

How can we improve air pollution? Try increasing trust first

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ONLINE APPENDIX

Appendix 1 Correlations Between Trust Variables

Table A1: Correlation Matrix: Trust Variables

	Trust: Political Party	Trust: President	Trust: Mayor CDMX	Trust: NGOs	Trust: Neighbours	Trust: People in street	Trust: Family and friends	Trust: Media
Trust: Political Party	1.00							
Trust: President	0.52***	1.00						
Trust: Mayor CDMX	0.49***	0.74***	1.00					
Trust: NGOs	0.24***	0.20***	0.25***	1.00				
Trust: Neighbours	0.21***	0.18***	0.15***	0.14***	1.00			
Trust: People in street	0.25***	0.18***	0.14***	0.12***	0.47***	1.00		
Trust: Family and friends	0.18***	0.17***	0.16***	0.20***	0.38***	0.29***	1.00	
Trust: Media	0.27***	0.17***	0.26***	0.30***	0.07**	0.12***	0.12***	1.00

Notes: * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$
 $N = 1785$

Appendix 2 Trust Distributions

Table A2: Distribution of Absolute and Relative Trust Variables

Panel A: Absolute Trust	Scale	Neighbours	People in street	Family and friends	Political Party	President	Mayor CDMX	Media	NGOs
	No trust	16%	30%	4%	47%	30%	32%	23%	17%
	Trust a bit	31%	38%	16%	35%	27%	30%	36%	31%
	Some trust	35%	23%	19%	15%	25%	26%	32%	37%
	Trust a lot	18%	9%	61%	3%	17%	12%	10%	15%
	Mean	2.53	2.11	3.38	1.72	2.28	2.17	2.27	2.50
Panel B: Relative Trust	Scale	Trust F/F - Neighbours	Trust F/F - People/Street	Trust F/F - Pol.Parties	Trust F/F - President	Trust F/F - Mayor CDMX	Trust F/F - Media	Trust F/F - NGO's	
	-3	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	
	-2	1%	1%	0%	2%	1%	2%	2%	
	-1	5%	3%	1%	6%	5%	6%	7%	
	0	33%	23%	15%	27%	24%	23%	30%	
	1	36%	30%	25%	26%	27%	29%	32%	
	2	19%	30%	33%	24%	25%	26%	21%	
	3	6%	14%	26%	16%	18%	13%	8%	
	Mean	0.84	1.26	1.65	1.08	1.19	1.1	0.87	

Appendix 3 Missing Values

Table A3: Missing Values in Outcome Variables

Variable	Description	Don't know	Refuse to answer
Megalopolis Program	Scale (1=Not effective, 10=Very effective)	44	5
Pollution control (Megalopolis)	Scale (1=Not effective, 10=Very effective)	65	5
Environmental quality (policy topic)	Scale (0=Not important, 10=All the importance)	17	0
Increase Tax	Proportion (0=no coins, 1=all coins)	19	3
Distribution of Resources: Government	Scale(-10=Resources to citizens, 10=Resources to government)	45	0
Use of Resources: Public goods	Scale(-10=Resources to privates, 10=resources to public)	32	0
Coin share: Government	Proportion (0=no coins, 1=all coins)	45	0
Coin share: Public	Proportion (0=no coins, 1=all coins)	32	0

Notes: "Don't know" and "refuse to respond" responses are coded as missing values for outcome variables. Number of participants responding "don't know" and "refuse to respond" show for each outcome variable.

Appendix 4 Relative Trust Results

Table A4: Relative Trust and Policy Preferences

Panel A: Increase Tax								
Variable	Absolute difference							
	Increase tax [1]	Increase tax [2]	Increase tax [3]	Increase tax [4]				
Trust F/F-Pol.Parties	0.00 (0.01)			0.02 (0.02)				
Trust F/F-President		-0.01 (0.01)		-0.03** (0.02)				
Trust F/F-Mayor CDMX			-0.01 (0.01)	0.01 (0.02)				
Trust F/F-NGO's				-0.03** (0.01)				
Trust F/F-Neighbours				0.01 (0.01)				
Trust F/F-People/Street				0.02* (0.01)				
Observations	1,731	1,728	1,727	1,688				
R-squared	0.090	0.092	0.090	0.100				
Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes				
Mean dep.Var.	0.739	0.739	0.739	0.739				

Panel B: Distribution of Resources to Government								
Variable	Absolute difference				Absolute difference			
	Dist. of Res. Gov. [1]	Dist. of Res. Gov. [2]	Dist. of Res. Gov. [3]	Dist. of Res. Gov. [4]	Dist. of Res. Gov. [5]	Dist. of Res. Gov. [6]	Dist. of Res. Gov. [7]	Dist. of Res. Gov. [8]
Trust F/F-Pol.Parties	-0.02*** (0.01)			-0.03*** (0.01)	-0.41*** (0.14)			-0.67*** (0.22)
Trust F/F-President		-0.02** (0.01)		-0.00 (0.01)		-0.31** (0.13)		-0.03 (0.22)
Trust F/F-Mayor CDMX			-0.02*** (0.01)	-0.01 (0.01)			-0.35*** (0.13)	-0.28 (0.22)
Trust F/F-NGO's				0.03*** (0.01)				0.55*** (0.16)
Trust F/F-Neighbours				0.00 (0.01)				0.05 (0.19)
Trust F/F-People/Street				0.01 (0.01)				0.26 (0.19)
Observations	1,715	1,714	1,713	1,675	1,715	1,714	1,713	1,675
R-squared	0.118	0.114	0.115	0.130	0.118	0.114	0.115	0.130
Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Mean dep.Var.	0.231	0.231	0.231	0.231	-5.385	-5.385	-5.385	-5.385

Panel C: Use of Public Resources to Public Goods								
Variable	Share of units				Absolute difference			
	Use of Res. Public goods [1]	Use of Res. Public goods [2]	Use of Res. Public goods [3]	Use of Res. Public goods [4]	Use of Res. Public goods [5]	Use of Res. Public goods [6]	Use of Res. Public goods [7]	Use of Res. Public goods [8]
Trust F/F-Pol.Parties	0.00 (0.01)			0.00 (0.01)	0.06 (0.14)			0.07 (0.23)
Trust F/F-President		-0.00 (0.01)		-0.01 (0.01)		-0.04 (0.12)		-0.26 (0.23)
Trust F/F-Mayor CDMX			0.00 (0.01)	0.01 (0.01)			0.07 (0.12)	0.23 (0.23)
Trust F/F-NGO's				-0.02** (0.01)				-0.32** (0.16)
Trust F/F-Neighbours				0.02** (0.01)				0.36** (0.18)
Trust F/F-People/Street				0.00 (0.01)				0.09 (0.19)
Observations	1,729	1,725	1,726	1,687	1,729	1,725	1,726	1,687
R-squared	0.086	0.086	0.086	0.095	0.086	0.086	0.086	0.095
Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Mean dep.Var.	0.637	0.637	0.637	0.637	2.741	2.741	2.741	2.741

Notes: Each panel shows regression results for a different dependent variable. Each column shows the regression coefficient and robust standard error in parenthesis corresponding to an OLS regression. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Demographic controls: age, gender, education, children dummy, number of household members, and BGA F.E.
Policy controls: Megalopolis program, Pollution control (Megalopolis) and Environmental quality (policy topic)
Trust is measured in relative terms (is the difference between trust in family and friends minus the variable in each row)

Appendix 5 Trimmed Sample Statistics

Table A5: Summary Statistics (Trimmed Sample)

Variable	Description	N (1)	Mean (2)	S.D. (3)	Min (4)	Max (5)
Age	Continuous	1508	41	15	18	84
Gender	Dummy (Male=1)	1511	0.36	0.48	0	1
Education	Scale (0=No education, 4=Superior education)	1511	2.38	0.94	0	4
Family with children	Dummy (Yes=1)	1511	.53	.49	0	1
Household Size	Continuous	1511	3.95	1.76	1	13
Megalopolis Program	Scale 1 to 10 (1=Not effective, 10=Very effective)	1471	5.74	2.61	1	10
Pollution control (Megalopolis)	Scale 1 to 10 (1=Not effective, 10=Very effective)	1452	4.85	2.57	1	10
Environmental quality (policy topic)	Scale 0 to 10 (0=Not important, 10=All the importance)	1497	3.02	2.27	0	10
Air pollution inevitable in big cities	Dummy(1=Yes)	1499	0.67	0.47	0	1
Air pollution inevitable in CDMX	Dummy(1=Yes)	1484	0.64	0.48	0	1
Air pollution is a problem in Mexico City	Scale(1=Not a problem, 4=A big problem)	1,509	3.71	.59	1	4
Air quality in the <i>colonia</i>	Scale(1=Lower than city, 4=Better than city)	1499	2.38	0.77	1	4
Pollution: CDMX take effective measures	Dummy (1=Yes)	1490	0.28	0.45	0	1
Trust: Family and friends	Scale 1 to 4 (1=No trust, 4=Trust a lot)	1505	3.68	0.62	1	4
Trust: Neighbours	Scale 1 to 4 (1=No trust, 4=Trust a lot)	1499	2.61	0.95	1	4
Trust: People in the street	Scale 1 to 4 (1=No trust, 4=Trust a lot)	1508	2.17	0.94	1	4
Trust: Political Party	Scale 1 to 4 (1=No trust, 4=Trust a lot)	1499	1.74	0.82	1	4
Trust: President	Scale 1 to 4 (1=No trust, 4=Trust a lot)	1498	2.25	1.07	1	4
Trust: Mayor CDMX	Scale 1 to 4 (1=No trust, 4=Trust a lot)	1494	2.15	1.01	1	4
Trust: Media	Scale 1 to 4 (1=No trust, 4=Trust a lot)	1501	2.25	0.91	1	4
Trust: NGOs	Scale 1 to 4 (1=No trust, 4=Trust a lot)	1487	2.50	0.93	1	4
Trust F/F-Neighbours	Distance	1494	1.07	0.91	0	3
Trust F/F-People/Street	Distance	1502	1.50	0.98	0	3
Trust F/F-Pol.Parties	Distance	1493	1.94	0.92	0	3
Trust F/F-President	Distance	1492	1.43	1.06	0	3
Trust F/F-Mayor CDMX	Distance	1488	1.53	1.05	0	3
Trust F/F-Media	Distance	1495	1.42	0.99	0	3
Trust F/F-NGO's	Distance	1482	1.17	0.96	0	3
Water service frequency	Scale 1 to 5 (1=Everyday interruptions, 5=Never interrupts)	1491	3.41	1.54	1	5
Street quality	Scale 1 to 4 (1=Very Bad, 4=Very Good)	1492	2.21	0.71	1	4
Increase Tax	Dummy(1=Pay tax)	1493	0.74	0.44	0	1
Distribution of Resources: Government	Scale(-10=Resources to citizens, 10=Resources to government)	1473	-5.38	6.13	-10	10
Use of Resources: Public goods	Scale(-10=Resources to privates, 10=resources to public)	1487	2.80	5.86	-10	10
Coin share: Government	Proportion (0=no coins, 1=all coins)	1473	0.23	0.31	0	1
Coin share: Public	Proportion (0=no coins, 1=all coins)	1487	0.64	0.29	0	1

Note: Sample restricted to individuals with weakly highest reported trust in friends and family. Excludes 19.15% (358 observations) of the sample.

Table A6: Correlation Matrix: Trust Variables (Trimmed Sample)

	Trust: Neighbours	Trust: People in street	Trust: Family and friends	Trust: Political Party	Trust: President	Trust: Mayor CDMX	Trust: Media	Trust: NGOs
Trust: Neighbours	1.00							
Trust: People in street	0.46***	1.00						
Trust: Family and friends	0.39***	0.28***	1.00					
Trust: Political Party	0.22***	0.25***	0.22***	1.00				
Trust: President	0.21***	0.20***	0.29***	0.52***	1.00			
Trust: Mayor CDMX	0.17***	0.15***	0.25***	0.49***	0.76***	1.00		
Trust: Media	0.11***	0.15***	0.21***	0.30***	0.20***	0.28***	1.00	
Trust: NGOs	0.18***	0.14***	0.29***	0.26***	0.23***	0.27***	0.30***	1.00

Note: Sample restricted to individuals with weakly highest reported trust in friends and family. Excludes 19.15% (358 observations) of the sample.

* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

$N = 1443$

Appendix 6 Trimmed Sample Results

Table A7: Absolute Trust and Policy Preferences (Trimmed Sample)

Panel A: Increase Tax				
Variable	Absolute difference			
	Increase tax [1]	Increase tax [2]	Increase tax [3]	Increase tax [4]
Trust: Political Party	0.05*** (0.01)			0.02 (0.02)
Trust: President		0.05*** (0.01)		0.02 (0.02)
Trust: Mayor CDMX			0.05*** (0.01)	0.01 (0.02)
Trust: NGOs				0.05*** (0.01)
Trust: Neighbours				-0.00 (0.01)
Trust: People in street				-0.00 (0.01)
Observations	1.395	1.393	1.391	1.360
R-squared	0.135	0.136	0.136	0.150
Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Mean dep.Var.	0.739	0.739	0.739	0.739

Panel B: Distribution of Resources to Government									
Variable	Share of units				Absolute difference				
	Dist. of Res. Gov.	Dist. of Res. Gov.	Dist. of Res. Gov.	Dist. of Res. Gov.	Dist. of Res. Gov.	Dist. of Res. Gov.	Dist. of Res. Gov.	Dist. of Res. Gov.	Dist. of Res. Gov.
	[1]	[2]	[3]	[4]	[5]	[6]	[7]	[8]	
Trust: Political Party	0.06*** (0.01)			0.05*** (0.01)	1.15*** (0.22)				0.99*** (0.25)
Trust: President		0.03*** (0.01)		0.00 (0.01)		0.66*** (0.18)			0.01 (0.26)
Trust: Mayor CDMX			0.04*** (0.01)	0.03** (0.01)			0.80*** (0.19)		0.52** (0.26)
Trust: NGOs				-0.02* (0.01)					-0.35* (0.20)
Trust: Neighbours				0.00 (0.01)					0.05 (0.22)
Trust: People in street				-0.01 (0.01)					-0.18 (0.21)
Observations	1,381	1,381	1,379	1,350	1,381	1,381	1,379	1,350	
R-squared	0.149	0.138	0.143	0.160	0.149	0.138	0.143	0.160	
Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	
Mean dep.Var.	0.236	0.236	0.236	0.236	-5.276	-5.276	-5.276	-5.276	

Panel C: Use of Resources to Public Goods								
Variable	Share of units				Absolute difference			
	Use of Res. Public goods	Use of Res. Public goods	Use of Res. Public goods	Use of Res. Public goods	Use of Res. Public goods	Use of Res. Public goods	Use of Res. Public goods	Use of Res. Public goods
	[1]	[2]	[3]	[4]	[5]	[6]	[7]	[8]
Trust: Political Party	0.01 (0.01)			0.00 (0.01)	0.20 (0.21)			0.01 (0.26)
Trust: President		0.01* (0.01)		0.02 (0.01)		0.29* (0.17)		0.36 (0.27)
Trust: Mayor CDMX			0.01 (0.01)	-0.01 (0.01)			0.14 (0.17)	-0.17 (0.27)
Trust: NGOs				0.03*** (0.01)				0.57*** (0.19)
Trust: Neighbours				-0.02* (0.01)				-0.40* (0.21)
Trust: People in street				0.00 (0.01)			(0.21)	0.03
Observations	1,394	1,392	1,392	1,361	1,394	1,392	1,392	1,361
R-squared	0.116	0.117	0.115	0.129	0.116	0.117	0.115	0.129
Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Mean dep.Var.	0.640	0.640	0.640	0.640	2.802	2.802	2.802	2.802

Note: Sample restricted to individuals with weakly highest reported trust in friends and family. Excludes 19.15% (358 observations) of the sample. Each panel shows regression results for a different dependent variable. Each column shows the regression coefficient and robust standard error in parenthesis corresponding to an OLS regression. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Demographic controls: age, gender, education, children dummy, number of household members, and BGA F.E.
Policy controls: Megalopolis program, Pollution control (Megalopolis) and Environmental quality (policy topic)
Trust control: Family and friends
Trust is measured in absolute terms (increasing levels trust with higher numbers)

Table A8: Relative Trust and Policy Preferences (Trimmed Sample)

Panel A: Increase Tax				
Variable	Absolute difference			
	Increase tax [1]	Increase tax [2]	Increase tax [3]	Increase tax [4]
Trust F/F-Pol.Parties	-0.00 (0.01)			0.02 (0.02)
Trust F/F-President		-0.02* (0.01)		-0.03* (0.02)
Trust F/F-Mayor CDMX			-0.02 (0.01)	0.00 (0.02)
Trust F/F-NGO's				-0.03** (0.01)
Trust F/F-Neighbours				0.02 (0.02)
Trust F/F-People/Street				0.02 (0.01)
Observations	1,395	1,393	1,391	1,360
R-squared	0.107	0.109	0.108	0.116
Controls	No	No	No	No
Mean dep.Var.	0.739	0.739	0.739	0.739

Panel B: Distribution of Resources to Government								
Variable	Share of units				Absolute difference			
	Dist. of Res. Gov. [1]	Dist. of Res. Gov. [2]	Dist. of Res. Gov. [3]	Dist. of Res. Gov. [4]	Dist. of Res. Gov. [5]	Dist. of Res. Gov. [6]	Dist. of Res. Gov. [7]	Dist. of Res. Gov. [8]
Trust F/F-Pol.Parties	-0.03*** (0.01)			-0.03*** (0.01)	-0.63*** (0.18)			-0.69*** (0.24)
Trust F/F-President		-0.02*** (0.01)		-0.00 (0.01)		-0.49*** (0.17)		-0.08 (0.26)
Trust F/F-Mayor CDMX			-0.03*** (0.01)	-0.02 (0.01)			-0.55*** (0.17)	-0.39 (0.26)
Trust F/F-NGO's				0.03*** (0.01)				0.53*** (0.20)
Trust F/F-Neighbours				0.00 (0.01)			(0.22)	0.04 (0.21)
Trust F/F-People/Street				0.02 (0.01)				0.34 (0.21)
Observations	1,381	1,381	1,379	1,350	1,381	1,381	1,379	1,350
R-squared	0.134	0.130	0.133	0.149	0.134	0.130	0.133	0.149
Controls	No	No	No	No	No	No	No	No
Mean dep.Var.	0.236	0.236	0.236	0.236	-5.276	-5.276	-5.276	-5.276

Panel C: Use of Resources to Public Goods								
Variable	Share of units				Absolute difference			
	Use of Res. Public goods [1]	Use of Res. Public goods [2]	Use of Res. Public goods [3]	Use of Res. Public goods [4]	Use of Res. Public goods [5]	Use of Res. Public goods [6]	Use of Res. Public goods [7]	Use of Res. Public goods [8]
Trust F/F-Pol.Parties	0.00 (0.01)			0.01 (0.01)	0.06 (0.19)			0.17 (0.25)
Trust F/F-President		-0.01 (0.01)		-0.02 (0.01)		-0.16 (0.16)		-0.40 (0.27)
Trust F/F-Mayor CDMX			0.00 (0.01)	0.01 (0.01)			0.02 (0.16)	0.25 (0.27)
Trust F/F-NGO's				-0.02** (0.01)				-0.47** (0.19)
Trust F/F-Neighbours				0.02** (0.01)				0.45** (0.20)
Trust F/F-People/Street				0.00 (0.01)				0.07 (0.21)
Observations	1,394	1,392	1,392	1,361	1,394	1,392	1,392	1,361
R-squared	0.112	0.113	0.111	0.125	0.112	0.113	0.111	0.125
Controls	No	No	No	No	No	No	No	No
Mean dep.Var.	0.640	0.640	0.640	0.640	2.802	2.802	2.802	2.802

Note: Sample restricted to individuals with weakly highest reported trust in friends and family. Excludes 19.15% (358 observations) of the sample. Each panel shows regression results for a different dependent variable. Each column shows the regression coefficient and robust standard error in parenthesis corresponding to an OLS regression. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Demographic controls: age, gender, education, children dummy, number of household members, and BGA F.E.
Policy controls: Megalopolis program, Pollution control (Megalopolis) and Environmental quality (policy topic)
Trust is measured in relative terms (is the difference between trust in family and friends minus the variable in each row)

Table A9: Public Service Quality and Policy Preferences (Trimmed Sample)

Panel A: Increase Tax						
Variable	Absolute difference					
	Increase tax [1]	Increase tax [2]	Increase tax [3]			
Water service frequency	0.00 (0.01)		0.00 (0.01)			
Street quality		0.05*** (0.02)	0.06*** (0.02)			
Observations	1,392	1,395	1,379			
R-squared	0.107	0.114	0.115			
Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes			
Mean dep.Var.	0.739	0.739	0.739			

Panel B: Distribution of Resources to Government						
Variable	Share of units			Absolute difference		
	Dist. of Res. Gov. [1]	Dist. of Res. Gov. [2]	Dist. of Res. Gov. [3]	Dist. of Res. Gov. [4]	Dist. of Res. Gov. [5]	Dist. of Res. Gov. [6]
Water service frequency	0.01* (0.01)		0.01* (0.01)	0.24* (0.13)		0.25* (0.13)
Street quality		-0.00 (0.01)	-0.00 (0.01)		-0.02 (0.26)	-0.02 (0.26)
Observations	1,379	1,380	1,364	1,379	1,380	1,364
R-squared	0.128	0.127	0.129	0.128	0.127	0.129
Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Mean dep.Var.	0.236	0.236	0.236	-5.276	-5.276	-5.276

Panel C: Use of Resources to Public Goods						
Variable	Share of units			Absolute difference		
	Use of Res. Public goods [1]	Use of Res. Public goods [2]	Use of Res. Public goods [3]	Use of Res. Public goods [4]	Use of Res. Public goods [5]	Use of Res. Public goods [6]
Water service frequency	0.00 (0.01)		-0.00 (0.01)	0.03 (0.13)		-0.02 (0.13)
Street quality		0.01 (0.01)	0.01 (0.01)		0.25 (0.25)	0.23 (0.25)
Observations	1,391	1,391	1,375	1,391	1,391	1,375
R-squared	0.112	0.115	0.116	0.112	0.115	0.116
Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Mean dep.Var.	0.640	0.640	0.640	2.802	2.802	2.802

Note: Sample restricted to individuals with weakly highest reported trust in friends and family. Excludes 19.15% (358 observations) of the sample. Each panel shows regression results for a different dependent variable. Each column shows the regression coefficient and robust standard error in parenthesis corresponding to an OLS regression. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Demographic controls: age, gender, education, children dummy, number of household members, and BGA F.E.
Policy controls: Megalopolis program, Pollution control (Megalopolis) and Environmental quality (policy topic)
Water service frequency: 1 (every day interruptions) to 5 (Never)
Street quality: 1 (Very bad) to 4 (Very good)

Appendix 7 Including Income as Additional Control

Table A10: Absolute Trust and Policy Preferences

Panel A: Increase Tax				
Variable	Absolute difference			
	Increase tax [1]	Increase tax [2]	Increase tax [3]	Increase tax [4]
Trust: Political Party	0.07*** (0.02)			0.04* (0.02)
Trust: President		0.04*** (0.01)		-0.00 (0.02)
Trust: Mayor CDMX			0.06*** (0.01)	0.04** (0.02)
Trust: NGOs				0.03* (0.02)
Trust: Neighbours				-0.01 (0.02)
Trust: People in street				-0.00 (0.02)
Observations	836	832	831	817
R-squared	0.175	0.173	0.181	0.192
Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Mean dep.Var.	0.739	0.739	0.739	0.739

Panel B: Distribution of Resources to Government								
Variable	Share of units				Absolute difference			
	Dist. of Res. Gov.	Dist. of Res. Gov.	Dist. of Res. Gov.	Dist. of Res. Gov.	Dist. of Res. Gov.	Dist. of Res. Gov.	Dist. of Res. Gov.	Dist. of Res. Gov.
	[1]	[2]	[3]	[4]	[5]	[6]	[7]	[8]
Trust: Political Party	0.06*** (0.01)			0.05*** (0.02)	1.23*** (0.29)			1.03*** (0.35)
Trust: President		0.03*** (0.01)		0.01 (0.02)		0.65*** (0.22)		0.14 (0.31)
Trust: Mayor CDMX			0.04*** (0.01)	0.02 (0.02)			0.72*** (0.23)	0.30 (0.32)
Trust: NGOs				-0.01 (0.01)				-0.25 (0.25)
Trust: Neighbours				0.00 (0.01)				0.05 (0.27)
Trust: People in street				0.00 (0.01)				0.06 (0.29)
Observations	829	826	825	812	829	826	825	812
R-squared	0.240	0.231	0.234	0.250	0.240	0.231	0.234	0.250
Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Mean dep.Var.	0.231	0.231	0.231	0.231	-5.385	-5.385	-5.385	-5.385

Panel C: Use of Resources to Public Goods								
Variable	Share of units				Absolute difference			
	Use of Res. Public goods	Use of Res. Public goods	Use of Res. Public goods	Use of Res. Public goods	Use of Res. Public goods	Use of Res. Public goods	Use of Res. Public goods	Use of Res. Public goods
	[1]	[2]	[3]	[4]	[5]	[6]	[7]	[8]
Trust: Political Party	0.00 (0.01)			-0.00 (0.02)	0.05 (0.28)			-0.04 (0.35)
Trust: President		0.01 (0.01)		0.01 (0.02)	0.10 (0.21)		0.10 (0.33)	
Trust: Mayor CDMX			0.00 (0.01)	-0.01 (0.02)		0.01 (0.22)	-0.10 (0.34)	
Trust: NGOs				0.02 (0.01)			0.38 (0.25)	
Trust: Neighbours				-0.01 (0.01)			-0.22 (0.28)	
Trust: People in street				0.01 (0.01)			0.21 (0.28)	
Observations	834	830	830	816	834	830	830	816
R-squared	0.171	0.173	0.172	0.187	0.171	0.173	0.172	0.187
Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Mean dep.Var.	0.637	0.637	0.637	0.637	2.741	2.741	2.741	2.741

Notes: Each panel shows regression results for a different dependent variable. Each column shows the regression coefficient and the standard error in parenthesis corresponding to an OLS regression.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Demographic controls: age, gender, education, income, children dummy, household size and BGA F.E.;
Policy controls: Megalopolis program, Pollution control (Megalopolis) and Environmental quality (policy topic)
Trust control: Family and friends
Trust is measured in absolute terms (increasing levels trust with higher numbers)

Table A11: Public Service Quality and Policy Preferences

Panel A: Increase Tax			
Variable	Absolute difference		
	Increase tax [1]	Increase tax [2]	Increase tax [3]
Water service frequency	-0.00 (0.01)		-0.00 (0.01)
Street quality		0.04 (0.02)	0.04 (0.02)
Observations	828	832	822
R-squared	0.152	0.154	0.156
Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes
Mean dep.Var.	0.739	0.739	0.739

Panel B: Distribution of Resources to Government						
Variable	Share of units			Absolute difference		
	Dist. of Res. Gov. [1]	Dist. of Res. Gov. [2]	Dist. of Res. Gov. [3]	Dist. of Res. Gov. [4]	Dist. of Res. Gov. [5]	Dist. of Res. Gov. [6]
Water service frequency	0.02** (0.01)		0.02** (0.01)	0.38** (0.16)		0.39** (0.16)
Street quality		0.00 (0.02)	0.00 (0.02)		0.02 (0.35)	0.06 (0.35)
Observations	821	825	815	821	825	815
R-squared	0.224	0.213	0.224	0.224	0.213	0.224
Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Mean dep.Var.	0.231	0.231	0.231	-5.385	-5.385	-5.385

Panel C: Use of Resources to Public Goods						
Variable	Share of units			Absolute difference		
	Use of Res. Public goods [1]	Use of Res. Public goods [2]	Use of Res. Public goods [3]	Use of Res. Public goods [4]	Use of Res. Public goods [5]	Use of Res. Public goods [6]
Water service frequency	-0.00 (0.01)		-0.00 (0.01)	-0.08 (0.16)		-0.08 (0.16)
Street quality		0.01 (0.02)	0.01 (0.02)		0.11 (0.33)	0.11 (0.33)
Observations	826	829	819	826	829	819
R-squared	0.174	0.170	0.173	0.174	0.170	0.173
Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Mean dep.Var.	0.637	0.637	0.637	2.741	2.741	2.741

Notes: Each panel shows regression results for a different dependent variable. Each column shows the regression coefficient and the standard error in parenthesis corresponding to an OLS regression. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Demographic controls: age, gender, education, income, children dummy, household size, and BGA F.E.;
Policy controls: Megalopolis program, Pollution control (Megalopolis) and Environmental quality (policy topic)
Water service frequency: 1 (every day interruptions) to 5 (Never)
Street quality: 1 (Very bad) to 4 (Very good)

Appendix 8 Alternative Estimation Models

Table A12: Absolute Trust and Policy Preferences

Panel A: Increase Tax				
Variable	Absolute difference			
	Increase tax [1]	Increase tax [2]	Increase tax [3]	Increase tax [4]
Trust: Political Party	0.05*** (3.83)			0.01 (0.97)
Trust: President		0.05*** (5.01)		0.03* (2.23)
Trust: Mayor CDMX			0.05*** (4.60)	0.01 (0.41)
Trust: NGOs				0.05*** (4.67)
Trust: Neighbours				0.00 (0.15)
Trust: People in street				-0.00 (-0.09)
Observations	1715	1712	1711	1672
Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Mean dep.Var.	0.739	0.739	0.739	0.739
Panel B: Distribution of Resources to Government				
Variable	Share of units			
	Dist. of Res. Gov. [1]	Dist. of Res. Gov. [2]	Dist. of Res. Gov. [3]	Dist. of Res. Gov. [4]
Trust: Political Party	0.06*** (6.52)			0.05*** (4.68)
Trust: President		0.03*** (4.55)		0.00 (0.13)
Trust: Mayor CDMX			0.04*** (5.10)	0.02 (1.94)
Trust: NGOs				-0.01 (-1.72)
Trust: Neighbours				0.01 (0.77)
Trust: People in street				-0.00 (-0.32)
Observations	1715	1714	1713	1675
Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Panel C: Use of Resources to Public Goods				
Variable	Share of units			
	Use of Res. Public goods [1]	Use of Res. Public goods [2]	Use of Res. Public goods [3]	Use of Res. Public goods [4]
Trust: Political Party	0.01 (0.83)			0.00 (0.19)
Trust: President		0.01 (1.38)		0.00 (1.15)
Trust: Mayor CDMX			0.00 (0.41)	-0.01 (-0.83)
Trust: NGOs				0.02* (2.49)
Trust: Neighbours				-0.02 (-1.76)
Trust: People in street				-0.00 (-0.09)
Observations	1729	1725	1726	1687
Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes

Note: Each panel shows regression results for a different dependent variable. Each column shows the average marginal effect and the z-score in parenthesis corresponding to a probit or fractional logit regression. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Demographic controls: age, gender, education, income, children dummy, number of household members and BGA F.E.
Policy controls: Megalopolis program, Pollution control (Megalopolis) and Environmental quality (policy topic)
Trust control: Family and friends
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Table A13: Public Service Quality and Policy Preferences

Panel A: Increase Tax			
Absolute difference			
Variable	Increase tax [1]	Increase tax [2]	Increase tax [3]
Water service frequency	-0.00 (-0.25)		-0.00 (-0.50)
Street quality		0.04** (2.83)	0.05** (2.95)
Observations	1706	1714	1690
Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes
Panel B: Distribution of Resources to Government			
Share of units			
Variable	Dist. of Res. Gov. [1]	Dist. of Res. Gov. [2]	Dist. of Res. Gov. [3]
Water service frequency	0.02** (3.14)		0.02** (3.10)
Street quality		0.00 (0.31)	0.00 (0.35)
Observations	1707	1713	1689
Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes
Panel C: Use of Resources to Public Goods			
Share of units			
Variable	Use of Res. Public goods [1]	Use of Res. Public goods [2]	Use of Res. Public goods [3]
Water service frequency	0.00 (0.20)		-0.00 (-0.17)
Street quality		0.01 (1.06)	0.01 (1.02)
Observations	1719	1724	1700
Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes

Note: Each panel shows regression results for a different dependent variable.

Each column shows the average marginal effect and the z-score in parenthesis corresponding to a probit or fractional logit regression.
 *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Demographic controls: age, gender, education, income, children dummy, number of household members and BGA F.E.

Policy controls: Megalopolis program, Pollution control (Megalopolis) and Environmental quality (policy topic)

Water service frequency: 1 (every day interruptions) to 5 (Never), Street quality: 1 (Very bad) to 4 (Very good)

Appendix 9 Figures

Appendix 9.1 Environmental Policies




Figure A1: Support for a Tax Increase to Improve Air Quality

Note: Percent of participants answering yes and no to the survey question “If the government commits to a plan that reduces air pollution enough to avoid all contingencies, would you be willing to pay \$ 100 per year in taxes?”.




Figure A2: Preference for Public or Private Allocation of Resources

Note: Preference for government retention or distribution to citizens of revenue from fines imposed on polluting firms. Participants allocated 10 units, representing the revenue, across four options (1. the government of the city where the factory is located, 2. the government of the nation, 3. citizens who live near the factory, 4. All the inhabitants of the city where the factory is located) in the following survey question: “If there is a possibility that companies pay a tax for polluting, who do you think should receive that money?”. This figure shows the distribution of the variable constructed as the sum of the units allocated to options 1 and 2 minus the sum of the units allocated to options 3 and 4.




Figure A3: Preference for Distribution of Resources

Note: Preference for government retention or distribution to citizens of revenue from fines imposed on polluting firms. This figure shows the average number of units (out of 10 units representing the revenue) that participants allocated to each of the four options (1. the government of the city where the factory is located, 2. the government of the nation, 3. citizens who live near the factory, 4. All the inhabitants of the city where the factory is located) to the following survey question: “If there is a possibility that companies pay a tax for polluting, who do you think should receive that money?”.




Figure A4: Preference for Public or Private Goods Spending

Note: Preference for environmental private goods or environmental public goods spending using revenue from fines imposed on polluting firms. Participants allocated 10 units, representing the revenue, to four options (1. To implement control measures and introduce new restrictions to reduce other sources of pollution, 2. to provide households with masks and air filters to reduce the effect of pollution on their daily life, 3. to reduce the effect of pollution in schools and public buildings, for example, by installing air filters, 4. To provide subsidies to households for the purchase of appliances that consume less energy) to the following survey question: “If it were the Government of Mexico City that receive this money, how should this money be used?” This figure shows the distribution of the variable constructed as the sum of the units allocated to options 1 and 3 minus the sum of the units allocated to options 2 and 4.




Figure A5: Preference for Use of Resources

Note: Preference for the spending of revenue from fines imposed on polluting firms. This figure shows the average number of units (out of 10 representing the revenue) that participants allocated to each of the four options (1. To implement control measures and introduce new restrictions to reduce other sources of pollution, 2. to provide households with masks and air filters to reduce the effect of pollution on their daily life, 3. to reduce the effect of pollution in schools and public buildings, for example, by installing air filters, 4. To provide subsidies to households for the purchase of appliances that consume less energy) to the following survey question: “If it were the Government of Mexico City that receive this money, how should this money be used?”.

Appendix 10 Questionnaire: Trust, Pollution and Policy questions

Table A14: Questions - Dependent variables

Variable	Regression code	Original code	Original Survey Question (Spanish)	Translated Survey Question
H10	1 0 . .	1 2 -999 -777	Si el gobierno se comprometiese a un plan que reduzca la contaminación del aire lo suficiente para evitar todas las contingencias, ¿estaría dispuesto a pagar \$100 por año en impuestos?	If the government commits to a plan that reduces air pollution enough to avoid all environmental emergencies, would you be willing to pay \$ 100 per year in taxes?
			Sí	Yes
			No	No
			No sabe	Doesn't know
			No quiere responder	Doesn't answer
			<i>En la siguiente sección tendrás algunas opciones entre las cuales debes distribuir 10 unidades de acuerdo a qué tan importante es cada opción. Más unidades significa que esa opción es más importante. Todas las distribuciones son posibles, incluyendo asignar cero unidades a alguna o varias de las opciones presentes.</i>	<i>In the next section you will have some options among which you must distribute 10 units according to how important each option is. More units means that option is more important. All distributions are possible, including assigning zero units to one or more of the options present.</i>
H5			Si fuese el Gobierno de la Ciudad de México quien recibiera ese dinero, ¿cómo se debería utilizar dicho dinero? (Escriba -999 en cada una de las afirmaciones si el encuestado no sabe o no quiere contestar) [Enc. Si no sabe, escriba -999 en TODAS las opciones] [Enc. Debe mostrar la tableta para que el participante vea la escala]	If it were the Government of Mexico City that received this money, how should this money be used?
H5.1		[]	Para implementar medidas de control e introducir nuevas restricciones que permitan reducir otras fuentes de contaminación	To implement control measures and introduce new restrictions to reduce other sources of pollution
H5.2		[]	Para proveer a los hogares máscaras y filtros de aire que disminuyan el efecto de la contaminación en su vida diaria	To provide households with masks and air filters that reduce the effect of pollution on their daily life
H5.3		[]	Para reducir el efecto de la contaminación en escuelas y edificios públicos, por ejemplo, instalando filtros de aire	To reduce the effect of pollution in schools and public buildings, for example, by installing air filters
H5.4		[]	Para dar subsidios a los hogares para la compra de electrodomésticos que consuman menos energía	To provide subsidies to households for the purchase of appliances that consume less energy
H4			Si existiera la posibilidad de que las empresas paguen un impuesto por contaminar, ¿quién cree que debería recibir ese dinero? [Enc. Si no sabe, escriba -999 en TODAS las opciones]	If there is a possibility that companies pay a tax for polluting, who do you think should receive that money?
H4.1		[]	El Gobierno de la ciudad donde está la fabrica	The Government of the city where the factory is located
H4.2		[]	El Gobierno de la Nación	The Government of the Nation
H4.3		[]	Los ciudadanos que viven cerca de las fábricas y que son afectados por la contaminación	Citizens who live near factories and who are affected by pollution
H4.4		[]	Todos los habitantes de la ciudad donde está la fabrica	All the inhabitants of the city where the factory is located

Table A15: Questions - Trust variables

Variable	Regression code	Original code	Original Survey Question (Spanish)	Translated Survey Question
G2			¿Con qué frecuencia se interrumpe el servicio de agua en su hogar?	How often is the water service in your home interrupted?
	5	1	Todos los días	Every day
	4	2	No todos los días, pero más de una vez por semana	Not every day, but more than once a week
	3	3	Una vez por semana	Once a week
	2	4	Menos de una vez por semana	Less than once a week
	1	5	Nunca	Never
	.	-999	No sabe	Doesn't know
	.	-777	No quiere responder	Doesn't answer
	G3			¿Cómo diría usted que es la calidad de las calles de su colonia/barrio?
1		1	Muy buena	Very good
2		2	Buena	Good
3		3	Mala	Bad
4		4	Muy mala	Very bad
.		-999	No sabe	Doesn't know
.		-777	No quiere responder	Doesn't answer
G5			¿Podría decirme cuánta confianza tiene en sus vecinos y personas de su barrio?	Could you tell me how much trust you have in your neighbors and people in your neighborhood?
	4	1	Mucho	A lot
	3	2	Algo	Something
	2	3	Un poco	Little
	1	4	Nada	Nothing
	.	-999	No sabe	Doesn't know
.	-777	No quiere responder	Doesn't answer	
G6			¿Cuánta confianza tiene en personas con las que usted se encuentra en la calle?	How much trust do you have in people you meet on the street?
	4	1	Mucho	A lot
	3	2	Algo	Something
	2	3	Un poco	Little
	1	4	Nada	Nothing
	.	-999	No sabe	Doesn't know
.	-777	No quiere responder	Doesn't answer	
G7			¿Cuánta confianza tiene en sus familiares y amigos?	How much trust do you have in your family and friends?
	4	1	Mucho	A lot
	3	2	Algo	Something
	2	3	Un poco	Little
	1	4	Nada	Nothing
	.	-999	No sabe	Doesn't know
.	-777	No quiere responder	Doesn't answer	

Table A16: Questions - Trust variables (cont.)

Variable	Regression code	Original code	Original Survey Question (Spanish)	Translated Survey Question
G8			¿En los Partidos Políticos?	In the Political Parties?
	4	1	Mucho	A lot
	3	2	Algo	Something
	2	3	Un poco	Little
	1	4	Nada	Nothing
	.	-999	No sabe	Doesn't know
	.	-777	No quiere responder	Doesn't answer
G9			¿En el Presidente de la Nación?	In the President of the Nation?
	4	1	Mucho	A lot
	3	2	Algo	Something
	2	3	Un poco	Little
	1	4	Nada	Nothing
	.	-999	No sabe	Doesn't know
	.	-777	No quiere responder	Doesn't answer
G10			¿En el Jefe de Gobierno de la Ciudad de México?	In the Head of Government of Mexico City?
	4	1	Mucho	A lot
	3	2	Algo	Something
	2	3	Un poco	Little
	1	4	Nada	Nothing
	.	-999	No sabe	Doesn't know
	.	-777	No quiere responder	Doesn't answer
G11			¿En los medios de comunicación (Periódicos, radio, TV)?	In the media (newspapers, radio, TV)?
	4	1	Mucho	A lot
	3	2	Algo	Something
	2	3	Un poco	Little
	1	4	Nada	Nothing
	.	-999	No sabe	Doesn't know
	.	-777	No quiere responder	Doesn't answer
G12			¿En las organizaciones no gubernamentales (ONG) (por el medio ambiente, por los derechos de grupos de individuos, etc)?	In non-governmental organizations (NGOs) (for the environment, for the rights of groups of individuals, etc.)?
	4	1	Mucho	A lot
	3	2	Algo	Something
	2	3	Un poco	Little
	1	4	Nada	Nothing
	.	-999	No sabe	Doesn't know
	.	-777	No quiere responder	Doesn't answer

Table A17: Questions - Policy control variables

Variable	Regression code	Original code	Original Survey Question (Spanish)	Translated Survey Question
			<p><i>Ahora utilizaremos una escala del 1 al 10 donde 1 es nada efectivo y 10 es muy efectivo. La comisión ambiental de la Megalópolis ha establecido restricciones a las fábricas para disminuir inmediatamente los niveles de contaminación cuando se declara la fase 1 de la contingencia. En su opinión...</i></p> <p><i>Comisión ambiental de Megalópolis: es un órgano de coordinación administrativa intergubernamental que tiene como objetivo establecer medidas ambientales entre los estados que la conforman: la Ciudad de México, Hidalgo, Estado de México, Puebla y Tlaxcala.</i></p>	<p><i>Now we will use a scale from 1 to 10 where 1 is not effective and 10 is very effective. The Megalopolis environmental commission has established restrictions on factories to immediately lower pollution levels when phase 1 environmental emergency is declared. In your opinion...</i></p> <p><i>Megalopolis Environmental Commission: it is an intergovernmental administrative coordination body that aims to establish environmental measures among the states that comprise it: Mexico City, Hidalgo, State of Mexico, Puebla and Tlaxcala</i></p>
H1		[]	<p>¿En su opinión, ¿qué tan efectivo ha sido este programa en reducir la contaminación? <i>[Enc. Debe mostrar la tableta para que el participante vea la escala]</i></p>	<p>In your opinion, how effective has this program been in reducing pollution</p>
H2		[]	<p>En su opinión, ¿qué tan efectivo es el control que se realiza para medir el cumplimiento por parte de las empresas? <i>[Enc. Debe mostrar la tableta para que el participante vea la escala]</i></p>	<p>In your opinion, how effective is the control carried out to measure compliance by companies?</p>
H7			<p>En su opinión personal ¿qué tanto énfasis tendría que otorgarle un candidato a un puesto político a los siguientes temas para lograr obtener su voto? <i>[Enc. Si no sabe, escriba -999 en TODAS las opciones]</i> En esta sección deberá distribuir 10 unidades entre las distintas opciones según cuán importante considera cada una. Más unidades significa que la opción es más importante. Todas las distribuciones son posibles, incluyendo la asignación de cero unidades a una o más de las opciones.</p>	<p>In your personal opinion, how much emphasis would a candidate for political office have to place on the following issues to get your vote? In the next section you will have some options among which you must distribute 10 units according to how important each option is. More units means that option is more important. All distributions are possible, including assigning zero units to one or more of the options present.</p>
H7.1		[]	Crecimiento económico	Economic growth
H7.2		[]	Calidad ambiental	Environmental quality
H7.1		[]	Reforzar el cumplimiento de las leyes	Law enforcement