Nara Pavão, Conditional Cash Transfer Programs and Electoral Accountability: Evidence from Latin America

*Latin American Politics and Society* vol. 58, no. 2 (Summer 2016)

Appendix A. Distribution of the Dependent Variables

Figure 1A. Mean of Presidential Performance by country



Figure 2A. Percentage of Intention to Vote for the Incumbent by country.



Appendix B. CCT programs in the sample

Table 1B. CCT Programs in Latin America

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
|   |   | **CCT Beneficiaries** |
| **Country/CCT Program** | **Sample size** | **Frequency** | **Percentage** |
|   |   |   |   |
| Mexico (Programa Oportunidades) | 1,535 | 361 | 23.52 |
| Guatemala (Mi Bono Seguro) | 1,506 | 260 | 17.26 |
| El Salvador (Programa Comunidades Solidarias) | 1,512 | 120 | 7.94 |
| Honduras (Programa Bono 10,000) | 1,561 | 331 | 21.2 |
| Costa Rica (Avancemos) | 1,537 | 124 | 8.07 |
| Panama (Programa Red de Oportunidade) | 1,508 | 199 | 13.2 |
| Colombia (Programa Familias en Acción) | 1,498 | 454 | 30.31 |
| Ecuador (Bono de Desarrollo Humano) | 1,489 | 439 | 29.48 |
| Bolivia (Bono Juancito Pinto) | 3,066 | 1,731 | 56.46 |
| Peru (Juntos) | 1,500 | 75 | 5 |
| Paraguay (Programa Tekopora) | 1,503 | 116 | 7.72 |
| Chile (Programa Chile Solidario) | 1,571 | 87 | 5.54 |
| Uruguay (Plan de Equidad) | 1,512 | 161 | 10.65 |
| Brazil (Bolsa Família) | 1,500 | 381 | 25.4 |
| Argentina (Asignación Universal por Hijo) | 1,512 | 279 | 18.45 |
| Dominican Republic (Tarjeta de Solidaridad) | 1,520 | 579 | 38.09 |
| **Total** | **25,830** | **5,697** |  |

Appendix C. Balance Checks

|  |
| --- |
| Polled Sample |
|  | Before Balancing | After Balancing |
| **Covariates** | **Mean in treated (CCT)** | **Mean in Untreated (non-CCT)** | **Standardized diff.**  | **Mean in treated (CCT)** | **Mean in Untreated (non-CCT)** | **Standardized diff.**  |
| Education | 8.53 | 9.72 | -0.268\*\*\* | 9.35 | 9.34 | 0.001 |
| Male | 0.47 | 0.5 | -0.049\*\* | 0.52 | 0.52 | 0 |
| Age | 38.67 | 41.2 | -0.163\*\*\* | 38.25 | 38.23 | 0.001 |
| Income | 6.87 | 8.66 | -0.415\*\*\* | 7.34 | 7.35 | -0.001 |
| Children 13 | 1.54 | 1 | 0.405\*\*\* | 1.13 | 1.09 | 0.025 |
| Urban | 0.6 | 0.74 | -0.292\*\*\* | 0.72 | 0.72 | 0 |
| Insider  | 0.51 | 0.4 | 0.229\*\*\* | 0.43 | 0.43 | 0 |
| Mexico |
|   | Before Balancing | After Balancing |
| **Covariates** | **Mean in treated (CCT)** | **Mean in Untreated (non-CCT)** | **Standardized diff.**  | **Mean in treated (CCT)** | **Mean in Untreated (non-CCT)** | **Standardized diff.**  |
| Education | 7.98 | 9.67 | **-0.409\*\*\*** | 7.53 | 7.36 | 0.043 |
| Male | 0.44 | 0.53 | **-0.18\*\*** | 0.41 | 0.53 | -0.255 |
| Age | 40.47 | 40.12 | 0.022 | 40.22 | 41.8 | -0.103 |
| Income | 7 | 9.09 | **-0.535\*\*\*** | 7.59 | 7.33 | 0.066 |
| Children 13 | 1.54 | 1.13 | **0.295\*\*\*** | 1.47 | 1.44 | 0.017 |
| Urban | 0.63 | 0.83 | **-0.48\*\*\*** | 0.78 | 0.73 | 0.111 |
| Insider  | 0.4 | 0.31 | **0.193\*\*\*** | 0.22 | 0.31 | -0.194 |
| Guatemala |
|   | Before Balancing | After Balancing |
| **Covariates** | **Mean in treated (CCT)** | **Mean in Untreated (non-CCT)** | **Standardized diff.**  | **Mean in treated (CCT)** | **Mean in Untreated (non-CCT)** | **Standardized diff.**  |
| Education | 7.98 | 9.67 | **-0.409\*\*\*** | 7.53 | 7.36 | 0.043 |
| Male | 0.44 | 0.53 | -0.18 | 0.41 | 0.53 | -0.255 |
| Age | 40.47 | 40.12 | 0.022 | 40.22 | 41.8 | -0.103 |
| Income | 7 | 9.09 | **-0.535\*\*\*** | 7.59 | 7.33 | 0.066 |
| Children 13 | 1.54 | 1.13 | **0.295\*\*\*** | 1.47 | 1.44 | 0.017 |
| Urban | 0.63 | 0.83 | **-0.48\*\*\*** | 0.78 | 0.73 | **0.111+** |
| Insider  | 0.4 | 0.31 | **0.193\*** | 0.22 | 0.31 | -0.194 |

|  |
| --- |
| El Salvador |
|   | Before Balancing | After Balancing |
| **Covariates** | **Mean in treated (CCT)** | **Mean in Untreated (non-CCT)** | **Standardized diff.**  | **Mean in treated (CCT)** | **Mean in Untreated (non-CCT)** | **Standardized diff.**  |
| Education | 6.86 | 8.79 | **-0.421\*\*\*** | 10 | 10 | 0 |
| Male | 0.4 | 0.46 | -0.113 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Age | 36.37 | 40.1 | **-0.256\*** | 24 | 22.5 | 0.103 |
| Income | 6.92 | 8.82 | **-0.44\*\*\*** | 8.25 | 8.5 | -0.058 |
| Children 13 | 1.79 | 1.02 | **0.685\*\*\*** | 0.75 | 0.75 | 0 |
| Urban | 0.24 | 0.64 | **-0.889\*\*\*** | 0.5 | 0.5 | 0 |
| Insider  | 0.26 | 0.27 | -0.039 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Honduras |
|   | Before Balancing | After Balancing |
| **Covariates** | **Mean in treated (CCT)** | **Mean in Untreated (non-CCT)** | **Standardized diff.**  | **Mean in treated (CCT)** | **Mean in Untreated (non-CCT)** | **Standardized diff.**  |
| Education | 6.08 | 7.76 | **-0.412\*\*\*** | 5.64 | 5.64 | 0 |
| Male | 0.47 | 0.52 | **-0.118+** | 0.5 | 0.5 | 0 |
| Age | 38.46 | 39.49 | -0.072 | 35.82 | 36.38 | -0.039 |
| Income | 5.11 | 6.48 | **-0.312\*\*\*** | 4.07 | 4.14 | -0.016 |
| Children 13 | 2.15 | 1.33 | **0.53\*\*\*** | 2.14 | 1.71 | 0.278 |
| Urban | 0.38 | 0.58 | **-0.4\*\*\*** | 0.32 | 0.32 | 0 |
| Insider  | 0.57 | 0.37 | **0.416\*\*\*** | 0.61 | 0.61 | 0 |
| Costa Rica |
|   | Before Balancing | After Balancing |
| **Covariates** | **Mean in treated (CCT)** | **Mean in Untreated (non-CCT)** | **Standardized diff.**  | **Mean in treated (CCT)** | **Mean in Untreated (non-CCT)** | **Standardized diff.**  |
| Education | 7.86 | 8.74 | **-0.229\*** | 7 | 7.19 | -0.049 |
| Male | 0.44 | 0.51 | -0.147 | 0.5 | 0.5 | 0 |
| Age | 39.42 | 42.88 | **-0.228\*** | 49.25 | 47.06 | 0.144 |
| Income | 6.48 | 7.29 | **-0.195+** | 4.12 | 4.12 | 0 |
| Children 13 | 1.35 | 0.8 | **0.467\*\*\*** | 0.5 | 0.5 | 0 |
| Urban | 0.42 | 0.62 | **-0.42\*\*\*** | 0.5 | 0.5 | 0 |
| Insider  | 0.16 | 0.18 | -0.042 | 0 | 0 | 0 |

|  |
| --- |
| Panama |
|   | Before Balancing | After Balancing |
| **Covariates** | **Mean in treated (CCT)** | **Mean in Untreated (non-CCT)** | **Standardized diff.**  | **Mean in treated (CCT)** | **Mean in Untreated (non-CCT)** | **Standardized diff.**  |
| Education | 9.91 | 11.48 | -0.37\*\*\* | 11.73 | 11.73 | 0 |
| Male | 0.51 | 0.5 | 0.014 | 0.47 | 0.47 | 0 |
| Age | 38.74 | 38.89 | -0.01 | 32.87 | 33.73 | -0.056 |
| Income | 5.72 | 8.4 | -0.584\*\*\* | 5.8 | 5.73 | 0.015 |
| Children 13 | 1.52 | 0.98 | 0.416\*\*\* | 0.87 | 1 | -0.103 |
| Urban | 0.56 | 0.72 | -0.342\*\*\* | 0.87 | 0.87 | 0 |
| Insider  | 0.51 | 0.37 | 0.271\*\*\* | 0.27 | 0.27 | 0 |
| Colombia |
|   | Before Balancing | After Balancing |
| **Covariates** | **Mean in treated (CCT)** | **Mean in Untreated (non-CCT)** | **Standardized diff.**  | **Mean in treated (CCT)** | **Mean in Untreated (non-CCT)** | **Standardized diff.**  |
| Education | 8.5 | 10.15 | **-0.422\*\*\*** | 10.98 | 10.16 | **0.212+** |
| Male | 0.45 | 0.52 | **-0.135\*** | 0.45 | 0.51 | -0.11 |
| Age | 35.29 | 39.01 | **-0.253\*\*\*** | 30.8 | 33.42 | -0.178 |
| Income | 7.44 | 9.81 | **-0.563\*\*\*** | 9.45 | 9.02 | 0.103 |
| Children 13 | 1.53 | 0.85 | **0.607\*\*\*** | 1.12 | 0.94 | 0.169 |
| Urban | 0.62 | 0.85 | **-0.545\*\*\*** | 0.89 | 0.88 | 0.016 |
| Insider  | 0.47 | 0.33 | **0.282\*\*\*** | 0.38 | 0.34 | 0.076 |
| Ecuador |
|   | Before Balancing | After Balancing |
| **Covariates** | **Mean in treated (CCT)** | **Mean in Untreated (non-CCT)** | **Standardized diff.**  | **Mean in treated (CCT)** | **Mean in Untreated (non-CCT)** | **Standardized diff.**  |
| Education | 9.39 | 11.23 | **-0.488\*\*\*** | 9 | 10.04 | -0.276 |
| Male | 0.5 | 0.5 | -0.014 | 0.57 | 0.51 | 0.13 |
| Age | 40.14 | 39.04 | 0.074 | 44.98 | 42.09 | 0.194 |
| Income | 6.59 | 8.73 | **-0.536\*\*\*** | 6.39 | 7.02 | -0.158 |
| Children 13 | 1.23 | 0.94 | **0.257\*\*\*** | 0.69 | 0.91 | -0.197 |
| Urban | 0.54 | 0.69 | **-0.306\*\*\*** | 0.7 | 0.72 | -0.032 |
| Insider  | 0.75 | 0.61 | **0.304\*\*\*** | 0.72 | 0.75 | -0.057 |

|  |
| --- |
| Bolivia |
|   | Before Balancing | After Balancing |
| **Covariates** | **Mean in treated (CCT)** | **Mean in Untreated (non-CCT)** | **Standardized diff.**  | **Mean in treated (CCT)** | **Mean in Untreated (non-CCT)** | **Standardized diff.**  |
| Education | 10.28 | 10.28 | 0 | 12.17 | 12.06 | 0.024 |
| Male | 0.5 | 0.52 | -0.022 | 0.64 | 0.64 | 0 |
| Age | 39.58 | 40.24 | -0.043 | 35.62 | 35.57 | 0.004 |
| Income | 7.95 | 7.82 | 0.035 | 8.62 | 8.61 | 0.003 |
| Children 13 | 1.45 | 1.4 | 0.032 | 1.16 | 1.15 | 0.007 |
| Urban | 0.66 | 0.68 | -0.04 | 0.83 | 0.83 | 0 |
| Insider  | 0.45 | 0.43 | 0.032 | 0.29 | 0.29 | 0 |
| Paraguay |
|   | Before Balancing | After Balancing |
| **Covariates** | **Mean in treated (CCT)** | **Mean in Untreated (non-CCT)** | **Standardized diff.**  | **Mean in treated (CCT)** | **Mean in Untreated (non-CCT)** | **Standardized diff.**  |
| Education | 7.96 | 10.52 | **-0.593\*\*\*** | 7.33 | 6.6 | 0.169 |
| Male | 0.55 | 0.51 | 0.073 | 0.56 | 0.6 | -0.089 |
| Age | 35.6 | 37.07 | -0.114 | 40.33 | 46.3 | -0.459 |
| Income | 5.47 | 8.11 | **-0.583\*\*\*** | 6 | 4.8 | 0.265 |
| Children 13 | 1.88 | 1.22 | **0.416\*\*\*** | 1.22 | 1.1 | 0.078 |
| Urban | 0.3 | 0.61 | **-0.654\*\*\*** | 0.33 | 0.3 | 0.07 |
| Insider  | 0.51 | 0.5 | 0.019 | 0.56 | 0.6 | -0.089 |
| Chile |
|   | Before Balancing | After Balancing |
| **Covariates** | **Mean in treated (CCT)** | **Mean in Untreated (non-CCT)** | **Standardized diff.**  | **Mean in treated (CCT)** | **Mean in Untreated (non-CCT)** | **Standardized diff.**  |
| Education | 10.05 | 10.4 | -0.099 | 9.25 | 10.93 | -0.468 |
| Male | 0.26 | 0.33 | -0.156 | 0.12 | 0 | 0.273 |
| Age | 46.02 | 49.12 | -0.174 | 66.88 | 57.64 | 0.52 |
| Income | 7.03 | 8.64 | **-0.356\*\*** | 6.88 | 8.86 | -0.441 |
| Children 13 | 1.07 | 0.69 | **0.393\*\*** | 0.38 | 0.29 | 0.093 |
| Urban | 0.84 | 0.83 | 0.004 | 0.88 | 1 | -0.335 |
| Insider  | 0.41 | 0.38 | 0.062 | 0.62 | 0.57 | 0.109 |

|  |
| --- |
| Uruguay |
|   | Before Balancing | After Balancing |
| **Covariates** | **Mean in treated (CCT)** | **Mean in Untreated (non-CCT)** | **Standardized diff.**  | **Mean in treated (CCT)** | **Mean in Untreated (non-CCT)** | **Standardized diff.**  |
| Education | 7.41 | 10 | **-0.76\*\*\*** | 7.6 | 7.6 | 0 |
| Male | 0.39 | 0.49 | **-0.207\*** | 0.6 | 0.6 | 0 |
| Age | 37.76 | 47.76 | **-0.653\*\*\*** | 32.8 | 33.2 | -0.026 |
| Income | 6.16 | 10.3 | **-0.986\*\*\*** | 8.8 | 8.8 | 0 |
| Children 13 | 1.91 | 0.5 | **1.209\*\*\*** | 1 | 1 | 0 |
| Urban | 0.97 | 0.93 | 0.153 | 1 | 1 | 0 |
| Insider  | 0.65 | 0.51 | **0.283\*\*** | 0.6 | 0.6 | 0 |
| Brazil |
|   | Before Balancing | After Balancing |
| **Covariates** | **Mean in treated (CCT)** | **Mean in Untreated (non-CCT)** | **Standardized diff.**  | **Mean in treated (CCT)** | **Mean in Untreated (non-CCT)** | **Standardized diff.**  |
| Education | 6.91 | 8.64 | **-0.453\*\*\*** | 7.94 | 7.88 | 0.015 |
| Male | 0.45 | 0.52 | **-0.139\*** | 0.47 | 0.47 | 0 |
| Age | 35.75 | 40.99 | **-0.345\*\*\*** | 34.59 | 35.15 | -0.037 |
| Income | 5.92 | 9.41 | **-0.904\*\*\*** | 7.41 | 7.41 | 0 |
| Children 13 | 1.38 | 0.62 | **0.738\*\*\*** | 0.76 | 0.82 | -0.057 |
| Urban | 0.76 | 0.9 | **-0.367\*\*\*** | 0.82 | 0.82 | 0 |
| Insider  | 0.55 | 0.49 | **0.104+** | 0.53 | 0.53 | 0 |
| Argentina |
|   | Before Balancing | After Balancing |
| **Covariates** | **Mean in treated (CCT)** | **Mean in Untreated (non-CCT)** | **Standardized diff.**  | **Mean in treated (CCT)** | **Mean in Untreated (non-CCT)** | **Standardized diff.**  |
| Education | 9.02 | 10.25 | **-0.329\*\*\*** | 9.8 | 10 | -0.053 |
| Male | 0.42 | 0.52 | **-0.197\*** | 0.4 | 0.4 | 0 |
| Age | 34.24 | 44.79 | **-0.697\*\*\*** | 42.2 | 41.8 | 0.026 |
| Income | 8.14 | 10.79 | **-0.617\*\*\*** | 13.8 | 13.8 | 0 |
| Children 13 | 1.75 | 0.67 | **0.874\*\*\*** | 0.6 | 0.6 | 0 |
| Urban | 0.81 | 0.87 | **-0.178\*** | 1 | 1 | 0 |
| Insider  | 0.54 | 0.37 | **0.352\*\*\*** | 0.4 | 0.4 | 0 |

|  |
| --- |
| Dominic Republic |
|   | Before Balancing | After Balancing |
| **Covariates** | **Mean in treated (CCT)** | **Mean in Untreated (non-CCT)** | **Standardized diff.**  | **Mean in treated (CCT)** | **Mean in Untreated (non-CCT)** | **Standardized diff.**  |
| Education | 8.21 | 10.48 | **-0.527\*\*\*** | 9 | 9.19 | -0.044 |
| Male | 0.5 | 0.51 | -0.018 | 0.69 | 0.69 | 0 |
| Age | 41.1 | 40.23 | 0.054 | 43.19 | 42.31 | 0.055 |
| Income | 7.16 | 9.68 | **-0.574\*\*\*** | 7.69 | 7.62 | 0.014 |
| Children 13 | 1.23 | 1 | **0.188\*\*** | 0.5 | 0.5 | 0 |
| Urban | 0.69 | 0.79 | **-0.24\*\*\*** | 0.75 | 0.75 | 0 |
| Insider  | 0.68 | 0.56 | **0.24\*\*\*** | 0.75 | 0.75 | 0 |

Appendix D. Non-Interacted Models

Table 3D. CCT Programs and Accountability for the Economy and for Corruption in Countries Whose CCT Programs Follow Strict or Not Strict Rules.

|  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | (7D) | (8D) | (9D) | (10D) |
|  | Presidential Approval | Vote Incumbent |
|  | Not Strict | Strict | Not Strict | Strict |
|  | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) |
| Performance Economy | **0.172\*\*\*** | **0.175\*\*\*** | **0.288\*\*\*** | **0.251\*\*\*** |
|  | **(0.012)** | **(0.011)** | **(0.045)** | **(0.039)** |
|  |  |  |  |  |
| Performance Corruption | **0.105\*\*\*** | **0.0790\*\*\*** | **0.278\*\*\*** | **0.209\*\*\*** |
|  | **(0.011)** | **(0.010)** | **(0.043)** | **(0.039)** |
|  |  |  |  |  |
| CCT | 0.0610 | 0.0985 | **0.721\*** | 0.0507 |
|  | (0.079) | (0.068) | **(0.325)** | (0.245) |
|  |  |  |  |  |
| Education | -0.000625 | -0.00518 | -0.0240 | -0.0210 |
|  | (0.004) | (0.003) | (0.015) | (0.013) |
|  |  |  |  |  |
| Male | 0.00211 | -0.0241 | **-0.201+** | **-0.175+** |
|  | (0.029) | (0.027) | **(0.114)** | **(0.104)** |
|  |  |  |  |  |
| Age | -0.000132 | -0.000209 | **-0.0128\*\*\*** | 0.00313 |
|  | (0.001) | (0.001) | **(0.004)** | (0.004) |
|  |  |  |  |  |
| Income | 0.000884 | -0.00571 | 0.00213 | -0.00505 |
|  | (0.003) | (0.004) | (0.015) | (0.014) |
|  |  |  |  |  |
| Children 13 | -0.0200 | -0.00624 | **-0.107\*** | 0.0196 |
|  | (0.016) | (0.012) | **(0.055)** | (0.052) |
|  |  |  |  |  |
| Urban | 0.0285 | -0.0137 | **-0.311\*** | 0.0371 |
|  | (0.035) | (0.034) | **(0.144)** | (0.138) |
|  |  |  |  |  |
| Political Insider | **0.368\*\*\*** | **0.315\*\*\*** | **2.845\*\*\*** | **2.219\*\*\*** |
|  | **(0.031)** | **(0.028)** | **(0.118)** | **(0.115)** |
|  |  |  |  |  |
| \_cons | 1.518\*\*\* | 2.069\*\*\* | -2.948\*\*\* | -3.620\*\*\* |
|  | (0.082) | (0.090) | (0.308) | (0.358) |
| *N* | 5926 | 6730 | 5298 | 5844 |
| Countries | 6 | 7 | 6 | 7 |
| Model | OLS | OLS | Logit | Logit |

Standard errors in parentheses

+ *p* < 0.10, \* *p* < 0.05, \*\* *p* < 0.01, \*\*\* *p* < 0.001

Appendix E. Robustness Checks

In this appendix I replicate the analysis presented in the paper with two slightly different dependent variables. While the main analyses focus on evaluations of performance as regards corruption and the economy, here I focus on individuals’ perceptions of the economy and of corruption. While the former set of questions are available for all sixteen countries included here, the latter are not asked in Brazil, Chile, and Costa Rica. Regardless of how we measure perceptions of corruption and of the economy (government performance *versus* general assessments of these issues) and of changes in the sample of countries, the main results hold. This consistency of the results serves as additional evidence of the robustness of the findings presented in this paper.

Assessments of the economy are based on a question that asks respondents whether they think the country’s current economic situation is better than, the same as or worse than it was 12 months ago. The three-category answer (better, the same, or worse) was rescaled so that high values represent positive views on the economy. Among the nine countries included in the sample, Ecuador presents the most positive perceptions of the economy, while Guatemala presents the most negative ones. A similar procedure was applied to the variable that corresponds to perceptions of corruption. This question asks respondents to take into account their own experience and what they have heard in order and to say whether they believe corruption among public officials is very uncommon, uncommon, common, or very common. Respondents’ perceptions of corruption range from one to four, where four means the highest perceptions of corruption possible. According to this indicator, perceptions of corruption reach the highest levels in Colombia and the lowest in Uruguay.

Table 1E below presents models that assess whether benefiting from a CCT program bias voters’ perceptions of the amount of corruption in their countries and of the performance of the economy. Models 1E and 2E present similar results to models 1 and 2 in the main paper. The lack of statistical significance of the variable CCT in both models suggest that beneficiaries and non-beneficiaries do not significantly differ in the way they perceive the economy and levels of corruption in their countries.

Table 1E: Effects of CCT Programs on Perceptions of Corruption and the National Economy

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
|  | (1E) | (2E) |
|  |  Economy | Corruption  |
| CCT | 0.0468 | 0.00136 |
|  | (0.040) | (0.052) |
|  |  |  |
| Education | **0.00327+** | **0.0157\*\*\*** |
|  | **(0.002)** | **(0.003)** |
|  |  |  |
| Male | **0.101\*\*\*** | **0.0394+** |
|  | **(0.014)** | **(0.020)** |
|  |  |  |
| Age | **-0.00251\*\*\*** | **0.00417\*\*\*** |
|  | **(0.000)** | **(0.001)** |
|  |  |  |
| Income | **0.00605\*\*\*** | **0.00571\*** |
|  | **(0.002)** | **(0.002)** |
|  |  |  |
| Children 13 | **-0.0160\*\*** | 0.00658 |
|  | **(0.006)** | (0.009) |
|  |  |  |
| Urban | **-0.0282+** | 0.0332 |
|  | **(0.017)** | (0.025) |
|  |  |  |
| Political Insider | **0.197\*\*\*** | **-0.109\*\*\*** |
|  | **(0.015)** | **(0.021)** |
|  |  |  |
| \_cons | 1.313\*\*\* | 2.883\*\*\* |
|  | (0.043) | (0.064) |
| *N* | 16683 | 13190 |
| Countries | 16 | 13 |
| Model Type | OLS | OLS |

Standard errors in parentheses

+ p < 0.10, \* p < 0.05, \*\* p < 0.01, \*\*\* p < 0.001

Models 3E and 4E below confirms that both levels of corruption and the state of the economy drive presidential approval and vote for the incumbent. They also show that benefiting from a CCT program does not affect presidential approval and vote for the incumbent. The interacted models (5E and 6E) assess the extent to which this effects are moderated by CCT programs. In line with the results of the main models presented in Table 2 of the paper the paper, I do not find evidence that benefiting from a CCT program makes voters more likely to discount their perceptions of corruption or of the state of the economy when evaluating the performance of the incumbent not when deciding to vote for it. Therefore, regardless of the independent variable employed (whether assessments of government performance managing corruption and the economy or general perceptions of corruption and of the state of the economy), there is no evidence that CCT programs affect accountability for these two issues in Latin America.

Table 2E: CCT Programs and Accountability for Corruption and the Economy (Non-Interacted and Interacted Models)

|  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | (3E) | (4E) | (5E) | (6E) |
|  | Presidential Approval | Vote Incumbent | Presidential Approval | Vote Incumbent |
| Economy | **0.329\*\*\*** | **0.658\*\*\*** | **0.331\*\*\*** | **0.666\*\*\*** |
|  | **(0.015)** | **(0.054)** | **(0.015)** | **(0.056)** |
|  |  |  |  |  |
| Corruption | **-0.0774\*\*\*** | **-0.142\*\*** | **-0.0753\*\*\*** | **-0.140\*\*** |
|  | **(0.013)** | **(0.047)** | **(0.013)** | **(0.048)** |
|  |  |  |  |  |
| CCT | 0.0237 | 0.248 | 0.380 | 0.986 |
|  | (0.050) | (0.180) | (0.222) | (0.707) |
|  |  |  |  |  |
| CCT\*Economy |  |  | -0.0722 | -0.257 |
|  |  |  | (0.061) | (0.213) |
|  |  |  |  |  |
| CCT\*Corruption |  |  | -0.0724 | -0.0834 |
|  |  |  | (0.055) | (0.179) |
|  |  |  |  |  |
| Education | **-0.00543\*** | **-0.0284\*\*** | **-0.00546\*** | **-0.0285\*\*** |
|  | **(0.003)** | **(0.009)** | **(0.003)** | **(0.009)** |
|  |  |  |  |  |
| Male | -0.0226 | -0.0970 | -0.0224 | -0.0964 |
|  | (0.020) | (0.075) | (0.020) | (0.075) |
|  |  |  |  |  |
| Age | -0.000726 | **-0.00583\*** | -0.000741 | **-0.00587\*** |
|  | (0.001) | **(0.002)** | (0.001) | **(0.002)** |
|  |  |  |  |  |
| Income | 0.00193 | 0.0130 | 0.00193 | 0.0130 |
|  | (0.002) | (0.009) | (0.002) | (0.009) |
|  |  |  |  |  |
| Children 13 | 0.00386 | 0.00546 | 0.00364 | 0.00471 |
|  | (0.009) | (0.034) | (0.009) | (0.034) |
|  |  |  |  |  |
| Urban | -0.0127 | -0.0226 | -0.0127 | -0.0216 |
|  | (0.024) | (0.095) | (0.024) | (0.095) |
|  |  |  |  |  |
| Political Insider | **0.491\*\*\*** | **2.603\*\*\*** | **0.491\*\*\*** | **2.603\*\*\*** |
|  | **(0.021)** | **(0.080)** | **(0.021)** | **(0.080)** |
|  |  |  |  |  |
| \_cons | 2.504\*\*\* | -2.472\*\*\* | 2.494\*\*\* | -2.492\*\*\* |
|  | (0.084) | (0.316) | (0.085) | (0.319) |
| *N* | 13029 | 11594 | 13029 | 11594 |
| Countries | 13 | 13 | 13 | 13 |
| Model Type | OLS | Logit | OLS | Logit |

Standard errors in parentheses

+ *p* < 0.10, \* *p* < 0.05, \*\* *p* < 0.01, \*\*\* *p* < 0.001

Models in table 3E mirror models 7 through 10 in table 3 of the main text. They replicate the interacted models just discussed (5E and 6E) splitting the sample among countries those CCT programs follow strict and non-strict rules. To recap, model 7 in the paper show a statistically significant interaction between CCT programs and economic performance in countries whose CCT programs do not follow strict rules. This finding suggests that benefiting from a CCT program moderates the negative impact of economy-related government performance on presidential approval. This finding holds when we use overall perceptions of the national economy instead of government performance regarding this issue. Therefore, regardless of how we measure respondents’ assessments of the economy, beneficiaries of CCT programs that follow less strict rules tend to weigh the economy less heavily compared to non-beneficiaries when evaluating the performance of their government. In line with model 8 of the main text, model 8E shows that a similar effect is not found in countries in which CCT programs follow more strict rules. While the interaction CCT\*Economy in model 9 of the main text is not significant (suggesting that the moderating effect of CCT programs found in model 7 is restricted to government approval), this interaction becomes significant in model 9E. In other words, when using a different measure of assessments of the economy, the results suggest that CCT programs that follow less strict rules do moderate the negative effect of the economy on vote choice. Model 10E confirms the findings of model 10.

Table 3E: CCT Programs and Accountability for Corruption and the Economy in countries whose CCT Programs follow Strict or Not Strict Rules

|  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | (7E) | (8E) | (9E) | (10E) |
|  | Presidential Approval | Vote Incumbent |
|  | Not Strict | Strict | Not Strict | Strict |
| Economy | **0.347\*\*\*** | **0.337\*\*\*** | **0.755\*\*\*** | **0.623\*\*\*** |
|  | **(0.025)** | **(0.024)** | **(0.098)** | **(0.095)** |
|  |  |  |  |  |
| Corruption | **-0.0913\*\*\*** | **-0.0720\*\*** | **-0.173+** | **-0.159+** |
|  | **(0.023)** | **(0.024)** | **(0.088)** | **(0.089)** |
|  |  |  |  |  |
| CCT | **1.024\*\*** | 0.212 | **2.998\*** | 0.593 |
|  | **(0.313)** | (0.392) | **(1.404)** | (1.066) |
|  |  |  |  |  |
| CCT\*Economy | **-0.277\*\*** | 0.0459 | **-0.673+** | -0.161 |
|  | **(0.093)** | (0.099) | **(0.360)** | (0.298) |
|  |  |  |  |  |
| CCT\*Corruption | -0.117 | -0.0832 | -0.290 | -0.105 |
|  | (0.076) | (0.092) | (0.334) | (0.269) |
|  |  |  |  |  |
| Education | -0.00639 | **-0.0102\*** | **-0.0294+** | **-0.0310\*** |
|  | (0.004) | **(0.004)** | **(0.017)** | **(0.015)** |
|  |  |  |  |  |
| Male | -0.00654 | -0.0348 | **-0.244+** | -0.100 |
|  | (0.035) | (0.035) | **(0.127)** | (0.131) |
|  |  |  |  |  |
| Age | -0.00100 | 0.000632 | **-0.0135\*\*\*** | 0.00193 |
|  | (0.001) | (0.001) | **(0.004)** | (0.004) |
|  |  |  |  |  |
| Income | 0.00230 | 0.00308 | -0.00248 | 0.00619 |
|  | (0.004) | (0.004) | (0.016) | (0.017) |
|  |  |  |  |  |
| Children 13 | 0.00180 | 0.00383 | -0.0638 | 0.00978 |
|  | (0.017) | (0.014) | (0.059) | (0.062) |
|  |  |  |  |  |
| Urban | 0.0184 | -0.0348 | -0.287 | 0.0448 |
|  | (0.044) | (0.043) | (0.178) | (0.168) |
|  |  |  |  |  |
| Political Insider | **0.535\*\*\*** | **0.429\*\*\*** | **2.903\*\*\*** | **2.205\*\*\*** |
|  | **(0.034)** | **(0.037)** | **(0.133)** | **(0.139)** |
|  |  |  |  |  |
| \_cons | 2.993\*\*\* | 2.503\*\*\* | -1.570\*\*\* | -2.416\*\*\* |
|  | (0.139) | (0.122) | (0.452) | (0.499) |
| *N* | 4850 | 4827 | 4299 | 4271 |
| Countries | 5 | 5 | 5 | 5 |

Standard errors in parentheses

+ *p* < 0.10, \* *p* < 0.05, \*\* *p* < 0.01, \*\*\* *p* < 0.001

Appendix F. Jackknife Resampling Results

Table 3F: CCT Programs and Accountability for Corruption and the Economy in Countries Whose CCT Programs Follow Strict or Not Strict Rules.

|  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | (7F) | (8F) | (9F) | (10F) |
|  | Presidential Approval | Vote Incumbent |
|  | Not Strict | Strict | Not Strict | Strict |
| Performance Economy | **0.219\*\*\*** | **0.202\*\*\*** | **0.0441\*\*** | **0.0419\*\*** |
|  | **(0.030)** | **(0.025)** | **(0.008)** | **(0.007)** |
|  |  |  |  |  |
| Performance Corruption | **0.0819\*** | **0.0971\*\*\*** | **0.0332\*** | **0.0373\*\*** |
|  | **(0.028)** | **(0.013)** | **(0.009)** | **(0.006)** |
|  |  |  |  |  |
| CCT | **0.606\*\*** | 0.173 | 0.128 | -0.00817 |
|  | **(0.143)** | (0.316) | (0.167) | (0.087) |
|  |  |  |  |  |
| CCT\*Performance Economy | **-0.115+** | -0.0132 | -0.0285 | 0.0362 |
|  | **(0.057)** | (0.069) | (0.041) | (0.044) |
|  |  |  |  |  |
| CCT\*Performance Corruption | -0.00120 | -0.000654 | 0.0204 | -0.0287 |
|  | (0.059) | (0.072) | (0.026) | (0.032) |
|  |  |  |  |  |
| Education | 0.00989 | 0.00388 | -0.00180 | -0.00268 |
|  | (0.009) | (0.006) | (0.002) | (0.003) |
|  |  |  |  |  |
| Male | -0.0260 | -0.0259 | **-0.0210+** | -0.0293 |
|  | (0.032) | (0.017) | **(0.010)** | (0.019) |
|  |  |  |  |  |
| Age | -0.000943 | 0.0000824 | **-0.00166\*** | 0.00133 |
|  | (0.002) | (0.001) | **(0.001)** | (0.001) |
|  |  |  |  |  |
| Income | 0.00354 | -0.0107 | 0.00109 | -0.00173 |
|  | (0.008) | (0.006) | (0.001) | (0.002) |
|  |  |  |  |  |
| Children 13 | 0.0135 | -0.0131 | -0.00830 | -0.00751 |
|  | (0.013) | (0.011) | (0.010) | (0.009) |
|  |  |  |  |  |
| Urban | 0.0800 | -0.0327 | -0.0298 | -0.00102 |
|  | (0.071) | (0.025) | (0.019) | (0.022) |
|  |  |  |  |  |
| Political Insider | **0.501\*\*** | **0.332\*\*** | **0.532\*\*\*** | **0.362\*\*\*** |
|  | **(0.106)** | **(0.058)** | **(0.061)** | **(0.054)** |
|  |  |  |  |  |
| \_cons | 1.815\* | 2.085\*\*\* | 0.00849 | -0.120 |
|  | (0.454) | (0.138) | (0.026) | (0.070) |
| *N* | 5811 | 6604 | 5210 | 5729 |

Standard errors in parentheses

+ *p* < 0.10, \* *p* < 0.05, \*\* *p* < 0.01, \*\*\* *p* < 0.001

Appendix G. Models without the variable “Political Insider”

Given concerns with endogeneity, it is important to include in the analysis a control for respondents’ political allegiances. At the same time, as one of the anonymous reviewers of this paper pointed out, this control variable also represents a mechanism linking CCT programs with lack of accountability. In other words, CCT programs would undermine accountability to the extent that they foster a blind allegiance of voters to their governments, one that ignores concerns with corruption and poor economic performance. This allegiance can take the form of partisanship or declared vote for the incumbent. Therefore, there is a risk of controlling for the main mechanism by which CCT programs have their hypothesized effect. In order to assess whether the results are robust to the exclusion of the control “Political Insider,” I re-estimated all the models without this control. As the analysis presented below show, the results remain unaltered.

Table 1G: Effects of CCT Programs on Perceptions of the National Economy and

Corruption

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
|  | (1G) | (2G) |
|  | Performance Economy | Performance Corruption |
| CCT | -0.0305 | 0.110 |
|  | (0.091) | (0.096) |
|  |  |  |
| Education | **-0.0134\*\*** | **-0.0301\*\*\*** |
|  | **(0.005)** | **(0.005)** |
|  |  |  |
| Male | **0.106\*\*** | -0.0117 |
|  | **(0.036)** | (0.037) |
|  |  |  |
| Age | **0.00274\*** | **-0.00297\*** |
|  | **(0.001)** | **(0.001)** |
|  |  |  |
| Income | **0.00970\*** | **0.00916\*** |
|  | **(0.004)** | **(0.005)** |
|  |  |  |
| Children 13 | 0.0100 | -0.00376 |
|  | (0.016) | (0.016) |
|  |  |  |
| Urban | **-0.195\*\*\*** | **-0.143\*\*** |
|  | **(0.044)** | **(0.045)** |
|  |  |  |
| cons | 2.912\*\*\* | 3.590\*\*\* |
|  | (0.121) | (0.122) |
| *N* | 16423 | 16494 |
| Countries | 16 | 16 |
| Model type | OLS | OLS |

Standard errors in parentheses

+ *p* < 0.10, \* *p* < 0.05, \*\* *p* < 0.01, \*\*\* *p* < 0.001

Table 2G: CCT Programs and Accountability for the Economy and Corruption (Non-Interacted and Interacted Models)

|  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | (3G) | (4G) | (5G) | (6G) |
|  | Presidential Approval | Vote Incumbent | Presidential Approval | Vote Incumbent |
| Performance Economy | **0.180\*\*\*** | **0.326\*\*\*** | **0.180\*\*\*** | **0.325\*\*\*** |
|  | **(0.007)** | **(0.022)** | **(0.007)** | **(0.023)** |
|  |  |  |  |  |
| Performance Corruption | **0.107\*\*\*** | **0.252\*\*\*** | **0.108\*\*\*** | **0.253\*\*\*** |
|  | **(0.006)** | **(0.021)** | **(0.007)** | **(0.021)** |
|  |  |  |  |  |
| CCT | 0.0682 | **0.271+** | **0.276\*** | 0.3326 |
|  | (0.046) | **(0.148)** | **(0.120)** | (0.456) |
|  |  |  |  |  |
| CCT\*Performance Economy |  |  | -0.0275 | 0.0453 |
|  |  |  | (0.034) | (0.103) |
|  |  |  |  |  |
| CCT\*Performance Corruption |  |  | -0.0284 | -0.0625 |
|  |  |  | (0.034) | (0.098) |
|  |  |  |  |  |
| Education | -0.00143 | **-0.0148\*** | -0.00142 | **-0.0148\*** |
|  | (0.002) | **(0.007)** | (0.002) | **(0.007)** |
|  |  |  |  |  |
| Male | -0.00953 | **-0.104+** | -0.00887 | **-0.104+** |
|  | (0.017) | **(0.057)** | (0.017) | **(0.057)** |
|  |  |  |  |  |
| Age | 0.000384 | **0.00467\*\*** | 0.000402 | **0.00469\*\*** |
|  | (0.001) | **(0.002)** | (0.001) | **(0.002)** |
|  |  |  |  |  |
| Income | -0.00137 | 0.00849 | -0.00138 | 0.00846 |
|  | (0.002) | (0.007) | (0.002) | (0.007) |
|  |  |  |  |  |
| Children 13 | -0.00507 | 0.0120 | -0.00509 | 0.0121 |
|  | (0.008) | (0.026) | (0.008) | (0.026) |
|  |  |  |  |  |
| Urban | -0.00558 | -0.0954 | -0.00514 | -0.0957 |
|  | (0.020) | (0.071) | (0.020) | (0.071) |
|  |  |  |  |  |
| \_cons | 1.952\*\*\* | -3.110\*\*\* | 1.945\*\*\* | -3.111\*\*\* |
|  | (0.064) | (0.218) | (0.064) | (0.219) |
| *N* | 16053 | 14214 | 16053 | 14214 |
| Countries | 16 | 16 | 16 | 16 |
| Model type | OLS | Logit | OLS | Logit |

Standard errors in parentheses

+ *p* < 0.10, \* *p* < 0.05, \*\* *p* < 0.01, \*\*\* *p* < 0.001

Table 3G: CCT Programs and Accountability for the Economy and for Corruption in Countries Whose CCT Programs Follow Strict or Not Strict Rules.

|  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | (7G) | (8G) | (9G) | (10G) |
|  | Presidential Approval | Vote Incumbent |
|  | Not Strict | Strict | Not Strict | Strict |
| Performance Economy | **0.192\*\*\*** | **0.188\*\*\*** | **0.351\*\*\*** | **0.294\*\*\*** |
|  | **(0.013)** | **(0.011)** | **(0.035)** | **(0.036)** |
|  |  |  |  |  |
| Performance Corruption | **0.119\*\*\*** | **0.0895\*\*\*** | **0.303\*\*\*** | **0.251\*\*\*** |
|  | **(0.012)** | **(0.011)** | **(0.033)** | **(0.035)** |
|  |  |  |  |  |
| CCT | **0.507\*** | 0.188 | 0.932 | -0.123 |
|  | (0.205) | (0.177) | (0.651) | (0.741) |
|  |  |  |  |  |
| CCT\*Performance Economy | **-0.0682+** | -0.0197 | -0.0757 | 0.276 |
|  | **(0.051)** | (0.065) | (0.161) | (0.177) |
|  |  |  |  |  |
| CCT\*Performance Corruption | -0.0563 | -0.000563 | -0.0976 | -0.202 |
|  | (0.048) | (0.059) | (0.157) | (0.145) |
|  |  |  |  |  |
| Education | -0.00131 | -0.00565 | **-0.0211+** | -0.0188 |
|  | (0.004) | (0.003) | **(0.012)** | (0.012) |
|  |  |  |  |  |
| Male | -0.0125 | -0.0190 | **-0.263\*\*** | -0.130 |
|  | (0.030) | (0.027) | **(0.090)** | (0.093) |
|  |  |  |  |  |
| Age | 0.000492 | 0.00130 | -0.00319 | 0.0137\*\*\* |
|  | (0.001) | (0.001) | (0.003) | (0.003) |
|  |  |  |  |  |
| Income | 0.00116 | **-0.00672+** | 0.00232 | -0.00526 |
|  | (0.003) | **(0.004)** | (0.011) | (0.012) |
|  |  |  |  |  |
| Children 13 | -0.0169 | -0.00622 | -0.0611 | 0.0165 |
|  | (0.015) | (0.012) | (0.044) | (0.042) |
|  |  |  |  |  |
| Urban | -0.00434 | -0.0120 | **-0.404\*\*\*** | 0.0574 |
|  | (0.036) | (0.034) | **(0.112)** | (0.120) |
|  |  |  |  |  |
| \_cons | 1.480\*\*\* | 2.047\*\*\* | -2.829\*\*\* | -3.308\*\*\* |
|  | (0.083) | (0.090) | (0.252) | (0.308) |
| *N* | 5975 | 6730 | 5345 | 5844 |
| Countries  | 6 | 7 | 6 | 7 |
| Model Type  | OLS | OLS | Logit | Logit |

Standard errors in parentheses

+ *p* < 0.10, \* *p* < 0.05, \*\* *p* < 0.01, \*\*\* *p* < 0.001