**Online Appendix A. Evolution of Candidate Selection Methods for District Legislative Candidates in Taiwan: 1992 to 2020**

|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| **Year** | **KMT** | **DPP** | **NP** | **PFP** | **TSU** |
| 1992(2nd) | Party member primary (50%), and evaluation of local party cadre (50%), but decided by the central party headquarter | Consensus made in the party; otherwise determined by party member vote | N/A | N/A | N/A |
| 1995(3rd) | Consultation with local party members, by opinion polls, or by evaluation of local party cadres, then decided by the central party headquarter | Consensus made in the party; otherwise adopted party member voting (50%) plus party cadres voting (50%) | Decided by the central party headquarter | N/A | N/A |
| 1998(4th) | Same as 1995 | Compromises (or consensus) made in the party, otherwise adopted party member voting (50%) and opinion polls (50%) | Open primary | N/A | N/A |
| 2001(5th) | Party member primary (50%) plus opinion polls (50%) | Compromises (or consensus) made in the party, otherwise adopted party member voting (30%) and opinion polls (70%) | Decided by the central party headquarter. | Selectorate committee determined but referred opinion poll and party member’s opinion | Selectorate committee nominated but decided by party chair |
| 2004(6th) | Party member primary (30%) plus opinion polls (70%) | Same as 2001 | Incorporating into KMT and Nominated together | Selectorate committee determined | Selectorate committee determined |
| 2008(7th) | Same as 2004 | Same as 2001 but adding the “blues-exclusion survey” | Same as 2004 | Incorporating into KMT and nominated together | Same as 2004 |
| 2012(8th) | Candidates produced by opinion poll (100%) | Candidates produced by opinion poll (100%) | As same as 2001, but only nominate one candidate | Selectorate committee determined | Did not nominate |
| 2016(9th) | Same as 2012 | Same as 2012 | Did not nominate | Same as 2012 | Decided by the central party headquarter. |
| 2020(10th) | Same as 2012 | Same as 2012 | Same as 2016 | Same as 2012 | Did not nominate |

Data resource: revised from Kao( 2011) and Yu, Shoji, and Batto (2016), and updated by the author.

**Online Appendix B. Evolution of Candidate Selection Methods for List-PR Legislative Candidates in Taiwan: 1992 to 2020**

|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| **Year** | **KMT** | **DPP** | **NP** | **FPF** | **TSU** |
| 1992(2nd) | Party selectorate nominated and approved in central party headquarter.  | Consensus made in the party; otherwise, determined by party member vote | N/A | N/A | N/A |
| 1995(3rd) | Party selectorate nominated and approved in central party headquarter. Extra provisions: a reserved seat for one female candidate for every four candidates and a limit of one term tenure | Candidates produced by party member voting (50%) and party cadres voting (50%) | Determined by central party headquarter | N/A | N/A |
| 1998(4th) | Same as 1995 | Candidates produced by party member voting (100%) | Open primary | N/A | N/A |
| 2001(5th) | Same as 1995 | Candidates produced by party member voting (50%) and opinion poll (50%) | Determined by central party headquarter | Determined by the central party headquarter | Determined by party chair |
| 2004(6th) | Same as 1995 | Political group: party member vote (50%) and opinion poll (50%);Expert and social organization group: approved by the central executive committee | No nomination | Same as 2001 | Same as 2001 |
| 2008(7th) | Party selectorate nominated and approved in central party headquarters | Political group: party member vote (30%) and opinion poll (70%);Expert and social organization group: approved by the central executive committee | Determined by central party headquarter | Same as 2001 | Determined by central party headquarter |
| 2012(8th) | Same as 2008 | Determined by central party headquarter | Same as 2008 | Same as 2001 | Same as 2008 |
| 2016(9th) | Same as 2008 | Same as 2012 | Same as 2008 | Same as 2001 | Same as 2008 |
| 2020(10th) | Same as 2008 | Same as 2012 | Same as 2008 | Same as 2001 | Same as 2008 |

Data resource: revised from (Kao, 2011) and (Yu et al., 2016)) and updated by the author.

**Online Appendix C. Process of Interviews**

 First, I set some inclusion and exclusion criteria. I determined that the population should be legislators in the ninth Legislative Yuan, and I set some criteria to select the interviewees. First, the Speaker and the Vice-Speaker were not selected because of their hierarchical positions. They always presided at the general meeting and usually did not initiate bills or interpellate to the minister and, therefore, engaged in no observable behaviors. Second, legislators who resigned were excluded from the population. Once there was an open vacancy, a new legislator elected via by-election or substitution on the party list would fill the vacancy. Hence, the third criterion was that those who entered the Legislative Yuan via by-election or later substitution were excluded from the population if their tenures of office were shorter than one year.

 Second, I used random selection to determine the list of interviewees. I randomly selected a list of potential subjects, and I contacted them in order. Some legislators were willing to be interviewed in person, but some legislators appointed their assistants to represent them. In that case, I requested an interview with senior staff to ensure data quality. After selecting the sample from the qualified legislators, I contacted them by letter, email, and phone call in the middle of May 2019. The interviews were conducted during the summer of 2019.

 I began the legislator interviews at the end of May of 2019. Interviews were usually conducted at the legislators’ offices in the Legislative Yuan. However, due to the summer adjournment period, I met a few legislators at their local district service offices because local district legislators had activities scheduled in their districtsduring the adjournment period. Before officially starting the interview, I obtained interviewees’ signatures on a consent form. This consent form described what the subjects should know about this interview. More importantly, this consent form requested their permission for audiotaping. If they disagreed with audiotaping, I took notes to record their response.

 Each interview lasted 30 to 45 minutes. If interviewees did not want to answer any specific question during the interview, they could choose not to answer and jump to the next question. They could also terminate the interview at any moment. Fortunately, no interviewee withdrew from the research. At the end of the interview, each received a gift for my gratitude. I finished conducting interviews in July 2019. In total, I completed interviewers with 15 legislators in person or their legislative assistants (including two assistants working in the party caucus office).

 I did several things to maintain a confidential interview. First, the interviewee could select the place they preferred for an interview. Second, I did not reveal interviewees’ names in my dissertation but used a code name when I quoted their remarks. I used K (Kuomintang, KMT) and D (Democratic Progressive Party, DPP) to indicate party affiliation; M and F indicate male or female; and L and P indicate local district tier and list-PR tier, respectively. The number denotes the order. For instance, KML1 means this legislator is KMT male local district representative number 1. DFP3 indicates this legislator is a DPP female PR list representative number 3, etc. Third, the audiotapes and identifiers’ information was stored in different files. The data will not be transmitted to any third party in the future. After the dissertation is published, I will store all these digital data permanently on my personal computer with password protection.

 The final list of interviewees is presented in Table 6. I used code names to maintain the interviewees anonymously, but I revealed some background information in the notes. Of these 15 interviewees (except for two legislative assistants working in the party caucus), there are seven DPP members (53.8%), five KMT members (38.5%), and one PFP member (7.7%). Eight are male (61.5%), and five of them are female (38.5%). There are nine local district legislators (69.2%) and four list-PR members (30.8%. Six legislators accepted the interview in person (46.2%), and seven interviewees were legislative assistants (53.8%). Finally, 11 legislators had experiences in the pre-reform period. Although I interviewed legislators elected in the ninth term, the interviews could still provide valuable insights because most of them have experienced the pre-and post-reform periods. Many legislative assistants have worked in Legislative Yuan since the pre-reform period.

Table 6. List of Interviewed Legislators and Legislative Assistants

|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| ID | Party | Gender | Electoral Tier | Cross-periods | Notes |
| DML1 | DPP | Male | SMD | No | In-person |
| DML2 | DPP | Male | SMD | Yes | Legislative assistant |
| DML3 | DPP | Male | SMD | Yes | In-person |
| DFL1 | DPP | Female | SMD | Yes | In-person |
| DFL2 | DPP | Female | SMD | Yes | Legislative assistant |
| DFL3 | DPP | Female | SMD | Yes | Legislative assistant |
| DFP | DPP | Female | Party-list | No | In-person |
| KML1 | KMT | Male | SMD | No | In-person |
| KML2 | KMT | Male | SMD | Yes | In-person |
| KML3 | KMT | Male | SMD | Yes | Legislative assistantDecline to voice-recording |
| KMP | KMT | Male | Party-list | Yes | Legislative assistant |
| KFP | KMT | Female | Party-list | No | Legislative assistant |
| PMP | PFP | Male | Party-list | Yes | Legislative assistant |
| DFC | DPP | Female | N/A | Yes | Party caucus assistant |
| PMC | PFP | Male | N/A | Yes | Party caucus assistant |

Note: The first letter of ID uses “D” to indicate the DPP, “K” indicates the KMT, and the “P” indicates “PFP.” The second letter of ID uses “M” to indicate the male and “F” to indicate the female. The third letter of ID uses “L” to indicate the local district tier, and “P” indicates the party-list tier. The fourth letter of the ID uses a number as the previous three letters are not enough to differentiate the interview.

**Online Appendix D. Additional Analysis of District Legislators**

District legislators faced the largest impact from electoral reform: district magnitude decreases from MMD to SMD. District legislators are expected to be more likely to defect from the party line than list-PR members because they need to represent their constituents. However, the opportunity cost of defection for district legislators should be different before and after electoral reform. Due to a smaller winning quota, SNTV encourages intraparty competition, and thus candidates have a strong incentive to emphasize their personal characteristics, distinguishing themselves from other candidates and rebel parties if they are not nominated (Carey & Shugart, 1995; Cox & Rosenbluth, 1993; Shugart et al., 2005). Under SMD, the party label becomes important in the election. The big parties particularly enjoy the electoral advantage under SMD. The evidence is that small parties have little chance of winning a plurality election after electoral reform (Stockton, 2010; Wu, 2008). Candidates without the party’s endorsement should find it difficult to win the election.

Consequently, district legislators elected in MMD should be more likely to defect from the party than those elected in SMD. I additionally examined the behavior of district legislators and included two additional variables in the regressional models: nature log of district magnitude and electoral security. First, in Taiwan, the district magnitude ranges from one to 13 during the SNTV period. The MPs elected in a higher district magnitude have a higher likelihood of adopting a constituency representation role, spending more time in the district (André & Depauw, 2013). Legislators elected in higher DM tended to exhibit personal vote earning attributes (André, Depauw, and Deschouwer 2014; Carey and Shugart 1995; Shugart, Valdini, and Suominen 2005). They attempted to distinguish themselves from the other competitors and cultivate a personal vote, and this incentive grows as the district magnitude increases. By contrast, local district legislators elected in SMDs were expected to face a higher level of cross-pressure from the constituent and the party leader. Party labels became more important in SMD. They should have a strong incentive to maintain the party’s image and present a broader constituent.

Second, existing literature shows that electoral vulnerability affects legislators’ behaviors. Previous empirical studies found that the legislators elected in marginal districts provided more constituency service than those who had a higher level of electoral security (Cain et al., 1987), and they would pay more attention to the policy preferred by their constituents (Immergut & Abou-Chadi, 2014). Besides, MPs who have a higher electoral security level decrease their response rates to constituent requests and increase the bills initiation (Dropp and Peskowitz 2012). Besides, a study on European countries showed that political parties tended to assign vulnerable legislators to distributive committees (e.g., more influential committees) where legislators could extract benefits and distribute them to their constituents (Riera & Cantú, 2018). André, Depauw, and Martin (2015) concluded that legislators value reelection; vulnerable incumbents should devote more resources to the goal of reelection. I expect that legislators who have higher electoral security levels should be more likely to toe the party line. By contract, vulnerable legislators should be more likely to defect parties and stand with their constituents. To measure electoral security comparable across the two periods (SNTV-MMD and SMD) before and after electoral reform, I adopted the indicator proposed by Olivella and Tavits (2013). The electoral security was computed as the difference between the local district candidate’s share of votes and Lijphart’s (1999) effective electoral threshold, calculated as 0.75/(M+1), where M is the district magnitude.

Table 7. OLS Model of Defection and Absence Rates: District Legislators Only

|  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|   |  (7) |  (8) |  (9) |  (10) |
|  | Type II Defection Rate | Absence Rate |
|   | Pre-reform | Post-reform | Pre-reform | Post-reform |
| DPP | -0.000 | -0.001 | -0.078\*\*\* | -0.147\*\*\* |
|   | (0.003) | (0.001) | (0.018) | (0.031) |
| PFP | -0.005\* |  | -0.040\* |  |
|   | (0.003) |  | (0.022) |  |
| TSU | 0.003 |  | -0.029 |  |
|   | (0.004) |  | (0.026) |  |
| Undergraduate | 0.006 | 0.002 | -0.026 | -0.193 |
|   | (0.004) | (0.001) | (0.034) | (0.150) |
| Graduate | 0.004 | 0.001 | -0.046 | -0.168 |
|   | (0.003) | (0.001) | (0.032) | (0.149) |
| Female | -0.003 | 0.000 | -0.017 | 0.033 |
|   | (0.003) | (0.001) | (0.015) | (0.035) |
| Seniority | 0.001 | 0.001\* | 0.010 | 0.001 |
|   | (0.001) | (0.000) | (0.006) | (0.011) |
| Chair | 0.001 | 0.000 | -0.009 | -0.020\*\* |
|   | (0.002) | (0.000) | (0.007) | (0.009) |
| Local Faction | 0.001 | -0.001 | 0.017 | 0.006 |
|   | (0.002) | (0.001) | (0.012) | (0.036) |
| Local Politics | 0.001 | 0.000 | -0.017 | 0.005 |
|   | (0.002) | (0.001) | (0.016) | (0.034) |
| District Magnitude | -0.001 |  | -0.019 |  |
|   | (0.002) |  | (0.018) |  |
| Electoral Security | -0.096\*\*\* | -0.010 | -0.121 | 0.146 |
|   | (0.029) | (0.006) | (0.235) | (0.173) |
| Sixth Term  | -0.013\*\*\* |  | -0.049\*\*\* |  |
|   | (0.002) |  | (0.013) |  |
| Eighth Term |  | 0.002\*\*\* |  | -0.091\*\*\* |
|   |  | (0.001) |  | (0.027) |
| Constant | 0.020\*\*\* | 0.001 | 0.214\*\*\* | 0.427\*\*\* |
|   | (0.006) | (0.001) | (0.059) | (0.146) |
| Observation | 334 | 149 | 334 | 149 |
| R-squared  | 0.139 | 0.186 | 0.176 | 0.282 |
| Note 1: Standard errors are in parenthesis.  |
| Note 2*: \*\*\* p* < .01, *\*\* p* < .05, *\* p* < .1*.*  |

Table 7 presents the outcomes. It shows that there is no statistical significance among the different district magnitudes. Legislators elected in different district magnitude had no difference in Type II defection rate and absence rate. However, the results show that legislators with more electoral security were less likely to defect from the party line. The conventional view is that the more electorally vulnerable the legislator, the more responsive they should be to constituents and more attentive to the public opinion (André et al., 2015; Dropp & Peskowitz, 2012). Thus, electorally vulnerable legislators were more likely to defect from the party when constituents’ preferences clashed with the party’s position. But, I did not find any effect of electoral security on absence rates.

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