Appendix A: Negotiating the Nuclear and Humanitarian Crisis on the Korean Peninsula

Simulation Scenario

Over the last year, Pyongyang has continued to test its short-, medium-, and longer-range ballistic missiles, while pursuing the miniaturization of its nascent nuclear weapons stockpile. Concurrently, it is believed that North Korea has begun producing highly-enriched uranium (HEU) at the Yongbyon nuclear site. Clandestine reporting by New Focus International (NFI) confirms the HEU reports. North Korea's only use for HEU would be for making nuclear weapons. An HEU production capability and operational nuclear reactor would give North Korea two pathways to making fissile material for nuclear weapons (i.e., HEU and plutonium).

As rounds of increasingly harsh UN-imposed ‘smart’ sanctions appear to have had little effect on Pyongyang’s behavior, the Six Party Talks are reconvening in February 2019 in Beijing to defuse tensions, gain more information, and slow North Korea’s nuclear program. The six players – **Pyongyang, Washington DC, Seoul, Tokyo, Moscow and Beijing** – have varying levels of interest in diffusing tensions. Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission members **Switzerland** and **Sweden** will also send experts to address the status of the demilitarized-zone and their confidence-building measures. The **International Atomic Energy Association (IAEA)** will send its technical experts to support the talks.

Along with these latest developments, there are other pressures. In 2014, the Commission of Inquiry on Human Rights in the DPRK found that Pyongyang’s violations of human rights constituted crimes against humanity, where violations were “essential components” of the political system and that “[t]he gravity, scale and nature of these violations revealed a State that does not have any parallel in the contemporary world.” Interest continues to grow about the Commission’s findings. In terms of **Pyongyang**, North Korea faced an unseasonably long and bitter winter in 2017, which has meant that there was very little to harvest. Strict government controls banning backyard farming and black market activities led to reports of starvation. There are more North Koreans attempting to enter China, and reports that those that enter are sick with a new strand of the bird flu.

Pyongyang’s developments are a grave cause for concern for the remaining members of the talks. **Washington**’s interest in promoting a US-led regional and global security order, means that these talks are particularly important – especially in the context of its South Korean and Japanese alliances. Washington also remains concerned about the health and security of US nationals who remain in North Korea, many of who are faculty members of the Pyongyang University of Science and Technology. In terms of **Beijing**, there is increased attention on the border control question. With many Chinese ethnic Koreans living along the border and many poultry farms, Beijing is also paying considerable attention to health security. In terms of **Seoul**, though there remains domestic support for family reunification and intermittent interest in ‘sunshine’ policies, relations with Pyongyang are still particularly frail. In terms of **Tokyo**, beyond the immediate concerns of a nuclear DPRK, the Japanese public remains focused on the return of Japanese abductees from North Korea. In terms of **Moscow**, the talks are another platform to display Russian technical expertise, diplomatic influence and prestige as a great power.

In order to deal with the issues at hand, the Six Party Talks members agreed to introduce a Track II discussion to their meetings. Leaders from the **Committee for Human Rights in North Korea; the Pyongyang University of Science and Technology; Red Cross Society of the DPRK; the UN Country Team in the DPRK, the UN Human Rights Council and the Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation** are invited to offer expertise and guidance to the Six Party Talks members. Unlike previous rounds of talks, these meetings have two goals: first, the talks must produce a single joint statement between the Six Party Talks members; and second, the Track II negotiations must produce an additional and complementary joint statement.