

# **The Political and Economic Consequences of Nationalist Protest in China: Repercussions of the 2012 Anti-Japanese Demonstrations**

## **Web Appendix**

The following document includes tables and text that for space reasons have been placed in this web appendix to clarify the claims of the manuscript and demonstrate the robustness of the findings presented there.

It is organized as follows.

### Appendix A. Additional Statistical Tables

This section provides additional statistical support for the core hypotheses and models in the main text.

### Appendix B. Effect of Protest on Mayor Promotions

This section analyzes mayors (as opposed to city party secretaries).

### Appendix C. Summary Statistics

This section provides summary statistics for the main variables in the manuscript and appendix.

### Appendix D. Details on Coding Scheme for Promotions

This section provides details on the coding scheme for promotions.

### Appendix E. On the Construction and Designation of Patriotic Bases

This section provides discussion of new patriotic bases.

## Appendix A: Additional Statistical Tables

	(1) Early	(2) Peak
GDP growth (pct, 2011)	-0.037*** (0.011)	-0.011 (0.011)
Exports (2011)	0.00020 (0.00020)	-0.00014 (0.00023)
FDI (2011)	-0.0012 (0.0019)	-0.0023 (0.0028)
GDP (2011, log)	0.033 (0.063)	0.0084 (0.070)
Log population, 2010 census	0.019 (0.065)	0.11 (0.073)
Student enrollment (2011, log)	0.091*** (0.030)	0.076** (0.030)
Total registered employment (2011)	-0.022 (0.023)	-0.0030 (0.030)
Share of migrants in population	0.00062 (0.0028)	0.0079* (0.0046)
Share of minorities in population	-0.0024 (0.0021)	-0.0038** (0.0017)
Any anti-Japan legacy	-0.013 (0.056)	-0.13* (0.073)
Any patriotic base	0.11** (0.052)	0.049 (0.058)
Observations	273	273

**Appendix Table 1:** Logistic regression of significant predictors of protest on protest occurrence in the early and peak protest waves. Results are reported as marginal effects at mean values of predictors. Standard errors in parentheses. \*\*\* p<0.01, \*\* p<0.05, \* p<0.1

	(1)	(2)	(3)
	FDI (%)	Exports (%)	GDP (%)
Total protest days	-7.93*	0.53	0.23
	(4.19)	(2.82)	(0.15)
Total protest days^2	0.54	0.037	-0.027
	(0.67)	(0.45)	(0.025)
GDP growth (pct, 1y lag)	-2.58*	2.45**	0.63***
	(1.33)	(0.99)	(0.049)
GDP growth (pct, 2011)	0.76	1.08	0.025
	(1.51)	(1.02)	(0.054)
GDP (2011, log)	-0.037	-11.1***	0.25
	(6.15)	(4.08)	(0.22)
FDI growth (pct, 1y lag)	-0.11***	0.030	0.0015
	(0.041)	(0.027)	(0.0015)
FDI (2011)	-0.47**	-0.074	-0.011
	(0.24)	(0.16)	(0.0087)
Export growth (pct, 1y lag)	0.086*	0.00064	0.00079
	(0.052)	(0.034)	(0.0019)
Exports, 2011	0.00040	0.0041	0.00015
	(0.015)	(0.010)	(0.00056)
Log population, 2010 census	16.4**	11.2**	0.55**
	(6.64)	(4.36)	(0.24)
New party secretary	-1.45	9.04*	0.54*
	(7.68)	(5.29)	(0.28)
Year = 2014	-4.61	5.72	-1.12***
	(6.47)	(4.37)	(0.24)
Constant	-194**	-144**	-7.33**
	(85.0)	(55.7)	(3.05)
Observations	538	523	544
R-squared	0.052	0.075	0.394
Distinct cities	272	272	272

**Appendix Table 2:** Economic consequences of protests. OLS regression. The significance and effect size of protest intensity are reported in this table, but are more easily interpreted in table 3, where they are presented in terms of marginal effects. Standard errors in parentheses. \*\*\* p<0.01, \*\* p<0.05, \* p<0.1

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
	A3.1		A3.2		A3.3	
	Retired	Promoted	Retired	Promoted	Retired	Promoted
<b>Early protests (before Sept 15)</b>	<b>1.28</b>	<b>0.42*</b>	<b>0.80</b>	<b>0.42*</b>	<b>1.28</b>	<b>0.47</b>
	(0.45)	(0.20)	(0.54)	(0.20)	(0.61)	(0.23)
Peak protests (on or after Sept 15)	0.83	0.90	1.67	0.89	0.61	0.84
	(0.27)	(0.32)	(1.17)	(0.31)	(0.28)	(0.31)
GDP growth (pct, 1y lag)	1.07	1.07	1.10	1.07	1.09	1.09
	(0.074)	(0.082)	(0.15)	(0.082)	(0.099)	(0.086)
GDP (1y lag, log)	0.77	1.57	1.79	1.54	0.78	1.73*
	(0.20)	(0.50)	(1.10)	(0.48)	(0.26)	(0.54)
Log population, 2010 census	1.46	1.21	0.52	1.24	1.50	1.15
	(0.47)	(0.47)	(0.41)	(0.48)	(0.68)	(0.46)
Age	1.14***	0.85***	0.98	0.85***	1.27***	0.85***
	(0.051)	(0.042)	(0.067)	(0.042)	(0.076)	(0.046)
Minority	0.66	1.74	3.86	1.79	1.04	2.01
	(0.35)	(0.98)	(4.33)	(1.01)	(0.55)	(1.18)
Tenure in position	1.35	1.42	375*	1.41	4.81**	1.77
	(0.60)	(0.69)	(1,140)	(0.67)	(3.10)	(0.90)
Tenure^2	1.01	1.00	0.17**	1.00	0.91	0.98
	(0.045)	(0.051)	(0.13)	(0.050)	(0.056)	(0.050)
FDI growth (pct, 1y lag)	1.00	1.00*	0.99*	1.00	1.00	1.00
	(0.0023)	(0.0020)	(0.0062)	(0.0019)	(0.0030)	(0.0019)
Years since 2012	0.85	0.62*	1.14	0.63*	0.57*	0.61*
	(0.18)	(0.16)	(0.97)	(0.16)	(0.17)	(0.17)
Constant	2.6e-07***	1.90	0.95	1.40	0***	1.08
	(1.2e-06)	(10.3)	(9.24)	(7.55)	(1.4e-10)	(6.22)
Observations	526	526	502	502	449	449
Distinct individuals	271	271	267	267	229	229
Pseudo R-Squared	0.15	0.15	0.20	0.20	0.20	0.20
chi2	147	147	144	144	171	171
Prob > chi2	0	0	0	0	0	0
Log likelihood	-407	-407	-344	-344	-298	-298

**Appendix Table 3:** Career consequences of anti-Japan protests for party secretaries. Multinomial logit model. Base outcome is non-change; (base and “passed over” omitted from results). Coefficients are odds ratios. Model A3.1 includes all observations; Model A3.2 excludes changes due to anti-corruption investigations; Model A3.3 excludes individuals who later became implicated in anti-corruption investigations. Clustered standard errors in parentheses. \*\*\* p<0.01, \*\* p<0.05, \* p<0.1

(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

	Probit model (A4.0)	Bivariate Probit (A4.1)		Bivariate Probit (A4.2)		Bivariate Probit (A4.3)	
	Promoted	Promoted	Early Protests	Promoted	Early Protests	Promoted	Early Protests
<b>Early protests</b>	<b>0.62**</b> (0.14)	<b>0.35**</b> (0.18)		<b>0.37*</b> (0.21)		<b>0.36</b> (0.24)	
GDP growth (pct, 1y lag)	1.03 (0.041)	1.02 (0.043)	0.90*** (0.035)	1.03 (0.043)	0.93* (0.037)	1.04 (0.044)	0.96 (0.044)
GDP (1y lag, log)	1.26 (0.20)	1.44* (0.27)	1.78*** (0.35)	1.41* (0.27)	1.75*** (0.36)	1.51** (0.29)	1.66** (0.37)
Log population, 2010 census	1.12 (0.21)	1.11 (0.21)	0.83 (0.22)	1.13 (0.21)	0.86 (0.23)	1.08 (0.22)	1.05 (0.30)
Age	0.91*** (0.023)	0.92*** (0.023)	1.00 (0.029)	0.91*** (0.024)	1.00 (0.029)	0.92*** (0.026)	1.00 (0.030)
Years since 2012	0.83 (0.11)	0.80* (0.10)	0.87 (0.083)	0.83 (0.11)	0.90 (0.088)	0.84 (0.11)	0.94 (0.094)
Tenure in position	1.29 (0.33)	1.34 (0.35)	0.99 (0.26)	1.28 (0.34)	0.97 (0.26)	1.33 (0.37)	0.95 (0.27)
Tenure^2	0.99 (0.027)	0.99 (0.029)	1.01 (0.030)	0.99 (0.029)	1.02 (0.030)	0.99 (0.030)	1.02 (0.032)
FDI growth (pct, 1y lag)	1.00* (0.0011)	1.00** (0.0010)	1.00* (0.0010)	1.00** (0.0011)	1.00** (0.0010)	1.00** (0.0011)	1.00* (0.0011)
Student enrollment (2011, log)			1.35** (0.17)		1.34** (0.17)		1.28* (0.17)
Any anti-Japan legacy			0.95 (0.26)		0.95 (0.26)		0.86 (0.26)
Any patriotic base			1.62** (0.38)		1.59* (0.38)		1.64** (0.40)
Observations	502	519	519	496	496	444	444
Distinct individuals	267	268	268	264	264	227	227
Rho		0.39 0.35		0.34 (0.38)		0.40 (0.43)	

**Appendix Table 4:** Career consequences of anti-Japan protests for party secretaries. IV estimation with a bivariate probit model. Outcome is a dummy variable representing promotion in a given year. All coefficients expressed as odds ratios. Model 1 is a probit model (no IV). Model 2 includes all observations; model 3 excludes changes due to anti-corruption drive; model 4 excludes all individuals who later became implicated in anti-corruption investigations. Clustered standard errors in parentheses. \*\*\* p<0.01, \*\* p<0.05, \* p<0.1

	(1) Early	(2) Peak
<b>GDP growth (pct, 2011)</b>	<b>0.74***</b>	<b>0.94</b>
	(0.073)	(0.065)
Exports (2011)	1.00	1.00
	(0.0017)	(0.0014)
FDI (2011)	0.99	0.99
	(0.015)	(0.017)
GDP (2011, log)	1.31	1.05
	(0.68)	(0.46)
Log population, 2010 census	1.17	1.93
	(0.62)	(0.88)
<b>Student enrollment (2011, log)</b>	<b>2.11***</b>	<b>1.60**</b>
	(0.54)	(0.31)
Total registered employment (2011)	0.83	0.98
	(0.16)	(0.18)
Share of migrants in population	1.01	1.05*
	(0.023)	(0.030)
Share of minorities in population	0.98	0.98**
	(0.017)	(0.011)
<b>Any anti-Japan legacy</b>	<b>0.90</b>	<b>0.44*</b>
	(0.41)	(0.20)
<b>Any patriotic base</b>	<b>2.44**</b>	<b>1.35</b>
	(1.06)	(0.48)
Constant	0.015	0.000048*
	(0.10)	(0.00028)
Observations	273	273
Log likelihood	-105	-135
Chi2	88.9	53.9

**Appendix Table 6:** Significant predictors of anti-Japan protests. Logistic regression. All coefficients expressed as odds ratios. Standard errors in parentheses. \*\*\* p<0.01, \*\* p<0.05, \* p<0.1

## **Appendix B: Effect of protest on mayor promotions**

Our dataset on Chinese cities at and above the prefectural level includes information on the careers of both mayors and party secretaries. In contrast to the clear results when examining party secretaries, we find no evidence that protests in the early wave negatively affected the probability of mayoral promotions. We cannot say with confidence, however, if this non-finding is because economic and social unrest targets do not play an important role in the performance evaluation of mayors, or if cases of mayoral promotions are too closely correlated with corresponding data on party secretary promotions. We do not report the results of analysis on mayors in the paper but provide them in this appendix for reference.

There are two explanations for why we would expect mayoral promotions and party secretary promotions (or departures) to be correlated. First, as noted above, the collective responsibility system implies that the evaluation, compensation and promotion of city leaders such as mayors and other officials in a city hierarchy is closely linked to the evaluation of the party secretary at the top of the hierarchy. This means that when a party secretary is rewarded with promotion a mayor is likely to also be rewarded with a promotion. Second, the most likely path to promotion for a city mayor is to party secretary of the same city. This means that the departure of a party secretary due to promotion, transfer, dismissal or retirement creates a vacancy that is, all things being equal, likely to be filled by a mayor. This correlation in outcomes poses a complicated inferential problem that likely requires a larger data set and is beyond the scope of this paper. With these caveats in mind, Appendix Table 4 reports the marginal effects of a multinomial logistic regression of promotion outcomes for mayors on standard economic and biographical covariates. We note two points of interest here: first, as expected, we see a close correlation between party secretary promotion or retirement and the promotion of mayors. Second, while we do not see evidence of a negative effect of early protests on mayor promotions, there is a substantial positive correlation between promotion of mayors and observations of protests on or after September 15. While

this is consistent with the central guidance hypothesis, we hesitate to make any causal claims from this result due to the high observed correlation between mayor promotions and party secretary departures.

	(1)	(2)	(3)
	Model A7.1	Model A7.2	Model A7.3
Early protests	-0.040 (0.031)	-0.038 (0.031)	-0.035 (0.032)
<b>Peak protests</b>	<b>0.056**</b> (0.027)	<b>0.053*</b> (0.027)	<b>0.057**</b> (0.028)
<b>Party secretary retired / dismissed</b>	<b>0.17***</b> (0.058)	<b>0.18***</b> (0.060)	<b>0.17***</b> (0.062)
Party secretary transferred	-0.030 (0.027)	-0.031 (0.027)	-0.028 (0.028)
<b>Party secretary promoted</b>	<b>0.24***</b> (0.061)	<b>0.24***</b> (0.061)	<b>0.20***</b> (0.062)
GDP growth (pct, 1y lag)	-0.0056 (0.0060)	-0.0050 (0.0061)	-0.0047 (0.0062)
<i>(standard controls omitted)</i>			
Observations	779	773	739

**Appendix Table 7:** Correlates of promotion for mayors, expressed in terms of marginal effect at mean values of early protests on probability of promotion. Model A7.1 includes all observations. Model A7.2 excludes career changes resulting from anti-corruption investigations. Model A7.3 excludes all individuals implicated in anti-corruption investigations. Clustered standard errors in parentheses. \*\*\* p<0.01, \*\* p<0.05, \* p<0.1

## Appendix C: Summary statistics

### i. Summary statistics of city-level data

VARIABLES	N	mean	2013			N	mean	2014		
			sd	min	max			sd	min	max
GDP growth (pct)	285	10.3	2.37	-8.96	16	285	8.32	2.98	-11.5	14.8
GDP growth (pct, 1y lag)	285	11.8	2.25	-0.70	21.7	285	10.3	2.37	-8.96	16
FDI growth (pct)	273	18.4	56.8	-80.6	525	269	17.0	67.3	-80.6	525
Export growth (pct)	285	15.2	33.9	-66.9	274	263	24.6	55.7	-66.9	274
FDI growth (pct, 1y lag)	272	30.7	74.0	-80.6	525	273	18.4	56.8	-80.6	525
Export growth (pct, 1y lag)	285	27.9	67.9	-66.9	274	285	15.2	33.9	-66.9	274
GDP growth (pct, 2011)	285	13.2	2.21	2.90	20.1	285	13.2	2.21	2.90	20.1
FDI (2011)	277	7.77	17.6	0.0013	131	277	7.77	17.6	0.0013	131
Registered employment (2011)	284	0.74	1.59	0.051	15.9	284	0.74	1.59	0.051	15.9
Exports (2011)	285	65.9	235	0.0018	2,454	285	65.9	235	0.0018	2,454
GDP (2011, log)	285	4.75	0.89	2.59	7.56	285	4.75	0.89	2.59	7.56
Student enrollment (2011, log)	280	3.49	1.36	-0.27	6.82	280	3.49	1.36	-0.27	6.82
Any patriotic base	285	0.57	0.50	0	1	285	0.57	0.50	0	1
Japanese occupation	285	0.19	0.39	0	1	285	0.19	0.39	0	1
Log population, 2010 census	285	15.1	0.69	12.4	17.2	285	15.1	0.69	12.4	17.2
Share of migrants in population	285	10.7	12.0	0.74	79.9	285	10.7	12.0	0.74	79.9
Share of minorities in population	285	7.21	14.9	0.0100	88.1	285	7.21	14.9	0.0100	88.1
Early protests	285	0.23	0.42	0	1	285	0.23	0.42	0	1
Peak protests	285	0.70	0.46	0	1	285	0.70	0.46	0	1
New party secretary	411	0	0	0	0	285	0.44	0.50	0	1

## ii. Summary statistics of individual-level data (party secretaries and mayors)

VARIABLES	2012					2013				
	N	mean	sd	min	max	N	mean	sd	min	max
Minority	19	0.32	0.48	0	1	545	0.072	0.26	0	1
GDP growth (pct, 1y lag)	19	13.5	1.98	8.20	16.5	545	11.8	2.25	-0.70	21.7
GDP (1y lag, log)	19	4.49	1.06	2.59	7.56	545	4.86	0.87	2.76	7.61
FDI growth (pct, 1y lag)	17	33.3	75.5	-27.2	318	521	30.8	71.7	-80.6	525
Student enrollment (2011, log)	19	3.04	1.34	0.64	6.24	535	3.50	1.35	-0.27	6.82
Any patriotic base	19	0.53	0.51	0	1	545	0.57	0.49	0	1
Japanese occupation	19	0	0	0	0	545	0.19	0.40	0	1
Log population, 2010	19	15.0	0.72	14.0	17.0	545	15.1	0.69	12.4	17.2
Anti-corruption dummy	19	0	0	0	0	545	0.013	0.11	0	1
Early protests	19	0.053	0.23	0	1	545	0.23	0.42	0	1
Peak protests	19	0.68	0.48	0	1	545	0.70	0.46	0	1
Years since 2012	19	0	0	0	0	545	1	0	1	1
Tenure	19	5.07	2.19	0.67	10	545	3.25	1.58	1.08	10.4
Age	19	53.5	3.05	49.3	58.7	545	52.6	3.95	37.6	68.2
Model 1: Retired	19	0.26	0.45	0	1	545	0.077	0.27	0	1
Model 1: No change	19	0.21	0.42	0	1	545	0.69	0.46	0	1
Model 1: Promotion	19	0.53	0.51	0	1	545	0.24	0.43	0	1
Model 2: Retired	19	0.26	0.45	0	1	545	0.077	0.27	0	1
Model 2: No change	19	0	0	0	0	545	0.066	0.25	0	1
Model 2: Passed over	19	0.21	0.42	0	1	545	0.62	0.49	0	1
Model 2: Promoted	19	0.53	0.51	0	1	545	0.24	0.43	0	1

VARIABLES	2014					2015				
	N	mean	sd	min	max	N	mean	sd	min	max
Minority	304	0.086	0.28	0	1	234	0.077	0.27	0	1
GDP growth (pct, 1y lag)	304	10.4	1.80	2.96	15.3	234	8.45	2.64	-9.40	14.4
GDP (1y lag, log)	304	4.99	0.91	2.92	7.59	234	5.05	0.92	3.00	7.67
FDI growth (pct, 1y lag)	291	16.1	52.3	-76.8	525	217	24.0	78.0	-80.6	525
Student enrollment (2011, log)	298	3.55	1.44	-0.27	6.82	232	3.49	1.47	-0.27	6.82
Any patriotic base	304	0.61	0.49	0	1	234	0.60	0.49	0	1
Japanese occupation	304	0.18	0.39	0	1	234	0.18	0.38	0	1
Log population, 2010	304	15.1	0.71	12.4	17.2	234	15.0	0.73	12.4	17.2
Anti-corruption dummy	304	0.059	0.24	0	1	234	0.021	0.14	0	1
Early protests	304	0.25	0.43	0	1	234	0.26	0.44	0	1
Peak protests	304	0.67	0.47	0	1	234	0.68	0.47	0	1
Years since 2012	304	2	0	2	2	234	3	0	3	3
Tenure	304	3.68	1.19	2.17	11.4	234	4.51	0.97	3.17	8.75
Age	304	53.3	3.89	42.1	67.5	234	53.9	3.96	42.8	68.5
Retired	304	0.10	0.30	0	1	234	0.098	0.30	0	1
No change	304	0.020	0.14	0	1	234	0	0	0	0
Passed over	304	0.80	0.40	0	1	234	0.72	0.45	0	1
Promoted	304	0.082	0.28	0	1	234	0.18	0.39	0	1

## Appendix D. Details on Coding Scheme for Promotions

The coding of many changes of position in the Chinese system as promotion or something else is not necessarily obvious. For party secretaries, appointments to the following positions were coded as promotions:

- Positions in important central party organs such as the Organization Department (组织部) or affiliated organizations such as the Communist Youth League (共青团) or the All-China Women's Federation (妇联);
- Leadership positions in provincial branches of important organizations;
- Provincial leadership posts including Provincial Party Secretary (省委书记), Governor (省长), Vice Provincial Party Secretary (省委副书记) and lower level appointments in the top provincial government such as Vice Governor (副省长) and Secretary General of provincial party committees (省委秘书长);
- Leadership positions in a small handful of influential administrative units at the provincial level, including the provincial Development and Reform Commission (省发改委) which has authority to oversee major business transactions, and the provincial Public Security Bureau (省公安厅).

For mayors, the following appointments were coded as promotions:

- City party secretaries (市委书记);
- Mayors of cities at a higher administrative level;
- Directors or party secretaries of important bureaus (厅) or administrations (局) in the provincial government;
- Any of the positions considered promotions for party secretaries.

Appointments to other positions such as the leadership of the provincial People's Consultative Conference (省政协) or the Provincial People's Congress (省人大) were coded as retirements. As Li and Zhou (2005) note, appointments to these posts represent a substantial loss of political power and influence for local leaders, and often effectively serve as holding patterns prior to formal retirement. Appointments to positions of real power but similar rank, for example the appointment of a mayor to the mayorship of another city at the same level in the administrative hierarchy, were coded as lateral transfers.

We follow the approach of Guo (2009) in coding an official's tenure in office as the number of years since the year of appointment. Guo (2009) did not have access to official's month of appointment and coded years as integers. We code tenure as a continuous value, equal to: (current year) - (year and month of appointment) + 1. Official Chinese state media have highlighted the role of GDP and GDP growth rates in cadre evaluation and promotion.

## Appendix E. On the Construction and Designation of Patriotic Bases

It is technically possible that a city may have had bases built for the first time during the term of a party secretary in our data set. This would be the case if a patriotic education base was built during the last wave on the 60<sup>th</sup> anniversary of the founding of the PRC. This seems to be the case for one city only (Daqing). The party secretary in question, Han Xuejian (韩学键), was removed during the anti-corruption campaign, and is coded as three non-promotions in models 4.2 and 4.4. The results from models 4.2-4 (the IV models) are basically unchanged after dropping this observation. The relevant models were re-run after dropping all observations associated with Daqing and are shown here in Appendix tables 8 and 9.

VARIABLES	A8.1		A8.2		A8.3		A8.4	
	promotion	promoted	early	promoted	early	promoted	early	
<b>Early protests</b>	<b>0.63**</b>	<b>0.36*</b>		<b>0.38*</b>		<b>0.36</b>		
	<b>(0.14)</b>	<b>(0.20)</b>		<b>(0.22)</b>		<b>(0.24)</b>		
GDP growth (pct, 1y)	1.03	1.02	0.91**	1.03	0.93*	1.04	0.96	
	(0.041)	(0.043)	(0.036)	(0.043)	(0.038)	(0.044)	(0.044)	
Student enrollment			1.36**		1.35**		1.28*	
			(0.17)		(0.17)		(0.17)	
Japanese occupation			0.97		0.96		0.86	
			(0.26)		(0.27)		(0.26)	
Any patriotic base			1.58*		1.56*		1.64**	
			(0.38)		(0.37)		(0.40)	
	(controls omitted from table)							
Observations	501	517	517	495	495	444	444	
Distinct individuals	266	267	267	263	263	227	227	

**Appendix Table 8:** Career consequences of anti-Japan protests for party secretaries, excluding Daqing. IV estimation with a bivariate probit model. Outcome is a dummy variable representing promotion in a given year. All coefficients expressed as odds ratios. Model 1 is a probit model (no IV). Model 2 includes all observations; model 3 excludes changes due to anti-corruption drive; model 4 excludes all individuals who later became implicated in anti-corruption investigations. The results are consistent with those reported in Appendix Table 4. Clustered standard errors in parentheses. \*\*\* p<0.01, \*\* p<0.05, \* p<0.1

	(A9.1)	(A9.2)	(A9.3)	(A9.4)
<b>Early protests</b>	<b>-0.081**</b>	<b>-0.16**</b>	<b>-0.15*</b>	<b>-0.16*</b>
	<b>(0.034)</b>	<b>(0.077)</b>	<b>(0.082)</b>	<b>(0.096)</b>
GDP growth (pct, 1y lag)	0.0058	0.0043	0.0059	0.0087
	(0.0078)	(0.0082)	(0.0083)	(0.0086)
	(controls omitted from table)			
Observations	501	517	495	444

**Appendix Table 9:** Results of probit and bivariate probit models: effect of early protests (dichotomous) on promotion expressed in terms of marginal effects at mean values of controls, excluding Daqing. The results are consistent with those reported in Table 4. \*\*\* p<0.01, \*\* p<0.05, \* p<0.1