Jami Nelson-Nuñez and Kate Cartwright, Getting Along or Going Alone: Understanding Collaboration Between Local Governments and NGOs in Bolivia. *Latin American Politics and Society* vol. 60, no. 1 (Spring 2018)

**Appendix**

Graph 1. Moran’s I Test of Autocorrelation

**Table 1. Balance Tests**

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| **Characteristic** | **Full Population** | **Sample Mean** | **T-value (p-value)** |
| Population | 33,611 | 22,390 | -2.16 (0.03) |
| HDI | 0.549 | 0.557 | 1.01 (0.32) |
| Revenue per capita | 1089.04 | 1064.66 |  -0.28 (0.77) |
| Political competition | 0.147 | 0.144 | -0.19 (0.85) |
| Percent MAS 2004 turnout\* | 0.186 | 0.184 | -0.10 (0.90) |
| Number of NGOs registered | 6.223 | 4.691 | -3.60 (0.000) |
| Rural (logged) | 4.184 | 4.236 | 0.82 (0.41) |

\* As our measure of MAS is based on the mayor’s response in the survey, we draw on voter turnout for the MAS as a percentage of the population in the 2004 mayoral election to compare to the full population.

**Table 2. NGO-Government Collaboration**

|  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| **Factors** | **Model 1** | **Model 2** | **Model 3** | **Model 4** |
| Education | -0.11(0.07) | -0.10(0.07) | -0.08(0.07) | -0.08(0.07) |
| MAS mayor | -0.40(0.59) | -0.24(0.61) | -0.38(0.59) | -0.06(0.58) |
| Mayoral instability | -0.51\*\*(0.20) | -0.47\*\*(0.20) | -0.48\*\*(0.20) | -0.41\*\*(0.20) |
| Political competition | -2.35(1.71) | -2.29(1.70) | -2.92(1.78) | -2.33(1.70) |
| CBO engagement | -1.18\*\*(0.48) | -1.19\*\*(0.49) | -1.29\*\*\*(0.49) | -1.17\*\*(0.48) |
| NGOs | 0.04(0.06) | 0.07(0.06) | 0.07(0.06) | 0.09(0.06) |
| HDI | 4.17(4.17) | 6.10(4.54) | 7.36\*(4.25) | 5.43(4.07) |
| Rural (logged) | 0.33(0.48) | -0.05(0.43) | -0.01(0.42) | -0.05(0.43) |
| Revenue per capita | 0.00\*(0.00) | 0.00\*(0.00) | 0.00\*\*(0.00) | 0.000\*(0.000) |
| Population | 0.00(0.00) |  |  |  |
| Percent indigenous |  | 0.18(1.16) |  |  |
| Percent Quechua |  |  | 1.34(1.06) |  |
| Size of municipality |  |  |  | 0.00(0.00) |
| N | 89 | 89 | 89 | 89 |
| Pseudo R2 | 0.136 | 0.121 | 0.130 | 0.130 |

\* p<0.10, \*\*p<0.05, \*\*\*p<0.01