**Online Supplemental Materials**

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**Deviations from Original Pre-Analysis Plan**

**Changes to Participant Sampling**

Sampling Challenges: In the pre-analysis plan we proposed to recruit a sample by contracting members of federal political parties in the Canadian cities of Kitchener-Waterloo and London. In Dec 2021, we contacted the political offices for the Conservative Party of Canada, Liberal Party, and New Democratic Party (NDP) of Canada in six federal political ridings.

* Kitchener Ridings: Kitchener Conestoga, Kitchener Centre.
* London Ridings: London West, Elgin-Middlesex-London, London North Center, London Fanshawe.

We focused on the Conservative, Liberal, and NDP parties because they represent the three largest parties in Canada as a percentage of Federal popular vote. We attempted to contract the Green Party; however, we were unable to identify the contact information for their party offices in any these ridings. After a two-week grace period, no party offices replied to our inquiry. Two ridings officers belonging to one of the three parties responded to our message after this period but declined to share our participant call with its membership.

Two further attempts were made to recruit a sample of local participants from the communities of London and Kitchener-Waterloo. First, we unsuccessfully attempted to recruit a sample of participants the London Ontario communities of Byron and Lambeth via their community centre contact information and their community Facebook profiles (n=6,000+). We found that participants from the Facebook community groups were reluctant to share their personal information which was necessary for us to send participants their compensation.

Following this we attempted to recruit a sample of participants from the online research firm Qualtrics (see additional details in the online supplemental materials). After soliciting a Qualtrics sample only a small number of respondents logged into the study, the quality of these responses was very poor, and no respondent successfully completed the CAM exercise.

After these initial failed attempts, we split our study into two sections and recruited a sample from Prolific. Section 1 contained the CAM exercise which was immediately followed by questions about the introduction of the Carbon Tax. Section 2 contained the remaining demographic and attitudinal measures. Participants were authorized to access Section 2 after completing Section 1 with no more than a 9-hour delay between the completion of Section 1 and the authorization for Section 2.

Original Sample Justification: Kitchener-Waterloo and London Ontario are selected on two considerations: 1) familiarity of the research team; 2) diversity of political representation. Historically, each of the three major Canadian political parties are represented in these cities. In 2015 the median household income in London was $62,011. In Kitchener-Waterloo, the median income is $77,530. The median household incomes for Ontario ($74,287) and Canada ($70,336). Both cities are home to a University and College campuses as well both commercial businesses and industrial manufacturing. In London 21.2% (76,585) of the population is foreign-born, in Kitchener-Waterloo it is 23.1% per cent (108,720). This compares to 28.5 per cent overall for Ontario. However, this statistic is heavily skewed by Toronto and its adjacent cities, in Toronto the percentage of foreign-born individuals is 50.00%. Across Canada 43% of all new immigrants settle in Toronto and its adjacent cities (Parliament research Publications; StatsCan).

Original Sample Compensation:In our original design we planned to compensate participants at a rate of ($14) for 40 mins, this is 1.5 times the minimum wage of the data collection site, the province of Ontario ($14 hr).

**Correspondence analysis**

In the original pre-analysis design, we planned to plot the structural network variables using a correspondence analysis. The purpose of the correspondence analysis was to visualize how these structural variables can contribute to explained variation around attitudes towards the carbon tax. We hoped that grouping the visualization by ideological or party identification would further contribute to the explained variation, that similar groups would tend to rely on similar structures. Two issues in executing the planned design we encountered two problems. First, after a more detailed review of the literature, we decided that a canonical variate analysis would be more appropriate for our data which is continuous measures with decimal places. Canonical variate, correspondence, and principal component analysis all belong to the same family of statistical approaches. Second, none of the structural variables operationalized in this study are correlated with attitudes towards the carbon tax, ideological orientation, or party ID. As a result, our attempts to use correspondence analysis and canonical variate analysis fail to produce a meaningful visualization of results e.g., we cannot differentiate attitudes of strong support or opposition. Consequently, we exclude these visualizations from the final draft of this paper. The failure of the structural measures to correlate with attitudes towards the carbon tax is disclosed in response to exploratory question nine in the main analysis.

**Modification of Original Exploratory Questions**

For improved clarity we have modified the wording, but not the substance of the exploratory questions as they appear in the previous draft. We have also added an additional question (question #8 in the main text) which emerged organically during the analysis. The original eight questions are listed below:

1. Do higher levels of emotional dependence predict stronger support and opposition to the introduction of a carbon tax?
2. Does the emotional dependence of a network equally predict both support and opposition?
3. Are neutral or uncertain attitudes towards the carbon tax associated with lower levels of emotional dependence?
4. Is the emotional dependence of the CAM, negative or positive, associated with support or opposition to the carbon tax?
5. How does emotional dependence compare to party identification and self-reported Ideology as a predictor of support or opposition to the Carbon tax?
6. Are the density and centrality of the network correlated with low political interest?
7. Are the density and centrality of the network with low issue sophistication?
8. Are the density and centrality of the network correlated with opposition to the Carbon Tax?

**Change from Closeness to Diameter**

In our original design we intended to include a measure of closeness, an alternative measure of centrality. Due to complications with Networkx python package (which does not support this centrality measure) we did not include the measure of closeness in our analysis. As a substitute, we included a measure of diameter however these measures do not measure the same properties.

Closeness: Closeness calculates how close a node is to all other nodes in the graph by calculating a geodesic distance (shortest number of steps to reach another node) for all nodes and summing the value for each node. This calculation allows us to find the “broadcasting” nodes in the graph.

Diameter: A measure of the expansiveness, the diameter of a network is the longest shortest path from one point to another. If you take all the shortest paths between every node the diameter is the longest of those.

**Demographic Tables**

What is your gender?

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
| Gender | Number | % |
|  |  |  |
| Man | 56 | 50.45 |
| Woman | 55 | 49.55 |
| Non-binary | 0 | 0.00 |
| Prefer not to say | 0 | 0.00 |
|  |  |  |
| Total | 111 | 100 |

What is your age?

|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Age | Mean | Std. | Min | Max | Total |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Total | 33.10 | 10.46 | 18 | 67 | 111 |

What is the highest level of education you have completed?

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
| Education | % | Total |
|  |  |  |
| 1 | 0 | 0 |
| 2 | 0.90 | 2 |
| 3 | 4.50 | 5 |
| 4 | 9.01 | 10 |
| 5 | 16.22 | 18 |
| 6 | 50.45 | 56 |
| 7 | 18.02 | 20 |
| 8 | 0.90 | 1 |
|  |  |  |
| Total | 100 | 111 |

How would you identify your race/ethnicity?

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
| Ethnicity | Total | % |
|  |  |  |
| White | 72 | 64.86 |
| Black (non-Hispanic) | 6 | 5.41 |
| Hispanic/Latino | 0 | 0 |
| Asian | 22 | 19.82 |
| First Nation/Inuit/Native American | 2 | 2 |
| Pacific Islander | 0 | 0 |
| Brown | 4 | 3.60 |
| Other | 5 | 4.50 |
|  |  |  |
| Total | 111 | 100 |

What is your total household income before taxes for 2018? Be sure to include income from all sources.

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
| Income | Total | % |
|  |  |  |
| $0-$15,000 | 5 | 4.50 |
| $15,001-$30,000 | 10 | 9.01 |
| $30,001-$45,000 | 13 | 11.71 |
| $45,001-$60,000 | 12 | 10.81 |
| $60,001-$75,000 | 13 | 11.71 |
| $75,001-$90,000 | 15 | 13.51 |
| $90,001-$105,000 | 11 | 9.91 |
| $105,001-$120,000 | 6 | 5.41 |
| $120,0001-$135,000 | 9 | 8.11 |
| $135,001-$150,000 | 8 | 7.21 |
| $150,001+ | 9 | 8.11 |
|  |  |  |
| Total | 111 | 100 |

How important would you say religion is in your life?

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
| Religion | Total | % |
|  |  |  |
| Very important | 17 | 15.32 |
| Somewhat important | 19 | 17.12 |
| Not very important | 14 | 12.61 |
| Not important at all | 61 | 54.95 |
| Don’t know | 0 | 0.00 |
|  |  |  |
| Total | 111 | 100 |

Which federal political party do you most identify with?

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
| Political Party | Total | % |
|  |  |  |
| Block Québécois | 1 | 0.90 |
| Conservative party of Canada | 25 | 22.52 |
| Green Party of Canada | 7 | 6.31 |
| Liberal Party of Canada | 38 | 34.23 |
| New Democratic Party | 34 | 30.63 |
| People’s Party of Canada | 2 | 1.80 |
| Other | 0 | 0.00 |
| I don’t support any federal party | 4 | 3.60 |
|  |  |  |
| Total | 111 | 100 |

Using the scale below, how would you describe your political orientation?

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
| Political orientation | Total | % |
|  |  |  |
| Very liberal | 20 | 18.02 |
| Liberal | 34 | 30.63 |
| Moderate liberal | 21 | 18.92 |
| Neutral | 7 | 6.31 |
| Moderate conservative | 21 | 18.92 |
| Conservative | 6 | 5.41 |
| Very conservative | 2 | 1.80 |
|  |  |  |
| Total | 111 | 100 |

In general, would you say that you agree or disagree with the introduction of the carbon tax?

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
| Carbon Tax | Total | % |
|  |  |  |
| Strongly disagree | 6 | 5.41 |
| Disagree | 7 | 6.31 |
| Moderately disagree | 6 | 5.41 |
| Neither agree nor disagree | 9 | 8.11 |
| Strongly agree | 29 | 26.13 |
| Agree | 35 | 31.53 |
| Strongly agree | 19 | 17.12 |
|  |  |  |
| Total | 111 | 100 |

Knowledge of Carbon Tax

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
| Carbon Tax | Total | % |
|  |  |  |
| 1 | 2 | 1.80 |
| 2 | 2 | 1.80 |
| 3 | 2 | 1.80 |
| 4 | 8 | 7.21 |
| 5 | 20 | 18.02 |
| 6 | 50 | 45.05 |
| 7 | 16 | 14.41 |
| 8 | 7 | 6.31 |
| 9 | 4 | 3.60 |
|  |  |  |
| Total | 111 | 100 |

In general, how familiar are you with carbon taxes?

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
| Carbon Tax | Total | % |
|  |  |  |
| 1 | 2 | 1.80 |
| 2 | 16 | 14.41 |
| 3 | 52 | 46.85 |
| 4 | 38 | 34.23 |
| 5 | 3 | 2.70 |
|  |  |  |
| Total | 111 | 100 |

If you had to decide one way or another, would you say you agree or disagree with the introduction of the carbon tax?

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
| Carbon Tax | Total | % |
|  |  |  |
| Agree | 90 | 81.08 |
| Disagree | 21 | 18.92 |
|  |  |  |
| Total | 111 | 100 |

**Network Properties**

Emotional network properties before transformation and standardization

|  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Variable | Mean | Std. | Min | Max |
| Node Diversity | 1.77 | 0.49 | 0 | 2.68 |
| Overall Node Valence 1 | 0.22 | 0.77 | -3 | 2 |
| Overall Node Valence 2 | 0.21 | 0.75 | -3 | 2 |
| Dependence of Central Node 1 | -0.80 | 0.41 | -1 | 1 |
| Dependence of Central Node 2 | -0.42 | 0.54 | -1 | 1 |
| Percent of Positive Nodes | 0.41 | 0.17 | 0 | 0.86 |
| Percent of Negative Nodes | 0.33 | 0.17 | 0 | 1 |
| Percent of Neutral Nodes | 0.230 | 0.17 | 0 | 1 |
|  |  |  |  |  |

Structural network properties before transformation and standardization

|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Variable | Mean | Std. | Min | Max | Obs |  |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Node count | 9.77 | 4.47 | 4 | 27 | 111 |  |
| Edge count | 13.44 | 8.66 | 3 | 63 | 111 |  |
| Dashed Edges | 2.13 | 2.38 | 0 | 14 | 111 |  |
| Solid Edges | 11.06 | 7.83 | 0 | 49 | 111 |  |
| Density | 0.36 | 0.17 | .1 | 1 | 111 |  |
| Diameter | 3.37 | 1.43 | 1 | 8 | 111 |  |
| Triadic Closure | 0.30 | 0.23 | 0 | 1 | 111 |  |
| Centrality | 0.70 | 0.26 | 0 | 1 | 111 |  |
| Centrality-Eig | 0.55 | 0.08 | 0.308 | 0.707 | 111 |  |
| Centrality-Betweenness | 0.57 | 0.24 | 0 | 1 | 111 |  |
| Assortativity | -0.42 | 0.27 | -1 | 0.26 | 109 |  |
| Assortativity-2 | -0.42 | 0.26 | -1 | 0.26 | 111 |  |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |

Note: Generated by black box function in Networkx, it is unclear why assortativity failed to produce two observations. In the variable assortativity-2 missing observations are recoded to the mean value. Assortativity-2 is used when reporting results.

Pearson’s correlations between emotional network measures. Significant correlations are marked by \*.

|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | Diversity | Valence 1 | Valence 2 | Valence Central N1 | Valence Central N2 | Percent Positive | Percent Negative | Percent Neutral |
| Diversity | 1 |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Valence 1 | -0.316\* | 1 |  |  |  |  |  |  |
|  | 0.001 |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Valence 2 | -0.302\* | 0.998\* | 1 |  |  |  |  |  |
|  | 0.001 | 0.001 |  |  |  |  |  |  |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Dependence | -0.213\* | -0.085\* | -0.079 | 1 |  |  |  |  |
| Central N1 | 0.025 | 0.375 | 0.408 |  |  |  |  |  |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Dependence | -0.221\* | -0.114 | -0.114 | 0.434\* | 1 |  |  |  |
| Central N2 | 0.020 | 0.234 | 0.233 | 0.001 |  |  |  |  |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Percent | 0.057 | 0.759\* | 0.761\* | -0.198\* | -0.209\* | 1 |  |  |
| Positive | 0.551 | 0.001 | 0.001 | 0.037 | 0.028 |  |  |  |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Percent | 0.358\* | -0.743\* | -0.738\* | -0.016 | 0.078 | -0.338\* | 1 |  |
| Negative | 0.001 | 0.001 | 0.001 | 0.866 | 0.414 | 0.001 |  |  |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Percent | -0.405 | 0.021 | 0.014 | 0.267\* | 0.195\* | -0.365\* | -0.438\* | 1 |
| Neutral | 0.001\* | 0.827 | 0.887 | 0.047 | 0.041 | 0.001 | 0.001 |  |

Note*:* Measures are transformed to produce the most normal distribution possible. All measures are standardized.

Pearson’s correlation between latent network measures. Significant correlations are marked by \*.

|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | Z-Node Count Log | Z-Edge Count | Z-Density | Z-Diameter | Z-Triadic  Closure | Z-Central | Z-Central  Eigen | Z-Central  Between |
| Z\_Edge | 0.872\* |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Count Log | 0.001 |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Z-Density | -0.727\* | -0.343\* |  |  |  |  |  |  |
|  | 0.001 | 0.001 |  |  |  |  |  |  |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Z-Diameter | 0.610\* | 0.337\* | -0.657\* |  |  |  |  |  |
|  | 0.001 | 0.001 | 0.001 |  |  |  |  |  |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Z-Triadic | -0.195\* | 0.217\* | 0.717\* | -0.440\* |  |  |  |  |
| Closure | 0.040 | 0.022 | 0.001 | 0.001 |  |  |  |  |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Z-Central | -0.569\* | -0.288\* | 0.640\* | -0.808\* | 0.420\* |  |  |  |
|  | 0.001 | 0.002 | 0.001 | 0.001 | 0.001 |  |  |  |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Z-Central | -0.430\* | -0.630\* | -0.053 | -0.315\* | -0.358\* | 0.489\* |  |  |
| Eigen | 0.001 | 0.001 | 0.581 | 0.001 | 0.001 | 0.001 |  |  |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Z-Central | 0.002 | -0.248\* | -0.406\* | 0.032 | -0.493\* | 0.255\* | 0.715\* |  |
| Betweeness | 0.988 | 0.009 | 0.001 | 0.737 | 0.001 | 0.007 | 0.001 |  |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Z-Assort2 | 0.526\* | 0.574\* | -0.226\* | 0.560\* | 0.167 | -0.633\* | -0.703\* | -0.574\* |
|  | 0.001 | 0.001 | 0.017 | 0.001 | 0.080 | 0.001 | 0.001 | 0.001 |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |

Note*:* Measures are transformed to produce the most normal distribution possible. All measures are standardized.

**Summary Regressions Tables by Research Question**

**Research Question 1**: *Do higher levels of emotional dependence predict attitude strength towards the introduction of a carbon tax?*

Table 1: Summarizes the relationship between the measure of emotional dependence and the strength of attitudes towards carbon tax.

|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Unconditional Model | | | | Conditioned Model | | | |
| Variable | Coef. | Std. Rob | P>|t| | | Coef. | Std. Rob | P>|t| |
|  |  |  |  | |  |  |  |
| Node Diversity | -0.177 | 0.076 | 0.022\*\* | | -0.160 | 0.087 | 0.070† |
| Emotional Dependence 1 | -0.106 | 0.093 | 0.260 | | -0.093 | 0.086 | 0.285 |
| Emotional Dependence 2 | -0.103 | 0.089 | 0.251 | | -0.142 | 0.092 | 0.124 |
|  |  |  |  | |  |  |  |

†P<0.100; \*\*P<0.050; \*\*\*P<0.001. Stronger attitudes towards the carbon tax are assessed by recoding the 7-point scale question on opposition and support for the carbon tax into a 4-point scale of attitudinal strength.

**Research Question 2**: *Does the emotional dependence of the network correlate with support for the carbon tax?*

Table 2: Summarizes the relationship between the measure of emotional dependence and support for the carbon tax.

|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Unconditional Model | | | | Conditioned Model | | | |
| Variable | Coef. | Std. Rob | P>|t| | | Coef. | Std. Rob | P>|t| |
|  |  |  |  | |  |  |  |
| Node Diversity | -0.193 | 0.203 | 0.345 | | -0.208 | 0.156 | 0.185 |
| Emotional Dependence 1 | 0.172 | 0.123 | 0.166 | | 0.177 | 0.137 | 0.200 |
| Emotional Dependence 2 | 0.036 | 0.155 | 0.819 | | 0.094 | 0.157 | 0.549 |
|  |  |  |  | |  |  |  |

†P<0.100; \*\*P<0.050; \*\*\*P<0.001. Support for the carbon tax is coded on a 7-point Likert-scale “Strongly disagree” to “Strongly agree”.

**Research Question 3**: *Is unfamiliarity with the carbon tax associated with lower levels of emotional dependence?*

Table 3: Summarizes the relationship between unfamiliarity with the carbon tax and network emotional dependence.

|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Unconditional Model | | | | Conditioned Model | | | |
| Variable | Coef. | Std. Rob | P>|t| | | Coef. | Std. Rob | P>|t| |
|  |  |  |  | |  |  |  |
| Node Diversity | -0.079 | 0.082 | 0.338 | | -0.069 | 0.085 | 0.421 |
| Emotional Dependence 1 | 0.095 | 0.085 | 0.265 | | 0.100 | 0.080 | 0.217 |
| Emotional Dependence 2 | 0.079 | 0.073 | 0.285 | | 0.152 | 0.074 | 0.042\*\* |
|  |  |  |  | |  |  |  |
| *Interaction Model* |  |  |  | |  |  |  |
| Emotional Dependence 2 | 0.149 | 0.077 | 0.056† | | 0.209 | 0.077 | 0.008\*\* |
| Percentage of Ambiguous Nodes | 0.319 | 0.120 | 0.009\*\* | | 0.276 | 0.131 | 0.038\*\* |
|  |  |  |  | |  |  |  |
| Depend##Ambiguous | 0.426 | 0.188 | 0.025\*\* | | 0.368 | 0.208 | 0.081† |
|  |  |  |  | |  |  |  |

†P<0.100; \*\*P<0.050; \*\*\*P<0.001. Unfamiliarity is coded from 1-5 “Extremely familiar” to “Not familiar at all”

**Research Question 4**: Is the emotional valence of the CAM, negative vs. positive, associated with support or opposition to the carbon tax?

Table 4: Summarizes the relationship between CAM Valence and support for the carbon tax.

|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Unconditional Model | | | | Conditioned Model | | | |
| Variable | Coef. | Std. Rob | P>|t| | | Coef. | Std. Rob | P>|t| |
|  |  |  |  | |  |  |  |
| CAM Valence 1 | 0.833 | 0.109 | 0.0001\*\*\* | | 0.730 | 0.108 | 0.0001\*\*\* |
| CAM Valence 2 | 0.837 | 0.107 | 0.0001\*\*\* | | 0.735 | 0.108 | 0.0001\*\*\* |
|  |  |  |  | |  |  |  |
| % of Positive Nodes | 0.397 | 0.147 | 0.008\*\* | | 0.389 | 0.117 | 0.001\*\*\* |
| % of Negative Nodes | -0.553 | 0.164 | 0.001\*\*\* | | -0.444 | 0.144 | 0.003\*\* |
| % of Neutral Nodes | 0.015 | 0.175 | 0.934 | | 0.065 | 0.159 | 0.684 |
|  |  |  |  | |  |  |  |

†P<0.100; \*\*P<0.050; \*\*\*P<0.001. Support for the carbon tax is coded on a 7-point Likert-scale “Strongly disagree” to “Strongly agree”. Coefficients for CAM Valence 1 and Valence 2 are assessed in independent statistical models. The coefficients for the percentages of different nodes are from a single statistical model. Zero order correlations for the percentage of different nodes are reported in detailed summary for Question 4, the results are highly similar.

**Research Question 5**: *How does emotional valence compare to party identification and self-reported ideology as a predictor of support for the carbon tax?*

Table 5: Summarizes the relationship between CAM emotional valence, party identification, and ideology as predictors of support for the carbon tax.

|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Unconditional Model | | | | Conditioned Model | | | |
| Variable | Coef. | Std. Rob | P>|t| | | Coef. | Std. Rob | P>|t| |
|  |  |  |  | |  |  |  |
| *Model 1* |  |  |  | |  |  |  |
| CAM Valence 1 | 0.498 | 0.100 | 0.0001\*\*\* | | 0.417 | 0.093 | 0.0001\*\*\* |
| Ideological Orientation | -0.948 | 0.122 | 0.0001\*\*\* | | -0.963 | 0.131 | 0.0001\*\*\* |
|  |  |  |  | |  |  |  |
| *Model 2* |  |  |  | |  |  |  |
| CAM Valence 2 | 0.507 | 0.097 | 0.0001\*\*\* | | 0.424 | 0.092 | 0.0001\*\*\* |
| Ideological Orientation | -0.947 | 0.121 | 0.0001\*\*\* | | -0.961 | 0.131 | 0.0001\*\*\* |
|  |  |  |  | |  |  |  |
| *Model 3* |  |  |  | |  |  |  |
| CAM Valence 1 | 0.591 | 0.103 | 0.0001\*\*\* | | 0.523 | 0.097 | 0.0001\*\*\* |
| Liberals | 0.102 | 0.259 | 0.693 | | 0.175 | 0.274 | 0.524 |
| Conservatives/PP | -1.820 | 0.403 | 0.0001\*\*\* | | -1.736 | 0.440 | 0.0001\*\*\* |
| Other | -0.935 | 0.540 | 0.087† | | -0.917 | 0.511 | 0.076† |
|  |  |  |  | |  |  |  |
| *Model 4* |  |  |  | |  |  |  |
| CAM Valence 2 | 0.523 | 0.097 | 0.0001\*\*\* | | 0.596 | 0.101 | 0.0001\*\*\* |
| Liberals | 0.175 | 0.274 | 0.524 | | 0.100 | 0.258 | 0.699 |
| Conservatives/PP | -1.736 | 0.440 | 0.0001\*\*\* | | -1.818 | 0.401 | 0.0001\*\*\* |
| Other | -0.917 | 0.511 | 0.076† | | -0.920 | 0.524 | 0.082† |
|  |  |  |  | |  |  |  |

†P<0.100; \*\*P<0.050; \*\*\*P<0.001. Support for the carbon tax is coded on a 7-point Likert-scale “Strongly disagree” to “Strongly agree”.

**Research Question 6**: *Are network density and centrality correlated with political interest?*

Table 6A: Summarizes the relationships between latent network properties and political interest. Unconditioned results only.

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Variable | Coef. | Std. Rob | P>|t| |
|  |  |  |  |
| Density | -0.112 | 0.260 | 0.668 |
| Degree Centrality | 0.009 | 0.242 | 0.971 |
| Eigen Vector Centrality | -0.335 | 0.217 | 0.126 |
| Betweeness Centrality | 0.184 | 0.247 | 0.457 |
| Number of Nodes | 0.101 | 0.240 | 0.675 |
| Number of Edges | 0.150 | 0.231 | 0.518 |
| Diameter | 0.091 | 0.246 | 0.712 |
| Triadic Closure | 0.236 | 0.283 | 0.407 |
| Dashed Edges | 0.091 | 0.241 | 0.707 |
| Solid Edges | 0.211 | 0.245 | 0.391 |
| Assortativity | -0.010 | 0.238 | 0.967 |
|  |  |  |  |

†P<0.100; \*\*P<0.050; \*\*\*P<0.001. Support for the carbon tax is coded on a 7-point Likert-scale

“Strongly disagree” to “Strongly agree”. As no outcomes are significant only the unconditioned results are reported.

Table 6B: Summarizes the relationship between the measures of political interest and reverse coded familiarity with the independent latent network properties.

|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Unconditional Model | | | | Conditioned Model | | | |
| Variable | Coef. | Std. Rob | P>|t| | | Coef. | Std. Rob | P>|t| |
|  |  |  |  | |  |  |  |
| *Density* |  |  |  | |  |  |  |
| Political Interest | 0.197 | 0.094 | 0.039\*\* | | 0.156 | 0.097 | 0.110 |
| Tax Familiarity | 0.715 | 0.244 | 0.004\*\* | | 0.618 | 0.225 | 0.007\*\* |
| Interest#Familiarity | -0.085 | 0.037 | 0.024\*\* | | -0.072 | 0.036 | 0.048\*\* |
|  |  |  |  | |  |  |  |
| *Degree Centrality* |  |  |  | |  |  |  |
| Political Interest | 0.245 | 0.122 | 0.047\*\* | | 0.192 | 0.130 | 0.142 |
| Tax Familiarity | 0.511 | 0.239 | 0.034\*\* | | 0.423 | 0.255 | 0.100† |
| Interest#Familiarity | -0.088 | 0.039 | 0.028\*\* | | -0.076 | 0.042 | 0.077† |
|  |  |  |  | |  |  |  |
| *Eigenvector Centrality* |  |  |  | |  |  |  |
| Political Interest | 0.056 | 0.120 | 0.644 | | 0.020 | 0.131 | 0.881 |
| Tax Familiarity | -0.340 | 0.216 | 0.118 | | -0.377 | 0.238 | 0.117 |
| Interest#Familiarity | -0.020 | 0.038 | 0.592 | | -0.013 | 0.043 | 0.762 |
|  |  |  |  | |  |  |  |
| *Betweenness Centrality* |  |  |  | |  |  |  |
| Political Interest | 0.008 | 0.136 | 0.952 | | 0.034 | 0.150 | 0.822 |
| Tax Familiarity | -0.432 | 0.285 | 0.133 | | -0.347 | 0.303 | 0.256 |
| Interest#Familiarity | 0.019 | 0.045 | 0.666 | | 0.006 | 0.049 | 0.903 |
|  |  |  |  | |  |  |  |

†P<0.100; \*\*P<0.050; \*\*\*P<0.001. Support for the carbon tax is coded on a 7-point Likert-scale

“Strongly disagree” to “Strongly agree”.

**Research Question 7**: *Are network density and centrality correlated with issue sophistication?*

Table 7A: Summarizes the correlations between latent network properties and issue sophistication.

|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Unconditional Model | | | | Conditioned Model | | | |
| Variable | Coef. | Std. Rob | P>|t| | | Coef. | Std. Rob | P>|t| |
|  |  |  |  | |  |  |  |
| Density | -0.214 | 0.200 | 0.286 | | -0.179 | 0.207 | 0.390 |
| Centrality | -0.288 | 0.165 | 0.084† | | -0.222 | 0.190 | 0.244 |
| Eigenvector Centrality | -0.448 | 0.140 | 0.002\*\* | | -0.390 | 0.134 | 0.004\*\* |
| Betweenness Centrality | -0.239 | 0.165 | 0.150 | | -0.236 | 0.157 | 0.135 |
| Number of Nodes | 0.359 | 0.158 | 0.025\*\* | | 0.329 | 0.158 | 0.040\*\* |
| Number of Edges | 0.386 | 0.141 | 0.007\*\* | | 0.361 | 0.141 | 0.012\*\* |
| Diameter | 0.084 | 0.171 | 0.625 | | 0.015 | 0.190 | 0.939 |
| Triadic Closure | -0.081 | 0.184 | 0.663 | | -0.008 | 0.184 | 0.967 |
| Dashed Edges | 0.132 | 0.144 | 0.360 | | 0.095 | 0.150 | 0.528 |
| Solid Edges | 0.329 | 0.139 | 0.020\*\* | | 0.304 | 0.154 | 0.052† |
| Assortativity | 0.278 | 0.130 | 0.034\*\* | | 0.262 | 0.140 | 0.064† |
|  |  |  |  | |  |  |  |

†P<0.100; \*\*P<0.050; \*\*\*P<0.001. Issue sophistication is a composite measure running less sophisticated to more sophisticated with a range from 0-14.

Table 7B: Correlations between reference to carbon tax in individuals’ central node and eigenvector centrality score.

|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Unconditional Model | | | | Conditioned Model | | | |
| Variable | Coef. | Std. Rob | P>|t| | | Coef. | Std. Rob | P>|t| |
|  |  |  |  | |  |  |  |
| Carbon Tax | 0.717 | 0.181 | 0.0001\*\*\* | | 0.723 | 0.181 | 0.000 |
|  |  |  |  | |  |  |  |

†P<0.100; \*\*P<0.050; \*\*\*P<0.001. Content is coded 1 = no reference to carbon tax, 2 = reference to

carbon tax.

Table 7C: Summarizes the interaction between issue sophistication and reverse coded tax familiarity with different latent network properties.

|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Unconditional Model | | | | | Conditioned Model | | | |
| Variable | Coef. | | Std. Rob | P>|t| | | Coef. | Std. Rob | P>|t| |
|  |  | |  |  | |  |  |  |
| *Density* | |  |  |  | |  |  |  |
| Issue Sophistication | | -0.228 | 0.266 | 0.394 | | -0.270 | 0.295 | 0.363 |
| Tax Familiarity | | -0.040 | 0.611 | 0.947 | | -0.179 | 0.663 | 0.788 |
| Sophistication#Familiarity | | 0.038 | 0.083 | 0.653 | | 0.054 | 0.090 | 0.554 |
|  | |  |  |  | |  |  |  |
| *Degree Centrality* | |  |  |  | |  |  |  |
| Issue Sophistication | | -0.319 | 0.313 | 0.311 | | -0.315 | 0.331 | 0.343 |
| Tax Familiarity | | -0.398 | 0.742 | 0.593 | | -0.501 | 0.756 | 0.509 |
| Sophistication#Familiarity | | 0.063 | 0.099 | 0.524 | | 0.071 | 0.103 | 0.493 |
|  | |  |  |  | |  |  |  |
| *Eigenvector Centrality* | |  |  |  | |  |  |  |
| Issue Sophistication | -0.610 | | 0.202 | 0.003\*\* | | -0.549 | 0.194 | 0.006\*\* |
| Tax Familiarity | -1.546 | | 0.495 | 0.002\*\* | | -1.459 | 0.476 | 0.003\*\* |
| Sophistication#Familiarity | 0.153 | | 0.060 | 0.012\*\* | | 0.139 | 0.057 | 0.017\*\* |
|  |  | |  |  | |  |  |  |
| *Betweenness Centrality* |  | |  |  | |  |  |  |
| Political Interest | -0.303 | | 0.242 | 0.213 | | -0.265 | 0.259 | 0.309 |
| Tax Familiarity | -0.784 | | 0.580 | 0.179 | | -0.675 | 0.615 | 0.275 |
| Interest#Familiarity | 0.075 | | 0.072 | 0.303 | | 0.061 | 0.077 | 0.435 |
|  |  | |  |  | |  |  |  |
| *Assortativity* |  | |  |  | |  |  |  |
| Political Interest | 0.624 | | 0.273 | 0.024\*\* | | 0.649 | 0.259 | 0.014\*\* |
| Tax Familiarity | 1.204 | | 0.630 | 0.059† | | 1.301 | 0.599 | 0.032\*\* |
| Interest#Familiarity | -0.163 | | 0.081 | 0.048\*\* | | -0.171 | 0.078 | 0.030\*\* |
|  |  | |  |  | |  |  |  |
| *Diameter* |  | |  |  | |  |  |  |
| Political Interest | 0.160 | | 0.290 | 0.581 | | 0.135 | 0.293 | 0.647 |
| Tax Familiarity | 0.105 | | 0.664 | 0.874 | | 0.198 | 0.674 | 0.770 |
| Interest#Familiarity | -0.035 | | 0.091 | 0.702 | | -0.038 | 0.091 | 0.681 |
|  |  | |  |  | |  |  |  |
| *Triadic Closure* |  | |  |  | |  |  |  |
| Political Interest | 0.420 | | 0.274 | 0.129 | | 0.459 | 0.288 | 0.114 |
| Tax Familiarity | 1.493 | | 0.634 | 0.020\*\* | | 1.528 | 0.656 | 0.022\*\* |
| Interest#Familiarity | -0.154 | | 0.087 | 0.080† | | -0.158 | 0.089 | 0.079† |
|  |  | |  |  | |  |  |  |

†P<0.100; \*\*P<0.050; \*\*\*P<0.001. Issue sophistication is a composite measure running less sophisticated to more sophisticated with a range from 0-14. Reverse coded familiarity is score 1-5 “Not familiar at all” to “Extremely familiar.

**Research Question 8:** *Are the latent network measures correlated with familiarity with the carbon tax?*

Table 8: Summary of correlations between familiarity with the Carbon Tax and latent network measures.

|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Unconditional Model | | | | Conditioned Model | | | |
| Dependent Variable | Coef. | Std. Rob | P>|t| | | Coef. | Std. Rob | P>|t| |
|  |  |  |  | |  |  |  |
| Node Count | -0.032 | 0.082 | 0.700 | | -0.032 | 0.077 | 0.683 |
| Edge Count | -0.140 | 0.078 | 0.073† | | -0.120 | 0.073 | 0.103 |
| Density | -0.119 | 0.065 | 0.070† | | -0.102 | 0.062 | 0.104 |
| Diameter | 0.083 | 0.076 | 0.275 | | 0.048 | 0.075 | 0.527 |
| Triadic Closure | -0.191 | 0.070 | 0.007\*\* | | -0.184 | 0.063 | 0.004\*\* |
| Degree Centrality | -0.013 | 0.077 | 0.868 | | 0.009 | 0.075 | 0.909 |
| Eigenvector | 0.286 | 0.062 | 0.0001\*\*\* | | 0.280 | 0.060 | 0.0001\*\*\* |
| Betweenness | 0.158 | 0.067 | 0.019\*\* | | 0.147 | 0.064 | 0.024\*\* |
| Dashed Edges | -0.044 | 0.081 | 0.594 | | 0.032 | 0.080 | 0.692 |
| Solid Edges | -0.139 | 0.074 | 0.062† | | -0.137 | 0.068 | 0.046\*\* |
| Assortativity | -0.021 | 0.070 | 0.762 | | -0.041 | 0.069 | 0.550 |
|  |  |  |  | |  |  |  |

†P<0.100; \*\*P<0.050; \*\*\*P<0.001. Unfamiliarity is coded from 1-5 “Extremely familiar” to “Not familiar at all”.

**Research Question 9**: Are the density and centrality of the network correlated with agreement with the carbon tax?

Table 9: Summary of correlations between latent network measures and agreement with the carbon tax.

|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Unconditional Model | | | | Conditioned Model | | | |
| Dependent Variable | Coef. | Std. Rob | P>|t| | | Coef. | Std. Rob | P>|t| |
|  |  |  |  | |  |  |  |
| Density | 0.108 | 0.169 | 0.527 | | 0.190 | 0.152 | 0.212 |
| Degree Centrality | -0.019 | 0.185 | 0.918 | | 0.083 | 0.172 | 0.629 |
| Eigenvector | -0.128 | 0.165 | 0.441 | | -0.053 | 0.169 | 0.756 |
| Betweenness | -0.080 | 0.170 | 0.640 | | -0.118 | 0.165 | 0.476 |
| Node Count | -0.050 | 0.167 | 0.765 | | -0.116 | 0.160 | 0.471 |
| Edge Count | 0.021 | 0.149 | 0.887 | | -0.022 | 0.148 | 0.882 |
| Diameter | 0.085 | 0.182 | 0.642 | | -0.048 | 0.180 | 0.789 |
| Triadic Closure | 0.093 | 0.163 | 0.570 | | 0.190 | 0.150 | 0.209 |
| Dashed Edges | -0.080 | 0.170 | 0.640 | | -0.025 | 0.158 | 0.876 |
| Solid Edges | 0.045 | 0.148 | 0.763 | | 0.002 | 0.151 | 0.989 |
| Assortativity | 0.236 | 0.151 | 0.119 | | 0.144 | 0.150 | 0.339 |
|  |  |  |  | |  |  |  |

†P<0.100; \*\*P<0.050; \*\*\*P<0.001. Support for the carbon tax is coded on a 7-point Likert-scale “Strongly disagree” to “Strongly agree”.

**Full Statistical Results by Research Question**

**Research Question 1**: *Do higher levels of emotional dependence predict attitude strength towards the introduction of the carbon tax?*

*Node Diversity*

Table 10A: Linear Regression with Robust Confidence Intervals. Correlation between node diversity and the

strength of attitudes towards the carbon tax.

|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Variable | Coef. | Std. Rob | P>|t| | [95% | Conf. Inter] |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Node Diversity | -0.177 | 0.076 | 0.022\*\* | -0.327 | -0.026 |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Cons | 2.748 | 0.084 | 0.0001 | 2.581 | 2.914 |
| R |  |  |  |  | 0.039 |
| N |  |  |  |  | 111 |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |

†P<0.100; \*\*P<0.050; \*\*\*P<0.001. Stronger attitudes towards the carbon tax are assessed by recoding the

7-point scale question on opposition and support for the carbon tax into a 4-point scale of attitudinal strength.

Table 10B: Linear Regression with Robust Confidence Intervals. Correlation between node diversity and

the strength of attitudes towards the carbon tax.

|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Variable | Coef. | Std. Rob | P>|t| | [95% | Conf. Inter] |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Node Diversity | -0.160 | 0.087 | 0.070† | -0.333 | 0.013 |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Age | -0.002 | 0.008 | 0.812 | -0.018 | 0.014 |
| Education | 0.052 | 0.084 | 0.540 | -0.115 | 0.218 |
| Non-white | -0.249 | 0.186 | 0.184 | -0.619 | 0.120 |
| Female | 0.015 | 0.173 | 0.931 | -0.327 | 0.357 |
| Income | 0.014 | 0.027 | 0.590 | -0.038 | 0.067 |
| Religiosity | 0.082 | 0.076 | 0.285 | -0.069 | 0.233 |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Cons | 2.263 | 0.582 | 0.0001 | 1.109 | 3.416 |
| R |  |  |  |  | 0.082 |
| N |  |  |  |  | 111 |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |

†P<0.100; \*\*P<0.050; \*\*\*P<0.001. Stronger attitudes towards the carbon tax are assessed by recoding

the 7-point scale question on opposition and support for the carbon tax into a 4-point scale of attitudinal

strength.

*Emotional Dependence of the Central Node Coding 1*

Table 11A: Linear Regression with Robust Confidence Intervals. Correlation between the emotional

dependence of the central node and the strength of attitudes towards the carbon tax.

|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Variable | Coef. | Std. Rob | P>|t| | [95% | Conf. Inter] |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Emotional Dependence 1 | -0.106 | 0.093 | 0.260 | -0.291 | 0.079 |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Cons | 2.748 | 0.085 | 0.0001 | 2.579 | 2.916 |
| R |  |  |  |  | 0.014 |
| N |  |  |  |  | 111 |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |

†P<0.100; \*\*P<0.050; \*\*\*P<0.001. Stronger attitudes towards the carbon tax are assessed by recoding

the 7-point scale question on opposition and support for the carbon tax into a 4-point scale of attitudinal

strength.

Table 11B: Linear Regression with Robust Confidence Intervals. Correlation between the emotional

dependence of the central node and the strength of attitudes towards the carbon tax.

|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Variable | Coef. | Std. Rob | P>|t| | [95% | Conf. Inter] |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Emotional Dependence 1 | -0.093 | 0.086 | 0.285 | -0.264 | 0.078 |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Age | 0.002 | 0.008 | 0.844 | -0.015 | 0.018 |
| Education | 0.060 | 0.085 | 0.485 | -0.109 | 0.229 |
| Non-white | -0.260 | 0.183 | 0.159 | -0.624 | 0.103 |
| Female | 0.041 | 0.173 | 0.815 | -0.302 | 0.383 |
| Income | 0.007 | 0.027 | 0.799 | -0.047 | 0.061 |
| Religiosity | 0.093 | 0.076 | 0.227 | -0.058 | 0.244 |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Cons | 2.100 | 0.589 | 0.001 | 0.932 | 3.268 |
| R |  |  |  |  | 0.064 |
| N |  |  |  |  | 111 |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |

†P<0.100; \*\*P<0.050; \*\*\*P<0.001. Stronger attitudes towards the carbon tax are assessed by recoding

the 7-point scale question on opposition and support for the carbon tax into a 4-point scale of attitudinal

strength.

*Emotional Dependence of the Central Node Coding 2*

Table 12A: Linear Regression with Robust Confidence Intervals. Correlation between the emotional dependence of the central node and the strength of attitudes towards the carbon tax.

|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Variable | Coef. | Std. Rob | P>|t| | [95% | Conf. Inter] |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Emotional Dependence 2 | -0.103 | 0.089 | 0.251 | -0.291 | 0.074 |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Cons | 2.748 | 0.085 | 0.0001 | 2.579 | 2.916 |
| R |  |  |  |  | 0.013 |
| N |  |  |  |  | 111 |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |

†P<0.100; \*\*P<0.050; \*\*\*P<0.001. Stronger attitudes towards the carbon tax are assessed by recoding

the 7-point scale question on opposition and support for the carbon tax into a 4-point scale of attitudinal

strength.

Table 12B: Linear Regression with Robust Confidence Intervals. Correlation between the emotional dependence of the central node and the strength of attitudes towards the carbon tax.

|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Variable | Coef. | Std. Rob | P>|t| | [95% | Conf. Inter] |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Emotional Dependence 2 | -0.142 | 0.092 | 0.124 | -0.325 | 0.040 |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Age | 0.004 | 0.008 | 0.642 | -0.013 | 0.021 |
| Education | 0.074 | 0.083 | 0.374 | -0.091 | 0.240 |
| Non-white | -0.306 | 0.186 | 0.104 | -0.675 | 0.064 |
| Female | -0.002 | 0.173 | 0.989 | -0.346 | 0.341 |
| Income | 0.008 | 0.028 | 0.769 | -0.047 | 0.063 |
| Religiosity | 0.090 | 0.074 | 0.227 | -0.057 | 0.237 |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Cons | 1.977 | 0.579 | 0.001 | 0.830 | 3.125 |
| R |  |  |  |  | 0.076 |
| N |  |  |  |  | 111 |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |

†P<0.100; \*\*P<0.050; \*\*\*P<0.001. Stronger attitudes towards the carbon tax are assessed by recoding

the 7-point scale question on opposition and support for the carbon tax into a 4-point scale of attitudinal

strength.

**Research Question 2**: *Does the emotional dependence of the networks correlate with support for the carbon tax?*

*Node Diversity*

Table 13A: Linear Regression with Robust Confidence Intervals. Correlation between node diversity and

support for the carbon tax.

|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Variable | Coef. | Std. Rob | P>|t| | [95% | Conf. Inter] |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Node Diversity | -0.193 | 0.203 | 0.345 | -0.596 | 0.210 |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Cons | 5.063 | 0.157 | 0.0001 | 4.752 | 5.374 |
| R |  |  |  |  | 0.014 |
| N |  |  |  |  | 111 |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |

†P<0.100; \*\*P<0.050; \*\*\*P<0.001. Support for the carbon tax is coded on a 7-point Likert-scale

“Strongly disagree” to “Strongly agree”.

Table 13B: Linear Regression with Robust Confidence Intervals. Correlation between node diversity and

support for the carbon tax.

|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Variable | Coef. | Std. Rob | P>|t| | [95% | Conf. Inter] |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Node Diversity | -0.208 | 0.156 | 0.185 | -0.518 | 0.101 |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Age | -0.029 | 0.017 | 0.101 | -0.063 | 0.006 |
| Education | 0.170 | 0.140 | 0.229 | -0.108 | 0.448 |
| Non-white | -0.363 | 0.315 | 0.251 | -0.987 | 0.261 |
| Female | 0.710 | 0.304 | 0.021\*\* | 0.107 | 1.314 |
| Income | 0.049 | 0.050 | 0.334 | -0.051 | 0.149 |
| Religiosity | 0.162 | 0.131 | 0.222 | -0.099 | 0.422 |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Cons | 4.041 | 1.058 | 0.0001 | 1.944 | 6.139 |
| R |  |  |  |  | 0.147 |
| N |  |  |  |  | 111 |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |

†P<0.100; \*\*P<0.050; \*\*\*P<0.001. Support for the carbon tax is coded on a 7-point Likert-scale

“Strongly disagree” to “Strongly agree”.

*Emotional Dependence of the Central Node Coding 1*

Table 14A: Linear Regression with Robust Confidence Intervals. Correlation between the emotional

dependence of the central node and support for the carbon tax.

|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Variable | Coef. | Std. Rob | P>|t| | [95% | Conf. Inter] |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Emotional Dependence 1 | 0.172 | 0.123 | 0.166 | -0.072 | 0.417 |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Cons | 5.063 | 0.157 | 0.0001 | 4.751 | 5.375 |
| R |  |  |  |  | 0.011 |
| N |  |  |  |  | 111 |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |

†P<0.100; \*\*P<0.050; \*\*\*P<0.001. Support for the carbon tax is coded on a 7-point Likert-scale

“Strongly disagree” to “Strongly agree”.

Table 14B: Linear Regression with Robust Confidence Intervals. Correlation between the emotional

dependence of the central node and support for the carbon tax.

|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Variable | Coef. | Std. Rob | P>|t| | [95% | Conf. Inter] |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Emotional Dependence 1 | 0.177 | 0.137 | 0.200 | -0.095 | 0.449 |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Age | -0.021 | 0.017 | 0.217 | -0.055 | 0.013 |
| Education | 0.161 | 0.140 | 0.251 | -0.116 | 0.439 |
| Non-white | -0.394 | 0.319 | 0.220 | -1.025 | 0.238 |
| Female | 0.760 | 0.304 | 0.014\*\* | 0.156 | 1.364 |
| Income | 0.037 | 0.052 | 0.475 | -0.066 | 0.140 |
| Religiosity | 0.194 | 0.132 | 0.143 | -0.067 | 0.455 |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Cons | 3.793 | 1.035 | 0.0001 | 1.742 | 5.845 |
| R |  |  |  |  | 0.144 |
| N |  |  |  |  | 111 |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |

†P<0.100; \*\*P<0.050; \*\*\*P<0.001. Support for the carbon tax is coded on a 7-point Likert-scale

“Strongly disagree” to “Strongly agree”.

*Emotional Dependence of the Central Node Coding 2*

Table 15A: Linear Regression with Robust Confidence Intervals. Correlation between the emotional

dependence of the central node and support for the carbon tax.

|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Variable | Coef. | Std. Rob | P>|t| | [95% | Conf. Inter] |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Emotional Dependence 2 | 0.036 | 0.155 | 0.819 | -0.272 | 0.343 |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Cons | 5.063 | 0.158 | 0.0001 | 4.750 | 5.376 |
| R |  |  |  |  | 0.001 |
| N |  |  |  |  | 111 |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |

†P<0.100; \*\*P<0.050; \*\*\*P<0.001. Support for the carbon tax is coded on a 7-point Likert-scale

“Strongly disagree” to “Strongly agree”.

Table 15B: Linear Regression with Robust Confidence Intervals. Correlation between the emotional

dependence of the central node and support for the carbon tax.

|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Variable | Coef. | Std. Rob | P>|t| | [95% | Conf. Inter] |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Emotional Dependence 2 | 0.094 | 0.157 | 0.549 | -0.217 | 0.406 |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Age | -0.024 | 0.017 | 0.164 | -0.058 | 0.010 |
| Education | 0.159 | 0.144 | 0.271 | -0.126 | 0.444 |
| Non-white | -0.357 | 0.336 | 0.291 | -1.024 | 0.310 |
| Female | 0.782 | 0.313 | 0.014\*\* | 0.162 | 1.402 |
| Income | 0.037 | 0.051 | 0.470 | -0.064 | 0.139 |
| Religiosity | 0.188 | 0.134 | 0.163 | -0.078 | 0.454 |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Cons | 3.889 | 1.037 | 0.0001 | 1.833 | 5.945 |
| R |  |  |  |  | 0.136 |
| N |  |  |  |  | 111 |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |

†P<0.100; \*\*P<0.050; \*\*\*P<0.001. Support for the carbon tax is coded on a 7-point Likert-scale

“Strongly disagree” to “Strongly agree”.

Research Question 2: Using a logistic regression in response to the question “If you had to decided one way or another, would you say you agree or disagree with the introduction of the carbon tax?”.

*Node Diversity*

Table 16A: Logistic Regression with Robust Confidence Intervals. Correlation between node diversity and

probability of opposing the carbon tax.

|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Variable | Coef. | Std. Rob | P>|z| | [95% | Conf. Inter] |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Node Diversity | 0.239 | 0.334 | 0.475 | -0.415 | 0.892 |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Cons | -1.472 | 0.250 | 0.0001 | -1.92 | -0.893 |
| Ps-R |  |  |  |  | 0.008 |
| N |  |  |  |  | 111 |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |

†P<0.100; \*\*P<0.050; \*\*\*P<0.001. Opposition to the tax is coded as 0 = “Agree”, 1 = “Disagree”.

Table 16B: Logistic Regression with Robust Confidence Intervals. Correlation between node diversity and

probability of opposing the carbon tax.

|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Variable | Coef. | Std. Rob | P>|z| | [95% | Conf. Inter] |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Node Diversity | 0.327 | 0.308 | 0.289 | -0.278 | 0.932 |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Age | 0.039 | 0.026 | 0.137 | -0.013 | 0.091 |
| Education | -0.353 | 0.246 | 0.152 | -0.835 | 0.130 |
| Non-white | 0.406 | 0.521 | 0.436 | -0.615 | 1.427 |
| Female | -1.300 | 0.590 | 0.028\*\* | -2.456 | -0.144 |
| Income | -0.018 | 0.092 | 0.843 | -0.199 | 0.162 |
| Religiosity | -0.186 | 0.217 | 0.392 | -0.611 | 0.240 |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Cons | 0.149 | 1.737 | 0.932 | -3.257 | 3.554 |
| Ps-R |  |  |  |  | 0.126 |
| N |  |  |  |  | 111 |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |

†P<0.100; \*\*P<0.050; \*\*\*P<0.001. Opposition to the tax is coded as 0 = “Agree”, 1 = “Disagree”.

*Emotional Dependence of the Central Node Coding 1*

Table 17A: Logistic Regression with Robust Confidence Intervals. Correlation between the emotional

dependence of the central node and probability of opposing the carbon tax.

|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Variable | Coef. | Std. Rob | P>|z| | [95% | Conf. Inter] |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Emotional Dependence 1 | -0.064 | 0.021 | 0.003\*\* | -0.105 | -0.022 |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Cons | 0.189 | 0.037 | 0.0001 | 0.116 | 0.263 |
| Ps-R |  |  |  |  | 0.026 |
| N |  |  |  |  | 111 |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |

†P<0.100; \*\*P<0.050; \*\*\*P<0.001. Opposition to the tax is coded as 0 = “Agree”, 1 = “Disagree”.

Table 17B: Logistic Regression with Robust Confidence Intervals. Correlation between the emotional

dependence of the central node and probability of opposing the carbon tax.

|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Variable | Coef. | Std. Rob | P>|z| | [95% | Conf. Inter] |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Emotional Dependence 1 | -0.063 | 0.026 | 0.015\*\* | -0.114 | -0.012 |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Age | 0.004 | 0.004 | 0.311 | -0.004 | 0.012 |
| Education | -0.051 | 0.040 | 0.203 | -0.129 | 0.028 |
| Non-white | 0.063 | 0.077 | 0.415 | -0.089 | 0.214 |
| Female | -0.178 | 0.072 | 0.016\*\* | -0.321 | -0.034 |
| Income | 0.001 | 0.012 | 0.902 | -0.023 | 0.026 |
| Religiosity | -0.037 | 0.032 | 0.249 | -0.101 | 0.027 |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Cons | 0.515 | 0.276 | 0.065 | -0.032 | 1.062 |
| R |  |  |  |  | 0.135 |
| N |  |  |  |  | 111 |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |

†P<0.100; \*\*P<0.050; \*\*\*P<0.001. Opposition to the tax is coded as 0 = “Agree”, 1 = “Disagree”.

*Emotional Dependence of the Central Node Coding 2*

Table 18A: Logistic Regression with Robust Confidence Intervals. Correlation between the emotional

dependence of the central node and probability of opposing the carbon tax.

|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Variable | Coef. | Std. Rob | P>|z| | [95% | Conf. Inter] |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Emotional Dependence 2 | -0.003 | 0.036 | 0.937 | -0.074 | 0.069 |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Cons | 0.189 | 0.038 | 0.0001 | 0.115 | 0.264 |
| Ps-R |  |  |  |  | 0.0001 |
| N |  |  |  |  | 111 |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |

†P<0.100; \*\*P<0.050; \*\*\*P<0.001. Opposition to the tax is coded as 0 = “Agree”, 1 = “Disagree”.

Table 18B: Logistic Regression with Robust Confidence Intervals. Correlation between the emotional

dependence of the central node and probability of opposing the carbon tax.

|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Variable | Coef. | Std. Rob | P>|z| | [95% | Conf. Inter] |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Emotional Dependence 2 | -0.017 | 0.040 | 0.675 | -0.095 | 0.062 |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Age | 0.005 | 0.004 | 0.233 | -0.003 | 0.013 |
| Education | -0.052 | 0.041 | 0.210 | -0.134 | 0.030 |
| Non-white | 0.054 | 0.080 | 0.498 | -0.104 | 0.213 |
| Female | -0.180 | 0.077 | 0.021\*\* | -0.332 | -0.028 |
| Income | 0.001 | 0.012 | 0.917 | -0.022 | 0.025 |
| Religiosity | -0.034 | 0.033 | 0.296 | -0.099 | 0.031 |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Cons | 0.494 | 0.281 | 0.082 | -0.063 | 1.052 |
| R |  |  |  |  | 0.111 |
| N |  |  |  |  | 111 |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |

†P<0.100; \*\*P<0.050; \*\*\*P<0.001. Opposition to the tax is coded as 0 = “Agree”, 1 = “Disagree”.

**Research Question 3***: Is unfamiliarity with the Carbon tax associated with lower levels of emotional dependence?*

*Node Diversity*

Table 19A: Linear Regression with Robust Confidence Intervals. Correlation between node diversity and

unfamiliarity with the carbon tax.

|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Variable | Coef. | Std. Rob | P>|t| | [95% | Conf. Inter] |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Node Diversity | -0.079 | 0.082 | 0.338 | -0.242 | 0.084 |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Cons | 3.216 | 0.075 | 0.0001 | 3.067 | 3.365 |
| R |  |  |  |  | 0.010 |
| N |  |  |  |  | 111 |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |

†P<0.100; \*\*P<0.050; \*\*\*P<0.001. Unfamiliarity is coded from 1-5 “Extremely familiar” to “Not familiar at all”

Table 19B: Linear Regression with Robust Confidence Intervals. Correlation between node diversity and

unfamiliarity with the carbon tax.

|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Variable | Coef. | Std. Rob | P>|t| | [95% | Conf. Inter] |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Node Diversity | -0.069 | 0.085 | 0.421 | -0.237 | 0.100 |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Age | 0.003 | 0.007 | 0.655 | -0.011 | 0.018 |
| Education | -0.045 | 0.067 | 0.501 | -0.179 | 0.088 |
| Non-white | 0.190 | 0.155 | 0.222 | -0.117 | 0.496 |
| Female | 0.527 | 0.147 | 0.001\*\*\* | 0.235 | 0.818 |
| Income | -0.006 | 0.027 | 0.832 | -0.060 | 0.048 |
| Religiosity | -0.066 | 0.056 | 0.238 | -0.176 | 0.044 |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Cons | 3.275 | 0.457 | 0.0001 | 2.369 | 4.182 |
| R |  |  |  |  | 0.142 |
| N |  |  |  |  | 111 |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |

†P<0.100; \*\*P<0.050; \*\*\*P<0.001. Unfamiliarity is coded from 1-5 “Extremely familiar” to “Not familiar at all”

*Emotional Dependence of the Central Node Coding 1*

Table 20A: Linear Regression with Robust Confidence Intervals. Correlation between the emotional

dependence of the central node and unfamiliarity with the carbon tax.

|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Variable | Coef. | Std. Rob | P>|t| | [95% | Conf. Inter] |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Emotional Dependence 1 | 0.095 | 0.085 | 0.265 | -0.073 | 0.263 |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Cons | 3.216 | 0.075 | 0.0001 | 3.067 | 3.365 |
| R |  |  |  |  | 0.014 |
| N |  |  |  |  | 111 |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |

†P<0.100; \*\*P<0.050; \*\*\*P<0.001. Unfamiliarity is coded from 1-5 “Extremely familiar” to “Not familiar at all”

Table 20B: Linear Regression with Robust Confidence Intervals. Correlation between the emotional

dependence of the central node and unfamiliarity with the carbon tax.

|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Variable | Coef. | Std. Rob | P>|t| | [95% | Conf. Inter] |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Emotional Dependence 1 | 0.100 | 0.080 | 0.217 | -0.059 | 0.259 |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Age | 0.006 | 0.007 | 0.365 | -0.007 | 0.020 |
| Education | -0.051 | 0.066 | 0.440 | -0.181 | 0.079 |
| Non-white | 0.178 | 0.156 | 0.256 | -0.131 | 0.486 |
| Female | 0.545 | 0.144 | 0.001\*\*\* | 0.259 | 0.832 |
| Income | -0.010 | 0.025 | 0.695 | -0.060 | 0.040 |
| Religiosity | -0.053 | 0.056 | 0.353 | -0.165 | 0.059 |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Cons | 3.189 | 0.447 | 0.0001 | 2.303 | 4.074 |
| R |  |  |  |  | 0.151 |
| N |  |  |  |  | 111 |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |

†P<0.100; \*\*P<0.050; \*\*\*P<0.001. Unfamiliarity is coded from 1-5 “Extremely familiar” to “Not familiar at all”

*Emotional Dependence of the Central Node Coding 2*

Table 21A: Linear Regression with Robust Confidence Intervals. Correlation between the emotional

dependence of the central node and unfamiliarity with the carbon tax.

|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Variable | Coef. | Std. Rob | P>|t| | [95% | Conf. Inter] |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Emotional Dependence 2 | 0.079 | 0.073 | 0.285 | -0.067 | 0.225 |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Cons | 3.216 | 0.075 | 0.0001 | 3.068 | 3.365 |
| R |  |  |  |  | 0.010 |
| N |  |  |  |  | 111 |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |

†P<0.100; \*\*P<0.050; \*\*\*P<0.001. Unfamiliarity is coded from 1-5 “Extremely familiar” to “Not familiar at all”

Table 21B: Linear Regression with Robust Confidence Intervals. Correlation between the emotional

dependence of the central node and unfamiliarity with the carbon tax.

|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Variable | Coef. | Std. Rob | P>|t| | [95% | Conf. Inter] |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Emotional Dependence 2 | 0.152 | 0.074 | 0.042\*\* | 0.006 | 0.298 |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Age | 0.004 | 0.007 | 0.581 | -0.009 | 0.017 |
| Education | -0.066 | 0.065 | 0.312 | -0.196 | 0.063 |
| Non-white | 0.226 | 0.159 | 0.159 | -0.090 | 0.542 |
| Female | 0.591 | 0.147 | 0.001\*\*\* | 0.299 | 0.883 |
| Income | -0.011 | 0.025 | 0.659 | -0.061 | 0.039 |
| Religiosity | -0.050 | 0.057 | 0.376 | -0.162 | 0.062 |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Cons | 3.320 | 0.441 | 0.0001 | 2.445 | 4.195 |
| R |  |  |  |  | 0.168 |
| N |  |  |  |  | 111 |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |

†P<0.100; \*\*P<0.050; \*\*\*P<0.001. Unfamiliarity is coded from 1-5 “Extremely familiar” to “Not familiar at all”

Table 22C: Linear Regression with Robust Confidence Intervals. Interaction effect between the emotional

dependence of the central node and percentage of ambiguous nodes on unfamiliarity with the carbon tax.

|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Variable | Coef. | Std. Rob | P>|t| | [95% | Conf. Inter] |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Emotional Dependence 2 | 0.149 | 0.077 | 0.056† | -0.004 | 0.303 |
| Percentage of Ambiguous N odes | 0.319 | 0.120 | 0.009\*\* | 0.081 | 0.558 |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Depend##Ambiguous | 0.426 | 0.188 | 0.025\*\* | 0.053 | 0.798 |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Cons | 3.255 | 0.077 | 0.0001 | 3.102 | 3.409 |
| R |  |  |  |  | 0.043 |
| N |  |  |  |  | 111 |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |

†P<0.100; \*\*P<0.050; \*\*\*P<0.001. Unfamiliarity is coded from 1-5 “Extremely familiar” to “Not familiar at all”

Table 22D: Linear Regression with Robust Confidence Intervals. Interaction effect between the emotional

dependence of the central node and percentage of ambiguous nodes on unfamiliarity with the carbon tax.

|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Variable | Coef. | Std. Rob | P>|t| | [95% | Conf. Inter] |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Emotional Dependence 2 | 0.209 | 0.077 | 0.008\*\* | 0.055 | 0.362 |
| Percentage of Ambiguous Nodes | 0.276 | 0.131 | 0.038\*\* | 0.016 | 0.536 |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Depend#Ambiguous | 0.368 | 0.208 | 0.081† | -0.046 | 0.781 |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Age | 0.003 | 0.007 | 0.646 | -0.010 | 0.016 |
| Education | -0.063 | 0.066 | 0.341 | -0.194 | 0.068 |
| Non-white | 0.252 | 0.163 | 0.125 | -0.071 | 0.575 |
| Female | 0.556 | 0.149 | 0.0001\*\*\* | 0.259 | 0.852 |
| Income | -0.005 | 0.025 | 0.845 | -0.055 | 0.045 |
| Religiosity | -0.068 | 0.058 | 0.247 | -0.183 | 0.048 |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Cons | 3.381 | 0.445 | 0.0001 | 2.498 | 4.264 |
| R |  |  |  |  | 0.191 |
| N |  |  |  |  | 111 |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |

†P<0.100; \*\*P<0.050; \*\*\*P<0.001. Unfamiliarity is coded from 1-5 “Extremely familiar” to “Not familiar at all”

*Percentage of Neutral Nodes*

Table 23A: Linear Regression with Robust Confidence Intervals. Correlation between the percentage of

neutral nodes and the unfamiliarity with the carbon tax.

|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Variable | Coef. | Std. Rob | P>|t| | [95% | Conf. Inter] |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Percentage of Neutral  Nodes | 0.072 | 0.098 | 0.464 | -0.122 | 0.266 |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Cons | 3.216 | 0.075 | 0.0001 | 3.068 | 3.365 |
| R |  |  |  |  | 0.008 |
| N |  |  |  |  | 111 |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |

†P<0.100; \*\*P<0.050; \*\*\*P<0.001. Unfamiliarity is coded from 1-5 “Extremely familiar” to “Not familiar at all”

Table 23B: Linear Regression with Robust Confidence Intervals. Correlation between the percentage of

neutral nodes and the unfamiliarity with the carbon tax.

|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Variable | Coef. | Std. Rob | P>|t| | [95% | Conf. Inter] |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Percentage of Neutral  Nodes | 0.033 | 0.101 | 0.743 | -0.168 | 0.235 |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Age | 0.005 | 0.007 | 0.469 | -0.008 | 0.018 |
| Education | -0.045 | 0.066 | 0.503 | -0.176 | 0.087 |
| Non-white | 0.173 | 0.159 | 0.281 | -0.143 | 0.489 |
| Female | 0.532 | 0.144 | 0.001\*\*\* | 0.247 | 0.817 |
| Income | -0.009 | 0.026 | 0.736 | -0.061 | 0.043 |
| Religiosity | -0.059 | 0.057 | 0.300 | -0.172 | 0.053 |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Cons | 3.222 | 0.448 | 0.0001 | 2.334 | 4.111 |
| R |  |  |  |  | 0.138 |
| N |  |  |  |  | 111 |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |

†P<0.100; \*\*P<0.050; \*\*\*P<0.001. Unfamiliarity is coded from 1-5 “Extremely familiar” to “Not familiar at all”

**Research Question 4**: *Is the emotional valence of the CAM, negative vs. positive, associated with support or opposition to the carbon tax?*

*Overall CAM Valence, Coding Number 1*

Table 24A: Linear Regression with Robust Confidence Intervals. Correlation between CAM Valence and

support for the carbon tax.

|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Variable | Coef. | Std. Rob | P>|t| | [95% | Conf. Inter] |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| CAM Valence 1 | 0.833 | 0.109 | 0.0001\*\*\* | 0.617 | 1.050 |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Cons | 5.063 | 0.137 | 0.0001 | 4.792 | 5.334 |
| R |  |  |  |  | 0.253 |
| N |  |  |  |  | 111 |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |

†P<0.100; \*\*P<0.050; \*\*\*P<0.001. Support for the carbon tax is coded on a 7-point Likert-scale

“Strongly disagree” to “Strongly agree”.

Table 24B: Linear Regression with Robust Confidence Intervals. Correlation between CAM Valence and

support for the carbon tax.

|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Variable | Coef. | Std. Rob | P>|t| | [95% | Conf. Inter] |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| CAM Valence 1 | 0.730 | 0.108 | 0.0001\*\*\* | 0.515 | 0.944 |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Age | -0.014 | 0.012 | 0.270 | -0.038 | 0.011 |
| Education | 0.088 | 0.112 | 0.433 | -0.134 | 0.310 |
| Non-white | -0.207 | 0.293 | 0.483 | -0.789 | 0.376 |
| Female | 0.574 | 0.279 | 0.042\*\* | 0.020 | 1.127 |
| Income | 0.016 | 0.046 | 0.725 | -0.075 | 0.107 |
| Religiosity | 0.143 | 0.121 | 0.240 | -0.097 | 0.384 |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Cons | 4.267 | 0.869 | 0.0001 | 2.544 | 5.991 |
| R |  |  |  |  | 0.311 |
| N |  |  |  |  | 111 |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |

†P<0.100; \*\*P<0.050; \*\*\*P<0.001. Support for the carbon tax is coded on a 7-point Likert-scale

“Strongly disagree” to “Strongly agree”.

*Overall CAM Valence, Coding Number 2*

Table 25A: Linear Regression with Robust Confidence Intervals. Correlation between CAM

Valence and support for the carbon tax.

|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Variable | Coef. | Std. Rob | P>|t| | [95% | Conf. Inter] |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| CAM Valence 2 | 0.837 | 0.107 | 0.0001\*\*\* | 0.626 | 1.049 |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Cons | 5.063 | 0.136 | 0.0001 | 4.793 | 5.334 |
| R |  |  |  |  | 0.253 |
| N |  |  |  |  | 111 |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |

†P<0.100; \*\*P<0.050; \*\*\*P<0.001. Support for the carbon tax is coded on a 7-point Likert-scale

“Strongly disagree” to “Strongly agree”.

Table 25B: Linear Regression with Robust Confidence Intervals. Correlation between CAM

Valence and support for the carbon tax.

|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Variable | Coef. | Std. Rob | P>|t| | [95% | Conf. Inter] |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| CAM Valence 2 | 0.735 | 0.108 | 0.0001\*\*\* | 0.522 | 0.948 |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Age | -0.012 | 0.012 | 0.315 | -0.037 | 0.012 |
| Education | 0.083 | 0.111 | 0.457 | -0.138 | 0.304 |
| Non-white | -0.216 | 0.293 | 0.463 | -0.797 | 0.365 |
| Female | 0.580 | 0.278 | 0.039\*\* | 0.029 | 1.130 |
| Income | 0.013 | 0.046 | 0.773 | -0.077 | 0.104 |
| Religiosity | 0.145 | 0.122 | 0.237 | -0.097 | 0.386 |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Cons | 4.269 | 0.866 | 0.0001 | 2.551 | 5.987 |
| R |  |  |  |  | 0.313 |
| N |  |  |  |  | 111 |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |

†P<0.100; \*\*P<0.050; \*\*\*P<0.001. Support for the carbon tax is coded on a 7-point Likert-scale

“Strongly disagree” to “Strongly agree”.

*Percentage of Different Node Types*

Table 26A: Linear Regression with Robust Confidence Intervals. Correlation between the percentages of

different nodes by valence and support for the carbon tax.

|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Variable | Coef. | Std. Rob | P>|t| | [95% | Conf. Inter] |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| % of Positive Nodes | 0.397 | 0.147 | 0.008\*\* | 0.105 | 0.689 |
| % of Negative Nodes | -0.553 | 0.164 | 0.001\*\*\* | -0.879 | -0.228 |
| % of Neutral Nodes | 0.015 | 0.175 | 0.934 | -0.333 | 0.362 |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Cons | 5.063 | 0.141 | 0.0001 | 4.784 | 5.342 |
| R |  |  |  |  | 0.224 |
| N |  |  |  |  | 111 |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |

†P<0.100; \*\*P<0.050; \*\*\*P<0.001. Support for the carbon tax is coded on a 7-point Likert-scale

“Strongly disagree” to “Strongly agree”.

Table 26B: Linear Regression with Robust Confidence Intervals. Correlation between the percentages of

different nodes by valence and support for the carbon tax.

|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Variable | Coef. | Std. Rob | P>|t| | [95% | Conf. Inter] |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| % of Positive Nodes | 0.389 | 0.117 | 0.001\*\*\* | 0.156 | 0.621 |
| % of Negative Nodes | -0.444 | 0.144 | 0.003\*\* | -0.729 | -0.159 |
| % of Neutral Nodes | 0.065 | 0.159 | 0.684 | -0.250 | 0.379 |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Age | -0.016 | 0.013 | 0.213 | -0.041 | 0.009 |
| Education | 0.100 | 0.118 | 0.397 | -0.134 | 0.335 |
| Non-white | -0.220 | 0.303 | 0.471 | -0.821 | 0.382 |
| Female | 0.541 | 0.287 | 0.062† | -0.028 | 1.111 |
| Income | 0.012 | 0.047 | 0.806 | -0.082 | 0.106 |
| Religiosity | 0.197 | 0.121 | 0.108 | -0.044 | 0.438 |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Cons | 4.147 | 0.908 | 0.0001 | 2.346 | 5.947 |
| R |  |  |  |  | 0.293 |
| N |  |  |  |  | 111 |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |

†P<0.100; \*\*P<0.050; \*\*\*P<0.001. Support for the carbon tax is coded on a 7-point Likert-scale

“Strongly disagree” to “Strongly agree”.

Table 27A: Linear Regression with Robust Confidence Intervals. Correlation between the percentage of

positive nodes and support for the carbon tax.

|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Variable | Coef. | Std. Rob | P>|t| | [95% | Conf. Inter] |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| % of Positive Nodes | 0.579 | 0.148 | 0.0001\*\*\* | 0.285 | 0.873 |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Cons | 5.063 | 0.148 | 0.0001 | 4.769 | 5.357 |
| R |  |  |  |  | 0.122 |
| N |  |  |  |  | 111 |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |

†P<0.100; \*\*P<0.050; \*\*\*P<0.001. Support for the carbon tax is coded on a 7-point Likert-scale

“Strongly disagree” to “Strongly agree”.

Table 27B: Linear Regression with Robust Confidence Intervals. Correlation between the percentage of

negative nodes and support for the carbon tax.

|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Variable | Coef. | Std. Rob | P>|t| | [95% | Conf. Inter] |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| % of Negative Nodes | -0.694 | 0.156 | 0.0001\*\*\* | -1.004 | -0.384 |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Cons | 5.063 | 0.144 | 0.0001 | 4.778 | 5.348 |
| R |  |  |  |  | 0.175 |
| N |  |  |  |  | 111 |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |

†P<0.100; \*\*P<0.050; \*\*\*P<0.001. Support for the carbon tax is coded on a 7-point Likert-scale

“Strongly disagree” to “Strongly agree”.

Table 27C: Linear Regression with Robust Confidence Intervals. Correlation between the percentage of

neutral nodes and support for the carbon tax.

|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Variable | Coef. | Std. Rob | P>|t| | [95% | Conf. Inter] |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| % of Neutral Nodes | 0.112 | 0.172 | 0.518 | -0.230 | 0.453 |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Cons | 5.063 | 0.158 | 0.0001 | 4.750 | 5.376 |
| R |  |  |  |  | 0.005 |
| N |  |  |  |  | 111 |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |

†P<0.100; \*\*P<0.050; \*\*\*P<0.001. Support for the carbon tax is coded on a 7-point Likert-scale

“Strongly disagree” to “Strongly agree”.

Research Question 4 (logistic models): *Is the emotional valence of the CAM correlated with support for the carbon tax?*

*Overall CAM Valence, Coding Number 1*

Table 28A: Logistic Regression with Robust Confidence Intervals. Correlation between CAM

Valence and the probability of opposing the carbon tax.

|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Variable | Coef. | Std. Rob | P>|z| | [95% | Conf. Inter] |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| CAM Valence 1 | -1.021 | 0.257 | 0.0001\*\*\* | -1.525 | -0.516 |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Cons | -1.701 | 0.284 | 0.0001 | -2.258 | -1.145 |
| Ps-R |  |  |  |  | 0.134 |
| N |  |  |  |  | 111 |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |

†P<0.100; \*\*P<0.050; \*\*\*P<0.001. Opposition to the tax is coded as 0 = “Agree”, 1 = “Disagree”.

Table 28B: Logistic Regression with Robust Confidence Intervals. Correlation between CAM

Valence and the probability of opposing the carbon tax.

|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Variable | Coef. | Std. Rob | P>|z| | [95% | Conf. Inter] |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| CAM Valence 1 | -1.032 | 0.312 | 0.001\*\*\* | -1.643 | -0.421 |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Age | 0.025 | 0.025 | 0.312 | -0.024 | 0.074 |
| Education | -0.293 | 0.277 | 0.290 | -0.835 | 0.250 |
| Non-white | 0.186 | 0.554 | 0.737 | -0.900 | 1.273 |
| Female | -1.319 | 0.666 | 0.048\*\* | -2.624 | -0.013 |
| Income | 0.028 | 0.098 | 0.779 | -0.165 | 0.220 |
| Religiosity | -0.142 | 0.230 | 0.536 | -0.594 | 0.309 |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Cons | -0.206 | 1.873 | 0.913 | -3.878 | 3.466 |
| Ps-R |  |  |  |  | 0.212 |
| N |  |  |  |  | 111 |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |

†P<0.100; \*\*P<0.050; \*\*\*P<0.001. Opposition to the tax is coded as 0 = “Agree”, 1 = “Disagree”.

Table 29A: Logistic Regression with Robust Confidence Intervals. Correlation between CAM

Valence and the probability of opposing the carbon tax.

|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Variable | Coef. | Std. Rob | P>|z| | [95% | Conf. Inter] |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| CAM Valence 2 | -1.037 | 0.266 | 0.0001\*\*\* | -1.558 | -0.516 |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Cons | -1.701 | 0.284 | 0.0001 | -2.257 | -1.145 |
| Ps-R |  |  |  |  | 0.135 |
| N |  |  |  |  | 111 |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |

†P<0.100; \*\*P<0.050; \*\*\*P<0.001. Opposition to the tax is coded as 0 = “Agree”, 1 = “Disagree”.

Table 29B: Logistic Regression with Robust Confidence Intervals. Correlation between CAM

Valence and the probability of opposing the carbon tax.

|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Variable | Coef. | Std. Rob | P>|z| | [95% | Conf. Inter] |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| CAM Valence 2 | -1.057 | 0.328 | 0.001\*\*\* | -1.701 | -0.414 |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Age | 0.024 | 0.025 | 0.337 | -0.025 | 0.073 |
| Education | -0.283 | 0.278 | 0.308 | -0.828 | 0.261 |
| Non-white | 0.201 | 0.554 | 0.717 | -0.885 | 1.287 |
| Female | -1.330 | 0.671 | 0.047\*\* | -2.644 | -0.015 |
| Income | 0.031 | 0.099 | 0.750 | -0.162 | 0.225 |
| Religiosity | -0.146 | 0.230 | 0.525 | -0.596 | 0.304 |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Cons | -0.230 | 1.883 | 0.903 | -3.921 | 3.460 |
| Ps-R |  |  |  |  | 0.213 |
| N |  |  |  |  | 111 |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |

†P<0.100; \*\*P<0.050; \*\*\*P<0.001. Opposition to the tax is coded as 0 = “Agree”, 1 = “Disagree”.

*Percentage of Different Nodes*

Table 30A: Logistic Regression with Robust Confidence Intervals. Correlation between the percentage of

different node types and the probability of opposing the carbon tax.

|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Variable | Coef. | Std. Rob | P>|z| | [95% | Conf. Inter] |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| % of Positive Nodes | -0.539 | 0.264 | 0.041\*\* | -1.056 | -0.022 |
| % of Negative Nodes | 0.518 | 0.269 | 0.054† | -0.009 | 1.045 |
| % of Neutral Nodes | -0.009 | 0.304 | 0.976 | -0.606 | 0.587 |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Cons | -1.649 | 0.269 | 0.0001 | -2.176 | -1.122 |
| Ps-R |  |  |  |  | 0.104 |
| N |  |  |  |  | 111 |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |

†P<0.100; \*\*P<0.050; \*\*\*P<0.001. Opposition to the tax is coded as 0 = “Agree”, 1 = “Disagree”.

Table 30B: Logistic Regression with Robust Confidence Intervals. Correlation between the percentage of

different node types and the probability of opposing the carbon tax.

|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Variable | Coef. | Std. Rob | P>|z| | [95% | Conf. Inter] |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| % of Positive Nodes | -0.632 | 0.268 | 0.018\*\* | -1.158 | -0.107 |
| % of Negative Nodes | 0.392 | 0.264 | 0.138 | -0.125 | 0.910 |
| % of Neutral Nodes | -0.091 | 0.308 | 0.768 | -0.693 | 0.512 |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Age | 0.025 | 0.023 | 0.282 | -0.020 | 0.070 |
| Education | -0.302 | 0.275 | 0.272 | -0.840 | 0.237 |
| Non-white | 0.221 | 0.538 | 0.680 | -0.832 | 1.275 |
| Female | -1.278 | 0.633 | 0.044\*\* | -2.518 | -0.037 |
| Income | 0.042 | 0.094 | 0.654 | -0.143 | 0.227 |
| Religiosity | -0.239 | 0.225 | 0.289 | -0.680 | 0.203 |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Cons | 0.081 | 1.869 | 0.965 | -3.581 | 3.744 |
| Ps-R |  |  |  |  | 0.190 |
| N |  |  |  |  | 111 |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |

†P<0.100; \*\*P<0.050; \*\*\*P<0.001. Opposition to the tax is coded as 0 = “Agree”, 1 = “Disagree”.

Table 31A: Logistic Regression with Robust Confidence Intervals. Correlation between the percentage of

positive nodes and the probability of opposing the carbon tax.

|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Variable | Coef. | Std. Rob | P>|z| | [95% | Conf. Inter] |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| % of Positive Nodes | -0.652 | 0.223 | 0.003\*\* | -1.089 | -0.215 |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Cons | -1.578 | 0.254 | 0.0001 | -2.076 | -1.081 |
| Ps-R |  |  |  |  | 0.064 |
| N |  |  |  |  | 111 |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |

†P<0.100; \*\*P<0.050; \*\*\*P<0.001. Opposition to the tax is coded as 0 = “Agree”, 1 = “Disagree”.

Table 31B: Logistic Regression with Robust Confidence Intervals. Correlation between the percentage of

negative nodes and the probability of opposing the carbon tax.

|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Variable | Coef. | Std. Rob | P>|z| | [95% | Conf. Inter] |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| % of Negative Nodes | 0.711 | 0.278 | 0.011\*\* | 0.165 | 1.257 |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Cons | -1.595 | 0.281 | 0.0001 | -2.146 | -1.044 |
| Ps-R |  |  |  |  | 0.074 |
| N |  |  |  |  | 111 |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |

†P<0.100; \*\*P<0.050; \*\*\*P<0.001. Opposition to the tax is coded as 0 = “Agree”, 1 = “Disagree”.

Table 31C: Logistic Regression with Robust Confidence Intervals. Correlation between the percentage of

neutral nodes and the probability of opposing the carbon tax.

|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Variable | Coef. | Std. Rob | P>|z| | [95% | Conf. Inter] |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| % of Neutral Nodes | -0.083 | 0.280 | 0.766 | -0.632 | 0.466 |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Cons | -1.457 | 0.244 | 0.0001 | -1.936 | -0.979 |
| Ps-R |  |  |  |  | 0.001 |
| N |  |  |  |  | 111 |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |

†P<0.100; \*\*P<0.050; \*\*\*P<0.001. Opposition to the tax is coded as 0 = “Agree”, 1 = “Disagree”.

**Research Question 5**: *How does emotional valence compare to party identification and self-reported ideology as a predictor of support for the Carbon tax?*

*Overall Cam Valence, Coding 1*

Table 32: Linear Regression with Robust Confidence Intervals. Correlations between ideological

orientation and support for the carbon tax.

|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Variable | Coef. | Std. Rob | P>|t| | [95% | Conf. Inter] |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Ideological Orientation | -1.124 | 0.116 | 0.0001\*\*\* | -1.354 | -0.894 |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Cons | 5.063 | 0.116 | 0.0001 | 4.833 | 5.294 |
| R |  |  |  |  | 0.459 |
| N |  |  |  |  | 111 |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |

†P<0.100; \*\*P<0.050; \*\*\*P<0.001. Support for the carbon tax is coded on a 7-point Likert-scale

“Strongly disagree” to “Strongly agree”.

Table 33: Linear Regression with Robust Confidence Intervals. Correlations between CAM

Valence and support for the carbon tax.

|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Variable | Coef. | Std. Rob | P>|t| | [95% | Conf. Inter] |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| CAM Valence 1 | 0.833 | 0.109 | 0.0001\*\*\* | 0.617 | 1.050 |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Cons | 5.063 | 0.137 | 0.0001 | 4.792 | 5.334 |
| R |  |  |  |  | 0.253 |
| N |  |  |  |  | 111 |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |

†P<0.100; \*\*P<0.050; \*\*\*P<0.001. Support for the carbon tax is coded on a 7-point Likert-scale

“Strongly disagree” to “Strongly agree”.

Table 34A: Linear Regression with Robust Confidence Intervals. Correlations between CAM

Valence and ideological orientation and support for the carbon tax.

|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Variable | Coef. | Std. Rob | P>|t| | [95% | Conf. Inter] |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| CAM Valence 1 | 0.498 | 0.100 | 0.0001\*\*\* | 0.300 | 0.696 |
| Ideological Orientation | -0.948 | 0.122 | 0.0001\*\*\* | -1.189 | -0.707 |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Cons | 5.063 | 0.108 | 0.0001 | 4.849 | 5.277 |
| R |  |  |  |  | 0.538 |
| N |  |  |  |  | 111 |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |

†P<0.100; \*\*P<0.050; \*\*\*P<0.001. Support for the carbon tax is coded on a 7-point Likert-scale

“Strongly disagree” to “Strongly agree”.

Table 34B: Linear Regression with Robust Confidence Intervals. Correlations between CAM

Valence and ideological orientation and support for the carbon tax.

|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Variable | Coef. | Std. Rob | P>|z| | [95% | Conf. Inter] |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| CAM Valence 1 | 0.417 | 0.093 | 0.0001\*\*\* | 0.233 | 0.601 |
| Ideological Orientation | -0.963 | 0.131 | 0.0001\*\*\* | -1.222 | -0.703 |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Age | -0.019 | 0.010 | 0.058† | -0.039 | 0.001 |
| Education | 0.065 | 0.094 | 0.491 | -0.122 | 0.253 |
| Non-white | -0.229 | 0.249 | 0.360 | -0.723 | 0.265 |
| Female | 0.175 | 0.229 | 0.447 | -0.279 | 0.629 |
| Income | 0.076 | 0.036 | 0.039\*\* | 0.004 | 0.148 |
| Religiosity | -0.020 | 0.108 | 0.851 | -0.234 | 0.193 |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Cons | 4.943 | 0.730 | 0.0001 | 3.494 | 6.392 |
| R |  |  |  |  | 0.572 |
| N |  |  |  |  | 111 |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |

†P<0.100; \*\*P<0.050; \*\*\*P<0.001. Support for the carbon tax is coded on a 7-point Likert-scale

“Strongly disagree” to “Strongly agree”.

*Overall Cam Valence, Coding 2*

Table 35A: Linear Regression with Robust Confidence Intervals. Correlations between CAM

Valence and ideological orientation on support for the carbon tax.

|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Variable | Coef. | Std. Rob | P>|t| | [95% | Conf. Inter] |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| CAM Valence 2 | 0.507 | 0.097 | 0.0001\*\*\* | 0.315 | 0.699 |
| Ideological Orientation | -0.947 | 0.121 | 0.0001\*\*\* | -1.186 | -0.707 |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Cons | 5.063 | 0.108 | 0.0001 | 4.850 | 5.276 |
| R |  |  |  |  | 0.541 |
| N |  |  |  |  | 111 |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |

†P<0.100; \*\*P<0.050; \*\*\*P<0.001. Support for the carbon tax is coded on a 7-point Likert-scale

“Strongly disagree” to “Strongly agree”.

Table 35B: Linear Regression with Robust Confidence Intervals. Correlations between CAM

Valence and ideological orientation on support for the carbon tax.

|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Variable | Coef. | Std. Rob | P>|z| | [95% | Conf. Inter] |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| CAM Valence 2 | 0.424 | 0.092 | 0.0001\*\*\* | 0.242 | 0.606 |
| Ideological Orientation | -0.961 | 0.131 | 0.0001\*\*\* | -1.221 | -0.702 |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Age | -0.019 | 0.010 | 0.069† | -0.039 | 0.001 |
| Education | 0.062 | 0.094 | 0.512 | -0.125 | 0.249 |
| Non-white | -0.234 | 0.248 | 0.349 | -0.726 | 0.259 |
| Female | 0.178 | 0.229 | 0.438 | -0.275 | 0.632 |
| Income | 0.074 | 0.036 | 0.044\*\* | 0.002 | 0.146 |
| Religiosity | -0.020 | 0.107 | 0.855 | -0.232 | 0.193 |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Cons | 4.945 | 0.729 | 0.0001 | 3.499 | 6.391 |
| R |  |  |  |  | 0.573 |
| N |  |  |  |  | 111 |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |

†P<0.100; \*\*P<0.050; \*\*\*P<0.001. Support for the carbon tax is coded on a 7-point Likert-scale

“Strongly disagree” to “Strongly agree”.

*Support by the Carbon Tax by Political Party*

* To reduce variation resulting from low identification with certain parties federal political party identification is recoded into a four-tier \*\*1=green/NDP, 2=Liberal, 3=Conservative/People’s Party, 4=other

Table 36: Linear Regression with Robust Confidence Intervals. Correlations between party

identification and support for the carbon tax.

|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Variable | Coef. | Std. Rob | P>|t| | [95% | Conf. Inter] |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Political Party |  |  |  |  |  |
| Liberals | -0.116 | 0.260 | 0.656 | -0.632 | 0.400 |
| Conservatives/PP | -2.324 | 0.384 | 0.0001\*\*\* | -3.085 | -1.564 |
| Other | -1.732 | 0.904 | 0.058 | -3.523 | 0.059 |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Cons | 5.732 | 0.196 | 0.0001 | 5.344 | 6.120 |
| R |  |  |  |  | 0.360 |
| N |  |  |  |  | 111 |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |

†P<0.100; \*\*P<0.050; \*\*\*P<0.001. Support for the carbon tax is coded on a 7-point Likert-scale

“Strongly disagree” to “Strongly agree”.

Table 37A: Linear Regression with Robust Confidence Intervals. Correlations between the CAM

Valence and party identification and support for the carbon tax.

|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Variable | Coef. | Std. Rob | P>|t| | [95% | Conf. Inter] |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| CAM Valence 1 | 0.591 | 0.103 | 0.0001\*\*\* | 0.387 | 0.796 |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Political Party |  |  |  |  |  |
| Liberals | 0.102 | 0.259 | 0.693 | -0.411 | 0.615 |
| Conservatives/PP | -1.820 | 0.403 | 0.0001\*\*\* | -2.618 | -1.022 |
| Other | -0.935 | 0.540 | 0.087† | -2.006 | 0.137 |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Cons | 5.503 | 0.212 | 0.0001 | 5.083 | 5.924 |
| R |  |  |  |  | 0.468 |
| N |  |  |  |  | 111 |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |

†P<0.100; \*\*P<0.050; \*\*\*P<0.001. Support for the carbon tax is coded on a 7-point Likert-scale

“Strongly disagree” to “Strongly agree”.

Table 37B: Linear Regression with Robust Confidence Intervals. Correlations between the CAM

Valence and party identification and support for the carbon tax.

|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Variable | Coef. | Std. Rob | P>|t| | [95% | Conf. Inter] |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| CAM Valence 1 | 0.523 | 0.097 | 0.0001\*\*\* | 0.330 | 0.717 |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Political Party |  |  |  |  |  |
| Liberals | 0.175 | 0.274 | 0.524 | -0.369 | 0.720 |
| Conservatives/PP | -1.736 | 0.440 | 0.0001\*\*\* | -2.609 | -0.863 |
| Other | -0.917 | 0.511 | 0.076† | -1.931 | 0.098 |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Age | -0.014 | 0.011 | 0.195 | -0.036 | 0.007 |
| Education | 0.025 | 0.101 | 0.807 | -0.176 | 0.226 |
| Non-white | -0.285 | 0.282 | 0.315 | -0.844 | 0.275 |
| Female | 0.228 | 0.250 | 0.365 | -0.269 | 0.725 |
| Income | 0.058 | 0.041 | 0.165 | -0.024 | 0.140 |
| Religiosity | 0.068 | 0.103 | 0.509 | -0.136 | 0.271 |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Cons | 5.222 | 0.747 | 0.0001 | 3.740 | 6.704 |
| R |  |  |  |  | 0.500 |
| N |  |  |  |  | 111 |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |

†P<0.100; \*\*P<0.050; \*\*\*P<0.001. Support for the carbon tax is coded on a 7-point Likert-scale

“Strongly disagree” to “Strongly agree”.

Table 38A: Linear Regression with Robust Confidence Intervals. Correlations between CAM Valence

and party identification and support for the carbon tax.

|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Variable | Coef. | Std. Rob | P>|t| | [95% | Conf. Inter] |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| CAM Valence 2 | 0.596 | 0.101 | 0.0001\*\*\* | 0.396 | 0.795 |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Political Party |  |  |  |  |  |
| Liberals | 0.100 | 0.258 | 0.699 | -0.411 | 0.612 |
| Conservatives/PP | -1.818 | 0.401 | 0.0001\*\*\* | -2.613 | -1.023 |
| Other | -0.920 | 0.524 | 0.082† | -1.958 | 0.118 |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Cons | 5.503 | 0.211 | 0.0001 | 5.084 | 5.922 |
| R |  |  |  |  | 0.470 |
| N |  |  |  |  | 111 |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |

†P<0.100; \*\*P<0.050; \*\*\*P<0.001. Support for the carbon tax is coded on a 7-point Likert-scale

“Strongly disagree” to “Strongly agree”.

Table 38B: Linear Regression with Robust Confidence Intervals. Correlations between CAM Valence

and party identification and support for the carbon tax.

|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Variable | Coef. | Std. Rob | P>|t| | [95% | Conf. Inter] |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| CAM Valence 2 | 0.527 | 0.097 | 0.0001\*\*\* | 0.336 | 0.719 |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Political Party |  |  |  |  |  |
| Liberals | 0.172 | 0.274 | 0.531 | -0.372 | 0.716 |
| Conservatives/PP | -1.734 | 0.440 | 0.0001\*\*\* | -2.606 | -0.862 |
| Other | -0.909 | 0.500 | 0.072† | -1.901 | 0.083 |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Age | -0.013 | 0.011 | 0.224 | -0.035 | 0.008 |
| Education | 0.021 | 0.101 | 0.833 | -0.179 | 0.222 |
| Non-white | -0.291 | 0.282 | 0.305 | -0.850 | 0.268 |
| Female | 0.233 | 0.250 | 0.353 | -0.263 | 0.729 |
| Income | 0.056 | 0.041 | 0.180 | -0.026 | 0.137 |
| Religiosity | 0.069 | 0.102 | 0.503 | -0.134 | 0.272 |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Cons | 5.222 | 0.747 | 0.0001 | 3.741 | 6.703 |
| R |  |  |  |  | 0.500 |
| N |  |  |  |  | 111 |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |

†P<0.100; \*\*P<0.050; \*\*\*P<0.001. Support for the carbon tax is coded on a 7-point Likert-scale

“Strongly disagree” to “Strongly agree”.

*Correlation between node diversity and Ideological Orientation*

Table 39: Linear Regression with Robust Confidence Intervals. Correlations between ideological

orientation and node diversity.

|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Variable | Coef. | Std. Rob | P>|t| | [95% | Conf. Inter] |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Ideological Orientation | 0.177 | 0.091 | 0.053† | -0.002 | 0.357 |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Cons | 0.000 | 0.094 | 1.000 | -0.186 | 0.186 |
| R |  |  |  |  | 0.031 |
| N |  |  |  |  | 111 |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |

†P<0.100; \*\*P<0.050; \*\*\*P<0.001. Positive scores indicate greater node diversity.

Table 40: Linear Regression with Robust Confidence Intervals. Correlations between party identification

and node diversity.

|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Variable | Coef. | Std. Rob | P>|t| | [95% | Conf. Inter] |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Political Party |  |  |  |  |  |
| Liberals | -0.098 | 0.208 | 0.639 | -0.510 | 0.314 |
| Conservatives/PP | 0.374 | 0.266 | 0.164 | -0.155 | 0.902 |
| Other | 0.569 | 0.431 | 0.189 | -0.285 | 1.424 |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Cons | -0.077 | 0.139 | 0.581 | -0.353 | 0.199 |
| R |  |  |  |  | 0.044 |
| N |  |  |  |  | 111 |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |

†P<0.100; \*\*P<0.050; \*\*\*P<0.001. Positive scores indicate greater node diversity.

**Research Question 6**: *Are network density and centrality correlated with political interest?*

Table 41: Linear Regression with Robust Confidence Intervals. Correlation between network density

and political interest.

|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Variable | Coef. | Std. Rob | P>|t| | [95% | Conf. Inter] |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Density | -0.112 | 0.260 | 0.668 | -0.627 | 0.403 |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Cons | 5.577 | 0.245 | 0.0001 | 5.092 | 6.061 |
| R |  |  |  |  | 0.002 |
| N |  |  |  |  | 111 |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |

†P<0.100; \*\*P<0.050; \*\*\*P<0.001. Political interest is measured on an 11-point scale, low to high interest.

Table 42: Linear Regression with Robust Confidence Intervals. Correlation between network centrality

and political interest.

|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Variable | Coef. | Std. Rob | P>|t| | [95% | Conf. Inter] |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Degree Centrality | 0.009 | 0.242 | 0.971 | -0.470 | 0.488 |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Cons | 5.577 | 0.245 | 0.0001 | 5.091 | 6.062 |
| R |  |  |  |  | 0.001 |
| N |  |  |  |  | 111 |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |

†P<0.100; \*\*P<0.050; \*\*\*P<0.001. Political interest is measured on an 11-point scale, low to high interest.

Table 43: Linear Regression with Robust Confidence Intervals. Correlation between network

eigenvector centrality and political interest.

|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Variable | Coef. | Std. Rob | P>|t| | [95% | Conf. Inter] |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Eigen Vector Centrality | -0.335 | 0.217 | 0.126 | -0.766 | 0.096 |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Cons | 5.577 | 0.243 | 0.0001 | 5.096 | 6.058 |
| R |  |  |  |  | 0.017 |
| N |  |  |  |  | 111 |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |

†P<0.100; \*\*P<0.050; \*\*\*P<0.001. Political interest is measured on an 11-point scale, low to high interest.

Table 44: Linear Regression with Robust Confidence Intervals. Correlation between betweenness

network centrality and political interest.

|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Variable | Coef. | Std. Rob | P>|t| | [95% | Conf. Inter] |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Betweeness Centrality | 0.184 | 0.247 | 0.457 | -0.305 | 0.674 |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Cons | 5.577 | 0.244 | 0.0001 | 5.093 | 6.061 |
| R |  |  |  |  | 0.005 |
| N |  |  |  |  | 111 |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |

†P<0.100; \*\*P<0.050; \*\*\*P<0.001. Political interest is measured on an 11-point scale, low to high interest.

Table 45: Linear Regression with Robust Confidence Intervals. Correlation between the number of nodes

and political interest.

|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Variable | Coef. | Std. Rob | P>|t| | [95% | Conf. Inter] |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Number of Nodes | 0.101 | 0.240 | 0.675 | -0.375 | 0.576 |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Cons | 5.577 | 0.245 | 0.0001 | 5.092 | 6.061 |
| R |  |  |  |  | 0.002 |
| N |  |  |  |  | 111 |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |

†P<0.100; \*\*P<0.050; \*\*\*P<0.001. Political interest is measured on an 11-point scale, low to high interest.

Table 46: Linear Regression with Robust Confidence Intervals. Correlation between the number of edges

and political interest.

|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Variable | Coef. | Std. Rob | P>|t| | [95% | Conf. Inter] |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Number of Edges | 0.150 | 0.231 | 0.518 | -0.308 | 0.608 |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Cons | 5.577 | 0.244 | 0.000 | 5.092 | 6.061 |
| R |  |  |  |  | 0.003 |
| N |  |  |  |  | 111 |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |

†P<0.100; \*\*P<0.050; \*\*\*P<0.001. Political interest is measured on an 11-point scale, low to high interest.

Table 47: Linear Regression with Robust Confidence Intervals. Correlation between network diameter

and political interest.

|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Variable | Coef. | Std. Rob | P>|t| | [95% | Conf. Inter] |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Diameter | 0.091 | 0.246 | 0.712 | -0.397 | 0.580 |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Cons | 5.577 | 0.245 | 0.0001 | 5.092 | 6.061 |
| R |  |  |  |  | 0.001 |
| N |  |  |  |  | 111 |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |

†P<0.100; \*\*P<0.050; \*\*\*P<0.001. Political interest is measured on an 11-point scale, low to high interest.

Table 48: Linear Regression with Robust Confidence Intervals. Correlation between network triadic

closure and political interest.

|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Variable | Coef. | Std. Rob | P>|t| | [95% | Conf. Inter] |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Triadic Closure | 0.236 | 0.283 | 0.407 | -0.325 | 0.797 |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Cons | 5.577 | 0.244 | 0.0001 | 5.093 | 6.060 |
| R |  |  |  |  | 0.008 |
| N |  |  |  |  | 111 |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |

†P<0.100; \*\*P<0.050; \*\*\*P<0.001. Political interest is measured on an 11-point scale, low to high interest.

Table 49: Linear Regression with Robust Confidence Intervals. Correlation between number of dashed

(incoherent) edges and political interest.

|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Variable | Coef. | Std. Rob | P>|t| | [95% | Conf. Inter] |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Dashed Edges | 0.091 | 0.241 | 0.707 | -0.387 | 0.569 |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Cons | 5.577 | 0.245 | 0.0001 | 5.092 | 6.061 |
| R |  |  |  |  | 0.001 |
| N |  |  |  |  | 111 |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |

†P<0.100; \*\*P<0.050; \*\*\*P<0.001. Political interest is measured on an 11-point scale, low to high interest.

Table 50: Linear Regression with Robust Confidence Intervals. Correlation between number of solid

(coherent) edges and political interest.

|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Variable | Coef. | Std. Rob | P>|t| | [95% | Conf. Inter] |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Solid Edges | 0.211 | 0.245 | 0.391 | -0.275 | 0.697 |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Cons | 5.633 | 0.244 | 0.0001 | 5.149 | 6.117 |
| R |  |  |  |  | 0.007 |
| N |  |  |  |  | 111 |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |

†P<0.100; \*\*P<0.050; \*\*\*P<0.001. Political interest is measured on an 11-point scale, low to high interest.

Table 51: Linear Regression with Robust Confidence Intervals. Correlation between assortativity

and political interest.

|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Variable | Coef. | Std. Rob | P>|t| | [95% | Conf. Inter] |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Assortativity | -0.010 | 0.238 | 0.967 | -0.481 | 0.461 |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Cons | 5.577 | 0.245 | 0.0001 | 5.091 | 6.062 |
| R |  |  |  |  | 0.001 |
| N |  |  |  |  | 111 |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |

†P<0.100; \*\*P<0.050; \*\*\*P<0.001. Political interest is measured on an 11-point scale, low to high interest.

*Interactions between measures of Interest and reverse coded familiarity with density and centrality*

Table 52A: Linear Regression with Robust Confidence Intervals. Interaction effect between political interest

and familiarity with the carbon tax on CAM density.

|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Variable | Coef. | Std. Rob | P>|t| | [95% | Conf. Inter] |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Political Interest | 0.197 | 0.094 | 0.039\*\* | 0.010 | 0.384 |
| Tax Familiarity | 0.715 | 0.244 | 0.004\*\* | 0.231 | 1.198 |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Interest#Familarity | -0.085 | 0.037 | 0.024\*\* | -0.159 | -0.012 |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Cons | -1.704 | 0.539 | 0.002 | -2.773 | -0.636 |
| R |  |  |  |  | 0.061 |
| N |  |  |  |  | 111 |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |

†P<0.100; \*\*P<0.050; \*\*\*P<0.001. Positive scores indicate greater network density.

Table 52B: Linear Regression with Robust Confidence Intervals. Interaction effect between political interest

and familiarity with the carbon tax on CAM density.

|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Variable | Coef. | Std. Rob | P>|t| | [95% | Conf. Inter] |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Political Interest | 0.156 | 0.097 | 0.110 | -0.036 | 0.349 |
| Tax Familiarity | 0.618 | 0.225 | 0.007\*\* | 0.172 | 1.065 |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Interest#Familarity | -0.072 | 0.036 | 0.048\*\* | -0.142 | -0.001 |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Age | 0.006 | 0.009 | 0.520 | -0.012 | 0.024 |
| Education | 0.042 | 0.076 | 0.583 | -0.109 | 0.192 |
| Non-white | -0.259 | 0.221 | 0.244 | -0.697 | 0.179 |
| Female | -0.127 | 0.177 | 0.476 | -0.479 | 0.225 |
| Income | 0.005 | 0.036 | 0.890 | -0.066 | 0.076 |
| Religiosity | -0.147 | 0.100 | 0.144 | -0.346 | 0.051 |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Cons | -1.286 | 0.633 | 0.045 | -2.543 | -0.030 |
| R |  |  |  |  | 0.112 |
| N |  |  |  |  | 111 |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |

†P<0.100; \*\*P<0.050; \*\*\*P<0.001. Positive scores indicate greater network density.

Table 53A: Linear Regression with Robust Confidence Intervals. Interaction effect between political

interest and familiarity with the carbon tax on CAM degree centrality.

|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Variable | Coef. | Std. Rob | P>|t| | [95% | Conf. Inter] |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Political Interest | 0.245 | 0.122 | 0.047\*\* | 0.004 | 0.486 |
| Tax Familiarity | 0.511 | 0.239 | 0.034\*\* | 0.038 | 0.984 |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Interest#Familarity | -0.088 | 0.039 | 0.028\*\* | -0.165 | -0.010 |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Cons | -1.368 | 0.685 | 0.048 | -2.726 | -0.010 |
| R |  |  |  |  | 0.030 |
| N |  |  |  |  | 111 |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |

†P<0.100; \*\*P<0.050; \*\*\*P<0.001. Positive scores indicate greater centrality.

Table 53B: Linear Regression with Robust Confidence Intervals. Interaction effect between political

interest and familiarity with the carbon tax on CAM degree centrality.

|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Variable | Coef. | Std. Rob | P>|t| | [95% | Conf. Inter] |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Political Interest | 0.192 | 0.130 | 0.142 | -0.066 | 0.451 |
| Tax Familiarity | 0.423 | 0.255 | 0.100† | -0.083 | 0.929 |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Interest#Familarity | -0.076 | 0.042 | 0.077† | -0.160 | 0.008 |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Age | 0.022 | 0.010 | 0.024\*\* | 0.003 | 0.042 |
| Education | -0.021 | 0.073 | 0.777 | -0.166 | 0.125 |
| Non-white | -0.095 | 0.211 | 0.653 | -0.514 | 0.323 |
| Female | -0.183 | 0.199 | 0.361 | -0.578 | 0.213 |
| Income | 0.039 | 0.033 | 0.242 | -0.027 | 0.104 |
| Religiosity | -0.065 | 0.096 | 0.497 | -0.255 | 0.125 |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Cons | -1.545 | 0.876 | 0.081 | -3.282 | 0.192 |
| R |  |  |  |  | 0.112 |
| N |  |  |  |  | 111 |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |

†P<0.100; \*\*P<0.050; \*\*\*P<0.001. Positive scores indicate greater centrality.

Table 54A: Linear Regression with Robust Confidence Intervals. Interaction effect between political

interest and familiarity with the carbon tax on CAM eigenvector centrality.

|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Variable | Coef. | Std. Rob | P>|t| | [95% | Conf. Inter] |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Political Interest | 0.056 | 0.120 | 0.644 | -0.182 | 0.293 |
| Tax Familiarity | -0.340 | 0.216 | 0.118 | -0.769 | 0.088 |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Interest#Familarity | -0.020 | 0.038 | 0.592 | -0.096 | 0.055 |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Cons | 0.970 | 0.632 | 0.128 | -0.282 | 2.223 |
| R |  |  |  |  | 0.133 |
| N |  |  |  |  | 111 |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |

†P<0.100; \*\*P<0.050; \*\*\*P<0.001. Positive scores indicate greater centrality.

Table 54B: Linear Regression with Robust Confidence Intervals. Interaction effect between political

interest and familiarity with the carbon tax on CAM eigenvector centrality.

|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Variable | Coef. | Std. Rob | P>|t| | [95% | Conf. Inter] |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Political Interest | 0.020 | 0.131 | 0.881 | -0.240 | 0.280 |
| Tax Familiarity | -0.377 | 0.238 | 0.117 | -0.849 | 0.096 |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Interest#Familarity | -0.013 | 0.043 | 0.762 | -0.098 | 0.072 |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Age | 0.021 | 0.008 | 0.010\*\* | 0.005 | 0.038 |
| Education | -0.078 | 0.074 | 0.291 | -0.225 | 0.068 |
| Non-white | 0.328 | 0.193 | 0.093† | -0.056 | 0.711 |
| Female | -0.101 | 0.197 | 0.609 | -0.492 | 0.289 |
| Income | 0.042 | 0.032 | 0.186 | -0.021 | 0.106 |
| Religiosity | -0.007 | 0.080 | 0.932 | -0.166 | 0.153 |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Cons | 0.595 | 0.866 | 0.494 | -1.123 | 2.313 |
| R |  |  |  |  | 0.217 |
| N |  |  |  |  | 111 |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |

†P<0.100; \*\*P<0.050; \*\*\*P<0.001. Positive scores indicate greater centrality.

Table 55A: Linear Regression with Robust Confidence Intervals. Interaction effect between political

interest and familiarity with the carbon tax on CAM betweenness centrality.

|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Variable | Coef. | Std. Rob | P>|t| | [95% | Conf. Inter] |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Political Interest | 0.008 | 0.136 | 0.952 | -0.262 | 0.278 |
| Tax Familiarity | -0.432 | 0.285 | 0.133 | -0.997 | 0.133 |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Interest#Familarity | 0.019 | 0.045 | 0.666 | -0.069 | 0.108 |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Cons | 0.842 | 0.815 | 0.304 | -0.774 | 2.457 |
| R |  |  |  |  | 0.064 |
| N |  |  |  |  | 111 |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |

†P<0.100; \*\*P<0.050; \*\*\*P<0.001. Positive scores indicate greater centrality.

Table 55B: Linear Regression with Robust Confidence Intervals. Interaction effect between political

interest and familiarity with the carbon tax on CAM betweenness centrality.

|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Variable | Coef. | Std. Rob | P>|t| | [95% | Conf. Inter] |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Political Interest | 0.034 | 0.150 | 0.822 | -0.264 | 0.332 |
| Tax Familiarity | -0.347 | 0.303 | 0.256 | -0.949 | 0.255 |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Interest#Familarity | 0.006 | 0.049 | 0.903 | -0.091 | 0.103 |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Age | 0.007 | 0.010 | 0.497 | -0.014 | 0.028 |
| Education | -0.082 | 0.075 | 0.277 | -0.230 | 0.066 |
| Non-white | 0.196 | 0.198 | 0.326 | -0.198 | 0.589 |
| Female | 0.053 | 0.193 | 0.783 | -0.329 | 0.435 |
| Income | 0.059 | 0.033 | 0.079† | -0.007 | 0.126 |
| Religiosity | 0.082 | 0.088 | 0.352 | -0.092 | 0.257 |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Cons | 0.211 | 0.936 | 0.822 | -1.645 | 2.067 |
| R |  |  |  |  | 0.112 |
| N |  |  |  |  | 111 |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |

†P<0.100; \*\*P<0.050; \*\*\*P<0.001. Positive scores indicate greater centrality.

Table 56A: Linear Regression with Robust Confidence Intervals. Interaction effect between political

interest and familiarity with the carbon tax on CAM diameter.

|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Variable | Coef. | Std. Rob | P>|t| | [95% | Conf. Inter] |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Political Interest | -0.159 | 0.133 | 0.234 | -0.422 | 0.104 |
| Tax Familiarity | -0.550 | 0.248 | 0.029\*\* | -1.042 | -0.057 |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Interest#Familarity | 0.068 | 0.045 | 0.130 | -0.020 | 0.156 |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Cons | 1.313 | 0.684 | 0.058 | -0.043 | 2.670 |
| R |  |  |  |  | 0.064 |
| N |  |  |  |  | 111 |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |

†P<0.100; \*\*P<0.050; \*\*\*P<0.001. Positive scores indicate greater diameter.

Table 56B: Linear Regression with Robust Confidence Intervals. Interaction effect between political

interest and familiarity with the carbon tax on CAM diameter.

|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Variable | Coef. | Std. Rob | P>|t| | [95% | Conf. Inter] |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Political Interest | -0.100 | 0.137 | 0.467 | -0.371 | 0.171 |
| Tax Familiarity | -0.423 | 0.263 | 0.111 | -0.946 | 0.099 |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Interest#Familarity | 0.053 | 0.047 | 0.259 | -0.040 | 0.145 |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Age | -0.021 | 0.009 | 0.026\*\* | -0.040 | -0.003 |
| Education | -0.023 | 0.070 | 0.747 | -0.162 | 0.117 |
| Non-white | 0.032 | 0.207 | 0.876 | -0.378 | 0.443 |
| Female | 0.288 | 0.189 | 0.132 | -0.088 | 0.664 |
| Income | -0.042 | 0.035 | 0.232 | -0.113 | 0.028 |
| Religiosity | 0.099 | 0.088 | 0.263 | -0.075 | 0.273 |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Cons | 1.500 | 0.795 | 0.062 | -0.077 | 3.078 |
| R |  |  |  |  | 0.154 |
| N |  |  |  |  | 111 |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |

†P<0.100; \*\*P<0.050; \*\*\*P<0.001. Positive scores indicate greater diameter.

Table 57A: Linear Regression with Robust Confidence Intervals. Interaction effect between political

interest and familiarity with the carbon tax on CAM triadic closure.

|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Variable | Coef. | Std. Rob | P>|t| | [95% | Conf. Inter] |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Political Interest | 0.216 | 0.129 | 0.096† | -0.039 | 0.472 |
| Tax Familiarity | 0.725 | 0.288 | 0.013\*\* | 0.154 | 1.295 |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Interest#Familarity | -0.076 | 0.049 | 0.125 | -0.173 | 0.021 |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Cons | -1.994 | 0.671 | 0.004 | -3.325 | -0.664 |
| R |  |  |  |  | 0.081 |
| N |  |  |  |  | 111 |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |

†P<0.100; \*\*P<0.050; \*\*\*P<0.001. Positive scores indicate greater triadic closure.

Table 57B: Linear Regression with Robust Confidence Intervals. Interaction effect between political

interest and familiarity with the carbon tax on CAM triadic closure.

|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Variable | Coef. | Std. Rob | P>|t| | [95% | Conf. Inter] |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Political Interest | 0.218 | 0.136 | 0.112 | -0.051 | 0.488 |
| Tax Familiarity | 0.699 | 0.286 | 0.016\*\* | 0.133 | 1.266 |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Interest#Familarity | -0.072 | 0.051 | 0.157 | -0.173 | 0.028 |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Age | -0.002 | 0.009 | 0.836 | -0.020 | 0.016 |
| Education | -0.060 | 0.073 | 0.414 | -0.205 | 0.085 |
| Non-white | -0.135 | 0.206 | 0.512 | -0.544 | 0.273 |
| Female | -0.077 | 0.197 | 0.695 | -0.467 | 0.313 |
| Income | 0.006 | 0.034 | 0.866 | -0.062 | 0.073 |
| Religiosity | -0.176 | 0.086 | 0.045\*\* | -0.347 | -0.004 |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Cons | -0.996 | 0.792 | 0.211 | -2.566 | 0.574 |
| R |  |  |  |  | 0.127 |
| N |  |  |  |  | 111 |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |

†P<0.100; \*\*P<0.050; \*\*\*P<0.001. Positive scores indicate greater triadic closure.

Table 58A: Linear Regression with Robust Confidence Intervals. Interaction effect between political

interest and familiarity with the carbon tax on CAM assortativity.

|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Variable | Coef. | Std. Rob | P>|t| | [95% | Conf. Inter] |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Political Interest | -0.207 | 0.137 | 0.135 | -0.479 | 0.066 |
| Tax Familiarity | -0.359 | 0.255 | 0.162 | -0.866 | 0.147 |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Interest#Familarity | 0.071 | 0.044 | 0.106 | -0.016 | 0.159 |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Cons | 0.993 | 0.755 | 0.191 | -0.504 | 2.489 |
| R |  |  |  |  | 0.021 |
| N |  |  |  |  | 111 |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |

†P<0.100; \*\*P<0.050; \*\*\*P<0.001. Positive scores indicate greater assortativity.

Table 58B: Linear Regression with Robust Confidence Intervals. Interaction effect between political

interest and familiarity with the carbon tax on CAM triadic closure.

|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Variable | Coef. | Std. Rob | P>|t| | [95% | Conf. Inter] |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Political Interest | -0.125 | 0.146 | 0.394 | -0.415 | 0.165 |
| Tax Familiarity | -0.205 | 0.275 | 0.457 | -0.750 | 0.340 |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Interest#Familarity | 0.048 | 0.047 | 0.313 | -0.046 | 0.142 |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Age | -0.020 | 0.009 | 0.035\*\* | -0.038 | -0.001 |
| Education | -0.082 | 0.066 | 0.218 | -0.213 | 0.049 |
| Non-white | -0.154 | 0.202 | 0.446 | -0.554 | 0.245 |
| Female | 0.221 | 0.204 | 0.283 | -0.185 | 0.626 |
| Income | -0.019 | 0.031 | 0.534 | -0.081 | 0.042 |
| Religiosity | 0.074 | 0.085 | 0.386 | -0.095 | 0.242 |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Cons | 1.445 | 0.948 | 0.131 | -0.435 | 3.325 |
| R |  |  |  |  | 0.112 |
| N |  |  |  |  | 111 |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |

†P<0.100; \*\*P<0.050; \*\*\*P<0.001. Positive scores indicate greater assortativity.

**Research Question 7**: *Are the density and centrality of the network with correlated low issue sophistication?*

Table 59A: Linear Regression with Robust Confidence Intervals. Correlations between network density

and issue sophistication.

|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Variable | Coef. | Std. Rob | P>|t| | [95% | Conf. Inter] |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Density | -0.214 | 0.200 | 0.286 | -0.610 | 0.181 |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Cons | 7.117 | 0.153 | 0.0001 | 6.813 | 7.421 |
| R |  |  |  |  | 0.017 |
| N |  |  |  |  | 111 |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |

†P<0.100; \*\*P<0.050; \*\*\*P<0.001. Issue sophistication is a composite measure running less sophisticated

to more sophisticated with a range from 0-14.

Table 59B: Linear Regression with Robust Confidence Intervals. Correlations between network density

and issue sophistication.

|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Variable | Coef. | Std. Rob | P>|t| | [95% | Conf. Inter] |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Density | -0.179 | 0.207 | 0.390 | -0.590 | 0.232 |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Age | -0.029 | 0.017 | 0.087† | -0.062 | 0.004 |
| Education | 0.450 | 0.175 | 0.011\*\* | 0.103 | 0.796 |
| Non-white | 0.012 | 0.319 | 0.969 | -0.620 | 0.645 |
| Female | -0.037 | 0.301 | 0.903 | -0.634 | 0.560 |
| Income | 0.006 | 0.048 | 0.905 | -0.089 | 0.100 |
| Religiosity | 0.172 | 0.139 | 0.219 | -0.104 | 0.449 |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Cons | 4.970 | 1.251 | 0.0001 | 2.490 | 7.451 |
| R |  |  |  |  | 0.149 |
| N |  |  |  |  | 111 |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |

†P<0.100; \*\*P<0.050; \*\*\*P<0.001. Issue sophistication is a composite measure running less sophisticated

to more sophisticated with a range from 0-14.

Table 60A: Linear Regression with Robust Confidence Intervals. Correlations between network degree

centrality and issue sophistication.

|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Variable | Coef. | Std. Rob | P>|t| | [95% | Conf. Inter] |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Centrality | -0.288 | 0.165 | 0.084† | -0.615 | 0.040 |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Cons | 7.117 | 0.152 | 0.0001 | 6.815 | 7.419 |
| R |  |  |  |  | 0.032 |
| N |  |  |  |  | 111 |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |

†P<0.100; \*\*P<0.050; \*\*\*P<0.001. Issue sophistication is a composite measure running less sophisticated

to more sophisticated with a range from 0-14.

Table 60B: Linear Regression with Robust Confidence Intervals. Correlations between network degree

centrality and issue sophistication.

|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Variable | Coef. | Std. Rob | P>|t| | [95% | Conf. Inter] |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Centrality | -0.222 | 0.190 | 0.244 | -0.598 | 0.154 |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Age | -0.025 | 0.018 | 0.178 | -0.060 | 0.011 |
| Education | 0.437 | 0.173 | 0.013\*\* | 0.093 | 0.782 |
| Non-white | 0.045 | 0.320 | 0.889 | -0.590 | 0.680 |
| Female | -0.033 | 0.301 | 0.914 | -0.630 | 0.565 |
| Income | 0.013 | 0.048 | 0.792 | -0.083 | 0.108 |
| Religiosity | 0.182 | 0.136 | 0.185 | -0.088 | 0.453 |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Cons | 4.809 | 1.247 | 0.0001 | 2.335 | 7.283 |
| R |  |  |  |  | 0.154 |
| N |  |  |  |  | 111 |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |

†P<0.100; \*\*P<0.050; \*\*\*P<0.001. Issue sophistication is a composite measure running less sophisticated

to more sophisticated with a range from 0-14.

Table 61A: Linear Regression with Robust Confidence Intervals. Correlations between eigenvector

network centrality and issue sophistication.

|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Variable | Coef. | Std. Rob | P>|t| | [95% | Conf. Inter] |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Eigen Vector Centrality | -0.448 | 0.140 | 0.002\*\* | -0.726 | -0.170 |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Cons | 7.117 | 0.149 | 0.0001 | 6.822 | 7.412 |
| R |  |  |  |  | 0.076 |
| N |  |  |  |  | 111 |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |

†P<0.100; \*\*P<0.050; \*\*\*P<0.001. Issue sophistication is a composite measure running less sophisticated

to more sophisticated with a range from 0-14.

Table 61B: Linear Regression with Robust Confidence Intervals. Correlations between eigenvector

network centrality and issue sophistication.

|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Variable | Coef. | Std. Rob | P>|t| | [95% | Conf. Inter] |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Eigen Vector Centrality | -0.390 | 0.134 | 0.004\*\* | -0.655 | -0.124 |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Age | -0.021 | 0.017 | 0.216 | -0.054 | 0.012 |
| Education | 0.400 | 0.165 | 0.017\*\* | 0.073 | 0.728 |
| Non-white | 0.224 | 0.326 | 0.494 | -0.422 | 0.870 |
| Female | 0.059 | 0.289 | 0.838 | -0.513 | 0.631 |
| Income | 0.020 | 0.047 | 0.667 | -0.073 | 0.113 |
| Religiosity | 0.185 | 0.135 | 0.174 | -0.083 | 0.454 |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Cons | 4.734 | 1.178 | 0.0001 | 2.397 | 7.071 |
| R |  |  |  |  | 0.189 |
| N |  |  |  |  | 111 |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |

†P<0.100; \*\*P<0.050; \*\*\*P<0.001. Issue sophistication is a composite measure running less sophisticated

to more sophisticated with a range from 0-14.

Table 62A: Linear Regression with Robust Confidence Intervals. Correlations between reference to carbon

Tax in individuals’ central node and eigenvector centrality score.

|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Variable | Coef. | Std. Rob | P>|t| | [95% | Conf. Inter] |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Carbon Tax | 0.717 | 0.181 | 0.0001\*\*\* | 0.359 | 1.076 |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Cons | -0.459 | 0.139 | 0.0001 | -0.734 | -0.184 |
| R |  |  |  |  | 0.120 |
| N |  |  |  |  | 111 |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |

†P<0.100; \*\*P<0.050; \*\*\*P<0.001. Content is coded 1 = no reference to carbon tax, 2 = reference to

carbon tax.

Table 62B: Linear Regression with Robust Confidence Intervals. Correlations between reference to carbon

Tax in individuals’ central node and eigenvector centrality score.

|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Variable | Coef. | Std. Rob | P>|t| | [95% | Conf. Inter] |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Carbon Tax | 0.723 | 0.181 | 0.0001\*\*\* | 0.363 | 1.083 |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Age | 0.024 | 0.008 | 0.002\*\* | 0.009 | 0.040 |
| Education | -0.055 | 0.072 | 0.447 | -0.198 | 0.088 |
| Non-white | 0.452 | 0.187 | 0.017\*\* | 0.081 | 0.822 |
| Female | 0.101 | 0.181 | 0.580 | -0.259 | 0.460 |
| Income | 0.014 | 0.031 | 0.660 | -0.048 | 0.075 |
| Religiosity | -0.029 | 0.077 | 0.708 | -0.182 | 0.124 |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Cons | -1.156 | 0.539 | 0.034 | -2.225 | -0.087 |
| R |  |  |  |  | 0.212 |
| N |  |  |  |  | 111 |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |

†P<0.100; \*\*P<0.050; \*\*\*P<0.001. Content is coded 1 = no reference to carbon tax, 2 = reference to

carbon tax.

Table 63A: Linear Regression with Robust Confidence Intervals. Correlations between betweenness

network centrality and issue sophistication.

|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Variable | Coef. | Std. Rob | P>|t| | [95% | Conf. Inter] |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Betweeness Centrality | -0.239 | 0.165 | 0.150 | -0.565 | 0.088 |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Cons | 7.117 | 0.153 | 0.0001 | 6.814 | 7.420 |
| R |  |  |  |  | 0.022 |
| N |  |  |  |  | 111 |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |

†P<0.100; \*\*P<0.050; \*\*\*P<0.001. Issue sophistication is a composite measure running less sophisticated

to more sophisticated with a range from 0-14.

Table 63B: Linear Regression with Robust Confidence Intervals. Correlations between betweenness

network centrality and issue sophistication.

|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Variable | Coef. | Std. Rob | P>|t| | [95% | Conf. Inter] |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Betweeness Centrality | -0.236 | 0.157 | 0.135 | -0.546 | 0.075 |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Age | -0.027 | 0.016 | 0.099† | -0.060 | 0.005 |
| Education | 0.417 | 0.170 | 0.016\*\* | 0.081 | 0.754 |
| Non-white | 0.119 | 0.319 | 0.710 | -0.514 | 0.752 |
| Female | 0.050 | 0.291 | 0.863 | -0.527 | 0.627 |
| Income | 0.020 | 0.047 | 0.672 | -0.073 | 0.113 |
| Religiosity | 0.220 | 0.139 | 0.117 | -0.056 | 0.495 |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Cons | 4.792 | 1.225 | 0.0001 | 2.362 | 7.223 |
| R |  |  |  |  | 0.157 |
| N |  |  |  |  | 111 |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |

†P<0.100; \*\*P<0.050; \*\*\*P<0.001. Issue sophistication is a composite measure running less sophisticated

to more sophisticated with a range from 0-14.

Table 64A: Linear Regression with Robust Confidence Intervals. Correlations between the number of nodes

and issue sophistication.

|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Variable | Coef. | Std. Rob | P>|t| | [95% | Conf. Inter] |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Number of Nodes | 0.359 | 0.158 | 0.025\*\* | 0.045 | 0.672 |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Cons | 7.117 | 0.151 | 0.0001 | 6.818 | 7.416 |
| R |  |  |  |  | 0.049 |
| N |  |  |  |  | 111 |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |

†P<0.100; \*\*P<0.050; \*\*\*P<0.001. Issue sophistication is a composite measure running less sophisticated

to more sophisticated with a range from 0-14.

Table 64B: Linear Regression with Robust Confidence Intervals. Correlations between the number of nodes

and issue sophistication.

|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Variable | Coef. | Std. Rob | P>|t| | [95% | Conf. Inter] |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Number of Nodes | 0.329 | 0.158 | 0.040\*\* | 0.015 | 0.642 |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Age | -0.024 | 0.017 | 0.163 | -0.058 | 0.010 |
| Education | 0.450 | 0.175 | 0.011\*\* | 0.103 | 0.797 |
| Non-white | 0.063 | 0.311 | 0.840 | -0.554 | 0.680 |
| Female | 0.001 | 0.294 | 0.996 | -0.582 | 0.585 |
| Income | 0.019 | 0.049 | 0.697 | -0.078 | 0.116 |
| Religiosity | 0.160 | 0.135 | 0.239 | -0.108 | 0.428 |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Cons | 4.729 | 1.234 | 0.0001 | 2.283 | 7.176 |
| R |  |  |  |  | 0.175 |
| N |  |  |  |  | 111 |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |

†P<0.100; \*\*P<0.050; \*\*\*P<0.001. Issue sophistication is a composite measure running less sophisticated

to more sophisticated with a range from 0-14.

Table 65A: Linear Regression with Robust Confidence Intervals. Correlations between the number of edges

and issue sophistication.

|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Variable | Coef. | Std. Rob | P>|t| | [95% | Conf. Inter] |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Number of Edges | 0.386 | 0.141 | 0.007\*\* | 0.107 | 0.666 |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Cons | 7.117 | 0.150 | 0.0001 | 6.819 | 7.415 |
| R |  |  |  |  | 0.057 |
| N |  |  |  |  | 111 |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |

†P<0.100; \*\*P<0.050; \*\*\*P<0.001. Issue sophistication is a composite measure running less sophisticated

to more sophisticated with a range from 0-14.

Table 65B: Linear Regression with Robust Confidence Intervals. Correlations between the number of edges

and issue sophistication.

|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Variable | Coef. | Std. Rob | P>|t| | [95% | Conf. Inter] |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Number of Edges | 0.361 | 0.141 | 0.012\*\* | 0.082 | 0.640 |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Age | -0.023 | 0.017 | 0.167 | -0.057 | 0.010 |
| Education | 0.440 | 0.173 | 0.013\*\* | 0.097 | 0.784 |
| Non-white | 0.144 | 0.314 | 0.648 | -0.479 | 0.767 |
| Female | 0.061 | 0.295 | 0.836 | -0.523 | 0.646 |
| Income | 0.021 | 0.050 | 0.674 | -0.077 | 0.119 |
| Religiosity | 0.166 | 0.135 | 0.220 | -0.101 | 0.433 |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Cons | 4.671 | 1.216 | 0.0001 | 2.259 | 7.083 |
| R |  |  |  |  | 0.183 |
| N |  |  |  |  | 111 |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |

†P<0.100; \*\*P<0.050; \*\*\*P<0.001. Issue sophistication is a composite measure running less sophisticated

to more sophisticated with a range from 0-14.

Table 66A: Linear Regression with Robust Confidence Intervals. Correlations between network diameter

and issue sophistication.

|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Variable | Coef. | Std. Rob | P>|t| | [95% | Conf. Inter] |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Diameter | 0.084 | 0.171 | 0.625 | -0.255 | 0.423 |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Cons | 7.117 | 0.154 | 0.0001 | 6.811 | 7.423 |
| R |  |  |  |  | 0.003 |
| N |  |  |  |  | 111 |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |

†P<0.100; \*\*P<0.050; \*\*\*P<0.001. Issue sophistication is a composite measure running less sophisticated

to more sophisticated with a range from 0-14.

Table 66B: Linear Regression with Robust Confidence Intervals. Correlations between network diameter

and issue sophistication.

|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Variable | Coef. | Std. Rob | P>|t| | [95% | Conf. Inter] |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Diameter | 0.015 | 0.190 | 0.939 | -0.362 | 0.391 |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Age | -0.030 | 0.018 | 0.097† | -0.065 | 0.005 |
| Education | 0.439 | 0.174 | 0.013\*\* | 0.094 | 0.784 |
| Non-white | 0.061 | 0.323 | 0.850 | -0.579 | 0.702 |
| Female | -0.004 | 0.317 | 0.990 | -0.633 | 0.625 |
| Income | 0.007 | 0.050 | 0.893 | -0.092 | 0.105 |
| Religiosity | 0.199 | 0.139 | 0.156 | -0.077 | 0.476 |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Cons | 4.932 | 1.258 | 0.0001 | 2.437 | 7.428 |
| R |  |  |  |  | 0.137 |
| N |  |  |  |  | 111 |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |

†P<0.100; \*\*P<0.050; \*\*\*P<0.001. Issue sophistication is a composite measure running less sophisticated

to more sophisticated with a range from 0-14.

Table 67A: Linear Regression with Robust Confidence Intervals. Correlations between network triadic

closure and issue sophistication.

|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Variable | Coef. | Std. Rob | P>|t| | [95% | Conf. Inter] |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Triadic Closure | -0.081 | 0.184 | 0.663 | -0.446 | 0.285 |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Cons | 7.117 | 0.154 | 0.0001 | 6.811 | 7.423 |
| R |  |  |  |  | 0.003 |
| N |  |  |  |  | 111 |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |

†P<0.100; \*\*P<0.050; \*\*\*P<0.001. Issue sophistication is a composite measure running less sophisticated

to more sophisticated with a range from 0-14.

Table 67B: Linear Regression with Robust Confidence Intervals. Correlations between network triadic

closure and issue sophistication.

|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Variable | Coef. | Std. Rob | P>|t| | [95% | Conf. Inter] |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Triadic Closure | -0.008 | 0.184 | 0.967 | -0.372 | 0.357 |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Age | -0.030 | 0.017 | 0.073† | -0.063 | 0.003 |
| Education | 0.438 | 0.175 | 0.014\*\* | 0.091 | 0.785 |
| Non-white | 0.061 | 0.326 | 0.853 | -0.585 | 0.707 |
| Female | -0.001 | 0.303 | 0.998 | -0.602 | 0.600 |
| Income | 0.006 | 0.049 | 0.901 | -0.091 | 0.104 |
| Religiosity | 0.200 | 0.135 | 0.143 | -0.068 | 0.468 |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Cons | 4.947 | 1.240 | 0.0001 | 2.488 | 7.405 |
| R |  |  |  |  | 0.137 |
| N |  |  |  |  | 111 |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |

†P<0.100; \*\*P<0.050; \*\*\*P<0.001. Issue sophistication is a composite measure running less sophisticated

to more sophisticated with a range from 0-14.

Table 68A: Linear Regression with Robust Confidence Intervals. Correlations between number of dashed

(incoherent) edges and issue sophistication.

|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Variable | Coef. | Std. Rob | P>|t| | [95% | Conf. Inter] |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Dashed Edges | 0.132 | 0.144 | 0.360 | -0.153 | 0.418 |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Cons | 7.117 | 0.154 | 0.0001 | 6.812 | 7.423 |
| R |  |  |  |  | 0.007 |
| N |  |  |  |  | 111 |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |

†P<0.100; \*\*P<0.050; \*\*\*P<0.001. Issue sophistication is a composite measure running less sophisticated

to more sophisticated with a range from 0-14.

Table 68B: Linear Regression with Robust Confidence Intervals. Correlations between number of dashed

(incoherent) edges and issue sophistication.

|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Variable | Coef. | Std. Rob | P>|t| | [95% | Conf. Inter] |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Dashed Edges | 0.095 | 0.150 | 0.528 | -0.203 | 0.393 |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Age | -0.030 | 0.016 | 0.072† | -0.062 | 0.003 |
| Education | 0.426 | 0.180 | 0.020\*\* | 0.069 | 0.783 |
| Non-white | 0.095 | 0.324 | 0.771 | -0.549 | 0.738 |
| Female | 0.042 | 0.316 | 0.894 | -0.584 | 0.669 |
| Income | 0.007 | 0.049 | 0.888 | -0.090 | 0.104 |
| Religiosity | 0.200 | 0.142 | 0.161 | -0.081 | 0.481 |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Cons | 4.974 | 1.266 | 0.0001 | 2.462 | 7.485 |
| R |  |  |  |  | 0.140 |
| N |  |  |  |  | 111 |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |

†P<0.100; \*\*P<0.050; \*\*\*P<0.001. Issue sophistication is a composite measure running less sophisticated

to more sophisticated with a range from 0-14.

Table 69A: Linear Regression with Robust Confidence Intervals. Correlations between number of solid

(coherent) edges and issue sophistication.

|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Variable | Coef. | Std. Rob | P>|t| | [95% | Conf. Inter] |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Solid Edges | 0.329 | 0.139 | 0.020\*\* | 0.054 | 0.605 |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Cons | 7.101 | 0.153 | 0.0001 | 6.797 | 7.405 |
| R |  |  |  |  | 0.041 |
| N |  |  |  |  | 111 |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |

†P<0.100; \*\*P<0.050; \*\*\*P<0.001. Issue sophistication is a composite measure running less sophisticated

to more sophisticated with a range from 0-14.

Table 69B: Linear Regression with Robust Confidence Intervals. Correlations between number of solid

(coherent) edges and issue sophistication.

|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Variable | Coef. | Std. Rob | P>|t| | [95% | Conf. Inter] |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Solid Edges | 0.304 | 0.154 | 0.052† | -0.002 | 0.610 |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Age | -0.023 | 0.017 | 0.182 | -0.057 | 0.011 |
| Education | 0.440 | 0.174 | 0.013\*\* | 0.094 | 0.785 |
| Non-white | 0.116 | 0.318 | 0.715 | -0.515 | 0.748 |
| Female | 0.002 | 0.296 | 0.995 | -0.586 | 0.589 |
| Income | 0.023 | 0.052 | 0.657 | -0.079 | 0.125 |
| Religiosity | 0.166 | 0.137 | 0.228 | -0.106 | 0.438 |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Cons | 4.670 | 1.216 | 0.0001 | 2.257 | 7.083 |
| R |  |  |  |  | 0.166 |
| N |  |  |  |  | 111 |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |

†P<0.100; \*\*P<0.050; \*\*\*P<0.001. Issue sophistication is a composite measure running less sophisticated

to more sophisticated with a range from 0-14.

Table 70A: Linear Regression with Robust Confidence Intervals. Correlations between assortativity

and issue sophistication.

|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Variable | Coef. | Std. Rob | P>|t| | [95% | Conf. Inter] |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Assortativity | 0.278 | 0.130 | 0.034\*\* | 0.021 | 0.536 |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Cons | 7.117 | 0.152 | 0.0001 | 6.815 | 7.419 |
| R |  |  |  |  | 0.030 |
| N |  |  |  |  | 111 |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |

†P<0.100; \*\*P<0.050; \*\*\*P<0.001. Issue sophistication is a composite measure running less sophisticated

to more sophisticated with a range from 0-14.

Table 70B: Linear Regression with Robust Confidence Intervals. Correlations between assortativity

and issue sophistication.

|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Variable | Coef. | Std. Rob | P>|t| | [95% | Conf. Inter] |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Assortativity | 0.262 | 0.140 | 0.064† | -0.015 | 0.539 |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Age | -0.027 | 0.017 | 0.118 | -0.062 | 0.007 |
| Education | 0.489 | 0.171 | 0.005\*\* | 0.150 | 0.827 |
| Non-white | 0.016 | 0.317 | 0.960 | -0.613 | 0.645 |
| Female | 0.006 | 0.296 | 0.985 | -0.582 | 0.593 |
| Income | -0.010 | 0.046 | 0.837 | -0.101 | 0.082 |
| Religiosity | 0.154 | 0.139 | 0.269 | -0.121 | 0.429 |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Cons | 4.848 | 1.236 | 0.0001 | 2.397 | 7.300 |
| R |  |  |  |  | 0.159 |
| N |  |  |  |  | 111 |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |

†P<0.100; \*\*P<0.050; \*\*\*P<0.001. Issue sophistication is a composite measure running less sophisticated

to more sophisticated with a range from 0-14.

*Interaction between Issues Sophistication and Carbon Tax Familiarity on Structural Network Measures*

Table 71A: Linear Regression with Robust Confidence Intervals. Interaction effect of issue

Sophistication and tax familiar on CAM density.

|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Variable | Coef. | Std. Rob | P>|t| | [95% | Conf. Inter] |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Issue Sophistication | -0.228 | 0.266 | 0.394 | -0.755 | 0.300 |
| Tax Familiarity | -0.040 | 0.611 | 0.947 | -1.252 | 1.171 |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Sophistication#Familiarity | 0.038 | 0.083 | 0.653 | -0.127 | 0.202 |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Cons | 0.979 | 1.906 | 0.609 | -2.800 | 4.758 |
| R |  |  |  |  | 0.054 |
| N |  |  |  |  | 111 |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |

†P<0.100; \*\*P<0.050; \*\*\*P<0.001. Issue sophistication is a composite measure running less sophisticated

to more sophisticated with a range from 0-14. Recoded familiarity is score 1-5 “Not familiar at all” to “Extremely familiar”.

Table 71B: Linear Regression with Robust Confidence Intervals. Interaction effect of issue

Sophistication and tax familiar on CAM density.

|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Variable | Coef. | Std. Rob | P>|t| | [95% | Conf. Inter] |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Issue Sophistication | -0.270 | 0.295 | 0.363 | -0.856 | 0.316 |
| Tax Familiarity | -0.179 | 0.663 | 0.788 | -1.495 | 1.138 |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Sophistication#Familiarity | 0.054 | 0.090 | 0.554 | -0.125 | 0.232 |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Age | 0.004 | 0.010 | 0.710 | -0.016 | 0.023 |
| Education | 0.102 | 0.088 | 0.251 | -0.073 | 0.277 |
| Non-white | -0.242 | 0.218 | 0.270 | -0.674 | 0.190 |
| Female | -0.090 | 0.177 | 0.614 | -0.441 | 0.262 |
| Income | -0.006 | 0.035 | 0.872 | -0.074 | 0.063 |
| Religiosity | -0.152 | 0.101 | 0.134 | -0.352 | 0.048 |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Cons | 1.270 | 2.092 | 0.545 | -2.879 | 5.420 |
| R |  |  |  |  | 0.106 |
| N |  |  |  |  | 111 |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |

†P<0.100; \*\*P<0.050; \*\*\*P<0.001. Issue sophistication is a composite measure running less sophisticated

to more sophisticated with a range from 0-14. Recoded familiarity is score 1-5 “Not familiar at all” to “Extremely familiar”.

Table 72A: Linear Regression with Robust Confidence Intervals. Interaction effect of issue

Sophistication and tax familiar on CAM centrality.

|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Variable | Coef. | Std. Rob | P>|t| | [95% | Conf. Inter] |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Issue Sophistication | -0.319 | 0.313 | 0.311 | -0.939 | 0.301 |
| Tax Familiarity | -0.398 | 0.742 | 0.593 | -1.869 | 1.073 |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Sophistication#Familiarity | 0.063 | 0.099 | 0.524 | -0.133 | 0.259 |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Cons | 2.105 | 2.294 | 0.361 | -2.443 | 6.653 |
| R |  |  |  |  | 0.039 |
| N |  |  |  |  | 111 |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |

†P<0.100; \*\*P<0.050; \*\*\*P<0.001. Issue sophistication is a composite measure running less sophisticated

to more sophisticated with a range from 0-14. Recoded familiarity is score 1-5 “Not familiar at all” to “Extremely familiar”.

Table 72B: Linear Regression with Robust Confidence Intervals. Interaction effect of issue

Sophistication and tax familiar on CAM centrality.

|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Variable | Coef. | Std. Rob | P>|t| | [95% | Conf. Inter] |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Issue Sophistication | -0.315 | 0.331 | 0.343 | -0.973 | 0.342 |
| Tax Familiarity | -0.501 | 0.756 | 0.509 | -2.002 | 1.000 |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Sophistication#Familiarity | 0.071 | 0.103 | 0.493 | -0.133 | 0.274 |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Age | 0.022 | 0.009 | 0.025\*\* | 0.003 | 0.040 |
| Education | 0.041 | 0.080 | 0.605 | -0.117 | 0.200 |
| Non-white | -0.082 | 0.204 | 0.689 | -0.486 | 0.322 |
| Female | -0.136 | 0.197 | 0.491 | -0.526 | 0.255 |
| Income | 0.028 | 0.032 | 0.380 | -0.035 | 0.090 |
| Religiosity | -0.067 | 0.094 | 0.478 | -0.253 | 0.119 |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Cons | 1.406 | 2.371 | 0.554 | -3.297 | 6.109 |
| R |  |  |  |  | 0.128 |
| N |  |  |  |  | 111 |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |

†P<0.100; \*\*P<0.050; \*\*\*P<0.001. Issue sophistication is a composite measure running less sophisticated

to more sophisticated with a range from 0-14. Recoded familiarity is score 1-5 “Not familiar at all” to “Extremely familiar”.

Table 73A: Linear Regression with Robust Confidence Intervals. Interaction effect of issue

Sophistication and tax familiar on CAM eigenvector centrality.

|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Variable | Coef. | Std. Rob | P>|t| | [95% | Conf. Inter] |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Issue Sophistication | -0.610 | 0.202 | 0.003\*\* | -1.010 | -0.210 |
| Tax Familiarity | -1.546 | 0.495 | 0.002\*\* | -2.527 | -0.564 |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Sophistication#Familiarity | 0.153 | 0.060 | 0.012\*\* | 0.034 | 0.272 |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Cons | 5.571 | 1.560 | 0.001 | 2.479 | 8.663 |
| R |  |  |  |  | 0.194 |
| N |  |  |  |  | 111 |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |

†P<0.100; \*\*P<0.050; \*\*\*P<0.001. Issue sophistication is a composite measure running less sophisticated

to more sophisticated with a range from 0-14. Recoded familiarity is score 1-5 “Not familiar at all” to “Extremely familiar”.

Table 73B: Linear Regression with Robust Confidence Intervals. Interaction effect of issue

Sophistication and tax familiar on CAM eigenvector centrality.

|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Variable | Coef. | Std. Rob | P>|t| | [95% | Conf. Inter] |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Issue Sophistication | -0.549 | 0.194 | 0.006\*\* | -0.935 | -0.164 |
| Tax Familiarity | -1.459 | 0.476 | 0.003\*\* | -2.404 | -0.515 |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Sophistication#Familiarity | 0.139 | 0.057 | 0.017\*\* | 0.025 | 0.253 |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Age | 0.018 | 0.008 | 0.025\*\* | 0.002 | 0.034 |
| Education | -0.019 | 0.074 | 0.792 | -0.165 | 0.127 |
| Non-white | 0.317 | 0.186 | 0.092† | -0.053 | 0.686 |
| Female | -0.078 | 0.196 | 0.692 | -0.468 | 0.312 |
| Income | 0.037 | 0.031 | 0.239 | -0.025 | 0.098 |
| Religiosity | 0.008 | 0.073 | 0.918 | -0.138 | 0.153 |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Cons | 4.379 | 1.628 | 0.008 | 1.149 | 7.609 |
| R |  |  |  |  | 0.259 |
| N |  |  |  |  | 111 |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |

†P<0.100; \*\*P<0.050; \*\*\*P<0.001. Issue sophistication is a composite measure running less sophisticated

to more sophisticated with a range from 0-14. Recoded familiarity is score 1-5 “Not familiar at all” to “Extremely familiar”.

Table 74A: Linear Regression with Robust Confidence Intervals. Interaction effect of issue

Sophistication and tax familiar on CAM betweenness centrality.

|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Variable | Coef. | Std. Rob | P>|t| | [95% | Conf. Inter] |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Issue Sophistication | -0.303 | 0.242 | 0.213 | -0.784 | 0.177 |
| Tax Familiarity | -0.784 | 0.580 | 0.179 | -1.933 | 0.366 |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Sophistication#Familiarity | 0.075 | 0.072 | 0.303 | -0.069 | 0.219 |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Cons | 2.834 | 1.847 | 0.128 | -0.827 | 6.495 |
| R |  |  |  |  | 0.056 |
| N |  |  |  |  | 111 |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |

†P<0.100; \*\*P<0.050; \*\*\*P<0.001. Issue sophistication is a composite measure running less sophisticated

to more sophisticated with a range from 0-14. Recoded familiarity is score 1-5 “Not familiar at all” to “Extremely familiar”.

Table 74B: Linear Regression with Robust Confidence Intervals. Interaction effect of issue

Sophistication and tax familiar on CAM eigenvector centrality.

|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Variable | Coef. | Std. Rob | P>|t| | [95% | Conf. Inter] |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Issue Sophistication | -0.265 | 0.259 | 0.309 | -0.778 | 0.249 |
| Tax Familiarity | -0.675 | 0.615 | 0.275 | -1.896 | 0.545 |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Sophistication#Familiarity | 0.061 | 0.077 | 0.435 | -0.093 | 0.214 |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Age | 0.007 | 0.010 | 0.471 | -0.013 | 0.028 |
| Education | -0.041 | 0.082 | 0.615 | -0.205 | 0.122 |
| Non-white | 0.193 | 0.200 | 0.337 | -0.204 | 0.591 |
| Female | 0.090 | 0.194 | 0.645 | -0.295 | 0.474 |
| Income | 0.059 | 0.033 | 0.078† | -0.007 | 0.125 |
| Religiosity | 0.108 | 0.088 | 0.222 | -0.066 | 0.282 |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Cons | 1.744 | 2.044 | 0.396 | -2.311 | 5.800 |
| R |  |  |  |  | 0.113 |
| N |  |  |  |  | 111 |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |

†P<0.100; \*\*P<0.050; \*\*\*P<0.001. Issue sophistication is a composite measure running less sophisticated

to more sophisticated with a range from 0-14. Recoded familiarity is score 1-5 “Not familiar at all” to “Extremely familiar”.

Table 75A: Linear Regression with Robust Confidence Intervals. Interaction effect of issue

Sophistication and tax familiar on CAM assortativity.

|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Variable | Coef. | Std. Rob | P>|t| | [95% | Conf. Inter] |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Issue Sophistication | 0.624 | 0.273 | 0.024\*\* | 0.082 | 1.166 |
| Tax Familiarity | 1.204 | 0.630 | 0.059† | -0.045 | 2.453 |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Sophistication#Familiarity | -0.163 | 0.081 | 0.048\*\* | -0.324 | -0.001 |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Cons | -4.520 | 2.035 | 0.028 | -8.554 | -0.485 |
| R |  |  |  |  | 0.057 |
| N |  |  |  |  | 111 |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |

†P<0.100; \*\*P<0.050; \*\*\*P<0.001. Issue sophistication is a composite measure running less sophisticated

to more sophisticated with a range from 0-14. Recoded familiarity is score 1-5 “Not familiar at all” to “Extremely familiar”.

Table 75B: Linear Regression with Robust Confidence Intervals. Interaction effect of issue

Sophistication and tax familiar on CAM assortativity.

|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Variable | Coef. | Std. Rob | P>|t| | [95% | Conf. Inter] |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Issue Sophistication | 0.649 | 0.259 | 0.014\*\* | 0.136 | 1.162 |
| Tax Familiarity | 1.301 | 0.599 | 0.032\*\* | 0.112 | 2.490 |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Sophistication#Familiarity | -0.171 | 0.078 | 0.030\*\* | -0.325 | -0.017 |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Age | -0.018 | 0.009 | 0.048\*\* | -0.036 | 0.000 |
| Education | -0.154 | 0.068 | 0.027\*\* | -0.289 | -0.018 |
| Non-white | -0.143 | 0.188 | 0.447 | -0.516 | 0.229 |
| Female | 0.180 | 0.205 | 0.381 | -0.226 | 0.586 |
| Income | -0.009 | 0.031 | 0.778 | -0.070 | 0.053 |
| Religiosity | 0.064 | 0.075 | 0.394 | -0.085 | 0.213 |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Cons | -3.513 | 1.933 | 0.072 | -7.348 | 0.321 |
| R |  |  |  |  | 0.157 |
| N |  |  |  |  | 111 |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |

†P<0.100; \*\*P<0.050; \*\*\*P<0.001. Issue sophistication is a composite measure running less sophisticated

to more sophisticated with a range from 0-14. Recoded familiarity is score 1-5 “Not familiar at all” to “Extremely familiar”.

Table 76A: Linear Regression with Robust Confidence Intervals. Interaction effect of issue

Sophistication and tax familiar on CAM diameter.

|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Variable | Coef. | Std. Rob | P>|t| | [95% | Conf. Inter] |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Issue Sophistication | 0.160 | 0.290 | 0.581 | -0.413 | 0.734 |
| Tax Familiarity | 0.105 | 0.664 | 0.874 | -1.211 | 1.422 |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Sophistication#Familiarity | -0.035 | 0.091 | 0.702 | -0.216 | 0.146 |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Cons | -0.733 | 2.053 | 0.722 | -4.802 | 3.337 |
| R |  |  |  |  | 0.019 |
| N |  |  |  |  | 111 |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |

†P<0.100; \*\*P<0.050; \*\*\*P<0.001. Issue sophistication is a composite measure running less sophisticated

to more sophisticated with a range from 0-14. Recoded familiarity is score 1-5 “Not familiar at all” to “Extremely familiar”.

Table 76B: Linear Regression with Robust Confidence Intervals. Interaction effect of issue

Sophistication and tax familiar on CAM diameter.

|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Variable | Coef. | Std. Rob | P>|t| | [95% | Conf. Inter] |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Issue Sophistication | 0.135 | 0.293 | 0.647 | -0.447 | 0.716 |
| Tax Familiarity | 0.198 | 0.674 | 0.770 | -1.139 | 1.534 |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Sophistication#Familiarity | -0.038 | 0.091 | 0.681 | -0.218 | 0.143 |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Age | -0.020 | 0.009 | 0.027\*\* | -0.039 | -0.002 |
| Education | -0.041 | 0.076 | 0.592 | -0.192 | 0.110 |
| Non-white | 0.028 | 0.200 | 0.888 | -0.369 | 0.425 |
| Female | 0.282 | 0.193 | 0.146 | -0.100 | 0.664 |
| Income | -0.034 | 0.035 | 0.336 | -0.105 | 0.036 |
| Religiosity | 0.116 | 0.086 | 0.181 | -0.055 | 0.287 |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Cons | -0.150 | 2.099 | 0.943 | -4.314 | 4.013 |
| R |  |  |  |  | 0.132 |
| N |  |  |  |  | 111 |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |

†P<0.100; \*\*P<0.050; \*\*\*P<0.001. Issue sophistication is a composite measure running less sophisticated

to more sophisticated with a range from 0-14. Recoded familiarity is score 1-5 “Not familiar at all” to “Extremely familiar”.

Table 77A: Linear Regression with Robust Confidence Intervals. Interaction effect of issue

Sophistication and tax familiar on CAM triadic closure.

|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Variable | Coef. | Std. Rob | P>|t| | [95% | Conf. Inter] |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Issue Sophistication | 0.420 | 0.274 | 0.129 | -0.124 | 0.963 |
| Tax Familiarity | 1.493 | 0.634 | 0.020\*\* | 0.237 | 2.750 |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Sophistication#Familiarity | -0.154 | 0.087 | 0.080† | -0.326 | 0.018 |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Cons | -4.048 | 1.956 | 0.041 | -7.926 | -0.170 |
| R |  |  |  |  | 0.094 |
| N |  |  |  |  | 111 |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |

†P<0.100; \*\*P<0.050; \*\*\*P<0.001. Issue sophistication is a composite measure running less sophisticated

to more sophisticated with a range from 0-14. Recoded familiarity is score 1-5 “Not familiar at all” to “Extremely familiar”.

Table 77B: Linear Regression with Robust Confidence Intervals. Interaction effect of issue

Sophistication and tax familiar on CAM triadic closure.

|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Variable | Coef. | Std. Rob | P>|t| | [95% | Conf. Inter] |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Issue Sophistication | 0.459 | 0.288 | 0.114 | -0.112 | 1.030 |
| Tax Familiarity | 1.528 | 0.656 | 0.022\*\* | 0.226 | 2.830 |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Sophistication#Familiarity | -0.158 | 0.089 | 0.079† | -0.334 | 0.019 |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Age | 0.000 | 0.009 | 0.982 | -0.018 | 0.019 |
| Education | -0.035 | 0.080 | 0.658 | -0.194 | 0.123 |
| Non-white | -0.081 | 0.206 | 0.697 | -0.489 | 0.328 |
| Female | -0.024 | 0.198 | 0.906 | -0.416 | 0.369 |
| Income | 0.003 | 0.034 | 0.933 | -0.064 | 0.070 |
| Religiosity | -0.180 | 0.088 | 0.044\*\* | -0.355 | -0.005 |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Cons | -3.582 | 2.122 | 0.094 | -7.791 | 0.627 |
| R |  |  |  |  | 0.132 |
| N |  |  |  |  | 111 |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |

†P<0.100; \*\*P<0.050; \*\*\*P<0.001. Issue sophistication is a composite measure running less sophisticated

to more sophisticated with a range from 0-14. Recoded familiarity is score 1-5 “Not familiar at all” to “Extremely familiar”.

**Research Question 8:** *Are the latent measure of the network correlated with familiarity with the Carbon Tax?*

Table 78A: Linear Regression with Robust Confidence Intervals. Correlation between node count and

familiarity with the carbon tax.

|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Variable | Coef. | Std. Rob | P>|t| | [95% | Conf. Inter] |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Node Count | -0.032 | 0.082 | 0.700 | -0.194 | 0.130 |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Cons | 3.216 | 0.075 | 0.0001 | 3.067 | 3.366 |
| R |  |  |  |  | 0.002 |
| N |  |  |  |  | 111 |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |

†P<0.100; \*\*P<0.050; \*\*\*P<0.001. Unfamiliarity is coded from 1-5 “Extremely familiar” to “Not familiar at all”.

Table 78B: Linear Regression with Robust Confidence Intervals. Correlation between node count and

familiarity with the carbon tax.

|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Variable | Coef. | Std. Rob | P>|t| | [95% | Conf. Inter] |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Node Count | -0.032 | 0.077 | 0.683 | -0.185 | 0.122 |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Age | 0.005 | 0.007 | 0.502 | -0.009 | 0.018 |
| Education | -0.046 | 0.067 | 0.500 | -0.179 | 0.088 |
| Non-white | 0.183 | 0.157 | 0.245 | -0.127 | 0.493 |
| Female | 0.540 | 0.146 | 0.0001\*\*\* | 0.251 | 0.829 |
| Income | -0.010 | 0.026 | 0.684 | -0.061 | 0.040 |
| Religiosity | -0.055 | 0.058 | 0.343 | -0.169 | 0.059 |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Cons | 3.221 | 0.450 | 0.0001 | 2.329 | 4.113 |
| R |  |  |  |  | 0.137 |
| N |  |  |  |  | 111 |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |

†P<0.100; \*\*P<0.050; \*\*\*P<0.001. Unfamiliarity is coded from 1-5 “Extremely familiar” to “Not familiar at all”.

Table 79A: Linear Regression with Robust Confidence Intervals. Correlation between edge count and

familiarity with the carbon tax.

|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Variable | Coef. | Std. Rob | P>|t| | [95% | Conf. Inter] |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Edge Count | -0.140 | 0.078 | 0.073† | -0.294 | 0.013 |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Cons | 3.216 | 0.074 | 0.0001 | 3.069 | 3.363 |
| R |  |  |  |  | 0.032 |
| N |  |  |  |  | 111 |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |

†P<0.100; \*\*P<0.050; \*\*\*P<0.001. Familiarity is coded from 1-5 “Extremely familiar” to “Not familiar at all”.

Table 79B: Linear Regression with Robust Confidence Intervals. Correlation between edge count and

familiarity with the carbon tax.

|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Variable | Coef. | Std. Rob | P>|t| | [95% | Conf. Inter] |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Edge Count | -0.120 | 0.073 | 0.103 | -0.265 | 0.025 |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Age | 0.003 | 0.007 | 0.666 | -0.011 | 0.017 |
| Education | -0.045 | 0.068 | 0.509 | -0.180 | 0.090 |
| Non-white | 0.156 | 0.159 | 0.329 | -0.160 | 0.471 |
| Female | 0.520 | 0.142 | 0.0001\*\*\* | 0.237 | 0.802 |
| Income | -0.014 | 0.026 | 0.584 | -0.065 | 0.037 |
| Religiosity | -0.047 | 0.058 | 0.419 | -0.163 | 0.068 |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Cons | 3.290 | 0.442 | 0.0001 | 2.413 | 4.167 |
| R |  |  |  |  | 0.156 |
| N |  |  |  |  | 111 |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |

†P<0.100; \*\*P<0.050; \*\*\*P<0.001. Familiarity is coded from 1-5 “Extremely familiar” to “Not familiar at all”.

Table 80A: Linear Regression with Robust Confidence Intervals. Correlation between density and

familiarity with the carbon tax.

|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Variable | Coef. | Std. Rob | P>|t| | [95% | Conf. Inter] |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Density | -0.119 | 0.065 | 0.070† | -0.247 | 0.010 |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Cons | 3.216 | 0.075 | 0.0001 | 3.068 | 3.364 |
| R |  |  |  |  | 0.023 |
| N |  |  |  |  | 111 |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |

†P<0.100; \*\*P<0.050; \*\*\*P<0.001. Familiarity is coded from 1-5 “Extremely familiar” to “Not familiar at all”.

Table 80B: Linear Regression with Robust Confidence Intervals. Correlation between density and

familiarity with the carbon tax.

|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Variable | Coef. | Std. Rob | P>|t| | [95% | Conf. Inter] |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Density | -0.102 | 0.062 | 0.104 | -0.225 | 0.021 |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Age | 0.006 | 0.007 | 0.390 | -0.007 | 0.019 |
| Education | -0.038 | 0.065 | 0.559 | -0.167 | 0.091 |
| Non-white | 0.155 | 0.157 | 0.328 | -0.157 | 0.467 |
| Female | 0.519 | 0.149 | 0.001\*\*\* | 0.222 | 0.815 |
| Income | -0.009 | 0.026 | 0.717 | -0.061 | 0.042 |
| Religiosity | -0.075 | 0.058 | 0.195 | -0.190 | 0.039 |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Cons | 3.218 | 0.444 | 0.0001 | 2.336 | 4.099 |
| R |  |  |  |  | 0.151 |
| N |  |  |  |  | 111 |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |

†P<0.100; \*\*P<0.050; \*\*\*P<0.001. Familiarity is coded from 1-5 “Extremely familiar” to “Not familiar at all”.

Table 81A: Linear Regression with Robust Confidence Intervals. Correlation between diameter and

familiarity with the carbon tax.

|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Variable | Coef. | Std. Rob | P>|t| | [95% | Conf. Inter] |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Diameter | 0.083 | 0.076 | 0.275 | -0.067 | 0.234 |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Cons | 3.216 | 0.075 | 0.0001 | 3.068 | 3.365 |
| R |  |  |  |  | 0.011 |
| N |  |  |  |  | 111 |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |

†P<0.100; \*\*P<0.050; \*\*\*P<0.001. Familiarity is coded from 1-5 “Extremely familiar” to “Not familiar at all”.

Table 81B: Linear Regression with Robust Confidence Intervals. Correlation between diameter and

familiarity with the carbon tax.

|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Variable | Coef. | Std. Rob | P>|t| | [95% | Conf. Inter] |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Diameter | 0.048 | 0.075 | 0.527 | -0.102 | 0.197 |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Age | 0.006 | 0.007 | 0.370 | -0.007 | 0.020 |
| Education | -0.043 | 0.067 | 0.521 | -0.175 | 0.089 |
| Non-white | 0.181 | 0.157 | 0.249 | -0.129 | 0.492 |
| Female | 0.524 | 0.151 | 0.001\*\*\* | 0.224 | 0.824 |
| Income | -0.008 | 0.026 | 0.773 | -0.059 | 0.044 |
| Religiosity | -0.064 | 0.057 | 0.261 | -0.177 | 0.049 |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Cons | 3.174 | 0.451 | 0.0001 | 2.280 | 4.068 |
| R |  |  |  |  | 0.138 |
| N |  |  |  |  | 111 |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |

†P<0.100; \*\*P<0.050; \*\*\*P<0.001. Familiarity is coded from 1-5 “Extremely familiar” to “Not familiar at all”.

Table 82A: Linear Regression with Robust Confidence Intervals. Correlation between triadic closure and

familiarity with the carbon tax.

|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Variable | Coef. | Std. Rob | P>|t| | [95% | Conf. Inter] |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Triadic Closure | -0.191 | 0.070 | 0.007\*\* | -0.328 | -0.053 |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Cons | 3.216 | 0.073 | 0.0001 | 3.071 | 3.361 |
| R |  |  |  |  | 0.058 |
| N |  |  |  |  | 111 |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |

†P<0.100; \*\*P<0.050; \*\*\*P<0.001. Familiarity is coded from 1-5 “Extremely familiar” to “Not familiar at all”.

Table 82B: Linear Regression with Robust Confidence Intervals. Correlation between triadic closure and

familiarity with the carbon tax.

|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Variable | Coef. | Std. Rob | P>|t| | [95% | Conf. Inter] |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Triadic Closure | -0.184 | 0.063 | 0.004\*\* | -0.310 | -0.059 |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Age | 0.005 | 0.006 | 0.428 | -0.008 | 0.018 |
| Education | -0.049 | 0.064 | 0.445 | -0.176 | 0.078 |
| Non-white | 0.150 | 0.156 | 0.337 | -0.159 | 0.459 |
| Female | 0.501 | 0.144 | 0.001\*\*\* | 0.214 | 0.787 |
| Income | -0.009 | 0.026 | 0.730 | -0.061 | 0.043 |
| Religiosity | -0.090 | 0.057 | 0.118 | -0.202 | 0.023 |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Cons | 3.351 | 0.434 | 0.0001 | 2.490 | 4.213 |
| R |  |  |  |  | 0.186 |
| N |  |  |  |  | 111 |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |

†P<0.100; \*\*P<0.050; \*\*\*P<0.001. Familiarity is coded from 1-5 “Extremely familiar” to “Not familiar at all”.

Table 83A: Linear Regression with Robust Confidence Intervals. Correlation between degree centrality and

familiarity with the carbon tax.

|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Variable | Coef. | Std. Rob | P>|t| | [95% | Conf. Inter] |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Degree Centrality | -0.013 | 0.077 | 0.868 | -0.164 | 0.139 |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Cons | 3.216 | 0.075 | 0.0001 | 3.067 | 3.366 |
| R |  |  |  |  | 0.001 |
| N |  |  |  |  | 111 |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |

†P<0.100; \*\*P<0.050; \*\*\*P<0.001. Familiarity is coded from 1-5 “Extremely familiar” to “Not familiar at all”.

Table 83B: Linear Regression with Robust Confidence Intervals. Correlation between degree centrality and

familiarity with the carbon tax.

|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Variable | Coef. | Std. Rob | P>|t| | [95% | Conf. Inter] |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Degree Centrality | 0.009 | 0.075 | 0.909 | -0.139 | 0.156 |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Age | 0.005 | 0.007 | 0.470 | -0.009 | 0.019 |
| Education | -0.044 | 0.067 | 0.507 | -0.177 | 0.088 |
| Non-white | 0.184 | 0.157 | 0.244 | -0.127 | 0.495 |
| Female | 0.541 | 0.147 | 0.0001\*\*\* | 0.249 | 0.833 |
| Income | -0.009 | 0.026 | 0.717 | -0.061 | 0.042 |
| Religiosity | -0.058 | 0.056 | 0.304 | -0.170 | 0.053 |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Cons | 3.206 | 0.454 | 0.0001 | 2.305 | 4.107 |
| R |  |  |  |  | 0.135 |
| N |  |  |  |  | 111 |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |

†P<0.100; \*\*P<0.050; \*\*\*P<0.001. Familiarity is coded from 1-5 “Extremely familiar” to “Not familiar at all”.

Table 84A: Linear Regression with Robust Confidence Intervals. Correlation between eigenvector centrality and

familiarity with the carbon tax.

|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Variable | Coef. | Std. Rob | P>|t| | [95% | Conf. Inter] |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Eigenvector | 0.286 | 0.062 | 0.0001\*\*\* | 0.163 | 0.409 |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Cons | 3.216 | 0.070 | 0.0001 | 3.077 | 3.356 |
| R |  |  |  |  | 0.131 |
| N |  |  |  |  | 111 |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |

†P<0.100; \*\*P<0.050; \*\*\*P<0.001. Familiarity is coded from 1-5 “Extremely familiar” to “Not familiar at all”.

Table 84B: Linear Regression with Robust Confidence Intervals. Correlation between eigenvector centrality and

familiarity with the carbon tax.

|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Variable | Coef. | Std. Rob | P>|t| | [95% | Conf. Inter] |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Eigenvector | 0.280 | 0.060 | 0.0001\*\*\* | 0.161 | 0.398 |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Age | -0.001 | 0.006 | 0.831 | -0.014 | 0.011 |
| Education | -0.017 | 0.066 | 0.796 | -0.148 | 0.114 |
| Non-white | 0.067 | 0.152 | 0.660 | -0.234 | 0.368 |
| Female | 0.498 | 0.135 | 0.0001\*\*\* | 0.230 | 0.766 |
| Income | -0.019 | 0.025 | 0.445 | -0.070 | 0.031 |
| Religiosity | -0.048 | 0.057 | 0.403 | -0.160 | 0.065 |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Cons | 3.349 | 0.440 | 0.0001 | 2.476 | 4.222 |
| R |  |  |  |  | 0.248 |
| N |  |  |  |  | 111 |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |

†P<0.100; \*\*P<0.050; \*\*\*P<0.001. Familiarity is coded from 1-5 “Extremely familiar” to “Not familiar at all”.

Table 85A: Linear Regression with Robust Confidence Intervals. Correlation between betweeness centrality and

familiarity with the carbon tax.

|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Variable | Coef. | Std. Rob | P>|t| | [95% | Conf. Inter] |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Betweenness | 0.158 | 0.067 | 0.019\*\* | 0.026 | 0.290 |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Cons | 3.216 | 0.074 | 0.0001 | 3.070 | 3.363 |
| R |  |  |  |  | 0.040 |
| N |  |  |  |  | 111 |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |

†P<0.100; \*\*P<0.050; \*\*\*P<0.001. Familiarity is coded from 1-5 “Extremely familiar” to “Not familiar at all”.

Table 85B: Linear Regression with Robust Confidence Intervals. Correlation between betweeness centrality and

familiarity with the carbon tax.

|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Variable | Coef. | Std. Rob | P>|t| | [95% | Conf. Inter] |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Betweenness | 0.147 | 0.064 | 0.024\*\* | 0.019 | 0.275 |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Age | 0.004 | 0.007 | 0.607 | -0.010 | 0.018 |
| Education | -0.031 | 0.068 | 0.646 | -0.167 | 0.104 |
| Non-white | 0.148 | 0.157 | 0.351 | -0.164 | 0.459 |
| Female | 0.509 | 0.145 | 0.001\*\*\* | 0.221 | 0.797 |
| Income | -0.018 | 0.026 | 0.494 | -0.070 | 0.034 |
| Religiosity | -0.071 | 0.058 | 0.223 | -0.185 | 0.044 |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Cons | 3.293 | 0.454 | 0.0001 | 2.392 | 4.195 |
| R |  |  |  |  | 0.168 |
| N |  |  |  |  | 111 |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |

†P<0.100; \*\*P<0.050; \*\*\*P<0.001. Familiarity is coded from 1-5 “Extremely familiar” to “Not familiar at all”.

Table 86A: Linear Regression with Robust Confidence Intervals. Correlation between dashed (incoherent)

edges and familiarity with the carbon tax.

|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Variable | Coef. | Std. Rob | P>|t| | [95% | Conf. Inter] |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Dashed Edges | -0.044 | 0.081 | 0.594 | -0.205 | 0.118 |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Cons | 3.216 | 0.075 | 0.0001 | 3.067 | 3.365 |
| R |  |  |  |  | 0.003 |
| N |  |  |  |  | 111 |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |

†P<0.100; \*\*P<0.050; \*\*\*P<0.001. Familiarity is coded from 1-5 “Extremely familiar” to “Not familiar at all”.

Table 86B: Linear Regression with Robust Confidence Intervals. Correlation between dashed (incoherent)

edges and familiarity with the carbon tax.

|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Variable | Coef. | Std. Rob | P>|t| | [95% | Conf. Inter] |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Dashed Edges | 0.032 | 0.080 | 0.692 | -0.127 | 0.191 |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Age | 0.005 | 0.007 | 0.434 | -0.008 | 0.018 |
| Education | -0.049 | 0.067 | 0.473 | -0.182 | 0.085 |
| Non-white | 0.194 | 0.160 | 0.229 | -0.124 | 0.512 |
| Female | 0.554 | 0.150 | 0.0001\*\*\* | 0.257 | 0.851 |
| Income | -0.009 | 0.026 | 0.732 | -0.061 | 0.043 |
| Religiosity | -0.059 | 0.057 | 0.304 | -0.173 | 0.054 |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Cons | 3.212 | 0.450 | 0.0001 | 2.319 | 4.104 |
| R |  |  |  |  | 0.137 |
| N |  |  |  |  | 111 |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |

†P<0.100; \*\*P<0.050; \*\*\*P<0.001. Familiarity is coded from 1-5 “Extremely familiar” to “Not familiar at all”.

Table 87A: Linear Regression with Robust Confidence Intervals. Correlation between solid (coherent)

edges and familiarity with the carbon tax.

|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Variable | Coef. | Std. Rob | P>|t| | [95% | Conf. Inter] |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Solid Edges | -0.139 | 0.074 | 0.062† | -0.286 | 0.007 |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Cons | 3.202 | 0.074 | 0.0001 | 3.056 | 3.348 |
| R |  |  |  |  | 0.032 |
| N |  |  |  |  | 111 |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |

†P<0.100; \*\*P<0.050; \*\*\*P<0.001. Familiarity is coded from 1-5 “Extremely familiar” to “Not familiar at all”.

Table 87B: Linear Regression with Robust Confidence Intervals. Correlation between solid (coherent)

edges and familiarity with the carbon tax.

|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Variable | Coef. | Std. Rob | P>|t| | [95% | Conf. Inter] |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Solid Edges | -0.137 | 0.068 | 0.046\*\* | -0.272 | -0.003 |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Age | 0.001 | 0.007 | 0.903 | -0.013 | 0.014 |
| Education | -0.040 | 0.068 | 0.560 | -0.174 | 0.095 |
| Non-white | 0.179 | 0.159 | 0.261 | -0.135 | 0.494 |
| Female | 0.503 | 0.141 | 0.001\*\*\* | 0.223 | 0.783 |
| Income | -0.009 | 0.025 | 0.715 | -0.059 | 0.041 |
| Religiosity | -0.058 | 0.058 | 0.320 | -0.173 | 0.057 |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Cons | 3.324 | 0.439 | 0.0001 | 2.453 | 4.194 |
| R |  |  |  |  | 0.160 |
| N |  |  |  |  | 111 |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |

†P<0.100; \*\*P<0.050; \*\*\*P<0.001. Familiarity is coded from 1-5 “Extremely familiar” to “Not familiar at all”.

Table 88A: Linear Regression with Robust Confidence Intervals. Correlation between assortativity

and familiarity with the carbon tax.

|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Variable | Coef. | Std. Rob | P>|t| | [95% | Conf. Inter] |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Assortativity | -0.021 | 0.070 | 0.762 | -0.160 | 0.118 |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Cons | 3.220 | 0.077 | 0.0001 | 3.068 | 3.372 |
| R |  |  |  |  | 0.001 |
| N |  |  |  |  | 111 |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |

†P<0.100; \*\*P<0.050; \*\*\*P<0.001. Familiarity is coded from 1-5 “Extremely familiar” to “Not familiar at all”.

Table 88B: Linear Regression with Robust Confidence Intervals. Correlation between assortativity

and familiarity with the carbon tax.

|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Variable | Coef. | Std. Rob | P>|t| | [95% | Conf. Inter] |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Assortativity | -0.041 | 0.069 | 0.550 | -0.178 | 0.096 |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Age | 0.004 | 0.007 | 0.571 | -0.010 | 0.018 |
| Education | -0.044 | 0.068 | 0.514 | -0.178 | 0.090 |
| Non-white | 0.167 | 0.162 | 0.303 | -0.153 | 0.488 |
| Female | 0.551 | 0.149 | 0.0001\*\*\* | 0.255 | 0.848 |
| Income | -0.012 | 0.027 | 0.659 | -0.065 | 0.042 |
| Religiosity | -0.062 | 0.059 | 0.296 | -0.178 | 0.055 |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Cons | 3.270 | 0.464 | 0.0001 | 2.349 | 4.190 |
| R |  |  |  |  | 0.140 |
| N |  |  |  |  | 111 |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |

†P<0.100; \*\*P<0.050; \*\*\*P<0.001. Familiarity is coded from 1-5 “Extremely familiar” to “Not familiar at all”.

**Research Question 9**: *Are the density and centrality of the network correlated with agreement with the Carbon Tax?*

Table 89A: Linear Regression with Robust Confidence Intervals. Correlation between density and

and agreement with the carbon tax.

|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Variable | Coef. | Std. Rob | P>|t| | [95% | Conf. Inter] |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Density | 0.108 | 0.169 | 0.527 | -0.228 | 0.443 |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Cons | 5.063 | 0.158 | 0.0001 | 4.750 | 5.376 |
| R |  |  |  |  | 0.004 |
| N |  |  |  |  | 111 |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |

†P<0.100; \*\*P<0.050; \*\*\*P<0.001. Support for the carbon tax is coded on a 7-point Likert-scale

“Strongly disagree” to “Strongly agree”.

Table 89B: Linear Regression with Robust Confidence Intervals. Correlation between density and

and agreement with the carbon tax.

|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Variable | Coef. | Std. Rob | P>|t| | [95% | Conf. Inter] |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Density | 0.190 | 0.152 | 0.212 | -0.111 | 0.491 |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Age | -0.024 | 0.017 | 0.170 | -0.058 | 0.010 |
| Education | 0.161 | 0.145 | 0.269 | -0.126 | 0.447 |
| Non-white | -0.331 | 0.328 | 0.315 | -0.981 | 0.319 |
| Female | 0.790 | 0.305 | 0.011 | 0.185 | 1.395 |
| Income | 0.039 | 0.051 | 0.446 | -0.062 | 0.139 |
| Religiosity | 0.213 | 0.136 | 0.119 | -0.056 | 0.483 |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Cons | 3.783 | 1.051 | 0.000 | 1.698 | 5.868 |
| R |  |  |  |  | 0.145 |
| N |  |  |  |  | 111 |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |

†P<0.100; \*\*P<0.050; \*\*\*P<0.001. Support for the carbon tax is coded on a 7-point Likert-scale

“Strongly disagree” to “Strongly agree”.

Table 90A: Linear Regression with Robust Confidence Intervals. Correlation between degree centrality and

and agreement with the carbon tax.

|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Variable | Coef. | Std. Rob | P>|t| | [95% | Conf. Inter] |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Degree Centrality | -0.019 | 0.185 | 0.918 | -0.385 | 0.347 |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Cons | 5.063 | 0.158 | 0.0001 | 4.750 | 5.376 |
| R |  |  |  |  | 0.001 |
| N |  |  |  |  | 111 |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |

†P<0.100; \*\*P<0.050; \*\*\*P<0.001. Support for the carbon tax is coded on a 7-point Likert-scale

“Strongly disagree” to “Strongly agree”.

Table 90B: Linear Regression with Robust Confidence Intervals. Correlation between degree centrality and

and agreement with the carbon tax.

|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Variable | Coef. | Std. Rob | P>|t| | [95% | Conf. Inter] |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Degree Centrality | 0.083 | 0.172 | 0.629 | -0.258 | 0.424 |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Age | -0.025 | 0.017 | 0.156 | -0.060 | 0.010 |
| Education | 0.173 | 0.139 | 0.218 | -0.104 | 0.450 |
| Non-white | -0.377 | 0.325 | 0.248 | -1.021 | 0.267 |
| Female | 0.763 | 0.301 | 0.013\*\* | 0.165 | 1.360 |
| Income | 0.036 | 0.050 | 0.478 | -0.064 | 0.136 |
| Religiosity | 0.190 | 0.136 | 0.164 | -0.079 | 0.459 |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Cons | 3.864 | 1.051 | 0.0001 | 1.780 | 5.948 |
| R |  |  |  |  | 0.135 |
| N |  |  |  |  | 111 |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |

†P<0.100; \*\*P<0.050; \*\*\*P<0.001. Support for the carbon tax is coded on a 7-point Likert-scale

“Strongly disagree” to “Strongly agree”.

Table 91A: Linear Regression with Robust Confidence Intervals. Correlation between eigenvector centrality

and agreement with the carbon tax.

|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Variable | Coef. | Std. Rob | P>|t| | [95% | Conf. Inter] |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Eigenvector | -0.128 | 0.165 | 0.441 | -0.456 | 0.200 |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Cons | 5.063 | 0.158 | 0.0001 | 4.751 | 5.376 |
| R |  |  |  |  | 0.006 |
| N |  |  |  |  | 111 |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |

†P<0.100; \*\*P<0.050; \*\*\*P<0.001. Support for the carbon tax is coded on a 7-point Likert-scale

“Strongly disagree” to “Strongly agree”.

Table 91B: Linear Regression with Robust Confidence Intervals. Correlation between eigenvector centrality

and agreement with the carbon tax.

|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Variable | Coef. | Std. Rob | P>|t| | [95% | Conf. Inter] |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Eigenvector | -0.053 | 0.169 | 0.756 | -0.389 | 0.283 |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Age | -0.022 | 0.017 | 0.212 | -0.056 | 0.013 |
| Education | 0.168 | 0.139 | 0.232 | -0.109 | 0.444 |
| Non-white | -0.362 | 0.324 | 0.267 | -1.005 | 0.281 |
| Female | 0.758 | 0.309 | 0.016\*\* | 0.146 | 1.371 |
| Income | 0.040 | 0.050 | 0.422 | -0.059 | 0.139 |
| Religiosity | 0.181 | 0.134 | 0.181 | -0.085 | 0.447 |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Cons | 3.787 | 1.048 | 0.0001 | 1.708 | 5.866 |
| R |  |  |  |  | 0.134 |
| N |  |  |  |  | 111 |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |

†P<0.100; \*\*P<0.050; \*\*\*P<0.001. Support for the carbon tax is coded on a 7-point Likert-scale

“Strongly disagree” to “Strongly agree”.

Table 92A: Linear Regression with Robust Confidence Intervals. Correlation between betweeness centrality

and agreement with the carbon tax.

|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Variable | Coef. | Std. Rob | P>|t| | [95% | Conf. Inter] |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Betweenness | -0.080 | 0.170 | 0.640 | -0.417 | 0.258 |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Cons | 5.063 | 0.158 | 0.0001 | 4.750 | 5.376 |
| R |  |  |  |  | 0.002 |
| N |  |  |  |  | 111 |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |

†P<0.100; \*\*P<0.050; \*\*\*P<0.001. Support for the carbon tax is coded on a 7-point Likert-scale

“Strongly disagree” to “Strongly agree”.

Table 92B: Linear Regression with Robust Confidence Intervals. Correlation between betweeness centrality

and agreement with the carbon tax.

|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Variable | Coef. | Std. Rob | P>|t| | [95% | Conf. Inter] |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Betweenness | -0.118 | 0.165 | 0.476 | -0.446 | 0.210 |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Age | -0.022 | 0.017 | 0.203 | -0.055 | 0.012 |
| Education | 0.162 | 0.144 | 0.262 | -0.123 | 0.448 |
| Non-white | -0.355 | 0.326 | 0.278 | -1.001 | 0.291 |
| Female | 0.775 | 0.312 | 0.014\*\* | 0.157 | 1.393 |
| Income | 0.045 | 0.052 | 0.382 | -0.057 | 0.148 |
| Religiosity | 0.192 | 0.133 | 0.152 | -0.072 | 0.457 |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Cons | 3.740 | 1.053 | 0.001 | 1.651 | 5.829 |
| R |  |  |  |  | 0.137 |
| N |  |  |  |  | 111 |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |

†P<0.100; \*\*P<0.050; \*\*\*P<0.001. Support for the carbon tax is coded on a 7-point Likert-scale

“Strongly disagree” to “Strongly agree”.

Table 93A: Linear Regression with Robust Confidence Intervals. Correlation between node count and

and agreement with the carbon tax.

|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Variable | Coef. | Std. Rob | P>|t| | [95% | Conf. Inter] |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Node Count | -0.050 | 0.167 | 0.765 | -0.381 | 0.280 |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Cons | 5.063 | 0.158 | 0.0001 | 4.750 | 5.376 |
| R |  |  |  |  | 0.001 |
| N |  |  |  |  | 111 |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |

†P<0.100; \*\*P<0.050; \*\*\*P<0.001. Support for the carbon tax is coded on a 7-point Likert-scale

“Strongly disagree” to “Strongly agree”.

Table 93B: Linear Regression with Robust Confidence Intervals. Correlation between node count and

and agreement with the carbon tax.

|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Variable | Coef. | Std. Rob | P>|t| | [95% | Conf. Inter] |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Node Count | -0.116 | 0.160 | 0.471 | -0.434 | 0.202 |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Age | -0.025 | 0.017 | 0.148 | -0.059 | 0.009 |
| Education | 0.169 | 0.142 | 0.239 | -0.113 | 0.451 |
| Non-white | -0.384 | 0.321 | 0.234 | -1.021 | 0.252 |
| Female | 0.750 | 0.304 | 0.015\*\* | 0.148 | 1.352 |
| Income | 0.034 | 0.051 | 0.507 | -0.067 | 0.135 |
| Religiosity | 0.197 | 0.136 | 0.150 | -0.072 | 0.467 |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Cons | 3.889 | 1.035 | 0.0001 | 1.837 | 5.942 |
| R |  |  |  |  | 0.140 |
| N |  |  |  |  | 111 |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |

†P<0.100; \*\*P<0.050; \*\*\*P<0.001. Support for the carbon tax is coded on a 7-point Likert-scale

“Strongly disagree” to “Strongly agree”.

Table 94A: Linear Regression with Robust Confidence Intervals. Correlation between edge count and

and agreement with the carbon tax.

|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Variable | Coef. | Std. Rob | P>|t| | [95% | Conf. Inter] |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Edge Count | 0.021 | 0.149 | 0.887 | -0.274 | 0.317 |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Cons | 5.063 | 0.158 | 0.0001 | 4.750 | 5.376 |
| R |  |  |  |  | 0.001 |
| N |  |  |  |  | 111 |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |

†P<0.100; \*\*P<0.050; \*\*\*P<0.001. Support for the carbon tax is coded on a 7-point Likert-scale

“Strongly disagree” to “Strongly agree”.

Table 94B: Linear Regression with Robust Confidence Intervals. Correlation between edge count and

and agreement with the carbon tax.

|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Variable | Coef. | Std. Rob | P>|t| | [95% | Conf. Inter] |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Edge Count | -0.022 | 0.148 | 0.882 | -0.316 | 0.272 |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Age | -0.023 | 0.017 | 0.174 | -0.057 | 0.010 |
| Education | 0.173 | 0.140 | 0.221 | -0.106 | 0.451 |
| Non-white | -0.389 | 0.322 | 0.230 | -1.027 | 0.249 |
| Female | 0.747 | 0.303 | 0.015\*\* | 0.145 | 1.348 |
| Income | 0.037 | 0.051 | 0.464 | -0.064 | 0.139 |
| Religiosity | 0.185 | 0.136 | 0.176 | -0.084 | 0.455 |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Cons | 3.831 | 1.024 | 0.0001 | 1.800 | 5.863 |
| R |  |  |  |  | 0.133 |
| N |  |  |  |  | 111 |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |

†P<0.100; \*\*P<0.050; \*\*\*P<0.001. Support for the carbon tax is coded on a 7-point Likert-scale

“Strongly disagree” to “Strongly agree”.

Table 95A: Linear Regression with Robust Confidence Intervals. Correlation between diameter and

and agreement with the carbon tax.

|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Variable | Coef. | Std. Rob | P>|t| | [95% | Conf. Inter] |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Diameter | 0.085 | 0.182 | 0.642 | -0.277 | 0.447 |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Cons | 5.063 | 0.158 | 0.0001 | 4.750 | 5.376 |
| R |  |  |  |  | 0.003 |
| N |  |  |  |  | 111 |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |

†P<0.100; \*\*P<0.050; \*\*\*P<0.001. Support for the carbon tax is coded on a 7-point Likert-scale

“Strongly disagree” to “Strongly agree”.

Table 95B: Linear Regression with Robust Confidence Intervals. Correlation between diameter and

and agreement with the carbon tax.

|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Variable | Coef. | Std. Rob | P>|t| | [95% | Conf. Inter] |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Diameter | -0.048 | 0.180 | 0.789 | -0.405 | 0.308 |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Age | -0.024 | 0.017 | 0.169 | -0.058 | 0.010 |
| Education | 0.171 | 0.142 | 0.232 | -0.111 | 0.453 |
| Non-white | -0.382 | 0.324 | 0.241 | -1.025 | 0.261 |
| Female | 0.766 | 0.298 | 0.012\*\* | 0.175 | 1.358 |
| Income | 0.037 | 0.051 | 0.470 | -0.064 | 0.137 |
| Religiosity | 0.189 | 0.138 | 0.173 | -0.084 | 0.461 |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Cons | 3.842 | 1.055 | 0.0001 | 1.750 | 5.933 |
| R |  |  |  |  | 0.133 |
| N |  |  |  |  | 111 |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |

†P<0.100; \*\*P<0.050; \*\*\*P<0.001. Support for the carbon tax is coded on a 7-point Likert-scale

“Strongly disagree” to “Strongly agree”.

Table 96A: Linear Regression with Robust Confidence Intervals. Correlation between triadic closure and

and agreement with the carbon tax.

|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Variable | Coef. | Std. Rob | P>|t| | [95% | Conf. Inter] |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Triadic Closure | 0.093 | 0.163 | 0.570 | -0.230 | 0.416 |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Cons | 5.063 | 0.158 | 0.0001 | 4.750 | 5.376 |
| R |  |  |  |  | 0.003 |
| N |  |  |  |  | 111 |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |

†P<0.100; \*\*P<0.050; \*\*\*P<0.001. Support for the carbon tax is coded on a 7-point Likert-scale

“Strongly disagree” to “Strongly agree”.

Table 96B: Linear Regression with Robust Confidence Intervals. Correlation between triadic closure and

and agreement with the carbon tax.

|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Variable | Coef. | Std. Rob | P>|t| | [95% | Conf. Inter] |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Triadic Closure | 0.190 | 0.150 | 0.209 | -0.108 | 0.488 |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Age | -0.023 | 0.017 | 0.184 | -0.057 | 0.011 |
| Education | 0.177 | 0.138 | 0.203 | -0.097 | 0.452 |
| Non-white | -0.350 | 0.324 | 0.283 | -0.993 | 0.294 |
| Female | 0.791 | 0.302 | 0.010\*\* | 0.193 | 1.389 |
| Income | 0.038 | 0.051 | 0.452 | -0.062 | 0.138 |
| Religiosity | 0.215 | 0.137 | 0.120 | -0.057 | 0.486 |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Cons | 3.659 | 1.045 | 0.001 | 1.586 | 5.733 |
| R |  |  |  |  | 0.145 |
| N |  |  |  |  | 111 |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |

†P<0.100; \*\*P<0.050; \*\*\*P<0.001. Support for the carbon tax is coded on a 7-point Likert-scale

“Strongly disagree” to “Strongly agree”.

Table 97A: Linear Regression with Robust Confidence Intervals. Correlation between dashed (incoherent)

edges and agreement with the carbon tax.

|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Variable | Coef. | Std. Rob | P>|t| | [95% | Conf. Inter] |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Dashed Edges | -0.080 | 0.170 | 0.640 | -0.417 | 0.258 |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Cons | 5.063 | 0.158 | 0.0001 | 4.750 | 5.376 |
| R |  |  |  |  | 0.006 |
| N |  |  |  |  | 111 |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |

†P<0.100; \*\*P<0.050; \*\*\*P<0.001. Support for the carbon tax is coded on a 7-point Likert-scale

“Strongly disagree” to “Strongly agree”.

Table 97B: Linear Regression with Robust Confidence Intervals. Correlation between dashed (incoherent)

edges and agreement with the carbon tax.

|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Variable | Coef. | Std. Rob | P>|t| | [95% | Conf. Inter] |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Dashed Edges | -0.025 | 0.158 | 0.876 | -0.339 | 0.289 |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Age | -0.023 | 0.017 | 0.185 | -0.057 | 0.011 |
| Education | 0.176 | 0.140 | 0.212 | -0.102 | 0.454 |
| Non-white | -0.392 | 0.332 | 0.240 | -1.051 | 0.266 |
| Female | 0.739 | 0.307 | 0.018\*\* | 0.130 | 1.349 |
| Income | 0.038 | 0.051 | 0.454 | -0.062 | 0.139 |
| Religiosity | 0.183 | 0.133 | 0.172 | -0.081 | 0.448 |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Cons | 3.806 | 1.044 | 0.0001 | 1.736 | 5.876 |
| R |  |  |  |  | 0.133 |
| N |  |  |  |  | 111 |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |

†P<0.100; \*\*P<0.050; \*\*\*P<0.001. Support for the carbon tax is coded on a 7-point Likert-scale

“Strongly disagree” to “Strongly agree”.

Table 98A: Linear Regression with Robust Confidence Intervals. Correlation between solid (coherent)

edges and agreement with the carbon tax.

|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Variable | Coef. | Std. Rob | P>|t| | [95% | Conf. Inter] |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Solid Edges | 0.045 | 0.148 | 0.763 | -0.248 | 0.337 |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Cons | 5.046 | 0.161 | 0.0001 | 4.728 | 5.364 |
| R |  |  |  |  | 0.001 |
| N |  |  |  |  | 111 |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |

†P<0.100; \*\*P<0.050; \*\*\*P<0.001. Support for the carbon tax is coded on a 7-point Likert-scale

“Strongly disagree” to “Strongly agree”.

Table 98B: Linear Regression with Robust Confidence Intervals. Correlation between solid (coherent)

edges and agreement with the carbon tax.

|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Variable | Coef. | Std. Rob | P>|t| | [95% | Conf. Inter] |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Solid Edges | 0.002 | 0.151 | 0.989 | -0.298 | 0.302 |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Age | -0.023 | 0.017 | 0.183 | -0.058 | 0.011 |
| Education | 0.175 | 0.141 | 0.218 | -0.105 | 0.454 |
| Non-white | -0.376 | 0.325 | 0.251 | -1.021 | 0.270 |
| Female | 0.737 | 0.309 | 0.019\*\* | 0.124 | 1.350 |
| Income | 0.041 | 0.052 | 0.427 | -0.061 | 0.144 |
| Religiosity | 0.177 | 0.137 | 0.198 | -0.094 | 0.449 |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Cons | 3.813 | 1.027 | 0.0001 | 1.776 | 5.851 |
| R |  |  |  |  | 0.129 |
| N |  |  |  |  | 111 |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |

†P<0.100; \*\*P<0.050; \*\*\*P<0.001. Support for the carbon tax is coded on a 7-point Likert-scale

“Strongly disagree” to “Strongly agree”.

Table 99A: Linear Regression with Robust Confidence Intervals. Correlation between assortativity

and agreement with the carbon tax.

|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Variable | Coef. | Std. Rob | P>|t| | [95% | Conf. Inter] |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Assortativity | 0.236 | 0.151 | 0.119 | -0.062 | 0.535 |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Cons | 5.063 | 0.157 | 0.0001 | 4.753 | 5.373 |
| R |  |  |  |  | 0.020 |
| N |  |  |  |  | 111 |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |

†P<0.100; \*\*P<0.050; \*\*\*P<0.001. Support for the carbon tax is coded on a 7-point Likert-scale

“Strongly disagree” to “Strongly agree”.

Table 99B: Linear Regression with Robust Confidence Intervals. Correlation between assortativity

and agreement with the carbon tax.

|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Variable | Coef. | Std. Rob | P>|t| | [95% | Conf. Inter] |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Assortativity | 0.144 | 0.150 | 0.339 | -0.153 | 0.440 |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Age | -0.020 | 0.017 | 0.239 | -0.053 | 0.013 |
| Education | 0.186 | 0.141 | 0.191 | -0.094 | 0.466 |
| Non-white | -0.359 | 0.322 | 0.268 | -0.998 | 0.281 |
| Female | 0.726 | 0.301 | 0.018\*\* | 0.130 | 1.323 |
| Income | 0.040 | 0.050 | 0.427 | -0.060 | 0.140 |
| Religiosity | 0.170 | 0.136 | 0.215 | -0.100 | 0.441 |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Cons | 3.670 | 1.047 | 0.001 | 1.594 | 5.746 |
| R |  |  |  |  | 0.139 |
| N |  |  |  |  | 111 |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |

†P<0.100; \*\*P<0.050; \*\*\*P<0.001. Support for the carbon tax is coded on a 7-point Likert-scale

“Strongly disagree” to “Strongly agree”.

Research Question 9: *Using Logistic Outcomes.*

Table 100: Logistic Regression with Robust Confidence Intervals. Correlation between node count

and disagreement with the carbon tax.

|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Variable | Coef. | Std. Rob | P>|z| | [95% | Conf. Inter] |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Node Count | -0.071 | 0.243 | 0.770 | -0.547 | 0.405 |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Cons | -1.457 | 0.244 | 0.0001 | -1.935 | -0.979 |
| Ps-R |  |  |  |  | 0.001 |
| N |  |  |  |  | 111 |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |

†P<0.100; \*\*P<0.050; \*\*\*P<0.001. Support for the carbon tax is coded on a 7-point Likert-scale

“Strongly disagree” to “Strongly agree”.

Table 101: Logistic Regression with Robust Confidence Intervals. Correlation between edge count

and disagreement with the carbon tax.

|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Variable | Coef. | Std. Rob | P>|z| | [95% | Conf. Inter] |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Edge Count | -0.099 | 0.216 | 0.648 | -0.523 | 0.325 |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Cons | -1.458 | 0.244 | 0.0001 | -1.936 | -0.980 |
| Ps-R |  |  |  |  | 0.002 |
| N |  |  |  |  | 111 |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |

†P<0.100; \*\*P<0.050; \*\*\*P<0.001. Support for the carbon tax is coded on a 7-point Likert-scale

“Strongly disagree” to “Strongly agree”.

Table 102: Logistic Regression with Robust Confidence Intervals. Correlation between density

and disagreement with the carbon tax.

|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Variable | Coef. | Std. Rob | P>|z| | [95% | Conf. Inter] |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Density | 0.068 | 0.253 | 0.789 | -0.429 | 0.565 |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Cons | -1.457 | 0.244 | 0.0001 | -1.935 | -0.979 |
| Ps-R |  |  |  |  | 0.001 |
| N |  |  |  |  | 111 |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |

†P<0.100; \*\*P<0.050; \*\*\*P<0.001. Support for the carbon tax is coded on a 7-point Likert-scale

“Strongly disagree” to “Strongly agree”.

Table 103: Logistic Regression with Robust Confidence Intervals. Correlation between diameter

and disagreement with the carbon tax.

|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Variable | Coef. | Std. Rob | P>|z| | [95% | Conf. Inter] |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Diameter | -0.258 | 0.326 | 0.430 | -0.897 | 0.382 |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Cons | -1.475 | 0.251 | 0.0001 | -1.967 | -0.983 |
| Ps-R |  |  |  |  | 0.009 |
| N |  |  |  |  | 111 |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |

†P<0.100; \*\*P<0.050; \*\*\*P<0.001. Support for the carbon tax is coded on a 7-point Likert-scale

“Strongly disagree” to “Strongly agree”.

Table 104: Logistic Regression with Robust Confidence Intervals. Correlation between triadic closure

and disagreement with the carbon tax.

|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Variable | Coef. | Std. Rob | P>|z| | [95% | Conf. Inter] |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Triadic Closure | 0.093 | 0.262 | 0.724 | -0.421 | 0.607 |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Cons | -1.458 | 0.244 | 0.0001 | -1.936 | -0.979 |
| Ps-R |  |  |  |  | 0.001 |
| N |  |  |  |  | 111 |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |

†P<0.100; \*\*P<0.050; \*\*\*P<0.001. Support for the carbon tax is coded on a 7-point Likert-scale

“Strongly disagree” to “Strongly agree”.

Table 105: Logistic Regression with Robust Confidence Intervals. Correlation between centrality

and disagreement with the carbon tax.

|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Variable | Coef. | Std. Rob | P>|z| | [95% | Conf. Inter] |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Degree Centrality | 0.097 | 0.300 | 0.747 | -0.491 | 0.685 |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Cons | -1.458 | 0.244 | 0.0001 | -1.937 | -0.979 |
| Ps-R |  |  |  |  | 0.002 |
| N |  |  |  |  | 111 |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |

†P<0.100; \*\*P<0.050; \*\*\*P<0.001. Support for the carbon tax is coded on a 7-point Likert-scale

“Strongly disagree” to “Strongly agree”.

Table 106: Logistic Regression with Robust Confidence Intervals. Correlation between eigenvector centrality

and disagreement with the carbon tax.

|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Variable | Coef. | Std. Rob | P>|z| | [95% | Conf. Inter] |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Eigenvector | 0.077 | 0.247 | 0.756 | -0.407 | 0.561 |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Cons | -1.457 | 0.244 | 0.0001 | -1.935 | -0.979 |
| Ps-R |  |  |  |  | 0.001 |
| N |  |  |  |  | 111 |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |

†P<0.100; \*\*P<0.050; \*\*\*P<0.001. Support for the carbon tax is coded on a 7-point Likert-scale

“Strongly disagree” to “Strongly agree”.

Table 107: Logistic Regression with Robust Confidence Intervals. Correlation between betweenness centrality

and disagreement with the carbon tax.

|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Variable | Coef. | Std. Rob | P>|z| | [95% | Conf. Inter] |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Betweenness | 0.102 | 0.280 | 0.714 | -0.446 | 0.651 |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Cons | -1.459 | 0.244 | 0.0001 | -1.938 | -0.979 |
| Ps-R |  |  |  |  | 0.002 |
| N |  |  |  |  | 111 |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |

†P<0.100; \*\*P<0.050; \*\*\*P<0.001. Support for the carbon tax is coded on a 7-point Likert-scale

“Strongly disagree” to “Strongly agree”.

Table 108: Logistic Regression with Robust Confidence Intervals. Correlation between dashed (incoherent)

Edges and disagreement with the carbon tax.

|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Variable | Coef. | Std. Rob | P>|z| | [95% | Conf. Inter] |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Dashed Edges | 0.061 | 0.252 | 0.808 | -0.433 | 0.555 |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Cons | -1.456 | 0.244 | 0.0001 | -1.934 | -0.979 |
| Ps-R |  |  |  |  | 0.001 |
| N |  |  |  |  | 111 |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |

†P<0.100; \*\*P<0.050; \*\*\*P<0.001. Support for the carbon tax is coded on a 7-point Likert-scale

“Strongly disagree” to “Strongly agree”.

Table 109: Logistic Regression with Robust Confidence Intervals. Correlation between solid (coherent)

edges and disagreement with the carbon tax.

|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Variable | Coef. | Std. Rob | P>|z| | [95% | Conf. Inter] |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Solid Edges | -0.147 | 0.217 | 0.497 | -0.573 | 0.278 |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Cons | -1.439 | 0.245 | 0.0001 | -1.919 | -0.959 |
| Ps-R |  |  |  |  | 0.004 |
| N |  |  |  |  | 111 |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |

†P<0.100; \*\*P<0.050; \*\*\*P<0.001. Support for the carbon tax is coded on a 7-point Likert-scale

“Strongly disagree” to “Strongly agree”.

Table 110: Logistic Regression with Robust Confidence Intervals. Correlation between assortitivity and

disagreement with the carbon tax.

|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Variable | Coef. | Std. Rob | P>|z| | [95% | Conf. Inter] |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Assortativity | -0.338 | 0.246 | 0.169 | -0.820 | 0.144 |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Cons | -1.490 | 0.251 | 0.0001 | -1.981 | -0.998 |
| Ps-R |  |  |  |  | 0.017 |
| N |  |  |  |  | 111 |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |

†P<0.100; \*\*P<0.050; \*\*\*P<0.001. Support for the carbon tax is coded on a 7-point Likert-scale

“Strongly disagree” to “Strongly agree”.

*Interaction between Emotional and Structural Network Properties*

*\*\*Only Significant Outcomes Reported\*\**

Table 111A: Linear Regression with Robust Confidence Intervals. Interaction effect between node diversity

and node count on agreement with the carbon tax.

|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Variable | Coef. | Std. Rob | P>|t| | [95% | Conf. Inter] |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Diversity | -0.289 | 0.190 | 0.132 | -0.666 | 0.089 |
| Node Count | 0.018 | 0.157 | 0.908 | -0.293 | 0.330 |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Diversity# Node Count | -0.248 | 0.168 | 0.143 | -0.582 | 0.085 |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Cons | 5.128 | 0.154 | 0.0001 | 4.823 | 5.434 |
| R |  |  |  |  | 0.036 |
| N |  |  |  |  | 111 |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |

†P<0.100; \*\*P<0.050; \*\*\*P<0.001. Support for the carbon tax is coded on a 7-point Likert-scale

“Strongly disagree” to “Strongly agree”.

Table 111B: Linear Regression with Robust Confidence Intervals. Interaction effect between node diversity

and node count on agreement with the carbon tax.

|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Variable | Coef. | Std. Rob | P>|t| | [95% | Conf. Inter] |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Diversity | -0.301 | 0.157 | 0.059† | -0.613 | 0.012 |
| Edge Count | -0.049 | 0.156 | 0.755 | -0.358 | 0.260 |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Diversity# Node Count |  |  |  |  |  |
|  | -0.267 | 0.131 | 0.044\*\* | -0.526 | -0.008 |
| Age |  |  |  |  |  |
| Education | -0.032 | 0.017 | 0.056† | -0.065 | 0.001 |
| Non-white | 0.140 | 0.147 | 0.345 | -0.153 | 0.433 |
| Female | -0.446 | 0.310 | 0.154 | -1.062 | 0.170 |
| Income | 0.681 | 0.302 | 0.026\*\* | 0.083 | 1.280 |
| Religiosity | 0.053 | 0.050 | 0.294 | -0.046 | 0.152 |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Cons | 4.418 | 1.115 | 0.0001 | 2.205 | 6.631 |
| R |  |  |  |  | 0.173 |
| N |  |  |  |  | 111 |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |

†P<0.100; \*\*P<0.050; \*\*\*P<0.001. Support for the carbon tax is coded on a 7-point Likert-scale

“Strongly disagree” to “Strongly agree”.

Table 112A: Linear Regression with Robust Confidence Intervals. Interaction effect between node diversity

and density on agreement with the carbon tax.

|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Variable | Coef. | Std. Rob | P>|t| | [95% | Conf. Inter] |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Diversity | -0.225 | 0.202 | 0.267 | -0.624 | 0.175 |
| Density | 0.018 | 0.162 | 0.911 | -0.302 | 0.338 |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Diversity#Density | 0.342 | 0.171 | 0.048\*\* | 0.003 | 0.680 |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Cons | 5.105 | 0.156 | 0.0001 | 4.795 | 5.415 |
| R |  |  |  |  | 0.048 |
| N |  |  |  |  | 111 |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |

†P<0.100; \*\*P<0.050; \*\*\*P<0.001. Support for the carbon tax is coded on a 7-point Likert-scale

“Strongly disagree” to “Strongly agree”.

Table 112B: Linear Regression with Robust Confidence Intervals. Interaction effect between node diversity

and density on agreement with the carbon tax.

|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Variable | Coef. | Std. Rob | P>|t| | [95% | Conf. Inter] |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Diversity | -0.232 | 0.153 | 0.134 | -0.536 | 0.072 |
| Density | 0.091 | 0.149 | 0.542 | -0.205 | 0.388 |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Diversity#Density |  |  |  |  |  |
|  | 0.337 | 0.143 | 0.020\*\* | 0.054 | 0.621 |
| Age |  |  |  |  |  |
| Education | -0.030 | 0.017 | 0.080† | -0.064 | 0.004 |
| Non-white | 0.113 | 0.149 | 0.451 | -0.183 | 0.408 |
| Female | -0.460 | 0.321 | 0.155 | -1.098 | 0.177 |
| Income | 0.710 | 0.301 | 0.020\*\* | 0.114 | 1.307 |
| Religiosity | 0.049 | 0.049 | 0.321 | -0.049 | 0.147 |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Cons | 4.485 | 1.110 | 0.0001 | 2.284 | 6.687 |
| R |  |  |  |  | 0.184 |
| N |  |  |  |  | 111 |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |

†P<0.100; \*\*P<0.050; \*\*\*P<0.001. Support for the carbon tax is coded on a 7-point Likert-scale

“Strongly disagree” to “Strongly agree”.

Table 113A: Linear Regression with Robust Confidence Intervals. Interaction effect between node diversity

and degree centrality on agreement with the carbon tax.

|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Variable | Coef. | Std. Rob | P>|t| | [95% | Conf. Inter] |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Diversity | -0.223 | 0.166 | 0.181 | -0.552 | 0.105 |
| Centrality | -0.123 | 0.169 | 0.467 | -0.459 | 0.212 |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Diversity# Degree | 0.331 | 0.185 | 0.076† | -0.035 | 0.697 |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Cons | 5.124 | 0.155 | 0.0001 | 4.817 | 5.431 |
| R |  |  |  |  | 0.053 |
| N |  |  |  |  | 111 |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |

†P<0.100; \*\*P<0.050; \*\*\*P<0.001. Support for the carbon tax is coded on a 7-point Likert-scale

“Strongly disagree” to “Strongly agree”.

Table 113B: Linear Regression with Robust Confidence Intervals. Interaction effect between node diversity

and degree centrality on agreement with the carbon tax.

|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Variable | Coef. | Std. Rob | P>|t| | [95% | Conf. Inter] |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Diversity | -0.205 | 0.150 | 0.176 | -0.502 | 0.093 |
| Centrality | 0.003 | 0.166 | 0.986 | -0.327 | 0.333 |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Diversity# Degree |  |  |  |  |  |
|  | 0.177 | 0.169 | 0.298 | -0.158 | 0.513 |
| Age |  |  |  |  |  |
| Education | -0.026 | 0.017 | 0.125 | -0.060 | 0.007 |
| Non-white | 0.146 | 0.143 | 0.311 | -0.138 | 0.431 |
| Female | -0.433 | 0.327 | 0.189 | -1.082 | 0.216 |
| Income | 0.665 | 0.303 | 0.031\*\* | 0.063 | 1.267 |
| Religiosity | 0.038 | 0.048 | 0.434 | -0.057 | 0.133 |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Cons | 4.308 | 1.126 | 0.0001 | 2.074 | 6.543 |
| R |  |  |  |  | 0.156 |
| N |  |  |  |  | 111 |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |

†P<0.100; \*\*P<0.050; \*\*\*P<0.001. Support for the carbon tax is coded on a 7-point Likert-scale

“Strongly disagree” to “Strongly agree”.

*Emotional Dependence of Central Node*

Table 114A: Linear Regression with Robust Confidence Intervals. Interaction effect between emotional dependence of central node and diameter on agreement with the carbon tax.

|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Variable | Coef. | Std. Rob | P>|t| | [95% | Conf. Inter] |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Emotional Dependence 1 | 0.245 | 0.103 | 0.019\*\* | 0.041 | 0.449 |
| Diameter | 0.088 | 0.188 | 0.642 | -0.285 | 0.461 |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| C-node Val# Diameter | -0.225 | 0.079 | 0.005\*\* | -0.383 | -0.068 |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Cons | 5.094 | 0.156 | 0.0001 | 4.784 | 5.403 |
| R |  |  |  |  | 0.039 |
| N |  |  |  |  | 111 |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |

†P<0.100; \*\*P<0.050; \*\*\*P<0.001. Support for the carbon tax is coded on a 7-point Likert-scale

“Strongly disagree” to “Strongly agree”.

Table 114B: Linear Regression with Robust Confidence Intervals. Interaction effect between emotional dependence of central node and diameter on agreement with the carbon tax.

|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Variable | Coef. | Std. Rob | P>|t| | [95% | Conf. Inter] |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Emotional Dependence 1 | 0.256 | 0.131 | 0.053† | -0.003 | 0.515 |
| Diameter | -0.058 | 0.190 | 0.761 | -0.436 | 0.320 |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| C-node Val# Diameter | -0.203 | 0.091 | 0.028\*\* | -0.384 | -0.023 |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Age | -0.023 | 0.017 | 0.169 | -0.057 | 0.010 |
| Education | 0.181 | 0.145 | 0.216 | -0.107 | 0.469 |
| Non-white | -0.342 | 0.317 | 0.283 | -0.970 | 0.286 |
| Female | 0.797 | 0.304 | 0.010\*\* | 0.195 | 1.399 |
| Income | 0.020 | 0.053 | 0.702 | -0.085 | 0.126 |
| Religiosity | 0.184 | 0.141 | 0.194 | -0.095 | 0.464 |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Cons | 3.873 | 1.045 | 0.0001 | 1.801 | 5.946 |
| R |  |  |  |  | 0.169 |
| N |  |  |  |  | 111 |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |

†P<0.100; \*\*P<0.050; \*\*\*P<0.001. Support for the carbon tax is coded on a 7-point Likert-scale

“Strongly disagree” to “Strongly agree”.

Table 115A: Linear Regression with Robust Confidence Intervals. Interaction effect between emotional

dependence of central node and degree centrality on agreement with the carbon tax.

|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Variable | Coef. | Std. Rob | P>|t| | [95% | Conf. Inter] |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Emotional Dependence 1 | 0.261 | 0.103 | 0.013\*\* | 0.056 | 0.466 |
| Centrality | 0.033 | 0.181 | 0.858 | -0.327 | 0.392 |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| C-node Val# Degree | 0.263 | 0.121 | 0.032\*\* | 0.023 | 0.502 |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Cons | 5.096 | 0.157 | 0.0001 | 4.786 | 5.406 |
| R |  |  |  |  | 0.031 |
| N |  |  |  |  | 111 |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |

†P<0.100; \*\*P<0.050; \*\*\*P<0.001. Support for the carbon tax is coded on a 7-point Likert-scale

“Strongly disagree” to “Strongly agree”.

Table 115B: Linear Regression with Robust Confidence Intervals. Interaction effect between emotional

dependence of central node and degree centrality on agreement with the carbon tax.

|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Variable | Coef. | Std. Rob | P>|t| | [95% | Conf. Inter] |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Emotional Dependence 1 | 0.277 | 0.123 | 0.026\*\* | 0.033 | 0.520 |
| Centrality | 0.151 | 0.170 | 0.378 | -0.186 | 0.487 |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| C-node Val# Degree | 0.274 | 0.129 | 0.036\*\* | 0.019 | 0.529 |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Age | -0.027 | 0.017 | 0.122 | -0.061 | 0.007 |
| Education | 0.177 | 0.140 | 0.208 | -0.100 | 0.454 |
| Non-white | -0.364 | 0.318 | 0.256 | -0.995 | 0.267 |
| Female | 0.783 | 0.304 | 0.011\*\* | 0.180 | 1.385 |
| Income | 0.022 | 0.053 | 0.683 | -0.083 | 0.126 |
| Religiosity | 0.192 | 0.138 | 0.168 | -0.082 | 0.465 |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Cons | 4.008 | 1.044 | 0.0001 | 1.938 | 6.079 |
| R |  |  |  |  | 0.168 |
| N |  |  |  |  | 111 |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |

†P<0.100; \*\*P<0.050; \*\*\*P<0.001. Support for the carbon tax is coded on a 7-point Likert-scale

“Strongly disagree” to “Strongly agree”.

Table 116A: Linear Regression with Robust Confidence Intervals. Interaction effect between emotional

dependence of central node and betweeness centrality on agreement with the carbon tax.

|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Variable | Coef. | Std. Rob | P>|t| | [95% | Conf. Inter] |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Emotional Dependence 1 | 0.159 | 0.131 | 0.228 | -0.101 | 0.418 |
| Betweeness | -0.062 | 0.164 | 0.704 | -0.387 | 0.262 |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| C-node Val# Betweeness | 0.251 | 0.152 | 0.102 | -0.050 | 0.553 |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Cons | 5.056 | 0.158 | 0.0001 | 4.743 | 5.368 |
| R |  |  |  |  | 0.030 |
| N |  |  |  |  | 111 |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |

†P<0.100; \*\*P<0.050; \*\*\*P<0.001. Support for the carbon tax is coded on a 7-point Likert-scale

“Strongly disagree” to “Strongly agree”.

Table 116B: Linear Regression with Robust Confidence Intervals Interaction effect between emotional

dependence of central node and betweenness centrality on agreement with the carbon tax.

|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Variable | Coef. | Std. Rob | P>|t| | [95% | Conf. Inter] |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Emotional Dependence 1 | 0.164 | 0.150 | 0.278 | -0.134 | 0.461 |
| Betweeness | -0.106 | 0.160 | 0.510 | -0.424 | 0.212 |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| C-node Val# Betweeness | 0.217 | 0.164 | 0.188 | -0.108 | 0.542 |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Age | -0.021 | 0.017 | 0.210 | -0.054 | 0.012 |
| Education | 0.156 | 0.147 | 0.289 | -0.135 | 0.447 |
| Non-white | -0.284 | 0.332 | 0.394 | -0.943 | 0.375 |
| Female | 0.797 | 0.311 | 0.012\*\* | 0.180 | 1.413 |
| Income | 0.044 | 0.052 | 0.406 | -0.060 | 0.147 |
| Religiosity | 0.191 | 0.138 | 0.168 | -0.082 | 0.465 |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Cons | 3.726 | 1.062 | 0.001 | 1.618 | 5.834 |
| R |  |  |  |  | 0.161 |
| N |  |  |  |  | 111 |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |

†P<0.100; \*\*P<0.050; \*\*\*P<0.001. Support for the carbon tax is coded on a 7-point Likert-scale

“Strongly disagree” to “Strongly agree”.

Table 117A: Linear Regression with Robust Confidence Intervals. Interaction effect between emotional

dependence of central node and CAM dashed (incoherent) edges centrality on agreement with the carbon tax.

|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Variable | Coef. | Std. Rob | P>|t| | [95% | Conf. Inter] |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Emotional Dependence 1 | 0.412 | 0.117 | 0.001\*\*\* | 0.179 | 0.644 |
| Dashed Edges | 0.046 | 0.155 | 0.768 | -0.262 | 0.353 |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| C-node Val# Dashed | 0.411 | 0.123 | 0.001\*\*\* | 0.168 | 0.654 |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Cons | 5.133 | 0.151 | 0.0001 | 4.834 | 5.433 |
| R |  |  |  |  | 0.049 |
| N |  |  |  |  | 111 |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |

†P<0.100; \*\*P<0.050; \*\*\*P<0.001. Support for the carbon tax is coded on a 7-point Likert-scale

“Strongly disagree” to “Strongly agree”.

Table 117B: Linear Regression with Robust Confidence Intervals. Interaction effect between emotional

dependence of central node and CAM dashed (incoherent) edges centrality on agreement with the carbon tax.

|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Variable | Coef. | Std. Rob | P>|t| | [95% | Conf. Inter] |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Emotional Dependence 1 | 0.426 | 0.133 | 0.002\*\* | 0.161 | 0.691 |
| Dashed Edges | 0.080 | 0.156 | 0.611 | -0.230 | 0.389 |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| C-node Val# Dashed | 0.427 | 0.124 | 0.001\*\*\* | 0.180 | 0.673 |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Age | -0.025 | 0.017 | 0.149 | -0.058 | 0.009 |
| Education | 0.159 | 0.139 | 0.254 | -0.116 | 0.434 |
| Non-white | -0.395 | 0.317 | 0.215 | -1.024 | 0.234 |
| Female | 0.739 | 0.307 | 0.018\*\* | 0.129 | 1.349 |
| Income | 0.053 | 0.052 | 0.306 | -0.049 | 0.156 |
| Religiosity | 0.172 | 0.129 | 0.186 | -0.084 | 0.428 |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Cons | 3.977 | 1.044 | 0.0001 | 1.907 | 6.047 |
| R |  |  |  |  | 0.183 |
| N |  |  |  |  | 111 |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |

†P<0.100; \*\*P<0.050; \*\*\*P<0.001. Support for the carbon tax is coded on a 7-point Likert-scale

“Strongly disagree” to “Strongly agree”.

Table 118A: Linear Regression with Robust Confidence Intervals. Interaction effect between emotional

dependence of central node and assortativity on agreement with the carbon tax.

|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Variable | Coef. | Std. Rob | P>|t| | [95% | Conf. Inter] |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Emotional Dependence 1 | 0.089 | 0.120 | 0.457 | -0.148 | 0.326 |
| Dashed Links | 0.184 | 0.148 | 0.215 | -0.109 | 0.478 |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| C-node Val# Dashed | -0.404 | 0.169 | 0.019\*\* | -0.740 | -0.069 |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Cons | 5.024 | 0.155 | 0.0001 | 4.716 | 5.332 |
| R |  |  |  |  | 0.069 |
| N |  |  |  |  | 111 |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |

†P<0.100; \*\*P<0.050; \*\*\*P<0.001. Support for the carbon tax is coded on a 7-point Likert-scale

“Strongly disagree” to “Strongly agree”.

Table 118B: Linear Regression with Robust Confidence Intervals. Interaction effect between emotional

dependence of central node and assortativity on agreement with the carbon tax.

|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Variable | Coef. | Std. Rob | P>|t| | [95% | Conf. Inter] |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Emotional Dependence 1 | 0.060 | 0.134 | 0.656 | -0.205 | 0.325 |
| Assortativity | 0.074 | 0.145 | 0.610 | -0.213 | 0.361 |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| C-node Val# Assortativity | -0.458 | 0.170 | 0.008\*\* | -0.796 | -0.120 |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Age | -0.022 | 0.016 | 0.192 | -0.054 | 0.011 |
| Education | 0.198 | 0.140 | 0.162 | -0.081 | 0.476 |
| Non-white | -0.181 | 0.321 | 0.574 | -0.818 | 0.456 |
| Female | 0.812 | 0.302 | 0.008\*\* | 0.213 | 1.412 |
| Income | 0.023 | 0.051 | 0.646 | -0.077 | 0.124 |
| Religiosity | 0.173 | 0.136 | 0.207 | -0.097 | 0.444 |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Cons | 3.599 | 1.023 | 0.001 | 1.569 | 5.628 |
| R |  |  |  |  | 0.190 |
| N |  |  |  |  | 111 |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |

†P<0.100; \*\*P<0.050; \*\*\*P<0.001. Support for the carbon tax is coded on a 7-point Likert-scale

“Strongly disagree” to “Strongly agree”.

*Emotional Dependence of the Central Node 2*

Table 119A: Linear Regression with Robust Confidence Intervals. . Interaction effect between emotional

dependence of central node and density on agreement with the carbon tax.

|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Variable | Coef. | Std. Rob | P>|t| | [95% | Conf. Inter] |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Emotional Dependence 2 | 0.085 | 0.162 | 0.599 | -0.235 | 0.405 |
| Density | 0.070 | 0.151 | 0.644 | -0.229 | 0.368 |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| C-node Valence # Density | -0.202 | 0.096 | 0.038\*\* | -0.392 | -0.012 |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Cons | 5.096 | 0.157 | 0.0001 | 4.785 | 5.407 |
| R |  |  |  |  | 0.023 |
| N |  |  |  |  | 111 |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |

†P<0.100; \*\*P<0.050; \*\*\*P<0.001. Support for the carbon tax is coded on a 7-point Likert-scale

“Strongly disagree” to “Strongly agree”.

Table 119B: Linear Regression with Robust Confidence Intervals. . Interaction effect between emotional

dependence of central node and density on agreement with the carbon tax.

|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Variable | Coef. | Std. Rob | P>|t| | [95% | Conf. Inter] |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Emotional Dependence 2 | 0.145 | 0.164 | 0.376 | -0.179 | 0.470 |
| Density | 0.149 | 0.136 | 0.276 | -0.121 | 0.420 |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| C-node Valence # Density | -0.198 | 0.097 | 0.044\*\* | -0.391 | -0.005 |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Age | -0.028 | 0.017 | 0.114 | -0.062 | 0.007 |
| Education | 0.139 | 0.151 | 0.360 | -0.161 | 0.438 |
| Non-white | -0.302 | 0.340 | 0.377 | -0.977 | 0.373 |
| Female | 0.795 | 0.314 | 0.013\*\* | 0.172 | 1.418 |
| Income | 0.040 | 0.052 | 0.440 | -0.062 | 0.143 |
| Religiosity | 0.209 | 0.136 | 0.129 | -0.062 | 0.479 |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Cons | 4.054 | 1.092 | 0.0001 | 1.888 | 6.220 |
| R |  |  |  |  | 0.164 |
| N |  |  |  |  | 111 |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |

†P<0.100; \*\*P<0.050; \*\*\*P<0.001. Support for the carbon tax is coded on a 7-point Likert-scale

“Strongly disagree” to “Strongly agree”.

**Statistical Power Analyses**

Table 120: Post-Hoc Statistical Power Analysis of the Significant the Reported Effects by Exploratory Question.

|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Question | Variable Y | Std. Y | Variable X | Std. X | Coefficient | Power |
| Q1 | Attitude Strength | 0.90 | Node Diversity | 1 | 0.177 | (1-Β) = 0.68 |
| Q2 | / | / | / | / | / | / |
| Q3 | Tax Familiarity | 0.80 | Emotional D Central Node | 1 | 0.154 | (1-Β) = 0.66 |
| Q4 | Tax Agreement | 1.66 | Valence 1 | 1 | 0.833 | (1-Β) = 1 |
|  | Tax Agreement | 1.66 | Valence 2 | 1 | 0.837 | (1-Β) = 1 |
|  | Tax Agreement | 1.66 | Percent Positive | 1 | 0.397 | (1-Β) = 0.82 |
|  | Tax Agreement | 1.66 | Percent Negative | 1 | 0.553 | (1-Β) = 0.98 |
| Q5 | / | / | / | / | / | / |
| Q6 | Density | 1 | Interest \* Familiarity | 2.57 | -0.085 | (1-Β) = 0.76 |
|  | Centrality | 1 | Interest \* Familiarity | 2.57 | -0.088 | (1-Β) = 0.78 |
| Q7 | Sophistication | 1.62 | Eigenvector | 1 | -0.448 | (1-Β) = 0.91 |
|  | Sophistication | 1.62 | Degree | 1 | -0.287 | (1-Β) = 0.60 |
|  | Sophistication | 1.62 | Number of Nodes | 1 | 0.359 | (1-Β) = 0.77 |
|  | Sophistication | 1.62 | Number of Edges | 1 | 0.386 | (1-Β) = 0.82 |
|  | Sophistication | 1.62 | Assortative | 1 | 0.386 | (1-Β) = 0.59 |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
|  | Eigenvector | 1 | Sophistifcation \* familiarity | 1.62 | 0.163 | (1-Β) = 0.85 |
|  | Assortativity | 1 | Sophistifcation \* familiarity | 1.62 | 0.163 | (1-Β) = 0.89 |
|  | Triadic Closure | 1 | Sophistifcation \* familiarity | 1.62 | 0.163 | (1-Β) = 0.89 |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Q8 | Tax Familiarity | .80 | Edge Count | 1 | -0.140 | (1-Β) = 0.58 |
|  | Tax Familiarity | .80 | Density | 1 | -0.119 | (1-Β) = 0.47 |
|  | Tax Familiarity | .80 | Triadic Closure | 1 | -0.191 | (1-Β) = 0.83 |
|  | Tax Familiarity | .80 | Eigenvector | 1 | 0.286 | (1-Β) = 0.99 |
|  | Tax Familiarity | .80 | Betweenness | 1 | 0.158 | (1-Β) = 0.68 |
|  | Tax Familiarity | .80 | Solid Links | 1 | -0.139 | (1-Β) = 0.58 |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |

Note: The post-hoc power analyses uses a linear bivariate model with a t distribution that compares the change in slope on the dependent variable to “0”. The observed standard errors for each of the x and y variables are used. As political variables are not standardized this value may differ from 1.