Ana Arjona, Institutions, Civilian Resistance, and Wartime Social Order: A Process-driven Natural Experiment in the Colombian Civil War

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**Online appendix**

Map 1. Random Sample of Localities (Arjona 2014, 2016)

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**Details on Figure 1**

The data presented in Figure 1 come from original data collected in a random sample of conflict zones in Colombia. For details on how the data were collected see Arjona (2016). The variable *institutional quality* is measured on the basis of several dichotomous variables that capture the extent to which the community relied on dispute institutions—as defined in the paper—that were legitimate and effective. The first four variables come from close-ended questions asked in a survey. The last two come from qualitative evidence collected with open questions.

1. Whether there were clear rules in place or, rather, people did as they pleased—a measure of the efficacy of dispute institutions to regulate interaction among locals.
2. Whether it was common for people to solve conflicts using force. This is another measure of efficacy because if people are relying on established means to resolve conflicts, they do not use force. This variable can plausibly capture legitimacy as well, when most community members believe that using violence is not a legitimate way to solve problems, but attitudes towards the use of violence can vary across communities.
3. Whether disputes with neighbors over land borders or debts were resolved quickly—a measure of efficacy.
4. Whether locals perceived the ways in which those disputes were resolved to be fair—a measure of legitimacy.
5. Whether most locals considered dispute institutions in general (to solve any type of conflict) to be legitimate.
6. Whether most locals used to follow dispute institutions in general (to solve any type of conflict).

Theoretically, communities that are willing and able to organize and resist a guerrilla or paramilitary group should have quite strong preferences for the status quo; furthermore, its members should have internalized the rules and view them as valid, in order to be able to launch and maintain such risky collective action. A community whose institutions give some signals of illegitimacy or inefficacy are unlikely to have the kind of preferences for the status quo that would trigger a desire to resist; likewise, they are unlikely to have a sufficiently strong capacity for collective action for it to be able to resist an armed actor. In order to capture whether a community has high institutional quality in this strong sense, I use a dichotomous variable that indicates whether *all* of the previous dichotomous variables are equal to 1. The variable institutional quality in Figure 1 is therefore calculated as the interaction of these six variables.

The variable *rebelocracy* aggregates several proxies of armed groups’ influence in the economic, social, and political realms of life in the locality. The variable is an index (a simple arithmetic sum) that varies from 0 (when all items take the value “no”) to 18 (when all items take the value “yes”). These are the proxies:

* Economic: armed groups’ intervention in the production, processing or transportation of coca, illegal mining, fishing, or in the assignment of state subsidies to individuals. Tax collection and other forms of material contributions are not included, as taxes can also be part of a social order of aliocracy.
* Political: whether an armed group ruled the locality; if people used to turn to the armed group to solve problems over land borders or robberies; and whether the armed group intervened in elections by forbidding voting or asking people to vote for a particular candidate.
* Public goods provision: whether the group provided or regulated the provision of education, health or the construction of infrastructure.
* Social: whether the group established rules to regulate domestic violence; personal appearance (like skirts for women and long hair and earrings for men); and sexual behavior (like forbidding homosexuality or regulating prostitution). Three additional variables measure the level of social influence of the armed group by identifying whether civilians and combatants used to have a beer together, play pool, or play soccer.

**Table 1. Cited interviews**

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| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| **No.** | **Year** | **Category** | **Village** | **No.** | **Year** | **Category** | **Village** |
| 3 | 2007 | Former politician, Liberal Party | Urban center | 27 | 2007 | Former FARC member | Operated throughout Viotá |
| 4 | 2007 | Communist leader | Zama | 29 | 2008 | Communist leader | Zama |
| 5 | 2007 | Communist leader | Zama | 32 | 2008 | Local resident | Tellus |
| 6 | 2007 | Communist leader | Zama | 33 | 2008 | Communist leader | Tellus |
| 15 | 2007 | Communist leader | Permia | 34 | 2008 | Communist leader | Tellus |
| 16 | 2007 | Communist leader | Tellus | 36 | 2008 | Liberal, resident | Urban center |
| 17 | 2007 | Merchant | Urban center | 37 | 2008 | Non-communist resident | Urban center |
| 18 | 2007 | Merchant | Urban center | 40 | 2015 | Adelia's aide | Urban center |
| 22 | 2007 | Politician, non-communist | Zama | F1 | 2008 | Focus Group | Zama |
| 23 | 2007 | Politician, non-communist | Urban center |  |  |  |  |