**APPENDIX for “Signing CEDAW: Human Rights Treaty Signature and Legal Mobilization”**

**Appendix word count: 1918**

**Robustness Checks**

The manuscript findings demonstrate the significance of signing CEDAW. I utilize several strategies to test the robustness of the findings. First, I test an alternative measure of human rights. Using the broader measure of Human Rights Protection Scores, I can test the findings beyond the CIRI measures used above. The Human Rights Protection Scores is a broad measure of human rights. Next, I use an alternative statistical model, country fixed-effects regression. This widely used model controls for within country effects that may be strongly driving human rights measures from one year to the next (e.g. Cole 2012; Hafner-Burton 2008; Neumayer 2005). Then, I test the argument on an alternative human rights treaty. Findings above are specific to women’s rights and the CEDAW. To check the robustness of the findings beyond women’s rights, I test the role of treaty signature of the ICCPR on human rights beyond women’s rights. Finally, I more closely examine the connection between CEDAW signature and NGOs by testing signature’s impact on women’s participation in civil society and whether interacting with this measure of civil society has a significant impact on women’s rights measures.

The findings from the robustness checks are generally supportive of the overall argument. When using the Human Rights Protection Scores as dependent variable I find that signing CEDAW has a significant and positive effect on human rights. Table 3 presents the findings and Figure 4 plots the coefficients of the Human Rights Protection Scores models. Positive changes in rights practices were likely to occur following CEDAW signature. When testing the original model using fixed country effects, I find CEDAW signature to be positively associated with *Women’s Economic Rights* (significant), *Women’s Social Rights*, and *Women’s Political Rights.*

Appendix Table 1: Signing CEDAW

 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4

 World Bank CIRI CIRI Hill and Watson

 Business & Law Women’s EconomicWomen’s PoliticalWomen’s Latent Mean

Signature 46.30 (21.45)\*\* 1.816(1.094)\* -1.529(1.034)\* .6729(1.350)

Ratification 13.90 (3.549)\*\*\* .4626(.2110)\*\* -.02963(.1924) .3131(.2776)

INGOs .-.3000(.5361) .0305(.0213) .0462(.0225)\*\* -.0600(.0262))\*\*

Polity2 .9893(.1470)\*\*\* .0115(.0062)\*\* .0329(.0076)\*\*\* .0181(.0067)\*\*\*

GDP (logged) 2.058(.7878)\*\*\* .1408(.0302)\*\*\* -.0241(.0376) .2439(.0354)\*\*\*

Population (logged) -2.290(1.071)\*\* -.2251(.0426)\*\*\*.0646(.0508) -.2550(.0553)\*\*\*

Internal War -3.157(1.769)\* -.0639(.0651) -.1142(.0748) -.0744(.0889)

Interstate War -2.749(2.578) -.1004(.1321) -.2060(.1835) -.3640(.1441)\*\*

Constant 34.56(11.92)\*\*\* 1.152(.5032)\*\* 1.305(.5015)\*\*\* -1.733(.6082)\*\*\*

Observations 5268 4024 4056 4447

State Clusters 155 155 155 156

Years 1970-2010 1980-2010 1980-2010 1979-2010

Instrumented: Signature

Included instruments: INGOs Cat. Polity2 GDP Population Internal War Interstate War Ratification

Excluded instruments: Common Law legal tradition and Regional Commitment Density of the ICCPR

\*\*\*p < .01; \*\*p < .05; \*p < .10 Instrumental Variable regression run on STATA 14.2 Robust standard errors in parenthesis.

In Appendix Table 1, Models 1-4, I include the ratification measure to control for any impact that ratifying CEDAW has. Signing CEDAW remains positive and significant across Models 1 and 2, and positive in Model 4. When accounting for ratification, signing CEDAW has a significant and negative impact on women’s political rights.

Appendix Table 2: Human Rights Protection Scores as Dependent Variable

 Model 5 Model 6

Signature 1.043(.4913)\*\* .6847(.6600)

Ratification -.8719(.4119)\*\* -.5391(.5353)

Polity2 .0647(.0077)\*\*\* .0640(.0076)\*\*\*

GDP -.0000(.0000) -.0000(.0000)

Durability .0114(.0024)\*\*\* .0115(.0024)\*\*\*

Population -.0019(.0004)\*\*\* -.0018(.0003)\*\*\*

Internal War -1.481(.1208)\*\*\* -1.492(.1294)\*\*\*

Interstate War -.2956(.1284)\*\* -.2444(.1400)\*

Constant .0328(.0776) .0517(.0894)

Observations 5813 5550

State Clusters 156 149

Years 1966-2010 1966-2010

Instrumented: Signature

Included instruments: Ratification; Polity2; GDP; Durability Population Internal War; Interstate War

Excluded instruments: Common Law Legal Tradition; Regional Density of ICCPR Commitment; Simmons Ratification Rules (Model 5)

\*\*\*p < .01; \*\*p < .05; \*< .1 Instrumental variable regression run on STATA 14.2 Robust standard errors in parenthesis.

Appendix Table 2 extends the analysis focusing on ratification to include the Human Rights Protection Scores as dependent variable. Signing CEDAW remains positive and significant in Model 5.

*Appendix Figure 1: Plotted Coefficients from Models 5-6 HRPS Measure of Human Rights* ****

Appendix Table 3, Model 7 includes a global count of total CEDAW ratification in each year to control for the overall support and commitment of the treaty on women’s’ rights. Total Ratification is positive and significant. In this model, signing CEDAW remains positive and significant as well.

Appendix Table 3: Controlling for Global Ratification Totals

 Model 7

 Women Business and the Law

Signature 62.33 (33.53)\*

Total Ratification .1474 (.0363)\*\*\*

INGOs -.2333(.5527)

Polity2 1.017(.1679)\*\*\*

GDPlog 1.686(.8861)\*

Populationlog -1.069(1.0586)

Internal War -3.747(2.128)\*

Interstate War -5.583(3.927)

Constant 19.35 (15.16)

Observations 5025

State Clusters 147

Years 1970-2010

Instrumented: Signature

Included instruments: Ratification; Polity2; GDP; Durability Population Internal War; Interstate War

Excluded instruments: Common Law Legal Tradition; Regional Density of ICCPR Commitment; Simmons Ratification Rules (Model 5)

\*\*\*p < .01; \*\*p < .05; \*< .1 Instrumental variable regression run on STATA 14.2 Robust standard errors in parenthesis.

Appendix Table 4: Alternative Treaty: ICCPR

 Model 8 Model 9 Model 10

 (+ Better rights) (- less violations) (-less violations)

 HRPS FH: Political Rights FH: Civil Liberties

Signature .0868(.1379) -.3306(.2590) -.3850(.2305)\*

Ratification .0889(.1000) -.0290(.1439) .0371(.1135)

Polity2 .0489(.0067)\*\*\* -.2009(.0104)\*\*\* -.1420(.0102)\*\*\*

GDP -.0000(.0000) -.0000(.0000) -.0000(.0000)

Durability .01189(.0024)\*\*\* .0043(.0048) .0030(.0050)

Population .0000(.0000)\* .0000(.0000)\* .0000(.0000)

Internal War -.6095(.0797)\*\*\* .2660(.0983)\*\*\* .3271(.0981)\*\*\*

Interstate War -.0772(.1261) -.1669(.1363) .0068(.1038)

Constant -.1588(.0607)\*\*\* 4.078(.1462)\*\*\* 4.062(.1249)(((

Observations 5818 5120 5120

State Clusters 157 158 158

Years 1966-2010 1973-2010 1972-2010

\*\*\*p < .01; \*\*p < .05; \*< .1 country fixed effects regression run on STATA 14.2 Robust standard errors in parenthesis.

Additionally, I examine the ICCPR treaty as an alternative treaty to CEDAW. I find strong support for the improvement of rights following signature and the improvement of political rights following ratification. Broader measures and explicitly political rights measures of human rights did not significantly improve following signature. However, more specific measures such as Freedom House’s Civil Liberties measure did statistically improve following signature. Appendix Table 4 lists the results of three fixed effects models testing the effect of signature and ratification of the ICCPR on human rights on HRPS (Model 8), Freedom House Political Rights (Model 9), and Freedom House Civil Liberties (Model 19). In Model 8, both signature and ratification had positive, but not significant relationships with the HRPS measure of human rights. Models 9 and 10 use Freedom House measures of human rights and are interpreted with lower values (negatives) as indicating lower levels of rights violations. Signature had a negative relationship with rights violations in both Models 5 and 6 with statistical significance in Model 8. We interpret the ICCPR findings as indicative of the importance of 1) signature in the rights recognition process and 2) the importance of looking beyond a broad measure of human rights. When the Human Rights Protection Score measure is used in Model 8, neither signature nor ratification is associated with significantly improved rights. There was no significant effect of signing ICCPR on Political Rights measure. This finding is consistent with the CEDAW finding that signature did not have a positive effect on *Women’s Political Rights.* Taken altogether, the robustness checks demonstrated the important role that treaty signature plays in human rights practices. When the argument is applied to different measures of human rights, an alternative form of statistical modeling, and to another human rights treaty, treaty signature had an overall positive effect on rights outcomes.

Appendix Table 5: Women’s Civil Society Participation and World Bank Women’s Rights Measure

 Model 11

Signature# Women’s CS Participation

0 2 2.533(1.781)

0 3 4.793(2.285)\*\*

0 4 13.08 (2.979)\*\*\*

1 1 -.1918(1.522)

1 2 .5127(2.104)

1 3 4.123(2.484)\*

1 4 8.477(2.775)\*\*\*

Regional ICCPR Rat -.2790(.2026)

Polity2 .0770(.0830)

GDP log 4.176(.6631)\*\*\*

Population log 1.294(2.117)

Internal War -.4984(.7310)

Interstate War -1.001(1.018)

Constant -83.13(25.45)\*\*\*

Observations 4522

State Clusters 154

Years 1970-2010

\*\*\*p < .01; \*\*p < .05; \*< .1 xtreg run on STATA 14.2 Robust standard errors in parenthesis.

Appendix Table 6: CEDAW Signature and Women’s Civil Society Participation on World Bank Women’s Rights Measure

 Model 12

Signature .9100(.4719)\*\*

INGOs .0052(.0069)

Polity2 .0195(.0021)\*\*\*

GDP log .0258(.0101)\*\*

Population log -.0188(.014)

Internal War -.0687(.0342)\*\*

Interstate War -.1453(.0529)\*\*\*

Constant .1840(.2269)

Observations 5825

State Clusters 157

Years 1970-2010

Instrumented: Signature

Included instruments: Polity2; INGOs; GDP; Population Internal War; Interstate War

Excluded instruments: Common Law Legal Tradition; Regional Density of ICCPR Commitment; Simmons Ratification Rules (Model 5)

\*\*\*p < .01; \*\*p < .05; \*< .1 Instrumental variable regression run on STATA 14.2 Robust standard errors in parenthesis.

Appendix Tables 5 and 6 looked closer at the relationship between women’s participation in civil society and CEDAW signature. In Table 5, I find that after states signed CEDAW then the allowance of women to create and participate in civil society was significant and positive. In Table 6, I find that the interaction between state CEDAW signature and more allowance of women’s participation in civil society had a significant and positive impact on the World Bank Women, Business, and the Law measure.

Appendix Table 6: Correlation Matrix Variables in Manuscript Models

|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | CEDAW Signature  | INGOs | Women’s Social Rights | Women’s Economic Rights | Women’s Political Rights | Women’s Rights Index  | Women’s Latent Mean | Polity2 | GDP log | Population Log | Internal Conflict | Interstate Conflict |
| CEDAW Signature  | 1.00 |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| INGOs | .037 | 1.00 |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Women’s Social Rights | .081 | .518 | 1.00 |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Women’s Economic Rights | .094 | .412 | .707 | 1.00 |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Women’s Political Rights | -.012 | .325 | .453 | .380 | 1.00 |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Women’s Rights Index | 0.07 | .518 | .900 | .841 | .722 | 1.00 |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Women’s Latent Mean | -.027 | .321 | .365 | .362 | .253 | .400 | 1.00 |  |  |  |  |  |
| Polity2 | 0.02 | .503 | .500 | .406 | .400 | .533 | .415 | 1.00 |  |  |  |  |
| GDP log | 0.28 | .700 | .339 | .300 | .185 | .337 | .386 | .406 | 1.00 |  |  |  |
| Population Log | 0.042 | .359 | -.016 | -.064 | .111 | .010 | -.031 | .109 | .686 | 1.00 |  |  |
| Internal Conflict | 0.003 | -.057 | -.189 | -.163 | -.045 | -.165 | -.152 | -.051 | .047 | .287 | 1.00 |  |
| Interstate Conflict  | 0.021 | .005 | -.074 | -.110 | -.068 | -.100 | -.138 | -.056 | .092 | .216 | .149 | 1.00 |



*Appendix Figure 2. INGOs Categorical Variable*

Instrumental Variable Regression

Appendix Table 7. Descriptive Statistics of Instruments used in Instrumental Variable Regressions *Observations Mean Std. Deviation Minimum Maximum*

Common Law 5921 .246 .431 0 1

Regional ICCPR density 5952 .763 1.079 0 5

Ratification Rules 5332 1.767 .630 1 3

*Common Law:* Dichotomous variable coding 1 if state has a tradition of common law, 0 if not from Mitchell, Ring, and Spellman (2013).

*Regional ICCPR density:* Count of total number of states that ratified the ICCPR in the same region. I use regions as defined by the UN. Coded by author following from Simmons (2009) inclusion of a similar measure.

*Ratification Rules:* Coding from Simmons (2009) on the domestic requirements for treaty ratification. This measure captures the extent of veto player involvement in the ratification process. This measure ranges from 1 to 3 with 1 signifying executive/cabinet level decision making on ratification and 3 requiring super majority in one body or majority in two separate legislative bodies for treaty ratification. Full coding information available online at <https://scholar.harvard.edu/files/bsimmons/files/APP_3.2_Ratification_rules.pdf>.

Instruments Tests

Women’s Social Rights Model 1

* Under-identification test (Kleinbergen-Paap rk LM statistic)
	+ I could reject the null hypothesis that the equation is under identified
* Hansen J statistic
	+ I could not reject the null hypothesis that the instruments are valid instruments
* 🡪 Model was not under identified and the instruments were valid

Women’s Economic Rights Model 2

* Under-identification test (Kleinbergen-Paap rk LM statistic)
	+ I could reject the null hypothesis that the equation is under identified
* Hansen J statistic
	+ I could not reject the null hypothesis that the instruments are valid instruments
* 🡪 Model was not under identified and the instruments were valid

Women’s Political Rights Model 3

* Under-identification test (Kleinbergen-Paap rk LM statistic)
	+ I could reject the null hypothesis that the equation is under identified
* Hansen J statistic
	+ I could not reject the null hypothesis that the instruments are valid instruments
* 🡪 Model was not under identified and the instruments were valid