**Online Appendix**

**Table R.2. Multinomial Logit Estimates for Correlates of Strategic Choices**

|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | **Model 1 (2016)** | | |  | **Model 2 (2019)** | | |  | **Model 3 (2020)** | | |
|  | **Isolation** | **Bandwagon** | **Balance** |  | **Isolation** | **Bandwagon** | **Balance** |  | **Isolation** | **Bandwagon** | **Balance** |
| Economic Coercion | 1.913\*\* | 0.717\*\* | 1.609\*\* |  | 1.225 | 0.758\*\* | 2.524\*\*\* |  | 1.403 | 0.558\*\*\* | 2.410\*\*\* |
|  | [0.444] | [0.093] | [0.279] |  | [0.308] | [0.097] | [0.461] |  | [0.293] | [0.084] | [0.367] |
| Hostility | 1.218 | 0.79 | 0.677 |  | 0.836 | 0.795 | 0.669 |  | 0.542\* | 0.465\*\* | 0.655 |
|  | [0.526] | [0.210] | [0.202] |  | [0.368] | [0.187] | [0.209] |  | [0.195] | [0.128] | [0.194] |
| Hostility Squared | 1.007 | 1.023 | 1.048\* |  | 1.016 | 1.02 | 1.046\* |  | 1.054\* | 1.064\*\* | 1.044\* |
|  | [0.035] | [0.025] | [0.027] |  | [0.038] | [0.021] | [0.027] |  | [0.031] | [0.024] | [0.025] |
| Age | 1.061 | 1.143\*\* | 1.006 |  | 1.145 | 1.032 | 1.118\* |  | 0.891 | 0.977 | 0.94 |
|  | [0.075] | [0.055] | [0.057] |  | [0.117] | [0.054] | [0.071] |  | [0.065] | [0.058] | [0.051] |
| Age Squared | 1 | 0.999\*\* | 1 |  | 0.999 | 1 | 0.999 |  | 1.002\*\* | 1 | 1.001\* |
|  | [0.001] | [0.001] | [0.001] |  | [0.001] | [0.001] | [0.001] |  | [0.001] | [0.001] | [0.001] |
| Male | 0.529\* | 1.234 | 0.743 |  | 1.256 | 0.949 | 1.255 |  | 0.521\* | 0.757 | 1.462 |
|  | [0.198] | [0.295] | [0.215] |  | [0.568] | [0.227] | [0.365] |  | [0.203] | [0.195] | [0.381] |
| College | 0.430\*\* | 0.743 | 0.589 |  | 0.629 | 0.575\*\* | 0.458\*\* |  | 0.501\* | 0.697 | 0.908 |
|  | [0.167] | [0.205] | [0.196] |  | [0.308] | [0.150] | [0.148] |  | [0.210] | [0.202] | [0.269] |
| Status Quo | 0.223\*\* | 0.163\*\* | 0.53 |  | 0.557 | 0.327\*\* | 4.579\* |  | 0.709 | 0.478\* | 1.671 |
|  | [0.169] | [0.091] | [0.420] |  | [0.408] | [0.113] | [3.577] |  | [0.513] | [0.193] | [1.041] |
| Independence | 0.313 | 0.060\*\*\* | 0.68 |  | 1.578 | 0.259\*\* | 8.857\*\* |  | 0.52 | 0.190\*\* | 2.672 |
|  | [0.249] | [0.036] | [0.546] |  | [1.252] | [0.121] | [7.037] |  | [0.416] | [0.101] | [1.724] |
| Dual Identity | 0.87 | 2.015\*\* | 0.343\*\* |  | 1 | 2.458\*\*\* | 0.428\*\* |  | 0.526 | 2.014\*\* | 0.486\*\* |
|  | [0.363] | [0.506] | [0.140] |  | [0.501] | [0.621] | [0.145] |  | [0.243] | [0.589] | [0.146] |
| Chinese Identity | 0.741 | 4.180\* | 0.831 |  | 3.758 | 5.578\*\* | 0 |  | 0.35 | 0.696 | 0.041\*\* |
|  | [0.984] | [3.352] | [1.082] |  | [4.970] | [4.674] | [0.001] |  | [0.416] | [0.445] | [0.055] |
| US Defense | 0.816 | 0.676\*\* | 1.31 |  | 0.855 | 0.595\*\*\* | 1.337\* |  | 0.803 | 0.441\*\*\* | 1.21 |
|  | [0.165] | [0.089] | [0.220] |  | [0.205] | [0.074] | [0.223] |  | [0.180] | [0.065] | [0.188] |
| Self-Defense | 4.479\*\* | 1.426 | 2.668\*\* |  | 1.814 | 0.545\* | 2.257\*\* |  | 1.399 | 0.443\*\* | 1.993\*\* |
|  | [2.454] | [0.653] | [1.237] |  | [0.903] | [0.183] | [0.724] |  | [0.596] | [0.168] | [0.568] |

**Table R.2. Multinomial Logit Estimates for Correlates of Strategic Choices (Continued)**

|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | **Model 1 (2016)** | | |  | **Model 2 (2019)** | | |  | **Model 3 (2020)** | | |
|  | **Isolation** | **Bandwagon** | **Balance** |  | **Isolation** | **Bandwagon** | **Balance** |  | **Isolation** | **Bandwagon** | **Balance** |
| DPP | 1.521 | 0.487\* | 10.962\*\* |  | 1.665 | 0.406\*\* | 2.660\*\* |  | 3.283\* | 1.108 | 5.134\*\*\* |
|  | [0.975] | [0.180] | [8.659] |  | [1.140] | [0.179] | [1.252] |  | [2.015] | [0.497] | [2.189] |
| NP | 0 | 0.18 | 0 |  | 1.334 | 1415070.3 | 19.035 |  | 0.997 | 2824948.3 | 8.759 |
|  | [0.005] | [0.188] | [0.041] |  | [10696.308] | [4.240e+09] | [80176.066] |  | [5517.772] | [6.146e+09] | [25534.827] |
| PFP | 3.216 | 0.262\*\* | 6.085 |  | 16.722\* | 1.048 | 0 |  | 0 | 0 | 0 |
|  | [3.072] | [0.178] | [7.078] |  | [26.223] | [1.320] | [0.001] |  | [0.001] | [0.000] | [0.001] |
| TSU | 0 | 0 | 9.369 |  | 0.977 | 10.723 | 31824444.7 |  | 0 | 0 | 0.462 |
|  | [0.001] | [0.001] | [15.198] |  | [22202.937] | [113057.447] | [2.691e+11] |  | [0.001] | [0.001] | [0.900] |
| NPP | 3.201 | 0.421 | 7.831\*\* |  | 4.145 | 0.433 | 4.456\*\* |  | 0 | 0 | 12.535\*\* |
|  | [2.524] | [0.268] | [7.101] |  | [4.281] | [0.430] | [3.275] |  | [0.004] | [0.001] | [14.129] |
| TPP |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  | 1.346 | 0.847 | 1.571 |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  | [0.736] | [0.252] | [0.612] |
| Other Parties | 0.753 | 0.928 | 17.672\*\* |  | 1.411 | 1.188 | 1.817 |  | 6.575\*\* | 0.381 | 4.954\*\* |
|  | [0.923] | [0.513] | [16.356] |  | [1.678] | [0.651] | [1.342] |  | [5.896] | [0.402] | [3.475] |
| Non-Partisan | 2.174 | 1.024 | 6.921\*\* |  | 0.912 | 0.688 | 1.04 |  | 0.5 | 0.213\*\* | 1.318 |
|  | [1.275] | [0.310] | [5.416] |  | [0.543] | [0.177] | [0.436] |  | [0.590] | [0.118] | [0.832] |
| Log likelihood |  | -549.795 |  |  |  | -510.118 |  |  |  | -538.708 |  |
| N |  | 635 |  |  |  | 661 |  |  |  | 692 |  |

Note: The baseline category is Hedge. Standard errors in brackets. Coefficients presented as relative risk ratios (RRRs). Abbreviations for party variables: DPP: Democratic Progressive Party; NP: New Party; PFP: People First Party; TSU: Taiwan Solidarity Union; NPP: New Power Party; TPP: Taiwan People’s Party. The TPP is established in 2018 so the coefficients are unavailable for Models 1 and 2.  
\* p < 0.1, \*\* p < 0.05, \*\*\* p < 0.01.