

## 9 Appendix

### Section 3: First Best Allocations.

**Proof of Lemma 1.** a.  $\Omega(x^1, \mu)$  is (at least once) continuously differentiable in  $x^1$ , with  $\Omega(0, \mu) = +\infty$ , and  $\Omega(1, \mu) = -\infty$ . By the Intermediate Value Theorem a value  $z \in (0, 1)$  such that  $\Omega(z, \mu) = 0$  exists and is unique, since  $\frac{\partial \Omega(x^1, \mu)}{\partial x^1} = \mu u''(x^1) + (1 - \mu) u''(1 - x^1) < 0$  for all  $\mu \in (0, 1)$  and  $x^1 \in [0, 1]$ . b. By the Implicit Function Theorem,  $z(\mu)$  is (at least once) continuously differentiable in  $\mu$ , with  $\frac{\partial z(\mu)}{\partial \mu} = -\frac{\frac{\partial \Omega(x^1, \mu)}{\partial \mu}}{\frac{\partial \Omega(x^1, \mu)}{\partial x^1}} \Big|_{x^1=z} > 0$ , since  $\frac{\partial \Omega(x^1, \mu)}{\partial \mu} = u'(x^1) + u'(1 - x^1) > 0$  for all  $\mu \in (0, 1)$  and  $x^1 \in [0, 1]$ ; c.  $z(0) = 0$  and  $z(1) = 1$ , since a type with zero weight in the objective function should be assigned zero consumption at an optimum;  $\Omega(x_t^1, \frac{1}{2}) = \frac{1}{2} [u'(x_t^1) - u'(1 - x_t^1)] = 0 \Leftrightarrow x_t^1 = 1 - x_t^1$ , hence,  $z(\frac{1}{2}) = \frac{1}{2}$ . ■

### Section 4: Non-Monetary Regime.

The proof of Lemma 2 requires some definitions and three preparatory Lemmas. Although only values of  $y \geq \frac{1}{2}$  are feasible, it will be more convenient to consider  $y \in [0, 1]$ , as a first step. Then, we will restrict  $y$  to the feasible interval  $[\frac{1}{2}, 1]$ . Let the function  $\Psi_T(y, \beta) : [0, 1] \times (0, 1) \rightarrow \mathbb{R}$  be defined as

$$\Psi_T(y, \beta) \equiv f_T(\beta) [u(1 - y) - u(0)] - g_T(\beta) [u(1) - u(y)], \quad (24)$$

i.e. as the difference between the LHS and the RHS of (9). Define also  $y_T(\beta) : (0, 1) \rightarrow [0, 1]$  as the function that explicitly relates pairs of values  $(y, \beta) \in [0, 1] \times (0, 1)$  such that  $\Psi_T(y, \beta) = 0$ , for any given  $T$ . Define the function  $\hat{y}_T(\beta) : (0, 1) \rightarrow [\frac{1}{2}, 1]$ , as  $\hat{y}_T(\beta) \equiv \max \{y_T(\beta), \frac{1}{2}\}$ , for any  $\beta \in (0, 1)$  and  $T$ , i.e. the restriction of  $y_T(\beta)$  to

feasible values in  $[\frac{1}{2}, 1]$ .

**Lemma A1.** *a. For any  $\beta \in (0, 1)$  and  $T > 0$ , there exists exactly one value  $y \in [0, 1)$  s.t.  $\Psi_T(y, \beta) = 0$ . b. For any  $T > 0$ , the function  $y_T(\beta)$  is (at least twice) continuously differentiable in  $\beta$ , with  $\frac{\partial y_T(\beta)}{\partial \beta} < 0$  for all  $\beta \in (0, 1)$ .*

**Proof.** a. The function  $\Psi_T(y, \beta) : [0, 1] \times (0, 1) \rightarrow \mathbb{R}$  is (at least twice) continuously differentiable in  $y$ . Observe that, for any  $T > 0$ , the following are true: i.  $\Psi_T(0, \beta) = -\frac{1+\beta^{T+1}}{1+\beta} [u(1) - u(0)] < 0$ , ii.  $\Psi_T(1, \beta) = 0$ , iii.  $\frac{\partial \Psi_T(y, \beta)}{\partial y} = -\frac{\beta(1-\beta^T)}{1-\beta^2} u'(1-y) + \frac{1-\beta^{T+2}}{1-\beta^2} u'(y)$ , iv.  $\frac{\partial \Psi_T(0, \beta)}{\partial y} = +\infty$ ,  $\frac{\partial \Psi_T(1, \beta)}{\partial y} = -\infty$ , v.  $\frac{\partial^2 \Psi_T(y, \beta)}{\partial y^2} = \frac{\beta(1-\beta^T)}{1-\beta^2} u''(1-y) + \frac{1-\beta^{T+2}}{1-\beta^2} u''(y) < 0$ . Hence, for any  $\beta \in (0, 1)$  and  $T > 0$ , there is exactly one  $y \in [0, 1)$  s.t.  $\Psi_T(y, \beta) = 0$ . b. The derivative  $\frac{\partial \Psi_T(y, \beta)}{\partial y}$  evaluated at any  $(y, \beta) \in (0, 1) \times (0, 1)$  such that  $\Psi_T(y, \beta) = 0$  is given by

$$g_T(\beta) [u(1) - u(y)] \left[ \frac{u'(y)}{u(1) - u(y)} - \frac{u'(1-y)}{[u(1-y) - u(0)]} \right] > 0, \quad (25)$$

since  $\frac{u'(y)}{u(1)-u(y)} > \frac{1}{1-y} > \frac{u'(1-y)}{[u(1-y)-u(0)]}$  for any  $y \in (0, 1)$  by strict concavity of the utility function. Therefore, the Implicit Function Theorem applies and  $y_T(\beta)$  is (at least twice) continuously differentiable in  $\beta$ . The derivative  $\frac{\partial \Psi_T(y, \beta)}{\partial \beta}$  evaluated at any  $(y, \beta) \in (0, 1) \times (0, 1)$  such that  $\Psi_T(y, \beta) = 0$  is given by

$$g_T(\beta) [u(1) - u(y)] \left[ \frac{f'_T(\beta)}{f_T(\beta)} - \frac{g'_T(\beta)}{g_T(\beta)} \right] > 0, \quad (26)$$

since  $f'_T(\beta) = \sum_{j=1}^{\frac{T}{2}} (2j-1) \beta^{2j-2} > \sum_{j=0}^{\frac{T}{2}} 2j \beta^{2j-1} = g'_T(\beta)$  and  $g_T(\beta) = \frac{1-\beta^{T+2}}{1-\beta^2} > \frac{\beta(1-\beta^T)}{1-\beta^2} = f_T(\beta)$ . Thus,  $\frac{\partial y_T(\beta)}{\partial \beta} < 0$ , for any  $\beta \in (0, 1)$  and  $T > 0$ , since it is given

by the ratio (26) to (25) changed of sign, as an application of the Implicit Function

Theorem. ■

There are two possible cases,  $T$  infinite or finite. Case 1.  $T = \infty$ . Define  $\underline{\beta} \equiv \frac{u(1)-u(\frac{1}{2})}{u(\frac{1}{2})-u(0)} \in (0, 1)$ .

**Lemma A2.**  $\Gamma_\infty(\beta) = [\widehat{y}_\infty(\beta), 1]$  for all  $\beta \in (0, 1)$ , where  $\widehat{y}_\infty(\beta)$  is continuous, and

i.  $\widehat{y}_\infty(\beta) = \frac{1}{2}$ , if  $\beta \geq \underline{\beta}$ ;

ii.  $\widehat{y}_\infty(\beta) = y_\infty(\beta) \in (\frac{1}{2}, 1)$ , if  $\beta < \underline{\beta}$ .

**Proof.** The value  $\underline{\beta}$  satisfies

$$\Psi_\infty\left(\frac{1}{2}, \underline{\beta}\right) = \frac{1}{1 - \underline{\beta}^2} \left[ \underline{\beta} \left[ u\left(\frac{1}{2}\right) - u(0) \right] - \left[ u(1) - u\left(\frac{1}{2}\right) \right] \right] = 0.$$

Thus,  $y_\infty(\underline{\beta}) = \frac{1}{2}$ . By Lemma A1,  $y_\infty(\beta)$  is (at least twice) continuously differentiable and strictly decreasing function for any  $\beta \in (0, 1)$ . Hence, we have that for  $\beta \in (0, \underline{\beta})$ ,  $y_\infty(\beta) > \frac{1}{2}$ ,  $\lim_{\beta \rightarrow \underline{\beta}^-} y_\infty(\beta) = \frac{1}{2}$  and for  $\beta \in [\underline{\beta}, 1)$ ,  $y_\infty(\beta) \leq \frac{1}{2}$ . By definition  $\widehat{y}_T(\beta) \equiv \max\{y_T(\beta), \frac{1}{2}\}$ . Thus, we have

$$\widehat{y}_\infty(\beta) = \begin{cases} \frac{1}{2}, & \text{if } \beta \geq \underline{\beta} \\ y_\infty(\beta), & \text{if } \beta < \underline{\beta} \end{cases},$$

which is continuous in  $\beta \in (0, 1)$ , since  $\lim_{\beta \rightarrow \underline{\beta}^-} y_\infty(\beta) = \frac{1}{2}$ . ■

Case 2.  $T$  finite,  $0 < T < \infty$ . Notice that  $\bar{T}$  is defined in the text as  $\bar{T} \equiv \left\lfloor \frac{2[u(1)-u(\frac{1}{2})]}{2u(\frac{1}{2})-u(1)-u(0)} \right\rfloor \in \mathbb{N}$ , where, for any  $w \in \mathbb{R}_+$ ,  $[w]$  denotes the largest natural number not greater than  $w$ .

**Lemma A3.**  $\Gamma_T(\beta) = [\widehat{y}_T(\beta), 1]$  for all  $\beta \in (0, 1)$ , where  $\widehat{y}_T(\beta)$  is continuous, and

a. if  $T > \bar{T}$ , there exists a unique  $\underline{\beta}_T \in (0, 1)$  such that:

i.  $\hat{y}_T(\beta) = \frac{1}{2}$ , for  $\beta \geq \underline{\beta}_T$ ;

ii.  $\hat{y}_T(\beta) = y_T(\beta) \in (\frac{1}{2}, 1)$ , for  $\beta < \underline{\beta}_T$ ;

b. if  $T \leq \bar{T}$ , for all  $\beta \in (0, 1)$ ,  $\hat{y}_T(\beta) = y_T(\beta) \in (\frac{1}{2}, 1)$ .

**Proof.** a. Evaluate  $\Psi_T(y, \beta)$  at  $y = \frac{1}{2}$  and  $\beta \rightarrow 1$ , obtaining  $\lim_{\beta \rightarrow 1} \Psi_T(\frac{1}{2}, \beta) = (\frac{T}{2}) [u(\frac{1}{2}) - u(0)] - (\frac{T}{2} + 1) [u(1) - u(\frac{1}{2})]$ . Since  $T > \bar{T}$ ,  $\lim_{\beta \rightarrow 1} \Psi_T(\frac{1}{2}, \beta) > 0$ . Evaluate  $\Psi_T(y, \beta)$  at  $y = \frac{1}{2}$  and  $\beta \rightarrow 0$ , obtaining  $\lim_{\beta \rightarrow 0} \Psi_T(\frac{1}{2}, \beta) = -[u(1) - u(\frac{1}{2})] < 0$ . Since  $\Psi_T(\frac{1}{2}, \beta)$  is continuous in  $\beta$ , by the Intermediate Value Theorem there exists a value  $\underline{\beta}_T \in (0, 1)$  that solves  $\Psi_T(\frac{1}{2}, \beta) = 0$ . The derivative  $\frac{\partial \Psi_T(\frac{1}{2}, \beta)}{\partial \beta} = f'_T(\beta) [u(\frac{1}{2}) - u(0)] - g'_T(\beta) [u(1) - u(\frac{1}{2})] > 0$ , since  $f'_T(\beta) > g'_T(\beta)$  and  $u(\frac{1}{2}) - u(0) > u(1) - u(\frac{1}{2})$  by strict concavity of the utility function. Hence,  $\underline{\beta}_T$  is unique. i. By Lemma A1,  $y_T(\beta)$  is continuously differentiable with  $\lim_{\beta \rightarrow \underline{\beta}_T^-} y_T(\beta) = \frac{1}{2}$ ,  $\lim_{\beta \rightarrow 0^+} y_T(\beta) = 1$  and  $\frac{\partial y_T(\beta)}{\partial \beta} < 0$ . Hence, for  $\beta \in [\underline{\beta}_T, 1)$ ,  $y_T(\beta) \leq \frac{1}{2}$  and  $\hat{y}_T(\beta) = \frac{1}{2}$ . ii. If  $\beta \in (0, \underline{\beta}_T)$ , once again by Lemma A1,  $y_T(\beta) \in (\frac{1}{2}, 1)$  and  $\hat{y}_T(\beta) = y_T(\beta)$ . Therefore, by definition of  $\hat{y}_T(\beta)$ ,

$$\hat{y}_T(\beta) = \begin{cases} \frac{1}{2}, & \text{if } \beta \geq \underline{\beta}_T \\ y_T(\beta), & \text{if } \beta < \underline{\beta}_T \end{cases},$$

which is continuous in  $\beta \in (0, 1)$ , since  $\lim_{\beta \rightarrow \underline{\beta}_T^-} y_T(\beta) = \frac{1}{2}$ . b. Since  $T \leq \bar{T}$ ,  $y = \frac{1}{2}$  never satisfies the participation constraint for any  $\beta \in (0, 1)$ . A solution of  $\Psi_T(y, \beta) = 0$  in  $y \in (\frac{1}{2}, 1)$  exists for any  $\beta \in (0, 1)$ , by the Intermediate Value Theorem, and is unique by the same argument used in part a. By Lemma A1,  $y_T(\beta)$  is continuously

differentiable in  $\beta$  with  $\lim_{\beta \rightarrow 1^-} y_T(\beta) \geq \frac{1}{2}$ ,  $\lim_{\beta \rightarrow 0^+} y_T(\beta) = 1$  and  $\frac{\partial y_T(\beta)}{\partial \beta} < 0$ . Hence, for all  $\beta \in (0, 1)$ ,  $y_T(\beta) \in (\frac{1}{2}, 1)$ . Therefore, by definition of  $\widehat{y}_T(\beta)$ ,  $\widehat{y}_T(\beta) = y_T(\beta)$ , for all  $\beta \in (0, 1)$ . ■

**Proof of Lemma 2.** With  $T = 0$ ,  $\Gamma_0(\beta) = \{1\}$ , hence, in this case the statement follows immediately. Consider  $T > 0$ . By Lemmas A2-A3, for any  $\beta \in (0, 1)$  and  $T > 0$ ,  $\Gamma_T(\beta) = [\widehat{y}_T(\beta), 1]$  is a non-empty, closed and bounded interval of the real line, hence,  $\Gamma_T(\beta)$  is non-empty, compact and convex-valued. For any  $T > 0$ , the upper boundary of  $\Gamma_T(\beta)$  is constant and the lower boundary,  $\widehat{y}_T(\beta)$ , varies continuously with  $\beta$ , by the previous Lemmas A2-A3, hence the correspondence  $\Gamma_T(\beta)$  is continuous in  $\beta$ . ■

The next Lemma is the formal proof of the statement made in the text that the set of sustainable allocations becomes larger for larger values of  $T$ . Define, for given  $T$ ,  $Gr(\Gamma_T) \equiv \{(y, \beta) \in [\frac{1}{2}, 1] \times (0, 1) \mid y \in \Gamma_T(\beta)\}$ , the graph of the correspondence  $\Gamma_T$ .

**Lemma A4.**  $Gr(\Gamma_T) \subset Gr(\Gamma_{T'}) \subset Gr(\Gamma_\infty)$ , for any finite  $T', T$  with  $T' > T$ .

**Proof.** (24) can be rewritten as  $\Psi_T(y, \beta) =$

$$g_T(\beta) \left\{ \frac{f_T(\beta)}{g_T(\beta)} [u(1-y) - u(0)] - [u(1) - u(y)] \right\} \geq 0. \quad (27)$$

The term  $g_T(\beta) = \frac{1-\beta^{T+2}}{1-\beta^2}$  is clearly increasing in  $T$ . The term  $\frac{f_T(\beta)}{g_T(\beta)} = \beta \left( \frac{1-\beta^T}{1-\beta^{T+2}} \right) \leq \beta$ , and approaches  $\beta$  when  $T \rightarrow \infty$ . Moreover, for any  $\beta \in (0, 1)$  and any  $T', T$  such that  $T' > T \geq 0$ ,  $\frac{f_T(\beta)}{g_T(\beta)} < \frac{f_{T'}(\beta)}{g_{T'}(\beta)}$ , since  $\beta \left( \frac{1-\beta^T}{1-\beta^{T+2}} \right) < \beta \left( \frac{1-\beta^{T'}}{1-\beta^{T'+2}} \right) \Leftrightarrow \beta^T (1-\beta^2) (1-\beta^{T'-T}) > 0$ . Hence, the LHS of (27) is strictly higher for larger  $T$ ,

for any given  $\beta$  and  $y$ . ■

### Section 5: Monetary Regime.

**Lemma A5.** *An allocation  $\tilde{x} \in [\frac{1}{2}, 1)$  that solves (18) exists and is unique for every  $\pi \in [\beta - 1, \infty)$  and  $\beta \in (0, 1)$ .*

**Proof.**  $\Phi(x, \pi, \beta)$  is (at least once) continuously differentiable in  $x$ , with  $\Phi(1, \pi, \beta) = -\infty$ , and  $\Phi(\frac{1}{2}, \pi, \beta) = u'(x)(1 - \frac{\beta}{1+\pi}) \geq 0$ . Hence, by the Intermediate Value Theorem, there exists a value  $\tilde{x} \in [\frac{1}{2}, 1)$  that solves (18) for any  $\pi \in [\beta - 1, \infty)$  and  $\beta \in (0, 1)$ . Moreover,  $\tilde{x}$  is unique for any  $\pi$  and  $\beta$ , since  $\frac{\partial \Phi(x, \pi, \beta)}{\partial x} = u''(x) + \frac{\beta}{1+\pi} u''(1-x) < 0$  for all  $\pi \in [\beta - 1, \infty)$ ,  $\beta \in (0, 1)$  and  $x \in [\frac{1}{2}, 1)$ . ■

**Lemma A6.** *a. The function  $\tilde{x}(\pi, \beta)$  is at least once continuously differentiable in  $\pi$ ; b. i.  $\tilde{x}(\beta - 1, \beta) = \frac{1}{2}$ , ii.  $\lim_{\pi \rightarrow \infty} \tilde{x}(\pi, \beta) = 1$  for any  $\beta \in (0, 1)$ ; c. the derivative  $\frac{\partial \tilde{x}(\pi, \beta)}{\partial \pi} > 0$  for any  $\beta \in (0, 1)$ .*

**Proof.** Part a. and part c., follow from the Implicit Function Theorem, since  $\frac{\partial \Phi(x, \pi, \beta)}{\partial x} \Big|_{x=\tilde{x}} < 0$  from Lemma A5 and  $\frac{\partial \Phi(x, \pi, \beta)}{\partial \pi} \Big|_{x=\tilde{x}} = \frac{\beta}{(1+\pi)^2} u'(1-\tilde{x}) > 0$ . Part b.i. is obvious from inspection of (18) and b. ii. from the Inada condition. ■

**Proof of Lemma 3.** The set  $\tilde{\Gamma}(0, \beta) = [\tilde{x}(0, \beta), 1]$  is non-empty, since  $\tilde{x}(0, \beta) < 1$  for any  $\beta \in (0, 1)$ , compact, convex-valued and continuous in  $\beta$  since  $\tilde{x}(0, \beta)$  is continuous in  $\beta$  by Lemma A6. The set  $(\tilde{\Gamma}(\beta - 1, \beta) \setminus \tilde{\Gamma}(0, \beta)) = [\frac{1}{2}, 1] \setminus [\tilde{x}(0, \beta), 1] = [\frac{1}{2}, \tilde{x}(0, \beta))$  is non-empty, since  $\tilde{x}(0, \beta) > \frac{1}{2}$ , by (18) with  $\pi = 0$ , for any  $\beta \in (0, 1)$ . The set  $\Gamma_T(\beta) = [\hat{y}_T(\beta), 1]$  is non-empty, compact, convex-valued and continuous in  $\beta$  for any  $T \geq 0$  by Lemma 2. The set  $(\tilde{\Gamma}(\beta - 1, \beta) \setminus \tilde{\Gamma}(0, \beta)) \cap \Gamma_T(\beta) =$

$[\frac{1}{2}, \tilde{x}(0, \beta)) \cap [\hat{y}_T(\beta), 1]$  could be: 1. empty, if  $\hat{y}_T(\beta) \geq \tilde{x}(0, \beta)$ ; or 2. equal to  $[\hat{y}_T(\beta), \tilde{x}(0, \beta))$ , if  $\hat{y}_T(\beta) < \tilde{x}(0, \beta)$ . The set  $\Gamma_T^M(\beta) = [\frac{1}{2}, \tilde{x}(0, \beta)) \cap [\hat{y}_T(\beta), 1] \cup [\tilde{x}(0, \beta), 1]$  is equal to  $[\tilde{x}(0, \beta), 1]$  in case 1. and  $[\hat{y}_T(\beta), \tilde{x}(0, \beta)) \cup [\tilde{x}(0, \beta), 1] = [\hat{y}_T(\beta), 1]$  in case 2. In either case,  $\Gamma_T^M(\beta)$  is non-empty, compact, convex-valued and continuous in  $\beta$  for any  $T \geq 0$ . ■

### Section 6: Comparison of the Regimes.

**Proof of Proposition 1.**  $\Gamma_T^M(\beta) \equiv \left( \left( \tilde{\Gamma}(\beta - 1, \beta) \setminus \tilde{\Gamma}(0, \beta) \right) \cap \Gamma_T(\beta) \right) \cup \tilde{\Gamma}(0, \beta)$  by definition. For any given  $\beta \in (0, 1)$  and  $T \geq 0$ , there are two possible cases: the intersection is empty or not. 1.  $\left( \tilde{\Gamma}(\beta - 1, \beta) \setminus \tilde{\Gamma}(0, \beta) \right) \cap \Gamma_T(\beta) = \emptyset$ . Since  $\tilde{\Gamma}(\beta - 1, \beta) \setminus \tilde{\Gamma}(0, \beta) = [\frac{1}{2}, 1] \setminus [\tilde{x}(0, \beta), 1] = [\frac{1}{2}, \tilde{x}(0, \beta))$  and  $\Gamma_T(\beta) = [\hat{y}_T(\beta), 1]$  for the intersection to be empty it must be the case that  $\hat{y}_T(\beta) \geq \tilde{x}(0, \beta)$ , therefore  $\Gamma_T^M(\beta) = (\emptyset \cup [\tilde{x}(0, \beta), 1]) = [\tilde{x}(0, \beta), 1] \supseteq [\hat{y}_T(\beta), 1] = \Gamma_T(\beta)$ . Clearly, the inclusion is strict if  $\hat{y}_T(\beta) > \tilde{x}(0, \beta)$ , while the two sets coincide if  $\hat{y}_T(\beta) = \tilde{x}(0, \beta)$ . 2.  $\left( \tilde{\Gamma}(\beta - 1, \beta) \setminus \tilde{\Gamma}(0, \beta) \right) \cap \Gamma_T(\beta) \neq \emptyset$ . For the intersection to be non-empty it must be the case that  $\hat{y}_T(\beta) < \tilde{x}(0, \beta)$ , therefore  $\Gamma_T^M(\beta) = \left( [\frac{1}{2}, \tilde{x}(0, \beta)) \cap [\hat{y}_T(\beta), 1] \right) \cup [\tilde{x}(0, \beta), 1] = [\hat{y}_T(\beta), \tilde{x}(0, \beta)) \cup [\tilde{x}(0, \beta), 1] = [\hat{y}_T(\beta), 1] = \Gamma_T(\beta)$ . ■

The proof of Proposition 2 requires some definitions and a preparatory Lemma. The ex-ante welfare functions in the non-monetary and monetary regimes are the same, given by

$$\frac{1}{1 - \beta^2} \{ \mu [u(h) + \beta u(1 - h)] + (1 - \mu) [u(1 - h) + \beta u(h)] \}. \quad (28)$$

with  $h \in \mathbb{R}_+$ . Consider the problem of maximizing the ex-ante welfare function

with the only constraint that the choice should be feasible, i.e. maximize (28) in  $h \in [\frac{1}{2}, 1]$ . The objective function (28) is (at least twice) continuously differentiable, strictly increasing and strictly concave in the choice variable,  $h$ . Hence, for any  $(\mu, \beta)$  there exists a unique, global maximizer, which is characterized by the following necessary and sufficient conditions

$$\mu [u'(h) - \beta u'(1-h)] + (1-\mu) [-u'(1-h) + \beta u'(h)] - \rho + \nu = 0, \quad (29)$$

$$\rho(1-h) = 0, \quad (30)$$

$$\nu \left( h - \frac{1}{2} \right) = 0, \quad (31)$$

where  $\rho \geq 0$  and  $\nu \geq 0$  are the multipliers for the boundary conditions on  $h$ . Define  $h^*(\mu, \beta): [0, 1] \times (0, 1) \rightarrow [\frac{1}{2}, 1]$  as the function that satisfies (29), (30), (31). Define also  $\tilde{h}(\beta): (0, 1) \rightarrow [\frac{1}{2}, 1]$  as the function that satisfies

$$u'(h) - \beta u'(1-h) = 0, \quad (32)$$

for any  $\beta \in (0, 1)$ . Such a function is continuous in  $\beta \in (0, 1)$ , by the same argument used in Lemma A6 with  $\pi = 0$ .

**Lemma A7.**  $h^*(\mu, \beta) \leq \tilde{h}(\beta)$  for all  $\mu \in [0, 1]$  at any  $\beta \in (0, 1)$ .

**Proof.** First, observe that  $\rho\nu = 0$ . Second,  $\rho = 0$  always. Suppose  $\rho > 0$ , instead.

By (30),  $h = 1$  and (29) gives  $\rho = -\infty$ , which contradicts  $\rho > 0$ . Define

$$\Phi(h, \mu, \beta) \equiv \mu [u'(h) - \beta u'(1-h)] + (1-\mu) [-u'(1-h) + \beta u'(h)] + \nu = 0,$$

where  $\Phi(1, \mu, \beta) = -\infty$ ,  $\Phi(\frac{1}{2}, \mu, \beta) = (1-\beta)u'(\frac{1}{2})(2\mu-1) + \nu$ , and

$$\frac{\partial \Phi(h, \mu, \beta)}{\partial h} = u''(h)(\mu + \beta - \mu\beta) + u''(1-h)(1-\mu + \mu\beta) < 0.$$



Hence, for  $\mu \in [0, \frac{1}{2})$ ,  $\nu > 0$  and  $h^*(\mu, \beta) = \frac{1}{2} < \tilde{h}(\beta)$  by (31) and (32) for any  $\beta \in (0, 1)$ . For  $\mu \in [\frac{1}{2}, 1]$ , we have  $\nu = 0$ . Observe that  $\Phi(h, 1, \beta) = u'(h) - \beta u'(1-h) = 0$ , which gives  $h^*(1, \beta) = \tilde{h}(\beta)$  for any  $\beta \in (0, 1)$ , and  $\Phi(h, \frac{1}{2}, \beta) = \frac{1}{2}(1+\beta)[u'(h) - u'(1-h)] = 0$ , which gives  $h^*(\frac{1}{2}, \beta) = \frac{1}{2} < \tilde{h}(\beta)$  for any  $\beta \in (0, 1)$ .

The derivative

$$\frac{\partial h^*(\mu, \beta)}{\partial \mu} = -\frac{(1-\beta)[u'(h) + u'(1-h)]}{u''(h)(\mu + \beta - \mu\beta) + u''(1-h)(1-\mu + \mu\beta)} > 0.$$

The statement follows. ■

**Proof of Proposition 2.** i. "if" part. From the Proof of Proposition 1,  $\Gamma_T(\beta) \subset \Gamma_T^M(\beta) \Leftrightarrow \hat{y}_T(\beta) > \tilde{x}(0, \beta)$  for any given  $\beta \in (0, 1)$  and  $T \geq 0$ . From Lemma A7,  $h^*(\mu, \beta) \leq \tilde{h}(\beta)$  for all  $\mu \in [0, 1]$  at any given  $\beta \in (0, 1)$ . By definition,  $\tilde{x}(0, \beta) \equiv \tilde{h}(\beta)$  for any given  $\beta \in (0, 1)$ . If  $\hat{y}_T(\beta) > \tilde{x}(0, \beta)$  for some  $\beta \in (0, 1)$  and  $T \geq 0$ , we have  $h^*(\mu, \beta) \leq \tilde{h}(\beta) = \tilde{x}(0, \beta) < \hat{y}_T(\beta)$ , for any given  $\mu \in [0, 1]$ , at those values of  $\beta \in (0, 1)$  and  $T \geq 0$ . Since (28) is strictly concave in  $h$  and  $h^*(\mu, \beta)$  is the global maximum for any given  $\mu \in [0, 1]$  and  $\beta \in (0, 1)$ , the function (28) is strictly decreasing in  $h$  for any  $h > h^*(\mu, \beta)$ , for given  $\mu \in [0, 1]$  and  $\beta \in (0, 1)$ . By definition,  $W_T^*(\mu, \beta) = \max\{(28) \mid h \in [\hat{y}_T(\beta), 1]\}$  and  $W_T^{M*}(\mu, \beta) = \max\{(28) \mid h \in [\tilde{x}(0, \beta), 1]\}$ . The statement follows. ii. "only if" part. Suppose,  $\Gamma_T(\beta) = \Gamma_T^M(\beta)$  for some  $\beta \in (0, 1)$  and  $T \geq 0$ . The objective functions (11) and (21) are identical. The statement follows by definition of  $W_T^*(\mu, \beta)$  and  $W_T^{M*}(\mu, \beta)$ . ■

**Proof of Proposition 3.** For any  $\beta$ ,  $\tilde{x}(0, \beta)$  satisfies  $\beta = \frac{u'(\tilde{x})}{u'(1-\tilde{x})}$ . Moreover,

$\frac{u'(\tilde{x})}{u'(1-\tilde{x})} > \frac{u(1)-u(\tilde{x})}{u(1-\tilde{x})-u(0)}$  for any  $\tilde{x}$  by strict concavity of the utility function. Hence,  $\Psi_\infty(\tilde{x}, \beta) > 0$ , for any  $\beta \in (0, 1)$ . Thus, for any  $\beta \in (0, 1)$ ,  $\Gamma_\infty^M(\beta) = [\hat{y}_\infty(\beta), 1] = \Gamma_\infty(\beta)$ . ■

**Proof of Proposition 4.** For any  $T < \infty$ ,  $\hat{y}_T(\beta)$  and  $\tilde{x}(0, \beta)$  are continuous in  $\beta \in (0, 1)$ , by Lemmas A2-A3 and A6 respectively. When  $T < \bar{T}$ , we have  $\lim_{\beta \rightarrow 1} \hat{y}_T(\beta) = \bar{y}_T > \frac{1}{2}$ ; moreover,  $\lim_{\beta \rightarrow 1} \tilde{x}(0, \beta) = \frac{1}{2}$ . Therefore, by continuity, there exists an interval  $B_T \subseteq (0, 1)$  with non-empty interior, such that  $\hat{y}_T(\beta) > \tilde{x}(0, \beta)$ , for  $\beta \in B_T$ , and, thus,  $\Gamma_T(\beta) = [\hat{y}_T(\beta), 1] \subset [\tilde{x}(0, \beta), 1] = \Gamma_T^M(\beta)$ , for  $\beta \in B_T$ . ■

### Section 7: Discriminatory Transfers.

The proof that the set of allocations that satisfies (22) and (23) simultaneously is not empty requires some definitions. Let  $\sigma(\beta, T) \equiv \frac{g_T(\beta)}{h_T(\beta)} = \frac{1-\beta^{T+2}}{(1+\beta)(1-\beta^{T+1})}$ . Notice that  $\frac{f_T(\beta)}{h_T(\beta)} = \frac{\beta(1-\beta^T)}{(1+\beta)(1-\beta^{T+1})} = 1 - \sigma(\beta, T)$ . Define also  $\hat{v}(\beta, T) \equiv \sigma(\beta, T)u(1) + (1 - \sigma(\beta, T))u(0)$  and  $\tilde{v}(\beta, T) \equiv (1 - \sigma(\beta, T))u(1) + \sigma(\beta, T)u(0)$ . Let

$$Z(\beta, T) \equiv \{z \in [0, 1] : z \geq u^{-1}(\hat{v}(\beta, T)) \text{ and } z \leq 1 - u^{-1}(\tilde{v}(\beta, T))\},$$

which identifies the allocations that can be sustained as a monetary equilibrium with discriminatory transfers. Define  $\text{Int}(Z(\beta, T)) \equiv (u^{-1}(\hat{v}(\beta, T)), 1 - u^{-1}(\tilde{v}(\beta, T)))$ , the interior of  $Z(\beta, T)$ .

**Lemma A8.** *Int*( $Z(\beta, T)$ )  $\neq \emptyset$  for any  $\beta \in (0, 1)$  and  $T > 0$ .

**Proof.** By strict concavity of the utility function,  $\hat{v}(\beta, T) < u(\sigma(\beta, T))$ , and  $\tilde{v}(\beta, T) < u(1 - \sigma(\beta, T))$ , for any  $\beta \in (0, 1)$  and  $T > 0$ . Since the utility function is

strictly increasing, we can invert it and obtain

$$u^{-1}(\widehat{v}(\beta, T)) < \sigma(\beta, T) = 1 - (1 - \sigma(\beta, T)) < 1 - u^{-1}(\widetilde{v}(\beta, T)),$$

for any  $\beta \in (0, 1)$  and  $T > 0$ , which proves our statement. ■