José Kaire. The Normative and Material Foundations of Judicial Confidence in Bolivia. *Latin American Politics and Society* vol. 61, no. 4 (Winter 2019)

**Online appendix**

This appendix replicates the analyses presented in *The Normative and Material Foundations of Judicial Confidence in Bolivia*. The original analyses operationalized ideological distance as “as the square root of the squared difference between the ideology of the judge of department *d* and the ideology of respondent *k* also of department *d*.” This assumes that people do not care about the overall ideology of the court, but about the ideology the judge elected by their district. However, research in other contexts suggests that people might care about the overall ideological position of the court instead. Here I utilize a different operationalization to reflect this concern. In particular, ideological distance is measured as the square root of the squared difference between the median judge and respondent *k.*  Whether people care about the ideology of the court or the ideology of their elected judge is an important theoretical debate, but it is beyond the scope of this research. Instead, I simply test my argument using both operationalizations. The substantive results remain the same regardless of how ideological distance is conceptualized.

Model 1a replicates the basic results presented in Table 2 of the main manuscript. Again, ideological and normative considerations seem to be at play. This is summarized in Figure 1a, which shows the same patterns presented in Figure 3 in the paper. Figure 3a shows that the conditional effect of marginalization is still identified using the alternative ideological distance measure. It plots the marginal effect of judge legalism and ideological distance at different levels of political and economic satisfaction, along with 95% confidence intervals. Judge legalism only has a positive effect on judicial confidence when economic and political satisfaction is high, and ideological distance significantly reduces confidence among marginalized groups.

Table 1a: Predictors of judicial confidence and political influence as a negative trait

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
|  | Model 1a | Model 2a |
|  | Confidence in TSJ | Political influence |
| Ideological distance | -0.03\* (0.01) | 1.12\* (0.04) |
| Judge legalism | 0.08\*\* (0.03) | 0.90a (0.05) |
| Desire independence (DI) | 0.04 (0.06) | 1.36 (0.23) |
| Observed independence (OI) | 0.01 (0.05) | 1.20 (0.19) |
| DI\*OI | 0.14\* (0.06) | 0.77 (0.16) |
| Political satisfaction | 0.14\*\*\* (0.02) | 0.95 (0.05) |
| Socio-economic status | -0.001 (0.02) | 0.98 (0.06) |
| Rural | 0.12\* (0.06) | 0.83 (0.15) |
| Trust in the Judiciary | 0.45\*\*\* (0.02) | 1.04 (0.06) |
| Interest in politics | 0.12\*\*\* (0.03) | 0.85 (0.07) |
| Political knowledge | -0.09\*\*\* (0.03) | 1.12 (0.10) |
| Years of education | 0.00 (0.01) | 1.02 (0.02) |
| *Reasons for underperformance*  (not enough judges=reference) |  |  |
| Not enough resources | -0.16 (0.15) |  |
| Judges are underprepared | -0.27\* (0.12) |  |
| Corruption | -0.25\* (0.11) |  |
| Too many criminals | -0.23 (0.17) |  |
| Lack of organization | -0.15 (0.13) |  |
| Too much political influence | -0.27\* (0.13) |  |
| N | 2216 | 2415 |
| R2/LR χ2(12) | 0.37 | 48.72\* |
| *\*p < .*05, \*\*p <.01, \*\*\*p<.001 | | |

Model 2a presents the results of a logistic regression predicting the probability of reporting that political influence is the main source of judicial underperformance. Note that the effect of ideological distance is 1.20, meaning that the odds of answering political influence get 20% bigger for a unit change in ideological distance. In terms of predicted probabilities, this implies that—given a mean level of trust in the TSJ—decreasing ideological distance from 10 to 5 would decrease the probability of answering political influence from 24% to 10%. The probability of attributing the underperformance of the judiciary to political interference drops to only 5% when ideological distance is at its minimum. Political influence is seen as a negative trait of the judiciary not because of a legalistic ideal, but because of strategic reasons.

Figure 2a:Predicted support for the TSJ given procedural and ideological dissatisfaction



Figure 3a:Marginal effect of explanatory variables at varying degrees of marginalization

