# Online appendix to “Measuring norms using social survey data”

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This online appendix contains additional material, which is referred to in the published article. This material is ordered following the references that are made in the footnotes of the article.

* Table O1: estimation results of the model presented in section 4.1 using a non-linear model. Both EE and NE are treated as ordinal variables. Footnote 17 refers to this material.
* Table O2: estimation results of the model presented in section 4.1 using rescaled NE items. We rescale the NE items to a 4-point scale, where the value of: 2 is rescaled to a value of 3.66, a value of 3 is rescaled to a value of 3.33, a value of 4 is rescaled to a value of 3 (…) and a value of 9 is rescaled to a value of 1.33. Footnote 18 refers to this material.
* Table O3: estimation results of the model presented in section 4.2 using an orthogonal rotation. Footnote 19 refers to this material.
* Table O4: full estimation results of the model presented in section 4.3. Footnote 23 refers to this material.
* Tables O5 and O6: estimation results of the models presented in sections 4.1 and 4.2 using rescaled NE items. We rescale the NE items to a 4-point scale, as described in the main text: we attribute the values 1, 2 and 3 to a value 1; the values 4 and 5 to the value 2; the values 6 and 7 to value 3; and the values 8, 9 and 10 to a value 4. Footnote 24 refers to this material
* Table O7: full results of the multilevel model that we estimate in robustness section 5.3.

Table O1: Correlation NE and EE conditional upon socio-demographic characteristics. Ordered logistic regression.

|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| VARIABLES | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) | (7) | (8) | (9) |
|  | Claiming state benefits | Avoiding a fare | Cheating on taxes | Accepting a bribe | Lying in own interest | Littering in public | Driving under influence of alcohol | Paying cash to avoid taxes | Speeding in built areas |
| **EE *<R>*** |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Amost all compatriots do *X* | (base) |
| Many compatriots do *X* | 0.315\*\*\* | 0.924\*\*\* | 0.663\*\*\* | 0.274\*\*\* | 0.895\*\*\* | 0.310\*\*\* | 0.434\*\*\* | 0.684\*\*\* | 0.570\*\*\* |
|  | (0.082) | (0.117) | (0.076) | (0.098) | (0.067) | (0.071) | (0.098) | (0.075) | (0.064) |
| Some compatriots do *X* | 0.443\*\*\* | 1.442\*\*\* | 1.051\*\*\* | 0.660\*\*\* | 1.409\*\*\* | 0.323\*\*\* | 0.566\*\*\* | 1.062\*\*\* | 0.805\*\*\* |
|  | (0.111) | (0.119) | (0.114) | (0.109) | (0.077) | (0.086) | (0.104) | (0.105) | (0.092) |
| Almost none do *X* | 0.530\*\*\* | 1.759\*\*\* | 1.138\*\*\* | 1.043\*\*\* | 1.935\*\*\* | 0.545\*\*\* | 0.793\*\*\* | 1.461\*\*\* | 1.188\*\*\* |
|  | (0.116) | (0.171) | (0.160) | (0.141) | (0.271) | (0.127) | (0.136) | (0.170) | (0.186) |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Age  | 0.021\*\*\* | 0.024\*\*\* | 0.021\*\*\* | 0.025\*\*\* | 0.019\*\*\* | 0.016\*\*\* | 0.017\*\*\* | 0.018\*\*\* | 0.022\*\*\* |
|  | (0.001) | (0.003) | (0.001) | (0.002) | (0.002) | (0.001) | (0.002) | (0.002) | (0.002) |
| Gender (female = 1)  | 0.137\*\*\* | 0.167\*\*\* | 0.267\*\*\* | 0.313\*\*\* | 0.231\*\*\* | 0.246\*\*\* | 0.708\*\*\* | 0.265\*\*\* | 0.483\*\*\* |
|  | (0.027) | (0.059) | (0.029) | (0.037) | (0.033) | (0.033) | (0.045) | (0.029) | (0.034) |
| Highest educational level  | 0.036\*\*\* | −0.032 | 0.009 | 0.011 | 0.006 | 0.011 | −0.031\*\* | −0.024\*\* | −0.065\*\*\* |
|  | (0.009) | (0.025) | (0.012) | (0.017) | (0.015) | (0.014) | (0.013) | (0.010) | (0.011) |
| Income level  | 0.032 | −0.068\*\* | −0.064\*\*\* | −0.072\* | −0.119\*\*\* | −0.041 | −0.116\*\*\* | −0.097\*\*\* | −0.168\*\*\* |
|  | (0.029) | (0.028) | (0.019) | (0.037) | (0.019) | (0.034) | (0.029) | (0.023) | (0.021) |
| Marital status (married = 1) | 0.193\*\*\* | 0.238\*\*\* | 0.151\*\*\* | 0.191\*\*\* | 0.191\*\*\* | 0.198\*\*\* | 0.228\*\*\* | 0.135\*\*\* | 0.142\*\*\* |
|  | (0.027) | (0.045) | (0.035) | (0.050) | (0.036) | (0.040) | (0.040) | (0.031) | (0.023) |
| Employment (unemployed = 1) | −0.264\*\*\* | −0.062 | −0.151\*\*\* | −0.094 | −0.180\*\* | −0.072 | −0.085 | −0.021 | 0.063 |
|  | (0.052) | (0.076) | (0.044) | (0.093) | (0.077) | (0.052) | (0.057) | (0.041) | (0.046) |
| Number of children | 0.012 | 0.072\*\*\* | −0.013 | 0.010 | 0.054\*\*\* | 0.021 | 0.000 | −0.006 | 0.036\*\* |
|  | (0.019) | (0.018) | (0.012) | (0.026) | (0.019) | (0.013) | (0.015) | (0.018) | (0.014) |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Observations | 29,940 | 14,811 | 30,481 | 16,965 | 16,234 | 31,575 | 31,611 | 28,884 | 31,454 |
| Pseudo R2 | 0.055 | 0.063 | 0.049 | 0.063 | 0.056 | 0.053 | 0.059 | 0.050 | 0.070 |
| The nine columns show the regression results for nine separate regression models, in which the dependent variable is the NE for a particular behavioural R and the independent variable of interest is the EE for the same behavioural rule R. The table depicts clustered standard errors at the country level in parentheses. Estimated with country fixed effects. Ordered log-odds (logit) regression coefficients are displayed. \*\*\* p<0.01, \*\* p<0.05, \* p<0.1. |
|  |

Table O2: Correlation NE and EE conditional upon socio-demographic characteristics. Rescaled NE items

|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|   | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) | (7) | (8) | (9) |
| VARIABLES | Claiming | Avoiding | Cheating | Bribe | Lying | Littering | Driving | Paying cash | Speeding |
| **EE *<R>*** |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |
| Claiming state benefits | 0.058\*\*\* |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
|  | (0.015) |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Avoiding a fare |  | 0.236\*\*\* |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
|  |  | (0.024) |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Cheating on taxes |  |  | 0.180\*\*\* |  |  |  |  |  |  |
|  |  |  | (0.022) |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Accepting a bribe |  |  |  | 0.096\*\*\* |  |  |  |  |  |
|  |  |  |  | (0.016) |  |  |  |  |  |
| Lying in own interest |  |  |  |  | 0.257\*\*\* |  |  |  |  |
|  |  |  |  |  | (0.016) |  |  |  |  |
| Littering in public |  |  |  |  |  | 0.042\*\*\* |  |  |  |
|  |  |  |  |  |  | (0.010) |  |  |  |
| Driving under influence of alcohol |  |  |  |  |  |  | 0.033\*\*\* |  |  |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  | (0.007) |  |  |
| Paying cash to avoid taxes |  |  |  |  |  |  |  | 0.214\*\*\* |  |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  | (0.022) |  |
| Speeding in built-up areas |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  | 0.121\*\*\* |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  | (0.015) |
| Age | 0.006\*\*\* | 0.008\*\*\* | 0.008\*\*\* | 0.005\*\*\* | 0.007\*\*\* | 0.004\*\*\* | 0.002\*\*\* | 0.008\*\*\* | 0.006\*\*\* |
|  | (0.000) | (0.001) | (0.001) | (0.001) | (0.001) | (0.000) | (0.000) | (0.001) | (0.000) |
| Gender (female = 1)  | 0.040\*\*\* | 0.069\*\*\* | 0.104\*\*\* | 0.066\*\*\* | 0.094\*\*\* | 0.051\*\*\* | 0.095\*\*\* | 0.114\*\*\* | 0.136\*\*\* |
|  | (0.007) | (0.018) | (0.011) | (0.008) | (0.012) | (0.007) | (0.009) | (0.012) | (0.011) |
| Highest educational level | 0.013\*\*\* | −0.003 | 0.009\* | 0.008\* | 0.008 | 0.006\*\* | −0.001 | −0.005 | −0.013\*\*\* |
|  | (0.003) | (0.009) | (0.004) | (0.004) | (0.005) | (0.003) | (0.001) | (0.004) | (0.003) |
| Income level | 0.010 | −0.018 | −0.016\*\* | −0.019\*\* | −0.039\*\*\* | −0.007 | −0.017\*\*\* | −0.030\*\*\* | −0.043\*\*\* |
|  | (0.009) | (0.013) | (0.007) | (0.009) | (0.008) | (0.007) | (0.005) | (0.010) | (0.007) |
| Marital status (married = 1) | 0.063\*\*\* | 0.109\*\*\* | 0.067\*\*\* | 0.049\*\*\* | 0.088\*\*\* | 0.047\*\*\* | 0.044\*\*\* | 0.064\*\*\* | 0.060\*\*\* |
|  | (0.010) | (0.020) | (0.014) | (0.012) | (0.014) | (0.009) | (0.007) | (0.013) | (0.008) |
| Employment (unemployed = 1) | −0.122\*\*\* | −0.037 | −0.076\*\*\* | −0.058\* | −0.088\*\* | −0.032\*\* | −0.014 | −0.015 | 0.006 |
|  | (0.024) | (0.029) | (0.021) | (0.028) | (0.035) | (0.014) | (0.013) | (0.016) | (0.012) |
| Number of children | 0.000 | 0.026\*\*\* | −0.005 | −0.001 | 0.012 | 0.003 | −0.001 | −0.003 | 0.007 |
|  | (0.005) | (0.007) | (0.004) | (0.006) | (0.008) | (0.004) | (0.002) | (0.007) | (0.004) |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Constant | 3.145\*\*\* | 2.358\*\*\* | 2.695\*\*\* | 3.185\*\*\* | 2.382\*\*\* | 3.174\*\*\* | 3.613\*\*\* | 2.297\*\*\* | 3.084\*\*\* |
|  | (0.053) | (0.114) | (0.065) | (0.059) | (0.069) | (0.040) | (0.031) | (0.064) | (0.040) |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Observations | 29,940 | 14,811 | 30,481 | 16,965 | 16,234 | 31,575 | 31,611 | 28,884 | 31,454 |
| R-squared | 0.130 | 0.200 | 0.134 | 0.117 | 0.175 | 0.102 | 0.076 | 0.152 | 0.164 |
| The nine columns show the regression results for nine separate regression models, in which the dependent variable is the NE for a particular behavioural R and the independent variable of interest is the EE for the same behavioural rule R. The table depicts clustered standard errors at the country level in parentheses. Estimated with country fixed effects. \*\*\* p<0.01, \*\* p<0.05, \* p<0.1. |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |

Table O3: NEs and EEs as two dimensions of civic norms (orthogonal rotation)

|  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|   | Variable | Factor 1 | Factor 2 | Uniqueness  |
| NE | Claiming state benefits | 0.5433 | 0.0162 | 0.7046 |
|  | Avoiding a fare | 0.5941 | 0.1261 | 0.6311 |
|  | Cheating on taxes | 0.6794 | 0.0733 | 0.533 |
|  | Accepting a bribe | 0.5902 | 0.0476 | 0.6493 |
|  | Lying in own interest | 0.6245 | 0.0894 | 0.602 |
|  | Littering in public | 0.4851 | 0.0272 | 0.764 |
|  | Driving under influence of alcohol | 0.5183 | 0.0515 | 0.7287 |
|  | Paying cash to avoid taxes | 0.6432 | 0.0917 | 0.5779 |
|  | Speeding in built-up areas | 0.5514 | 0.091 | 0.6877 |
| EE | Claiming state benefits | −0.0024 | 0.4994 | 0.7505 |
|  | Avoiding a fare | 0.0944 | 0.4893 | 0.7517 |
|  | Cheating on taxes | 0.1278 | 0.6186 | 0.601 |
|  | Accepting a bribe | 0.055 | 0.5106 | 0.7363 |
|  | Lying in own interest | 0.1831 | 0.5328 | 0.6826 |
|  | Littering in public | 0.0497 | 0.5186 | 0.7286 |
|  | Driving under influence of alcohol | 0.0111 | 0.4897 | 0.7601 |
|  | Paying cash to avoid taxes | 0.0979 | 0.6046 | 0.6249 |
|   | Speeding in built-up areas | 0.0589 | 0.5531 | 0.6906 |
| Factor outcomes are rotated using an orthogonal rotation. N=13,902.  |

Table O4: The impact of NEs and EEs on trust. Full results

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
|   | Generalized trust (logit) | Generalized trust (odds ratios) |
| VARIABLES | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) |
|   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |
| NE | −0.001 |  | −0.017 | 0.042 | 0.999 |  | 0.983 | 1.043 |
|  | (0.027) |  | (0.026) | (0.075) | (0.027) |  | (0.026) | (0.078) |
| EE |  | 0.306\*\*\* | 0.312\*\*\* | 0.531\* |  | 1.358\*\*\* | 1.367\*\*\* | 1.701\* |
|  |  | (0.049) | (0.050) | (0.288) |  | (0.067) | (0.069) | (0.490) |
| NE\*EE |  |  |  | −0.025 |  |  |  | 0.975 |
|  |  |  |  | (0.032) |  |  |  | (0.031) |
| Age | 0.005\*\*\* | 0.004\*\*\* | 0.004\*\*\* | 0.004\*\*\* | 1.005\*\*\* | 1.004\*\*\* | 1.004\*\*\* | 1.004\*\*\* |
|  | (0.001) | (0.001) | (0.001) | (0.001) | (0.001) | (0.001) | (0.001) | (0.001) |
| Gender (female = 1) | −0.089\*\*\* | −0.095\*\*\* | −0.090\*\*\* | −0.090\*\*\* | 0.915\*\*\* | 0.910\*\*\* | 0.914\*\*\* | 0.914\*\*\* |
|  | (0.031) | (0.032) | (0.031) | (0.031) | (0.028) | (0.029) | (0.028) | (0.028) |
| Highest educational level | 0.159\*\*\* | 0.160\*\*\* | 0.160\*\*\* | 0.160\*\*\* | 1.173\*\*\* | 1.173\*\*\* | 1.173\*\*\* | 1.173\*\*\* |
|  | (0.018) | (0.018) | (0.018) | (0.018) | (0.021) | (0.021) | (0.021) | (0.021) |
| Income level | 0.167\*\*\* | 0.170\*\*\* | 0.169\*\*\* | 0.169\*\*\* | 1.182\*\*\* | 1.186\*\*\* | 1.184\*\*\* | 1.185\*\*\* |
|  | (0.026) | (0.026) | (0.026) | (0.026) | (0.031) | (0.031) | (0.031) | (0.031) |
| Employment (unemployed = 1) | −0.212\*\*\* | −0.212\*\*\* | −0.215\*\*\* | −0.214\*\*\* | 0.809\*\*\* | 0.809\*\*\* | 0.806\*\*\* | 0.807\*\*\* |
|  | (0.059) | (0.059) | (0.058) | (0.058) | (0.048) | (0.048) | (0.047) | (0.047) |
| Marital status (married = 1) | −0.081\*\* | −0.088\*\*\* | −0.085\*\* | −0.086\*\* | 0.922\*\* | 0.915\*\*\* | 0.918\*\* | 0.918\*\* |
|  | (0.034) | (0.033) | (0.034) | (0.034) | (0.032) | (0.030) | (0.031) | (0.031) |
| Number of children | 0.022\*\* | 0.021\*\* | 0.021\*\* | 0.021\*\* | 1.022\*\* | 1.021\*\* | 1.022\*\* | 1.022\*\* |
|  | (0.011) | (0.011) | (0.011) | (0.011) | (0.011) | (0.011) | (0.011) | (0.011) |
| Constant | −1.453\*\*\* | −2.130\*\*\* | −2.010\*\*\* | −2.521\*\*\* | 0.234\*\*\* | 0.119\*\*\* | 0.134\*\*\* | 0.080\*\*\* |
|  | (0.227) | (0.159) | (0.229) | (0.678) | (0.053) | (0.019) | (0.031) | (0.055) |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Observations | 31,285 | 31,285 | 31,285 | 31,285 | 31,285 | 31,285 | 31,285 | 31,285 |
| Pseudo R2 | 0.104 | 0.107 | 0.107 | 0.107 | 0.104 | 0.107 | 0.107 | 0.107 |
| Clustered robust standard errors at the country level in parentheses. Estimated with country fixed effects.  |
| \*\*\* p<0.01, \*\* p<0.05, \* p<0.1. |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |

Table O5 Relation NE and EE conditional upon socio-demographic characteristics (rescaled NE items)

|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|   | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) | (7) | (8) | (9) |
| VARIABLES | Claiming | Avoiding | Cheating | Bribe | Lying | Littering | Driving | Paying cash | Speeding |
| EE: |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |
| Claiming state benefits | 0.066\*\*\* |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
|  | (0.015) |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Avoiding a fare |  | 0.267\*\*\* |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
|  |  | (0.027) |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Cheating on taxes |  |  | 0.191\*\*\* |  |  |  |  |  |  |
|  |  |  | (0.024) |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Accepting a bribe |  |  |  | 0.092\*\*\* |  |  |  |  |  |
|  |  |  |  | (0.017) |  |  |  |  |  |
| Lying in own interest |  |  |  |  | 0.273\*\*\* |  |  |  |  |
|  |  |  |  |  | (0.020) |  |  |  |  |
| Littering in public |  |  |  |  |  | 0.041\*\*\* |  |  |  |
|  |  |  |  |  |  | (0.010) |  |  |  |
| Driving under influence of alcohol |  |  |  |  |  |  | 0.029\*\*\* |  |  |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  | (0.008) |  |  |
| Paying cash to avoid taxes |  |  |  |  |  |  |  | 0.239\*\*\* |  |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  | (0.025) |  |
| Speeding in built-up areas |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  | 0.129\*\*\* |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  | (0.016) |
| Age | 0.005\*\*\* | 0.008\*\*\* | 0.007\*\*\* | 0.004\*\*\* | 0.007\*\*\* | 0.003\*\*\* | 0.002\*\*\* | 0.008\*\*\* | 0.005\*\*\* |
|  | (0.001) | (0.001) | (0.001) | (0.001) | (0.001) | (0.000) | (0.000) | (0.001) | (0.000) |
| Gender (female = 1)  | 0.034\*\*\* | 0.063\*\* | 0.101\*\*\* | 0.050\*\*\* | 0.096\*\*\* | 0.040\*\*\* | 0.058\*\*\* | 0.115\*\*\* | 0.119\*\*\* |
|  | (0.007) | (0.021) | (0.012) | (0.007) | (0.014) | (0.008) | (0.008) | (0.014) | (0.014) |
| Highest educational level | 0.013\*\*\* | 0.004 | 0.011\*\* | 0.009\*\* | 0.013\*\* | 0.007\*\*\* | 0.001 | −0.001 | −0.009\*\* |
|  | (0.003) | (0.009) | (0.004) | (0.004) | (0.005) | (0.002) | (0.001) | (0.004) | (0.003) |
| Income level | 0.008 | −0.017 | −0.014\* | −0.020\* | −0.033\*\* | −0.005 | −0.012\*\*\* | −0.025\*\* | −0.035\*\*\* |
|  | (0.009) | (0.016) | (0.008) | (0.010) | (0.012) | (0.007) | (0.004) | (0.012) | (0.007) |
| Employment (unemployed = 1) | −0.135\*\*\* | −0.052 | −0.092\*\*\* | −0.073\*\* | −0.104\*\* | −0.040\*\*\* | −0.014 | −0.021 | −0.006 |
|  | (0.028) | (0.035) | (0.023) | (0.029) | (0.042) | (0.014) | (0.014) | (0.019) | (0.014) |
| Marital status (married = 1) | 0.060\*\*\* | 0.113\*\*\* | 0.069\*\*\* | 0.041\*\*\* | 0.090\*\*\* | 0.036\*\*\* | 0.035\*\*\* | 0.073\*\*\* | 0.061\*\*\* |
|  | (0.011) | (0.020) | (0.015) | (0.012) | (0.019) | (0.009) | (0.006) | (0.015) | (0.009) |
| Number of children | −0.001 | 0.025\*\*\* | −0.004 | −0.002 | 0.007 | 0.002 | −0.000 | −0.002 | 0.006 |
|  | (0.004) | (0.008) | (0.004) | (0.005) | (0.009) | (0.004) | (0.002) | (0.008) | (0.004) |
| Constant | 3.242\*\*\* | 2.385\*\*\* | 2.748\*\*\* | 3.354\*\*\* | 2.439\*\*\* | 3.322\*\*\* | 3.711\*\*\* | 2.302\*\*\* | 3.196\*\*\* |
|  | (0.059) | (0.121) | (0.075) | (0.063) | (0.087) | (0.042) | (0.027) | (0.075) | (0.047) |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Observations | 29,940 | 14,811 | 30,481 | 16,965 | 16,234 | 31,575 | 31,611 | 28,884 | 31,454 |
| R-squared | 0.101 | 0.173 | 0.113 | 0.080 | 0.142 | 0.067 | 0.039 | 0.126 | 0.120 |
| The nine columns show the regression results for nine separate regression models, in which the dependent variable is the NE for a particular behavioural R and the independent variable of interest is the EE for the same behavioural rule R. The table depicts clustered standard errors at the country level in parentheses. Estimated with country fixed effects. \*\*\* p<0.01, \*\* p<0.05, \* p<0.1. |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |

Table O6: NEs and EEs as two dimensions of civic norms (rescaled NE items)

|  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | Variable | Factor 1 | Factor 2 | Uniqueness  |
| NE | Claiming state benefits | 0.51 | −0.06 | 0.75 |
|  | Avoiding a fare | 0.54 | 0.06 | 0.69 |
|  | Cheating on taxes | 0.67 | −0.01 | 0.55 |
|  | Accepting a bribe | 0.55 | −0.02 | 0.71 |
|  | Lying in own interest | 0.60 | 0.01 | 0.63 |
|  | Littering in public | 0.41 | −0.02 | 0.83 |
|  | Driving under influence of alcohol | 0.45 | 0.00 | 0.80 |
|  | Paying cash to avoid taxes | 0.63 | 0.01 | 0.60 |
|  | Speeding in built-up areas | 0.49 | 0.03 | 0.75 |
| EE | Claiming state benefits | −0.07 | 0.51 | 0.75 |
|  | Avoiding a fare | 0.03 | 0.49 | 0.75 |
|  | Cheating on taxes | 0.04 | 0.62 | 0.60 |
|  | Accepting a bribe | −0.01 | 0.51 | 0.74 |
|  | Lying in own interest | 0.10 | 0.53 | 0.69 |
|  | Littering in public | −0.04 | 0.53 | 0.73 |
|  | Driving under influence of alcohol | −0.05 | 0.50 | 0.76 |
|  | Paying cash to avoid taxes | 0.01 | 0.61 | 0.63 |
|  | Speeding in built-up areas | −0.04 | 0.57 | 0.69 |
| Factor outcomes are rotated using an oblique rotation. N=13,902.  |

Table O7: Multilevel analyses of trust. Full results

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
|   | Generalized trust (multilevel logit) |
| VARIABLES | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) |
|   |   |   |   |   |
| NE | −0.001 |  | −0.018 | 0.040 |
|  | (0.011) |  | (0.011) | (0.048) |
| EE |  | 0.309\*\*\* | 0.315\*\*\* | 0.528\*\*\* |
|  |  | (0.031) | (0.031) | (0.176) |
| NE\*EE |  |  |  | −0.025 |
|  |  |  |  | (0.020) |
| Age | 0.005\*\*\* | 0.004\*\*\* | 0.004\*\*\* | 0.004\*\*\* |
|  | (0.001) | (0.001) | (0.001) | (0.001) |
| Gender (female = 1) | −0.089\*\*\* | −0.095\*\*\* | −0.090\*\*\* | −0.090\*\*\* |
|  | (0.027) | (0.027) | (0.027) | (0.027) |
| Highest educational level | 0.159\*\*\* | 0.159\*\*\* | 0.159\*\*\* | 0.159\*\*\* |
|  | (0.007) | (0.007) | (0.007) | (0.007) |
| Income level | 0.167\*\*\* | 0.170\*\*\* | 0.169\*\*\* | 0.169\*\*\* |
|  | (0.019) | (0.019) | (0.019) | (0.019) |
| Employment (unemployed = 1) | −0.213\*\*\* | −0.214\*\*\* | −0.217\*\*\* | −0.217\*\*\* |
|  | (0.056) | (0.057) | (0.057) | (0.057) |
| Marital status (married = 1) | −0.082\*\*\* | −0.090\*\*\* | −0.086\*\*\* | −0.087\*\*\* |
|  | (0.030) | (0.030) | (0.031) | (0.031) |
| Number of children | 0.022\* | 0.021\* | 0.021\* | 0.022\* |
|  | (0.011) | (0.011) | (0.011) | (0.011) |
| Constant | −2.089\*\*\* | −2.801\*\*\* | −2.680\*\*\* | −3.178\*\*\* |
|  | (0.181) | (0.169) | (0.187) | (0.448) |
|  |  |  |  |  |
| Observations | 31,285 | 31,285 | 31,285 | 31,285 |
| Number of groups | 31 | 31 | 31 | 31 |
| Standard errors in parentheses. \*\*\* p<0.01, \*\* p<0.05, \* p<0.1. |
|  |  |  |  |  |