**Online Appendix**

**Civil Rights, World War II, and U.S. Public Opinion**

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While there are limits inherent to the nature of the questions asked and the limited data available to assess them, I argue that the results presented in “Civil Rights, World War II, and U.S. Public Opinion” reflect the best possible assessment and are thus an improvement on prior assessments grounded largely in inductive plausibility.

One limitation relates to question wording effects. In particular, the lynching questions were not consistent in their wording. Ultimately, the question wording issue is a problem of sheer data availability. Working with survey data sets from this time period is often more like entering an archive than the standard, well-organized setup of contemporary surveys. Fortunately, the findings are generally consistent with the lack of liberalization in attitudes toward the poll tax (using equivalent question wordings). If I instead found that attitudes toward the poll tax liberalized, but lynching did not, it would be tempting to write the latter off as a question wording issue. However, this is not the case.

An unresolved issue, in this project but also in other work, is that standard tests of statistical significance assume a data-generating process that is probabilistic, which quota sampling is not. Thus, “the question of generating standard errors for estimates—at both the individual and aggregate levels—should be the subject of future work,” Berinsky writes.[[1]](#footnote-1) In this article, I have noted as “statistically significant” regression coefficients that are significant at the .05 level. This has become standard in using these older surveys in regression analysis. However, for Figures 1–3, which plot aggregate estimates of opinion at various points over time, I have decided not to include confidence intervals. I believe that plotting confidence intervals would obscure more than it would enlighten, as it would graphically imply far greater precision than actually exists mathematically. As such, I have tried to be careful in interpreting these analyses, speaking mostly in terms of what the evidence is—and is not—consistent with.

The veterans hypothesis is assessed with regression analysis, where a statistically significant coefficient for the veteran variable in a multivariate model (controlling for other factors correlated with racial attitudes) is understood as support for the hypothesis. Educational attainment is part of the model. However, by 1961, it is possible that for many respondents, educational attainment might actually have been partially a result of the “treatment” of military service due to the effects of the G. I. Bill. In an experimental framework, including posttreatment variables in a model can introduce bias. Tables 1 and 2 of this appendix replicate the analysis using a bivariate model specification (i.e., the only explanatory variable is veteran status; there are no controls). The results for the black voting and friendship dependent variables are robust. For most of the other variables, the veteran coefficient is still statistically insignificant. However, there is one difference: The veteran coefficient in the model assessing the white, anti-integration protestors is now statistically significant as well.[[2]](#footnote-2)

However, it is important not to use causal language too strongly. Although the draft was semirandom, the reasons the military used to refuse service included illiteracy and poor health, which might correlate with racial attitudes and would be hard to control for. The article also refers to some initial analyses of the contact hypothesis; these results are shown in Table 3 of this appendix.

Table 1: Negro Political Participation Study White Sample, Logit Models, 1961 (Bivariate)

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
|  | Sit-ins | Friend |
| Veteran | −0.41 | 0.91*∗* |
|  | (0.43) | (0.38) |
| Constant | 1.58*∗∗∗* | 0.23 |
|  | (0.29) | (0.22) |
| Pseudo *R*2 | 0.007 | 0.033 |
| LOG likelihood | −67.55 | −91.08 |
| *N* | 137 | 144 |

*Notes:* Standard errors in parentheses. *∗ p <* 0.05, *∗∗ p <* 0.01, *∗∗∗ p <* 0.001.

Table 2: Negro Political Participation Study White Sample, Ordered Probit Models, 1961 (Bivariate)

|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | Segregation  1 | Segregation  2 | Black  Voting | Sit-ins | Anti-Integration | | All Alike |
| Veteran | −0.06 | −0.30 | −0.81*∗∗∗* | −0.19 | 0.46*∗* | 0.38 | |
|  | (0.19) | (0.21) | (0.24) | (0.19) | (0.23) | (0.22) | |
| Cut 1 | −1.59*∗∗∗* | −1.51*∗∗∗* | 0.28*∗* | −2.10*∗∗∗* | −1.04*∗∗∗* | −1.04*∗∗∗* | |
|  | (0.19) | (0.18) | (0.14) | (0.26) | (0.16) | (0.16) | |
| Cut 2 | −1.01*∗∗∗* | −0.48*∗∗∗* | 0.98*∗∗∗* | −1.44*∗∗∗* | −0.71*∗∗∗* | −0.83*∗∗∗* | |
|  | (0.15) | (0.14) | (0.16) | (0.17) | (0.15) | (0.15) | |
| Cut 3 | 0.42*∗∗* |  | 1.15*∗∗∗* | −0.93*∗∗∗* | −0.38*∗∗* | −0.40*∗∗* | |
|  | (0.13) |  | (0.17) | (0.15) | (0.14) | (0.14) | |
| Cut 4 |  |  |  | 0.61*∗∗∗* |  |  | |
|  |  |  |  | (0.14) |  |  | |
| Pseudo *R*2 | 0.000 | 0.009 | 0.050 | 0.003 | 0.016 | 0.012 | |
| Log Likelihood | −151.72 | −119.07 | −115.71 | −160.84 | −124.22 | −128.25 | |
| *N* | 137 | 141 | 142 | 137 | 138 | 143 | |

*Notes:* Standard errors in parentheses. *∗ p <* 0.05, *∗∗ p <* 0.01, *∗∗∗ p <* 0.001.

Table 3: Negro Political Participation Study White Sample, Contact Hypothesis, 1961

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | Black Voting | Black Voting  (Friend = 1) | Black Voting  (Friend = 0) |
| Friend | −0.65*∗∗* |  |  |
|  | (0.22) |  |  |
| Veteran |  | −0.35 | −1.07*∗* |
|  |  | (0.33) | (0.50) |
| Age | 0.01 | 0.02 | −0.01 |
|  | (0.01) | (0.02) | (0.03) |
| Grammar School | 0.16 | −0.27 | 0.80 |
|  | (0.34) | (0.46) | (0.64) |
| HS Grad | 0.03 | −0.38 | 0.50 |
|  | (0.35) | (0.46) | (0.69) |
| College | −0.88 | −1.23 | 0.16 |
|  | (0.46) | (0.63) | (0.90) |
| Cut 1 | 0.82 | 1.26 | −0.16 |
|  | (0.73) | (1.02) | (1.59) |
| Cut 2 | 1.50*∗* | 2.28*∗* | 0.40 |
|  | (0.74) | (1.04) | (1.59) |
| Cut 3 | 1.67*∗* | 2.43*∗* | 0.62 |
|  | (0.74) | (1.06) | (1.59) |
| Pseudo *R*2 | 0.079 | 0.079 | 0.074 |
| Log Likelihood | −120.62 | −55.64 | −51.03 |
| *N* | 164 | 92 | 50 |

*Notes:* Standard errors in parentheses. *∗ p <* 0.05, *∗∗ p <* 0.01, *∗∗∗ p <* 0.001.

1. Adam J. Berinsky, “American Public Opinion in the 1930s and 1940s: The Analysis of Quota-Controlled Sample Survey Data,” *Public Opinion Quarterly* 70, no. 4 (2006): 518. [↑](#footnote-ref-1)
2. This is largely driven by the fact that only two veterans said they “agree quite a bit” with the merits of the anti-integration protests, even if violence would arise. Since violence was primed by this question, this would still be consistent with the findings on lynching: that veterans were more likely to oppose violence against African Americans, even if they were not willing to support integration. [↑](#footnote-ref-2)