Online Appendix

I. List of Publications and Reanalysis Results

Table A1 Quantitative CIPE studies in *International Organization* and *World Politics*, July 2007-July 2012

Study	Dataset obtained	Obtained online	Obtained by request
Biglaiser and Staats 2012	✘		
Cao 2012	✘		
Allee and Scalera 2012	✔	✔	
Dreher and Gassebner 2012	✔	✔	
Caraway, Rickard, and Anner 2012	✔	✔	
Brooks and Kurtz 2012	✔		✔
Pelc 2011a	✔		✔
Pelc 2011b	✔		✔
Allee and Peinhardt 2011	✔		✔
Biglaiser and Letzkian 2011	✘		
Ramsay 2011	✔		✔
Ward, Ezrow, and Dorussen 2011	✔		✔
Oatley 2011	✔	✔	
Obinger and Schmitt 2011	✔		✔
Baccaro and Simoni 2010	✘		
Broz and Plouffe 2010	✔	✔	
Pandya 2010	✔		✔
Cao and Prakash 2010	✔	✔	
Winters 2010	✔	✔	
Guisinger and Singer 2010	✔		✔
Hartzell, Hoddie, and Bauer 2010	✔		✔
Efrat 2010	✔		✔
Tobin and Busch 2010	✘		
Gawande, Krishna, and Olarreaga 2009	✔	✔	
Houle 2009	-		
Bueno de Mesquita and Smith 2009	✔	✔	
Scheve and Stasavage 2009	-		
Morrison 2009	✔	✔	
Stone 2008	✘		
Mansfield and Reinhardt 2008	✘		
López-Córdova and Meissner 2008	✔		✔
Kucik and Reinhardt 2008	✔		✔
Ansell 2008	✔		✔
Boix 2008	✔		✔
Mukherjee and Singer 2008	✘		
Rueda 2008	✔		✔
Accominotti and Flandreau 2008	✔		✔
Kurtz and Brooks 2008	✔		✔
Arce and Bellinger 2007	✘		
Baccaro and Rei 2007	✔		✔
Ehrlich 2007	✔		✔
Keefer 2007	✔		✔

Notes: I did not seek to obtain the datasets used in Houle 2009 and Scheve and Stasavage 2009 because these studies already employ multiple imputation as their primary missing-data method.

Table A2 Results of Little's MCAR Test

Study	Observations	χ^2 distance	Degrees of Freedom	Prob $> \chi^2$
Allee and Scalera 2012	11904	17990.38	1071	0.00
Dreher and Gassebner 2012	5512	3421.57	545	0.00
Caraway, Rickard, and Anner 2012	939	1692.79	381	0.00
Brooks and Kurtz 2012	722	1472.92	447	0.00
Pelc 2011a	316974	1548995.00	2265	0.00
Pelc 2011b	385798	573887.70	343	0.00
Allee and Peinhardt 2011	7790	25595.29	6610	0.00
Ramsay 2011	1680	4503.34	696	0.00
Ward, Ezrow, and Dorussen 2011	909	124.23	11	0.00
Oatley 2011	5370	58505.50	31402	0.00
Broz and Plouffe 2010	10010	40130.14	4030	0.00
Pandya 2010	8058	58754.93	38689	0.00
Cao and Prakash 2010	9384	35570.39	7853	0.00
Winters 2010	1024	478.48	58	0.00
Guisinger and Singer 2010	7315	46136.78	18086	0.00
Hartzell, Hoddie, and Bauer 2010	4248	2591.90	374	0.00
Efrat 2010	1000	860.57	397	0.00
Gawande, Krishna, and Olarreaga 2009	39260	38493.86	5140	0.00
Bueno de Mesquita and Smith 2009	137412	75651.14	587	0.00
Morrison 2009	7746	52300.84	10539	0.00
Lopez-Cordova and Meissner 2008	4094	23285.63	2235	0.00
Kucik and Reinhardt 2008	8900	8707.84	210	0.00
Ansell 2008	5061	3105.12	281	0.00
Boix 2008	14326	16077.30	1626	0.00
Rueda 2008	368	1399.15	413	0.00
Accominotti and Flandreau 2008	7392	11285.19	516	0.00
Kurtz and Brooks 2008	323	1202.36	481	0.00
Baccaro and Rei 2007	820	1106.36	401	0.00
Ehrlich 2007	1056	1676.24	450	0.00
Keefer 2007	4785	3488.55	410	0.00

Notes: The test was implemented using the *mcartest* command in Stata (version 13.1), which in most instances required removing highly collinear variables from the dataset. For studies that employ more than one dataset, I take the average value across all datasets.

Table A3 Allee and Scalera 2012: The Effect of Different Types of GATT/WTO Accession on Trade Flows (Table 4)

	Model 1		*Model 2*		*Model 3*		*Model 4*		*Model 5*		*Model 6*	
	Replicated	*Imputed*	*Replicated*	*Imputed*	*Replicated*	*Imputed*	*Replicated*	*Imputed*	*Replicated*	*Imputed*	*Replicated*	*Imputed*
Population, log	0.738	0.725	0.728	0.718	0.668	0.676	0.710	0.701	0.669	0.676	0.692	0.694
	(0.045)	(0.023)	(0.044)	(0.022)	(0.047)	(0.023)	(0.047)	(0.024)	(0.047)	(0.023)	(0.047)	(0.024)
GDP per Capita ($\times 10^{-3}$)	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Shared Borders	0.040	0.050	0.041	0.051	0.046	0.057	0.043	0.054	0.046	0.057	0.043	0.056
	(0.021)	(0.013)	(0.021)	(0.013)	(0.020)	(0.012)	(0.021)	(0.013)	(0.020)	(0.012)	(0.019)	(0.012)
Democracy	0.013	0.013	0.012	0.012	0.010	0.011	0.012	0.012	0.010	0.011	0.011	0.011
	(0.003)	(0.002)	(0.003)	(0.002)	(0.003)	(0.002)	(0.003)	(0.002)	(0.003)	(0.002)	(0.003)	(0.002)
Internal Political Conflict ($\times 10^{-4}$)	-0.000	-0.000	-0.000	-0.000	-0.000	-0.000	-0.000	-0.000	-0.000	-0.000	-0.000	-0.000
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
GATT/WTO Member (other)			0.176	0.219	0.610	0.633	0.070	0.098				
			(0.140)	(0.106)	(0.164)	(0.123)	(0.146)	(0.106)				
Rigorous Acceder			0.647	0.647					0.707	0.682	0.661	0.684
			(0.156)	(0.118)					(0.162)	(0.121)	(0.178)	(0.123)
GATT/WTO Member	0.233	0.254										
	(0.136)	(0.100)										
Automatic Acceder					-0.178	-0.111			-0.171	-0.106	-0.345	-0.225
					(0.165)	(0.120)			(0.165)	(0.120)	(0.187)	(0.120)
Early Acceder							0.479	0.533	0.572	0.612	1.279	1.261
							(0.180)	(0.145)	(0.186)	(0.148)	(0.250)	(0.186)
Years Since Rigorous Accession											-0.008	-0.012
											(0.007)	(0.005)
Years Since Automatic Accession											0.005	0.002
											(0.007)	(0.004)
Years Since Early Accession											-0.028	-0.026
											(0.006)	(0.004)
Constant	-0.393	-0.347	-0.275	-0.224	0.081	0.147	-0.239	-0.166	0.085	0.149	-0.348	0.041
N	6315	11904	6315	11904	6315	11904	6315	11904	6315	11904	6315	11904

Notes: Dependent variable is national trade volume. Key explanatory variables (in bold) are different types of GATT/WTO accession. OLS regressions with standard errors clustered by country in parentheses. Time dummies estimated but not reported.

Table A4 Dreher and Gassebner 2012: Government Crises and IFI Involvement (Table 1)

	Model 1		*Model 2*		*Model 3*		*Model 4*		*Model 5*		*Model 6*		*Model 7*	
	Replicated	*Imputed*	*Replicated*	*Imputed*	*Replicated*	*Imputed*	*Replicated*	*Imputed*	*Replicated*	*Imputed*	*Replicated*	*Imputed*	*Replicated*	*Imputed*
Democracy	0.047	-0.018	0.049	-0.020	0.050	0.022	0.044	-0.018	0.051	0.022	0.044	-0.018	0.069	0.022
	(0.016)	(0.009)	(0.015)	(0.009)	(0.027)	(0.018)	(0.016)	(0.009)	(0.027)	(0.018)	(0.017)	(0.009)	(0.031)	(0.018)
Regime Duration	-0.010	0.004	-0.011	0.004	-0.025	0.006	-0.011	0.004	-0.024	0.006	-0.010	0.004	-0.027	0.006
	(0.007)	(0.004)	(0.007)	(0.004)	(0.014)	(0.006)	(0.007)	(0.004)	(0.014)	(0.006)	(0.008)	(0.004)	(0.017)	(0.006)
Riots (*log*)	0.152	0.325	0.141	0.328	0.461	0.320	0.142	0.324	0.464	0.324	0.138	0.321	0.550	0.321
	(0.150)	(0.131)	(0.150)	(0.130)	(0.212)	(0.187)	(0.150)	(0.131)	(0.214)	(0.187)	(0.162)	(0.131)	(0.248)	(0.187)
Demonstrations (*log*)	0.817	0.557	0.823	0.545	0.852	0.662	0.817	0.550	0.853	0.661	0.799	0.551	0.867	0.666
	(0.137)	(0.113)	(0.137)	(0.113)	(0.173)	(0.151)	(0.137)	(0.113)	(0.173)	(0.151)	(0.150)	(0.113)	(0.205)	(0.151)
Strikes (*log*)	0.367	0.448	0.381	0.421	0.258	0.240	0.368	0.437	0.262	0.246	0.509	0.439	0.483	0.246
	(0.203)	(0.172)	(0.204)	(0.172)	(0.270)	(0.227)	(0.203)	(0.172)	(0.269)	(0.228)	(0.222)	(0.172)	(0.317)	(0.230)
Guerilla Warfare (*log*)	0.444	1.030	0.416	1.029	0.457	0.454	0.430	1.029	0.466	0.459	0.340	1.031	0.347	0.457
	(0.259)	(0.164)	(0.259)	(0.165)	(0.368)	(0.292)	(0.259)	(0.165)	(0.369)	(0.291)	(0.281)	(0.164)	(0.422)	(0.293)
Assassinations (*log*)	0.379	0.359	0.369	0.350	0.071	0.280	0.366	0.351	0.054	0.284	0.418	0.348	0.082	0.280
	(0.161)	(0.138)	(0.162)	(0.139)	(0.211)	(0.186)	(0.162)	(0.139)	(0.212)	(0.185)	(0.178)	(0.140)	(0.253)	(0.187)
Purges (*log*)	1.344	0.755	1.338	0.793	1.571	0.540	1.361	0.769	1.565	0.546	1.377	0.773	1.967	0.539
	(0.263)	(0.193)	(0.263)	(0.192)	(0.675)	(0.483)	(0.263)	(0.192)	(0.668)	(0.481)	(0.275)	(0.193)	(0.903)	(0.480)
Growth per Capita (*t - 1*)	-0.035	-0.008	-0.037	-0.009	-0.033	-0.013	-0.038	-0.009	-0.036	-0.013	-0.032	-0.009	-0.021	-0.013
	(0.011)	(0.006)	(0.011)	(0.006)	(0.013)	(0.008)	(0.011)	(0.006)	(0.013)	(0.008)	(0.012)	(0.006)	(0.015)	(0.008)
World Bank Program (*t - 1*)	0.220	-0.196					0.175	-0.174	0.172	-0.161	0.223	-0.174	0.191	-0.159
	(0.084)	(0.067)					(0.087)	(0.072)	(0.104)	(0.082)	(0.097)	(0.074)	(0.119)	(0.086)
IMF SAF/PGRF Program (*t - 1*)			0.609	-0.104	0.609	0.226	0.491	0.039	0.503	0.335	0.582	0.157	0.681	0.509
			(0.238)	(0.159)	(0.282)	(0.192)	(0.245)	(0.170)	(0.290)	(0.199)	(0.310)	(0.201)	(0.376)	(0.236)
IMF SBA Program (*t - 1*)			0.143	-0.479	0.377	-0.151	0.106	-0.430	0.333	-0.093	0.139	-0.421	0.225	-0.105
			(0.173)	(0.134)	(0.225)	(0.166)	(0.174)	(0.136)	(0.227)	(0.169)	(0.197)	(0.139)	(0.273)	(0.177)
IDA Disbursements (*t - 1*)											185.102	43.409	177.908	50.387
											(115.550)	(44.187)	(132.870)	(54.542)
IBRD Disbursements (*t - 1*)											-34.575	5.165	-12.404	5.700
											(32.458)	(20.232)	(39.670)	(24.802)
IMF SBA Disbursements (*t - 1*)											-4.561	-3.976	38.450	1.851
											(22.719)	(10.301)	(40.123)	(17.322)
IMF SAF/PGRF Disbursements (*t - 1*)											-77.533	-36.584	-77.400	-57.399
											(56.842)	(27.875)	(64.915)	(39.065)
N	2406	5565	2406	5565	1207	3021	2406	5565	1207	3021	1937	5565	870	3021

Notes: Dependent variable is the occurrence of a major government crisis in a given country and year. Key explanatory variables (in bold) are measures of participation in IMF and World Bank programs. Conditional fixed effects logit regressions with standard errors in parentheses. Controls for temporal dependence estimated but not reported.

Table A5 Caraway, Rickard, and Anner 2009: Domestic Labor Power and IMF Labor Conditionality (Table 2)

	(1) Letters of intent		*(2) Letters of intent*		*(3) Arrangement letters*		*(4) Arrangement letters*	
	Replicated	*Imputed*	*Replicated*	*Imputed*	*Replicated*	*Imputed*	*Replicated*	*Imputed*
Potential Labor Power (PLP)	-0.211	-0.091	0.026	-0.001	-0.526	0.045	0.529	0.359
	(0.049)	(0.024)	(0.125)	(0.052)	(0.167)	(0.090)	(0.453)	(0.176)
Democracy	-0.000	-0.006	0.018	0.002	0.084	0.002	0.167	0.032
	(0.011)	(0.005)	(0.015)	(0.007)	(0.038)	(0.021)	(0.057)	(0.025)
Democracy $\times$ PLP			-0.016	-0.006			-0.076	-0.023
			(0.008)	(0.003)			(0.035)	(0.011)
Firing Costs	-0.000	0.000	-0.001	-0.000	-0.000	-0.001	-0.002	-0.001
	(0.001)	(0.000)	(0.001)	(0.000)	(0.004)	(0.002)	(0.003)	(0.002)
UN Voting	1.885	0.885	1.876	0.915	-2.601	-1.438	-3.646	-1.278
	(0.804)	(0.333)	(0.816)	(0.336)	(2.941)	(1.232)	(2.950)	(1.220)
GDP per Capita (*log*)	-0.026	0.017	-0.019	0.022	-0.743	-0.205	-0.572	-0.192
	(0.076)	(0.042)	(0.076)	(0.041)	(0.315)	(0.142)	(0.356)	(0.140)
GDP (*log*)	-0.087	-0.067	-0.097	-0.071	-0.355	-0.355	-0.511	-0.377
	(0.049)	(0.027)	(0.048)	(0.027)	(0.190)	(0.107)	(0.178)	(0.107)
Debt	0.001	-0.002	0.001	-0.002	0.007	0.009	0.003	0.009
	(0.006)	(0.002)	(0.006)	(0.003)	(0.019)	(0.009)	(0.019)	(0.009)
# of Documents	0.367	0.341	0.369	0.334	0.958	1.999	0.895	1.914
	(0.036)	(0.026)	(0.036)	(0.026)	(0.260)	(0.560)	(0.232)	(0.561)
Time Trend	0.114	0.110	0.117	0.111	0.319	0.227	0.332	0.232
	(0.011)	(0.006)	(0.011)	(0.006)	(0.043)	(0.019)	(0.046)	(0.019)
Constant	1.132	0.724	1.056	0.667	5.955	0.694	7.643	0.887
	(0.807)	(0.489)	(0.799)	(0.499)	(3.576)	(3.078)	(3.018)	(3.081)
N	257	939	257	939	257	939	257	939

Notes: Dependent variable is the stringency of labor conditions in IMF loan programs. Key explanatory variables (in bold) are domestic labor power and its interaction with democracy. Negative binomial regressions with robust standard errors clustered by country in parentheses.

Table A6 Brooks and Kurtz 2012: Emulation, Domestic Politics, and International Pressures in Latin America (Table 1)

	Model 1		*Model 2*	
	Replicated	*Imputed*	*Replicated*	*Imputed*
All Countries	0.223	0.234		
	(0.243)	(0.230)		
ISI Peer	0.111	0.222	0.246	0.374
	(0.189)	(0.180)	(0.111)	(0.103)
Success	-0.006	-0.006	0.001	-0.001
	(0.038)	(0.034)	(0.037)	(0.034)
Inflation Performance	-0.043	-0.050	-0.039	-0.047
	(0.041)	(0.037)	(0.041)	(0.037)
Negative Learning	0.019	0.003	0.028	0.012
	(0.039)	(0.034)	(0.038)	(0.032)
Competition	0.002	-0.021	0.005	-0.017
	(0.063)	(0.059)	(0.062)	(0.059)
IMF (*t - 1*)	0.066	0.085	0.071	0.087
	(0.058)	(0.053)	(0.058)	(0.052)
ISI	1.280	1.196	1.284	1.225
	(0.334)	(0.356)	(0.336)	(0.360)
Partisanship	0.065	0.058	0.067	0.059
	(0.037)	(0.032)	(0.037)	(0.032)
Checks on Authority	0.037	0.008	0.035	0.008
	(0.029)	(0.014)	(0.029)	(0.014)
US Rate (*t - 1*)	-0.006	-0.011	-0.005	-0.010
	(0.016)	(0.014)	(0.016)	(0.014)
ln(Inflation) (*t - 1*)	-0.087	-0.066	-0.090	-0.068
	(0.034)	(0.033)	(0.034)	(0.033)
Bank RA (*t - 1*)	-0.006	-0.005	-0.006	-0.005
	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)
Current Account (*t - 1*)	-0.006	-0.005	-0.007	-0.006
	(0.009)	(0.007)	(0.009)	(0.006)
Growth (*t - 1*)	-0.011	-0.008	-0.012	-0.009
	(0.006)	(0.005)	(0.006)	(0.005)
Trade Balance (*t - 1*)	0.006	0.001	0.007	0.002
	(0.008)	(0.006)	(0.008)	(0.006)
ln(GDP per Capita)	0.230	0.395	0.245	0.424
	(0.166)	(0.165)	(0.171)	(0.170)
ln(GDP)	-0.546	-0.546	-0.546	-0.554
	(0.099)	(0.098)	(0.099)	(0.098)
Break	0.225	0.334	0.243	0.347
	(0.166)	(0.155)	(0.164)	(0.154)
Time Trend	0.085	0.071	0.092	0.078
	(0.020)	(0.018)	(0.018)	(0.017)
Year 1995	0.133	0.125	0.132	0.123
	(0.125)	(0.113)	(0.124)	(0.112)
Constant	8.953	8.030	8.658	7.816
	(2.416)	(2.360)	(2.422)	(2.376)
N	403	475	403	475

Notes: Dependent variable is capital account openness. Key explanatory variable (in bold) is an economic legacy of import substitution. Generalized least squares (GLS) regressions corrected for panel-specific AR-1 autocorrelation with standard errors in parentheses.

Table A7 Pelc 2011a: The Effect of the Imports Sector on De Jure Versus De Facto Depth (Table 3)

	De jure depth		*De facto depth*	
	Replicated	*Imputed*	*Replicated*	*Imputed*
Log GDP	0.522	0.859	-0.951	-0.814
	(0.867)	(1.087)	(0.452)	(0.324)
Log Industry Imports	0.312	0.535	0.429	0.149
	(0.093)	(0.151)	(0.120)	(0.119)
Log Product Exports	0.152	-0.028	-0.245	-0.114
	(0.091)	(0.161)	(0.066)	(0.120)
Accession Period	-1.470	-1.007	0.621	0.790
	(0.256)	(0.423)	(0.241)	(0.199)
Log GDP per Capita	1.171	0.353	1.290	1.150
	(0.942)	(1.297)	(0.719)	(0.438)
Prior Applied Rate	0.535	0.461	0.204	0.209
	(0.038)	(0.052)	(0.091)	(0.044)
Regime Type	0.429	0.419	0.133	0.067
	(0.078)	(0.088)	(0.073)	(0.065)
China Dummy	19.072	12.622	6.382	1.042
	(3.961)	(4.527)	(2.050)	(1.435)
Membership Year	2.452	1.726	-0.199	-0.426
	(0.377)	(0.431)	(0.216)	(0.163)
Constant	-41.409	-42.316	4.092	4.453
	(12.116)	(14.442)	(5.150)	(4.762)
N	89,609	315,385	89,600	315,385

Notes: Dependent variable is the depth of trade liberalization imposed on entrants to the WTO (de jure depth) and subsequently undertaken by such countries (de facto depth). Key explanatory variable (in bold) is the logged value of industry product imports. OLS regressions with robust standard errors clustered by country in parentheses.

Table A8 Pelc 2011b: The Effect of Exchange Rate Regimes on Binding Overhang (Table 2)

	Model 1		*Model 2*		*Model 3*		*Model 4*	
	Replicated	*Imputed*	*Replicated*	*Imputed*	*Replicated*	*Imputed*	*Replicated*	*Imputed*
Applied Rate	-0.354	-0.269	-0.501	-0.362	-0.491	-0.352	-0.522	-0.348
	(0.122)	(0.102)	(0.079)	(0.065)	(0.084)	(0.068)	(0.081)	(0.064)
Logged GDP per capita			-1.913	-2.241	-1.843	-1.634	-1.708	-1.243
			(3.407)	(1.757)	(3.288)	(1.617)	(3.300)	(1.704)
Logged GDP			-2.027	-4.482	-2.116	-3.916	0.894	-2.850
			(1.021)	(0.681)	(1.100)	(0.673)	(1.315)	(0.900)
Regime			-0.009	0.106	0.031	0.142	0.125	0.177
			(0.357)	(0.146)	(0.367)	(0.142)	(0.319)	(0.131)
Logged Product Imports			0.032	0.004	0.053	0.022	0.091	0.032
			(0.194)	(0.121)	(0.159)	(0.108)	(0.165)	(0.112)
LDC Dummy			4.668	0.632	1.268	2.793	4.667	3.407
			(9.324)	(5.573)	(7.009)	(4.879)	(7.453)	(4.754)
Agricultural Product			23.665	18.483	24.107	19.070	23.929	19.042
			(4.021)	(2.923)	(3.779)	(2.796)	(3.773)	(2.800)
Recent Entrant			-4.373	-4.134	-4.789	-4.445	-5.023	-4.612
			(0.608)	(0.478)	(0.501)	(0.435)	(0.631)	(0.448)
Pegs (1)			4.586	-3.177				
			(4.156)	(4.003)				
Crawling Pegs (2)			16.598	3.238				
			(6.017)	(5.160)				
Crawling or Moving Bands or Managed Floating (3)			6.344	-2.851				
			(3.967)	(3.800)				
Fully Floating (4)	-21.479	-23.477			-11.301	-3.993	-9.909	-3.965
	(3.474)	(3.551)			(3.720)	(3.976)	(3.828)	(3.856)
Remedies User							-16.168	-8.696
							(7.718)	(5.360)
Constant	25.045	25.184	77.529	149.277	90.514	130.613	22.052	104.739
	(3.055)	(2.468)	(27.647)	(18.684)	(18.415)	(14.893)	(38.362)	(25.137)
N	256760	385798	144074	341803	166637	385798	163097	385798

Notes: Dependent variable is binding overhang (the difference between maximum WTO tariffs and actual applied rates). Key explanatory variables (in bold) are measures of exchange rate fixity and the use of trade remedies. OLS regressions with robust standard errors clustered by country in parentheses. Replicated results differ marginally from published results due to unavailability of original dataset.

Table A9 Allee and Peinhardt 2011: The Effects of ICSID Filings on FDI Inflows (Table 2)

	Model 2.1		*Model 2.2*		*Model 2.3*		*Model 2.4*	
	Replicated	*Imputed*	*Replicated*	*Imputed*	*Replicated*	*Imputed*	*Replicated*	*Imputed*
Bilateral Investment Treaties	0.014	0.035	0.015	0.036	0.015	0.036	0.016	0.036
	(0.009)	(0.005)	(0.010)	(0.005)	(0.010)	(0.005)	(0.010)	(0.005)
Pending ICSID Disputes			-0.036	-0.050				
			(0.012)	(0.012)				
ICSID Disputes Filed Against (past 2 years)					-0.057	-0.085		
					(0.018)	(0.027)		
ICSID Disputes Filed Against (past 5 years)							-0.040	-0.056
							(0.011)	(0.015)
Domestic Economic Shocks	-0.030	0.003	-0.032	-0.002	-0.031	-0.000	-0.031	-0.001
	(0.065)	(0.072)	(0.066)	(0.072)	(0.065)	(0.072)	(0.065)	(0.072)
Domestic Political Shocks	-0.012	-0.011	-0.011	-0.011	-0.011	-0.011	-0.011	-0.011
	(0.010)	(0.007)	(0.010)	(0.007)	(0.010)	(0.007)	(0.010)	(0.007)
Lack of External Threat	0.048	0.049	0.046	0.049	0.047	0.049	0.047	0.049
	(0.026)	(0.016)	(0.026)	(0.016)	(0.026)	(0.016)	(0.026)	(0.016)
Democracy	0.015	0.008	0.015	0.008	0.015	0.008	0.015	0.008
	(0.018)	(0.007)	(0.018)	(0.007)	(0.018)	(0.007)	(0.018)	(0.007)
Property Rights	0.040	0.034	0.039	0.033	0.039	0.033	0.039	0.033
	(0.022)	(0.008)	(0.022)	(0.008)	(0.022)	(0.008)	(0.022)	(0.008)
Population, *log*	1.311	0.309	1.299	0.309	1.316	0.309	1.306	0.309
	(0.525)	(0.067)	(0.525)	(0.067)	(0.525)	(0.067)	(0.526)	(0.067)
GDP per Capita, *log*	1.066	0.336	1.061	0.336	1.053	0.336	1.055	0.336
	(0.262)	(0.051)	(0.265)	(0.051)	(0.264)	(0.051)	(0.264)	(0.051)
Economic growth	0.017	0.011	0.018	0.011	0.018	0.011	0.018	0.011
	(0.006)	(0.004)	(0.006)	(0.004)	(0.006)	(0.004)	(0.006)	(0.004)
Exchange Rate Volatility	-0.001	-0.000	-0.001	-0.000	-0.001	-0.000	-0.001	-0.000
	(0.000)	(0.001)	(0.000)	(0.001)	(0.000)	(0.001)	(0.000)	(0.001)
Financial Openness	0.127	0.041	0.126	0.041	0.127	0.041	0.125	0.041
	(0.058)	(0.031)	(0.059)	(0.031)	(0.059)	(0.031)	(0.058)	(0.031)
Total World FDI (in millions, $\times 10^{-7}$)	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Constant	-25.923	-4.953	-25.659	-4.943	-25.883	-4.942	-25.727	-4.941
	(8.444)	(1.184)	(8.448)	(1.184)	(8.429)	(1.183)	(8.440)	(1.183)
N	1796	6771	1796	6771	1796	6771	1796	6771

Notes: Dependent variable is foreign direct investment inflows. Key explanatory variables (in bold) are the signing of bilateral investment treaties and alternative measures of dispute filings against a country at the International Centre for the Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID). Fixed effects models with standard errors clustered by country in parentheses.

Table A10 Ramsay 2011: Two-stage Least Squares: Polity IV Scores on Oil Income (Table 3)

	World oil producers' political freedom measure							
	Polity IV (1)		*Polity IV (2)*		*Polity IV (3)*		*Polity IV (4)*	
	Replicated	*Imputed*	*Replicated*	*Imputed*	*Replicated*	*Imputed*	*Replicated*	*Imputed*
Log Oil Income per Capita	-0.633	-0.685	-0.356	-0.276	-0.356	-0.278	-0.357	-0.242
	(0.206)	(0.290)	(0.077)	(0.049)	(0.077)	(0.049)	(0.167)	(0.083)
Log GDP per Capita			0.361	0.310	0.355	0.308	0.355	0.263
			(0.056)	(0.041)	(0.053)	(0.040)	(0.155)	(0.083)
GDP Growth					-0.012	-0.009	-0.012	-0.008
					(0.004)	(0.003)	(0.005)	(0.003)
Polity at Entry							-0.001	0.186
							(0.371)	(0.209)
Constant	2.803	3.272	-1.031	-0.799	-0.961	-0.737	-0.962	-0.626
	(0.836)	(1.238)	(0.206)	(0.148)	(0.200)	(0.142)	(0.438)	(0.219)
	Log oil revenues per capita (first stage)							
	(1)		*(2)*		*(3)*		*(4)*	
Log Out of Region Disaster Estimates	0.178	0.154	0.245	0.296	0.244	0.297	0.117	0.154
	(0.056)	(0.050)	(0.055)	(0.044)	(0.054)	(0.044)	(0.056)	(0.048)
Log GDP per Capita			0.733	0.827	0.710	0.814	0.937	1.000
			(0.055)	(0.046)	(0.054)	(0.046)	(0.040)	(0.033)
GDP Growth					-0.040	-0.042	-0.027	-0.032
					(0.010)	(0.009)	(0.008)	(0.008)
Polity at Entry							-2.090	-2.314
							(0.173)	(0.162)
Constant	0.077	1.207	-7.127	-7.992	-6.888	-7.742	-5.051	-5.330
	(1.245)	(1.118)	(1.417)	(1.129)	(1.406)	(1.114)	(1.353)	(1.133)
N	1379	1680	1277	1,680	1267	1680	1267	1680

Notes: Dependent variable is democracy (measured using normalized Polity scores). Key explanatory variable (in bold) is an instrument for the logged value of oil income per capita based on the occurrence of natural disasters. Two-stage least squares regressions with Newey-West heterosketastistic and autocorrelation-consistent standard errors in parentheses.

Table A11 Ward, Ezrow, and Dorussen 2011: Globalization and Party Position (Table 1)

	Model 1		*Model 2*		*Model 3*		*Model 4*		*Model 5*	
	Replicated	*Imputed*	*Replicated*	*Imputed*	*Replicated*	*Imputed*	*Replicated*	*Imputed*	*Replicated*	*Imputed*
prevposition	0.176	0.143	0.179	0.154	0.188	0.153	0.172	0.167	0.163	0.165
	(0.049)	(0.049)	(0.053)	(0.049)	(0.049)	(0.048)	(0.052)	(0.047)	(0.046)	(0.048)
voterposition	27.175	13.629			9.477	7.614	4.575	5.861	35.936	10.564
	(9.346)	(9.153)			(5.435)	(3.900)	(3.214)	(2.501)	(12.388)	(8.865)
economicglobalization	1.781	0.704	0.095	0.127						
	(0.664)	(0.686)	(0.066)	(0.061)						
voterpositionXeconglob	-0.346	-0.109								
	(0.128)	(0.133)								
totaltrade					0.422	0.144				
					(0.269)	(0.227)				
totaltradeXvoterposition					-0.094	-0.011				
					(0.056)	(0.046)				
fdi							2.412	-0.008		
							(1.167)	(0.656)		
fdiXvoterposition							-0.476	0.007		
							(0.229)	(0.128)		
quinnall									15.774	2.342
									(5.737)	(3.939)
quinnallXvoterposition									-3.026	-0.425
									(1.076)	(0.744)
constant	-141.301	-84.250	-8.863	-11.745	-45.339	-49.483	-25.127	-33.993	-189.538	-59.901
	(48.200)	(47.285)	(4.877)	(4.509)	(27.615)	(20.724)	(17.260)	(13.417)	(66.323)	(47.364)
N	617	909	790	909	617	909	566	909	617	909

Notes: Dependent variable is a party's left-right policy position. Key explanatory variables (in bold) are the median voter's position, economic globalization, and their interaction. Fixed effects regressions with robust clustered standard errors in parentheses.

Table A12 Oatley 2011: Regime Type, the WTO, and Average Tariffs (Table 2)

	Model 1		*Model 2*	
	Replicated	*Imputed*	*Replicated*	*Imputed*
Regime Type	-0.317	-0.123	0.134	-0.065
	(0.108)	(0.058)	(0.154)	(0.061)
Regime Type × WTO			-0.498	-0.199
			(0.129)	(0.095)
Population	35.016	-0.091	31.872	-0.084
	(6.447)	(0.464)	(6.369)	(0.464)
GDP per Capita	0.001	-0.000	0.001	-0.000
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Economic Crisis	-0.469	-2.895	-0.360	-2.845
	(0.688)	(1.114)	(0.683)	(1.109)
Balance of Payments Crisis	0.775	0.423	0.832	0.369
	(0.719)	(0.596)	(0.742)	(0.592)
IMF Program	0.140	-0.007	0.143	-0.053
	(0.372)	(0.738)	(0.381)	(0.732)
Years in Office	-0.183	-0.027	-0.177	-0.028
	(0.057)	(0.041)	(0.056)	(0.041)
WTO Membership	2.275	1.479	3.380	1.393
	(1.159)	(1.040)	(1.315)	(1.040)
Five Open	-1.566	13.197	-1.616	13.073
	(1.585)	(2.365)	(1.538)	(2.348)
US Hegemony	22.537	18.689	21.975	18.092
	(18.177)	(46.371)	(17.941)	(46.113)
Constant	2665.092	2879.011	2610.291	2829.887
	(338.316)	(485.682)	(323.534)	(482.258)
N	694	5370	694	5370

Notes: Dependent variable is average national tariff rate. Key explanatory variable (in bold) is the interaction between regime type and WTO membership. OLS regressions with panel-corrected standard errors in parentheses. Country fixed effects, AR1 correction, and time trend included but not shown. All right-hand-side variables lagged one period.

Table A13 Broz and Plouffe 2010: INFLATION CONCERN and Pegged Exchange Rates (Table 4)

	Model 1		*Model 2*		*Model 3*		*Model 4*		*Model 5*		*Model 6*	
	Replicated	*Imputed*	*Replicated*	*Imputed*	*Replicated*	*Imputed*	*Replicated*	*Imputed*	*Replicated*	*Imputed*	*Replicated*	*Imputed*
Sales Change	-0.067	-0.054	-0.050	-0.045	-0.046	-0.039	-0.046	-0.041	-0.046	-0.041	-0.046	-0.039
	(0.039)	(0.037)	(0.031)	(0.032)	(0.031)	(0.030)	(0.031)	(0.030)	(0.032)	(0.029)	(0.031)	(0.030)
Firm Size	-0.057	-0.053	-0.086	-0.092	-0.089	-0.093	-0.094	-0.097	-0.090	-0.092	-0.080	-0.091
	(0.028)	(0.024)	(0.027)	(0.022)	(0.024)	(0.019)	(0.027)	(0.021)	(0.024)	(0.019)	(0.026)	(0.019)
Management	-0.212	-0.159	-0.123	-0.060	-0.121	-0.074	-0.140	-0.100	-0.108	-0.072	-0.141	-0.073
	(0.065)	(0.060)	(0.062)	(0.055)	(0.063)	(0.054)	(0.061)	(0.053)	(0.059)	(0.051)	(0.070)	(0.054)
Services	-0.332	-0.276	-0.185	-0.116	-0.183	-0.127	-0.200	-0.145	-0.163	-0.111	-0.195	-0.131
	(0.064)	(0.057)	(0.059)	(0.052)	(0.061)	(0.052)	(0.060)	(0.052)	(0.054)	(0.047)	(0.069)	(0.052)
Foreign Owned	-0.227	-0.194	-0.156	-0.125	-0.137	-0.112	-0.130	-0.102	-0.129	-0.109	-0.152	-0.110
	(0.060)	(0.054)	(0.041)	(0.040)	(0.040)	(0.038)	(0.043)	(0.040)	(0.037)	(0.036)	(0.037)	(0.037)
Exporter	-0.226	-0.215	-0.106	-0.115	-0.114	-0.117	-0.108	-0.104	-0.094	-0.092	-0.094	-0.115
	(0.067)	(0.058)	(0.046)	(0.044)	(0.046)	(0.042)	(0.046)	(0.042)	(0.044)	(0.040)	(0.050)	(0.042)
π Variance			0.380	0.357	0.381	0.350	0.365	0.341	0.358	0.326	0.390	0.342
			(0.193)	(0.147)	(0.147)	(0.103)	(0.155)	(0.113)	(0.125)	(0.089)	(0.153)	(0.100)
GDPPC			-0.029	-0.027	-0.027	-0.025	-0.028	-0.025	-0.028	-0.025	-0.026	-0.025
			(0.008)	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.006)	(0.007)	(0.005)	(0.007)	(0.006)	(0.008)	(0.006)
$\triangle$ GDPPC			-0.039	-0.043	-0.042	-0.046	-0.038	-0.043	-0.043	-0.047	-0.041	-0.045
			(0.015)	(0.011)	(0.014)	(0.011)	(0.015)	(0.011)	(0.014)	(0.011)	(0.016)	(0.012)
Freely Falling			0.587	0.565	0.520	0.472	0.536	0.504	0.585	0.533	0.521	0.468
			(0.221)	(0.164)	(0.215)	(0.160)	(0.214)	(0.160)	(0.152)	(0.105)	(0.222)	(0.149)
Peg (RR)					-0.298	-0.374					-0.322	-0.410
					(0.114)	(0.102)					(0.154)	(0.115)
Peg (LYS)							-0.258	-0.311				
							(0.108)	(0.091)				
Peg (IMF)									-0.400	-0.450		
									(0.113)	(0.096)		
CBI (CWN)											0.152	0.233
											(0.327)	(0.231)
IT (Mishkin)											-0.081	-0.093
											(0.169)	(0.158)
N	7886	10010	7020	10010	7020	10010	6986	10010	7020	10010	6248	10010

Notes: Dependent variable is firm owners' concern about inflation. Key explanatory variables (in bold) are alternative measures of exchange rate fixity. Ordered probit regressions with robust standard errors clustered by country in parentheses.

Table A14 Pandya 2010: Baseline Results (Table 2)

	Model 1 (1995)		*Model 2 (1995)*		*Model 3 (1995)*		*Model 4 (1998)*		*Model 5 (1998)*		*Model 6 (1998)*	
	Replicated	*Imputed*	*Replicated*	*Imputed*	*Replicated*	*Imputed*	*Replicated*	*Imputed*	*Replicated*	*Imputed*	*Replicated*	*Imputed*
												(continued)
Years of Education	0.029	0.013					0.032	0.024				
	(0.003)	(0.003)					(0.005)	(0.004)				
Job Insecurity	-0.007	-0.012	-0.003	-0.012	-0.003	-0.013	-0.063	-0.070	-0.062	-0.070	-0.063	-0.070
	(0.015)	(0.015)	(0.014)	(0.015)	(0.014)	(0.016)	(0.017)	(0.015)	(0.017)	(0.015)	(0.017)	(0.015)
Public Employee	-0.013	-0.043	-0.034	-0.060	0.000	-0.053	-0.045	-0.049	-0.038	-0.045	-0.049	-0.058
	(0.073)	(0.070)	(0.089)	(0.071)	(0.082)	(0.075)	(0.042)	(0.038)	(0.040)	(0.037)	(0.038)	(0.035)
Female	-0.193	-0.110	-0.173	-0.110	-0.186	-0.113	-0.161	-0.113	-0.162	-0.113	-0.162	-0.113
	(0.050)	(0.029)	(0.049)	(0.028)	(0.048)	(0.027)	(0.038)	(0.036)	(0.038)	(0.036)	(0.038)	(0.036)
Age	0.002	0.002	0.002	0.002	0.001	0.002	0.001	0.001	-0.000	0.000	-0.001	-0.000
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
Married	0.132	0.077	0.101	0.074	0.138	0.076	0.054	0.051	0.049	0.047	0.054	0.051
	(0.045)	(0.043)	(0.047)	(0.043)	(0.052)	(0.044)	(0.036)	(0.033)	(0.036)	(0.033)	(0.036)	(0.033)
University Completed					0.286	0.172					0.375	0.319
					(0.055)	(0.046)					(0.063)	(0.056)
Vocational Training					0.242	0.145					0.187	0.138
					(0.075)	(0.067)					(0.045)	(0.043)
Incomplete University					0.197	0.067					0.206	0.161
					(0.054)	(0.057)					(0.061)	(0.053)
Secondary Completed					0.156	0.102					0.116	0.098
					(0.044)	(0.035)					(0.041)	(0.038)
Education Level			0.149	0.082					0.146	0.111		
			(0.014)	(0.008)					(0.024)	(0.021)		
Constant	0.543	0.824	0.658	0.848	0.789	0.932	0.165	0.372	0.416	0.550	0.482	0.594
	(0.069)	(0.079)	(0.050)	(0.046)	(0.053)	(0.057)	(0.084)	(0.076)	(0.059)	(0.051)	(0.051)	(0.045)
N	6759	9069	7199	9069	6427	9069	15011	17839	15011	17839	15011	17839

(continued)

	Model 7 (1998)		*Model 8 (1998)*		*Model 9 (1998)*		*Model 10 (2000)*		*Model 11 (2000)*		*Model 12 (2000)*	
	Replicated	*Imputed*	*Replicated*	*Imputed*	*Replicated*	*Imputed*	*Replicated*	*Imputed*	*Replicated*	*Imputed*	*Replicated*	*Imputed*
Years of Education	0.028	0.019					0.014	0.009				
	(0.005)	(0.004)					(0.003)	(0.003)				
Job Insecurity	-0.044	-0.046	-0.045	-0.046	-0.044	-0.045	-0.022	-0.029	-0.022	-0.030	-0.022	-0.029
	(0.016)	(0.014)	(0.015)	(0.014)	(0.016)	(0.014)	(0.014)	(0.014)	(0.014)	(0.014)	(0.013)	(0.014)
Public Employee	-0.094	-0.108	-0.088	-0.106	-0.092	-0.111	-0.097	-0.103	-0.114	-0.110	-0.108	-0.110
	(0.051)	(0.049)	(0.049)	(0.048)	(0.048)	(0.047)	(0.033)	(0.033)	(0.036)	(0.035)	(0.036)	(0.035)
Female	-0.163	-0.120	-0.164	-0.121	-0.163	-0.119	-0.121	-0.088	-0.122	-0.089	-0.122	-0.089
	(0.039)	(0.034)	(0.039)	(0.035)	(0.039)	(0.034)	(0.027)	(0.025)	(0.027)	(0.025)	(0.027)	(0.025)
Age	0.003	0.003	0.002	0.003	0.002	0.002	0.001	0.002	0.001	0.002	0.001	0.002
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
Married	0.012	0.003	0.007	-0.000	0.017	0.007	0.026	0.020	0.026	0.020	0.027	0.020
	(0.029)	(0.024)	(0.028)	(0.024)	(0.031)	(0.026)	(0.033)	(0.031)	(0.033)	(0.031)	(0.033)	(0.031)
University Completed					0.276	0.225					0.201	0.149
					(0.069)	(0.063)					(0.066)	(0.058)
Vocational Training					0.153	0.097					-0.031	-0.060
					(0.068)	(0.062)					(0.053)	(0.043)
Incomplete University					0.260	0.191					0.109	0.061
					(0.065)	(0.060)					(0.061)	(0.061)
Secondary Completed					0.103	0.073					0.090	0.057
					(0.036)	(0.031)					(0.034)	(0.033)
Education Level			0.120	0.088					0.075	0.040		
			(0.021)	(0.019)					(0.019)	(0.018)		
Constant	0.195	0.386	0.415	0.526	0.442	0.547	0.172	0.275	0.195	0.299	0.282	0.347
	(0.074)	(0.078)	(0.048)	(0.050)	(0.052)	(0.055)	(0.074)	(0.072)	(0.075)	(0.071)	(0.066)	(0.065)
N	15220	17839	15220	17839	15220	17839	16526	18135	16526	18135	16526	18135

Notes: Dependent variable is individual support for foreign direct investment. Key explanatory variables (in bold) are different measures of educational attainment. Probit regressions with robust standard errors clustered by country in parentheses.

Table A15 Cao and Prakash 2010: Race to the Bottom or Race to the Top? (Table 6)

	Model 13: SO_2		*Model 14: BOD*	
	Replicated	*Imputed*	*Replicated*	*Imputed*
Lagged DV	0.789	0.917	0.830	0.866
	(0.014)	(0.012)	(0.038)	(0.018)
GDP per Capita	0.658	-0.023	-0.333	-0.006
	(0.350)	(0.029)	(0.317)	(0.025)
GDP per Capita	-0.046	-0.002	0.008	-0.002
	(0.021)	(0.002)	(0.019)	(0.001)
Industry (% of GDP)	0.003	0.003	0.001	0.001
	(0.002)	(0.001)	(0.002)	(0.001)
GDP Growth	-0.004	-0.005	-0.007	-0.006
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
Population Density	0.098	-0.001	0.238	0.002
	(0.120)	(0.009)	(0.115)	(0.007)
Urban Population (% of total)	0.007	0.001	0.000	-0.000
	(0.003)	(0.001)	(0.003)	(0.001)
Trade Salience	0.005	-0.001	-0.002	0.034
	(0.033)	(0.013)	(0.035)	(0.013)
FDI Stock (% of GDP)	-0.011	0.003	-0.021	-0.008
	(0.010)	(0.003)	(0.010)	(0.003)
Fuel Exports (% Exports)	-0.001	0.001	-0.005	-0.003
	(0.004)	(0.003)	(0.005)	(0.002)
Polity	0.005	-0.001	0.002	0.001
	(0.002)	(0.001)	(0.002)	(0.001)
Structural Equivalence of Trade:				
Race to the Bottom (ρ_{bottom})	0.052	-0.020	0.103	0.097
	(0.030)	(0.016)	(0.038)	(0.018)
Race to the Top (ρ_{top})	0.036	0.063	0.105	0.044
	(0.038)	(0.019)	(0.036)	(0.015)
Intercept	-3.336	0.202	1.129	-0.015
	(1.413)	(0.180)	(1.304)	(0.133)
N	1630	9384	1295	9384

Notes: Dependent variable is air pollution intensity in Model 13 and water pollution intensity in Model 14. Key explanatory variables (in bold) are the existence of a race to the bottom and a race to the top in regulatory standards among trade competitors. OLS regressions with standard errors in parentheses.

Table A16 Winters 2010: Explaining the Proportions of World Bank Programmatic and National Commitments to Individual Countries (1996-2002) (Figure 4)

	Model 1 (World Bank)				*Model 2 (IDA)*				*Model 3 (IBRD)*			
	Programmatic		*National*		*Programmatic*		*National*		*Programmatic*		*National*	
	Replicated	*Imputed*	*Replicated*	*Imputed*	*Replicated*	*Imputed*	*Replicated*	*Imputed*	*Replicated*	*Imputed*	*Replicated*	*Imputed*
Governance	-0.004	-0.046	0.055	0.079	-0.119	-0.097	0.050	0.113	0.179	0.038	0.010	0.023
	(0.040)	(0.024)	(0.042)	(0.026)	(0.054)	(0.032)	(0.052)	(0.034)	(0.069)	(0.041)	(0.079)	(0.044)
Log(GDP per Capita)	0.039	0.048	-0.005	-0.040	0.057	0.033	-0.022	-0.040	-0.016	0.020	0.096	0.011
	(0.026)	(0.017)	(0.027)	(0.020)	(0.041)	(0.028)	(0.040)	(0.029)	(0.058)	(0.034)	(0.066)	(0.042)
Log(Investment Ratio)	-0.011	-0.022	-0.043	-0.022	-0.015	-0.034	-0.060	-0.044	-0.061	-0.016	-0.083	-0.014
	(0.032)	(0.021)	(0.033)	(0.024)	(0.038)	(0.027)	(0.037)	(0.027)	(0.072)	(0.043)	(0.082)	(0.046)
Log(External Debt Ratio)	0.104	0.039	0.070	0.042	0.083	0.037	0.045	0.035	0.090	0.007	0.061	0.051
	(0.030)	(0.019)	(0.032)	(0.019)	(0.042)	(0.026)	(0.041)	(0.025)	(0.051)	(0.031)	(0.059)	(0.033)
IMF Program	0.072	0.015	0.064	0.091	0.034	0.003	0.073	0.089	0.136	0.063	0.063	0.081
	(0.033)	(0.022)	(0.034)	(0.024)	(0.046)	(0.031)	(0.044)	(0.030)	(0.051)	(0.035)	(0.059)	(0.039)
Log(Population)	0.004	-0.018	-0.010	0.004	-0.029	-0.040	-0.037	-0.004	0.035	-0.018	0.028	0.021
	(0.018)	(0.010)	(0.018)	(0.011)	(0.024)	(0.015)	(0.023)	(0.016)	(0.034)	(0.018)	(0.039)	(0.020)
Log(Land Area)	0.007	0.005	-0.055	-0.025	0.025	0.010	-0.044	-0.013	0.004	0.012	-0.081	-0.039
	(0.014)	(0.009)	(0.015)	(0.009)	(0.019)	(0.012)	(0.019)	(0.013)	(0.025)	(0.015)	(0.029)	(0.015)
Africa	-0.044	0.010	0.101	0.011	-0.019	-0.001	0.129	-0.026	-0.148	-0.016	-0.230	-0.025
	(0.052)	(0.037)	(0.054)	(0.038)	(0.068)	(0.048)	(0.065)	(0.048)	(0.148)	(0.083)	(0.168)	(0.086)
East Asia	-0.168	-0.038	-0.091	-0.118	-0.166	-0.086	-0.056	-0.137	-0.174	0.005	-0.077	-0.138
	(0.060)	(0.042)	(0.062)	(0.057)	(0.086)	(0.062)	(0.082)	(0.068)	(0.100)	(0.062)	(0.117)	(0.078)
Latin America	-0.142	-0.073	0.056	0.005	-0.162	-0.063	0.068	-0.056	-0.066	-0.053	0.024	0.014
	(0.048)	(0.032)	(0.050)	(0.039)	(0.093)	(0.061)	(0.089)	(0.062)	(0.060)	(0.040)	(0.070)	(0.047)
Middle East and North Africa	-0.174	-0.126	0.011	0.035	-0.277	-0.205	-0.013	-0.074	-0.056	-0.043	0.029	0.065
	(0.059)	(0.043)	(0.061)	(0.046)	(0.104)	(0.077)	(0.098)	(0.077)	(0.076)	(0.055)	(0.090)	(0.060)
South Asia	-0.175	-0.066	0.025	-0.062	-0.115	-0.037	0.097	-0.087		-0.310		-0.275
	(0.077)	(0.052)	(0.079)	(0.053)	(0.098)	(0.063)	(0.093)	(0.061)		(0.663)		(0.853)
Constant	-0.090	0.188	1.465	1.092	0.049	0.526	1.782	1.098	-0.292	0.290	0.308	0.621
	(0.256)	(0.163)	(0.267)	(0.201)	(0.408)	(0.277)	(0.396)	(0.291)	(0.648)	(0.367)	(0.736)	(0.447)
N	611	1024	568	1024	359	592	330	592	252	432	238	432

Notes: Dependent variables are World Bank programmatic and national lending commitments. Key explanatory variable (in bold) is the quality of governance within a country. OLS regressions including regional fixed effects with standard errors in parentheses.

Table A17 Guisinger and Singer 2010: Analysis of the Effect of De Jure and de Facto Regimes on Average Consumer Price Inflation Rates (1975-2004) (Table 1)

	Replicated	*Imputed*
Lagged Dependent Variable	0.247	0.438
	(0.041)	(0.018)
De Jure Fix (*lagged*)	-0.007	-0.111
	(0.096)	(0.126)
De Facto Fix (*lagged*)	0.101	-0.470
	(0.083)	(0.088)
De Jure and De Facto Fix (*lagged*)	-0.232	-0.027
	(0.111)	(0.182)
Central Bank Independence (*0/1*)	0.100	0.095
	(0.112)	(0.101)
Democracy (*0/1*)	0.030	0.096
	(0.091)	(0.058)
CBI and Democracy	-0.159	-0.183
	(0.119)	(0.111)
Political Crisis (past five years) (*0/1*)	0.105	0.013
	(0.120)	(0.072)
GDP Growth	-0.011	-0.019
	(0.006)	(0.004)
GDP per capita (*logged*)	-0.297	-0.142
	(0.080)	(0.026)
Capital Openness	-0.123	-0.083
	(0.028)	(0.018)
Trade (% of GDP) (*logged*)	0.324	0.094
	(0.119)	(0.051)
1980s	-0.092	-0.179
	(0.067)	(0.041)
1990s	-0.301	-0.342
	(0.115)	(0.051)
2000s	-0.489	-0.627
	(0.153)	(0.063)
Constant	2.669	2.421
	(0.801)	(0.239)
N	1924	7315

Notes: Dependent variable is consumer price inflation (logged). Key explanatory variables (in bold) are the possession of both a de jure and de facto fixed exchange rate regime. Fixed effects models with robust standard errors clustered by country in parentheses.

Table A18 Hartzell, Hoddie, and Bauer 2010: Bivariate probit estimates (Table 2)

	Model 1		*Model 2*	
	Replicated	*Imputed*	*Replicated*	*Imputed*
Civil war onset equation				
Signed IMF Agreements	1.905	1.123	1.914	1.211
	(0.578)	(0.954)	(0.563)	(0.969)
GDP per Capita (*lagged*)	-0.068	-0.058	-0.072	-0.062
	(0.043)	(0.027)	(0.044)	(0.027)
Economic Growth (*lagged*)	-0.001	-0.007	-0.001	-0.007
	(0.007)	(0.008)	(0.007)	(0.008)
Foreign Currency Reserves (*lagged*)	-0.027	-0.043	-0.033	-0.048
	(0.028)	(0.030)	(0.030)	(0.030)
Democracy	0.004	0.014	0.006	0.016
	(0.014)	(0.009)	(0.014)	(0.009)
Democracy Squared	-0.007	-0.008	-0.007	-0.008
	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)
Population Size (*lagged*)	0.053	0.063	0.023	0.025
	(0.040)	(0.027)	(0.046)	(0.035)
Oil	0.386	0.317	0.482	0.407
	(0.220)	(0.135)	(0.212)	(0.141)
Previous Civil War	-0.085	-0.281	-0.102	-0.291
	(0.111)	(0.123)	(0.111)	(0.122)
Years under IMF SAP (*lagged*)	0.006	0.005	0.005	0.003
	(0.008)	(0.007)	(0.008)	(0.007)
Mountainous Terrain	0.099	0.094	0.089	0.082
	(0.048)	(0.034)	(0.048)	(0.034)
Trade Dependency Ratio			-0.003	-0.003
			(0.002)	(0.002)
Constant	-2.245	-3.298	-1.713	-2.667
	(0.385)	(0.381)	(0.579)	(0.500)
Signing of IMF SAP equation				
GDP per Capita (*lagged*)	-0.133	-0.111	-0.133	-0.111
	(0.018)	(0.015)	(0.018)	(0.015)
Economic Growth (*lagged*)	-0.010	-0.010	-0.010	-0.010
	(0.006)	(0.004)	(0.006)	(0.004)
Foreign Currency Reserves (*lagged*)	-0.073	-0.079	-0.074	-0.079
	(0.024)	(0.017)	(0.024)	(0.017)
Democracy	0.015	0.019	0.015	0.019
	(0.008)	(0.007)	(0.008)	(0.007)
Democracy Squared	-0.000	-0.001	-0.000	-0.001
	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)
Population Size (*lagged*)	-0.006	0.030	-0.007	0.030
	(0.030)	(0.028)	(0.030)	(0.028)
Oil	0.029	-0.022	0.031	-0.023
	(0.102)	(0.100)	(0.102)	(0.100)
Previous Civil War	0.030	-0.076	0.025	-0.076
	(0.093)	(0.109)	(0.093)	(0.108)
Years under IMF SAP (*lagged*)	0.015	0.023	0.015	0.023
	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.006)
# Countries under IMF SAP (*lagged*)	-0.007	-0.006	-0.007	-0.006
	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)
Constant	-0.122	-0.473	-0.120	-0.474
	(0.307)	(0.310)	(0.308)	(0.311)
N	2405	4248	2405	4248

Notes: Dependent variable is the onset of civil war in the first equation and participation in an IMF Structural Adjustment Program (SAP) in the second equation. The latter variable is the key explanatory variable (in bold) in the upper equation. Bivariate probit regressions with robust standard errors clustered by country in parentheses. Temporal dichotomous variables estimated but not reported.

Table A19 Efrat 2010: Determinants of Government Preferences on International Regulation of Small Arms (Table 1)

	Model 1 *REGULATION*		*Model 2* *SCOPE*		*Model 3* *TRANSPARENCY*		*Model 4* *REGULATION*		*Model 5* *SCOPE*		*Model 6* *TRANSPARENCY*	
	Replicated	*Imputed*	*Replicated*	*Imputed*	*Replicated*	*Imputed*	*Replicated*	*Imputed*	*Replicated*	*Imputed*	*Replicated*	*Imputed*
State-owned Arms Exporter	-1.383	-1.383	-1.403	-1.403	-3.079	-3.024	-0.925	-1.078	-1.100	-1.134	-2.555	-2.601
	(0.513)	(0.513)	(0.653)	(0.653)	(0.830)	(0.787)	(0.506)	(0.514)	(0.663)	(0.644)	(0.751)	(0.703)
Privately-owned Arms Exporter	0.106	0.106	0.203	0.203	-0.906	-1.323	0.266	0.322	0.395	0.540	-0.738	-0.939
	(0.666)	(0.666)	(0.827)	(0.827)	(1.317)	(0.993)	(0.672)	(0.677)	(0.829)	(0.818)	(1.319)	(0.966)
Democracy	0.138	0.138	0.156	0.156	0.198	0.191	0.150	0.123	0.148	0.134	0.185	0.175
	(0.033)	(0.033)	(0.042)	(0.042)	(0.047)	(0.046)	(0.038)	(0.038)	(0.049)	(0.045)	(0.049)	(0.052)
Refugees	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000						
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)						
GDP per Capita	-0.445	-0.445	-0.403	-0.403	-0.392	-0.342	-0.205	-0.402	-0.166	-0.382	-0.233	-0.405
	(0.165)	(0.165)	(0.201)	(0.201)	(0.250)	(0.246)	(0.199)	(0.189)	(0.254)	(0.219)	(0.262)	(0.230)
Humanitarian Aid Provision	14.911	14.911	21.967	21.967	28.493	23.125	13.860	17.078	19.482	23.128	26.116	22.699
	(6.494)	(6.494)	(9.368)	(9.368)	(16.326)	(11.129)	(6.448)	(6.439)	(9.290)	(9.222)	(16.306)	(9.526)
Common Law	-1.006	-1.006	-0.824	-0.824	-0.850	-0.760	-1.095	-1.116	-0.952	-0.898	-0.821	-0.912
	(0.440)	(0.440)	(0.497)	(0.497)	(0.711)	(0.669)	(0.511)	(0.467)	(0.583)	(0.519)	(0.714)	(0.621)
Homicide Rate							0.060	0.068	0.057	0.057	0.031	0.028
							(0.027)	(0.044)	(0.032)	(0.043)	(0.036)	(0.042)
Cut 1	-5.926	-5.926	-3.395	-3.395	-6.060	-5.665	-3.500	-5.288	-1.035	-2.996	-4.394	-6.076
	(1.385)	(1.385)	(1.555)	(1.555)	(2.123)	(2.106)	(1.685)	(1.697)	(2.043)	(1.875)	(2.221)	(2.023)
Cut 2	-5.016	-5.016	-2.847	-2.847	-4.407	-4.355	-2.477	-4.343	-0.462	-2.434	-2.736	-4.769
	(1.343)	(1.343)	(1.544)	(1.544)	(2.053)	(1.952)	(1.646)	(1.687)	(2.041)	(1.888)	(2.167)	(1.815)
Cut 3	-4.264	-4.264				-4.000	-1.590	-3.555				-4.408
	(1.318)	(1.318)				(2.031)	(1.626)	(1.696)				(1.961)
Cut 4	-3.464	-3.464				-3.922	-0.900	-2.721				-4.329
	(1.300)	(1.300)				(2.028)	(1.622)	(1.716)				(1.958)
Cut 5	-2.797	-2.797				-0.915	-0.004	-2.016				-1.607
	(1.290)	(1.290)				(5.687)	(1.629)	(1.739)				(4.797)
N	118	118	118	118	114	118	94	118	94	118	92	118

Notes: Dependent variable is government support for the international regulation of small arms. Key explanatory variables (in bold) are the existence of state-owned arms exporters, democracy, homicide rates, refugee outflows, GDP per capita, and humanitarian aid provision. Ordered logit regressions with standard errors in parentheses.

Table A20 Gawande, Krishna, and Olarreaga 2009: Hypothesis Tests About Determinants of *a* OLS Estimates: Dependent Variable Ln(*a*) (Table 4)

	Model 1		*Model 2*	
	Replicated	*Imputed (DV)*	*Replicated*	*Imputed (DV)*
Proportional	0.037	0.079	-0.102	0.067
	(0.356)	(0.152)	(0.326)	(0.152)
Prop + Legcohesion	1.460	0.126	0.990	0.102
	(0.677)	(0.290)	(0.620)	(0.288)
Plur + Legcohesion	1.376	-0.014	0.338	-0.057
	(0.748)	(0.320)	(0.694)	(0.323)
Illiteracy	-2.759	0.094	-3.665	-0.020
	(1.130)	(0.483)	(1.089)	(0.507)
Urban	3.821	-0.108	3.175	-0.169
	(0.972)	(0.416)	(0.877)	(0.408)
LRdivide	-0.746	-0.031	-0.688	-0.018
	(0.342)	(0.146)	(0.314)	(0.146)
Tvadvertising_gdp	0.214	0.025	0.211	0.025
	(0.116)	(0.050)	(0.106)	(0.050)
Checks	0.153	0.023		
	(0.073)	(0.031)		
EIEC	-0.368	-0.002		
	(0.142)	(0.061)		
Allhouse	-0.296	0.137	-0.369	0.120
	(0.344)	(0.147)	(0.291)	(0.135)
Esimilarity	0.326	-0.029	0.496	-0.017
	(0.335)	(0.143)	(0.313)	(0.146)
Binarychecks			1.809	0.253
			(0.717)	(0.333)
BEIEC			-1.576	-0.002
			(0.420)	(0.196)
Constant	0.537	-0.670	0.680	-0.540
	(1.262)	(0.540)	(0.830)	(0.386)
N	50	50	50	50

Notes: The dependent variable, government concern for aggregate welfare, is based on the results of a separate regression involving multiply imputed data (see Table 1 in the original article). All right-hand-side variables are explanatory (in bold). OLS regressions with standard errors in parentheses.

Table A21 Bueno de Mesquita and Smith 2009: Determinants of the Amount of Aid Given (Table 1)

	Model 1		*Model 2*		*Model 3*		*Model 4*	
	Replicated	*Imputed*	*Replicated*	*Imputed*	*Replicated*	*Imputed*	*Replicated*	*Imputed*
Donor Resources: R_A	0.800	0.751	0.803	0.753	0.392	0.420	0.353	0.383
	(0.009)	(0.007)	(0.009)	(0.007)	(0.022)	(0.015)	(0.022)	(0.015)
Lagged W_B	-0.142	0.116	-0.260	0.169	-0.843	-0.084	-0.896	-0.086
	(0.160)	(0.129)	(0.159)	(0.129)	(0.310)	(0.205)	(0.312)	(0.208)
Lagged $(W_B)^2$	0.398	0.046	0.599	0.072	1.092	0.316	1.181	0.432
	(0.180)	(0.146)	(0.179)	(0.145)	(0.347)	(0.231)	(0.349)	(0.233)
Lagged Wealth $_B$			4.247	0.392			3.901	0.259
			(0.429)	(0.174)			(0.921)	(0.268)
Lagged $(\text{Wealth}_B)^2$			-0.305	-0.052			-0.325	-0.078
			(0.027)	(0.011)			(0.059)	(0.017)
Population_B	1.230	0.370	1.526	0.354	0.936	0.294	0.829	0.021
	(0.077)	(0.022)	(0.088)	(0.021)	(0.192)	(0.039)	(0.239)	(0.033)
$(\text{Population}_B)^2$			-0.077	-0.017			-0.084	-0.030
			(0.014)	(0.005)			(0.035)	(0.008)
Gov.Share_B			0.017	0.015			0.014	0.010
			(0.003)	(0.002)			(0.005)	(0.003)
$(\text{Gov.Share}_B)^2$			-0.000	-0.000			-0.000	-0.000
			(0.000)	(0.000)			(0.000)	(0.000)
Lagged Life Expectancy					-0.005	0.001	-0.000	0.009
					(0.007)	(0.004)	(0.007)	(0.004)
ln(Distance)	-0.825	-0.823	-0.827	-0.828	0.228	-0.419	0.314	-0.398
	(0.022)	(0.019)	(0.022)	(0.019)	(0.055)	(0.035)	(0.058)	(0.036)
Cold War	-0.092	-0.173	-0.202	-0.239	0.109	0.091	-0.116	-0.022
	(0.031)	(0.019)	(0.031)	(0.019)	(0.064)	(0.033)	(0.067)	(0.034)
Colony	2.619	2.268	2.609	2.254	1.512	1.577	1.436	1.470
	(0.043)	(0.038)	(0.043)	(0.038)	(0.082)	(0.061)	(0.082)	(0.062)
Trade					0.573	0.496	0.640	0.569
					(0.021)	(0.015)	(0.022)	(0.015)
Alignment					0.395	-0.203	0.724	0.158
					(0.277)	(0.191)	(0.324)	(0.227)
$(\text{Alignment})^2$					-0.288	-0.196	-0.673	-0.337
					(0.417)	(0.268)	(0.451)	(0.291)
ln(Multilateral Aid)					0.039	0.172	-0.014	0.120
					(0.019)	(0.016)	(0.020)	(0.016)
US	0.714	0.683	0.696	0.663	0.128	0.745	19.683	5.563
	(0.045)	(0.039)	(0.045)	(0.039)	(0.084)	(0.061)	(12.554)	(2.487)
US $\times$ R_A							-0.590	-0.251
							(0.802)	(0.149)
US $\times$ Lagged W_B							-0.102	-0.154
							(0.750)	(0.573)
US $\times$ Lagged $(W_B)^2$							-0.103	-0.131
							(0.796)	(0.594)
US $\times$ Lagged Wealth_B							-1.081	0.078
							(1.518)	(0.175)
US $\times$ Lagged $(\text{Wealth}_B)^2$							0.098	0.029
							(0.098)	(0.012)

(Table 18 continued)

US × ln(Population$_B$)							0.441	0.561
							(0.111)	(0.071)
US × ln(Population$_B$)^2							-0.047	-0.044
							(0.016)	(0.012)
US × Gov.Share$_B$							-0.002	0.009
							(0.022)	(0.011)
US × (Gov.Share$_B$)^2							0.000	-0.000
							(0.000)	(0.000)
US × Lagged Life Expectancy							0.043	0.025
							(0.012)	(0.008)
US × ln(Distance)							-1.299	-0.575
							(0.200)	(0.136)
US × Cold War							0.684	0.900
							(0.224)	(0.120)
US × Colony							-0.034	-0.152
							(0.609)	(0.413)
US × Trade							-0.398	-0.405
							(0.072)	(0.046)
US × Alignment							-1.467	-0.768
							(0.683)	(0.468)
US × (Alignment)^2							-0.202	-0.644
							(1.222)	(0.845)
US × ln(Multilateral Aid)							0.133	0.039
							(0.071)	(0.055)
Donor Coalition: $\mathbf{W_A}$	-7.985	-3.455	-8.243	-3.494		-2.622		-2.483
	(0.753)	(0.097)	(0.749)	(0.097)		(0.146)		(0.146)
Lagged $\mathbf{R_B}$	0.840	0.264			0.995	0.177		
	(0.089)	(0.068)			(0.214)	(0.107)		
Lagged $(\mathbf{R_B})^2$	-0.057	-0.021			-0.079	-0.032		
	(0.005)	(0.004)			(0.013)	(0.006)		
Constant	1.148	1.129	-10.469	1.847	-11.676	-0.144	-19.412	2.064
	(0.822)	(0.360)	(1.850)	(0.764)	(1.114)	(0.586)	(3.638)	(1.133)
N	39919	57540	39919	57540	11520	52393	11520	52393

Notes: Dependent variable is the size of aid-for-policy deals. Key explanatory variables (in bold) are alternative measures of the salience of the policy, the level of resources available to donor and recipient governments, and political institutions in each nation. OLS regressions with standard errors in parentheses.

Table A22 Morrison 2009: Nontax Revenue's Effects on Regime Instability (Table 3)

	Model 1		*Model 2*		*Model 3*	
	Replicated	*Imputed*	*Replicated*	*Imputed*	*Replicated*	*Imputed*
Grants per Capita$_{t-1}$	-0.018	-0.000				
	(0.008)	(0.000)				
Other Nontax Revenue per Capita$_{t-1}$	-0.001	-0.000				
	(0.001)	(0.000)				
SOE Revenue per Capita$_{t-1}$	-0.002	-0.000				
	(0.001)	(0.000)				
GDP per Capita Growth	-0.053	-0.007	-0.056	-0.007	-0.055	-0.008
	(0.032)	(0.006)	(0.020)	(0.006)	(0.018)	(0.006)
GDP per Capita (ln)$_{t-1}$	0.050	-0.027	-0.192	-0.036	0.039	-0.031
	(0.158)	(0.099)	(0.106)	(0.098)	(0.123)	(0.099)
$\triangle$ % Population Urban	0.356	-0.192	0.570	-0.190	0.201	-0.213
	(0.364)	(0.224)	(0.249)	(0.223)	(0.233)	(0.227)
Ethnolinguistic Fractionalization	0.316	-0.268	-0.031	-0.282	0.071	-0.368
	(0.606)	(0.448)	(0.541)	(0.447)	(0.529)	(0.442)
Population Density (ln)$_{t-1}$	-0.063	0.118	-0.016	0.114	0.034	0.114
	(0.121)	(0.088)	(0.089)	(0.087)	(0.083)	(0.087)
Past Regime Instability	0.089	-0.456	-0.011	-0.457	0.019	-0.450
	(0.058)	(0.153)	(0.056)	(0.152)	(0.055)	(0.153)
Regime Age	-0.347	-0.068	-0.370	-0.068	-0.407	-0.066
	(0.075)	(0.013)	(0.056)	(0.013)	(0.062)	(0.014)
Spline (1)	0.001	0.000	0.001	0.000	0.001	0.000
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Spline (2)	-0.000	0.000	-0.000	0.000	-0.000	0.000
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Nontax Revenue per Capita (t - 1)			-0.001	-0.000	-0.001	-0.000
			(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Polity					-0.070	0.010
					(0.023)	(0.014)
Polity $\times$ Nontax Revenue per Capita$_{t-1}$					-0.000	-0.000
					(0.000)	(0.000)
Constant	-1.576	0.547	0.420	0.625	-1.253	0.603
	(1.203)	(0.830)	(0.969)	(0.831)	(1.084)	(0.846)
N	1307	7639	1808	7639	1808	7639

Notes: Dependent variable is regime instability (a binary variable equal to 1 if the regime changes in a given year and 0 otherwise). Key explanatory variables (in bold) are different measures of government nontax revenue per capita. Logistic regressions with standard errors clustered by country in parentheses.

Table A23 López-Córdova and Meissner 2008: Openness as a Determinant of Democracy: Instrumental Variables Estimates (Table 5)

	1870		*1875*		*1880*		*1885*		*1890*		*1895*		*1900*		*1905*	
	Rep.	*Imp.*	*Rep.*	*Imp.*	*Rep.*	*Imp.*	*Rep.*	*Imp.*	*Rep.*	*Imp.*	*Rep.*	*Imp.*	*Rep.*	*Imp.*	*Rep.*	*Imp.*
Openness	0.482	0.018	0.436	0.067	0.163	0.068	-0.008	0.042	0.070	0.054	0.166	0.109	0.046	0.043	0.011	0.035
	(0.263)	(0.025)	(0.513)	(0.099)	(0.346)	(0.166)	(0.175)	(0.573)	(0.177)	(0.085)	(0.166)	(0.121)	(0.092)	(0.071)	(0.057)	(0.056)
Log(Pop.)	2.953	-1.089	3.061	0.681	2.372	0.511	-0.682	0.287	0.322	0.408	1.850	0.970	-0.201	-0.255	-1.519	-0.255
	(2.923)	(1.398)	(3.826)	(2.074)	(6.069)	(3.670)	(4.339)	(12.475)	(3.571)	(2.231)	(2.795)	(2.612)	(2.645)	(1.807)	(2.378)	(1.902)
Log(Area)	2.822	-0.350	2.722	-0.570	0.218	-0.535	-0.665	-0.844	0.385	-0.292	1.084	0.402	-0.280	-0.669	-0.115	-0.515
	(2.033)	(1.069)	(3.975)	(1.331)	(2.449)	(1.439)	(1.625)	(1.506)	(2.303)	(1.590)	(2.345)	(1.794)	(1.839)	(1.609)	(1.494)	(1.530)
Constant	-104.6	20.116	-103.5	-7.951	-49.70	-5.185	21.17	3.877	-12.23	-5.578	-51.56	-26.079	6.779	11.668	29.22	10.154
	(73.72)	(25.918)	(127.4)	(44.174)	(139.8)	(77.831)	(92.17)	(247.215)	(88.15)	(49.843)	(69.04)	(58.747)	(59.64)	(41.865)	(48.80)	(40.320)
N	18	50	19	50	20	50	21	50	21	50	22	50	22	50	23	50

	1910		*1920*		*1925*		*1928*		*1932*		*1935*		*1938*		*1960*	
	Rep.	*Imp.*	*Rep.*	*Imp.*	*Rep.*	*Imp.*	*Rep.*	*Imp.*	*Rep.*	*Imp.*	*Rep.*	*Imp.*	*Rep.*	*Imp.*	*Rep.*	*Imp.*
Openness	0.071	0.087	0.690	0.461	0.631	0.462	1.300	0.481	0.913	0.275	0.810	0.535	0.866	0.538	0.519	0.264
	(0.072)	(0.072)	(0.518)	(0.137)	(0.191)	(0.151)	(0.866)	(0.378)	(0.329)	(0.280)	(0.276)	(0.186)	(0.195)	(0.159)	(0.110)	(0.157)
Log(Pop.)	-0.907	0.238	5.719	2.754	2.846	2.577	7.735	2.364	1.178	1.703	2.713	2.116	3.517	2.131	2.164	1.042
	(2.178)	(2.015)	(6.276)	(0.890)	(1.714)	(0.900)	(7.379)	(1.603)	(2.046)	(1.268)	(2.743)	(1.032)	(2.503)	(0.957)	(0.701)	(0.683)
Log(Area)	0.780	0.372	-0.615	-0.917	-0.406	-0.759	-1.076	-0.765	-0.275	-0.793	-0.137	-0.114	0.779	0.121	0.540	0.294
	(1.489)	(1.704)	(0.936)	(0.588)	(0.582)	(0.521)	(1.155)	(0.652)	(0.826)	(0.761)	(0.717)	(0.668)	(0.677)	(0.621)	(0.824)	(0.730)
Constant	5.486	-11.055	-105.4	-48.733	-55.33	-45.922	-148.9	-43.150	-26.14	-26.741	-55.91	-42.354	-75.40	-43.605	-48.068	-25.455
	(47.31)	(45.819)	(115.8)	(15.757)	(31.40)	(16.910)	(138.7)	(32.843)	(37.37)	(24.260)	(48.82)	(17.925)	(43.05)	(15.885)	(13.133)	(15.753)
N	24	50	22	65	26	68	27	70	29	71	29	72	29	71	76	208

	1965		*1970*		*1975*		*1980*		*1985*		*1990*		*1995*		*2000*	
	Rep.	*Imp.*	*Rep.*	*Imp.*	*Rep.*	*Imp.*	*Rep.*	*Imp.*	*Rep.*	*Imp.*	*Rep.*	*Imp.*	*Rep.*	*Imp.*	*Rep.*	*Imp.*
Openness	0.433	0.249	0.234	0.223	0.226	0.163	0.115	0.086	0.155	0.118	0.092	0.104	0.067	0.050	0.057	0.115
	(0.108)	(0.157)	(0.161)	(0.149)	(0.097)	(0.101)	(0.054)	(0.072)	(0.093)	(0.090)	(0.060)	(0.081)	(0.050)	(0.064)	(0.032)	(0.053)
Log(Pop.)	2.914	1.214	1.402	0.576	1.515	0.275	1.082	-0.046	0.903	-0.059	1.150	0.142	0.199	-0.356	0.305	-0.481
	(0.679)	(0.816)	(0.845)	(0.628)	(0.911)	(0.623)	(0.773)	(0.607)	(0.757)	(0.606)	(0.696)	(0.598)	(0.605)	(0.593)	(0.599)	(0.633)
Log(Area)	-0.908	-0.034	-0.635	0.140	0.010	-0.086	-0.207	-0.292	-0.156	-0.042	-0.640	-0.203	0.076	0.096	0.102	0.368
	(0.492)	(0.655)	(0.614)	(0.824)	(0.847)	(0.679)	(0.789)	(0.653)	(0.699)	(0.688)	(0.734)	(0.699)	(0.543)	(0.663)	(0.544)	(0.654)
Constant	-41.940	-24.153	-18.960	-16.250	-31.514	-9.036	-19.072	0.717	-15.713	-1.813	-11.056	-1.552	-1.825	5.876	-2.975	3.096
	(11.844)	(16.986)	(14.352)	(14.297)	(13.465)	(9.782)	(9.511)	(6.776)	(9.889)	(8.107)	(8.914)	(7.834)	(7.898)	(6.684)	(7.309)	(6.718)
N	90	208	97	208	103	208	104	208	105	208	105	208	117	208	115	208

Notes: Dependent variable is democracy (measured using Polity scores). Key explanatory variable (in bold) is an instrument for trade openness based on geographic and demographic information. Single-equation instrumental variables regressions with robust standard errors in parentheses.

Table A24 Kucik and Reinhardt 2008: Estimates of Markov chain bivariate probit model (Table 1)

	$WTO_{i,t}$		$AD\ LAW_{i,t}$	
	Replicated	*Imputed*	*Replicated*	*Imputed*
WTO $_{i,t}$			0.330	0.335
			(0.169)	(0.125)
Log GDP per Capita$_{i,t}$	0.225	0.074	-0.076	-0.115
	(0.101)	(0.054)	(0.072)	(0.055)
Democracy$_{i,t}$	0.046	0.035	0.024	0.030
	(0.011)	(0.008)	(0.013)	(0.009)
Log GDP$_{i,t}$	-0.043	-0.033	0.202	0.121
	(0.066)	(0.035)	(0.074)	(0.051)
Log Import Openness$_{i,t}$	0.147	-0.118	0.255	0.177
	(0.173)	(0.121)	(0.202)	(0.121)
Ad Target$_{i,t}$			0.814	1.071
			(0.210)	(0.203)
Regional Average AD Law GDP$_{i,t}$			1.804	1.419
			(0.387)	(0.295)
Ad Law $_{i,t}$	0.767	0.643		
	(0.271)	(0.142)		
Region Average WTO$_{i,t}$	0.963	0.111		
	(0.473)	(0.272)		
Constant	-3.442	-1.276	-8.103	-5.769
	(1.667)	(1.048)	(1.906)	(1.203)
N	2496	6447	2496	6447

Notes: Dependent variable is accession to the WTO in the WTO$_{i,t}$ model and adoption of a domestic antidumping (AD) law in the AD LAW$_{i,t}$ model. Key explanatory variable (in bold) is possession of an AD law in the former and WTO membership in the latter. Markov chain bivariate probit regressions with heteroscedastic-robust standard errors in parentheses. Markov interaction terms not reported.

Table A25 Ansell 2008: Democracy, Log Openness, and Education Spending (Table 1)

	Model A (PCSE)		*Model B (Fixed effects)*		*Model C (IV lags)*		*Model D (IV region)*		*Model E (PCSE)*		*Model F (Fixed effects)*	
	Replicated	*Imputed*	*Replicated*	*Imputed*	*Replicated*	*Imputed*	*Replicated*	*Imputed*	*Replicated*	*Imputed*	*Replicated*	*Imputed*
Lagged DV	0.792	0.825	0.608	0.790	0.607	0.789	0.607	0.788	0.770	0.822	0.648	0.786
	(0.034)	(0.018)	(0.018)	(0.019)	(0.019)	(0.019)	(0.018)	(0.019)	(0.037)	(0.018)	(0.022)	(0.018)
Polity Score	0.016	0.010	0.012	0.009	0.030	0.019	0.015	0.018	0.013	0.009	0.012	0.008
	(0.005)	(0.003)	(0.005)	(0.003)	(0.014)	(0.008)	(0.009)	(0.008)	(0.005)	(0.003)	(0.006)	(0.003)
Log Openness	0.282	0.176	0.232	0.143	0.767	0.022	0.224	0.134				
	(0.061)	(0.050)	(0.089)	(0.067)	(0.447)	(0.165)	(0.091)	(0.066)				
Population < 15	0.005	0.002	-0.015	0.002	-0.012	0.003	-0.015	0.003	0.007	0.008	0.017	0.008
	(0.006)	(0.005)	(0.011)	(0.007)	(0.012)	(0.007)	(0.011)	(0.007)	(0.009)	(0.006)	(0.013)	(0.007)
Log GDP	-0.390	-0.151	2.180	-0.091	3.128	-0.058	2.120	-0.069	0.148	-0.055	1.565	-0.085
	(0.251)	(0.116)	(0.833)	(0.136)	(1.011)	(0.138)	(0.843)	(0.138)	(0.266)	(0.112)	(1.073)	(0.134)
(Log GDP)^2	0.010	0.004	-0.041	0.002	-0.065	0.002	-0.040	0.002	-0.000	0.002	-0.031	0.002
	(0.005)	(0.002)	(0.017)	(0.003)	(0.023)	(0.003)	(0.017)	(0.003)	(0.005)	(0.002)	(0.021)	(0.003)
Log Population	-0.058	-0.044	-0.012	0.083	-0.175	0.057	-0.011	0.082	-0.161	-0.052	-0.222	-0.005
	(0.045)	(0.035)	(0.225)	(0.131)	(0.241)	(0.130)	(0.225)	(0.131)	(0.053)	(0.036)	(0.258)	(0.135)
Government Expenditures	0.003	0.017	0.003	0.014	-0.001	0.014	0.003	0.014	0.021	0.017	0.006	0.014
	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.007)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.008)	(0.006)	(0.009)	(0.006)
Year	-0.019	-0.016	-0.016	-0.016	-0.017	-0.015	-0.017	-0.017	-0.014	-0.013	-0.000	-0.011
	(0.004)	(0.003)	(0.006)	(0.004)	(0.008)	(0.004)	(0.006)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.002)	(0.007)	(0.003)
Hiscox/Kastner									-0.007	-0.010	-0.015	-0.010
									(0.003)	(0.002)	(0.003)	(0.002)
Constant	41.430	34.344	5.829	30.477	-2.502	30.371	8.405	32.597	27.129	27.939	-14.077	24.337
	(7.494)	(5.235)	(14.297)	(6.260)	(20.262)	(7.168)	(15.332)	(6.792)	(7.568)	(4.714)	(17.398)	(5.619)
N	1501	4516	1501	4517	1402	4516	1501	4516	1022	4516	1022	4517

Notes: Dependent variable is public spending on education as a percentage of GDP. Key explanatory variables (in bold) are democracy (measured using Polity scores) and alternative measures of economic openness. PCSE = panel-corrected standard errors. Model A includes regional dummies. Models G and H omitted due to absence of data.

Table A26 Boix 2008: Determinants of Civil Wars (1860-1997) (Table 1)

		Model 1: 1860-1997		*Model 2: 1900-1997*		*Model 3: 1945-97*		*Model 4: 1860-97*		*Model 5: 1900-1997*		*Model 6: 1945-97*	
		Replicated	*Imputed*	*Replicated*	*Imputed*	*Replicated*	*Imputed*	*Replicated*	*Imputed*	*Replicated*	*Imputed*	*Replicated*	*Imputed*
Civil War t-1		0.101	0.180	0.119	0.160	-0.030	0.010	0.000	0.009	0.005	0.009	0.007	0.006
		(0.143)	(0.092)	(0.151)	(0.093)	(0.179)	(0.101)	(0.004)	(0.002)	(0.005)	(0.002)	(0.006)	(0.002)
Percentage of Family Farms t-1	*Beta*	0.002	0.011	0.006	0.010	0.008	0.008	0.000	0.009	0.005	0.009	0.007	0.006
		(0.004)	(0.002)	(0.005)	(0.002)	(0.005)	(0.002)	(0.004)	(0.002)	(0.005)	(0.002)	(0.006)	(0.002)
	Alpha							0.025	0.020	0.022	0.021	0.020	0.027
								(0.010)	(0.009)	(0.012)	(0.010)	(0.015)	(0.012)
Index of Occupational Diversification t-1	*Beta*	0.005	0.024	0.006	0.024	0.009	0.021	0.002	0.022	0.005	0.022	0.008	0.019
		(0.005)	(0.002)	(0.006)	(0.002)	(0.006)	(0.002)	(0.005)	(0.002)	(0.006)	(0.002)	(0.007)	(0.003)
	Alpha							0.022	0.009	0.021	0.011	0.012	0.012
								(0.012)	(0.011)	(0.014)	(0.013)	(0.016)	(0.014)
Family Farms × Occup. Divers. t-1	*Beta*	-0.021	-0.013	-0.027	-0.012	-0.029	-0.010	-0.023	-0.012	-0.033	-0.011	-0.035	-0.008
		(0.012)	(0.004)	(0.013)	(0.004)	(0.014)	(0.004)	(0.013)	(0.004)	(0.014)	(0.004)	(0.015)	(0.004)
	Alpha							-0.013	-0.017	-0.011	-0.018	0.000	-0.019
								(0.034)	(0.031)	(0.037)	(0.034)	(0.041)	(0.036)
Log of per Capita Income t-1	*Beta*	-0.236	-0.278	-0.223	-0.296	-0.258	-0.301	-0.141	-0.229	-0.115	-0.244	-0.166	-0.254
		(0.093)	(0.049)	(0.097)	(0.050)	(0.104)	(0.050)	(0.095)	(0.049)	(0.099)	(0.050)	(0.108)	(0.050)
	Alpha							-0.103	-0.141	-0.079	-0.135	0.050	-0.115
								(0.097)	(0.090)	(0.107)	(0.095)	(0.126)	(0.108)
Log of Population t-1	*Beta*	0.117	-0.110	0.120	-0.119	0.093	-0.134	0.126	-0.106	0.133	-0.115	0.116	-0.127
		(0.026)	(0.011)	(0.029)	(0.012)	(0.034)	(0.013)	(0.027)	(0.012)	(0.031)	(0.012)	(0.036)	(0.013)
	Alpha							-0.117	-0.010	-0.117	-0.023	-0.186	-0.067
								(0.061)	(0.054)	(0.068)	(0.058)	(0.080)	(0.066)
Democracy t-1	*Beta*	-0.014	-0.186	-0.051	-0.165	0.016	-0.043	0.106	-0.169	0.068	-0.152	0.143	-0.021
		(0.115)	(0.049)	(0.122)	(0.051)	(0.132)	(0.053)	(0.120)	(0.052)	(0.127)	(0.053)	(0.137)	(0.056)
	Alpha							0.057	0.305	0.136	0.359	0.097	0.286
								(0.227)	(0.204)	(0.237)	(0.213)	(0.255)	(0.223)
Constant	*Beta*	-1.538	0.535	-1.746	0.830	-1.354	1.206	3.619	2.921	3.536	2.891	3.519	2.876
			(0.700)	(0.351)	(0.751)	(0.363)	(0.818)	(0.370)	(0.435)	(0.427)	(0.434)	(0.418)	(0.443)	(0.423)
	Alpha								-2.228	0.230	-2.607	0.486	-2.185	0.913
									(0.697)	(0.347)	(0.759)	(0.359)	(0.831)	(0.365)
N		8576	12362	6995	10203	5312	7384	8136	12362	6596	10257	4872	7384

Notes: Models 1-3 are probit analyses in which the dependent variable is civil war onset. Models 4-6 are dynamic probit analyses in which the dependent variables are the likelihood of starting a war (*beta*) and sustaining it conditional on the initial state (*alpha*). Key explanatory variable (in bold) is the interaction between the percentage of family farms in a country and an index of occupational diversification.

Table A27 Rueda 2008: Regression Results for Figure 7 (Appendix 2)

	The Determinants of Policy						*The Determinants of Inequality*					
	Gov. Employment		*Welfare Generosity*		*Minimum Wage*							
	Replicated	*Imputed*	*Replicated*	*Imputed*	*Replicated*	*Imputed*	*Replicated*	*Imputed*	*Replicated*	*Imputed*	*Replicated*	*Imputed*
Cabinet Partisanship	0.047	0.032	-0.011	-0.016	0.001	0.001						
	(0.015)	(0.016)	(0.019)	(0.019)	(0.000)	(0.000)						
Corporatism	0.239	0.580	-7.185	-6.977	-0.003	0.032	-0.157	-0.117	0.102	0.292	-0.141	-0.188
	(2.244)	(2.404)	(3.933)	(3.946)	(0.045)	(0.060)	(0.165)	(0.287)	(0.141)	(0.238)	(0.059)	(0.130)
Cabinet Partisanship × Corporatism	-0.095	-0.075	-0.059	-0.052	-0.002	-0.002						
	(0.028)	(0.030)	(0.037)	(0.038)	(0.001)	(0.001)						
International Openness	-0.021	-0.022	-0.123	-0.123	-0.001	-0.001						
	(0.015)	(0.017)	(0.036)	(0.036)	(0.000)	(0.001)						
Financial Openness	0.216	0.123	-0.107	-0.141	0.008	0.009						
	(0.107)	(0.116)	(0.178)	(0.178)	(0.003)	(0.004)						
Government Debt	-0.019	-0.774	2.456	2.174	0.045	0.048						
	(0.799)	(1.060)	(1.612)	(1.590)	(0.026)	(0.046)						
Unemployment Rate	0.383	0.371	0.476	0.486	0.003	0.002	-0.003	-0.003	-0.004	-0.004	-0.002	-0.003
	(0.051)	(0.056)	(0.115)	(0.115)	(0.001)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.003)	(0.002)	(0.003)	(0.002)	(0.003)
GDP Growth	-0.008	-0.034	-0.185	-0.193	-0.002	-0.002						
	(0.041)	(0.044)	(0.082)	(0.083)	(0.001)	(0.002)						
Government Employment							-0.012	-0.022	-0.008	-0.018	-0.010	-0.024
							(0.005)	(0.008)	(0.003)	(0.004)	(0.003)	(0.004)
Government Employ. × Corporatism							0.004	-0.003				
							(0.006)	(0.010)				
Minimum Wage							-0.258	-0.042	-0.264	-0.009	-0.347	-0.022
							(0.111)	(0.144)	(0.106)	(0.136)	(0.111)	(0.227)
Welfare Generosity							-0.000	0.001	0.003	0.011	-0.001	0.001
							(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.003)	(0.005)	(0.001)	(0.002)
LDC Trade							0.006	-0.009	0.005	-0.010	0.003	-0.009
							(0.004)	(0.008)	(0.004)	(0.008)	(0.004)	(0.008)
Female Labor Force Participation							-0.002	0.010	-0.002	0.008	0.004	0.009
							(0.003)	(0.005)	(0.003)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.006)
Private Service Sector							-0.002	-0.009	-0.002	-0.008	-0.003	-0.009
							(0.003)	(0.005)	(0.003)	(0.004)	(0.003)	(0.004)
Welfare Generosity × Corporatism									-0.005	-0.016		
									(0.004)	(0.007)		
Minimum Wage × Corporatism											0.633	-0.063
											(0.257)	(0.486)
Constant	21.998	22.658	17.828	17.925	-0.116	-0.127	2.151	2.261	1.971	2.042	1.903	2.348
	(1.451)	(1.592)	(2.790)	(2.797)	(0.040)	(0.062)	(0.211)	(0.400)	(0.178)	(0.295)	(0.172)	(0.295)
	(1.451)	(1.590)	(2.790)	(2.774)	(0.0399)	(0.0373)	(0.211)	(0.324)	(0.178)	(0.241)	(0.172)	(0.236)
N	360	368	362	368	339	368	226	368	226	368	226	368

Notes: Dependent variables are government employment (column 1), welfare generosity (column 2), the minimum wage (column 3), and wage inequality (columns 4-6). Key explanatory variables (in bold) are the interaction of corporatism with partisanship (columns 1-3), government employment (column 4), welfare generosity (column 5), and the minimum wage (column 6). Fixed effects analyses with panel-corrected standard errors in parentheses.

Table A28 Accominotti and Flandreau 2008: Effects of the Cobden Chevalier Network (Table 4)

	Model 1 (OLS)		*Model 2 (OLS)*		*Model 3 (OLS)*		*Model 4 (OLS)*	
	Replicated	*Imputed*	*Replicated*	*Imputed*	*Replicated*	*Imputed*	*Replicated*	*Imputed*
								(continued)
Ln Product of GDPS	0.522	0.360	0.513	0.363	0.541	0.369	0.523	0.354
	(0.024)	(0.021)	(0.025)	(0.022)	(0.026)	(0.022)	(0.024)	(0.019)
Ln Product of GDP per head	0.104	0.029	0.069	0.035	0.004	0.020	0.018	0.001
	(0.069)	(0.043)	(0.071)	(0.046)	(0.077)	(0.058)	(0.077)	(0.058)
Ln Distance	-0.720	-0.658	-0.727	-0.662	-0.740	-0.677	-0.717	-0.655
	(0.050)	(0.054)	(0.050)	(0.056)	(0.051)	(0.055)	(0.050)	(0.053)
Border	0.534	0.637	0.542	0.630	0.506	0.628	0.537	0.660
	(0.184)	(0.183)	(0.183)	(0.184)	(0.183)	(0.180)	(0.183)	(0.184)
Language	0.475	0.542	0.514	0.537	0.498	0.528	0.524	0.554
	(0.168)	(0.131)	(0.169)	(0.130)	(0.170)	(0.135)	(0.169)	(0.128)
Commonwealth	2.856	3.032	2.850	3.040	3.042	3.153	2.952	3.065
	(0.278)	(0.312)	(0.278)	(0.310)	(0.285)	(0.338)	(0.279)	(0.326)
Italian Group	-0.765	-0.925	-0.709	-0.935	-0.676	-1.011	-0.675	-0.934
	(0.790)	(0.450)	(0.790)	(0.453)	(0.793)	(0.467)	(0.793)	(0.452)
Australian Group	0.547	0.258	0.690	0.237	0.387	0.152	0.606	0.281
	(0.350)	(0.310)	(0.357)	(0.323)	(0.378)	(0.324)	(0.349)	(0.320)
MFN	-0.164	0.329	0.000	0.296	-0.575	-0.001		
	(0.164)	(0.130)	(0.183)	(0.138)	(0.291)	(0.244)		
MFN/Out			0.239	-0.043	-0.336	-0.317		
			(0.119)	(0.089)	(0.234)	(0.144)		
Year 1855					0.351	0.060	0.342	0.086
					(0.204)	(0.184)	(0.204)	(0.180)
Year 1860					0.945	0.349	0.810	0.342
					(0.236)	(0.236)	(0.217)	(0.235)
Year 1865					1.167	0.642	0.812	0.457
					(0.304)	(0.289)	(0.201)	(0.237)
Year 1870					0.896	0.397	0.543	0.223
					(0.306)	(0.184)	(0.203)	(0.134)
Year 1875					1.048	0.543	0.702	0.372
					(0.313)	(0.297)	(0.213)	(0.253)
Year 1880					0.811	0.388	0.491	0.206
					(0.310)	(0.232)	(0.217)	(0.190)
Years in MFN							-0.015	0.027
							(0.015)	(0.014)
Intercept	-2.254	0.528	-1.770	0.471	-1.728	0.462	-1.782	0.682
	(0.845)	(0.568)	(0.878)	(0.583)	(0.927)	(0.655)	(0.927)	(0.647)
N	1462	7392	1462	7392	1462	7392	1462	7392

(continued)

	Model 5 (Random Effects)		*Model 6 (Random Effects)*		*Model 7 (Random Effects)*		*Model 8 (Random Effects)*	
	Replicated	*Imputed*	*Replicated*	*Imputed*	*Replicated*	*Imputed*	*Replicated*	*Imputed*
Ln Product of GDPS	0.493	0.341	0.472	0.338	0.466	0.337	0.459	0.329
	(0.038)	(0.025)	(0.039)	(0.026)	(0.038)	(0.025)	(0.038)	(0.023)
Ln Product of GDP per head	0.315	0.057	0.192	0.047	-0.028	0.010	-0.022	0.002
	(0.087)	(0.047)	(0.096)	(0.050)	(0.117)	(0.066)	(0.117)	(0.065)
Ln Distance	-0.773	-0.660	-0.757	-0.655	-0.746	-0.663	-0.738	-0.653
	(0.084)	(0.060)	(0.084)	(0.061)	(0.082)	(0.060)	(0.082)	(0.057)
Border	0.690	0.665	0.714	0.675	0.701	0.689	0.707	0.713
	(0.337)	(0.208)	(0.337)	(0.210)	(0.327)	(0.206)	(0.327)	(0.209)
Language	0.235	0.507	0.322	0.515	0.379	0.516	0.413	0.529
	(0.291)	(0.156)	(0.292)	(0.153)	(0.286)	(0.159)	(0.285)	(0.153)
Commonwealth	2.993	3.067	3.039	3.057	3.342	3.196	3.272	3.136
	(0.557)	(0.367)	(0.557)	(0.364)	(0.546)	(0.397)	(0.544)	(0.389)
Italian Group	-0.312	-0.865	-0.329	-0.853	-0.362	-0.916	-0.389	-0.880
	(0.875)	(0.494)	(0.874)	(0.493)	(0.858)	(0.506)	(0.858)	(0.496)
Australian Group	0.141	0.169	0.436	0.201	0.311	0.146	0.494	0.212
	(0.602)	(0.372)	(0.609)	(0.383)	(0.602)	(0.388)	(0.591)	(0.385)
MFN	0.161	0.492	0.353	0.525	-0.202	0.280		
	(0.131)	(0.160)	(0.145)	(0.156)	(0.216)	(0.277)		
MFN/Out			0.266	0.058	-0.266	-0.197		
			(0.088)	(0.112)	(0.168)	(0.145)		
Year 1855					0.158	0.098	0.155	0.110
					(0.130)	(0.184)	(0.130)	(0.180)
Year 1860					0.712	0.380	0.604	0.372
					(0.156)	(0.241)	(0.141)	(0.240)
Year 1865					0.888	0.593	0.637	0.486
					(0.215)	(0.283)	(0.139)	(0.238)
Year 1870					0.810	0.360	0.550	0.258
					(0.225)	(0.182)	(0.153)	(0.135)
Year 1875					0.975	0.521	0.712	0.414
					(0.239)	(0.292)	(0.175)	(0.255)
Year 1880					0.984	0.371	0.710	0.247
					(0.240)	(0.227)	(0.180)	(0.193)
Years in MFN							0.008	0.038
							(0.011)	(0.017)
Intercept	-4.142	0.460	-2.601	0.566	-0.262	0.879	-0.281	0.983
	(1.026)	(0.638)	(1.144)	(0.631)	(1.370)	(0.758)	(1.369)	(0.746)
N	1462	7392	1462	7392	1462	7392	1462	7392

Notes: Dependent variable is logged imports from country *j* to country *i* at date *t*. Key explanatory variables (in bold) are the existence of a most-favored-nation (MFN) treaty between *i* and *j* at *t*, the number of years such a treaty has been in force, and the existence of an MFN treaty between *i* or *j* and a third country (if no treaty between *i* and *j* exists). OLS (columns 1-4) and random effects (columns 5-8) regressions with standard errors in parentheses.

Table A29 Kurtz and Brooks 2008: Explaining Economic Policy Outcomes in Latin America 1985-2003 (Table 3)

	(1) Embedded Neoliberalism		*(2) Orthodox Neoliberalism*		*(3) Embedded Neoliberalism*		*(4) Orthodox Neoliberalism*	
	Replicated	*Imputed*	*Replicated*	*Imputed*	*Replicated*	*Imputed*	*Replicated*	*Imputed*
Partisanship	0.728	0.059	0.483	0.318	0.720	0.052	0.488	0.326
	(0.389)	(0.198)	(0.328)	(0.241)	(0.384)	(0.194)	(0.328)	(0.246)
Partisanship × Unionization	-0.051	-0.004	-0.014	-0.014	-0.050	-0.003	-0.015	-0.015
	(0.024)	(0.012)	(0.019)	(0.014)	(0.024)	(0.012)	(0.019)	(0.014)
Unionization	0.189	0.046	-0.012	-0.019	0.205	0.046	-0.024	-0.019
	(0.053)	(0.023)	(0.047)	(0.029)	(0.055)	(0.023)	(0.047)	(0.029)
Majority	0.682	0.182	-1.024	-0.433	0.577	0.154	-0.938	-0.407
	(0.341)	(0.206)	(0.359)	(0.237)	(0.334)	(0.201)	(0.364)	(0.235)
PR					-0.687	-1.012	0.457	0.594
					(0.386)	(0.346)	(0.317)	(0.345)
Manufacturing 1980	0.159	0.071	-0.099	0.049	0.170	0.095	-0.106	0.035
	(0.034)	(0.034)	(0.033)	(0.043)	(0.036)	(0.034)	(0.032)	(0.045)
Human Capital	0.386	0.336	-0.147	-0.003	0.349	0.300	-0.121	0.019
	(0.114)	(0.103)	(0.091)	(0.104)	(0.103)	(0.099)	(0.091)	(0.106)
Inequality	0.049	0.080	-0.100	-0.027	0.031	0.069	-0.087	-0.020
	(0.025)	(0.026)	(0.025)	(0.028)	(0.028)	(0.026)	(0.027)	(0.029)
Growth 1980s	0.186	-0.082	0.064	0.038	0.129	-0.159	0.098	0.082
	(0.062)	(0.071)	(0.076)	(0.077)	(0.071)	(0.075)	(0.082)	(0.077)
Democracy	0.012	0.007	-0.108	-0.023	0.006	0.003	-0.103	-0.020
	(0.026)	(0.015)	(0.031)	(0.017)	(0.025)	(0.014)	(0.031)	(0.017)
Trade	0.004	0.003	-0.017	-0.003	0.002	0.001	-0.015	-0.002
	(0.006)	(0.004)	(0.006)	(0.005)	(0.006)	(0.004)	(0.006)	(0.005)
IMF	1.275	-0.669	-5.631	-2.484	0.868	-1.201	-5.344	-2.137
	(1.853)	(1.393)	(2.221)	(1.843)	(1.802)	(1.335)	(2.172)	(1.831)
World Bank	-4.992	-1.133	1.581	-1.911	-5.732	-1.475	2.154	-1.704
	(2.699)	(1.970)	(2.973)	(2.571)	(2.739)	(1.924)	(2.999)	(2.581)
Inflation (ln)	-0.123	-0.089	0.079	-0.024	-0.113	-0.084	0.072	-0.028
	(0.058)	(0.039)	(0.049)	(0.045)	(0.059)	(0.039)	(0.049)	(0.045)
Current Account	-0.018	-0.007	0.026	0.002	-0.019	-0.006	0.027	0.002
	(0.013)	(0.007)	(0.016)	(0.008)	(0.013)	(0.007)	(0.015)	(0.008)
Unemployment	-0.023	0.007	-0.043	-0.017	-0.029	0.005	-0.037	-0.016
	(0.017)	(0.012)	(0.017)	(0.013)	(0.019)	(0.011)	(0.017)	(0.014)
Age Dependency	0.826	-3.138	-1.412	3.200	1.180	-2.188	-1.643	2.642
	(1.767)	(1.285)	(1.685)	(1.360)	(1.813)	(1.330)	(1.635)	(1.419)
GDP per Capita	-0.193	-0.155	0.106	0.078	-0.214	-0.164	0.121	0.083
	(0.059)	(0.063)	(0.067)	(0.079)	(0.062)	(0.063)	(0.069)	(0.079)
lnGDP	-0.642	-0.268	-0.089	-0.242	-0.667	-0.271	-0.067	-0.239
	(0.095)	(0.081)	(0.110)	(0.105)	(0.093)	(0.079)	(0.105)	(0.103)
Time Trend	0.127	0.094	0.166	0.165	0.138	0.103	0.158	0.159
	(0.020)	(0.022)	(0.021)	(0.024)	(0.021)	(0.021)	(0.021)	(0.025)
Constant	-8.732	-4.639	9.319	-2.049	-7.439	-4.081	8.349	-2.413
	(3.078)	(2.098)	(2.722)	(2.421)	(2.831)	(2.031)	(2.847)	(2.442)
N	193	323	193	323	193	323	193	323

Notes: Dependent variable is embedded neoliberalism in columns 1 and 3 and orthodox neoliberalism in columns 2 and 4. Key explanatory variables (in bold) are the interaction between partisanship and unionization and alternative measures of a legacy of import-substitution industrialization. Prais-Winsten regressions adjusted for AR-1 autocorrelation with panel-corrected standard errors in parentheses.

Table A30 Baccaro and Rei 2007: Annual Data (Table 1)

	OLS		*FGLS (common-panel)*		*FGLS (panel-specific)*		*Column III, BENOECD*		*OLS, PCSEs*		*PCSEs, BENOECD*	
	Replicated	*Imputed*	*Replicated*	*Imputed*	*Replicated*	*Imputed*	*Replicated*	*Imputed*	*Replicated*	*Imputed*	*Replicated*	*Imputed*
Lagged DV	0.901	0.900	0.829	0.846	0.832	0.845	0.831	0.846	0.901	0.900	0.897	0.898
	(0.020)	(0.018)	(0.023)	(0.021)	(0.023)	(0.020)	(0.023)	(0.021)	(0.031)	(0.024)	(0.031)	(0.024)
Real Interest Rate	0.056	0.061	0.059	0.055	0.055	0.053	0.055	0.053	0.056	0.061	0.058	0.062
	(0.015)	(0.014)	(0.013)	(0.012)	(0.013)	(0.012)	(0.013)	(0.012)	(0.016)	(0.014)	(0.016)	(0.014)
△ Inflation	-0.041	-0.039	-0.030	-0.031	-0.033	-0.034	-0.033	-0.034	-0.041	-0.039	-0.040	-0.039
	(0.017)	(0.016)	(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.010)	(0.011)	(0.010)	(0.019)	(0.018)	(0.019)	(0.017)
Terms of Trade Shocks	-0.052	-0.024	-0.060	-0.025	-0.063	-0.028	-0.061	-0.028	-0.052	-0.024	-0.051	-0.024
	(0.035)	(0.031)	(0.026)	(0.023)	(0.026)	(0.023)	(0.026)	(0.023)	(0.039)	(0.031)	(0.039)	(0.031)
Lagged Productivity △	-0.081	-0.059	-0.049	-0.042	-0.050	-0.041	-0.050	-0.041	-0.081	-0.059	-0.079	-0.058
	(0.019)	(0.016)	(0.013)	(0.012)	(0.013)	(0.012)	(0.013)	(0.012)	(0.022)	(0.018)	(0.022)	(0.018)
EP	-0.096	0.047	0.120	0.217	0.013	0.143	0.034	0.142	-0.096	0.047	-0.042	0.065
	(0.184)	(0.150)	(0.183)	(0.162)	(0.197)	(0.175)	(0.190)	(0.174)	(0.154)	(0.142)	(0.149)	(0.141)
UD	0.013	0.013	0.021	0.014	0.018	0.014	0.016	0.013	0.013	0.013	0.014	0.013
	(0.006)	(0.005)	(0.007)	(0.006)	(0.008)	(0.006)	(0.008)	(0.007)	(0.008)	(0.006)	(0.008)	(0.006)
BRR	0.006	0.003	-0.004	-0.002	-0.000	-0.002			0.006	0.003		
	(0.004)	(0.003)	(0.004)	(0.003)	(0.004)	(0.003)			(0.004)	(0.003)		
TW	-0.006	-0.014	-0.018	-0.012	-0.014	-0.011	-0.015	-0.012	-0.006	-0.014	-0.005	-0.013
	(0.010)	(0.008)	(0.011)	(0.009)	(0.011)	(0.009)	(0.011)	(0.009)	(0.010)	(0.008)	(0.010)	(0.008)
CBI	0.501	-0.011	0.828	0.524	1.100	0.541	1.121	0.548	0.501	-0.011	0.490	-0.024
	(0.394)	(0.314)	(0.366)	(0.312)	(0.386)	(0.319)	(0.385)	(0.319)	(0.372)	(0.311)	(0.379)	(0.315)
BC	0.035	0.005	0.093	0.057	0.075	0.045	0.071	0.039	0.035	0.005	0.045	0.009
	(0.047)	(0.043)	(0.046)	(0.041)	(0.044)	(0.039)	(0.044)	(0.039)	(0.050)	(0.044)	(0.049)	(0.043)
BC × **UD**	-0.005	-0.004	-0.006	-0.004	-0.006	-0.005	-0.006	-0.005	-0.005	-0.004	-0.005	-0.004
	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)
BC × **TW**	-0.002	0.001	-0.001	0.001	-0.002	0.001	-0.001	0.002	-0.002	0.001	-0.002	0.002
	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.003)	(0.005)	(0.004)	(0.005)	(0.004)
BC × **EP**	0.095	0.038	0.108	0.032	0.115	0.042	0.110	0.037	0.095	0.038	0.106	0.038
	(0.076)	(0.069)	(0.075)	(0.066)	(0.073)	(0.065)	(0.075)	(0.065)	(0.078)	(0.069)	(0.080)	(0.070)
BC × **BRR**	-0.000	-0.000	0.002	0.001	0.001	0.001			-0.000	-0.000		
	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)			(0.002)	(0.002)		
BC × **CBI**	0.079	-0.091	-0.126	-0.113	-0.158	-0.199	-0.120	-0.187	0.079	-0.091	0.104	-0.086
	(0.217)	(0.189)	(0.191)	(0.185)	(0.196)	(0.184)	(0.194)	(0.184)	(0.208)	(0.172)	(0.202)	(0.169)
BENOECD							0.002	-0.001			0.007	0.002
							(0.007)	(0.005)			(0.006)	(0.005)
BC × **BENOECD**							0.000	0.001			-0.001	-0.001
							(0.003)	(0.003)			(0.003)	(0.003)
Constant	-0.226	0.114	0.017	-0.178	-0.231	-0.150	-0.213	-0.062	-0.226	0.114	-0.279	0.046
	(0.460)	(0.390)	(0.570)	(0.428)	(0.563)	(0.450)	(0.573)	(0.454)	(0.430)	(0.364)	(0.425)	(0.369)
N	620	738	620	738	620	738	620	738	620	738	620	738

Notes: Dependent variable is the unemployment rate. Key explanatory variables (in bold) are alternative measures of labor market rigidity. FGLS = feasible generalized least squares. PCSE = panel-corrected standard errors. Models 7 and 8 omitted due to unavailability of data.

Table A31 Ehrlich 2007: Effects of Institutions on Tariff Rates: Error-correction Models (Table 1)

	Model 1		*Model 2*		*Model 3*		*Model 4*		*Model 6*		*Model 7*	
	Replicated	*Imputed*	*Replicated*	*Imputed*	*Replicated*	*Imputed*	*Replicated*	*Imputed*	*Replicated*	*Imputed*	*Replicated*	*Imputed*
Exports	0.002	-0.007	0.001	-0.005	0.002	-0.003	0.006	-0.005	0.005	-0.000	0.003	-0.031
	(0.004)	(0.013)	(0.004)	(0.012)	(0.004)	(0.014)	(0.005)	(0.012)	(0.003)	(0.013)	(0.010)	(0.017)
△ Exports	-0.007	-0.014	-0.008	-0.013	-0.007	-0.013	-0.005	-0.014				
	(0.003)	(0.014)	(0.003)	(0.014)	(0.003)	(0.014)	(0.004)	(0.014)				
Unemployment	0.000	-0.000	0.000	-0.000	0.000	-0.000	0.000	-0.000	0.000	-0.000	-0.003	-0.002
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.001)
△ Unemployment	0.002	-0.001	0.002	-0.001	0.002	-0.001	0.002	-0.001				
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)				
GDPPC	-0.000	-0.000	0.000	-0.000	-0.000	-0.000	-0.000	-0.000	-0.000	-0.000	-0.000	-0.000
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
△ GDPPC	-0.000	-0.000	-0.000	-0.000	-0.000	-0.000	-0.000	-0.000				
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)				
GDP	-0.000	-0.000	0.000	-0.000	-0.000	-0.000	0.000	-0.000	-0.000	-0.000	-0.000	-0.000
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
△ GDP	0.000	-0.000	0.000	-0.000	0.000	-0.000	0.000	-0.000				
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)				
Terms of Trade	0.001	-0.002	-0.002	-0.008	0.002	-0.003	0.005	-0.001	-0.003	-0.005	-0.020	0.013
	(0.003)	(0.008)	(0.003)	(0.007)	(0.003)	(0.008)	(0.003)	(0.009)	(0.003)	(0.008)	(0.013)	(0.013)
△ Terms of Trade	0.027	0.024	0.028	0.022	0.028	0.024	0.029	0.024				
	(0.007)	(0.019)	(0.006)	(0.019)	(0.007)	(0.019)	(0.007)	(0.020)				
Inflation	-0.000	-0.001	-0.000	-0.001	-0.000	-0.001	-0.000	-0.001	-0.000	-0.000	-0.002	-0.002
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
△ Inflation	-0.000	-0.001	0.000	-0.001	-0.000	-0.001	0.000	-0.001				
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)				
Left	0.003	-0.002	0.001	-0.003	0.003	-0.003	0.002	-0.002	0.001	-0.004	-0.002	-0.015
	(0.002)	(0.004)	(0.002)	(0.003)	(0.002)	(0.004)	(0.002)	(0.003)	(0.002)	(0.003)	(0.004)	(0.006)
△ **Left**	0.009	0.004	0.007	0.002	0.008	0.003	0.008	0.003				
	(0.003)	(0.006)	(0.002)	(0.005)	(0.003)	(0.006)	(0.003)	(0.006)				
No. of Parties	0.002	0.002			0.002	0.001	0.001	0.002	0.002	0.001	0.009	0.002
	(0.000)	(0.001)			(0.000)	(0.001)	(0.000)	(0.001)	(0.000)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.002)
△ **No. of Parties**	0.002	0.002			0.002	0.001	0.002	0.001				
	(0.001)	(0.002)			(0.001)	(0.002)	(0.001)	(0.002)				
Presidential	-0.009	-0.007	-0.002	0.000					-0.008	-0.005	-0.027	-0.014
	(0.001)	(0.004)	(0.001)	(0.003)					(0.001)	(0.004)	(0.005)	(0.008)
Electoral Districts	0.000	0.000			0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000
	(0.000)	(0.000)			(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Bicameralism	-0.000	-0.000	-0.000	-0.000	-0.000	-0.000	-0.000	-0.000	-0.000	-0.000	-0.000	-0.000
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
PR	0.001	0.001	-0.005	-0.008	0.000	-0.000	0.002	0.001	0.000	0.001	0.026	0.027
	(0.003)	(0.007)	(0.002)	(0.004)	(0.003)	(0.008)	(0.003)	(0.008)	(0.003)	(0.008)	(0.012)	(0.013)
Pool	0.002	0.003			0.002	0.002	0.002	0.003	0.002	0.003	0.019	0.017
	(0.001)	(0.002)			(0.001)	(0.003)	(0.001)	(0.003)	(0.001)	(0.003)	(0.004)	(0.005)
N	713	1012	713	1012	713	1012	713	1012	715	1034	717	1034

Notes: Dependent variable is the change in tariff rate in Models 1-5 and the tariff rate in Models 6-7. Key explanatory variables (in bold) are alternative measures of the number of institutional access points in a country's political system. Model 5 and 8 omitted due to substantial differences in sample size. Constant, time lags, and other controls not reported. OLS regressions with panel-corrected standard errors in parentheses.

Table A32 Keefer 2007: Elections, Political Instability, and Fiscal Transfers (Table 4)

	Model 1		*Model 2*		*Model 3*		*Model 4*		*Model 5*		*Model 6*	
	Replicated	*Imputed*	*Replicated*	*Imputed*	*Replicated*	*Imputed*	*Replicated*	*Imputed*	*Replicated*	*Imputed*	*Replicated*	*Imputed*
Checks and Balances	0.442	0.442	0.247	0.301	0.626	0.621	2.528	0.613	0.197	0.339	3.126	0.811
	(1.424)	(1.424)	(1.909)	(1.582)	(2.050)	(1.822)	(2.426)	(1.835)	(1.816)	(1.560)	(2.308)	(1.644)
Electoral Competitiveness			-14.012	-13.128	-12.640	-11.761	-9.334	-11.915	-13.350	-12.608	-12.061	-10.307
			(5.563)	(5.415)	(5.077)	(4.896)	(5.114)	(4.738)	(6.865)	(6.616)	(5.163)	(5.401)
Political Stability			-16.189	-15.697	-14.431	-14.081	-19.000	-14.499	-10.309	-9.663	-20.518	-10.013
			(7.128)	(7.183)	(7.614)	(7.584)	(9.226)	(8.197)	(6.895)	(6.843)	(11.698)	(9.963)
Reserves/Debt (*t - 1*)							0.120	0.116			0.037	0.094
							(0.060)	(0.048)			(0.072)	(0.047)
Current Account Balance (*t - 1*, % GDP)					-0.474	-0.477	-0.562	-0.426			-1.222	-0.350
					(0.614)	(0.581)	(0.840)	(0.579)			(0.920)	(0.561)
Current Account Balance (*t*) - (*t - 1*)					-0.630	-0.660	-0.752	-0.544			-0.633	-0.670
					(0.757)	(0.736)	(0.756)	(0.703)			(0.552)	(0.711)
Terms of Trade (% change between *t-1* and *t*)									-3.491	-2.898	3.544	-2.782
									(33.570)	(31.685)	(35.160)	(29.017)
Income									-0.000	-0.000	0.002	-0.000
									(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.001)	(0.000)
Growth									1.090	1.125	0.380	0.878
									(0.486)	(0.479)	(0.652)	(0.470)
Constant	12.501	12.501	24.370	23.370	22.106	21.139	18.777	18.101	21.603	20.685	7.961	17.616
	(1.811)	(1.811)	(5.257)	(5.066)	(6.301)	(5.969)	(7.591)	(5.718)	(5.387)	(5.009)	(8.099)	(5.403)
N	41	41	38	41	38	41	27	41	38	41	27	41

Notes: Dependent variable is the fiscal cost of a financial crisis. Key explanatory variables (in bold) are electoral competitiveness and institutional checks and balances. OLS regressions with robust (White-adjusted) standard errors in parentheses.

1 II. Sensitivity Analyses

Table A33 Reanalysis of Oatley 2011 (Table 2, Model 2) with Alternative Imputation Specifications

	Amelia II: m = 26	*Amelia II: m = 5*	*Amelia II: m = 93*	*hot.deck: m = 40*	*mice: m = 40*
Regime Type	-0.065	-0.062	-0.056	-0.067	-0.019
	(0.061)	(0.068)	(0.060)	(0.038)	(0.035)
Regime Type × WTO	-0.199	-0.189	-0.191	-0.316	-0.195
	(0.095)	(0.081)	(0.094)	(0.059)	(0.046)
Population	-0.084	0.055	-0.052	0.033	0.651
	(0.464)	(0.515)	(0.474)	(0.283)	(0.274)
GDP per Capita	-0.000	-0.000	-0.000	-0.000	-0.000
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Economic Crisis	-2.845	-2.363	-2.730	-3.279	-3.164
	(1.109)	(0.934)	(1.046)	(0.861)	(0.765)
Balance of Payments Crisis	0.369	0.572	0.441	0.663	0.685
	(0.592)	(0.524)	(0.559)	(0.414)	(0.334)
IMF Program	-0.053	-0.354	-0.215	1.217	0.426
	(0.732)	(0.619)	(0.772)	(0.503)	(0.462)
Years in Office	-0.028	-0.032	-0.036	-0.065	-0.016
	(0.041)	(0.032)	(0.037)	(0.024)	(0.022)
WTO Membership	1.393	1.103	1.187	1.956	0.295
	(1.040)	(0.665)	(0.935)	(0.732)	(0.566)
Five Open	13.073	14.181	13.270	2.088	12.147
	(2.348)	(2.143)	(2.519)	(0.541)	(1.858)
US Hegemony	18.092	20.591	20.660	14.954	48.895
	(46.113)	(45.173)	(51.889)	(45.556)	(42.374)
Constant	2,829.887	3,009.531	2,863.361	-140.425	2,544.450
	(482.258)	(484.370)	(514.111)	(197.076)	(428.467)
N	5,191	5,191	5,191	5,191	5,191

Notes: Dependent variable is average national tariff rate. Key explanatory variable (in bold) is the interaction between regime type and WTO membership. OLS regressions with panel-corrected standard errors in parentheses. Country fixed effects, AR1 correction, and time trend included but not shown. All right-hand-side variables lagged one period. The column titles indicate the R package used to perform multiple imputation and the number of imputations conducted (*m*).

Table A34 Reanalysis of Broz and Plouffe 2010 (Table 4, Model 3) with Alternative Imputation Specifications

	Amelia II: m = 10	*Amelia II: m = 5*	*Amelia II: m = 94*	*hot.deck: m = 10*	*mice: m = 10*
Sales Change	-0.039	-0.048	-0.044	-0.048	-0.048
	(0.030)	(0.033)	(0.029)	(0.033)	(0.029)
Firm Size	-0.093	-0.130	-0.094	-0.130	-0.091
	(0.019)	(0.023)	(0.020)	(0.023)	(0.018)
Management	-0.074	-0.059	-0.074	-0.059	-0.092
	(0.054)	(0.054)	(0.053)	(0.054)	(0.055)
Services	-0.127	-0.139	-0.127	-0.139	-0.130
	(0.052)	(0.051)	(0.051)	(0.051)	(0.051)
Foreign Owned	-0.112	-0.136	-0.112	-0.136	-0.121
	(0.038)	(0.037)	(0.039)	(0.037)	(0.034)
Exporter	-0.117	-0.143	-0.121	-0.143	-0.144
	(0.042)	(0.044)	(0.041)	(0.044)	(0.037)
π Variance	0.350	0.175	0.346	0.175	0.355
	(0.103)	(0.127)	(0.102)	(0.127)	(0.108)
GDPPC	-0.025	-0.031	-0.025	-0.031	-0.026
	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.006)
$\triangle$ GDPPC	-0.046	-0.045	-0.046	-0.045	-0.048
	(0.011)	(0.013)	(0.011)	(0.013)	(0.012)
Freely Falling	0.472	0.596	0.469	0.596	0.530
	(0.160)	(0.206)	(0.161)	(0.206)	(0.193)
Peg (RR)	-0.374	-0.366	-0.371	-0.366	-0.395
	(0.102)	(0.112)	(0.102)	(0.112)	(0.099)
N	10,010	10,010	10,010	10,010	10,010

Notes: Dependent variable is firm owners' concern about inflation. Key explanatory variables (in bold) are alternative measures of exchange rate fixity. Ordered probit regressions with robust standard errors clustered by country in parentheses. The column titles indicate the R package used to perform multiple imputation and the number of imputations conducted (*m*).

Table A35 Reanalysis of Broz and Plouffe 2010 (Table 4, Model 4) with Alternative Imputation Specifications

	Amelia II: m = 10	*Amelia II: m = 5*	*Amelia II: m = 94*	*hot.deck: m = 10*	*mice: m = 10*
Sales Change	-0.041	-0.046	-0.045	-0.046	-0.048
	(0.030)	(0.033)	(0.029)	(0.033)	(0.029)
Firm Size	-0.097	-0.129	-0.098	-0.129	-0.094
	(0.021)	(0.025)	(0.022)	(0.025)	(0.020)
Management	-0.100	-0.093	-0.100	-0.093	-0.120
	(0.053)	(0.051)	(0.052)	(0.051)	(0.053)
Services	-0.145	-0.166	-0.146	-0.166	-0.151
	(0.052)	(0.048)	(0.051)	(0.048)	(0.051)
Foreign Owned	-0.102	-0.126	-0.102	-0.126	-0.115
	(0.040)	(0.038)	(0.041)	(0.038)	(0.036)
Exporter	-0.104	-0.132	-0.108	-0.132	-0.132
	(0.042)	(0.045)	(0.041)	(0.045)	(0.038)
π Variance	0.341	0.164	0.337	0.164	0.343
	(0.113)	(0.133)	(0.112)	(0.133)	(0.118)
GDPPC	-0.025	-0.031	-0.025	-0.031	-0.027
	(0.005)	(0.006)	(0.005)	(0.006)	(0.006)
$\triangle$ GDPPC	-0.043	-0.042	-0.042	-0.042	-0.043
	(0.011)	(0.013)	(0.011)	(0.013)	(0.012)
Freely Falling	0.504	0.619	0.500	0.619	0.562
	(0.160)	(0.206)	(0.160)	(0.206)	(0.193)
Peg (LYS)	-0.311	-0.319	-0.309	-0.319	-0.329
	(0.091)	(0.100)	(0.091)	(0.100)	(0.089)

Notes: Dependent variable is firm owners' concern about inflation. Key explanatory variable (in bold) is exchange rate fixity. Ordered probit regressions with robust standard errors clustered by country in parentheses. The column titles indicate the R package used to perform multiple imputation and the number of imputations conducted (*m*).

Table A36 Reanalysis of Broz and Plouffe 2010 (Table 4, Model 5) with Alternative Imputation Specifications

	Amelia II: m = 10	*Amelia II: m = 5*	*Amelia II: m = 94*	*hot.deck: m = 10*	*mice: m = 10*
Sales Change	-0.041	-0.047	-0.045	-0.047	-0.047
	(0.029)	(0.033)	(0.028)	(0.033)	(0.028)
Firm Size	-0.092	-0.128	-0.093	-0.128	-0.090
	(0.019)	(0.022)	(0.019)	(0.022)	(0.017)
Management	-0.072	-0.063	-0.072	-0.063	-0.088
	(0.051)	(0.052)	(0.050)	(0.052)	(0.051)
Services	-0.111	-0.131	-0.112	-0.131	-0.114
	(0.047)	(0.047)	(0.046)	(0.047)	(0.046)
Foreign Owned	-0.109	-0.129	-0.108	-0.129	-0.119
	(0.036)	(0.034)	(0.037)	(0.034)	(0.031)
Exporter	-0.092	-0.115	-0.097	-0.115	-0.121
	(0.040)	(0.042)	(0.039)	(0.042)	(0.036)
π Variance	0.326	0.163	0.322	0.163	0.328
	(0.089)	(0.118)	(0.088)	(0.118)	(0.092)
GDPPC	-0.025	-0.031	-0.025	-0.031	-0.026
	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.006)
$\triangle$ GDPPC	-0.047	-0.047	-0.046	-0.047	-0.048
	(0.011)	(0.013)	(0.011)	(0.013)	(0.012)
Freely Falling	0.533	0.661	0.529	0.661	0.610
	(0.105)	(0.141)	(0.105)	(0.141)	(0.125)
Peg (IMF)	-0.450	-0.476	-0.447	-0.476	-0.476
	(0.096)	(0.110)	(0.096)	(0.110)	(0.097)
N	10,010	10,010	10,010	10,010	10,010

Notes: Dependent variable is firm owners' concern about inflation. Key explanatory variable (in bold) is exchange rate fixity. Ordered probit regressions with robust standard errors clustered by country in parentheses. The column titles indicate the R package used to perform multiple imputation and the number of imputations conducted (*m*).

Table A37 Reanalysis of Guisinger and Singer 2010 (Table 1) with Alternative Imputation Specifications

	Amelia II: m = 40	*Amelia II: m = 5*	*Amelia II: m = 90*	*hot.deck: m = 26*	*mice: m = 26*
Lagged Dependent Variable	0.438	0.439	0.438	0.289	0.475
	(0.018)	(0.014)	(0.018)	(0.022)	(0.016)
De Jure Fix (*lagged*)	-0.111	-0.099	-0.116	-0.178	-0.062
	(0.126)	(0.189)	(0.150)	(0.048)	(0.040)
De Facto Fix (*lagged*)	-0.470	-0.454	-0.476	-0.138	-0.245
	(0.088)	(0.102)	(0.100)	(0.044)	(0.039)
De Jure and De Facto (*lagged*)	-0.027	-0.033	-0.007	-0.034	-0.045
	(0.182)	(0.281)	(0.227)	(0.043)	(0.049)
Central Bank Independence (*0/1*)	0.095	0.100	0.096	0.200	0.004
	(0.101)	(0.108)	(0.102)	(0.135)	(0.080)
Democracy (*0/1*)	0.096	0.079	0.086	0.118	0.129
	(0.058)	(0.066)	(0.057)	(0.069)	(0.045)
CBI and Democracy (*0/1*)	-0.183	-0.194	-0.181	-0.128	-0.148
	(0.111)	(0.132)	(0.110)	(0.144)	(0.092)
Political Crisis (past five years) (*0/1*)	0.013	0.006	0.021	-0.002	0.023
	(0.072)	(0.059)	(0.064)	(0.062)	(0.058)
GDP Growth	-0.019	-0.020	-0.019	-0.009	-0.017
	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.003)	(0.002)
GDP per capita (*logged*)	-0.142	-0.140	-0.137	-0.049	-0.104
	(0.026)	(0.022)	(0.026)	(0.021)	(0.017)
Capital Openness	-0.083	-0.076	-0.082	-0.076	-0.089
	(0.018)	(0.020)	(0.019)	(0.016)	(0.014)
Trade (% of GDP) (*logged*)	0.094	0.091	0.091	0.053	-0.031
	(0.051)	(0.075)	(0.047)	(0.042)	(0.038)
1980s	-0.179	-0.194	-0.181	-0.003	-0.084
	(0.041)	(0.049)	(0.043)	(0.043)	(0.032)
1980s	-0.342	-0.357	-0.345	-0.288	-0.201
	(0.051)	(0.052)	(0.052)	(0.061)	(0.041)
2000s	-0.627	-0.651	-0.632	-0.831	-0.414
	(0.063)	(0.055)	(0.060)	(0.070)	(0.051)
Constant	2.421	2.428	2.400	1.969	2.319
	(0.239)	(0.322)	(0.238)	(0.223)	(0.192)
N	7,315	7,315	7,315	7,315	7,315

Notes: Dependent variable is consumer price inflation (logged). Key explanatory variables (in bold) are the possession of both a de jure and de facto fixed exchange rate regime. Fixed effects models with robust standard errors clustered by country in parentheses. The column titles indicate the R package used to perform multiple imputation and the number of imputations conducted (*m*).

Table A38 Reanalysis of Morrison 2009 (Table 3, Model 1) with Alternative Imputation Specifications

	Amelia II: m = 37	*Amelia II: m = 5*	*Amelia II: m = 94*	*hot.deck: m = 37*	*mice: m = 37*
Grants per Capita$_{t-1}$	-0.000	-0.000	-0.000	0.001	0.000
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Other Nontax Revenue per Capita$_{t-1}$	-0.000	-0.000	-0.000	-0.000	-0.000
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
SOE Revenue per Capita$_{t-1}$	-0.000	-0.000	-0.000	-0.000	-0.000
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
GDP per Capita Growth	-0.007	-0.007	-0.006	-0.031	-0.035
	(0.006)	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.009)	(0.016)
GDP per Capita (ln)$_{t-1}$	-0.027	-0.032	-0.034	-0.214	-0.199
	(0.099)	(0.101)	(0.098)	(0.045)	(0.055)
$\triangle$ % Population Urban	-0.192	-0.191	-0.184	-0.164	0.143
	(0.224)	(0.223)	(0.224)	(0.117)	(0.145)
Ethnolinguistic Fractionalization	-0.268	-0.299	-0.264	-0.153	0.208
	(0.448)	(0.445)	(0.448)	(0.265)	(0.255)
Population Density (ln)$_{t-1}$	0.118	0.121	0.119	0.079	0.043
	(0.088)	(0.088)	(0.087)	(0.043)	(0.041)
Past Regime Instability	-0.456	-0.455	-0.458	0.021	0.061
	(0.153)	(0.153)	(0.153)	(0.034)	(0.037)
Regime Age	-0.068	-0.070	-0.070	-0.073	-0.223
	(0.013)	(0.013)	(0.014)	(0.014)	(0.040)
Spline (1)	0.000	0.000	0.000	-0.000	0.001
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Spline (2)	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	-0.000
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Constant	0.547	0.583	0.593	-0.106	-0.373
	(0.830)	(0.838)	(0.828)	(0.445)	(0.530)
N	7,639	7,639	7,639	7,616	5,211

Notes: Dependent variable is regime instability (a binary variable equal to 1 if the regime changes in a given year and 0 otherwise). Key explanatory variables (in bold) are different types of government nontax revenue per capita. Logistic regressions with standard errors clustered by country in parentheses. The column titles indicate the R package used to perform multiple imputation and the number of imputations conducted (*m*).

Table A39 Reanalysis of Morrison 2009 (Table 3, Model 2) with Alternative Imputation Specifications

	Amelia II: m = 37	*Amelia II: m = 5*	*Amelia II: m = 94*	*hot.deck: m = 37*	*mice: m = 37*
GDP per Capita Growth	-0.007	-0.007	-0.006	-0.031	-0.033
	(0.006)	(0.007)	(0.006)	(0.009)	(0.015)
GDP per Capita $(\ln)_{t-1}$	-0.036	-0.043	-0.043	-0.212	-0.212
	(0.098)	(0.100)	(0.098)	(0.045)	(0.054)
$\triangle$ % Population Urban	-0.190	-0.180	-0.181	-0.157	0.148
	(0.223)	(0.222)	(0.223)	(0.116)	(0.145)
Ethnolinguistic Fractionalization	-0.282	-0.315	-0.278	-0.176	0.170
	(0.447)	(0.444)	(0.447)	(0.263)	(0.251)
Population Density $(\ln)_{t-1}$	0.114	0.116	0.115	0.080	0.043
	(0.087)	(0.087)	(0.086)	(0.043)	(0.041)
Past Regime Instability	-0.457	-0.458	-0.459	0.024	0.061
	(0.152)	(0.153)	(0.153)	(0.037)	(0.037)
Regime Age	-0.068	-0.071	-0.070	-0.073	-0.222
	(0.013)	(0.013)	(0.014)	(0.014)	(0.040)
Spline (1)	0.000	0.000	0.000	-0.000	0.001
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Spline (2)	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	-0.000
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Nontax Revenue per Capita$_{t-1}$	-0.000	-0.000	-0.000	0.000	0.000
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Constant	0.625	0.681	0.676	-0.108	-0.338
	(0.831)	(0.840)	(0.831)	(0.449)	(0.519)
N	7,639	7,639	7,639	7,616	5,211

Notes: Dependent variable is regime instability (a binary variable equal to 1 if the regime changes in a given year and 0 otherwise). Key explanatory variable (in bold) is government nontax revenue per capita. Logistic regressions with standard errors clustered by country in parentheses. The column titles indicate the R package used to perform multiple imputation and the number of imputations conducted (m).

Table A40 Reanalysis of Baccaro and Rei 2007 (Table 1, Model 1) with Alternative Imputation Specifications

	Amelia II: m = 5	*Amelia II: m = 30*	*hot.deck: m = 5*	*mice: m = 5*
Lagged DV	0.900	0.898	0.887	0.916
	(0.018)	(0.018)	(0.016)	(0.017)
Real Interest Rate	0.061	0.062	0.066	0.055
	(0.014)	(0.014)	(0.013)	(0.013)
$\triangle$ Inflation	-0.039	-0.038	-0.036	-0.034
	(0.016)	(0.016)	(0.015)	(0.015)
Terms of Trade Shocks	-0.024	-0.026	-0.030	-0.015
	(0.031)	(0.030)	(0.030)	(0.030)
Lagged Productivity $\triangle$	-0.059	-0.060	-0.050	-0.068
	(0.016)	(0.017)	(0.016)	(0.016)
EP	0.047	0.088	0.154	0.074
	(0.150)	(0.138)	(0.130)	(0.114)
UD	0.013	0.016	0.016	0.011
	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.004)
BRR	0.003	0.002	0.002	0.003
	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)
TW	-0.014	-0.014	-0.011	-0.002
	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.006)	(0.006)
CBI	-0.011	-0.036	-0.301	0.147
	(0.314)	(0.316)	(0.301)	(0.306)
BC	0.005	0.010	-0.028	0.023
	(0.043)	(0.044)	(0.040)	(0.040)
BC $\times$ **UD**	-0.004	-0.005	-0.003	-0.004
	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.002)	(0.002)
BC $\times$ **TW**	0.001	0.001	0.003	0.000
	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.003)	(0.003)
BC $\times$ **EP**	0.038	0.038	-0.004	0.065
	(0.069)	(0.068)	(0.065)	(0.063)
BC $\times$ **BRR**	-0.000	-0.000	-0.002	-0.000
	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)
BC $\times$ **CBI**	-0.091	-0.115	-0.106	0.054
	(0.189)	(0.188)	(0.174)	(0.161)
Constant	0.114	0.002	0.217	-0.798
	(0.390)	(0.406)	(0.332)	(0.342)
N	738	738	738	738

Notes: Dependent variable is the unemployment rate. Key explanatory variables (in bold) are alternative measures of labor market rigidity. FGLS = feasible generalized least squares. PCSE = panel-corrected standard errors. The column titles indicate the R package used to perform multiple imputation and the number of imputations conducted (m).

Table A41 Reanalysis of Baccaro and Rei 2007 (Table 1, Model 4) with Alternative Imputation Specifications

	Amelia II: m = 5	*Amelia II: m = 30*	*hot.deck: m = 5*	*mice: m = 5*
Lagged DV	0.846	0.842	0.824	0.864
	(0.021)	(0.021)	(0.019)	(0.019)
Real Interest Rate	0.053	0.053	0.058	0.047
	(0.012)	(0.012)	(0.011)	(0.011)
$\triangle$ Inflation	-0.034	-0.032	-0.029	-0.027
	(0.010)	(0.010)	(0.010)	(0.010)
Terms of Trade Shocks	-0.028	-0.029	-0.033	-0.022
	(0.023)	(0.023)	(0.022)	(0.022)
Lagged Productivity $\triangle$	-0.041	-0.041	-0.036	-0.047
	(0.012)	(0.012)	(0.011)	(0.011)
EP	0.142	0.164	0.202	0.111
	(0.174)	(0.158)	(0.137)	(0.107)
UD	0.013	0.018	0.020	0.009
	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.006)	(0.004)
TW	-0.012	-0.014	-0.013	-0.005
	(0.009)	(0.008)	(0.005)	(0.005)
CBI	0.548	0.524	0.346	0.688
	(0.319)	(0.323)	(0.306)	(0.303)
BC	0.039	0.042	0.006	0.029
	(0.039)	(0.042)	(0.038)	(0.037)
BC $\times$ **UD**	-0.005	-0.005	-0.002	-0.003
	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.002)	(0.002)
BC $\times$ **TW**	0.002	0.002	0.001	0.001
	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)
BC $\times$ **EP**	0.037	0.044	0.032	0.058
	(0.065)	(0.073)	(0.066)	(0.060)
BC $\times$ **CBI**	-0.187	-0.188	-0.182	-0.035
	(0.184)	(0.184)	(0.165)	(0.129)
BENOECD	-0.001	-0.001	-0.002	0.004
	(0.005)	(0.006)	(0.005)	(0.005)
BC $\times$ **BENOECD**	0.001	0.000	-0.002	0.000
	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.002)	(0.002)
Constant	-0.062	-0.114	0.066	-0.625
	(0.454)	(0.420)	(0.350)	(0.332)
N	738	738	738	738

Notes: Dependent variable is the unemployment rate. Key explanatory variables (in bold) are alternative measures of labor market rigidity. FGLS = feasible generalized least squares. PCSE = panel-corrected standard errors. The column titles indicate the R package used to perform multiple imputation and the number of imputations conducted (*m*).