Appendix B-1: The Robustness of Results to Heterogeneity

Notes: The first two column of numbers give the results that come from using the respective article's original model. The next columns then give the results of adding fixed-effects to the original. Following that, we list the effect of including fixed-effects on the magnitude and sign of the coefficient. In the column for change in magnitude, "++" ("--") indicates that the coefficient value increased (decreased) by a full standard error from the original model. Similarly, "+" ("-") indicates that the coeffecient value increased (decreased) by more than half a standard error but less than a full standard error. A "0" indicates that the change was less than half a standard error, and "-/s" indicates that the sign on the coefficient changed. In the column for changes in stastitical significance, the first value represents the statistical significance of the original result and the second the significance after including fixed-effects. Thus a "i-s", would indicate that the original variable was statistically insignificant but was significant after the inclusion of fixed-effects. The second group of numbers represents similar results, this time for the model without the LDV. For all of the studies we used PCSE's to determine statistical significance, including Cox et al. (1998) and Zahariadas (2001) which did not use PCSE's in their initial studies. It should be noted that our "original results" for Saideman et al. are slightly different than what the authors report in their paper. After dropping the variables with missing data we had a few less (usually a difference of 10 or less) observations then they use in their reported models. We felt justified in including their article in this study despite that discrephency because the results are not different in any significant way from what they report. Finally, we include below each set of comparisions between the models with and without fixed-effects, two measures of the impact of the fixed effects. First, we include the percentage of how much of the variance in the d

Cox, Thies, & Rosenbluth (WP, 1998)

DV= Total expenditures per elector	Original	Results	F.E. (w	(LDV)	Δin	Δin	No LDV,	No F.E.	F.E. (w/c	o LDV)	Δin	Δin
I.V.'s (Table 1, Col 1)	Coeff.	PCSE	Coeff.	PCSE	Coeff	<u>S.S.</u>	Coeff.	PCSE	Coeff.	PCSE	Coeff	<u>S.S.</u>
Margin of victory	-0.191	0.056	-0.186	0.030	0	s-s	-0.221	0.048	-0.219	0.032	0	S-S
			Variance E	Explained	by F.E.:	40%			Variance E	Explained	by F.E.:	43%
			P-Value	on F-test	for F.E.	0			P-Value	on F-test	for F.E.	0
DV= Voter Turnout	Original	Results	F.E. (w	LDV)	Δin	Δin	No LDV,	No F.E.	F.E. (w/c	o LDV)	Δin	Δin
I.V.'s (Table 2, Col. 2)	Coeff.	PCSE	Coeff.	PCSE	Coeff	<u>S.S.</u>	Coeff.	PCSE	Coeff.	PCSE	Coeff	<u>S.S.</u>
Margin	-0.093	0.019	-0.097	0.018	0	s-s	-0.104	0.014	-0.098	0.016	0	S-S
\ <u>-</u>	-0.093 0.038	0.019 0.020	-0.097 0.023	0.018 0.018	•	s-s s-i	-0.104 0.062	0.014 0.018	-0.098 0.024	0.016 0.015	0	s-s s-i
Margin					•						•	
Margin Total Campaign Expenditures	0.038	0.020	0.023	0.018	 -/s	s-i	0.062	0.018	0.024	0.015		s-i
Margin Total Campaign Expenditures % of district that is urban	0.038 -0.059	0.020 0.017	0.023 0.031	0.018 0.029	 -/s	s-i s-i	0.062 -0.126	0.018 0.012	0.024 0.027	0.015 0.024	 -/s	s-i s-i
Margin Total Campaign Expenditures % of district that is urban % of population under 15	0.038 -0.059 0.419	0.020 0.017 0.216	0.023 0.031 -0.337	0.018 0.029 0.548 1.628	 -/s -/s ++	s-i s-i i-i i-i	0.062 -0.126 0.602	0.018 0.012 0.158	0.024 0.027 -0.342	0.015 0.024 0.503 1.459	 -/s -/s ++	s-i s-i s-i i-i

Hood, K	(idd, &	Morris	(LSQ,	2001)

DV=Unadjusted LCCR scores	Original	Results	F.E. (w	/LDV)	Δin	Δin	No LDV,	No F.E.	F.E. (w/	o LDV)	Δin	Δin
I.V.'s (Table 1, Col. 1)	Coeff.	PCSE	Coeff.	PCSE	Coeff	<u>S.S.</u>	Coeff.	PCSE	Coeff.	PCSE	Coeff	<u>S.S.</u>
GOP Strength	0.487	0.210	1.329	0.365	++	s-s	0.775	0.224	1.635	0.346	++	s-s
Black Electoral Strength	1.799	0.604	1.382	0.659	-	s-s	2.631	0.603	1.778	0.655		s-s
			Variance E	Explained	by F.E.:	62%			Variance E	Explained	by F.E.:	75%
			P-Value	on F-test	for F.E.	0			P-Value	on F-test	for F.E.	0

Moene and Wallerstein (APSR, 2001)

DV= Government Spending for	<u>5K, 2001)</u>											
insurance against loss of income as a share of GDP	Original	Results	F.E. (w	/LDV)	Δin	Δin	No LDV,	No F.E.	F.E. (w/	o LDV)	Δin	Δin
I.V.'s (Table 1, Col. 2)	Coeff.	PCSE	Coeff.	PCSE	Coeff	<u>S.S.</u>	Coeff.	PCSE	Coeff.	PCSE	Coeff	<u>S.S.</u>
Inequality (90/10)	-1.933	0.346	1.670	2.095	/s	s-i	-4.442	0.066	1.553	2.243	-/s	s-i
			Variance	Explained	by F.E.:	94%			Variance I	Explained	by F.E.:	95%
			P-Value	on F-test	for F.E.	0.01			P-Value	on F-test	for F.E.	0
DV= Government Spending for insurance against loss of income as a												

insurance against loss of income as a share of GDP	Original	Results	F.E. (w	/LDV)	Δin	Δin	No LDV,	No F.E.	F.E. (w/	o LDV)	Δin	Δin
I.V.'s (Table 1, Col. 5)	Coeff.	PCSE	Coeff.	PCSE	Coeff	<u>S.S.</u>	Coeff.	PCSE	Coeff.	PCSE	Coeff	<u>S.S.</u>
Inequality (50/10)	-1.306	0.573	1.016	2.360	-/s	s-i	-4.696	0.386	0.309	2.629	-/s	s-i
Inequality (90/50)	-1.531	0.954	1.741	0.574	- /s	i-s	-2.761	0.601	3.788	2.309	-/s	s-s
			Variance I	Explained	by F.E.:	95%			Variance E	Explained	by F.E.:	97%
			P-Value	on F-test	for F.E.	0.01			P-Value	on F-test	for F.E.	0

Pickering (JPR, 2002)

DV=Foreign Military Intervention	Original	Results	F.E. (w	/LDV)	Δin	Δin	No LDV,	No F.E.	F.E. (w/	o LDV)	Δin	Δin
I.V.'s (Table 2, Col. 2)	Coeff.	PCSE	Coeff.	PCSE	Coeff	<u>S.S.</u>	Coeff.	PCSE	Coeff.	PCSE	Coeff	<u>S.S.</u>
War experience	0.069	0.028	0.053	0.088	-	s-i	0.080	0.027	0.048	0.088		s-i
War experience squared	0.048	0.015	-0.033	0.033	- /s	s-i	0.057	0.015	-0.035	0.033	-/s	s-i
			Variance I	Explained	by F.E.:	14%			Variance E	Explained	by F.E.:	15%
			P-Value	on F-test	for F.E.	0			P-Value	on F-test	for F.E.	0

Poe & Tate	<u>(APSR, 1994)</u>
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DV= Governmental repression (Amnesty International) I.V.'s (Table 1, Col. 1) Democracy (Freedom House)	$ \begin{array}{c ccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccc$	No LDV, No F.E. F.E. (w/o LDV) Δ in Δ in Coeff. PCSE Coeff. PCSE Coeff. -0.160 0.015 -0.125 0.031 s-s Variance Explained by F.E.: 83% P-Value on F-test for F.E. 0
DV= Repression (Amnesty) I.V.'s (Table 1, Col. 2) Democracy (Vanhanen Measure)		No LDV, No F.E. F.E. (w/o LDV) Δ in Δ in Coeff. PCSE Coeff. PCSE Coeff. S.S. -0.030 0.002 -0.012 0.004 s-s Variance Explained by F.E.: 82% P-Value on F-test for F.E. 0
DV= Repression (State Department) I.V.'s (Table 1, Col. 3) Democracy (Freedom House)		No LDV, No F.E. F.E. (w/o LDV) Δ in Δ in Coeff. PCSE Coeff. PCSE Coeff. S.S. -0.167 0.012 -0.101 0.031 s-s Variance Explained by F.E.: 98% P-Value on F-test for F.E. 0
DV= Repression (State Department) I.V.'s (Table 1, Col. 4) Democracy (Vanhanen Measure)	$ \begin{array}{c ccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccc$	No LDV, No F.E.F.E. (w/o LDV)Δ inΔ inCoeff.PCSECoeff.PCSECoeffS.S0.0260.002-0.0040.005s-iVariance Explained by F.E.:97%P-Value on F-test for F.E.0
Reich (PRQ, 1999) DV= Seniorage I.V.'s (Table 1, Col. 3) First democratic government	Original Results F.E. (w/ LDV) Δ in Δ in Coeff. PCSE Coeff. PCSE Coeff. S.S. 1.064201 0.461121 1.118613 0.559966 0 s-s Variance Explained by F.E.: 24% P-Value on F-test for F.E. 0.2	No LDV, No F.E. F.E. (w/o LDV) Δ in Δ in Coeff. PCSE Coeff. PCSE Coeff. 1.713 0.553 1.65714 0.59982 0 s-s Variance Explained by F.E.: 37% P-Value on F-test for F.E. 0
DV= Seniorage I.V.'s (Table 1, Col. 4) <10 years continuous democracy	Coeff. PCSE Coeff. PCSE Coeff. PCSE Coeff. PCSE Coeff. S.S. 1.36026 0.55144 1.406213 1.01801 0 s-i Variance Explained by F.E.: 21% P-Value on F-test for F.E. 0.28	No LDV, No F.E. F.E. (w/o LDV) Δ in Δ in Coeff. PCSE Coeff. PCSE Coeff. S.S. 2.149 0.703 1.32685 1.07613 s-i Variance Explained by F.E.: 34% P-Value on F-test for F.E. 0.01

DV= Protest	Original	Results	F.E. (w/	(LDV)	Δin	Δin	No LDV,	No F.E.	F.E. (w/c	o LDV)	Δ in	Δin
I.V.'s (Table 1, Col. 1)	Coeff.	PCSE	Coeff.	PCSE	Coeff	<u>S.S.</u>	Coeff.	PCSE	Coeff.	PCSE	Coeff	<u>S.S.</u>
Regime type	0.024	0.007	0.046	0.010	++	s-s	0.059	0.009	0.063	0.012	0	S-S
Enduring regime	0.028	0.052	-0.206	0.087	/s	i-s	0.037	0.096	-0.232	0.101	-/s	i-s
Young democracy	0.029	0.062	-0.120	0.085	/s	i-i	-0.003	0.106	-0.119	0.104	- /s	i-i
First election	0.040	0.114	0.009	0.108	0	i-i	-0.082	0.093	-0.051	0.103	0	i-i
Proportional democracy	-0.163	0.053	-0.117	0.158	-	s-i	-0.445	0.096	-0.358	0.181	-	s-s
Federal system	0.142	0.054	0.042	0.230		s-i	0.313	0.106	0.012	0.285		s-i
			Variance E	Explained	by F.E.:	39%			Variance E	Explained	by F.E.:	53%
			P-Value	on F-test	for F.E.	0			P-Value	on F-test	for F.E.	0
DV= Protest (Democracies)	Original	Results	F.E. (w	(LDV)	Δin	Δin	No LDV,	No F.E.	F.E. (w/c	o LDV)	Δin	Δin
DV= Protest (Democracies) I.V.'s (Table 2, Col. 1)	Original :	Results PCSE	F.E. (w/	LDV) PCSE	Δ in Coeff		No LDV, Coeff.	No F.E. PCSE	F.E. (w/c	o LDV) PCSE	Δ in Coeff	
,	J		•	•	Coeff		•		•	•	Coeff	
I.V.'s (Table 2, Col. 1)	Coeff.	PCSE	Coeff.	PCSE	Coeff	<u>S.S.</u>	Coeff.	PCSE	Coeff.	<u>PCSE</u>	Coeff ++	<u>S.S.</u>
I.V.'s (Table 2, Col. 1) Enduring regime	Coeff. 0.031	PCSE 0.076	Coeff. 0.217	PCSE 0.130	<u>Coeff</u> ++ +	<u>S.S.</u> i-i	Coeff. 0.025	PCSE 0.133	Coeff. 0.221	PCSE 0.143	<u>Coeff</u> ++ 0	<u>S.S.</u> i-i
I.V.'s (Table 2, Col. 1) Enduring regime First election	Coeff. 0.031 -0.252	PCSE 0.076 0.192	Coeff. 0.217 -0.390	PCSE 0.130 0.181	<u>Coeff</u> ++ + +	<u>S.S.</u> i-i i-s	Coeff. 0.025 -0.389	PCSE 0.133 0.144	Coeff. 0.221 -0.402	PCSE 0.143 0.170	<u>Coeff</u> ++ 0	S.S. i-i s-s
I.V.'s (Table 2, Col. 1) Enduring regime First election Electoral system	Coeff. 0.031 -0.252 -0.092	0.076 0.192 0.030 0.033	Coeff. 0.217 -0.390 -0.600	PCSE 0.130 0.181 0.242	<u>Coeff</u> ++ + +	S.S. i-i i-s s-s	Coeff. 0.025 -0.389 -0.192	0.133 0.144 0.047 0.051	Coeff. 0.221 -0.402 -0.579	90.143 0.170 0.250 0.381	<u>Coeff</u> ++ 0 ++	<u>S.S.</u> i-i s-s s-s
I.V.'s (Table 2, Col. 1) Enduring regime First election Electoral system Parliamentary	Coeff. 0.031 -0.252 -0.092 0.053	0.076 0.192 0.030 0.033	0.217 -0.390 -0.600 0.428	0.130 0.181 0.242 0.346	<u>Coeff</u> ++ + ++ ++	<u>S.S.</u> i-i i-s s-s i-i	Coeff. 0.025 -0.389 -0.192 0.115	0.133 0.144 0.047 0.051	Coeff. 0.221 -0.402 -0.579 0.558	PCSE 0.143 0.170 0.250 0.381	Coeff ++ 0 ++ ++	<u>S.S.</u> i-i s-s s-s s-i

Zahariadas (ISQ, 2001)

Editariadas (100; 2001)												
DV=Total Aid	Original	Results	F.E. (w/	(LDV)	Δ in	Δ in	No LDV,	No F.E.	F.E. (w/	o LDV)	Δin	Δin
I.V.'s (Table 2, Col. 1)	Coeff.	<u>PCSE</u>	Coeff.	PCSE	Coeff	<u>S.S.</u>	Coeff.	PCSE	Coeff.	PCSE	Coeff	<u>S.S.</u>
Research and Development	-1.481	0.523	-0.964	0.685	-	s-i	-0.209	0.296	-0.760	0.580	++	i-i
Research and Development Sqaured	0.297	0.129	0.169	0.173	-	s-i	-0.093	0.085	0.127	0.155	-/s	i-i
Job gain	-0.002	0.010	0.005	0.011	-/s	i-i	-0.004	0.012	0.004	0.011	-/s	i-i
			Variance E	Explained	by F.E.:	85%			Variance E	Explained	by F.E.:	95%
			P-Value	on F-test	for F.E.	0.07			P-Value	on F-test	for F.E.	0