

**Globalization of markets and consumption home bias:  
new insights for the environment**

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**ONLINE APPENDIX**

# Appendices

## Appendix A. International trade condition

International trade takes place when

$$a < \theta_h^* = \frac{a+b}{3} - \frac{t}{3(u_g - u_d)} - \frac{2(\gamma_h u_g - u_d)}{3(u_g - u_d)} < b$$

$$a < \theta_l^* = \frac{a+b}{3} + \frac{t}{3(u_g - u_d)} + \frac{2(\gamma_l u_d - u_g)}{3(u_g - u_d)} < b$$

Denote  $t'' \equiv (b-2a)(u_g - u_d) - 2(u_g \gamma_h - u_d)$  and  $\bar{t} \equiv (u_g - u_d)(2b-a) - 2(\gamma_l u_d - u_g)$ . Then, trade takes place when  $t \in t'' < t < \bar{t}$ . Recall that the trade condition in absence of home bias is  $t < t' \equiv (b-2a)(u_g - u_d)$ . Then it is easy to rank these thresholds as follows:  $t'' < t' < \bar{t}$ . It follows that the feasible set for bilateral trade in presence of home bias is:

$$t'' < t < t'$$

## Appendix B. Profits in presence of home bias

Profit of both firms in absence of home bias are:

$$\Pi_g^* = \frac{2}{9} \frac{t^2}{u_g - u_d} + \frac{2}{9} ((2b-a)^2 (u_g - u_d)) \text{ and}$$

$$\Pi_d^* = \frac{2}{9} \frac{t^2}{u_g - u_d} + \frac{2}{9} ((b-2a)^2 (u_g - u_d)),$$

while in presence of home bias, each firms obtain  $\hat{\Pi}_g^*$  and  $\hat{\Pi}_d^*$ :

$$\hat{\Pi}_g^* = \frac{2}{9} (2b-a)^2 (u_g - u_d) + \frac{4}{9} (2b-a) (u_g - u_d + u_g \gamma_h - u_d \gamma_l) + \Gamma$$

$$\hat{\Pi}_d^* = \frac{2}{9} (b-2a)^2 (u_g - u_d) + \frac{4}{9} (b-2a) (u_d - u_g - u_g \gamma_h + u_d \gamma_l) + \Gamma$$

where  $\Gamma = \frac{2(2t((u_g \gamma_h - u_g) + (u_d \gamma_l - u_d)) + t^2 + 2(u_d \gamma_l - u_g)^2 + 2(u_g \gamma_h - u_d)^2)}{9(u_g - u_d)}$ . The difference of equilibrium in presence and in absence of home bias is:

$$\hat{\Pi}_g^* - \Pi_g^* = \frac{4}{9} (2b-a) (u_d - u_g - u_g \gamma_h + u_d \gamma_l) + \tau \geq 0 \Leftrightarrow t \geq \hat{t}$$

$$\hat{\Pi}_d^* - \Pi_d^* = \frac{4}{9} (b-2a) (u_d - u_g - u_g \gamma_h + u_d \gamma_l) + \tau \geq 0 \Leftrightarrow t \geq \tilde{t}$$

where  $\tau = \frac{4((u_g \gamma_h - u_d)^2 + (u_d \gamma_l - u_g)^2 + t(u_g \gamma_h - u_g - u_d + u_d \gamma_l))}{9(u_g - u_d)}$  and

$$\hat{t} = \frac{(u_g - u_d)(2b-a)(u_d \gamma_l - u_g \gamma_h + u_d + u_g) - (u_g \gamma_h - u_d)^2 - (u_d \gamma_l - u_g)^2}{(u_g \gamma_h - u_g - u_d + u_d \gamma_l)}$$

$$\tilde{t} = \frac{(b-2a)(u_g - u_d)(u_g \gamma_h - u_d + u_g - u_d \gamma_l) - (u_g \gamma_h - u_d)^2 - (u_d \gamma_l - u_g)^2}{(u_g \gamma_h - u_g - u_d + u_d \gamma_l)},$$

with  $\hat{t} > \tilde{t}$ .

## Appendix C. Total environmental damage of home bias

Denote  $\hat{\gamma}_h = \gamma_h u_g - u_d$ ;  $\hat{\gamma}_l = \gamma_l u_d - u_g$ ,  $\Delta\beta = \beta_d - \beta_g$ . Recall that the difference of emissions in production and transportation for each good write as:

$$\begin{aligned}\hat{E}_g - E_g^* &= \frac{2(\hat{\gamma}_h - \hat{\gamma}_l)\mu_p - \hat{\gamma}_l\mu_t}{3(u_g - u_d)} \\ \hat{E}_d^* - E_d^* &= \frac{2\hat{\gamma}_l - 2\hat{\gamma}_h}{3(u_g - u_d)}\end{aligned}$$

The damage from consumption for each good is

$$\begin{aligned}\hat{E}_{g,c} - E_{g,c} &= \beta_g \frac{2(\hat{\gamma}_h - \hat{\gamma}_l)}{3(u_g - u_d)} \\ \hat{E}_{d,c} - E_{d,c} &= \beta_d x_d^* - \beta_d \frac{2(\hat{\gamma}_h - \hat{\gamma}_l)}{3(u_g - u_d)} - \beta_d x_d^* = -\beta_d \frac{2(\hat{\gamma}_h - \hat{\gamma}_l)}{3(u_g - u_d)}\end{aligned}$$

Then

$$\begin{aligned}\hat{E}_{g,c} - E_{g,c} + \hat{E}_{d,c} - E_{d,c} &= \beta_g \frac{2(\hat{\gamma}_h - \hat{\gamma}_l)}{3(u_g - u_d)} - \beta_d \frac{2(\hat{\gamma}_h - \hat{\gamma}_l)}{3(u_g - u_d)} \\ &= -\Delta\beta \frac{2(\hat{\gamma}_h - \hat{\gamma}_l)}{3(u_g - u_d)}\end{aligned}$$

It follows that the total damage writes as

$$\begin{aligned}\hat{E}^* - E^* &= \frac{2(\hat{\gamma}_h - \hat{\gamma}_l)\mu_p - \hat{\gamma}_l\mu_t}{3(u_g - u_d)} + 2\frac{\hat{\gamma}_l - 2\hat{\gamma}_h}{3(u_g - u_d)} - \Delta\beta \frac{2(\hat{\gamma}_h - \hat{\gamma}_l)}{3(u_g - u_d)} \\ &= \frac{2((\mu_p - \Delta\beta - 2)\hat{\gamma}_h + (1 + \Delta\beta - (\mu_t + \mu_p))\hat{\gamma}_l)}{3(u_g - u_d)}\end{aligned}$$

where we find that when  $\mu_p - \Delta\beta - 2 > 0 \Leftrightarrow \mu_p > 2 + \Delta\beta$ , then  $\hat{E} - E^* \geq 0$  iff  $\hat{\gamma}_h \geq \bar{\gamma} \equiv \frac{(\mu_t + \mu_p) - 1 - \Delta\beta}{\mu_p - \Delta\beta - 2} \hat{\gamma}_l$ . Otherwise, when  $\mu_p < 1 + \Delta\beta - \mu_t$ , then  $\hat{E} - E^* \geq 0$  iff  $\hat{\gamma}_h \leq \bar{\gamma}_h$ . Finally, if  $1 + \Delta\beta - \mu_t < \mu_p < 2 + \Delta\beta$ , then  $\hat{E}^* - E^* < 0$  for any  $\hat{\gamma}_h$ .