6148 | 0.6148 | 1 |  |
| Crime | Trust in Institutions | 0.5300 | 0.5188 | 0.0351 |  | 0.5235 | 0.5235 | 1 |  |
| Corruption | Age | 4.8877 | 5.3295 | 0 | 0 | 4.0934 | 4.0934 | 1 | 1 |
| Corruption | Female | 0.4701 | 0.4767 | 0.2187 |  | 0.4444 | 0.4444 | 1 |  |
| Corruption | Urban | 0.7019 | 0.7153 | 0.0060 |  | 0.7753 | 0.7753 | 1 |  |
| Corruption | Education | 3.5417 | 3.4793 | 0.00002 | 0 | 3.6970 | 3.6970 | 1 | 1 |
| Corruption | Income | 5.8828 | 5.4299 | 0 | 0 | 5.9520 | 5.9520 | 1 | 1 |
| Corruption | Ideology | 3.1378 | 3.0604 | 0.000000 | 0 | 3.2348 | 3.2348 | 1 | 1 |
| Corruption | Presidential Approval | 0.4202 | 0.4198 | 0.9326 |  | 0.4192 | 0.4192 | 1 |  |
| Corruption | Democracy Support | 0.6445 | 0.6605 | 0.0018 |  | 0.7096 | 0.7096 | 1 |  |
| Corruption | Trust in Military | 0.5878 | 0.5682 | 0.0002 |  | 0.6086 | 0.6086 | 1 |  |
| Corruption | Trust in Institutions | 0.5305 | 0.5181 | 0.0205 |  | 0.5379 | 0.5379 | 1 |  |
|  | | | | | | | | | |

Table A. 13 Interaction between Remittances and Concurrent Economic Evaluations

|  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | | | | |
|  | | | | |
|  | High Crime | | High Corruption | |
|  | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) |
|  | | | | |
| Intercept | 0.453\*\*\* | 0.483\*\*\* | 0.415\*\*\* | 0.441\*\*\* |
|  | (0.020) | (0.019) | (0.019) | (0.020) |
| Remittances | 0.009 | 0.027\*\* | 0.004 | 0.029\*\* |
|  | (0.018) | (0.012) | (0.020) | (0.013) |
| Pocketbook Evaluation | -0.067\*\*\* |  | -0.078\*\*\* |  |
|  | (0.014) |  | (0.015) |  |
| Sociotropic Evaluation |  | -0.155\*\*\* |  | -0.150\*\*\* |
|  |  | (0.017) |  | (0.017) |
| Remittances x Pocketbook | 0.073\*\* |  | 0.078\*\* |  |
|  | (0.030) |  | (0.032) |  |
| Remittances x Sociotropic |  | 0.045\* |  | 0.031 |
|  |  | (0.027) |  | (0.027) |
| Age | -0.003\*\*\* | -0.003\*\*\* | -0.004\*\*\* | -0.004\*\*\* |
|  | (0.0002) | (0.0002) | (0.0003) | (0.0003) |
| Female | 0.018\*\*\* | 0.013\*\*\* | 0.010\*\* | 0.005 |
|  | (0.004) | (0.004) | (0.005) | (0.005) |
| Urban | 0.040\*\*\* | 0.038\*\*\* | 0.037\*\*\* | 0.036\*\*\* |
|  | (0.007) | (0.007) | (0.007) | (0.007) |
| Education | -0.008\*\*\* | -0.008\*\*\* | -0.007\*\*\* | -0.007\*\*\* |
|  | (0.001) | (0.001) | (0.001) | (0.001) |
| Income | -0.121\*\*\* | -0.121\*\*\* | -0.128\*\*\* | -0.130\*\*\* |
|  | (0.018) | (0.017) | (0.018) | (0.017) |
| Ideology | 0.071\*\*\* | 0.070\*\*\* | 0.056\*\*\* | 0.055\*\*\* |
|  | (0.022) | (0.020) | (0.020) | (0.019) |
| N | 74,626 | 75,630 | 74,375 | 75,394 |
| R2 | 0.070 | 0.073 | 0.065 | 0.069 |
|  | | | | |
| Note. \*p < .1; \*\*p < .05; \*\*\*p < .01 | | | | |
| All models control for country-year fixed-effects. | | | | |
| Standard errors are clustered at the country-year level. | | | | |

Table A.14. Interaction between Remittances and Retrospective Economic Evaluations

|  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | | | | |
|  | High Crime | | High Corruption | |
|  | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) |
|  | | | | |
| Intercept | 0.450\*\*\* | 0.462\*\*\* | 0.390\*\*\* | 0.404\*\*\* |
|  | (0.017) | (0.017) | (0.017) | (0.017) |
| Remittances | 0.038\*\*\* | 0.042\*\*\* | 0.037\*\*\* | 0.049\*\*\* |
|  | (0.010) | (0.009) | (0.011) | (0.009) |
| Pocketbook Evaluation | -0.022\*\*\* |  | -0.020\*\*\* |  |
|  | (0.008) |  | (0.008) |  |
| Sociotriopic Evaluation |  | -0.060\*\*\* |  | -0.057\*\*\* |
|  |  | (0.009) |  | (0.008) |
| Remittances x Pocketbook | 0.002 |  | 0.004 |  |
|  | (0.016) |  | (0.016) |  |
| Remittances x Sociotropic |  | -0.006 |  | -0.027 |
|  |  | (0.017) |  | (0.017) |
| Age | -0.004\*\*\* | -0.004\*\*\* | -0.004\*\*\* | -0.004\*\*\* |
|  | (0.0002) | (0.0002) | (0.0002) | (0.0002) |
| Female | 0.024\*\*\* | 0.022\*\*\* | 0.014\*\*\* | 0.012\*\*\* |
|  | (0.004) | (0.004) | (0.004) | (0.004) |
| Urban | 0.033\*\*\* | 0.033\*\*\* | 0.031\*\*\* | 0.030\*\*\* |
|  | (0.006) | (0.006) | (0.006) | (0.006) |
| Education | -0.009\*\*\* | -0.009\*\*\* | -0.007\*\*\* | -0.007\*\*\* |
|  | (0.001) | (0.001) | (0.001) | (0.001) |
| Income | -0.097\*\*\* | -0.097\*\*\* | -0.095\*\*\* | -0.095\*\*\* |
|  | (0.012) | (0.012) | (0.013) | (0.013) |
| Ideology | 0.058\*\*\* | 0.057\*\*\* | 0.051\*\*\* | 0.049\*\*\* |
|  | (0.016) | (0.016) | (0.016) | (0.015) |
| N | 100,410 | 99,899 | 100,415 | 99,924 |
| R2 | 0.073 | 0.074 | 0.061 | 0.062 |
|  | | | | |
| \*p < .1; \*\*p < .05; \*\*\*p < .01 | | | | |
| All models control for country-year fixed-effects | | | | |
| Standard errors are clustered at country-year | | | | |

Table A.15. Remittance and Economic Evaluations

|  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | | | | |
|  | Concurrent | | Retrospective | |
|  | Pocketbook | Sociotropic | Pocketbook | Sociotropic |
|  | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) |
|  | | | | |
| Intercept | 0.442\*\*\* | 0.459\*\*\* | 0.501\*\*\* | 0.457\*\*\* |
|  | (0.008) | (0.011) | (0.011) | (0.015) |
| Remittances | 0.015\*\*\* | 0.001 | 0.023\*\*\* | 0.005 |
|  | (0.003) | (0.004) | (0.004) | (0.004) |
| Age | -0.001\*\*\* | -0.0005\*\*\* | -0.003\*\*\* | -0.001\*\*\* |
|  | (0.0001) | (0.0001) | (0.0001) | (0.0001) |
| Female | -0.004\*\* | -0.029\*\*\* | -0.017\*\*\* | -0.042\*\*\* |
|  | (0.002) | (0.003) | (0.003) | (0.003) |
| Urban | -0.003 | -0.014\*\*\* | -0.013\*\*\* | -0.015\*\*\* |
|  | (0.002) | (0.003) | (0.003) | (0.003) |
| Education | 0.003\*\*\* | 0.001\*\* | 0.001\*\*\* | 0.001\*\*\* |
|  | (0.0003) | (0.0003) | (0.0004) | (0.0004) |
| Income | 0.184\*\*\* | 0.081\*\*\* | 0.147\*\*\* | 0.054\*\*\* |
|  | (0.008) | (0.009) | (0.009) | (0.008) |
| Ideology | 0.021\*\*\* | 0.004 | 0.010 | -0.009 |
|  | (0.008) | (0.014) | (0.012) | (0.016) |
| N | 98,438 | 101,386 | 147,176 | 146,309 |
| R2 | 0.146 | 0.147 | 0.105 | 0.146 |
|  | | | | |
| \*p < .1; \*\*p < .05; \*\*\*p < .01 | | | | |
| All models control for country-year fixed-effects | | | | |
| Standard errors are clustered at country-year | | | | |
|  | | | | |

Table A.16. Interaction between Remittances and Self-Reported Income

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
|  | | |
|  | High Crime | High Corruption |
|  | (1) | (2) |
|  | | |
| Intercept | 0.441\*\*\* | 0.385\*\*\* |
|  | (0.016) | (0.016) |
| Remittances | 0.014 | 0.012 |
|  | (0.014) | (0.015) |
| Income | -0.108\*\*\* | -0.104\*\*\* |
|  | (0.012) | (0.013) |
| Remittances x Income | 0.054\*\* | 0.058\*\* |
|  | (0.023) | (0.025) |
| Age | -0.004\*\*\* | -0.004\*\*\* |
|  | (0.0002) | (0.0002) |
| Female | 0.023\*\*\* | 0.013\*\*\* |
|  | (0.004) | (0.004) |
| Urban | 0.035\*\*\* | 0.033\*\*\* |
|  | (0.006) | (0.006) |
| Education | -0.009\*\*\* | -0.007\*\*\* |
|  | (0.001) | (0.001) |
| Ideology | 0.054\*\*\* | 0.045\*\*\* |
|  | (0.016) | (0.015) |
| N | 106,596 | 106,618 |
| R2 | 0.071 | 0.061 |
|  | | |
| \*p < .1; \*\*p < .05; \*\*\*p < .01 | | |
| All models control for country-year fixed-effects | | |
| Standard errors are clustered at country-year | | |

Table A.17. Remittances and the Testing Disengagement Hypothesis

|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | | | | | | | | |
|  | Crime | | | Corruption | | | Political Interest | Discuss Politics |
|  | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) | (7) | (8) |
|  | | | | | | | | |
| Intercept | 0.420\*\*\* | 0.452\*\*\* | 0.654\*\*\* | 0.362\*\*\* | 0.391\*\*\* | 0.624\*\*\* | 0.299\*\*\* | 0.242\*\*\* |
|  | (0.016) | (0.017) | (0.037) | (0.016) | (0.017) | (0.037) | (0.010) | (0.012) |
| Remittances | 0.037\*\*\* | 0.031\*\*\* | 0.047\*\* | 0.031\*\*\* | 0.034\*\*\* | 0.033\* | 0.027\*\*\* | 0.029\*\*\* |
|  | (0.008) | (0.011) | (0.019) | (0.009) | (0.010) | (0.018) | (0.004) | (0.006) |
| Intentions to Migrate | 0.075\*\*\* |  |  | 0.082\*\*\* |  |  |  |  |
|  | (0.005) |  |  | (0.005) |  |  |  |  |
| Political Interest |  | -0.040\*\*\* |  |  | -0.031\*\*\* |  |  |  |
|  |  | (0.010) |  |  | (0.011) |  |  |  |
| Discuss Politics |  |  | -0.056\*\* |  |  | -0.063\*\*\* |  |  |
|  |  |  | (0.022) |  |  | (0.021) |  |  |
| Remittances x Emigrate | -0.020\* |  |  | -0.010 |  |  |  |  |
|  | (0.012) |  |  | (0.014) |  |  |  |  |
| Remittances x Interest |  | 0.023 |  |  | 0.017 |  |  |  |
|  |  | (0.020) |  |  | (0.017) |  |  |  |
| Remittances x Discuss |  |  | 0.001 |  |  | 0.037 |  |  |
|  |  |  | (0.027) |  |  | (0.033) |  |  |
| Age | -0.003\*\*\* | -0.004\*\*\* | -0.003\*\*\* | -0.003\*\*\* | -0.004\*\*\* | -0.004\*\*\* | 0.001\*\*\* | 0.002\*\*\* |
|  | (0.0002) | (0.0002) | (0.0004) | (0.0002) | (0.0002) | (0.001) | (0.0001) | (0.0002) |
| Female | 0.029\*\*\* | 0.022\*\*\* | 0.011 | 0.017\*\*\* | 0.012\*\*\* | 0.011 | -0.050\*\*\* | -0.078\*\*\* |
|  | (0.004) | (0.004) | (0.009) | (0.004) | (0.004) | (0.009) | (0.003) | (0.005) |
| Urban | 0.031\*\*\* | 0.033\*\*\* | 0.034\*\*\* | 0.029\*\*\* | 0.031\*\*\* | 0.023\*\* | -0.020\*\*\* | -0.004 |
|  | (0.006) | (0.006) | (0.010) | (0.006) | (0.006) | (0.012) | (0.003) | (0.006) |
| Education | -0.009\*\*\* | -0.009\*\*\* | -0.006\*\*\* | -0.008\*\*\* | -0.007\*\*\* | -0.004\*\*\* | 0.011\*\*\* | 0.013\*\*\* |
|  | (0.001) | (0.001) | (0.001) | (0.001) | (0.001) | (0.001) | (0.001) | (0.001) |
| Income | -0.098\*\*\* | -0.097\*\*\* | -0.120\*\*\* | -0.094\*\*\* | -0.096\*\*\* | -0.154\*\*\* | 0.069\*\*\* | 0.155\*\*\* |
|  | (0.012) | (0.012) | (0.027) | (0.012) | (0.012) | (0.029) | (0.009) | (0.014) |
| Ideology | 0.052\*\*\* | 0.059\*\*\* | 0.059\* | 0.043\*\*\* | 0.052\*\*\* | 0.039 | 0.018 | -0.041\*\*\* |
|  | (0.016) | (0.016) | (0.036) | (0.016) | (0.016) | (0.032) | (0.012) | (0.016) |
| N | 101,397 | 100,649 | 27,457 | 101,454 | 100,679 | 27,281 | 128,180 | 37,770 |
| R2 | 0.075 | 0.073 | 0.059 | 0.066 | 0.061 | 0.057 | 0.065 | 0.153 |
|  | | | | | | | | |
| \*p < .1; \*\*p < .05; \*\*\*p < .01 | | | | | | | | |
| All models control for country-year fixed-effects | | | | | | | | |
| Standard errors are clustered at country-year | | | | | | | | |

Table A.18. Remittances and Diffusion

|  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | | | | |
|  | Crime | | Corruption | |
|  | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) |
|  | | | | |
| Intercept | 0.412\*\*\* | 0.424\*\*\* | 0.368\*\*\* | 0.380\*\*\* |
|  | (0.024) | (0.023) | (0.024) | (0.023) |
| Remittances | 0.054\*\*\* | 0.059\*\*\* | 0.046\*\*\* | 0.040\*\*\* |
|  | (0.019) | (0.011) | (0.017) | (0.012) |
| Communication Abroad | 0.032 |  | 0.039\* |  |
|  | (0.020) |  | (0.020) |  |
| Family in the U.S. |  | 0.006 |  | 0.005 |
|  |  | (0.010) |  | (0.010) |
| Remittances x Communication Abroad | -0.035 |  | -0.035 |  |
|  | (0.033) |  | (0.026) |  |
| Remittances x Family in U.S. |  | -0.019 |  | -0.005 |
|  |  | (0.017) |  | (0.018) |
| Age | -0.003\*\*\* | -0.003\*\*\* | -0.004\*\*\* | -0.004\*\*\* |
|  | (0.0003) | (0.0003) | (0.0003) | (0.0003) |
| Female | 0.021\*\*\* | 0.020\*\*\* | 0.010 | 0.008 |
|  | (0.006) | (0.006) | (0.006) | (0.006) |
| Urban | 0.035\*\*\* | 0.035\*\*\* | 0.030\*\*\* | 0.030\*\*\* |
|  | (0.009) | (0.009) | (0.010) | (0.009) |
| Education | -0.007\*\*\* | -0.007\*\*\* | -0.005\*\*\* | -0.006\*\*\* |
|  | (0.001) | (0.001) | (0.001) | (0.001) |
| Income | -0.164\*\*\* | -0.153\*\*\* | -0.169\*\*\* | -0.153\*\*\* |
|  | (0.023) | (0.022) | (0.023) | (0.023) |
| Ideology | 0.088\*\*\* | 0.078\*\*\* | 0.070\*\*\* | 0.060\*\* |
|  | (0.027) | (0.025) | (0.024) | (0.024) |
| N | 46,740 | 51,930 | 46,631 | 51,830 |
| R2 | 0.070 | 0.068 | 0.061 | 0.061 |
|  | | | | |
| \*p < .1; \*\*p < .05; \*\*\*p < .01 | | | | |
| All models control for country-year fixed-effects | | | | |
| Standard errors are clustered at country-year | | | | |

Table A.19 Survival Analysis, Cox-Proportional Hazard Regression Results

|  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | | | | |
|  |
|  | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) |
|  | | | | |
| Remittances (% GDP) | 0.276 | 0.249 | -0.005 | 0.226 |
|  | (0.311) | (0.286) | (0.370) | (0.299) |
| Scandals | 0.212\*\*\* |  | 0.081\*\* |  |
|  | (0.047) |  | (0.090) |  |
| Economic Growth |  | -0.214\*\*\* |  | -0.229\*\*\* |
|  |  | (0.055) |  | (0.072) |
| Party Institutionalization | 0.402\*\*\* | 0.364\*\*\* | 0.434\*\*\* | 0.375\*\*\* |
|  | (0.188) | (0.189) | (0.195) | (0.194) |
| Party Institutionalization2 | -0.006\*\*\* | -0.005\*\*\* | -0.006\*\*\* | -0.006\*\*\* |
|  | (0.003) | (0.003) | (0.003) | (0.003) |
| Legislative Support | -0.052\*\*\* | -0.052\*\*\* | -0.049\*\*\* | -0.053\*\*\* |
|  | (0.017) | (0.016) | (0.017) | (0.017) |
| Anti-Government Demonstrations | 0.355\*\*\* | 0.290\*\*\* | 0.334\*\*\* | 0.291\*\*\* |
|  | (0.097) | (0.093) | (0.099) | (0.094) |
| Remittances (% GDP) x Scandals |  |  | 0.268\*\*\* |  |
|  |  |  | (0.151) |  |
| Remittances (% GDP) x Economic Growth |  |  |  | 0.022 |
|  |  |  |  | (0.063) |
| Observations | 541 | 541 | 541 | 541 |
| Subjects | 147 | 147 | 147 | 147 |
| Failures | 20 | 20 | 20 | 20 |
| Log Likelihood | -90.796 | -89.001 | -89.394 | -88.942 |
| Wald Test | 99.010\*\*\* | 80.800\*\*\* | 149.850\*\*\* | 74.900\*\*\* |
| Score (Logrank) Test | 65.357\*\*\* | 48.055\*\*\* | 78.312\*\*\* | 48.187\*\*\* |
|  | | | | |
| \*p < .1; \*\*p < .05; \*\*\*p < .01 | | | | |
| Clustered standard errors by country in parentheses | | | | |
| Coefficients are in log hazard ratios | | | | |

Table A.20. Regime Preferences

|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | | | | | |
|  | Authoritarianism | Non-Elected Leader | Iron Fist | Democracy Support | Home Democracy |
|  | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) |
|  | | | | | |
| Intercept | 0.195\*\*\* | 0.212\*\*\* | 0.305\*\*\* | 0.689\*\*\* | 0.569\*\*\* |
|  | (0.016) | (0.014) | (0.026) | (0.013) | (0.020) |
| Remittances | 0.012\*\* | 0.020\*\*\* | 0.011\* | -0.005 | 0.004 |
|  | (0.005) | (0.006) | (0.006) | (0.004) | (0.005) |
| Age | -0.002\*\*\* | -0.001\*\*\* | 0.0001 | 0.002\*\*\* | 0.00003 |
|  | (0.0002) | (0.0002) | (0.0003) | (0.0002) | (0.0002) |
| Female | 0.001 | 0.004 | -0.004 | -0.010\*\*\* | -0.011\*\*\* |
|  | (0.003) | (0.004) | (0.006) | (0.002) | (0.002) |
| Urban | 0.018\*\*\* | 0.020\*\*\* | 0.034\*\*\* | -0.016\*\*\* | -0.024\*\*\* |
|  | (0.003) | (0.007) | (0.008) | (0.003) | (0.004) |
| Education | -0.003\*\*\* | -0.005\*\*\* | -0.011\*\*\* | 0.005\*\*\* | -0.003\*\*\* |
|  | (0.001) | (0.001) | (0.001) | (0.001) | (0.001) |
| Income | -0.028\*\*\* | -0.059\*\*\* | -0.064\*\*\* | 0.081\*\*\* | -0.002 |
|  | (0.009) | (0.012) | (0.015) | (0.007) | (0.011) |
| Ideology | 0.001 | -0.021 | 0.037 | 0.061\*\*\* | 0.024 |
|  | (0.012) | (0.016) | (0.026) | (0.019) | (0.027) |
| N | 100,424 | 88,237 | 92,540 | 130,840 | 122,897 |
| R2 | 0.032 | 0.045 | 0.059 | 0.090 | 0.079 |
|  | | | | | |
| \*p < .1; \*\*p < .05; \*\*\*p < .01 | | | | | |
| All models control for country-year fixed-effects | | | | | |
| Standard errors are clustered at country-year | | | | | |

Table A.21. Summary Statistics (All Observations)

|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | | | | | |
|  | N | Mean | SD | Min | Max |
|  | | | | | |
| Coup-Crime | 82,986 | 0.867 | 0.339 | 0 | 1 |
| Coup-Corruption | 81,560 | 0.868 | 0.339 | 0 | 1 |
| Remittances | 79,366 | 0.108 | 0.310 | 0 | 1 |
| Age | 92,702 | 37.435 | 15.436 | 16 | 112 |
| Female | 92,838 | 0.515 | 0.500 | 0 | 1 |
| Urban | 92,847 | 0.694 | 0.461 | 0 | 1 |
| Education | 91,562 | 9.173 | 4.345 | 0 | 18 |
| Income | 80,883 | 0.436 | 0.252 | 0 | 1 |
| Economic Pocketbook Eval. (Concurrent) | 57,477 | 0.483 | 0.200 | 0 | 1 |
| Economic Sociotropic Eval. (Concurrent) | 61,451 | 0.388 | 0.225 | 0 | 1 |
| Economic Pocketbook Eval. (Retrospective) | 84,601 | 0.433 | 0.362 | 0 | 1 |
| Economic Sociotropic Eval. (Retrospective) | 85,681 | 0.340 | 0.361 | 0 | 1 |
| Ideology | 77,179 | 0.519 | 0.292 | 0 | 1 |
| Employment | 70,394 | 0.491 | 0.500 | 0 | 1 |
| Executive Approval | 91,357 | 0.527 | 0.252 | 0 | 1 |
| Support for Democracy | 88,798 | 0.648 | 0.289 | 0 | 1 |
| Trust in Military | 84,288 | 0.626 | 0.310 | 0 | 1 |
| Trust in Institutions Index | 92,732 | 0.467 | 0.218 | 0 | 1 |
| Intentions to Emigrate | 82,675 | 0.255 | 0.436 | 0 | 1 |
| Neighborhood Insecurity | 91,700 | 0.472 | 0.322 | 0 | 1 |
| Corruption Perception | 74,893 | 0.728 | 0.297 | 0 | 1 |
| Family in the U.S. | 37,524 | 0.218 | 0.413 | 0 | 1 |
| Communication Frequency Abroad | 33,463 | 0.111 | 0.241 | 0 | 1 |
| Political Interest | 82,649 | 0.348 | 0.319 | 0 | 1 |
| Discusses Politics | 23,436 | 0.316 | 0.281 | 0 | 1 |

Table A.22. Summary Statistics (Remittance Recipients)

|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | | | | | |
|  | N | Mean | SD | Min | Max |
|  | | | | | |
| Coup-Crime | 7,707 | 0.865 | 0.341 | 0 | 1 |
| Coup-Corruption | 7,648 | 0.874 | 0.331 | 0 | 1 |
| Age | 8,527 | 35.165 | 15.971 | 16 | 96 |
| Female | 8,536 | 0.497 | 0.500 | 0 | 1 |
| Urban | 8,537 | 0.687 | 0.464 | 0 | 1 |
| Education | 8,479 | 9.395 | 4.290 | 0 | 18 |
| Income | 7,687 | 0.493 | 0.247 | 0 | 1 |
| Economic Pocketbook Eval. (Concurrent) | 5,763 | 0.489 | 0.211 | 0 | 1 |
| Economic Sociotropic Eval. (Concurrent) | 5,986 | 0.360 | 0.232 | 0 | 1 |
| Economic Pocketbook Eval. (Retrospective) | 7,699 | 0.432 | 0.371 | 0 | 1 |
| Economic Sociotropic Eval. (Retrospective) | 7,677 | 0.312 | 0.361 | 0 | 1 |
| Ideology | 7,337 | 0.533 | 0.305 | 0 | 1 |
| Employment | 6,604 | 0.431 | 0.495 | 0 | 1 |
| Executive Approval | 8,461 | 0.533 | 0.261 | 0 | 1 |
| Support for Democracy | 8,232 | 0.646 | 0.293 | 0 | 1 |
| Trust in Military | 8,139 | 0.626 | 0.314 | 0 | 1 |
| Trust in Institutions Index | 8,528 | 0.474 | 0.222 | 0 | 1 |
| Intentions to Emigrate | 8,149 | 0.444 | 0.497 | 0 | 1 |
| Neighborhood Insecurity | 8,492 | 0.452 | 0.325 | 0 | 1 |
| Corruption Perception | 7,294 | 0.731 | 0.298 | 0 | 1 |
| Family in the U.S. | 4,727 | 0.645 | 0.479 | 0 | 1 |
| Communication Frequency Abroad | 3,562 | 0.495 | 0.331 | 0 | 1 |
| Political Interest | 7,730 | 0.385 | 0.329 | 0 | 1 |
| Discusses Politics | 2,606 | 0.345 | 0.293 | 0 | 1 |
|  | | | | | |

Table A.23. Summary Statistics (Non-Recipients)

|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | | | | | |
|  | N | Mean | SD | Min | Max |
|  | | | | | |
| Coup-Crime | 64,518 | 0.861 | 0.346 | 0 | 1 |
| Coup-Corruption | 63,924 | 0.862 | 0.345 | 0 | 1 |
| Age | 70,705 | 37.551 | 15.316 | 16 | 112 |
| Female | 70,822 | 0.515 | 0.500 | 0 | 1 |
| Urban | 70,829 | 0.688 | 0.463 | 0 | 1 |
| Education | 70,270 | 8.983 | 4.371 | 0 | 18 |
| Income | 61,985 | 0.435 | 0.252 | 0 | 1 |
| Economic Pocketbook Eval. (Concurrent) | 46,957 | 0.484 | 0.200 | 0 | 1 |
| Economic Sociotropic Eval. (Concurrent) | 49,084 | 0.394 | 0.226 | 0 | 1 |
| Economic Pocketbook Eval. (Retrospective) | 65,181 | 0.432 | 0.362 | 0 | 1 |
| Economic Sociotropic Eval. (Retrospective) | 64,765 | 0.344 | 0.363 | 0 | 1 |
| Ideology | 58,670 | 0.521 | 0.293 | 0 | 1 |
| Employment | 56,518 | 0.504 | 0.500 | 0 | 1 |
| Executive Approval | 69,691 | 0.533 | 0.252 | 0 | 1 |
| Support for Democracy | 67,566 | 0.654 | 0.292 | 0 | 1 |
| Trust in Military | 63,446 | 0.627 | 0.311 | 0 | 1 |
| Trust in Institutions Index | 70,734 | 0.474 | 0.219 | 0 | 1 |
| Intentions to Emigrate | 66,857 | 0.231 | 0.422 | 0 | 1 |
| Neighborhood Insecurity | 70,384 | 0.469 | 0.321 | 0 | 1 |
| Corruption Perception | 58,911 | 0.730 | 0.294 | 0 | 1 |
| Family in the U.S. | 32,654 | 0.156 | 0.363 | 0 | 1 |
| Communication Frequency Abroad | 29,791 | 0.065 | 0.179 | 0 | 1 |
| Political Interest | 65,339 | 0.345 | 0.318 | 0 | 1 |
| Discusses Politics | 18,589 | 0.310 | 0.278 | 0 | 1 |
|  | | | | | |

Table A.24 Variable Descriptions from LAPOP surveys

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Variable | Original Scale | Code | Question |
| Coup | 1=Justified  2=Not justified | JC10 (crime),  JC13(corruption) | Some people say that under some circumstances it would be justified for the military of this country to take power by a coup d’état (military coup). In your opinion, would a military coup be justified under the following circumstances? |
| Remittances | 1=Yes  2=No | Q10a | Do you or someone else living in your household receive remittances, that is, economic assistance from abroad? |
| Female | 1=Male  2=Female | Q1 | Sex |
| Age |  | Q2 | Age |
| Urban | 1=urban  2=rural | UR | Urban or Rural area? |
| Education |  | ED | How many years of schooling of you completed? |
|  |  |  |  |
| Income | 10-point scale from 2004 to 2012.  16-point scale from 2012 to 2018. Rescaled to 0-1. | Q10  Q10NEW\_12  Q10NEW\_14  Q10NEW\_16  Q10NEW\_18 | Into which of the following income ranges does the total MONTHLY income of this household fit, including remittances from abroad and the income from all the working adults and children? |
| Economic Pocketbook Evaluation (concurrent) | 1=Very good  2=Good  3=Neither good nor bad  4=Bad  5=Very bad | IDIO1 | How would you describe your overall economic situation? Would you say that it is very good, good, neither good nor bad, bad or very bad? |
| Economic Pocketbook Evaluation (retrospective) | 1=Better  2=Same  3=Worse | IDIO2 | Do you think that your economic situation is better than, the same as, or worse than it was 12 months ago? |
| Economic Sociotropic Evaluation (concurrent) | 1=Very good  2=Good  3=Neither good nor bad  4=Bad  5=Very bad | SOCT1 | How would you describe the country’s economic situation? Would you say that it is very good, good, neither good nor bad, bad or very bad? |
| Economic Sociotropic Evaluation (retrospective) | 1=Better  2=Same  3=Worse | SOCT2 | Do you think that the country’seconomic situation is better than, the same as, or worse than it was 12 months ago? |
| Ideology | 1=Left  10=Right | L1 | On this card there is a 1-10 scale that goes from liberal to conservative. According to the meaning that the terms ”liberals” and ”conservatives” have for you, and thinking of your own political leanings, where would you place yourself on this scale? |
| Employed |  | OCUP4A | How do you mainly spend your time? Are you currently... |
| Executive  Approval |  | M1 | Speaking in general of the current administration, how would you rate the job performance of President/ |
| Support for Democracy | 1=Strongly disagree to 7=strongly agree | ING4 | Changing the subject again, democracy may have problems, but it is better than any  other form of government. To what extent do you agree or disagree with this statement? |
| Trust in Military | 1=Not at all to  7=A lot | B12 | To what extent do you trust the Armed Forces? |
| Trust in Institutions |  | B2, B4, B13, B21, B32, B47 | Please see endnote iii. |
| Emigrate | 1=yes  2=no | Q14 | Do you have any intention of going to live or work in another country in the next three years? |
| Neighborhood Insecurity | 1=Very safe  2=Somewhat safe  3=Somewhat unsafe  4=Very unsafe | AOJ11 | Speaking of the neighborhood where you live and thinking of the possibility of being  assaulted or robbed, do you feel very safe, somewhat safe, somewhat unsafe or very **un**safe? |
| Corruption  Perception |  | EXC7 | Taking into account your own experience or what you have heard, corruption among public officials is... |
| Family in the U.S. | 1= Yes, in the United States only  2=Yes, in the United States and in other countries  3=Yes, in other countries  4=No | Q10C | Do you or someone else living in your household receive remittances, that is, economic assistance from abroad? |
| Communication Abroad | 1=Everyday  2=Once or twice a week  3=Once or twice a month  4=Rarely  5=Never | Q16 | How often do you communicate with  them? (Only if answered yes in Q10C) |
| Political Interest | 1=A lot  2= Some  3=Little  4=None | POL1 | How much interest do you have in politics. a lot, some, little or none? |
| Discusses Politics | 1=Daily  2=A few times a week  3=A few times a month  4=Rarely  5-Never | POL2 | How often do you discuss politics with other people? |
|  |  |  |  |

Figure A1. Support for Coups over Time in Latin America

