# Appendix for the paper of Causal Graph Justifications of Logic Programs* 

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## Appendix A. Auxiliary figures

Associativity
$t+(u+w)=(t+u)+w$
$t *(u * w)=(t * u) * w$

Distributive

| Commutativity | Absorption |
| :---: | :---: |
| $t+u=u+t$ | $=t+(t * u)$ |
| $t * u=u * t$ | $=t *(t+u)$ |

Identity Idempotence Annihilator


Fig. 1. Sum and product satisfy the properties of a completely distributive lattice.

## Appendix B. An example of causal action theory

In this section we consider a more elaborated example from Pearl (2000).
Example 1
Consider the circuit in Figure 2 with two switches, $a$ and $b$, and a lamp $l$. Note that $a$ is the main switch, while $b$ only affects the lamp when $a$ is up. Additionally, when the light is on, we want to track which wire section, $v$ or $w$, is conducting current to the lamp.

As commented by Pearl (2000), the interesting feature of this circuit is that, seen from outside as a black box, it behaves exactly as a pair of independent, parallel switches, so it is impossible to detect the causal dependence between $a$ and $b$ by a mere observation of performed actions and their effects on the lamp. Figure 2 also includes a possible representation for this scenario; let us call it program $P_{1}$. It uses a pair of fluents $u p(X)$ and $\operatorname{down}(X)$ for the position of switch $X$, as

[^0]well as on and off to represent the state of the lamp. Fluents $u p(X)$ and $\operatorname{down}(X)$ (respectively, on and off) can be seen as the strong negation of each other, although we do not use an operator for that purpose". Action $m(X, D)$ stands for "move switch $X$ in direction $D \in\{u, d\}$ " (up and down, respectively). Actions between state $t$ and $t+1$ are located in the resulting state. Finally, we have also labelled inertia laws (by $i$ ) to help keeping track of fluent justifications inherited by persistence.

Circuit diagram


Inertia $u p(X)_{t+1} \leftarrow u p(X)_{t}, \operatorname{not} \operatorname{down}(X)_{t+1}$
$\operatorname{down}(X)_{t+1} \leftarrow \operatorname{down}(X)_{t}, \operatorname{not} u p(X)_{t+1}$

Direct effects

$$
u p\left(\overline{X)_{t}} \leftarrow m(X, u)_{t}\right.
$$

$$
\operatorname{down}(X)_{t} \quad \leftarrow m(X, d)_{t}
$$

Causal rules (indirect effects)

$$
\begin{array}{rlll}
v: & \text { on }_{t} & \leftarrow \operatorname{down}(a)_{t} \\
w: & \text { on }_{t} & \leftarrow \operatorname{up}(a)_{t}, \operatorname{down}(b)_{t} \\
& \text { off }_{t} & \leftarrow \operatorname{up}(a)_{t}, \operatorname{up}(b)_{t}
\end{array}
$$

$$
\perp \leftarrow \frac{\text { Constraints }}{m(X, u)_{t}, m(X, d)_{t}}
$$

$$
\perp \leftarrow u p(X)_{t}, \operatorname{down}(X)_{t}
$$

$$
\perp \leftarrow o n_{t}, \text { off }_{t}
$$

$$
u p(a)_{0} \frac{\text { Initial state }}{u p(b)_{0}} \quad o f f_{0}
$$

Fig. 2. A circuit with two switches together with a possible representation.

Suppose we perform the following sequence of actions: we first move down both switches, next switch $b$ is moved first up and then down, and finally we move up switch $a$. Assume also that each action occurrence is labelled with the action name so that, for instance, moving $b$ up in Situation 1 corresponds to the program fact $m(b, u)_{1}: m(b, u)_{1}$. The table in Figure 3 shows the resulting temporal projection. Note how the lamp turns on in Situation 1 but only because of $v$, that is, moving $a$ down. Movements of $b$ at 2 and 3 do not affect the lamp, and its causal explanation $(\operatorname{down}(a))$ is maintained by inertia. In Situation 4, the lamp is still on but the reason has changed. The explanation this time is that we had closed down $b$ at 3 (and this persisted by inertia) while we have just moved $a$ up, firing rule $w$.
This example also illustrates why we are not interested in providing negative justifications through default negation. This would mean to explicitly include non-occurrences of actions that might otherwise have violated inertia. For instance, the explanation for $o n_{2}$ would include the fact that we did not perform $m(a, u)_{2}$. Including this information for one transition is perhaps not so cumbersome, but suppose that, from 2 we executed a high number of transitions without performing any action. The explanation for $o_{3}$ would additionally collect that we did not perform $m(a, u)_{3}$ either. The explanation for $\mathrm{on}_{4}$ should also collect the negation of further possibilities: moving $a$ up at 4 ; three movements of $a$ up, down and up; moving $b$ at 3 and both switches at 4 ; moving both switches at 3 and $b$ at 4; etc. It is easy to see that negative explanations grow exponentially:

[^1]| $t$ | 0 | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Actions | $m(a, d)_{1}, m(b, d)_{1}$ | $m(b, u)_{2}$ | $m(b, d)_{3}$ | $m(a, u)_{4}$ |  |
| $u p(a)_{t}$ <br> down $(a)_{t}$ | 1 | 0 | $m(a, d)_{1}$ | $m(a, d)_{1} \cdot i$ | $m(a, d)_{1} \cdot i$ |

Fig. 3. Temporal projection of a sequence of actions for program $P_{1}$.
at step $t$ we would get the negation of all possible plans for making $o n_{t}$ false, while indeed, nothing has actually happened (everything persisted by inertia).

## Appendix C. Example with infinite rules

Example 2
Consider the infinite program $P_{2}$ given by the ground instances of the set of rules:

$$
\begin{aligned}
l(s(X)) & : \operatorname{nat}(s(X)) \leftarrow \operatorname{nat}(X) \\
l(z) & : \operatorname{nat}(z)
\end{aligned}
$$

defining the natural numbers with a Peano-like representation, where $z$ stands for "zero." For each natural number $n$, the causal value obtained for $\operatorname{nat}\left(s^{n}(z)\right)$ in the least model of the program is $l(z) \cdot l(s(z)) \ldots l\left(s^{n}(z)\right)$. Read from right to left, this value can be seen as the computation steps performed by a top-down Prolog interpreter when solving the query nat $\left(s^{n}(z)\right)$. As a further elaboration, assume that we want to check that at least some natural number exists. For that purpose, we add the following rule to the previous program:

$$
\begin{equation*}
\operatorname{some} \leftarrow \operatorname{nat}(X) \tag{1}
\end{equation*}
$$

The interesting feature of this example is that atom some collects an infinite number of causes from all atoms $\operatorname{nat}\left(s^{n}(z)\right)$ with $n$ ranging among all the natural numbers. That is, the value for some is $I($ some $)=\alpha_{0}+\alpha_{1}+\alpha_{2}+\ldots+\alpha_{n}+\ldots$ where $\alpha_{n} \xlongequal{\text { def }} l(z) \cdot l(s(z)) \cdot \ldots \cdot l\left(s^{n}(z)\right)$. However, it is easy to see that the fact nat $(z)$ labelled with $l(z)$ is not only sufficient to prove the existence of some natural number, but, due to the recursive definition of the natural numbers, it is also necessary - note how all the proofs $\alpha_{i}$ actually begin with an application of $l(z)$.

This fact is captured in our semantic by the algebraic equivalences showed in Fig ??. From associativity and identity of ' $\because$ ', the following equivalence holds:

$$
\alpha_{n}=1 \cdot l(z) \cdot \beta_{n} \quad \text { with } \quad \beta_{i} \stackrel{\text { def }}{=} l(s(z)) \cdot \ldots \cdot l\left(s^{i}(z)\right)
$$

for any $n \geq 1$. Furthermore, from absorption of ' $\because$ ' w.r.t the addition, it also holds that

$$
\alpha_{0}+\alpha_{n}=l(z)+1 \cdot l(z) \cdot \beta_{n}=l(z)
$$

As a consequence, the previous infinite sum just collapses to $I$ (some) $=l(z)$, reflecting the fact that, to prove the existence of a natural number, only the fact labelled as $l(z)$ is relevant.

Suppose now that, rather than defining natural numbers in a recursive way, we define them by directly asserting an infinite set of facts as follows:

$$
\begin{equation*}
l\left(s^{n}(z)\right): \operatorname{nat}\left(s^{n}(z)\right) \tag{2}
\end{equation*}
$$

for any $n \geq 0$, where $s^{0}(z)$ stands for $z$. In this variant, the causal value obtained for $\operatorname{nat}\left(s^{n}(z)\right)$ is simply $l\left(s^{n}(z)\right)$, so that the dependence we had before on lower natural numbers does not exist any more. Adding rule (1) to the set of facts (2) allows us concluding $I($ some $)=l(z)+l(s(z))+$ $l\left(s^{2}(z)\right)+\ldots+l\left(s^{n}(z)\right)+\ldots$ and this infinite sum cannot be collapsed into any finite term. This reflects that we have now infinite independent ways to prove that some natural number exists.

This last elaboration can be more elegantly captured by replacing the infinite set of facts (2) by an auxiliary recursive predicate $a u x$ defined as follows:

$$
\begin{aligned}
& \operatorname{aux}(s(X)) \leftarrow \operatorname{aux}(X) \quad l(X): \operatorname{nat}(X) \leftarrow \operatorname{aux}(X) \\
& \operatorname{aux}(z)
\end{aligned}
$$

Since rules for $\operatorname{aux}$ are unlabelled, the value of $\operatorname{aux}\left(s^{n}(z)\right)$ in the least model is $I\left(\operatorname{aux}\left(s^{n}(z)\right)=1\right.$ so the effect of this predicate is somehow "transparent" regarding causal justifications. As a result, the value of $\operatorname{nat}\left(s^{n}(z)\right)$ is just $l\left(s^{n}(z)\right)$ as before.

## Appendix D. Proofs

In order to improve clarity, for any causal graph $G=\langle V, E\rangle$ we use the notation $V(G)$ and $E(G)$ to refer to $V$ and $E$ respectively.

Proposition 1 (Monotonicity)
Let $G, G^{\prime}$ be a pair of causal graph with $G \leq G^{\prime}$. Then, for any causal graph $H$ :

$$
G * H \leq G^{\prime} * H, \quad G \cdot H \leq G^{\prime} \cdot H \quad \text { and } \quad H \cdot G \leq H \cdot G^{\prime}
$$

Proof. First we will show that $G * H \leq G^{\prime} * H$. Suppose that $E(G * H) \nsupseteq E\left(G^{\prime} * H\right)$ and let $\left(l_{1}, l_{2}\right)$ be an edge in $E\left(G^{\prime} * H\right)$ but not in $E\left(G * H^{\prime}\right)$, i.e. $\left(l_{1}, l_{2}\right) \in E\left(G^{\prime} * H\right) \backslash E\left(G * H^{\prime}\right)$.
Thus, since by product definition $E\left(G^{\prime} * H\right)=E\left(G^{\prime}\right) \cup E(H)$, it follows that either $\left(l_{1}, l_{2}\right) \in E\left(G^{\prime}\right)$ or $\left(l_{1}, l_{2}\right) \in E(H)$. It is clear that if $\left(l_{1}, l_{2}\right) \in E(H)$ then $\left(l_{1}, l_{2}\right) \in E(G * H)=E(G) \cup E(H)$. Furthermore, since $G \leq G^{\prime}$ it follows that $E(G) \supseteq E\left(G^{\prime}\right)$, if $\left(l_{1}, l_{2}\right) \in E\left(G^{\prime}\right)$ then $\left(l_{1}, l_{2}\right) \in E(G)$ and consequently $\left(l_{1}, l_{2}\right) \in E(G * H)=E(G) \cup E(H)$. That is $E(G * H) \supseteq E\left(G^{\prime} * H\right)$ and then $G * H \leq G^{\prime} * H$. Note that $V(G * H) \supseteq V\left(G^{\prime} * H\right)$ follows directly from $E(G * H) \supseteq E\left(G^{\prime} * H\right)$ and the fact that every vertex has and edge to itself.

To show that $G \cdot H \leq G^{\prime} \cdot H$ (the case for $H \cdot G \leq H \cdot G^{\prime}$ is analogous) we have has to show that, in addition to the previous, for every edge $\left(l_{G}, l_{H}\right) \in E\left(G^{\prime} \cdot H\right)$ with $l_{G} \in V\left(G^{\prime}\right)$ and $l_{H} \in V(H)$ it holds that $\left(l_{G}, l_{H}\right) \in E(G \cdot H)$. Simply note that since $G \leq G^{\prime}$ it follows $V(G) \supseteq V(G)^{\prime}$ and then $l_{G} \in V(G)$. Consequently $\left(l_{G}, l_{H}\right) \in E(G \cdot H)$.

Proposition 2 (Distributivity)
For every pair of sets of causal graphs $S$ and $S^{\prime}$, it holds that

$$
\left(\prod S\right) \cdot\left(\prod S^{\prime}\right)=\prod\left\{G \cdot G^{\prime} \mid G \in S \text { and } G^{\prime} \in S^{\prime}\right\}
$$

Proof. For readability sake, we define two causal graphs

$$
G_{R} \xlongequal{\text { def }}\left(\prod S\right) \cdot\left(\prod S^{\prime}\right) \quad \text { and } \quad G_{L} \stackrel{\text { def }}{=} \prod\left\{G \cdot G^{\prime} \mid G \in S \text { and } G^{\prime} \in S^{\prime}\right\}
$$

and we assume that both $S$ and $S^{\prime}$ are not empty sets. Note that $\Pi \emptyset=\mathbf{C}_{L b}=\Pi\left\{G_{\emptyset}\right\}$. Then, by product definition, it follows that

$$
\begin{aligned}
& E\left(G_{L}\right)=\left(\bigcup\{E(G) \mid G \in S\} \cup \bigcup\left\{E\left(G^{\prime}\right) \mid G \in S^{\prime}\right\} \cup E_{L}\right)^{*} \\
& E\left(G_{R}\right)=\left(\bigcup\left\{E(G) \cup E\left(G^{\prime}\right) \cup E_{R}\left(G, G^{\prime}\right) \mid G \in S \text { and } G^{\prime} \in S^{\prime}\right\}\right)^{*}
\end{aligned}
$$

where $\quad E_{L}=\left\{\left(l, l^{\prime}\right) \mid l \in \bigcup\{V(G) \mid G \in S\}\right.$ and $\left.l^{\prime} \in \bigcup\left\{V\left(G^{\prime}\right) \mid G^{\prime} \in S^{\prime}\right\}\right\}$

$$
E_{R}\left(G, G^{\prime}\right)=\left\{\left(l, l^{\prime}\right) \mid l \in V(G) \text { and } l^{\prime} \in V\left(G^{\prime}\right)\right\}
$$

Furthermore let $E_{R}=\bigcup\left\{E_{R}\left(G, G^{\prime}\right) \mid G \in S\right.$ and $\left.G^{\prime} \in S^{\prime}\right\}$. For every edge $\left(l, l^{\prime}\right) \in E_{L}$ there are a pair of c-graphs $G \in S$ and $G^{\prime} \in S^{\prime}$ s.t. $l \in V(G)$ and $l^{\prime} \in V\left(G^{\prime}\right)$ and then $\left(l, l^{\prime}\right) \in E_{R}\left(G, G^{\prime}\right)$ and so $\left(l, l^{\prime}\right) \in E_{R}$. Moreover, for every edge $\left(l, l^{\prime}\right) \in E_{R}$ there are a pair of c-graphs $G \in S$ and $G^{\prime} \in S^{\prime}$ s.t. $\left(l, l^{\prime}\right) \in E_{R}\left(G, G^{\prime}\right)$ with $l \in V(G)$ and $l^{\prime} \in V(G)^{\prime}$. So that $\left(l, l^{\prime}\right) \in E_{L}$. That is $E_{L}=E_{R}$. Then

$$
\begin{aligned}
E\left(G_{R}\right) & =\left(\bigcup\{E(G) \mid G \in S\} \cup \bigcup\left\{E\left(G^{\prime}\right) \mid G^{\prime} \in S^{\prime}\right\} \cup E_{R}\right)^{*} \\
& =\left(E\left(G_{L}\right) \backslash E_{L} \cup E_{R}\right)^{*}=\left(E\left(G_{L}\right)\right)^{*}=E\left(G_{L}\right)
\end{aligned}
$$

Consequently $G_{L}=G_{R}$.

Proposition 3 (Distributivity cont)
For any causal graphs $G, G^{\prime} \neq \emptyset$ and $G^{\prime \prime}$, it holds that

$$
G \cdot G^{\prime} \cdot G^{\prime \prime}=G \cdot G^{\prime} * G^{\prime} \cdot G^{\prime \prime}
$$

Proof. It is clear that $G \cdot G^{\prime} \cdot G^{\prime \prime} \leq G \cdot G^{\prime}$ and $G \cdot G^{\prime} \cdot G^{\prime \prime} \leq G^{\prime} \cdot G^{\prime \prime}$ and then $G \cdot G^{\prime} \cdot G^{\prime \prime} \leq G$. $G^{\prime} * G^{\prime} \cdot G^{\prime \prime}$. Let $G_{1}, G_{2}, G_{L}$ and $G_{R}$ be respectively $G_{1}=G \cdot G^{\prime}, G_{2}=G^{\prime} \cdot G^{\prime \prime}, G_{L}=G_{1} \cdot G^{\prime \prime}$, and $G_{R}=G_{1} * G_{2}$. Suppose that $G_{L}<G_{R}$, i.e. $G_{L} \supset G_{R}$ and there is an edge $\left(v_{1}, v_{2}\right) \in G_{L}$ but $\left(v_{1}, v_{2}\right) \notin G_{R}$. Then $G_{1} \subseteq G_{R}$ and $G^{\prime \prime} \subseteq G_{2} \subseteq G_{R}$ and one of the following conditions holds:

1. $\left(v_{1}, v_{2}\right) \in G_{1} \subseteq G_{R}$ or $\left(v_{1}, v_{2}\right) \in G^{\prime \prime} \subseteq G_{R}$ which is a contradiction with $\left(v_{1}, v_{2}\right) \notin G_{R}$.
2. $v_{1} \in G_{1}$ and $v_{2} \in G^{\prime \prime}$, i.e. $v_{1} \in G$ and $v_{2} \in G^{\prime \prime}$ or $v_{1} \in G^{\prime}$ and $v_{2} \in G^{\prime \prime}$. Furthermore, if the last it is clear that $\left(v_{1}, v_{2}\right) \in G^{\prime} \cdot G^{\prime \prime}=G_{2} \subseteq G_{R}$ which is a contradiction with $\left(v_{1}, v_{2}\right) \notin G_{R}$.

Thus it must be that $v_{1} \in G$ and $v_{2} \in G^{\prime \prime}$. But then, since $G^{\prime} \neq \emptyset$ there is some $v^{\prime} \in G^{\prime}$ and consequently there are edges $\left(v_{1}, v^{\prime}\right) \in G \cdot G^{\prime}=G_{1} \subseteq G_{R}$ and $\left(v^{\prime}, v_{2}\right) \in G^{\prime} \cdot G^{\prime \prime}=G_{2} \subseteq G_{R}$. Since $G_{R}$ is closed transitively, $\left(v_{1}, v_{2}\right) \in G_{R}$ which is a contradiction with the assumption that $\left(v_{1}, v_{2}\right) \notin G_{R}$. That is, $G_{L}=G \cdot G^{\prime} \cdot G^{\prime \prime}=G \cdot G^{\prime} * G^{\prime} \cdot G^{\prime \prime}=G_{R}$.

## Proposition 4

For every causal graph $G=\langle V, E\rangle$ it holds that $G=\Pi\left\{l \cdot l^{\prime} \mid\left(l, l^{\prime}\right) \in E\right\}$.
Proof. Let $G^{\prime}$ be a causal graphb s.t. $G^{\prime}=\Pi\left\{l \cdot l^{\prime} \mid\left(l, l^{\prime}\right) \in E\right\}$. Then for every edge $\left(l, l^{\prime}\right) \in$ $E(G)$ it holds that $\left(l, l^{\prime}\right) \in E\left(l \cdot l^{\prime}\right)$ and then $\left(l, l^{\prime}\right) \in E\left(G^{\prime}\right)=\bigcup\left\{E\left(l \cdot l^{\prime}\right) \mid\left(l, l^{\prime}\right) \in E\right\}$, i.e. $E(G) \subseteq$ $E\left(G^{\prime}\right)$. Furthermore for every $\left(l, l^{\prime}\right) \in E\left(G^{\prime}\right)$ there is $l_{i} \cdot l_{j}$ s.t. $\left(l, l^{\prime}\right) \in l_{i} \cdot l_{j}$ and $\left(l_{i}, l_{j}\right) \in E(G)$. Then, since $E\left(l_{i} \cdot l_{j}\right)=\left\{\left(l_{i}, l_{j}\right)\right\}$ it follows that $\left(l, l^{\prime}\right) \in E(G)$, i.e. $E(G) \supseteq E\left(G^{\prime}\right)$. Consequently $G=G^{\prime}=\Pi\left\{l \cdot l^{\prime} \mid\left(l, l^{\prime}\right) \in E\right\}$.

## Proposition 5 (Infimum)

Any set of causal graphs $S$ has a $\leq$-infimum given by their product $\Pi S$.
Proof. By definition $\Pi S$ is the causal graph whose vertices and edges are respectively the sets $V(\Pi S)=\bigcup\{V(G) \mid G \in S\}$ and $E(\Pi S)=\bigcup\{E(G) \mid G \in S\}$. It is easy to see that $\Pi S$ is the supremum of the subgraph relation, so that, since for every pair of causal graphs $G \leq G^{\prime}$ iff $G \supseteq G^{\prime}$, it follows that infimum of $S$ w.r.t. $\leq$.

Proof of Theorem 1. Let $\mathbf{F}$ be the set of filters over the lower semilattice $\left\langle\mathbf{C}_{L b}, *\right\rangle$. Stumme was showed in (Stumme 1997) that the concept lattice $\mathfrak{B}\left\langle\mathbf{F}, \mathbf{V}_{L b}, \Delta\right\rangle$ (with $F \Delta I \Leftrightarrow F \cap I \neq \emptyset$ ) is isomorphic to the free completely distributive complete lattice generated by the partial lattice $\left\langle\mathbf{C}_{L b},+, *\right\rangle$ where + and $*$ are two partial functions corresponding with the supremum and infimum. In our particular, case for every set of causal graphs $S$ its infimum is defined as $\Pi S$ and the supremum is defined as $G \in S$ such that $G^{\prime} \leq G$ for all $G^{\prime} \in S$, when such $G$ exists and undefined otherwise. Thus $\mathbf{V}_{L b}$ is the set of ideals over the partial lattice $\left\langle\mathbf{C}_{L b},+, *\right\rangle$, i.e. every $I \in \mathbf{V}_{L b}$ is also closed under defined suprema. He also show that the elements of such lattice are described as pairs

$$
\left\{\left(\mathbf{F}_{t}, \mathbf{I}_{t}\right) \mid \mathbf{F}_{t} \subseteq \mathbf{F}, \mathbf{I}_{t} \subseteq \mathbf{V}_{L b}, \mathbf{F}_{t}^{I}=\mathbf{I}_{t} \text { and } \mathbf{F}_{t}=\mathbf{I}_{t}^{I}\right\}
$$

where

$$
\begin{aligned}
\mathbf{F}_{t}^{I} & =\left\{I \in \mathbf{I} \mid \forall F \in \mathbf{F}_{t}: F \cap I \neq \emptyset\right\} \\
\mathbf{I}_{t}^{I} & =\left\{F \in \mathbf{F} \mid \forall I \in \mathbf{I}_{t}: F \cap I \neq \emptyset\right\}
\end{aligned}
$$

That is, every element is in the form $\left\langle\mathbf{I}_{t}^{I}, \mathbf{I}_{t}\right\rangle$. Furthermore infima and suprema can be described as follows:

$$
\begin{aligned}
& \bigwedge_{t \in T}\left(\mathbf{I}_{t}^{I}, \mathbf{I}_{t}\right)=\left(\bigcap_{t \in T} \mathbf{I}_{t}^{I},\left(\bigcup_{t \in T} \mathbf{I}_{t}\right)^{I I}\right) \\
& \bigvee_{t \in T}\left(\mathbf{I}_{t}^{I}, \mathbf{I}_{t}\right)=\left(\left(\bigcup_{t \in T} \mathbf{I}_{t}^{I}\right)^{I I}, \bigcap_{t \in T} \mathbf{I}_{t}\right)
\end{aligned}
$$

We will show that $\varepsilon_{I}: \underline{\mathfrak{B}} \longrightarrow \mathbf{V}_{L b}$ given by $\left(\mathbf{I}_{t}^{I}, \mathbf{I}_{t}\right) \mapsto \bigcap \mathbf{I}_{t}$ is an isomorphism between $\langle\underline{\mathfrak{B}}, \vee, \wedge\rangle$ and $\left\langle\mathbf{V}_{L b}, \cup, \cap\right\rangle$. Note that, since $\Pi \emptyset=G_{\emptyset}$ it holds that the empty set is not close under defined infimum and then it is not a filter, i.e. $\emptyset \notin \mathbf{F}$, and then for every filter $F \in \mathbf{F}$ it holds that $G_{\emptyset} \in F$. Thus if $\mathbf{I}_{t}=\emptyset$ follows that $\mathbf{I}_{t}^{I}=\mathbf{F}$ and then $\mathbf{I}_{t}^{I I}=\left\{I \in \mathbf{V}_{L b} \mid G_{\emptyset} \in I\right\}=\mathbf{C}_{L b} \neq \mathbf{I}_{t}$. That is, $\left\langle\emptyset^{I}, \emptyset\right\rangle \notin \underline{\mathfrak{B}}$. We will show that for every ideal $I_{t} \in \mathbf{I}$ and for every set of ideals $\mathbf{I}_{t} \subseteq \mathbf{I}$ s.t. $I_{t}=\bigcap \mathbf{I}_{t}$ it holds that

$$
\begin{equation*}
\left(\mathbf{I}_{t}^{I}, \mathbf{I}_{t}\right) \in \underline{\mathfrak{B}}\langle\mathbf{F}, \mathbf{I}, \Delta\rangle \Longleftrightarrow \mathbf{I}_{t}=\left\{I \in \mathbf{I} \mid I_{t} \subseteq I\right\} \tag{3}
\end{equation*}
$$

and consequently $\varepsilon_{I}$ is a bijection between and $\underline{\mathfrak{B}}$ and $\mathbf{V}_{L b}$.
Suppose that $\left(\mathbf{I}_{t}^{I}, \mathbf{I}_{t}\right) \in \underline{\mathfrak{B}}\langle\mathbf{F}, \mathbf{I}, \Delta\rangle$. For every $I \in \mathbf{I}_{t}$ it holds that $I_{t} \subseteq I$. So suppose there is $I \in \mathbf{I}$ s.t. $I_{t} \subseteq I$ and $I \notin \mathbf{I}_{t}$. Then there is $F \in \mathbf{I}_{t}^{I}$ s.t. $I \cap F=\emptyset$ and for every element $I^{\prime} \in \mathbf{I}_{t}$ it holds that $I^{\prime} \cap F \neq \emptyset$. Pick a causal graph $G$ s.t. $G=\Pi\left\{G^{\prime} \mid G^{\prime} \in I^{\prime} \cap F\right.$ and $\left.I^{\prime} \in \mathbf{I}_{t}\right\}$. Since for every $G^{\prime}$ it holds $G^{\prime} \in F$ and $G \leq G^{\prime}$ follows that $G \in F$ ( $F$ is close under infimum) and $G \in I^{\prime}$ (every $I^{\prime}$ is close under $\leq)$. That is, for every $I^{\prime} \in \mathbf{I}_{t}$ it holds that $G \in I^{\prime} \cap F$ and then, since $I_{t}=\bigcap \mathbf{I}_{t}$, it also holds that $G \in I_{t} \cap F$ and since $I_{t} \subseteq I$ also $G \in I \cap F$ which contradict that $I \cap F=\emptyset$. So that $I \in \mathbf{I}_{t}$ and it holds that

$$
\left(\mathbf{I}_{t}^{I}, \mathbf{I}_{t}\right) \in \underline{\mathfrak{B}}\langle\mathbf{F}, \mathbf{I}, \Delta\rangle \Longrightarrow \mathbf{I}_{t}=\left\{I \in \mathbf{I} \mid I_{t} \subseteq I\right\}
$$

Suppose that $\mathbf{I}_{t}=\left\{I \in \mathbf{I} \mid I_{t} \subseteq I\right\}$ but $\left(\mathbf{I}_{t}^{I}, \mathbf{I}_{t}\right) \in \underline{\mathfrak{B}}\langle\mathbf{F}, \mathbf{I}, \Delta\rangle$, i.e. $\mathbf{I}_{t} \neq \mathbf{I}_{t}^{I I}$. Note that $\mathbf{I}_{t} \subseteq \mathbf{I}_{t}^{I I}$ because otherwise there are $I \in \mathbf{I}_{t}$ and $F \in \mathbf{I}_{t}^{I}$ s.t. $I \cap F=\emptyset$ which is a contradiction with the fact that for every $F \in \mathbf{I}_{t}^{I}$ and $I \in \mathbf{I}_{t}$ it holds that $F \cap I \neq \emptyset$.

So, there is $I \in \mathbf{I}_{t}^{I I}$ s.t. $I \notin \mathbf{I}_{t}$, i.e. for every $F \in \mathbf{I}_{t}^{I}$ it holds that $F \cap I \neq \emptyset$ but $I_{t} \nsubseteq I$. Pick $G \in I_{t} \backslash I$ and $F=\left\{G^{\prime} \mid G \leq G^{\prime}\right\}$. It is clear that $F \in \mathbf{F}$ and $F \cap I_{t} \neq \emptyset$ because $G \in I_{t}$, so that $F \in \mathbf{I}_{t}^{I}$. Furthermore $F \cap I=\emptyset$, because $G \notin I$, which is a contradiction with the assumption. Thus

$$
\left(\mathbf{I}_{t}^{I}, \mathbf{I}_{t}\right) \in \underline{\mathfrak{B}}\langle\mathbf{F}, \mathbf{I}, \Delta\rangle \Longleftarrow \mathbf{I}_{t}=\left\{I \in \mathbf{I} \mid I_{t} \subseteq I\right\}
$$

Now, we will show that $\left(\mathbf{I}_{1}^{I}, \mathbf{I}_{1}\right) \vee\left(\mathbf{I}_{2}^{I}, \mathbf{I}_{2}\right)=\left(\mathbf{I}_{3}^{I}, \mathbf{I}_{3}\right)$ iff $I_{1} \cup I_{2}=I_{3}$. From the above statement follows that

$$
\begin{aligned}
\mathbf{I}_{1} \cap \mathbf{I}_{2} & =\left\{I \in \mathbf{I} \mid I_{1} \subseteq I \text { and } I_{2} \subseteq I\right\}= \\
& =\left\{I \in \mathbf{I} \mid I_{1} \cup I_{2} \subseteq I\right\} \\
\mathbf{I}_{3} & =\left\{I \in \mathbf{I} \mid I_{3} \subseteq I\right\}
\end{aligned}
$$

That is, $\mathbf{I}_{1} \cap \mathbf{I}_{2}=\mathbf{I}_{3}$ iff $I_{1} \cup I_{2}=I_{3}$ and by definition of $\vee$ the first is equivalent to $\left(\mathbf{I}_{1}^{I}, \mathbf{I}_{1}\right) \vee$ $\left(\mathbf{I}_{2}^{I}, \mathbf{I}_{2}\right)=\left(\mathbf{I}_{3}^{I}, \mathbf{I}_{3}\right)$.

Finally we will show that $\left(\mathbf{I}_{1}^{I}, \mathbf{I}_{1}\right) \wedge\left(\mathbf{I}_{2}^{I}, \mathbf{I}_{2}\right)=\left(\mathbf{I}_{3}^{I}, \mathbf{I}_{3}\right)$ iff $I_{1} \cap I_{2}=I_{3}$. It holds that

$$
\begin{aligned}
\left(\mathbf{I}_{1} \cup \mathbf{I}_{2}\right)^{I I} & =\left(\left\{I \in \mathbf{I} \mid I_{1} \subseteq I \text { or } I_{2} \subseteq I\right\}\right)^{I I}= \\
& =\left(\left\{I \in \mathbf{I} \mid I_{1} \cap I_{2} \subseteq I\right\}\right)^{I I} \\
\mathbf{I}_{3} & =\left\{I \in \mathbf{I} \mid I_{3} \subseteq I\right\}
\end{aligned}
$$

Since $\varepsilon_{I}$ is a bijection, it holds that $\left(\mathbf{I}_{1} \cup \mathbf{I}_{2}\right)^{I I}=\mathbf{I}_{3}$ iff $I_{1} \cap I_{2}=I_{3}$.
Thus $\varepsilon_{I}: \underline{\mathfrak{B}} \longrightarrow \mathbf{V}_{L b}$ is an isomorphism between $\langle\underline{\mathfrak{B}}, \vee, \wedge\rangle$ and $\left\langle\mathbf{V}_{L b}, \cup, \cap\right\rangle$, i.e. $\left\langle\mathbf{V}_{L b}, \cup, \cap\right\rangle$ is isomorphic to the free completely distributive lattice generated by $\left\langle\mathbf{C}_{L b}, *\right\rangle$.
Let's check now that $\downarrow: \mathbf{C}_{L b} \longrightarrow \mathbf{V}_{L b}$ defined as is an injective homomorphism. Stumme has already showed that $\varepsilon_{p}: \mathbf{C}_{L b} \longrightarrow \underline{\mathfrak{B}}$ given by

$$
\varepsilon_{p}(G) \mapsto(\{F \in \mathbf{F} \mid G \in F\},\{I \in \mathbf{I} \mid G \in I\})
$$

is an injective homomorphism between the partial lattice $\left\langle\mathbf{C}_{L b},+, *\right\rangle$ and $\langle\underline{\mathfrak{B}}, \vee, \wedge\rangle$. So that $\varepsilon_{I} \circ \varepsilon_{p}$ is an injective homomorphism between $\left\langle\mathbf{C}_{L b},+, *\right\rangle$ and $\left\langle\mathbf{V}_{L b}, \cup, \cap\right\rangle$ given by

$$
\varepsilon_{I} \circ \varepsilon_{p}(G) \mapsto \bigcap\left\{I \in \mathbf{V}_{L b} \mid G \in I\right\}
$$

Note that for any causal graph $G$ and $G^{\prime} \in \mathbf{C}_{L b}$ s.t. $G^{\prime} \leq G$ it holds that $G^{\prime} \in \varepsilon_{I} \circ \varepsilon_{p}(G)$ that is $\downarrow G \subseteq \varepsilon_{I} \circ \varepsilon_{p}(G)$. Furthermore for every causal graph $G$ it holds that $\varepsilon(G)$ is an ideal, i.e. $\downarrow G \in \mathbf{V}_{L b}$ and it is clear that $G \in \downarrow G$ so that, $\varepsilon_{I} \circ \varepsilon_{p}$ is a intersection of which one element is $\downarrow G$, thus $\varepsilon_{I} \circ \varepsilon_{p}(G) \subseteq \downarrow G$. That is $\downarrow G=\varepsilon_{I} \circ \varepsilon_{p}(G)$ and consequently it is an injective homomorphism between $\left\langle\mathbf{C}_{L b},+, *\right\rangle\left\langle\mathbf{V}_{L b}, \cup \cap\right\rangle$.

## Lemma 0.1

Let $P$ be a positive (and possible infinite) logic program over signature $\langle A t, L b\rangle$. Then, (i) the least fix point of $T_{P}, l f p\left(T_{P}\right)$ is the least model of $P$, and (ii) lfp $\left(T_{P}\right)=T_{P} \uparrow^{\omega}(\mathbf{0})$.

Proof. Since the set of causal values forms a lattice causal logic programs can be translated to Generalized Annotated Logic Programming (GAP). GAP is a general a framework for multivalued logic programming where the set of truth values must to form an upper semilattice and rules (annotated clauses) have the following form:

$$
\begin{equation*}
H: \rho \leftarrow B_{1}: \mu_{1} \& \ldots \& B_{n}: \mu_{n} \tag{4}
\end{equation*}
$$

where $L_{0}, \ldots, L_{m}$ are literals, $\rho$ is an annotation (may be just a truth value, an annotation variable or a complex annotation) and $\mu_{1}, \ldots, \mu_{n}$ are values or annotation variables. A complex annotation is the result to apply a total continuous function to a tuple of annotations. Thus a positive program $P$ is encoded in a GAP program, $\operatorname{GAP}(P)$ rewriting each rule $R \in \Pi$ of the form

$$
\begin{equation*}
t: H \leftarrow B_{1} \wedge \ldots \wedge B_{n} \tag{5}
\end{equation*}
$$

as a rule $\operatorname{GAP}(R)$ in the form (4) where $\mu_{1}, \ldots, \mu_{n}$ are annotation that capture the causal values of each body literal and $\rho$ is a complex annotation defined as $\rho=\left(\mu_{1} * \ldots * \mu_{n}\right) \cdot t$.
Thus we will show that a causal interpretation $I \models \Pi$ if and only if $I \models^{r} \operatorname{GAP}(P)$ where $\models^{r}$ refers to the GAP restricted semantics.

For any program $P$ and interpretation $I$, by definition, $I \models P$ (resp. $I \models^{r} \operatorname{GAP}(P)$ ) iff $I \models R$ (resp. $\left.I \models^{r} \operatorname{GAP}(R)\right)$ for every rule $R \in P$. Thus it is enough to show that for every rule $R$ it holds that $I \models R$ iff $I \models^{r} \operatorname{GAP}(R)$.
By definition, for any rule $R$ of the form of (5) and an interpretation $I, I \models R$ if and only if $\left(I\left(B_{1}\right) * \ldots * I\left(B_{n}\right)\right) \cdot t \leq I(H)$ whereas for any rule $\operatorname{GAP}(R)$ in the form of $(4), I \models^{r} G A P(R)$ iff for all $\mu_{i} \leq I\left(B_{i}\right)$ implies that $\rho=\left(\mu_{1} * \ldots * \mu_{n}\right) \cdot t \leq I(H)$.
For the only if direction, take $\mu_{i}=I\left(B_{i}\right)$, then $\rho=\left(\mu_{1} * \ldots * \mu_{n}\right) \cdot t=\left(I\left(B_{1}\right) * \ldots * I\left(B_{n}\right)\right) \cdot t$ and then $\rho \leq I(H)$ implies $\left(I\left(B_{1}\right) * \ldots * I\left(B_{n}\right)\right) \cdot t \leq I(H)$, i.e. $I \models^{r} G A P(R)$ implies $I \models R$. For the if direction, take $\mu_{i} \leq I\left(B_{i}\right)$ then, since product an applications are monotonic operations, it follows that $\left(\mu_{1} * \ldots * \mu_{n}\right) \cdot t \leq\left(I\left(B_{1}\right) * \ldots * I\left(B_{n}\right)\right) \cdot t \leq I(H)$, That is, $I \models R$ also implies $I \models^{r} G A P(R)$. Consequently $I \models R$ iff $I \models^{r} G A P(R)$.

Thus, from Theorem 1 in (Kifer and Subrahmanian 1992), it follows that the operator $T_{P}$ is monotonic.

To show that the operator $T_{P}$ is also continuous we need to show that for every causal program $P$ the translation $\operatorname{GAP}(P)$ is an acceptable program. Indeed since in a program $\operatorname{GAP}(P)$ all body atoms are v-annotated it is acceptable. Thus from Theorem 3 in (Kifer and Subrahmanian 1992), it follows that $T_{P} \uparrow{ }^{\omega}(\mathbf{0})=l f p\left(T_{P}\right)$ and this is the least model of $P$.

## Lemma 0.2

Given a positive and completely labelled program $P$, for every atom $p$ and integer $k \geq 1$,

$$
T_{P} \uparrow^{k}(\mathbf{0})(p)=\sum_{R \in \Psi} \sum_{f \in R} \prod\left\{f\left(T_{P} \uparrow^{k-1}(\mathbf{0})(q)\right) \mid q \in \operatorname{body}(R)\right\} \cdot \operatorname{label}(R)
$$

where $\Psi$ is the set of rules $\Psi=\{R \in \Pi \mid \operatorname{head}(R)=p\}$ and $R$ is the set of choice functions $R=\{f \mid f(S) \in S\}$.

Proof. By definition of $T_{P} \uparrow^{k}(\mathbf{0})(p)$ it follows that
$T_{P} \uparrow^{k}(\mathbf{0})(p)=\sum\left\{\left(T_{P} \uparrow^{k-1}(\mathbf{0})\left(q_{1}\right) * \ldots * T_{P} \uparrow^{k-1}(\mathbf{0})\left(q_{1}\right)\right) \cdot \operatorname{label}(R) \mid R \in P\right.$ with head $\left.(R)=p\right\}$
then, applying distributive of application w.r.t. to the sum and and rewriting the sum and the product aggregating properly, it follows that

$$
T_{P} \uparrow^{k}(\mathbf{0})(p)=\sum_{R \in \Psi} \prod\left\{T_{P} \uparrow^{k-1}(\mathbf{0})(q) \mid q \in \operatorname{body}(R)\right\} \cdot \operatorname{label}(R)
$$

Furthermore for any atom $q$ the causal value $T_{P} \uparrow^{k-1}(\mathbf{0})(q)$ can be expressed as the sum of all c-graphs in it and then

$$
T_{P} \uparrow^{k}(\mathbf{0})(p)=\sum_{R \in \Psi} \prod\left\{\sum_{f \in R} f\left(T_{P} \uparrow^{k-1}(\mathbf{0})(q)\right) \mid q \in \operatorname{body}(R)\right\} \cdot \operatorname{abel}(R)
$$

and applying distributivity of products over sums it follows that

$$
T_{P} \uparrow^{k}(\mathbf{0})(p)=\sum_{R \in \Psi} \sum_{f \in R} \prod\left\{f\left(T_{P} \uparrow^{k-1}(\mathbf{0})(q)\right) \mid q \in \operatorname{body}(R)\right\} \cdot l_{R}
$$

## Lemma 0.3

Given a positive and completely labelled program $P$ and a causal graph $G$, for every atom $p$ and integer $k \geq 1$, it holds that $G \in T_{P} \uparrow^{k}(\mathbf{0})(p)$ iff there is a rule $l: p \leftarrow q_{1}, \ldots, q_{m}$ and causal graphs $G_{q_{1}}, \ldots, G_{q_{m}}$ respectively in $T_{P} \uparrow^{k-1}(\mathbf{0})\left(q_{i}\right)$ and $G \leq\left(G_{q_{1}} * \ldots * G_{q_{m}}\right) \cdot l$.

Proof. From Lemma 0.2 it follows that $G \in T_{P} \uparrow^{k}(\mathbf{0})(p)$ iff
iff

$$
\begin{aligned}
& G \in \operatorname{value}\left(\sum_{R \in \Psi} \sum_{f \in R} \prod\left\{f\left(T_{P} \uparrow^{k-1}(\mathbf{0})(q)\right) \mid q \in \operatorname{body}(R)\right\} \cdot \operatorname{label}(R)\right) \\
& G \in \bigcup_{R \in \Psi} \bigcup_{f \in R} \operatorname{value}\left(\prod\left\{\downarrow f\left(T_{P} \uparrow^{k-1}(\mathbf{0})(q)\right)\right) \mid q \in \operatorname{body}(R)\right\} \cdot \operatorname{label}(R)
\end{aligned}
$$

iff there is $R \in \Phi$, with $\operatorname{head}(R)=p$ and a choice function $f \in \Psi$ s.t.

$$
G \in \operatorname{value}\left(\prod\left\{f\left(T_{P} \uparrow^{k-1}(\mathbf{0})(q)\right) \mid q \in \operatorname{body}(R)\right\} \cdot \operatorname{label}(R)\right)
$$

Let $R=l: p \leftarrow q_{1}, \ldots, q_{m}$ and $f\left(T_{P} \uparrow^{k-1}(\mathbf{0})\left(q_{i}\right)\right)=G_{q_{i}}$. Then the above can be rewritten as $G \leq\left(G_{q_{1}} * \ldots * G_{q_{m}}\right) \cdot l$.

## Definition 1

Given a causal graph $G=\langle V, E\rangle$, we define the restriction of $G$ to a set of vertex $V^{\prime} \subseteq V$ as the casual graph $G^{\prime}=\left\langle V^{\prime}, E^{\prime}\right\rangle$ where $E^{\prime}=\left\{\left(l_{1}, l_{2}\right) \in E \mid l_{1} \in V^{\prime}\right.$ and $\left.l_{2} \in V^{\prime}\right\}$, and we define the reachable restriction of $G$ to a set of vertex $V^{\prime} \subseteq V$, in symbols $G^{V^{\prime}}$, as the restriction of $G$ to the set of vertex $V^{\prime \prime}$ from where some vertex $l \in V^{\prime}$ is reachable $V^{\prime \prime}=\left\{l^{\prime} \in V \mid\left(l^{\prime}, l\right) \in\right.$ $E^{*}$ for some $\left.l \in V^{\prime}\right\}$. When $V^{\prime}=l$ is a singleton we write $G^{l}$.

## Lemma 0.4

Let $P$ be a positive, completely labelled program, $p$ and $q$ be atoms, $G$ be a causal graph, $R$ be a causal rule s.t. $\operatorname{head}(R)=q$ and $\operatorname{label}(R)=l$ is a vertex in $G$ and $k \in\{1, \ldots, \omega\}$ be an ordinal. If $G \in T_{P} \uparrow^{k}(\mathbf{0})(p)$, then $G^{l} \in T_{P} \uparrow^{k}(\mathbf{0})(q)$.

Proof. In case that $k=0$ the lemma statement holds vacuous. Otherwise assume as induction hypothesis that the lemma statement holds for $k-1$. From Lemma 0.3, since $G \in T_{P} \uparrow^{k}(\mathbf{0})(p)$, there is a rule $R_{p}=\left(l_{p}: p \leftarrow p_{1}, \ldots, p_{m}\right)$ and c-graph $G_{p_{1}}, \ldots, G_{p_{m}}$ s.t. each $G_{p_{i}} \in T_{P} \uparrow^{k-1}(\mathbf{0})\left(p_{i}\right)$ and $G \leq\left(G_{p_{1}} * \ldots * G_{p_{m}}\right) \cdot l_{p}$.
If $l=l_{p}$ then, since $P$ is uniquely labelled, $R=R_{p}, G^{l}=G$ and by assumption $G \in T_{P} \uparrow^{k}(\mathbf{0})(p)$. Otherwise $l \in G_{p_{i}}$ for some $G_{p_{i}}$ and in its turn $G_{p_{i}} \in T_{P} \uparrow{ }^{k-1}(\mathbf{0})\left(p_{i}\right)$. By induction hypothesis $G^{l} \in T_{P} \uparrow^{k-1}(\mathbf{0})(q)$ and since $T_{P} \uparrow^{k-1}(\mathbf{0})(q) \subseteq T_{P} \uparrow^{k}(\mathbf{0})(q)$ it follows that $G^{l} \in T_{P} \uparrow^{k}(\mathbf{0})(q)$.
In case that $k=\omega$, by definition $T_{P} \uparrow^{\omega}(\mathbf{0})(p)=\sum_{i<\omega} T_{P} \uparrow^{i}(\mathbf{0})(p)$ and the same for atom $q$. Thus, if $G \in T_{P} \uparrow^{\omega}(\mathbf{0})(p)$ there is some $i<\omega$ s.t. $G \in T_{P} \uparrow^{i}(\mathbf{0})(p)$, and as we already show, $G^{l} \in T_{P} \uparrow^{i}(\mathbf{0})(q)$ and consequently $G^{l} \in T_{P} \uparrow{ }^{\omega}(\mathbf{0})(q)$.

## Lemma 0.5

Let $P$ be a positive, completely labelled program, $p$ be an atom and $G$ be a causal graph and $k \geq 1$ be an integer. If $G$ is maximal in $T_{P} \uparrow^{k}(\mathbf{0})(p)$ then

1. there is a causal rule $R=\left(l: p \leftarrow p_{1}, \ldots, p_{m}\right)$ and there are causal graphs $G_{p_{1}}, \ldots, G_{p_{m}}$ s.t. each $G_{p_{i}} \in \max T_{P} \uparrow^{k-1}(\mathbf{0})\left(p_{i}\right)$ and $G_{p}=\left(G_{p_{1}} * \ldots * G_{p_{m}}\right) \cdot l$ and
2. $l$ is not a vertex of any $G_{p_{i}}$.

Proof. From Lemma 0.3 it follows that $G \in T_{P} \uparrow^{k}(\mathbf{0})(p)$ iff there is a rule $R=\left(l: p \leftarrow q_{1}, \ldots, q_{m}\right)$ and causal graphs $G_{q_{1}}^{\prime}, \ldots, G_{q_{m}}^{\prime}$ s.t. each $G_{p_{i}} \in \max T_{P} \uparrow^{k-1}(\mathbf{0})\left(p_{i}\right)$ and $G=\left(G_{q_{1}}^{\prime} * \ldots * G_{q_{m}}^{\prime}\right) \cdot l$. Let $G_{q_{1}}, \ldots, G_{q_{m}}$ be causes such that each $G_{q_{i}} \in \max T_{P} \uparrow^{k-1}(\mathbf{0})\left(q_{i}\right)$ and $G_{q_{i}}^{\prime} \leq G_{q_{i}}$ and let $G^{\prime}$ be the c-graph $G^{\prime}=\left(G_{q_{1}} * \ldots * G_{q_{m}}\right) \cdot l$. By product and application monotonicity it holds that $G \leq G^{\prime}$ and, again from Lemma 0.3, it follows that $G^{\prime} \in T_{P} \uparrow^{k}(\mathbf{0})(p)$. Thus, since $G$ is maximal, it must to be that $G=G^{\prime}$ and consequently $G=\left(G_{q_{1}} * \ldots * G_{q_{m}}\right) \cdot l$ where each $G_{q_{i}}$ is maximal.
Suppose that $l$ is a vertex of $G_{p_{i}}$ for some $G_{p_{i}}$. From Lemma 0.4 , if follows that $G_{p_{i}}^{l} \in T_{P} \uparrow^{k}(\mathbf{0})(p)$. Furthermore, since $G_{p_{i}} \supseteq G_{p_{i}}^{l}$, it follows that $G_{p_{i}} \leq G_{p_{i}}^{l}$ and, since $l$ is a label ( $l \neq 1$ ), it follows that $G<G_{p_{i}}$ and so that $G<G_{p_{i}}^{l}$ which contradicts the assumption that $G \in \max T_{P} \uparrow^{k}(\mathbf{0})(p)$.

## Definition 2

Given a causal graph $G$ we define $\operatorname{height}(G)$ as the length of the maximal simple (no repeated vertices) path in $G$.

## Lemma 0.6

Let $P$ be a positive, completely labelled program, $p$ be an atom, $k \in\{1, \ldots, \omega\}$ be an ordinal and $G$ be a causal graph. If $G \in \max T_{P} \uparrow^{k}(\mathbf{0})(p)$ and $\operatorname{height}(G)=h \leq k$ then $G \in T_{P} \uparrow^{h}(\mathbf{0})(p)$.

Proof. In case that $h=0$, from Lemma 0.5, it follows that if $G \in \max T_{P} \uparrow^{k}(\mathbf{0})(p)$ there is a causal rule $R=\left(l: p \leftarrow p_{1}, \ldots, p_{m}\right)$ and c-graphs. $\ldots$. Furthermore, since $P$ is completely labelled, it follows that $l \neq 1$ and then $G<l<1$. Since 1 is the only c-graph whose height is 0 the lemma statement holds vacuous.

In case that $h>0$, we proceed by induction assuming as hypothesis that the lemma statement holds for any $h^{\prime}<h$. From Lemma 0.5 , there is a causal rule $l: p \leftarrow p_{1}, \ldots, p_{m}$, and there are causal graphs $G_{p_{1}}, \ldots, G_{p_{m}}$ s.t. each $G_{p_{i}} \in \max T_{P} \uparrow^{k-1}(\mathbf{0})\left(p_{i}\right), G=G_{R} \cdot l$ and $l \notin V\left(G_{p_{i}}\right)$ for any $G_{p_{i}}$ where $G_{R}=G_{p_{1}} * \ldots * G_{p_{m}}$.
If $m=0$ then $G=1 \cdot l=l$, height $(l)=1$ and $l \in \max T_{P} \uparrow^{k}(\mathbf{0})(p)$ for any $k \geq 1$. Otherwise, since any path in $G_{p_{i}}$ is also a path $G_{p}$, it is clear that $\operatorname{height}\left(G_{p_{i}}\right)=h_{p_{i}}^{\prime} \leq h$ for any $G_{p_{i}}$. Suppose that $h_{p_{i}}^{\prime}=h$ for some $G_{p_{i}}$. Then there is a simple path $l_{1}, \ldots, l_{h}$ of length $h$ in $G_{p_{i}}$ and, since $G=G_{R} \cdot l$, there is an edge $\left(l_{h}, l\right) \in E(G)$. That is $l_{1}, \ldots, l_{h}, l$ is a walk of length $h+1$ in $G$ and, since $l \notin V\left(G_{p_{i}}\right)$, it follows that $l_{i} \neq l$ with $1 \leq i \leq h$. So that $l_{1}, \ldots, l_{h}, l$ is a simple path of length $h+1$ which contradicts the assumption that $\operatorname{height}(G)=h$. Thus height $\left(G_{p_{i}}\right)=h_{p_{i}}^{\prime}<h$ for any $G_{p_{i}}$ and then, by induction hypothesis, $G_{p_{i}} \in \max T_{P} \uparrow h_{p_{i}}^{\prime}(\mathbf{0})\left(p_{i}\right)$.
Let $h^{\prime}=\max \left\{h_{p_{i}}^{\prime} \mid 1 \leq i \leq m\right\}<h$. Since the $T_{P}$ operator is monotonic and $h_{p_{i}}^{\prime} \leq h^{\prime}$ for any $p_{i}$, it follows that $T_{P} \uparrow^{h_{p_{i}}^{\prime}}(\mathbf{0})\left(p_{i}\right) \leq T_{P} \uparrow^{h^{\prime}}(\mathbf{0})\left(p_{i}\right)$ and then there are casual graphs $G_{p_{1}}^{\prime}, \ldots, G_{p_{m}}^{\prime}$ such that each $G_{p_{i}}^{\prime} \in \max T_{P} \uparrow^{h^{\prime}}(\mathbf{0})\left(p_{i}\right), G_{p_{i}} \leq G_{p_{i}}^{\prime}$ and $G^{\prime}=G_{R} \cdot l$ where $G_{R}^{\prime}=G_{p_{1}}^{\prime} * \ldots * G_{p_{m}}^{\prime}$. By product and application monotonicity, it follows that $G \leq G^{\prime}$, and, from Lemma 0.3, it follows that $G^{\prime} \in T_{P} \uparrow h^{h^{\prime}+1}(\mathbf{0})(p)$. Since $h^{\prime}+1 \leq h$ it follows that $G^{\prime} \in T_{P} \uparrow{ }^{h}(\mathbf{0})(p)$ and since $G \leq G^{\prime}$ it follows that $G \in T_{P} \uparrow^{h}(\mathbf{0})(p)$.

Suppose that $G \notin \max T_{P} \uparrow^{h}(\mathbf{0})(p)$. Then there is $G^{\prime \prime} \in \max T_{P} \uparrow^{h}(\mathbf{0})(p)$ s.t. $G<G^{\prime \prime}$ and then, since $h \leq k$, it follows that $G^{\prime \prime} \in T_{P} \uparrow^{k}(\mathbf{0})(p)$ which, since $G<G^{\prime \prime}$, contradicts the assumption that $G \in \max T_{P} \uparrow^{k}(\mathbf{0})(p)$. Thus, if $G \in \max T_{P} \uparrow^{k}(\mathbf{0})(p)$ and height $(G)=h \leq k$ it follows that $G \in T_{P} \uparrow^{h}(\mathbf{0})(p)$.
In case that $k=\omega$, by definition $T_{P} \uparrow{ }^{\omega}(\mathbf{0})(p)=\sum_{i<\omega} T_{P} \uparrow^{i}(\mathbf{0})(p)$. Thus, if $G \in \max T_{P} \uparrow{ }^{\omega}(\mathbf{0})(p)$ and $\operatorname{height}(G)=h$ then there is some $i<\omega$ s.t. $G \in \max T_{P} \uparrow^{i}(\mathbf{0})(p)$ and $h \leq i$, and as we already show, then $G \in T_{P} \uparrow^{h}(\mathbf{0})(p)$.

## Lemma 0.7

Let $P, Q$ two positive causal logic programs such that $Q$ is the result of replacing label $l$ in $P$ by some $u$ (a label or 1) then $T_{Q} \uparrow^{k}(\mathbf{0})(p)=T_{P} \uparrow^{k}(\mathbf{0})(p)[l \mapsto u]$ for any atom $p$ and $k \in\{1, \ldots, \omega\}$.

Proof. In case that $n=0, T_{Q} \uparrow^{k}(\mathbf{0})(p)=0$ and $T_{P} \uparrow^{k}(\mathbf{0})(p)=0$ and $0=0[l \mapsto u]$. That is $T_{Q} \uparrow^{k}(\mathbf{0})(p)=T_{P} \uparrow^{k}(\mathbf{0})(p)[l \mapsto u]$.
We proceed by induction on $k$ assuming that $T_{Q} \uparrow^{k-1}(\mathbf{0})(p)=T_{P} \uparrow^{k-1}(\mathbf{0})(p)[l \mapsto u]$ for any atom $p$ and we will show that $T_{Q} \uparrow(\mathbf{0})(p)=T_{P} \uparrow^{k}(\mathbf{0})(p)[l \mapsto u]$.
Pick $G \in T_{P} \uparrow^{k}(\mathbf{0})(p)$ then, from Lemma 0.3 , there is a rule $l^{\prime}: p \leftarrow q_{1}, \ldots, q_{m}$ and causal graphs $G_{q_{1}}, \ldots, G_{q_{m}}$ each one respectively in $T_{P} \uparrow^{k-1}(\mathbf{0})\left(q_{i}\right)$ s.t. $G \leq G_{R}=\left(G_{q_{1}} * \ldots * G_{q_{m}}\right) \cdot l^{\prime}$. Thus, by induction hypothesis, for every atom $q_{i}$ and c-graph $G_{q_{i}} \in T_{P} \uparrow^{k-1}(\mathbf{0})(q)$ it holds that $G_{q_{i}}[l \mapsto u] \in T_{Q} \uparrow^{k-1}(\mathbf{0})\left(q_{i}\right)$.
Let $G_{R}[l \mapsto u]$ be a c-graph defined as $G_{R}[l \mapsto u]=\left(G_{q_{1}}[l \mapsto u] * \ldots * G_{q_{m}}[l \mapsto u]\right) \cdot l^{\prime}[l \mapsto u]$. Then, since $G \leq G_{R}$, it follows that $G[l \mapsto u] \leq G_{R}[l \mapsto u]$ and then, again from Lemma 0.3 , it follows that $G[l \mapsto u] \in T_{Q} \uparrow^{n}(\mathbf{0})(p)$. That is $T_{P} \uparrow^{k}(\mathbf{0})(p)[l \mapsto u] \subseteq T_{Q} \uparrow^{k}(\mathbf{0})(p)$.
Pick $G \in T_{Q} \uparrow^{k}(\mathbf{0})(p)$ then, from Lemma 0.3 , there is a rule there is a rule $l^{\prime}: p \leftarrow q_{1}, \ldots, q_{m}$ and c-graphs $G_{q_{1}}, \ldots, G_{q_{m}}$ respectively in $T_{P} \uparrow^{k-1}(\mathbf{0})\left(q_{i}\right)$ s.t. $G \leq G_{R}$ where $G_{R}=\left(G_{q_{1}} * \ldots *\right.$ $\left.G_{q_{m}}\right) \cdot l^{\prime}$.
By induction hypothesis, for every atom $q_{i}$ and graph $G_{q_{i}}$ it holds that if $G_{q_{i}} \in T_{Q} \uparrow^{k-1}(\mathbf{0})\left(q_{i}\right)$ then $G_{q_{i}} \in T_{P} \uparrow^{k-1}(\mathbf{0})\left(q_{i}\right)[l \mapsto u]$. Thus, it follows that there is a graph $G_{q_{i}}^{\prime} \in T_{P} \uparrow^{k-1}(\mathbf{0})\left(q_{i}\right)$ such that $G_{q_{i}}^{\prime}[l \mapsto u]=G_{q_{i}}$. Let $G_{R}^{\prime}$ be a graph s.t. $G_{R}^{\prime}=\left(G_{q_{1}}^{\prime} * \ldots * G_{q_{m}}^{\prime}\right) \cdot l^{\prime}$. From Lemma 0.3 for every causal graph $G^{\prime} \leq G_{R}^{\prime}$ it holds that $G^{\prime} \in T_{P} \uparrow^{k}(\mathbf{0})(p)$. Since $G_{R}^{\prime}[l \mapsto u]=G_{R}$ and $G \leq G_{R}$ it follows that $G \leq G_{R}[l \mapsto u]$ and, since $G_{R} \in T_{P} \uparrow^{k}(\mathbf{0})(p)$, it follows that $G \in T_{P} \uparrow^{k}(\mathbf{0})(p)[l \mapsto u]$. Consequently $T_{P} \uparrow^{k}(\mathbf{0})(p)[l \mapsto u] \supseteq T_{Q} \uparrow^{n}(\mathbf{0})(p)$ and then $T_{P} \uparrow^{k}(\mathbf{0})(p)[l \mapsto u]=T_{Q} \uparrow^{n}(\mathbf{0})(p)$.
In case that $k=\omega$, by definition $T_{P} \uparrow \omega(\mathbf{0})(p)[l \mapsto u]=\sum_{i<\omega} T_{P} \uparrow(\mathbf{0})(i) p[l \mapsto u]$ and as we alerady show $T_{P} \uparrow(\mathbf{0})(i) p[l \mapsto u]=T_{Q} \uparrow^{i}(\mathbf{0})(p)$ for all integer $i<\omega$, so that, their sum is also equal and consequently $T_{P} \uparrow{ }^{\omega}(\mathbf{0})(p)[l \mapsto u]=T_{Q} \uparrow^{\omega}(\mathbf{0})(p)$.

Proof of Theorem 2. Let $P^{\prime}$ be a positive, completely labelled causal program with the same rules as $P$. From Lemma 0.1 it follows that (i) $l f p\left(T_{P}\right)$ and $l f p\left(T_{P^{\prime}}\right)$ are respectively the least model of the programs $P$ and $P^{\prime}$, and (ii) $l f p\left(T_{P}\right)=T_{P} \uparrow^{\omega}(\mathbf{0})$ and $l f p\left(T_{P^{\prime}}\right)=T_{P^{\prime}} \uparrow^{\omega}(\mathbf{0})$.
Futhermore, it is clear that if $P$ is an infinite program, i.e. $n=\omega$, then $T_{P^{\prime}} \uparrow^{n}(\mathbf{0})=T_{P^{\prime}} \uparrow{ }^{\omega}(\mathbf{0})$. Otherwise, by definition it holds that $T_{P^{\prime}} \uparrow^{n}(\mathbf{0}) \leq T_{P^{\prime}} \uparrow{ }^{\omega}(\mathbf{0})$. Suppose $T_{P^{\prime}} \uparrow^{n}(\mathbf{0})<T_{P^{\prime}} \uparrow{ }^{\omega}(\mathbf{0})$. Then there is some atom $p$ and c-graph $G \in T_{P^{\prime}} \uparrow{ }^{\omega}(\mathbf{0})(p)$ such that $G \notin T_{P^{\prime}} \uparrow^{n}(\mathbf{0})(p)$. The
longest simple path in $G$ must be smaller than the number of its vertices and this must be smaller than the number of labels of the program which in its turn is equal to the number of rules $n$, i.e. height $(G)=h \leq n$. From Lemma 0.6 it follows that $G \in T_{P^{\prime}} \uparrow^{h}(\mathbf{0})(p)$ and since $h \leq n$ it follows that $T_{P^{\prime}} \uparrow^{h}(\mathbf{0})(p) \subseteq T_{P^{\prime}} \uparrow^{n}(\mathbf{0})(p)$ and so that $G \in T_{P^{\prime}} \uparrow^{n}(\mathbf{0})(p)$ which is a contradiction with the assumption that $G \in T_{P} \uparrow^{\omega}(\mathbf{0})(p)$ but $G \notin T_{P} \uparrow^{n}(\mathbf{0})(p)$. Thus $T_{P^{\prime}} \uparrow^{n}(\mathbf{0})=T_{P^{\prime}} \uparrow^{\omega}(\mathbf{0})$.
Furthermore, from Lemma 0.7, $T_{P} \uparrow^{k}(\mathbf{0})(p)=T_{P^{\prime}} \uparrow^{k}(\mathbf{0})(p)\left[l_{1}^{\prime} \mapsto l_{1}\right] \ldots\left[l_{n}^{\prime} \mapsto l_{n}\right]$ for $k \in\{n, \omega\}$ and where $l_{1}^{\prime}, \ldots, l_{n}^{\prime}$ are the labels of rules of $P^{\prime}$ and $l_{1}, \ldots, l_{n}$ are the correspondent labels of such rules in $P$. Thus, since $T_{P^{\prime}} \uparrow^{n}(\mathbf{0})=T_{P^{\prime}} \uparrow^{\omega}(\mathbf{0})$, it follows that $T_{P} \uparrow^{n}(\mathbf{0})=T_{P} \uparrow^{\omega}(\mathbf{0})$.

## Lemma 0.8

For any proof $\pi(p)$ it holds that

$$
\operatorname{graph}\left(\frac{\pi\left(q_{1}\right), \ldots, \pi\left(q_{m}\right)}{p}(l)\right)=\left(\operatorname{graph}\left(\pi\left(q_{1}\right)\right) * \ldots * \operatorname{graph}\left(\pi\left(q_{1}\right)\right)\right) \cdot l
$$

Proof. We proceed by structural induction assuming that for every proof in the antecedent $\pi\left(q_{i}\right)$ and every label $l^{\prime} \in V\left(\operatorname{graph}\left(\pi\left(q_{i}\right)\right)\right)$ there is an edge $\left(l^{\prime}, \operatorname{label}\left(\pi\left(q_{i}\right)\right)\right) \in E\left(\operatorname{graph}\left(\pi\left(q_{i}\right)\right)\right)$.

By definition $\operatorname{graph}(\pi(p))=G_{\pi(p)}^{*}$ is the reflexive and transitive closure of $G_{\pi(p)}$ and then

$$
\operatorname{graph}(\pi(p))=\left(\bigcup\left\{\operatorname{graph}\left(\pi\left(q_{i}\right)\right) \mid 1 \leq i \leq m\right\} \cup\left\{\left(\operatorname{label}\left(\pi\left(q_{i}\right), l\right) \mid 1 \leq i \leq m\right\}\right)^{*}\right.
$$

Thus, $\operatorname{graph}(\pi(p)) \geq \Pi\left\{\operatorname{graph}\left(\pi\left(q_{i}\right)\right) \mid 1 \leq i \leq m\right\} \cdot l$ and remain to show that for every atom $q_{i}$ and label $l^{\prime} \in V\left(\operatorname{graph}\left(\pi\left(q_{i}\right)\right)\right)$ the edge $\left(l^{\prime}, l\right) \in E(\operatorname{graph}(\pi(p)))$. Indeed, since by induction hypothesis there is an edge $\left(l^{\prime}, \operatorname{label}\left(\pi\left(q_{i}\right)\right)\right) \in E\left(\operatorname{graph}\left(\pi\left(q_{i}\right)\right)\right) \subseteq E(\operatorname{graph}(\pi(p))$, the fact that the edge $\left(\operatorname{label}\left(\pi\left(q_{i}\right), l\right) \in E(\operatorname{graph}(\pi(p)))\right.$ and since $\operatorname{graph}(\pi(p))$ is closed transitively, it follows that $\left(l^{\prime}, l\right) \in E(\operatorname{graph}(\pi(p)))$.

## Lemma 0.9

Let $P$ be a positive, completely labelled program and $\pi(p)$ be a proof for $p$ w.r.t. $P$. Then it holds that $\operatorname{graph}\left(\pi_{p}\right) \in T_{P} \uparrow^{h}(\mathbf{0})(p)$ where $h$ is the height of $\pi(p)$ which is recursively defined as

$$
\operatorname{height}(\pi)=1+\max \left\{\operatorname{height}\left(\pi^{\prime}\right) \mid \pi^{\prime} \text { is a sub-proof of } \pi\right\}
$$

Proof. In case that $h=1$ the antecedent of $\pi(p)$ is empty, i.e.

$$
\pi(p)=\frac{\top}{p}(l)
$$

where $l$ is the label of the fact $(l: p)$. Then $\operatorname{graph}(\pi(p))=l$. Furthermore, since the fact $(l: p)$ is in the program $P$, it follows that $l \in T_{P} \uparrow^{1}(\mathbf{0})(p)$.

In the remain cases, we proceed by structural induction assuming that for every natural number $h \leq n-1$, atom $p$ and proof $\pi(p)$ of $p$ w.r.t. $P$ whose height $(\pi(p))=h$ it holds that $\operatorname{graph}(\pi(p)) \in T_{P} \uparrow^{h}(\mathbf{0})(p)$ and we will show it in case that $h=n$.

Since $\operatorname{height}\left(\pi_{p}\right)>1$ it has a non empty antecedent, i.e.

$$
\pi(p)=\frac{\pi\left(q_{1}\right), \ldots, \pi\left(q_{m}\right)}{p}(l)
$$

where $l$ is the label of the rule $l: p \leftarrow q_{1}, \ldots, q_{m}$. By height definition, for each $q_{i}$ it holds that $\operatorname{height}\left(\pi\left(q_{i}\right)\right) \leq n-1$ and so that, by induction hypothesis, $\operatorname{graph}\left(\pi\left(q_{i}\right)\right) \in T_{P} \uparrow^{h-1}(\mathbf{0})\left(q_{i}\right)$. Thus, from Lemmas 0.3 and 0.8 , it follows respectively that

$$
\begin{aligned}
& \prod\left\{\operatorname{graph}\left(\pi\left(q_{i}\right)\right) \mid 1 \leq i \leq m\right\} \cdot l \in T_{P} \uparrow^{h}(\mathbf{0})(p) \\
\operatorname{graph}(\pi(p))= & \prod\left\{\operatorname{graph}\left(\pi\left(q_{i}\right)\right) \mid 1 \leq i \leq m\right\} \cdot l
\end{aligned}
$$

That is, $\operatorname{graph}(\pi(p)) \in T_{P} \uparrow^{h}(\mathbf{0})(p)$.

## Lemma 0.10

Let $P$ be a positive, completely labelled program and $\pi(p)$ be a proof of $p$ w.r.t. $P$. For every atom $p$ and maximal causal graph $G \in T_{P} \uparrow^{\omega}(\mathbf{0})(p)$ there is a non-redundant proof $\pi(p)$ for $p$ w.r.t. $P$ s.t. $\operatorname{graph}(\pi(p))=G$.

Proof. From Lemma 0.5 for any maximal graph $G \in T_{P} \uparrow^{k}(\mathbf{0})(p)$, there is a rule $l: p \leftarrow q_{1}, \ldots, q_{m}$ and maximal graphs $G_{q_{1}} \in T_{P} \uparrow^{h-1}(\mathbf{0})\left(q_{1}\right), \ldots, G_{q_{m}} \in T_{P} \uparrow^{k-1}(\mathbf{0})\left(q_{m}\right)$ s.t.

$$
G=\left(G_{q_{1}} * \ldots * G_{q_{m}}\right) \cdot l
$$

Furthermore, we assume as induction hypothesis that for every atom $q_{i}$ there is a non redundant proof $\pi\left(q_{i}\right)$ for $q_{i}$ w.r.t. $P$ s.t. $\operatorname{graph}\left(\pi\left(q_{i}\right)\right)=G_{q_{i}}$. Then $\pi(p)$ defined as

$$
\pi(p)=\frac{\pi\left(q_{1}\right), \ldots, \pi\left(q_{m}\right)}{p}(l)
$$

is a proof for $p$ w.r.t. $P$ which holds $\operatorname{graph}(\pi(p))=G_{p}$ (from Lemma 0.8) and $\operatorname{height}(\pi(p) \leq$ $h$. Furthermore, suppose that $\pi(p)$ is redundant, i.e. there is a proog $\pi^{\prime}$ for $p$ w.r.t $P$ such that $\operatorname{graph}(\pi(p))<\operatorname{graph}\left(\pi^{\prime}\right)$. Let $h=\operatorname{height}\left(\pi^{\prime}\right)$. Then, from Lemma 0.9, it follows that $\operatorname{graph}\left(\pi^{\prime}\right) \in T_{P} \uparrow^{h}(\mathbf{0})(p)$ and then $\operatorname{graph}\left(\pi^{\prime}\right) \in T_{P} \uparrow^{\omega}(\mathbf{0})(p)$ which contradicts the hypothesis that $G$ is maximal in $T_{P} \uparrow{ }^{\omega}(\mathbf{0})(p)$.

Proof of Theorem 3. From Theorem 2 it follows that the least model $I$ is equal to $T_{P} \uparrow{ }^{\omega}(\mathbf{0})$. For the only if direction, from Lemma 0.10, it follows that for every maximal c-graph $G \in I(p)=$ $T_{P} \uparrow^{\omega}(\mathbf{0})(p)$ there is a non-redundant proof $\pi(p)$ for $p$ w.r.t $P$ s.t. $G=\operatorname{graph}(\pi(p))$. That is, $\pi(p) \in \Pi_{p}$ and then $G=\operatorname{graph}(\pi(p)) \in \operatorname{graph}\left(\Pi_{p}\right)$. For the if direction, from Lemma 0.9 , for every $G \in \operatorname{graph}\left(\Pi_{p}\right)$, i.e. $G=\operatorname{graph}(\pi(p))$ for some non-redundant proof $\pi(p)$ for $p$ w.r.t. $P$, it holds that $G \in T_{P} \uparrow^{\omega}(\mathbf{0})(p)$ and so that $G \in I(p)$. Furthermore, suppose that $G$ is not maximal, i.e. there is a maximal c-graph $G^{\prime} \in I(p)$ s.t. $G<G^{\prime}$ and a proof $\pi^{\prime}$ for $p$ w.r.t. $P$ s.t. $\operatorname{graph}\left(\pi^{\prime}\right)=G^{\prime}$ which contradicts that $\pi(p)$ is non-redundant.
Lemma 0.11
Let $t$ be a causal term. Then value $(t[l \mapsto u])=\operatorname{value}(t)[l \mapsto u]$.
Proof. We proceed by structural induction. In case that $t$ is a label. If $t=l$ then value $(l[l \mapsto$ $u]=\operatorname{value}(u)=\downarrow u=\operatorname{value}(l)[l \mapsto u]$. If $t=l^{\prime} \neq l$ then value $\left(l^{\prime}[l \mapsto u]=\operatorname{value}\left(l^{\prime}\right)=\downarrow l^{\prime}=\right.$ value $\left(l^{\prime}\right)[l \mapsto u]$. In case that $t=\Pi T$ it follows that value $(\Pi T[l \mapsto u])=\bigcap\left\{\right.$ value $\left(t^{\prime}[l \mapsto\right.$ $\left.\left.u]) \mid t^{\prime} \in T\right\}\right)$ and by induction hypothesis value $\left(t^{\prime}[l \mapsto u]\right)=\operatorname{value}\left(t^{\prime}\right)[l \mapsto u]$. Then value $(\Pi T[l \mapsto$ $\left.u])=\bigcap\left\{\operatorname{value}\left(t^{\prime}\right)[l \mapsto u] \mid t^{\prime} \in T\right\}\right)=\operatorname{value}(\Pi T)[l \mapsto u]$. The cases for $t=\Sigma T$ is analogous. In case that $t=t_{1} \cdot t_{2}$ it follows that value $(t[l \mapsto u])=\operatorname{value}\left(t_{1}[l \mapsto u]\right) \cdot \operatorname{value}\left(t_{2}[l \mapsto u]\right)=$ value $\left(t_{1}\right)[l \mapsto u] \cdot \operatorname{value}\left(t_{2}\right)[l \mapsto u]=\operatorname{value}(t)[l \mapsto u]$

Proof of Theorem 4. From Theorem 2, models $I$ and $I^{\prime}$ are respectively equal to $T_{P} \uparrow{ }^{\omega}(\mathbf{0})$ and $T_{P^{\prime}} \uparrow{ }^{\omega}(\mathbf{0})$. Furthermore, from Lemma 0.7, it follows that $T_{P^{\prime}} \uparrow{ }^{\omega}(\mathbf{0})(p)=T_{P} \uparrow{ }^{\omega}(\mathbf{0})(p)[l \mapsto u]$ for any atom $p$. Lemma 0.11 shows that the replacing can be done in any causal term without operate it.

Proof of Theorem 5. It is clear that if every rule in $P$ is unlabelled, i.e. $P=P^{\prime}$, then their least model assigns 0 to every false atom and 1 to every true atom, so that their least models coincide with the classical one, i.e. $I=I^{\prime}$ and then $I^{c l}=I=I^{\prime}$. Otherwise, let $P_{n}$ be a program where $n$ rules are labelled. We can build a program $P_{n-1}$ removing one label $l$ and, from Theorem 4, it follows that $I_{n-1}=I_{n}[l \rightarrow 1]$. By induction hypothesis the corresponding classical interpretation of least model of $P_{n-1}$ coincides with the least model of the unlabelled program, i.e. $I_{n-1}^{c l}=I^{\prime}$, and then $I_{n}[l \mapsto 1]^{c l}=I_{n-1}^{c l}=I^{\prime}$. Furthermore, for every atom $p$ and c-graph $G$ it holds that $G \in I_{n}(p)$ iff $G[l \mapsto 1] \in I_{n}[l \mapsto 1](p)$. Simple remain to note that value $(z)=\emptyset$, so that $I_{n}(p)=0$ iff $I_{n}[l \mapsto 1](p)=0$ and consequently $I_{n}^{c l}=I_{n}[l \mapsto 1]^{c l}=I^{\prime}$.

Proof of Theorem 6. By definition $I$ and $I^{c l}$ assigns 0 to the same atoms, so that $P^{I}=P^{I^{c l}}$. Furthermore let $Q$ (instead of $P^{\prime}$ for clarity) be the unlabelled version of $P$. Then $Q^{I^{c l}}$ is the unlabelled version of $P^{I}$. (1) Let $I$ be a stable model of $P$ and $J$ be the least model of $Q^{I^{c l}}$. Then, $I$ is the least model of $P^{I}$ and, from Theorem 5, it follows that $I^{c l}=J$, i.e. $I^{c l}$ is a stable model of $Q$. (2) Let $I^{\prime}$ is a stable model of $Q$ and $I$ be the least model of $I^{I^{\prime}}$. Since $I^{\prime}$ is a stable model of $Q$, by definition it is the least model of $Q^{I^{\prime}}$, furthermore, since $Q^{I^{\prime}}$ is the unlabelled version of $P^{I^{\prime}}$ it follows, from Theorem 5, that $I^{c l}=I^{\prime}$. Note that $P^{I}=P^{I^{c l}}=P^{I^{\prime}}$. Thus $I$ is a stable model of $P$.


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[^1]:    ${ }^{1}$ Notice how strong negation would point out the cause(s) for a boolean fluent to take value false, whereas default negation represents the absence of cause.

