**Supplemental Appendix for “Congressional Pay and Responsiveness”**

Table A1. Support for or Abstention on S.398 on Final Passage

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
|  | Nay Vote | Abstention |
| Sought reelection | 1.39\*\*\*  (0.32) | 0.31  (0.35) |
| Margin | -1.74\*  (0.78) | -0.51  (0.74) |
| First term | -0.51  (0.32) | -0.50  (0.38) |
| No. of opponents | -0.50\*  (0.20) | -0.31  (0.23) |
| Roll call after election | -0.12  (0.79) | 0.89  (0.76) |
| DW-Nominate Dim 1 | -1.30  (0.83) | -1.18  (0.91) |
| DW-Nominate Dim 2 | -1.72\*\*\*  (0.44) | -0.64  (0.47) |
| Democrat | -1.00  (0.63) | -0.29  (0.64) |
| Republican | -0.37  (0.44) | 0.47  (0.64) |
| American | -0.88\*  (0.41) | 0.47  (0.52) |
| Distance (ln of km) | 0.07  (0.23) | -0.14  (0.24) |
| Constant | 0.54  (1.48) | 0.56  (1.67) |
| *N* | 220 | |
| Wald χ2 | 61.28\*\*\* | |

*Note.* Cell entries are multinomial probit coefficients with robust standard errors in parentheses. The baseline category is a vote in favor of S.398 on final passage.

\* *p* < 0.05, \*\*\* *p* < 0.001, \*\* *p* < 0.01, + p < 0.10.

Table A2. Support for S.398 on Final Passage Omitting California Representatives

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| Sought reelection | -1.00\*\*\*  (0.24) |
| Margin | 1.36\*  (0.54) |
| First term | 0.33  (0.24) |
| No. of opponents | 0.36\*  (0.15) |
| Roll call after election | 0.29  (0.66) |
| DW-Nominate Dim 1 | 1.23+  (0.65) |
| DW-Nominate Dim 2 | 1.29\*\*\*  (0.34) |
| Democrat | 0.90+  (0.47) |
| Republican | 0.24  (0.33) |
| American | 0.77\*\*  (0.30) |
| Distance (ln of km) | -0.07  (0.17) |
| Constant | -0.39  (1.15) |
| *N* | 189 |
| Pseudo *R*2 | 0.26 |
| Wald χ2 | 45.55\*\*\* |
| PRE | 52.1% |

*Note.* Cell entries are probit coefficients with robust standard errors in parentheses.

+ *p* < 0.10, \* *p* < 0.05, \*\* *p* < 0.01, \*\*\* *p* < 0.001.

Table A3. Support for S.398 on Final Passage, Including Wealth and Profession Indicators

|  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | Model 1 | Model 2 | Model 3 | Model 4 |
| Sought reelection | -0.96\*  (0.43) | -1.50\*\*\*  (0.39) | -1.58\*\*\*  (0.39) | -1.01\*\*\*  (0.24) |
| Margin | 0.97  (0.81) | 1.05  (0.88) | 1.31  (0.86) | 1.35\*  (0.53) |
| First term | 0.52  (0.46) | 0.25  (0.44) | 0.39  (0.44) | 0.32  (0.24) |
| No. of opponents | 0.58\*  (0.23) | 0.72\*\*  (0.24) | 0.71\*\*  (0.23) | 0.34\*  (0.15) |
| DW-Nominate Dim 1 | 1.19  (1.54) | 1.85  (1.59) | 1.64  (1.51) | 1.41\*  (0.70) |
| DW-Nominate Dim 2 | 2.66\*\*\*  (0.69) | 3.15\*\*\*  (0.71) | 2.89\*\*\*  (0.62) | 1.35\*\*\*  (0.35) |
| Democrat | 1.15  (0.82) | 1.43  (0.92) | 1.27  (0.88) | 0.95+  (0.49) |
| Republican | 0.51  (0.45) | 1.13\*  (0.54) | 1.04\*  (0.51) | 0.21  (0.33) |
| American | 0.98  (0.60) | 1.68\*\*  (0.62) | 1.16\*  (0.58) | 0.77\*  (0.31) |
| Distance (ln of km) | -0.34  (0.40) | -0.66+  (0.40) | -0.60  (0.39) | -0.04  (0.17) |
| Log of real estate wealth (1850) | -0.11  (0.17) | • | • | • |
| Log of real estate wealth (1860) | • | -0.19  (0.16) | • | • |
| Log of total wealth (1860) | • | • | -0.11  (0.18) | • |
| Lawyer | • | • | • | 0.22  (0.24) |
| Farmer | • | • | • | -0.20  (0.54) |
| Constant | 2.02  (3.27) | 4.64  (3.00) | 3.50  (3.19) | -0.70  (1.14) |
| *N* | 80 | 94 | 97 | 191 |
| Pseudo *R*2 | 0.40 | 0.48 | 0.47 | 0.27 |
| Wald χ2 | 33.11\*\*\* | 49.60\*\*\* | 49.59\*\*\* | 50.84\*\*\* |
| PRE | 57.5% | 68.1% | 64.6% | 52.1% |

*Note.* Cell entries are probit coefficients with robust standard errors in parentheses.

+ *p* < 0.10, \* *p* < 0.05, \*\* *p* < 0.01, \*\*\* *p* < 0.001.

Table A4. Support for S.398 on Final Passage, Including Smith List and Banks Vote Indicators

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | Model 1 | Model 2 | Model 3 |
| Sought reelection | -0.95\*\*\*  (0.25) | -0.94\*\*\*  (0.24) | -0.96\*\*\*  (0.25) |
| Margin | 1.46\*\*  (0.56) | 1.37\*\*  (0.53) | 1.47\*\*  (0.55) |
| First term | 0.45+  (0.25) | 0.47\*  (0.24) | 0.47+  (0.25) |
| No. of opponents | 0.31\*  (0.14) | 0.31\*  (0.15) | 0.28+  (0.15) |
| Roll call after election | -0.23  (0.67) | -0.14  (0.64) | -0.25  (0.66) |
| DW-Nominate Dim 1 | 1.38+  (0.71) | 0.63  (0.44) | 1.49+  (0.76) |
| DW-Nominate Dim 2 | 1.07\*\*\*  (0.32) | 1.35\*\*\*  (0.28) | 1.11\*\*\*  (0.32) |
| Vote for Banks as speaker | -0.91+  (0.54) | • | -0.89+  (0.53) |
| Identified as Know Nothing | • | -0.19  (0.27) | -0.15  (0.27) |
| Distance (ln of km) | 0.009  (0.17) | -0.01  (0.17) | 0.01  (0.17) |
| Constant | 0.04  (1.12) | -0.15  (1.14) | 0.12  (1.16) |
| *N* | 179 | 191 | 179 |
| Pseudo *R*2 | 0.25 | 0.25 | 0.25 |
| Wald χ2 | 41.27\*\*\* | 46.31\*\*\* | 43.94\*\*\* |
| PRE | 50.0% | 47.9% | 47.7% |

*Note.* Cell entries are probit coefficients with robust standard errors in parentheses.

+ *p* < 0.10, \* *p* < 0.05, \*\* *p* < 0.01, \*\*\* *p* < 0.001.

Table A5. Support for S.398 on Final Passage, Including Indicator for American Opponent

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| Sought reelection | -0.97\*\*\*  (0.25) |
| Margin | 1.16\*  (0.52) |
| First term | 0.38  (0.25) |
| No. of opponents | 0.45\*\*  (0.17) |
| Roll call after election | 0.03  (0.66) |
| DW-Nominate Dim 1 | 0.95  (0.66) |
| DW-Nominate Dim 2 | 1.32\*\*\*  (0.35) |
| Democrat | 1.05\*  (0.47) |
| Republican | 0.17  (0.33) |
| American | 0.59+  (0.31) |
| American opponent | -0.80\*  (0.36) |
| Distance (ln of km) | -0.05  (0.17) |
| Constant | -0.47  (1.11) |
| *N* | 191 |
| Pseudo *R*2 | 0.29 |
| Wald χ2 | 48.84\*\*\* |
| PRE | 55.3% |

*Note.* Cell entries are probit coefficients with robust standard errors in parentheses.

+ *p* < 0.10, \* *p* < 0.05, \*\* *p* < 0.01, \*\*\* *p* < 0.001.

Table A6. Support for S.398 on Final Passage, Including Interaction between Democratic Membership and Southern State

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
|  | Model 1 | Model 2 |
| Sought reelection | -0.99\*\*\*  (0.24) | -1.07\*\*\*  (0.24) |
| Margin | 1.34\*  (0.54) | 0.90+  (0.55) |
| First term | 0.33  (0.24) | 0.45+  (0.23) |
| No. of opponents | 0.36\*  (0.15) | 0.30\*  (0.13) |
| Roll call after election | 0.03  (0.68) | 0.91  (0.60) |
| DW-Nominate Dim 1 | 1.18  (0.76) | • |
| DW-Nominate Dim 2 | 1.30\*\*\*  (0.34) | • |
| Democrat | 0.87+  (0.51) | 0.30  (0.33) |
| Southern state | -0.13  (0.61) | -0.17  (0.52) |
| Democrat x South | 0.12  (0.65) | -0.03  (0.62) |
| Republican | 0.24  (0.33) | -0.08  (0.31) |
| American | 0.78\*  (0.31) | 0.96\*\*  (0.32) |
| Distance (ln of km) | -0.06  (0.18) | -0.16  (0.16) |
| Constant | -0.43  (1.14) | 0.65  (0.99) |
| *N* | 191 | 191 |
| Pseudo *R*2 | 0.27 | 0.20 |
| Wald χ2 | 46.22\*\*\* | 45.51\*\*\* |
| PRE | 51.1% | 42.6% |

*Note.* Cell entries are probit coefficients with robust standard errors in parentheses.

+ *p* < 0.10, \* *p* < 0.05, \*\* *p* < 0.01, \*\*\* *p* < 0.001.

Table A7. Association between the Vote on Final Passage of S.398 and Reelection, Including Interaction between Democratic Membership and Southern State

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
|  | Reelection Seeking | Reelection Success |
| Voted yea | -0.92\*\*\*  (0.25) | -0.20  (0.41) |
| Did not vote | -0.53  (0.34) | -0.22  (0.48) |
| Margin | 1.37\*  (0.63) | 2.25\*  (1.00) |
| No. of opponents | -0.09  (0.12) | 0.07  (0.22) |
| Quality challenger | • | -0.63\*  (0.29) |
| Terms in the House | 0.04  (0.09) | 0.14  (0.11) |
| Rate of roll call participation | 2.41\*\*  (0.88) | 0.11  (1.33) |
| Age | -0.04\*\*  (0.01) | • |
| DW-Nominate distance from House median, Dim 1 | 0.71  (0.69) | 2.09\*  (1.06) |
| DW-Nominate distance from House median, Dim 2 | -0.23  (0.40) | -0.77  (0.55) |
| Democrat | 0.38  (0.34) | 1.31\*\*  (0.53) |
| Southern state | 0.11  (0.56) | -0.49  (0.68) |
| Democrat x South | -0.19  (0.67) | 5.06\*\*\*  (0.93) |
| Republican | 0.36  (0.32) | 0.76\*  (0.36) |
| American | 0.75\*  (0.30) | 0.21  (0.42) |
| Distance (ln of km) | -0.58\*\*  (0.18) | • |
| Constant | 3.82\*\*  (1.34) | -0.54  (1.29) |
| *N* | 210 | 143 |
| Wald χ2 | 964.88\*\*\* | |
| ρ | -0.18  (0.60) | |

*Note.* A bivariate probit selection model is estimated with reelection seeking as the dependent variable for the selection model and reelection success as the dependent variable for the outcome model. Cell entries are probit coefficients with robust standard errors in parentheses.

+ *p* < 0.10, \* *p* < 0.05, \*\* *p* < 0.01, \*\*\* *p* < 0.001.

Table A8. Association between the Vote on Final Passage on S.398 and Reelection Seeking

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
|  | Model 1 | Model 2 |
| Voted yea | -0.91\*\*\*  (0.24) | • |
| Did not vote | -0.52  (0.34) | • |
| Margin | 1.36\*  (0.61) | 1.48\*  (0.63) |
| No. of opponents | -0.09  (0.12) | -0.17  (0.12) |
| Terms in the House | 0.04  (0.09) | 0.04  (0.08) |
| Rate of roll call participation | 2.41\*\*  (0.87) | 3.10\*\*\*  (0.86) |
| Age | -0.04\*\*  (0.01) | -0.03\*  (0.01) |
| DW-Nominate distance from House median, Dim 1 | 0.64  (0.66) | 0.84  (0.66) |
| DW-Nominate distance from House median, Dim 2 | -0.21  (0.39) | -0.10  (0.38) |
| Democrat | 0.35  (0.31) | 0.40  (0.30) |
| Republican | 0.36  (0.32) | 0.38  (0.31) |
| American | 0.76\*\*  (0.29) | 0.63\*  (0.28) |
| Distance (ln of km) | -0.58\*\*\*  (0.17) | -0.58\*\*\*  (0.16) |
| Constant | 3.83\*\*  (1.32) | 2.58\*  (1.17) |
| *N* | 210 | 210 |
| Pseudo *R*2 | 0.21 | 0.15 |
| Wald χ2 | 47.29\*\*\* | 39.64\*\*\* |
| PRE | 25.4% | 22.4% |

*Note.* Cell entries are probit coefficients with robust standard errors in parentheses.

+ *p* < 0.10, \* *p* < 0.05, \*\* *p* < 0.01, \*\*\* *p* < 0.001.