ONLINE APPENDIX for "The Politics of Time"

Appendix A: Tabular presentation of statistical results for RCV models

Main party RCV results

Table A1

*Tabular Presentation of Figure 1 in the Main Text, Logit Models of 65 Roll Call Votes 1882–1940*

Party	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Liberals	0.54***	0.51***	0.56***	0.64***
	(26.01)	(18.58)	(20.36)	(17.25)
Social-Liberals	0.043	0.0016	0.059	0.084
	(1.61)	(0.04)	(1.46)	(0.73)
Farmers	0.94***	0.88***	0.83***	0.87***
	(32.86)	(23.51)	(21.04)	(19.36)
Kristelig Folkeparti	0.86***	0.82***	0.91***	0.88***
	(12.16)	(9.59)	(10.06)	(8.92)
Samfundspartiet	0.32	0.34	0.30	0.33
	(1.01)	(1.20)	(1.05)	(0.99)
Conservatives	0.89***	0.87***	0.92***	0.91***
	(68.96)	(32.79)	(34.01)	(28.24)
No_Party	0.83***	0.76***	0.88***	0.88***
	(10.27)	(8.50)	(8.28)	(7.16)
Constant	0.015*	0.082	0.015	-0.046
	(2.49)	(1.52)	(0.20)	(-0.38)
Fixed effects				
Election district	No	No	No	Yes
RCV	No	No	Yes	Yes
Occupation	No	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	4,194	4,190	4,190	4190
R^2	0.388	0.404	0.519	0.595

Note. *T* statistics in parentheses; Occupational, education, election district, and RCV dummies are excluded for ease of presentation.

*p = .xx; ***p = .xx.

Figure A1

Only RCV on Restrictions on Work Hours

Note. Results from a series of linear probability models with standard errors clustered by person for 21 roll call votes between 1880 and 1940 (tabular presentation in Table A2). All models are nested, with subsequent models including the above specifications.

Table A2

Models Restricted to 21 Roll Call Votes For or Against Hour Reductions

Party	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Liberals	0.540***	0.5100***	0.560***	0.640***
	(26.010)	(18.5800)	(20.360)	(17.250)
Social-Liberals	0.043	0.0016	0.059	0.084
	(1.610)	(0.0400)	(1.460)	(0.730)
Farmers	0.940***	0.8800***	0.830***	0.870***
	(32.860)	(23.5100)	(21.040)	(19.360)
Kristelig Folkeparti	0.860***	0.8200***	0.910***	0.880***
	(12.160)	(9.5900)	(10.060)	(8.920)
Samfundspartiet	0.320	0.3400	0.300	0.330
	(1.010)	(1.2000)	(1.050)	(0.990)
Conservatives	0.809***	0.8700***	0.920***	0.910***
	(68.960)	(32.7900)	(34.010)	(28.240)
No Party	0.830***	0.7600***	0.880***	0.880***
	(10.270)	(8.5000)	(8.280)	(7.160)
Constant	0.015*	0.0820	0.015	-0.046
	(2.490)	(1.5200)	(0.200)	(-0.380)
Fixed effects				
Election district	No	No	No	Yes
RCV	No	No	Yes	Yes
Occupation	No	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	4,194	4,190	4,190	4,190
R^2	0.388	0.404	0.519	0.595

Note. T statistics in parentheses; occupational, education, election district, and RCV dummies are excluded for ease of presentation. *p = .xx; ***p = .xx.

Figure A2

Within Liberal Results

Note. Results from a series of linear probability models with standard errors clustered by person for 65 roll call votes between 1880 and 1940 (tabular presentation in Table A3). All models are nested, with subsequent models including the above specifications.

Table A3

Probability of a Liberal Member of Parliament (MP) Voting Against a Working-Time RCV

MP	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Agrarian Society	0.17**	0.15*	0.0059			
	(2.72)	(2.24)	(0.10)			
City				-0.17***	-0.14**	-0.14*
				(-4.17)	(-2.61)	(-2.53)
Constant	0.55***	1.00**	0.39	0.60***	1.14***	0.54***
	(50.02)	(2.90)	(1.31)	(27.37)	(21.24)	(4.87)
Fixed effects						
RCV	No	No	Yes	No	No	Yes
Occupation	No	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	Yes
Observations	2,078	2,078	2,078	2,078	2,078	2,078
R^2	0.004	0.050	0.386	0.022	0.056	0.394

Note. *T* statistics in parentheses; occupational, education, election district, and RCV dummies are excluded for ease of presentation. *p = .xx; ***p = .xx.

Appendix B: Percentage of working time proposals for or against the status quo in percentage of total party proposals (1880–1940)

Party	For status qou and/or restrictions in coverage	Hour decrease and/or coverage for new groups
Social Democrats	0	100
	-	(80)
Liberals	50	50
	(23)	(53)
Social Liberals	0	100
	-	(100)
Farmers	100	0
	(100)	-
Christian Democrats	100	0
	(100)	(0)
Conservatives	94	6
	(75)	(100)
No party	50	50
	(100)	(100)
Total	47	53
	(35)	(65)

Note. Percentage of proposals in specific category that failed to gain majority are shown in parentheses.

Appendix C: Country-level measurement, specification and results

For the country-level analysis, I used original data collected on the normal regulated hours of work, the primary focus of most working-time reforms. Normal hours of work are defined as the number of hours an employee can work before further work is defined as overtime (which may or may not be regulated). It is therefore not maximum hours (normal hours + allowed overtime). Most countries define their labor laws in weekly terms, although some use daily restrictions. When that was the case, I followed Madisson (1991) in calculating the number of weekly hours allowed given a 5-day workweek. This underestimates the amount of work allowed in countries before adoption of the English week in the early 20th century (Huberman & Minns, 2007).[1] The principle sources were the International Labour Organization's (ILO, various dates) Legislative Series and their (various dates) hours of work reports. After 2000, observatories on industrial relations were used for European countries and the ILO's Travail and Natlex databases for non-European countries. Because there is no accepted way of coding regulated normal working time in the absence of such a law, I assigned unregulated countries 72 hours (the hours prescribed in the *first* working-time law). However, this is far from a perfect solution. I therefore ran additional measures of whether a country adopted a working-time law or reforms that reduced hours.

To measure government partisanship, I followed Scheve and Stasavage (2009) in constructing a dummy variable, *left executive*, equal to 1 if the head of government (prime minister or president) is from a left party each year, 0 otherwise. I included a dummy variable of whether the head of government is Christian or comes from a party with a *religious* platform. I did the same for center

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[1] The extent of this bias depends on the number of laws enacted before the English week became standard. Because few universal laws regulating working time existed before the introduction of the English week, this is unlikely to bias the estimates.

parties to capture liberal and social-liberal parties. The data and classifications are from Brambor et al. (2014). However, although most executives included are members of liberal parties, other parties are also included, meaning this is not a perfect measure of liberal parties. For example, several agrarian parties are coded as *center*. I therefore showed that the results are robust by including a dummy that takes the value 1 if a center executive is from an agrarian party. I expect more left, center, and religious executives than *right* executives to be associated with reductions in hours (following H2, H3/H8, H9, and H5).

It's important to highlight that these measures of party influence are a mere proxy for party families, only capturing the ideological affinity of the executive in rather broad categories. The choice of measures has her been restricted by data available, with party-datasets being restricted to the post 1945 period for a few set of countries.

Countries differs in numerous ways because of factors such as national culture (e.g., law, culture, and governing traditions), climate, and available resources. Because these and other country-specific factors also might correlate with the likelihood to reduce hours through law, I included a set of country dummies. I included only a conservative set of controls, controlling for the levels of wealth, urbanization, and trade integration because previous research had linked all these to the demand for working-time reforms (Huberman, 2004; Huberman & Minns, 2007). Wealth is measured as gross domestic product (GDP) per capita (log), urbanization as the percentage of the population in urban areas, and trade as the sum of exports and imports. Data is taken from the V-dem dataset (Coppedge et al., 2020).

In the period under study, several countries became democracies or reverted to autocracy. This presented a problem because my theory is focused primarily on explaining politics under democratic regimes. To control for regime changes, I restricted the sample to countries scored as democratic on

Boix et al.'s (2013) dichotomous measure of democracy. A country scored as democratic if it had free and fair elections and over half of the male population was eligible to vote. The sample is therefore constituted by the following 32 countries: Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, Mexico, Sweden, Switzerland, Japan, Colombia, Brazil, USA, Portugal, Bolivia, Peru, Argentina, Canada, Australia, Chile, Costa Rica, Ecuador, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Netherlands, Spain, United Kingdom, Uruguay, Greece, New Zealand, Norway, and Paraguay.

To ensure a combination of variables did not determine my results, I first ran a set of sparse models with only the primary explanatory factors. I then sequentially built the models, with each subsequent model including the controls from the previous models. Model 5 in figure C1 below presents the results from the following regression:

$$
\begin{aligned}
NormalHours_{it} \\
&= \beta_0 + \beta_1 Left_{it} + \beta_2 Center_{it} + \beta_3 Religious_{it} + \beta_3 Urbanization_{it} \\
&+ \beta_3 GDP_{it} + \beta_3 Trade\ (export\ and\ imports)_{it} + \beta_3 country\ dummies_i \\
&+ \beta_4 year\ trend_t + \varepsilon_{it}
\end{aligned}
$$

Results

Figure C1 summarizes the results for the main regressions on the number of normal weekly hours for 32 democracies between 1870 and 2010. Model 1 shows the effect of the main explanatory variables, with right executives being the reference category; Model 2 controls for GDP (log) and urbanization (percentage of urban population); Model 3 controls for the level of trade integration (import and exports); Model 4 adds country dummies to capture unique national factors; and Model 5 adds a linear year trend to de-trend the series.

Figure C1

Differences in Predicted Weekly Working Time by Executives' Ideology and Religion Compared to a Conservative Secular Executive

Note. Results from a series of ordinary least squares models with panel-corrected standard errors for 32 countries between 1880 and 2010 (tabular presentation in table C1). All models are nested, with subsequent models including the above specifications and restricted to democracies. FE indicates fixed effects.

The estimated decrease in hours following a left-oriented executive is 7.6 hours in Model 1, a substantial association if taken at face value. The coefficient estimate is sensitive to modeling decisions, however, and is especially correlated with country-specific factors. However, the association is still significant even in the most conservative models. The implied association between a center executive and hours is weaker than that of a left executive in Model 1. However, it is less sensitive to modeling decisions. A religious head of government is significantly and substantially associated with lower hours but, in line with the left results, the size of the coefficient declines as we add controls. In the final

model, the confidence interval of the three groups overlaps, meaning that if we trust this conservative model, center, religious and left executives differ from right executives by 2 to 3 hours.

This measurement model assigns 72 hours as a standard for unregulated economies. This design suffers from one especially pertinent flaw in that early reforms are assigned greater weight than later (especially if the assigned 72 hours were higher than actual hours, if they are higher the approach undervalues the impact of the reform). Why? a country with no regulating while score 72 hours even if worked hours are considerably lower. Since the first law for most countries tend to be around 48 hours, first laws will therefore have an impact of 24 hours. Later reforms will tend to be smaller, of about 2-4-8 hours reductions (e.g., going from 48 to 40). Its therefore easy to see how this arbitrary choice of 72 hours may end up assigning greater weight to early/first reforms compared to later ones. However, it's not also easy to get away from assigning an arbitrary hour number if we want to run a regression including both the first reforms and later reforms using the same scale.

I therefore constructed a measure that captured whether a country was experiencing a reform that reduced hours. This measure takes the value 1 if the country implemented a working-hour reform in a specific year and 0 if not. I also was interested in which parties introduced the first working-time laws; therefore, I constructed a measure taking 1 if the country was adopting its first law and 0 if not.

The results presented in Figure C2 are quite interesting. The first part of the figure shows the results predicting the probability of introducing a reform that reduced work hours. The second part shows the probability of introducing a working-time law. First, left executives were not only most likely to carry out working-time reforms, but also to adopt a first law. Center parties, with the caveats noted before, were positively associated with both reforms and first laws, but these results are significantly associated only with a first law, and the result is not robust. It should be noted that if we accept greater

uncertainty, the center coefficient is significant at the 10% level. The results for religious executives differ from those observed in the previous models:

Figure C2

Differences in Predicted Probabilities of Adopting a Reform or Introducing a First Working-Time Law by Executives' Ideology and Religion Compared to a Conservative Secular Executive

Note. Results from a series of linear probability models with panel-corrected standard errors for 32 democracies between 1880 and 2010 (tabular presentation in C2). All models are nested, with subsequent models including the above specifications and restricted to democracies. FE indicates fixed effects.

This indicates that the association between religious executives and working hours is a result of religious parties introducing the first laws, for which this measurement model assigned stronger weight than later changes. However, they were not more likely than right executives to reduce hours after the initial reforms. That is, together with the left, religious parties may have led the charge that broke the dam, but after that. only the left decisively adopted further reforms.

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Additional robustness tests indicated these results were similar when replacing the uniform time trend with individual country-specific trends. However, the inclusion of year-specific effects rendered the main results insignificant. We therefore cannot rule out the role of common shocks, such as technology adoption or international wars, in driving some observed results. I also created a dummy of agrarian center parties to detangle the effects of agrarianism that might be captured in Brambor et. al.'s (2014) center classifications. This measure was not encompassing enough to work as an agrarianism indicator but should take away confounding factors in the center measure arising from Farmers being classified as center. However, including it as a control did not substantially affect the center coefficient.

Tabular presentation of country-level results

Table C1

Tabular Presentation of Figure 3 in Main Text: Linear Regression, Correlated Panel/Corrected Standard Errors for 32 Countries

Party	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Left	-7.67***	-6.61***	-5.81***	-3.03***	-1.83***
	(-11.24)	(-10.16)	(-8.74)	(-5.89)	(-4.30)
Center	-1.39**	-2.09***	-2.23***	-1.95***	-0.94**
	(-2.79)	(-4.41)	(-4.54)	(-4.47)	(-2.94)
Religious	-5.17***	-4.76***	-3.90***	-3.30***	-2.30***
	(-9.75)	(-8.86)	(-7.05)	(-4.92)	(-4.65)
Country dummies	No	No	No	Yes	Yes
Year trend	No	No	No	No	Yes
Urbanization and GDP	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Exports and imports	No	No	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	2,655	2,307	2,150	2,150	2,150
R^2	0.078	0.266	0.247	0.595	0.711

Note. T statistics in parentheses. $*p < 0.05$, $**p < 0.01$, $***p < 0.001$.

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Adopting a reform or introducing a first working-time law

Table C2

Tabular Presentation of Figure B1, Linear Probability Models with Panel-Corrected Standard Errors on Adopting a Working-Time Reform Reducing Hours for 32 Democracies between 1880 and 2010

Variable	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Left	0.0230**	0.0330***	0.0330**	0.0330**
	(2.7800)	(3.4100)	(3.1800)	(3.2000)
Center	0.0110	0.0130	0.0180	0.0180
	(1.5900)	(1.6500)	(1.9200)	(1.9200)
Religious	-0.0034	-0.0028	0.0093	0.0093
	(-0.4000)	(-0.3400)	(0.7300)	(0.7200)
Constant	0.0150**	0.0210	-0.0360	-0.0340
	(3.0400)	(1.6100)	(-0.8600)	(-0.0600)
Country dummy	No	No	Yes	Yes
Year trend	No	No	No	Yes
Urbanization and GDP	No	Yes	Yes	Yes
Exports and imports	No	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	2,655	2,150	2,150	2,150
R^2	0.004	0.008	0.027	0.027

Note. T statistics in parentheses. $*p < 0.05$, $**p < 0.01$, $***p < 0.001$.

Table C3

Tabular Presentation of Figure B2, Linear Probability Models with Panel-Corrected Standard Errors on Introduction of a First Working-Time Law for 32 Democracies between 1880 and 2010

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Left	0.260***	0.210***	0.120***	0.0720***
	(11.600)	(8.790)	(5.970)	(4.4600)
Center	0.069***	0.098***	0.044*	0.0066
	(3.770)	(5.050)	(2.520)	(0.4900)
Religious	0.210***	0.170***	0.130***	0.0960***
	(11.360)	(7.650)	(5.020)	(4.7900)
Constant	0.670***	0.480***	0.140	-20.6000***
	(28.770)	(12.430)	(1.550)	(-22.7200)
Country dummies	No	No	Yes	Yes
Year trend	No	No	No	Yes
Urbanization and GDP	No	Yes	Yes	Yes
Exports and imports	No	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	2,655	2,150	2,150	2,150
R^2	0.077	0.133	0.514	0.642

Note. *T* statistics in parentheses; occupational, education, election district, and RCV dummies are excluded for ease of presentation. $*p < 0.05$, $**p < 0.01$, $***p < 0.001$.

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Appendix D. Development of and Proposals for Changing Norwegian Working-Time Restrictions

This section provides a short overview over the various working time reforms undertaken in the period under study.

The Norwegian experience with working time reforms exemplifies the typical European pattern of regulating work (Messenger et al. 2007). Prior to 1915, hours were regulated for only specific small occupations, such as various public workers (railways, military factories) and especially night work and regular hours in bakeries. Even for these small occupations, the question of whether to allow regulated hours was highly politicized. Postponement votes that stopped legislation to reduce or increase hours plagued legislative efforts during the 1880s and 1890s.

The first decisive proposal for a normal working day originated from Liberal Worker Societies and Trade unions. In 1885, the third meeting of Worker Societies in Kristiania, later supported by trade unions, demanded a 10-hour day for all factory and craftworkers. When unions in Norway turned to parliament to enact the eight-hour day, it was a direct result of their inability to achieve desired breakthroughs in negotiations with employers. The worker proposals were incorporated into the duties of the "Worker Commission of 1885," the first major parliamentary initiative to introduce a general working-time law. Proposals for the 8- or 10-hour day were seriously considered; the majority opted for a 10-hour day. However, even with the commission's proposal at hand, most attempts to implement regulations either failed in parliamentary commissions or died during voting on the parliamentary floor. The Conservative government dropped the normal hour restriction in its proposal for a Factory Act in 1890. The Liberal proposal of 1892 also failed to include provisions to regulate hours for adults but, after

several parliamentary votes, restricted daily hours for children between 12 and 14 years old to 6 hours and for children between 14 and 18 years old to 10 hours. The working-hours question was then pursued only for occupations with extreme hours, such as bakers. The young—but soon-to-be PM—Liberal, Gunnar Knudsen, tried to break the standstill by proposing hours be regulated for commercial workers in 1897; his proposal was defeated in a suspension vote.

During the early 1900s, various attempts were made to regulate hours by amending the factory act. However, Conservatives' and Liberals' government initiative was lacking, and union and Social Liberal initiatives fell by the wayside. The Social Liberal Johan Castberg complained in 1902 that the question of regulating hours had been on the political agenda for 17 years, and nothing of substance had been done. Casteberg would make several attempts to remedy the situation with two major revisions of the Factory Act—the first in 1909 and the latter in 1914. The first, responding to union demands in 1907 for an eight-hour day, tried but failed to limit the hours to nine. A Liberal government reworked the 1914 social–liberal proposal. In 1915, it proposed restricting hours to 10 per day and 58 per week, with implementation in 1920. The act passed against parliamentary opposition (documented further in the next section).

How radical were the 1909/1915 proposals? Did they reify existing conditions on the ground, or did they attempt to shift hours worked down? Comparable statistics are not available, but an oversight compiled in 1887 reported that only 1.1 percent of workers had daily hours equal to or below nine. In 1909, only 0.6 percent of workers in noncontinuous factories worked less than 48 hours, and only 2.0 percent worked 48 to 50 hours, with 79 percent working 55 to 60 hours. In the cellulose factories, 80 percent of workers worked 58 to 60 hours a week (statistics available in Ot. prp. 35 1914: 71–91). In sum, proposals would have had drastic impacts on most workers' daily lives.

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In 1918, the Liberal government, facing the largest strike wave in Norwegian history, proposed allowing the government to set maximum hours to eight per day *as it wished*. Various proposals for an *actual* eight-hour law were made in commission and the parliamentary floor, but all fell on the parliamentary floor. Facing stiff opposition and demands for further action, the government moved to have the Worker Protection Commission of 1915 formulate a proposal for an eight-hour law to be presented the next year. In 1919, following increased labor radicalization, an even-greater strike wave, and the formation of soldier and worker councils, a 48-hour workweek finally passed parliament by acclamation in both chambers of parliament (Rasmussen and Knutsen in press). However, Socialists still called RCVs to extend the law's reach to other sectors, such as commercial workers, and remove firm-size restrictions. Their attempts were defeated.

The 1920s marked a standstill on working-time regulation. This was somewhat surprising because the Worker Protection Commission had outlined proposals for a total reworking of the Factory Act of 1915. However, the context had decisively changed with the decline of trade union strength—decisive strikes ended in failures, and farmers, whose support was needed to form a government, emerged as an independent party. Only during the 1930s were further reforms considered. In 1936, the new Labor government put forward a worker protection law that the Liberal Party had prepared before vacating the government offices. Although the parties agreed in principle on the new legislation, the scope of the law was expanded to all mainland wageworkers, introducing paid vacation and increased employment protection. The act was met with staunch opposition on several issues, including overtime- and night-work restrictions. The act passed through parliament through a combination of Labor and Liberal party votes, with Conservatives and Farmers voicing strong protests to the most widespread proposals.

The final major law prior to the German invasion in 1940 was the 1939 Law of Working Time for Seafarers. Especially impactful for a seafaring nation such as Norway, the law originated from the ILO's work on securing a convention for seafarers with intra-Nordic coordination but faced stiff opposition in parliament on the following issues: (1) At what level of tonnage would the working-time regulations apply? Should domestic seafaring be limited to a (2) 70-hour or (3) 63-hour workweek? Conservatives wanted higher work hours and restricted coverage. The Social Democrats and parts of the Liberals defeated their proposals.

To summarize: the Norwegian regulation of working time, though pursued by trade unions from the 1880s, was voted in by parliament only in 1919, with extensions in 1936 for paid vacation and increased employment protection and in1939 for Law of working time for seafarers. On these occasions, the regulatory changes were pushed through by Labour and the Liberal Party, and opposed by the Conservatives and eventually the Farmers party.

Appendix E. Short historical presentation of the formation of Norwegian political parties

Although initially a two-party system consisting of Liberals (Venstre, 1884–) and Conservatives (Høire, 1884–), defections from the Liberal Party, such as the conservative Free-Minded Liberal Party (1909–) and religious Moderate Liberals (Moderate Venstre, 1888–1906) broke up the existing order. In 1905, an attempt was made to re-create a two-party system by forming an anti-socialist party in the Coalition Party (1903–1909). A failure at the outset, with effective representation of the Labor (Arbeiderpartiet, 1887) party in 1903 and a Social Liberal (Arbeiderdemokratene, 1903–1940) party, the Coalition party was short-lived. In the 1910s, the Liberal party, supported in governing coalition with the Social liberals, would dominate. Farmer interests were organized in the Agrarian society (Landmandsforbund, 1896–), with Liberal and Conservative MPs co-signing their electoral manifesto and a "farmers group" operating in parliament. In 1918, the agrarian society managed to have its independent candidates elected. With the adoption of proportional representation the following year, the Farmer Party (Bondepartiet, 1921–) was formed, winning 11 percent of all mandates in the first election under the new rules. Subsequently, the 1920s to 1935 was a period of Conservative and Liberal governments (interrupted only by a week-long socialist government in 1927) supported by the Farmers. In the early 1930s, Farmers entered government alone (1931–1933). In 1935, Farmers and the labor party (united with the social democrats after a party split in 1919, but still lacking the Communist party that broke out in 1923) undertook the famous "cow trade," in which Farmers would support the 1935 Labor budget (Huber and Stephens 2001: 118-119). At the same time, the Christian Democrats (Kristendemokratene, 1933–) entered the scene, completing the party system that would exist until the 1960s (Rokkan 1987).