Independent Redistricting Commissions are Associated with More Competitive Elections

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Appendix

Table A1: The regression models shown in *Table 2* had several control variables, state and year fixed effects, and state clustered standard errors. The following models do not have control variables, fixed effects, and do not recalculate standard errors. The results are consistent with the models found in the main text.

	Incumbent Party Win	Semi-Competitive	Competitive
(Intercept)	2.730 ***	-1.094 ***	-2.082 ***
	(0.061)	(0.034)	(0.047)
Independent Commission	-0.438 *	0.503 ***	0.561 ***
	(0.177)	(0.104)	(0.132)
Political Commission	-0.299 *	0.255 **	0.329 **
	(0.146)	(0.085)	(0.112)
Court	-0.020	0.167 **	0.272 ***
	(0.107)	(0.058)	(0.077)
N	8023	8136	8136
AIC	3861.000	9476.534	6153.632

*** $p < 0.001$; ** $p < 0.01$; * $p < 0.05$.

Table A2: In *Table 2* an election was considered competitive if it had a democratic vote share between 45 and 55 percent. The following models use alternate specifications for competitiveness. The results are consistent with the models found in the main text.

	Between 44 and 56	**Between 43 and 57**
(Intercept)	-1.860 ***	-1.742 ***
	(0.311)	(0.293)
Independent Commission	0.662 ***	0.630 ***
	(0.198)	(0.187)
Political Commission	0.512 *	0.351
	(0.253)	(0.239)
Court	0.270 **	0.236 **
	(0.091)	(0.086)
State & Year Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes
State Clustered Standard Errors	Yes	Yes
N	8136	8136
AIC	6678	7365

*** $p < 0.001$; ** $p < 0.01$; * $p < 0.05$.

Table A3: Democratic vote share was considered 100 or 0 for uncontested and same-party elections in *Table 2.* The following model removes uncontested and same-party elections. The results are consistent with the models found in the main text.

	Competitive
(Intercept)	-1.424 ***
	(0.331)
Independent Commission	0.895 ***
	(0.216)
Political Commission	0.665 *
	(0.269)
Court	0.325 **
	(0.100)
State & Year Fixed Effects	Yes
State Clustered Standard Errors	Yes
N	6979
AIC	5664

*** $p < 0.001$; ** $p < 0.01$; * $p < 0.05$.

Table A4: The regression models shown in *Table 2* included election data from 1982-2018. The following models only include election data from 2002-2018.The results are consistent with the models found in the main text.

	Incumbent Party Win	**Semi-Competitive**	**Competitive**
(Intercept)	4.498 ***	-2.588 ***	-2.698 ***
	(0.801)	(0.415)	(0.495)
Independent Commission	-3.359 **	1.142 ***	1.083 **
	(1.056)	(0.257)	(0.364)
Political Commission	-2.556 *	0.816 *	1.771 **
	(1.198)	(0.386)	(0.552)
Court	-0.007	0.233	0.493 *
	(0.347)	(0.169)	(0.224)
State & Year Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes
State Clustered Standard Errors	Yes	Yes	Yes
N	3800	3852	3852
AIC	1769	4205	2666

*** $p < 0.001$; ** $p < 0.01$; * $p < 0.05$.

Table A5: In the following model quality challenger is considered as a dependent variable. There is not a statistically significant relationship between redistricting institutions and quality challengers.

	Quality Challenger
(Intercept)	-1.263 ***
	(0.281)
Independent Commission	0.360
	(0.194)
Political Commission	0.006
	(0.225)
Court	-0.058
	(0.089)
State & Year Fixed Effects	Yes
State Clustered Standard Errors	Yes
N	8107
AIC	7383

*** $p < 0.001$; ** $p < 0.01$; * $p < 0.05$.

Table A6: The following model has a binary dependent variable, *Presidential Competitive*, that identifies whether a district was competitive in the last presidential election (1 if Democrat's share of two-party presidential vote was between 45% and 55%; 0 otherwise). There is not a statistically significant relationship between redistricting institutions and presidential competition.

	Presidential Competition
(Intercept)	-1.634 ***
	(0.277)
Independent Commission	-0.206
	(0.179)
Political Commission	0.406
	(0.228)
Court	-0.061
	(0.076)
State & Year Fixed Effects	Yes
State Clustered Standard Errors	Yes
N	8137
AIC	9055

*** $p < 0.001$; ** $p < 0.01$; * $p < 0.05$.