Appendices:

Online Supplementary Material for “Opportunistic Bargaining”

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Appendix 1: Sample Compensation Scheme

Table 1A: Abridged Compensation Scheme of District G, City X (April, 2007)

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| Items | Compensation Rates |
| House Compensation | **Compensation Rates for Houses:**\* Total = Building replacement value (150 to 680 Chinese Yuan per square meter) + Interior decorations (380-500 Yuan per square meter) + location adjustment (500 Yuan per square meter for the CMC project)\* Base Price for Relocating Apartments(only applicable to evictees opt for property-exchange): 560 Yuan per square meter. |
| **Determining the Size of Compensated Area:**(1) Properly authorized houses will be fully compensated;(2) Houses not authorized but with reasonable justification … and was built prior to January 31, 2007: for families with four people or less, full compensation for up to 218 square meters; for families with five people or more, full compensation up to 250 square meters; and for families with six people or more, each additional member gets the location adjustment compensation for 30 square meters.(3) Non-authorized buildings done after January 31, 2007 will only be compensated the building replacement value.… |
| Transitioning Rent Subsidies | Families with fewer than 4 people will receive 400 Yuan per month; families with 5 people or more, each additional member will receive an extra 100 Yuan per month. |
| Compliance Award | For families sign the agreement and move by the deadline: 30 Yuan per square meter; for families evacuate ahead of the deadline: up to 50 additional Yuan per square meter. |
| Moving Expenses | One-time 500 Yuan per family |
| Decorations | \* Families without interior decorations will receive 380 Yuan per square meter for all authorized building area.\* If interior decorations were done before January 31, 2007, in addition to the 380 Yuan award, authorized building area will be compensated the residual value of decorations; total compensation combined shall not exceed 500 Yuan per square meter.\* Rush internal decorations after January 31, 2007 will be compensated 380 Yuan and the total amount shall not exceed 450 Yuan per square meter.\* Rush exterior decorations will not be compensated. |

*Notes*: Source not provided to keep City anonymous; the document is available upon request.

**Appendix 2: Reported Opportunistic Bargaining Cases in Eviction (2000-2017)**

**Table A2: Reported Eviction-Related Opportunistic Bargaining Cases**

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| **Year** | **Counts** |
| 2000 | 26 |
| 2001 | 44 |
| 2002 | 68 |
| 2003 | 96 |
| 2004 | 125 |
| 2005 | 205 |
| 2006 | 577 |
| 2007 | 659 |
| 2008 | 726 |
| 2009 | 628 |
| 2010 | 833 |
| 2011 | 766 |
| 2012 | 378 |
| 2013 | 527 |
| 2014 | 486 |
| 2015 | 361 |
| 2016 | 329 |
| 2017 | 435 |
| **Total** | **7269** |

Source: CNKI China Core Newspapers Full-Text Database

**Appendix 3: Geographical Distribution of Respondents**



**Figure A3. Respondent’s Geographic Distribution**

Notes: Darker color represents more respondents.

**Appendix 4: Sample Comparisons**

**Table A4: Our Sample with CNNIC and 2008 China Survey Internet Samples**

|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | Our Sample | CNNIC | China Survey(Internet) | Comparison |  | Comparison |
|  | 1 | 2 | 3 | 1 - 2 |  | 1 - 3 |
| *Female* | 50.61  | 52.70 | 50. 62 | -2.09 |  | -0.01 |
| *Age* | 35.4 |  | 31.72 |  |  | 3.68 |
| *Minority* | 0.04 |  | 0.067 |  |  | -0.027 |
| *Education* |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Primary school and below | 0.44  | 17.90 |  | -17.46 |  |  |
| Junior high school | 4.88 | 38.1 |  | -33.22 |  |  |
| Senior high school | 32.47 | 23.8 |  | 8.67 |  |  |
| 3-year college | 20.3 | 10.5 |  | 9.8 |  |  |
| College and above | 41.91 | 9.7 |  | 32.21 |  |  |
| Rural | 44.83 | 26.7 | 29.54 | 18.13 |  | 15.29 |
| CCP | 0.15 |  | 0.206 |  |  | -0.056 |
| *Occupation* |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Student | 12.72 | 25.4 |  | -12.68 |  |  |
| Self-employed | 26.48 | 20 |  | 6.48 |  |  |
| Corporate oﬃce worker | 30.49 | 10.1 |  | 20.39 |  |  |
| Corporate management | 8.27 | 2.8 |  | 5.47 |  |  |
| Government employee | 6.79 | 2.8 | 0.135 | 3.99 |  | 6.655 |
| Professional | 4.14 | 5.2 |  | -1.06 |  |  |
| Manufacturing worker | 2.65 | 3.8 |  | -1.15 |  |  |
| Service worker | 2.65 | 5.2 |  | -2.55 |  |  |
| Migrant worker | 2.04 | 3.9 |  | -1.86 |  |  |
| Farmer | 0.31 | 7.8 | 0.105 | -7.49 |  | 0.205 |
| Unemployed | 2.96 | 8.8 |  | -5.84 |  |  |
| Retired and other | 0.49 | 4.1 |  | -3.61 |  |  |
| Year | 2018 | 2018 | 2009 |  |  |  |

*Notes*: The table compares the means for covariates across our sample with internet-based sample from the 43th Statistical Report of Internet Development in China (CNNIC) in February 2019 and the 2008 China Survey. The China Survey, a collaborative project between Texas A&M and Beijing University, is representative of the full Chinese population, though here we only look at the subgroup of respondents with internet access.

**Appendix 5: The Balance Table**

**Table A5: Covariate Balance across Independent Variables**

|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|   | Control | TG1 | TG2 | TG3 | TG4 | TG5 | TG6 | TG7 | P- value |
| Age | 1.607 | 1.607 | 1.741 | 1.59 | 1.662 | 1.574 | 1.745 | 1.609 | 0.197  |
| Gender (Male) | 0.49 | 0.455 | 0.515 | 0.475 | 0.492 | 0.518 | 0.49 | 0.514 | 0.902  |
| Ethnicity (Han) | 0.954 | 0.976 | 0.961 | 0.955 | 0.96 | 0.959 | 0.951 | 0.962 | 0.889  |
| College Education | 0.667 | 0.611 | 0.624 | 0.577 | 0.643 | 0.641 | 0.615 | 0.601 | 0.631  |
| News Time | 2.781 | 3.004 | 2.913 | 2.93 | 3.01 | 2.906 | 2.974 | 2.914 | 0.647  |
| Social Media Time | 2.164 | 2.415 | 2.306 | 2.463 | 2.324 | 2.367 | 2.446 | 2.322 | 0.108  |
| Income | 3.552 | 3.867 | 3.645 | 3.727 | 3.915 | 3.545 | 3.641 | 3.767 | 0.567  |
| CCP Membership | 0.124 | 0.166 | 0.162 | 0.172 | 0.095 | 0.126 | 0.189 | 0.148 | 0.112  |
| Urban Residence | 0.536 | 0.54 | 0.593 | 0.53 | 0.583 | 0.532 | 0.573 | 0.529 | 0.761  |
| Eviction Experience | 0.584 | 0.544 | 0.662 | 0.545 | 0.614 | 0.583 | 0.656 | 0.568 | 0.046  |
| House Buying Experience | 0.713 | 0.719 | 0.747 | 0.737 | 0.787 | 0.711 | 0.719 | 0.725 | 0.618  |
| Family Resourceful | 2.708 | 2.763 | 2.822 | 2.79 | 2.831 | 2.793 | 2.862 | 2.808 | 0.591  |
| Family Income Reasonable | 2.923 | 2.987 | 2.973 | 2.938 | 3.068 | 2.942 | 3 | 2.961 | 0.453  |
| Default Hotel Reservation | 2.121 | 2.197 | 2.266 | 2.244 | 2.107 | 2.138 | 2.181 | 2.241 | 0.289  |
| Protest against Local Authorities | 2.044 | 2.175 | 2.144 | 2.131 | 2.097 | 2.105 | 2.122 | 2.062 | 0.763  |
| Suing Local Government | 2.655 | 2.812 | 2.64 | 2.783 | 2.723 | 2.605 | 2.724 | 2.67 | 0.114  |
| Petition Signing | 2.869 | 2.915 | 2.896 | 2.937 | 2.883 | 2.819 | 2.792 | 2.85 | 0.531  |
| Paying Bribes | 2.354 | 2.372 | 2.405 | 2.385 | 2.505 | 2.315 | 2.353 | 2.317 | 0.371  |
| Bus or Park Fare Evasion | 1.374 | 1.363 | 1.392 | 1.362 | 1.364 | 1.345 | 1.348 | 1.383 | 0.996  |
| Political Efficacy | 2.543 | 2.714 | 2.692 | 2.782 | 2.589 | 2.612 | 2.723 | 2.658 | 0.109  |
| Current Regime Preference | 3.487 | 3.438 | 3.564 | 3.507 | 3.495 | 3.511 | 3.479 | 3.516 | 0.712  |
| Public Interest over Personal Interest | 3.266 | 3.253 | 3.341 | 3.355 | 3.252 | 3.286 | 3.305 | 3.292 | 0.746 |
| Confidence in Regime Stability | 3.593 | 3.548 | 3.559 | 3.583 | 3.545 | 3.581 | 3.577 | 3.589 | 0.982  |
| Confidence in Economy | 3.543 | 3.544 | 3.616 | 3.573 | 3.52 | 3.577 | 3.549 | 3.534 | 0.780  |
| Govt. Policies Represent My Interest | 3.231 | 3.207 | 3.289 | 3.232 | 3.272 | 3.335 | 3.286 | 3.219 | 0.401 |
| Trust in Central Govt. | 9.035 | 8.935 | 8.967 | 8.905 | 8.772 | 9.159 | 9.15 | 8.913 | 0.122  |
| Trust in County Govt. | 6.201 | 6.387 | 6.441 | 6.289 | 5.965 | 6.335 | 6.432 | 6.146 | 0.431  |

*Note*: The table shows group means and p-values for F tests of all eight groups.

**Appendix 6: Survey Experiment Design—Scenarios and Questions**

***Experiment Scenarios (English and Chinese)***

[**All groups**]: Suppose one of your relatives’ neighborhood is to be evicted. The compensation scheme has been publicized, and is generally in accordance with laws and state regulations. Now local authorities have decreed a ban on construction or renovation of houses and a freeze of household registration, and plan to start appraisal within two months to decide the amount of compensation. [**Treatment 1**: Your relative finds that neighbors have started to take actions such as expanding and upgrading houses or adding additional family members, preparing to ask for extra compensation.] [**Treatment 2**: Your relative finds that neighbors have started to take actions such as expanding and upgrading houses or adding additional family members, preparing to ask for extra compensation. It is said that some evictees in nearby communities have used similar tactics to bargain for extra compensation, but failed and their houses were demolished by force.] [**Treatment 3**:Your relative finds that neighbors have started to take actions such as expanding and upgrading houses or adding additional family members, preparing to ask for extra compensation. It is said that some evictees in nearby communities got an extra apartment using similar tactics.] [**Treatment 4**: Your relative finds that neighbors have started to take actions such as expanding and upgrading houses or adding additional family members, preparing to ask for extra compensation. Your relative also learned that local authorities would like to maintain a stable and harmonies social order and avoid any disruption.] [**Treatment 5**: Your relative finds that neighbors have started to take actions such as expanding and upgrading houses or adding additional family members, preparing to ask for extra compensation. The eviction project involves huge investment, and if completely timely, will bring enormous economic benefits for local authorities; the later it is completed, the more losses local authorities will face.] [**Treatment 6**: Your relative finds that neighbors have started to take actions such as expanding and upgrading houses or adding additional family members, preparing to ask for extra compensation. Your relative also learned that local authorities would like to maintain a stable and harmonies social order and avoid any disruption. The eviction project involves huge investment, and if completely timely, will bring enormous economic benefits for local authorities; the later it is completed, the more losses local authorities will face.] [**Treatment 7**: Your relative finds that neighbors have started to take actions such as expanding and upgrading houses or adding additional family members, preparing to ask for extra compensation. It is said that some evictees in nearby communities got an extra apartment using similar tactics. Your relative also learned that local authorities would like to maintain a stable and harmonies social order and avoid any disruption. The eviction project involves huge investment, and if completely timely, will bring enormous economic benefits for local authorities; the later it is completed, the more losses local authorities will face.]

Control: 假如您的一个亲戚家所在的地方正面临征地拆迁，该项目补偿标准已经公布，该标准基本符合国家法律法规。政府要求冻结房屋增建装修和各户户口，并计划两个月之内入户评估具体补偿数额。

Treatment 1: 假如您的一个亲戚家所在的地方正面临征地拆迁，该项目补偿标准已经公布，该标准基本符合国家法律法规。政府要求冻结房屋增建装修和各户户口，并计划两个月之内入户评估具体补偿数额。您的亲戚发现很多邻居通过悄悄增建房屋、突击装修、迁入户口等手段，准备向政府要求额外补偿。

Treatment 2: 假如您的一个亲戚家所在的地方正面临征地拆迁，该项目补偿标准已经公布，该标准基本符合国家法律法规。政府要求冻结房屋增建装修和各户户口，并计划两个月之内入户评估具体补偿数额。您的亲戚发现很多邻居通过悄悄增建房屋、突击装修、迁入户口等手段，准备向政府要求额外补偿。但据了解，周边地区曾有拆迁户试图通过类似手段要求额外补偿并未成功，反而遭到了强拆。

Treatment 3: 假如您的一个亲戚家所在的地方正面临征地拆迁，该项目补偿标准已经公布，该标准基本符合国家法律法规。政府要求冻结房屋增建装修和各户户口，并计划两个月之内入户评估具体补偿数额。您的亲戚发现很多邻居通过悄悄增建房屋、突击装修、迁入户口等手段，准备向政府要求额外补偿。据了解，附近有不少人通过类似手段获得了额外的一套安置房。

Treatment 4: 假如您的一个亲戚家所在的地方正面临征地拆迁，该项目补偿标准已经公布，该标准基本符合国家法律法规。政府要求冻结房屋增建装修和各户户口，并计划两个月之内入户评估具体补偿数额。您的亲戚发现很多邻居通过悄悄增建房屋、突击装修、迁入户口等手段，准备向政府要求额外补偿。您亲戚还了解到，当地政府比较希望维护安定团结的社会局面，不愿意节外生枝。

Treatment 5: 假如您的一个亲戚家所在的地方正面临征地拆迁，该项目补偿标准已经公布，该标准基本符合国家法律法规。政府要求冻结房屋增建装修和各户户口，并计划两个月之内入户评估具体补偿数额。您的亲戚发现很多邻居通过悄悄增建房屋、突击装修、迁入户口等手段，准备向政府要求额外补偿。该项目投资巨大，早日完成拆迁将为地方政府产生巨大的经济效益，拖延越久，则损失越大。

Treatment 6: 假如您的一个亲戚家所在的地方正面临征地拆迁，该项目补偿标准已经公布，该标准基本符合国家法律法规。政府要求冻结房屋增建装修和各户户口，并计划两个月之内入户评估具体补偿数额。您的亲戚发现不少邻居通过悄悄增建房屋、突击装修、迁入户口等手段，准备向政府要求额外补偿。您亲戚还了解到，当地政府比较希望维护安定团结的社会局面，不愿意节外生枝。该项目投资巨大，早日完成拆迁将为地方政府产生巨大的经济效益，拖延越久，则损失越大。

Treatment 7: 假如您的一个亲戚家所在的地方正面临征地拆迁，该项目补偿标准已经公布，该标准基本符合国家法律法规。政府要求冻结房屋增建装修和各户户口，并计划两个月之内入户评估具体补偿数额。您的亲戚发现很多邻居通过悄悄增建房屋、突击装修、迁入户口等手段，准备向政府要求额外补偿。据了解，附近不少人通过类似手段获得了额外的一套安置房。您亲戚还了解到，当地政府比较希望维护安定团结的社会局面，不愿意节外生枝。该项目投资巨大，早日完成拆迁将为地方政府产生巨大的经济效益，拖延越久，则损失越大。

***Experiment Questions***

1. 在这种情况下，您是否会建议您的亲戚采用包括增建房屋、突击装修、迁入户口在内的各种手段向政府要求额外补偿？

1. Under this circumstances, would you recommend your relative to ask the government for extra compensation using tactics such as expanding the house, furnishing up, or adding a member to the household registration?

A. 一定会 (Yes)

B. 可能会 (Maybe Yes)

C.可能不会 (Maybe No)

D. 一定不会 (No)

2. 假设您的亲戚拿到了额外补偿，但是有当地有官员被人举报通过抢建厂房获得了大量的补偿，有媒体因此采访当地居民。那么下列选项哪一个是您最有可能给您亲戚的建议?

2. Suppose your relative managed to get the extra compensation, but someone has reported local officials for getting huge amount of compensation for rush-building factory buildings and the media is trying to interview local residents. Which of the following suggestions is the most-likely one that you’d offer to your relative?

A. 不接受采访，否则事情闹大了，大家争取到的额外补偿可能有变数。

A. Do not accept the interview request because if the case got exposed, extra compensation that everyone managed to get may be jeopardized.

B. 接受采访，协助反腐是每个公民的义务，那怕自身利益可能受到损害。

B. Accept the interview request because it is every citizen’s duty to help the government to fight corruption, even when it may harm one’s own interests.

**Appendix 7: Descriptive Statistics of Variables**

**Table A7: Descriptive Statistics of Variables**

|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  |  Obs |  Mean | Std.Dev. |  Min |  Max |
| Age | 1822 | 1.642 | 0.863 | 0 | 3 |
| Gender (Male) | 1645 | 0.494 | 0.500 | 0 | 1 |
| Ethnicity (Han) | 1645 | 0.960 | 0.196 | 0 | 1 |
| College Education | 1824 | 0.622 | 0.485 | 0 | 1 |
| News Time | 1824 | 2.929 | 1.287 | 1 | 6 |
| Social Media Time | 1824 | 2.353 | 1.176 | 1 | 6 |
| Income | 1644 | 3.706 | 2.207 | 1 | 11 |
| CCP Membership | 1645 | 0.148 | 0.355 | 0 | 1 |
| Urban Residence | 1645 | 0.552 | 0.497 | 0 | 1 |
| Control | 219 | 1.991 | 0.977 | 1 | 4 |
| T1, Neighbor | 229 | 2.070 | 0.925 | 1 | 4 |
| T2, Neighbor + Fail | 229 | 1.782 | 0.920 | 1 | 4 |
| T3, Neighbor + Win | 227 | 2.150 | 0.909 | 1 | 4 |
| T4, Neighbor + Stability | 210 | 2.038 | 0.922 | 1 | 4 |
| T5, Neighbor + Project | 245 | 2 | 0.941 | 1 | 4 |
| T6, Neighbor + Stability + Project | 232 | 2.134 | 0.918 | 1 | 4 |
| T7, Neighbor + Win + Stability  | 233 | 2.210 | 0.921 | 1 | 4 |
| Accept interview | 1821 | 0.785 | 0.411 | 0 | 1 |
| Rightful Resistance | 1812 | 0.912 | 0.169 | 0 | 1 |
| Constructive Noncompliance | 1812 | 0.313 | 0.300 | 0 | 1 |
| Opportunistic Bargaining 1 | 1812 | 0.127 | 0.216 | 0 | 1 |
| Opportunistic Bargaining 2 | 1812 | 0.238 | 0.258 | 0 | 1 |
| Eviction Experience | 1789 | 0.594 | 0.491 | 0 | 1 |
| House Buying Experience | 1789 | 0.732 | 0.443 | 0 | 1 |
| Family Resourceful | 1789 | 2.797 | 0.754 | 1 | 4 |
| Family Income Reasonable | 1789 | 2.973 | 0.678 | 1 | 4 |
| Default Hotel Reservation | 1768 | 2.187 | 0.825 | 1 | 4 |
| Protest against Local Authorities | 1765 | 2.110 | 0.829 | 1 | 4 |
| Suing Local Government | 1765 | 2.701 | 0.835 | 1 | 4 |
| Petition Signing | 1765 | 2.870 | 0.769 | 1 | 4 |
| Paying Bribes | 1765 | 2.375 | 0.868 | 1 | 4 |
| Bus or Park Fare Evasion | 1765 | 1.366 | 0.647 | 1 | 4 |
| Political Efficacy | 1700 | 2.665 | 0.874 | 1 | 4 |
| Current Regime Preference | 1700 | 3.500 | 0.648 | 1 | 4 |
| Public Interest over Personal Interest | 1700 | 3.293 | 0.732 | 1 | 4 |
| Confidence in Regime Stability | 1700 | 3.572 | 0.569 | 1 | 4 |
| Confidence in Economy | 1700 | 3.558 | 0.602 | 1 | 4 |
| Govt. Policies Represent My Interest | 1700 | 3.259 | 0.661 | 1 | 4 |
| Trust in Central Govt | 1700 | 8.982 | 1.524 | 0 | 10 |
| Trust in County Govt | 1700 | 6.276 | 2.648 | 0 | 10 |

Appendix 8: Full Regression Results (Experiment)

**Table 8A: Opportunistic Bargaining Experiment Regression Results**

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| VARIABLES | Opportunistic Bargaining Inclination |
| 1 | 2 | 3 |
| T1, Neighbor | 0.026 | 0.019 | 0.014 |
|  | (0.029) | (0.030) | (0.027) |
| T2, Neighbor + Fail | -0.070\*\* | -0.079\*\*\* | -0.098\*\*\* |
|  | (0.029) | (0.030) | (0.027) |
| T3, Neighbor + Win | 0.053\* | 0.052\* | 0.042 |
|  | (0.029) | (0.030) | (0.027) |
| T4, Neighbor + Stability | 0.016 | -0.002 | -0.010 |
|  | (0.030) | (0.030) | (0.027) |
| T5, Neighbor + Project | 0.003 | 0.001 | -0.001 |
|  | (0.029) | (0.029) | (0.027) |
| T6, Neighbor + Stability + Project | 0.048 | 0.038 | 0.032 |
|  | (0.029) | (0.030) | (0.027) |
| T7, Neighbor + Win + Stability + Project | 0.073\*\* | 0.060\*\* | 0.057\*\* |
|  | (0.029) | (0.030) | (0.027) |
| Age |  | 0.014 | 0.010 |
|  |  | (0.011) | (0.010) |
| Gender (Male) |  | 0.023 | 0.002 |
|  |  | (0.015) | (0.014) |
| Ethnicity (Han) |  | -0.053 | -0.049 |
|  |  | (0.038) | (0.034) |
| College Education |  | -0.001 | 0.003 |
|  |  | (0.019) | (0.017) |
| News Time |  | -0.004 | -0.004 |
|  |  | (0.007) | (0.007) |
| Social Media Time |  | -0.002 | 0.001 |
|  |  | (0.008) | (0.007) |
| Income |  | -0.002 | -0.000 |
|  |  | (0.004) | (0.003) |
| CCP Membership |  | -0.029 | -0.000 |
|  |  | (0.021) | (0.019) |
| Urban Residence |  | 0.020 | 0.007 |
|  |  | (0.015) | (0.014) |
| Eviction Experience |  | 0.027\* | 0.013 |
|  |  | (0.015) | (0.014) |
| House Buying Experience |  | -0.002 | 0.001 |
|  |  | (0.017) | (0.016) |
| Family Resourceful |  | 0.028\*\* | 0.015 |
|  |  | (0.011) | (0.010) |
| Family Income Reasonable |  | -0.028\*\* | -0.015 |
|  |  | (0.013) | (0.011) |
| Political Efficacy |  | 0.004 | 0.001 |
|  |  | (0.009) | (0.009) |
| Current Regime Preference |  | -0.041\*\*\* | -0.029\*\* |
|  |  | (0.016) | (0.015) |
| Public Interest over Personal Interest |  | -0.017 | -0.006 |
|  |  | (0.012) | (0.011) |
| Confidence in Regime Stability |  | 0.031\* | 0.031\* |
|  |  | (0.018) | (0.016) |
| Confidence in Economy |  | -0.038\*\* | -0.024 |
|  |  | (0.017) | (0.015) |
| Govt. Policies Represent My Interest |  | -0.006 | -0.000 |
|  |  | (0.014) | (0.013) |
| Trust in Central Govt |  | -0.020\*\*\* | -0.009 |
|  |  | (0.006) | (0.005) |
| Trust in County Govt |  | -0.013\*\*\* | -0.009\*\*\* |
|  |  | (0.003) | (0.003) |
| Default Hotel Reservation |  |  | 0.072\*\*\* |
|  |  |  | (0.009) |
| Protest against Local Authorities |  |  | 0.017\* |
|  |  |  | (0.010) |
| Suing Local Government |  |  | -0.028\*\*\* |
|  |  |  | (0.010) |
| Petition Signing |  |  | -0.003 |
|  |  |  | (0.010) |
| Paying Bribes |  |  | 0.095\*\*\* |
|  |  |  | (0.009) |
| Bus or Park Fare Evasion |  |  | 0.066\*\*\* |
|  |  |  | (0.012) |
| Constant | 0.330\*\*\* | 0.860\*\*\* | 0.166\* |
|  | (0.021) | (0.081) | (0.087) |
| Observations | 1,824 | 1,642 | 1,642 |
| R-squared | 0.017 | 0.103 | 0.268 |
| *Notes*: Standard errors in parentheses; \*\*\* p<0.01, \*\* p<0.05, \* p<0.1 |

**Appendix 9: Multiple Hypothesis Testing**

**Table 9A Romano-Wolf Multiple Hypothesis Testing**

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Treatments | Model p-value | Resample p-value | Romano-Wolf |
| Panel A: Without covariates |  |  |  |
| T1, Neighbor | 0.3796 | 0.3546 | 0.3546 |
| T2, Neighbor + Fail | **0.02** | **0.0319** | **0.0319** |
| T3, Neighbor + Win | **0.0759** | **0.0558** | **0.0558** |
| T4, Neighbor + Stability | 0.6072 | 0.6056 | 0.6056 |
| T5, Neighbor + Project | 0.9184 | 0.9442 | 0.9442 |
| T6, Neighbor + Stability + Project | 0.1104 | 0.1355 | 0.1355 |
| T7, Neighbor + Win + Stability + Project | **0.0143** | **0.0199** | **0.0199** |
| Panel B: With covariates |  |  |  |
| T1, Neighbor | 0.9135 | 0.9004 | 0.9004 |
| T2, Neighbor + Fail | **0.0089** | **0.0159** | **0.0159** |
| T3, Neighbor + Win | 0.176 | 0.1713 | 0.1713 |
| T4, Neighbor + Stability | 0.9389 | 0.9402 | 0.9402 |
| T5, Neighbor + Project | 0.7868 | 0.7968 | 0.7968 |
| T6, Neighbor + Stability + Project | 0.3885 | 0.4502 | 0.4502 |
| T7, Neighbor + Win + Stability + Project | 0.0554 | **0.0717** | **0.0717** |
| Notes: Romano-Wolf stepdown procedure (Romano and Wolf 2016) was used to estimate the p values with 250 bootstrap replications.  |

Reference:

Romano, Joseph P., and Michael Wolf. 2016. “Efficient Computation of Adjusted P-Values for Resampling-Based Stepdown Multiple Testing.” *Statistics and Probability Letters* 113: 38–40. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.spl.2016.02.012.

**Appendix 10: Full Regression Results (Opportunistic Bargaining in Comparison)**

**Table 10A: Opportunistic Bargaining in Comparison (Control group, Trust in Central Govt)**

|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) |
| VARIABLES | OBE | OB1 | OB2 | CNC | RR |
| Trust in Central Govt | -0.032\*\* | -0.042\*\*\* | -0.032\*\*\* | -0.033\*\* | 0.010 |
|  | (0.016) | (0.010) | (0.012) | (0.014) | (0.007) |
| Political Efficacy | 0.001 | 0.003 | -0.038\* | -0.011 | 0.034\*\*\* |
|  | (0.030) | (0.019) | (0.022) | (0.025) | (0.013) |
| Age | -0.050 | 0.002 | 0.018 | 0.004 | -0.010 |
|  | (0.033) | (0.020) | (0.024) | (0.028) | (0.014) |
| Gender (Male) | 0.063 | 0.045 | 0.005 | 0.055 | -0.030 |
|  | (0.049) | (0.031) | (0.036) | (0.042) | (0.021) |
| Ethnicity (Han) | 0.033 | -0.062 | -0.022 | 0.085 | 0.110\*\* |
|  | (0.113) | (0.071) | (0.084) | (0.096) | (0.048) |
| College Education | -0.063 | -0.014 | 0.042 | -0.018 | 0.027 |
|  | (0.060) | (0.037) | (0.045) | (0.051) | (0.025) |
| News Time | 0.017 | 0.029\* | 0.021 | 0.006 | 0.020\*\* |
|  | (0.024) | (0.015) | (0.018) | (0.020) | (0.010) |
| Social Media Time | 0.008 | -0.026 | 0.008 | 0.029 | 0.006 |
|  | (0.030) | (0.019) | (0.022) | (0.025) | (0.013) |
| Income | -0.005 | -0.014 | 0.005 | -0.010 | 0.014\*\* |
|  | (0.013) | (0.008) | (0.010) | (0.011) | (0.006) |
| CCP Membership | 0.013 | 0.066 | 0.120\*\* | 0.030 | -0.072\*\* |
|  | (0.075) | (0.047) | (0.056) | (0.064) | (0.032) |
| Urban Residence | 0.022 | 0.014 | -0.025 | -0.042 | -0.011 |
|  | (0.050) | (0.031) | (0.037) | (0.042) | (0.021) |
| Constant | 0.622\*\*\* | 0.541\*\*\* | 0.493\*\*\* | 0.505\*\*\* | 0.553\*\*\* |
|  | (0.206) | (0.130) | (0.154) | (0.176) | (0.087) |
| Observations | 194 | 194 | 194 | 194 | 194 |
| R-squared | 0.051 | 0.135 | 0.118 | 0.073 | 0.186 |

Notes: Standard errors in parentheses; \*\*\* p<0.01, \*\* p<0.05, \* p<0.1

**Table 10B: Opportunistic Bargaining in Comparison (Control group, Trust in County Govt)**

|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) |
| VARIABLES | OBE | OB1 | OB2 | CNC | RR |
| Trust in County Govt | -0.019\*\* | -0.017\*\*\* | -0.018\*\* | -0.019\*\* | -0.000 |
|  | (0.009) | (0.006) | (0.007) | (0.008) | (0.004) |
| Political Efficacy | 0.002 | -0.003 | -0.038\* | -0.011 | 0.039\*\*\* |
|  | (0.030) | (0.019) | (0.022) | (0.025) | (0.013) |
| Age | -0.054\* | -0.004 | 0.013 | -0.001 | -0.008 |
|  | (0.032) | (0.021) | (0.024) | (0.028) | (0.014) |
| Gender (Male) | 0.064 | 0.048 | 0.007 | 0.056 | -0.032 |
|  | (0.049) | (0.031) | (0.037) | (0.042) | (0.021) |
| Ethnicity (Han) | 0.046 | -0.050 | -0.010 | 0.098 | 0.110\*\* |
|  | (0.113) | (0.073) | (0.084) | (0.096) | (0.048) |
| College Education | -0.081 | -0.035 | 0.024 | -0.037 | 0.029 |
|  | (0.060) | (0.038) | (0.045) | (0.051) | (0.025) |
| News Time | 0.015 | 0.025 | 0.019 | 0.003 | 0.022\*\* |
|  | (0.024) | (0.015) | (0.018) | (0.020) | (0.010) |
| Social Media Time | 0.004 | -0.028 | 0.004 | 0.026 | 0.006 |
|  | (0.030) | (0.019) | (0.022) | (0.025) | (0.013) |
| Income | -0.004 | -0.013 | 0.006 | -0.009 | 0.014\*\* |
|  | (0.013) | (0.009) | (0.010) | (0.011) | (0.006) |
| CCP Membership | -0.009 | 0.042 | 0.099\* | 0.008 | -0.070\*\* |
|  | (0.075) | (0.049) | (0.057) | (0.064) | (0.032) |
| Urban Residence | 0.030 | 0.022 | -0.017 | -0.034 | -0.011 |
|  | (0.050) | (0.032) | (0.037) | (0.042) | (0.021) |
| Constant | 0.469\*\*\* | 0.312\*\*\* | 0.338\*\* | 0.345\*\* | 0.624\*\*\* |
|  | (0.176) | (0.113) | (0.132) | (0.150) | (0.075) |
| Observations | 194 | 194 | 194 | 194 | 194 |
| R-squared | 0.051 | 0.094 | 0.117 | 0.072 | 0.177 |
| Notes: Standard errors in parentheses; \*\*\* p<0.01, \*\* p<0.05, \* p<0.1 |

**Table 10C: Opportunistic Bargaining in Comparison (Control group, Current Regime Preference)**

|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) |
| VARIABLES | OBE | OB1 | OB2 | CNC | RR |
| Current Regime Preference | -0.115\*\*\* | -0.089\*\*\* | -0.108\*\*\* | -0.069\*\* | 0.025 |
|  | (0.036) | (0.023) | (0.027) | (0.031) | (0.015) |
| Political Efficacy | 0.011 | 0.002 | -0.030 | -0.012 | 0.033\*\*\* |
|  | (0.029) | (0.019) | (0.022) | (0.025) | (0.013) |
| Age | -0.054\* | -0.004 | 0.014 | -0.001 | -0.009 |
|  | (0.032) | (0.021) | (0.024) | (0.028) | (0.014) |
| Gender (Male) | 0.073 | 0.055\* | 0.015 | 0.063 | -0.033 |
|  | (0.048) | (0.031) | (0.036) | (0.042) | (0.021) |
| Ethnicity (Han) | 0.034 | -0.061 | -0.021 | 0.086 | 0.110\*\* |
|  | (0.111) | (0.071) | (0.082) | (0.096) | (0.048) |
| College Education | -0.060 | -0.017 | 0.044 | -0.020 | 0.027 |
|  | (0.059) | (0.038) | (0.043) | (0.051) | (0.025) |
| News Time | 0.029 | 0.036\*\* | 0.032\* | 0.011 | 0.018\* |
|  | (0.024) | (0.015) | (0.018) | (0.021) | (0.010) |
| Social Media Time | -0.000 | -0.031 | 0.000 | 0.025 | 0.008 |
|  | (0.029) | (0.019) | (0.022) | (0.026) | (0.013) |
| Income | -0.003 | -0.012 | 0.007 | -0.009 | 0.013\*\* |
|  | (0.013) | (0.009) | (0.010) | (0.012) | (0.006) |
| CCP Membership | -0.020 | 0.035 | 0.088 | 0.007 | -0.064\*\* |
|  | (0.074) | (0.048) | (0.055) | (0.065) | (0.032) |
| Urban Residence | 0.014 | 0.009 | -0.032 | -0.046 | -0.009 |
|  | (0.049) | (0.031) | (0.036) | (0.042) | (0.021) |
| Constant | 0.694\*\*\* | 0.477\*\*\* | 0.550\*\*\* | 0.453\*\*\* | 0.558\*\*\* |
|  | (0.194) | (0.125) | (0.144) | (0.168) | (0.083) |
| Observations | 194 | 194 | 194 | 194 | 194 |
| R-squared | 0.081 | 0.125 | 0.161 | 0.069 | 0.189 |
| Notes: Standard errors in parentheses; \*\*\* p<0.01, \*\* p<0.05, \* p<0.1 |

**Table 10D: Opportunistic Bargaining in Comparison (Control group, Public Interest over Personal Interest)**

|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) |
| VARIABLES | OBE | OB1 | OB2 | CNC | RR |
| Public Interest over Personal Interest | -0.014 | -0.017 | -0.053\*\* | -0.008 | 0.010 |
|  | (0.035) | (0.023) | (0.026) | (0.030) | (0.015) |
| Political Efficacy | -0.012 | -0.015 | -0.048\*\* | -0.026 | 0.037\*\*\* |
|  | (0.029) | (0.019) | (0.022) | (0.025) | (0.012) |
| Age | -0.056\* | -0.006 | 0.009 | -0.002 | -0.008 |
|  | (0.033) | (0.021) | (0.024) | (0.028) | (0.014) |
| Gender (Male) | 0.069 | 0.053 | 0.013 | 0.061 | -0.032 |
|  | (0.049) | (0.032) | (0.037) | (0.042) | (0.021) |
| Ethnicity (Han) | 0.033 | -0.061 | -0.022 | 0.085 | 0.110\*\* |
|  | (0.114) | (0.074) | (0.085) | (0.097) | (0.048) |
| College Education | -0.071 | -0.026 | 0.034 | -0.027 | 0.029 |
|  | (0.060) | (0.039) | (0.045) | (0.051) | (0.025) |
| News Time | 0.014 | 0.024 | 0.020 | 0.002 | 0.021\*\* |
|  | (0.024) | (0.016) | (0.018) | (0.021) | (0.010) |
| Social Media Time | 0.009 | -0.024 | 0.009 | 0.031 | 0.006 |
|  | (0.030) | (0.020) | (0.022) | (0.026) | (0.013) |
| Income | -0.006 | -0.015\* | 0.005 | -0.011 | 0.014\*\* |
|  | (0.014) | (0.009) | (0.010) | (0.012) | (0.006) |
| CCP Membership | 0.002 | 0.052 | 0.104\* | 0.020 | -0.068\*\* |
|  | (0.076) | (0.049) | (0.057) | (0.065) | (0.032) |
| Urban Residence | 0.020 | 0.012 | -0.038 | -0.042 | -0.008 |
|  | (0.051) | (0.033) | (0.038) | (0.044) | (0.022) |
| Constant | 0.441\*\* | 0.299\*\* | 0.428\*\*\* | 0.301\* | 0.592\*\*\* |
|  | (0.203) | (0.132) | (0.151) | (0.173) | (0.085) |
| Observations | 194 | 194 | 194 | 194 | 194 |
| R-squared | 0.031 | 0.057 | 0.105 | 0.044 | 0.179 |

Notes: Standard errors in parentheses; \*\*\* p<0.01, \*\* p<0.05, \* p<0.1

**Table 10E: Opportunistic Bargaining in Comparison (Control group, Confidence in Regime Stability)**

|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) |
| VARIABLES | OBE | OB1 | OB2 | CNC | RR |
| Confidence in Regime Stability | -0.144\*\*\* | -0.136\*\*\* | -0.134\*\*\* | -0.127\*\*\* | 0.058\*\*\* |
|  | (0.045) | (0.029) | (0.034) | (0.039) | (0.019) |
| Political Efficacy | 0.017 | 0.012 | -0.025 | 0.000 | 0.026\*\* |
|  | (0.030) | (0.019) | (0.022) | (0.025) | (0.013) |
| Age | -0.052 | -0.003 | 0.015 | 0.001 | -0.010 |
|  | (0.032) | (0.020) | (0.024) | (0.027) | (0.013) |
| Gender (Male) | 0.080\* | 0.062\*\* | 0.021 | 0.070\* | -0.036\* |
|  | (0.048) | (0.030) | (0.036) | (0.041) | (0.020) |
| Ethnicity (Han) | 0.069 | -0.028 | 0.011 | 0.116 | 0.096\*\* |
|  | (0.111) | (0.070) | (0.083) | (0.095) | (0.047) |
| College Education | -0.054 | -0.009 | 0.050 | -0.012 | 0.022 |
|  | (0.059) | (0.037) | (0.044) | (0.050) | (0.025) |
| News Time | 0.023 | 0.032\*\* | 0.026 | 0.010 | 0.018\* |
|  | (0.024) | (0.015) | (0.018) | (0.020) | (0.010) |
| Social Media Time | 0.013 | -0.020 | 0.012 | 0.034 | 0.004 |
|  | (0.029) | (0.018) | (0.022) | (0.025) | (0.012) |
| Income | -0.001 | -0.010 | 0.009 | -0.007 | 0.012\*\* |
|  | (0.013) | (0.008) | (0.010) | (0.011) | (0.006) |
| CCP Membership | -0.021 | 0.030 | 0.088 | -0.001 | -0.060\* |
|  | (0.074) | (0.047) | (0.055) | (0.064) | (0.031) |
| Urban Residence | 0.024 | 0.017 | -0.023 | -0.040 | -0.011 |
|  | (0.049) | (0.031) | (0.036) | (0.042) | (0.021) |
| Constant | 0.735\*\*\* | 0.567\*\*\* | 0.584\*\*\* | 0.571\*\*\* | 0.487\*\*\* |
|  | (0.200) | (0.126) | (0.149) | (0.171) | (0.084) |
| Observations | 194 | 194 | 194 | 194 | 194 |
| R-squared | 0.081 | 0.159 | 0.158 | 0.097 | 0.217 |
| Notes: Standard errors in parentheses; \*\*\* p<0.01, \*\* p<0.05, \* p<0.1 |

**Table 10F: Opportunistic Bargaining in Comparison (Control group, Confidence in Economy)**

|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) |
| VARIABLES | OBE | OB1 | OB2 | CNC | RR |
| Confidence in Economy | -0.077\* | -0.109\*\*\* | -0.137\*\*\* | -0.092\*\*\* | 0.048\*\*\* |
|  | (0.040) | (0.025) | (0.029) | (0.034) | (0.017) |
| Age | -0.056\* | -0.006 | 0.017 | -0.000 | -0.014 |
|  | (0.032) | (0.020) | (0.023) | (0.027) | (0.014) |
| Gender (Male) | 0.075 | 0.061\*\* | 0.019 | 0.067 | -0.032 |
|  | (0.049) | (0.030) | (0.036) | (0.041) | (0.021) |
| Ethnicity (Han) | 0.041 | -0.050 | -0.012 | 0.093 | 0.109\*\* |
|  | (0.112) | (0.070) | (0.082) | (0.095) | (0.048) |
| College Education | -0.066 | -0.018 | 0.046 | -0.020 | 0.024 |
|  | (0.059) | (0.037) | (0.043) | (0.050) | (0.025) |
| News Time | 0.019 | 0.032\*\* | 0.028 | 0.009 | 0.018\* |
|  | (0.024) | (0.015) | (0.018) | (0.020) | (0.010) |
| Social Media Time | 0.006 | -0.029 | 0.007 | 0.028 | 0.004 |
|  | (0.030) | (0.019) | (0.022) | (0.025) | (0.013) |
| Income | -0.003 | -0.010 | 0.012 | -0.007 | 0.010\* |
|  | (0.013) | (0.008) | (0.010) | (0.011) | (0.006) |
| CCP Membership | -0.025 | 0.014 | 0.054 | -0.015 | -0.045 |
|  | (0.076) | (0.048) | (0.055) | (0.064) | (0.032) |
| Urban Residence | 0.024 | 0.017 | -0.014 | -0.036 | -0.020 |
|  | (0.049) | (0.031) | (0.036) | (0.042) | (0.021) |
| Constant | 0.604\*\*\* | 0.546\*\*\* | 0.540\*\*\* | 0.485\*\*\* | 0.596\*\*\* |
|  | (0.192) | (0.120) | (0.140) | (0.163) | (0.082) |
| Observations | 194 | 194 | 194 | 194 | 194 |
| R-squared | 0.049 | 0.141 | 0.160 | 0.076 | 0.168 |
| Notes: Standard errors in parentheses; \*\*\* p<0.01, \*\* p<0.05, \* p<0.1 |

**Table 10G: Opportunistic Bargaining in Comparison (Control group, Govt. Policies Represent My Interest)**

|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) |
| VARIABLES | OBE | OB1 | OB2 | CNC | RR |
| Govt. Policies Represent My Interest | -0.027 | -0.055\*\* | -0.086\*\*\* | -0.072\*\* | 0.006 |
|  | (0.040) | (0.025) | (0.029) | (0.033) | (0.017) |
| Political Efficacy | -0.006 | -0.001 | -0.028 | -0.006 | 0.037\*\*\* |
|  | (0.031) | (0.020) | (0.023) | (0.026) | (0.013) |
| Age | -0.051 | 0.004 | 0.027 | 0.010 | -0.009 |
|  | (0.033) | (0.021) | (0.025) | (0.028) | (0.014) |
| Gender (Male) | 0.067 | 0.048 | 0.005 | 0.055 | -0.031 |
|  | (0.049) | (0.032) | (0.036) | (0.042) | (0.021) |
| Ethnicity (Han) | 0.036 | -0.055 | -0.012 | 0.094 | 0.109\*\* |
|  | (0.114) | (0.073) | (0.084) | (0.096) | (0.048) |
| College Education | -0.062 | -0.007 | 0.063 | -0.002 | 0.027 |
|  | (0.062) | (0.040) | (0.045) | (0.052) | (0.026) |
| News Time | 0.014 | 0.026\* | 0.021 | 0.005 | 0.021\*\* |
|  | (0.024) | (0.016) | (0.018) | (0.020) | (0.010) |
| Social Media Time | 0.009 | -0.024 | 0.009 | 0.031 | 0.006 |
|  | (0.030) | (0.019) | (0.022) | (0.025) | (0.013) |
| Income | -0.006 | -0.015\* | 0.004 | -0.011 | 0.014\*\* |
|  | (0.014) | (0.009) | (0.010) | (0.011) | (0.006) |
| CCP Membership | -0.003 | 0.040 | 0.089 | 0.003 | -0.068\*\* |
|  | (0.077) | (0.049) | (0.057) | (0.065) | (0.032) |
| Urban Residence | 0.024 | 0.018 | -0.021 | -0.038 | -0.011 |
|  | (0.050) | (0.032) | (0.037) | (0.042) | (0.021) |
| Constant | 0.447\*\* | 0.347\*\*\* | 0.427\*\*\* | 0.405\*\* | 0.611\*\*\* |
|  | (0.188) | (0.121) | (0.139) | (0.159) | (0.079) |
| Observations | 194 | 194 | 194 | 194 | 194 |
| R-squared | 0.033 | 0.078 | 0.127 | 0.068 | 0.178 |
| Notes: Standard errors in parentheses; \*\*\* p<0.01, \*\* p<0.05, \* p<0.1 |

**Table 10H: Opportunistic Bargaining in Comparison (Control group, Govt. Bus or Park Fare Evasion)**

|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) |
| VARIABLES | OBE | OB1 | OB2 | CNC | RR |
| Bus or Park Fare Evasion | 0.111\*\*\* | 0.052\* | 0.109\*\*\* | 0.049 | -0.051\*\*\* |
|  | (0.041) | (0.027) | (0.031) | (0.036) | (0.017) |
| Political Efficacy | -0.008 | -0.014 | -0.047\*\* | -0.024 | 0.036\*\*\* |
|  | (0.029) | (0.019) | (0.021) | (0.025) | (0.012) |
| Age | -0.053 | -0.004 | 0.015 | -0.001 | -0.009 |
|  | (0.032) | (0.021) | (0.024) | (0.028) | (0.014) |
| Gender (Male) | 0.047 | 0.042 | -0.011 | 0.051 | -0.022 |
|  | (0.049) | (0.032) | (0.036) | (0.042) | (0.021) |
| Ethnicity (Han) | 0.029 | -0.064 | -0.027 | 0.083 | 0.112\*\* |
|  | (0.112) | (0.073) | (0.083) | (0.097) | (0.047) |
| College Education | -0.065 | -0.023 | 0.040 | -0.025 | 0.026 |
|  | (0.059) | (0.039) | (0.044) | (0.051) | (0.025) |
| News Time | 0.017 | 0.025 | 0.021 | 0.003 | 0.020\*\* |
|  | (0.024) | (0.016) | (0.018) | (0.021) | (0.010) |
| Social Media Time | 0.007 | -0.025 | 0.007 | 0.030 | 0.007 |
|  | (0.030) | (0.019) | (0.022) | (0.026) | (0.012) |
| Income | -0.001 | -0.013 | 0.009 | -0.009 | 0.012\*\* |
|  | (0.013) | (0.009) | (0.010) | (0.012) | (0.006) |
| CCP Membership | -0.012 | 0.047 | 0.096\* | 0.014 | -0.063\*\* |
|  | (0.075) | (0.049) | (0.056) | (0.065) | (0.031) |
| Urban Residence | 0.024 | 0.017 | -0.023 | -0.039 | -0.011 |
|  | (0.049) | (0.032) | (0.037) | (0.043) | (0.021) |
| Constant | 0.214 | 0.163 | 0.091 | 0.195 | 0.706\*\*\* |
|  | (0.184) | (0.121) | (0.137) | (0.160) | (0.077) |
| Observations | 194 | 194 | 194 | 194 | 194 |
| R-squared | 0.067 | 0.073 | 0.145 | 0.054 | 0.214 |
| Notes: Standard errors in parentheses; \*\*\* p<0.01, \*\* p<0.05, \* p<0.1 |

**Table 10I: Opportunistic Bargaining in Comparison (Control group, Default Hotel Reservation)**

|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) |
| VARIABLES | OBE | OB1 | OB2 | CNC | RR |
| Default Hotel Reservation | 0.141\*\*\* | 0.042\*\* | 0.026 | 0.071\*\* | -0.036\*\*\* |
|  | (0.031) | (0.021) | (0.025) | (0.028) | (0.014) |
| Political Efficacy | 0.004 | -0.012 | -0.050\*\* | -0.018 | 0.034\*\*\* |
|  | (0.028) | (0.019) | (0.022) | (0.025) | (0.012) |
| Age | -0.056\* | -0.006 | 0.012 | -0.002 | -0.008 |
|  | (0.031) | (0.021) | (0.025) | (0.028) | (0.014) |
| Gender (Male) | 0.038 | 0.043 | 0.005 | 0.045 | -0.024 |
|  | (0.047) | (0.032) | (0.037) | (0.042) | (0.021) |
| Ethnicity (Han) | 0.012 | -0.068 | -0.026 | 0.075 | 0.115\*\* |
|  | (0.108) | (0.073) | (0.086) | (0.096) | (0.047) |
| College Education | -0.061 | -0.023 | 0.035 | -0.022 | 0.027 |
|  | (0.057) | (0.039) | (0.045) | (0.050) | (0.025) |
| News Time | 0.016 | 0.024 | 0.017 | 0.003 | 0.021\*\* |
|  | (0.023) | (0.016) | (0.018) | (0.020) | (0.010) |
| Social Media Time | 0.009 | -0.024 | 0.009 | 0.031 | 0.006 |
|  | (0.029) | (0.019) | (0.023) | (0.025) | (0.012) |
| Income | 0.006 | -0.012 | 0.006 | -0.005 | 0.011\* |
|  | (0.013) | (0.009) | (0.010) | (0.012) | (0.006) |
| CCP Membership | -0.032 | 0.043 | 0.104\* | 0.003 | -0.061\* |
|  | (0.073) | (0.049) | (0.058) | (0.064) | (0.032) |
| Urban Residence | -0.004 | 0.008 | -0.028 | -0.054 | -0.004 |
|  | (0.048) | (0.033) | (0.038) | (0.043) | (0.021) |
| Constant | 0.052 | 0.144 | 0.208 | 0.100 | 0.711\*\*\* |
|  | (0.183) | (0.124) | (0.145) | (0.162) | (0.080) |
| Observations | 194 | 194 | 194 | 194 | 194 |
| R-squared | 0.127 | 0.074 | 0.090 | 0.077 | 0.207 |

Notes: Standard errors in parentheses; \*\*\* p<0.01, \*\* p<0.05, \* p<0.1

**Table 10J: Opportunistic Bargaining in Comparison (Control group, Paying Bribes)**

|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) |
| VARIABLES | OBE | OB1 | OB2 | CNC | RR |
| Paying Bribes | 0.104\*\*\* | 0.030\* | 0.071\*\*\* | 0.026 | -0.015 |
|  | (0.026) | (0.017) | (0.020) | (0.023) | (0.011) |
| Political Efficacy | 0.002 | -0.013 | -0.042\*\* | -0.023 | 0.036\*\*\* |
|  | (0.028) | (0.019) | (0.021) | (0.025) | (0.012) |
| Age | -0.050 | -0.004 | 0.016 | -0.001 | -0.009 |
|  | (0.031) | (0.021) | (0.024) | (0.028) | (0.014) |
| Gender (Male) | 0.055 | 0.048 | 0.002 | 0.057 | -0.030 |
|  | (0.047) | (0.032) | (0.036) | (0.042) | (0.021) |
| Ethnicity (Han) | 0.038 | -0.060 | -0.019 | 0.087 | 0.110\*\* |
|  | (0.109) | (0.073) | (0.083) | (0.097) | (0.048) |
| College Education | -0.064 | -0.024 | 0.039 | -0.026 | 0.028 |
|  | (0.058) | (0.039) | (0.044) | (0.051) | (0.025) |
| News Time | 0.015 | 0.024 | 0.019 | 0.002 | 0.021\*\* |
|  | (0.023) | (0.016) | (0.018) | (0.021) | (0.010) |
| Social Media Time | 0.009 | -0.024 | 0.010 | 0.031 | 0.006 |
|  | (0.029) | (0.019) | (0.022) | (0.026) | (0.013) |
| Income | -0.008 | -0.016\* | 0.003 | -0.012 | 0.014\*\* |
|  | (0.013) | (0.009) | (0.010) | (0.012) | (0.006) |
| CCP Membership | 0.026 | 0.060 | 0.126\*\* | 0.026 | -0.073\*\* |
|  | (0.073) | (0.049) | (0.056) | (0.065) | (0.032) |
| Urban Residence | 0.034 | 0.020 | -0.016 | -0.037 | -0.013 |
|  | (0.048) | (0.032) | (0.037) | (0.043) | (0.021) |
| Constant | 0.091 | 0.159 | 0.062 | 0.199 | 0.666\*\*\* |
|  | (0.184) | (0.124) | (0.140) | (0.163) | (0.080) |
| Observations | 194 | 194 | 194 | 194 | 194 |
| R-squared | 0.111 | 0.070 | 0.147 | 0.051 | 0.185 |
| Notes: Standard errors in parentheses; \*\*\* p<0.01, \*\* p<0.05, \* p<0.1 |

**Table 10K: Opportunistic Bargaining in Comparison (Control group, Protest against Local Authorities)**

|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) |
| VARIABLES | OBE | OB1 | OB2 | CNC | RR |
| Protest against Local Authorities | 0.071\*\* | 0.041\*\* | 0.043\* | 0.017 | -0.035\*\*\* |
|  | (0.032) | (0.021) | (0.024) | (0.028) | (0.013) |
| Political Efficacy | -0.004 | -0.011 | -0.047\*\* | -0.024 | 0.034\*\*\* |
|  | (0.029) | (0.019) | (0.022) | (0.025) | (0.012) |
| Age | -0.054\* | -0.005 | 0.013 | -0.002 | -0.009 |
|  | (0.032) | (0.021) | (0.025) | (0.028) | (0.014) |
| Gender (Male) | 0.059 | 0.047 | 0.005 | 0.058 | -0.027 |
|  | (0.049) | (0.032) | (0.037) | (0.042) | (0.020) |
| Ethnicity (Han) | 0.009 | -0.076 | -0.037 | 0.080 | 0.122\*\* |
|  | (0.113) | (0.074) | (0.085) | (0.098) | (0.047) |
| College Education | -0.079 | -0.030 | 0.029 | -0.029 | 0.033 |
|  | (0.059) | (0.039) | (0.045) | (0.051) | (0.025) |
| News Time | 0.013 | 0.023 | 0.017 | 0.001 | 0.022\*\* |
|  | (0.024) | (0.016) | (0.018) | (0.021) | (0.010) |
| Social Media Time | 0.012 | -0.022 | 0.011 | 0.032 | 0.005 |
|  | (0.030) | (0.019) | (0.023) | (0.026) | (0.012) |
| Income | -0.010 | -0.017\* | 0.002 | -0.012 | 0.016\*\*\* |
|  | (0.013) | (0.009) | (0.010) | (0.012) | (0.006) |
| CCP Membership | -0.007 | 0.047 | 0.104\* | 0.018 | -0.064\*\* |
|  | (0.075) | (0.049) | (0.057) | (0.065) | (0.032) |
| Urban Residence | 0.021 | 0.015 | -0.025 | -0.040 | -0.010 |
|  | (0.050) | (0.032) | (0.038) | (0.043) | (0.021) |
| Constant | 0.269 | 0.173 | 0.192 | 0.245 | 0.686\*\*\* |
|  | (0.182) | (0.119) | (0.138) | (0.157) | (0.076) |
| Observations | 194 | 194 | 194 | 194 | 194 |
| R-squared | 0.056 | 0.074 | 0.101 | 0.046 | 0.207 |
| Notes: Standard errors in parentheses; \*\*\* p<0.01, \*\* p<0.05, \* p<0.1 |

 **Table 10L: Opportunistic Bargaining in Comparison (Control group, Suing Local Government)**

|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) |
| VARIABLES | OBE | OB1 | OB2 | CNC | RR |
| Suing Local Government | -0.040 | -0.021 | 0.005 | -0.048\* | 0.010 |
|  | (0.032) | (0.021) | (0.024) | (0.027) | (0.013) |
| Political Efficacy | -0.014 | -0.017 | -0.053\*\* | -0.027 | 0.039\*\*\* |
|  | (0.029) | (0.019) | (0.022) | (0.025) | (0.012) |
| Age | -0.058\* | -0.007 | 0.013 | -0.005 | -0.008 |
|  | (0.033) | (0.021) | (0.025) | (0.028) | (0.014) |
| Gender (Male) | 0.077 | 0.057\* | 0.010 | 0.071\* | -0.034 |
|  | (0.050) | (0.032) | (0.037) | (0.042) | (0.021) |
| Ethnicity (Han) | 0.050 | -0.053 | -0.024 | 0.106 | 0.106\*\* |
|  | (0.114) | (0.074) | (0.086) | (0.097) | (0.048) |
| College Education | -0.071 | -0.026 | 0.033 | -0.027 | 0.029 |
|  | (0.060) | (0.039) | (0.045) | (0.051) | (0.025) |
| News Time | 0.016 | 0.025 | 0.016 | 0.005 | 0.021\*\* |
|  | (0.024) | (0.016) | (0.018) | (0.021) | (0.010) |
| Social Media Time | 0.008 | -0.024 | 0.010 | 0.029 | 0.006 |
|  | (0.030) | (0.020) | (0.023) | (0.026) | (0.013) |
| Income | -0.003 | -0.014 | 0.003 | -0.008 | 0.013\*\* |
|  | (0.014) | (0.009) | (0.010) | (0.012) | (0.006) |
| CCP Membership | 0.005 | 0.054 | 0.111\* | 0.022 | -0.070\*\* |
|  | (0.076) | (0.049) | (0.057) | (0.064) | (0.032) |
| Urban Residence | 0.026 | 0.018 | -0.023 | -0.037 | -0.012 |
|  | (0.050) | (0.033) | (0.038) | (0.043) | (0.021) |
| Constant | 0.470\*\* | 0.286\*\* | 0.262\* | 0.362\*\* | 0.605\*\*\* |
|  | (0.183) | (0.119) | (0.139) | (0.156) | (0.077) |
| Observations | 194 | 194 | 194 | 194 | 194 |
| R-squared | 0.038 | 0.059 | 0.085 | 0.060 | 0.179 |
| Notes: Standard errors in parentheses; \*\*\* p<0.01, \*\* p<0.05, \* p<0.1 |

**Table 10M: Opportunistic Bargaining in Comparison (Control group, Petition Signing)**

|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) |
| VARIABLES | OBE | OB1 | OB2 | CNC | RR |
| Petition Signing | -0.006 | -0.012 | -0.025 | -0.012 | 0.018 |
|  | (0.032) | (0.021) | (0.024) | (0.027) | (0.013) |
| Political Efficacy | -0.014 | -0.018 | -0.054\*\* | -0.027 | 0.039\*\*\* |
|  | (0.029) | (0.019) | (0.022) | (0.025) | (0.012) |
| Age | -0.056\* | -0.006 | 0.010 | -0.003 | -0.007 |
|  | (0.033) | (0.021) | (0.025) | (0.028) | (0.014) |
| Gender (Male) | 0.071 | 0.055\* | 0.018 | 0.064 | -0.037\* |
|  | (0.050) | (0.033) | (0.038) | (0.043) | (0.021) |
| Ethnicity (Han) | 0.034 | -0.061 | -0.021 | 0.086 | 0.109\*\* |
|  | (0.114) | (0.074) | (0.085) | (0.097) | (0.048) |
| College Education | -0.071 | -0.026 | 0.034 | -0.027 | 0.029 |
|  | (0.060) | (0.039) | (0.045) | (0.051) | (0.025) |
| News Time | 0.013 | 0.024 | 0.019 | 0.002 | 0.020\*\* |
|  | (0.024) | (0.016) | (0.018) | (0.021) | (0.010) |
| Social Media Time | 0.008 | -0.025 | 0.006 | 0.029 | 0.008 |
|  | (0.030) | (0.020) | (0.023) | (0.026) | (0.013) |
| Income | -0.006 | -0.014 | 0.006 | -0.010 | 0.013\*\* |
|  | (0.014) | (0.009) | (0.010) | (0.012) | (0.006) |
| CCP Membership | 0.003 | 0.053 | 0.109\* | 0.020 | -0.068\*\* |
|  | (0.076) | (0.049) | (0.057) | (0.065) | (0.032) |
| Urban Residence | 0.024 | 0.017 | -0.023 | -0.040 | -0.011 |
|  | (0.050) | (0.033) | (0.038) | (0.043) | (0.021) |
| Constant | 0.415\*\* | 0.281\*\* | 0.340\*\* | 0.309\* | 0.574\*\*\* |
|  | (0.195) | (0.127) | (0.146) | (0.166) | (0.082) |
| Observations | 194 | 194 | 194 | 194 | 194 |
| R-squared | 0.030 | 0.056 | 0.091 | 0.045 | 0.185 |
| Notes: Standard errors in parentheses; \*\*\* p<0.01, \*\* p<0.05, \* p<0.1 |

**Table 10N: Opportunistic Bargaining in Comparison (Control group, Accept interview)**

|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) |
| VARIABLES | OBE | OB1 | OB2 | CNC | RR |
| Accept interview | -0.209\*\*\* | -0.085\*\* | -0.122\*\*\* | -0.088\* | 0.063\*\* |
|  | (0.057) | (0.038) | (0.044) | (0.050) | (0.025) |
| Age | -0.049 | -0.000 | 0.025 | 0.005 | -0.017 |
|  | (0.031) | (0.021) | (0.024) | (0.027) | (0.014) |
| Gender (Male) | 0.058 | 0.047 | -0.000 | 0.054 | -0.025 |
|  | (0.047) | (0.032) | (0.037) | (0.042) | (0.021) |
| Ethnicity (Han) | 0.009 | -0.073 | -0.041 | 0.073 | 0.121\*\* |
|  | (0.110) | (0.073) | (0.085) | (0.097) | (0.048) |
| College Education | -0.066 | -0.023 | 0.040 | -0.024 | 0.025 |
|  | (0.058) | (0.038) | (0.045) | (0.051) | (0.025) |
| News Time | 0.012 | 0.022 | 0.015 | 0.000 | 0.023\*\* |
|  | (0.023) | (0.015) | (0.018) | (0.020) | (0.010) |
| Social Media Time | 0.008 | -0.023 | 0.015 | 0.033 | 0.001 |
|  | (0.029) | (0.019) | (0.022) | (0.025) | (0.013) |
| Income | -0.006 | -0.014 | 0.007 | -0.010 | 0.012\*\* |
|  | (0.013) | (0.009) | (0.010) | (0.011) | (0.006) |
| CCP Membership | 0.029 | 0.061 | 0.116\*\* | 0.027 | -0.070\*\* |
|  | (0.073) | (0.049) | (0.057) | (0.065) | (0.032) |
| Urban Residence | 0.023 | 0.020 | -0.010 | -0.034 | -0.021 |
|  | (0.048) | (0.032) | (0.037) | (0.042) | (0.021) |
| Constant | 0.546\*\*\* | 0.271\*\*\* | 0.208\* | 0.269\*\* | 0.693\*\*\* |
|  | (0.150) | (0.100) | (0.116) | (0.132) | (0.066) |
| Observations | 194 | 194 | 194 | 194 | 194 |
| R-squared | 0.095 | 0.075 | 0.093 | 0.054 | 0.161 |
| Notes: Standard errors in parentheses; \*\*\* p<0.01, \*\* p<0.05, \* p<0.1 |

**Appendix 11: Heterogeneous Treatment Effects**

In Table 11A and 11B we explore if treatments have heterogeneous effects on opportunistic bargaining. We do so by splitting the full sample into twelve subsamples by respondents’ demographics (i.e., urban residence, CCP membership, income, education, news time, and social media time). Gray color means that the heterogeneous effect is insignificant after multiple testing correction. We find that the negative/positive impact of neighbor fail (T2)/win (T3) mainly comes from respondents who are CCP member, above-average income, above college, above-average news time, and above-average social media time; the positive impact of political opening signals (T6) and political opening signals accompanied with successful precedents (T7) mainly comes from the respondents who are non-CCP member, below-average income, college and above, below-average news time, and below-average social media time.

**Table 11A Heterogeneous Treatment Effects by Pre-treatment Variables**

|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) |
| VARIABLES | Urban Residence | Non-Urban Residence | CCP Member | Non-CCP Member | Above-average Income | Below-average Income |
| T1, Neighbor | 0.018 | 0.023 | 0.035 | 0.016 | 0.078 | -0.024 |
|  | (0.042) | (0.045) | (0.084) | (0.033) | (0.048) | (0.041) |
| T2, Neighbor + Fail | -0.079\* | -0.093\*\* | -0.151\* | -0.075\*\* | -0.096\*\* | -0.061 |
|  | (0.042) | (0.047) | (0.085) | (0.034) | (0.047) | (0.042) |
| T3, Neighbor + Win | 0.050 | 0.051 | 0.053 | 0.051 | 0.129\*\*\* | -0.002 |
|  | (0.043) | (0.046) | (0.084) | (0.034) | (0.050) | (0.040) |
| T4, Neighbor + Stability | 0.031 | -0.030 | -0.134 | 0.018 | 0.047 | -0.035 |
|  | (0.042) | (0.047) | (0.098) | (0.033) | (0.047) | (0.042) |
| T5, Neighbor + Project | 0.007 | -0.019 | -0.049 | 0.002 | 0.040 | -0.036 |
|  | (0.042) | (0.044) | (0.088) | (0.033) | (0.047) | (0.040) |
| T6, Neighbor + Stability + Project | 0.070\* | -0.007 | 0.098 | 0.020 | 0.091\* | -0.004 |
|  | (0.042) | (0.046) | (0.082) | (0.034) | (0.048) | (0.041) |
| T7, Neighbor + Win + Stability + Project | 0.070 | 0.058 | 0.090 | 0.061\* | 0.060 | 0.072\* |
|  | (0.043) | (0.045) | (0.086) | (0.033) | (0.047) | (0.041) |
| Constant | 0.451\*\*\* | 0.309\*\*\* | 0.283 | 0.365\*\*\* | 0.359\*\*\* | 0.367\*\*\* |
|  | (0.078) | (0.076) | (0.181) | (0.057) | (0.089) | (0.067) |
| Control variables | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| Observations | 908 | 734 | 243 | 1,399 | 705 | 938 |
| R-squared | 0.031 | 0.027 | 0.095 | 0.022 | 0.056 | 0.026 |
| Notes: Standard errors in parentheses; \*\*\* p<0.01, \*\* p<0.05, \* p<0.1; We conduct multiple testing correction following Clarke, Romano, and Wolf (2020). Gray color means that significant result becomes insignificant after this correction. |

|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | (7) | (8) | (9) | (10) | (11) | (12) |
| VARIABLES | College and Above | Below College | Above-average News Time | Below-average News Time | Above-average Social Media Time | Below-average Social Media Time |
| T1, Neighbor | 0.009 | 0.032 | -0.027 | 0.036 | -0.015 | 0.040 |
|  | (0.038) | (0.053) | (0.060) | (0.036) | (0.053) | (0.038) |
| T2, Neighbor + Fail | -0.086\*\* | -0.085 | -0.183\*\*\* | -0.051 | -0.157\*\*\* | -0.054 |
|  | (0.038) | (0.054) | (0.062) | (0.036) | (0.056) | (0.037) |
| T3, Neighbor + Win | 0.065\* | 0.024 | 0.027 | 0.056 | 0.052 | 0.047 |
|  | (0.039) | (0.054) | (0.063) | (0.036) | (0.054) | (0.039) |
| T4, Neighbor + Stability | 0.017 | -0.018 | -0.027 | 0.012 | -0.074 | 0.045 |
|  | (0.038) | (0.055) | (0.061) | (0.037) | (0.055) | (0.038) |
| T5, Neighbor + Project | -0.020 | 0.019 | 0.000 | -0.010 | -0.041 | 0.016 |
|  | (0.037) | (0.054) | (0.060) | (0.035) | (0.052) | (0.038) |
| T6, Neighbor + Stability + Project | 0.042 | 0.027 | -0.016 | 0.051 | 0.003 | 0.051 |
|  | (0.038) | (0.054) | (0.062) | (0.036) | (0.053) | (0.038) |
| T7, Neighbor + Win + Stability + Project | 0.085\*\* | 0.038 | 0.039 | 0.071\*\* | 0.037 | 0.077\*\* |
|  | (0.038) | (0.053) | (0.061) | (0.036) | (0.052) | (0.039) |
| Constant | 0.397\*\*\* | 0.342\*\*\* | 0.370\*\*\* | 0.358\*\*\* | 0.339\*\*\* | 0.366\*\*\* |
|  | (0.065) | (0.085) | (0.101) | (0.064) | (0.095) | (0.066) |
| Control variables | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| Observations | 1,028 | 614 | 470 | 1,172 | 589 | 1,053 |
| R-squared | 0.033 | 0.033 | 0.052 | 0.022 | 0.055 | 0.024 |
| Notes: Standard errors in parentheses; \*\*\* p<0.01, \*\* p<0.05, \* p<0.1; We conduct multiple testing correction following Clarke, Romano, and Wolf (2020). Gray color means that significant result becomes insignificant after this correction. |

**Table 11B Heterogeneous Treatment Effects by Pre-treatment Variables II**