**Appendix I: Operationalization of the Dependent Variable and Aggregation Rules**

1. Prevention Provisions

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| --- | --- |
| Dimensions |  Indicators and values |
|  High = 2 |  Low = 1 |  Non-existent = 0 |
| **Obligation** | * Binding due to document type
* Binding due to wording
 | * Non-binding due to document type
* Non-binding due to wording
 | * No provisions
 |
| **Precision** | * Detailed specification
 | * Some specification
 | * No specification
 |
| **Scope** | * Comprehensive
 | * Limited
 | * No provisions
 |
| **Addressee** | * All actors involved in policy design and implementation
 | * Some actors involved in policy design and implementation
 | * No provisions
 |
| **Compliance management** | * Demanding monitoring provisions
* Significant capacity-building
* Mandatory training provisions
 | * Superficial monitoring provisions
* Sparse capacity-building
* Non-mandatory training provisions
 | * No monitoring provisions
* No capacity-building
* No training provisions
 |
| **Mainstreaming** | * All or most applications of the policy covered
 | * Only a few applications of the policy covered
 | * No provisions
 |

1. Complaints provisions

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| Dimensions |  Indicators and Values |
|  High = 2 |  Low = 1 |  Non-existent = 0 |
| **Delegation** | * Independent assessment of complaints
* Independent decision making
 | * Partisan assessment of complaints
* Partisan decision making
 | * No provisions
 |
| **Obligation** | * Body authorized to take binding decisions
* Decisions binding due to wording
 | * Body authorized to take non-binding decisions
* Decisions non-binding due to wording
 | * No provisions
 |
| **Complainant** | * Aggrieved individual can file complaint
 | * Complaints can be filed by third parties only
 | * No provisions
 |
| **Accessibility** | * High transparency
* Central and non-central submission of complaints
 | * Low transparency
* Only central submission of complaints
 | * No provisions
 |
| **Remedy** | * Appropriate punishment and compensation
 | * Inappropriate punishment and compensation
 | * No remedy
 |
| **Mainstreaming** | * All or most applications of the policy covered
 | * Only a few applications of the policy covered
 | * No provisions
 |

1. Aggregation Rules

The evolution of human rights protection provisions is traced in each IO over time. We start in the year in which protection provisions were first introduced and we end in 2012. For each year, we create an aggregate value that can range from 0 to 2. We label protection provisions with aggregate values between 0.5 and 1.0 limited protection provisions, while we call protection provisions with an aggregate value above 1.0 comprehensive protection provisions. Generating the aggregate values involves two steps. First, we determine the values of the prevention provisions and the complaints provisions independently. To this end, we allocate to each dimension of the prevention (and complaint) provisions annual values, namely the values 2, 1 or 0. In cases in which the values of the indicators of a dimension differ, a dimension can also be assigned the value 1.5 or 0.5. Based on this, we estimate the annual average value of the provisions by aggregating the values of the individual dimensions. That means that the aggregate value of an IO’s prevention provisions in a given year is, for example, 1.4 if the values 2, 1.5, 1.5, 1, 0 and 1 have been assigned to the six dimensions. Second, we estimate the overall annual values of the provisions. We do this by aggregating the average value for each year of the prevention and complaints provisions. The following example illustrates this procedure: If, for a given year, the value of the prevention provisions is 1.4 and the value of the complaint provisions is 0.6, then the overall value of the human rights protection provisions for that year is 1.

In the process of assigning values, we acknowledge that human rights protection provisions in IOs frequently comprise both general provisions that cover the policy instrument as a whole (e.g., sanctions policy as such) and tailored provisions that cover merely specific applications of the policy (e.g., the sanctions regime against Myanmar). Tailored provisions tend to reach higher values compared to general provisions. It may also be that tailored provisions come first and general provisions are only introduced at a later stage. For these reasons, it would be misleading to merely take into account general provisions and neglect tailored provisions that apply to specific applications of a policy only. We therefore generate for each year the average value of general and tailored provisions. If, for example, in a given year the value of the general prevention provisions is 1.2 and the value of the tailored prevention provisions is 1.6, we determine the value of the prevention provisions for that year to be 1.4.[[1]](#footnote-1) We only deviate from this rule in cases in which there are binding general and binding tailored provisions with the general provisions reaching a higher value than the tailored provisions. In these cases, we consider only the value of the general provisions, recognizing that binding general provisions are by definition imperative for each application of the policy.

1. In cases in which different tailored provisions with different values that apply to different applications of a policy exist side by side – if, for example, the provisions of the UN’s Myanmar sanctions regime reach the value 1.5 and the provisions of its Iran sanctions regime reach the value 0.9 – we merely consider the tailored provisions with the highest value. Obviously, this value is not representative of all tailored provisions. This is compensated, however, by assigning a low value in the mainstreaming dimension. [↑](#footnote-ref-1)