**Towards a Theory of Minority-Party Influence in the U.S. Congress:**

**Whip Counts, Amendment Votes, and Minority Leverage in the House**

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**Abstract**

The literature on congressional decision-making has largely ignored the influence of the minority party in the legislative process. This follows from the widely held belief that the majority party dominates the agenda-setting process. Though the minority party rarely achieves major policy success in Congress, we argue that the minority has significantly more influence over the legislative agenda than is commonly believed. We posit that, under some conditions, the minority has enough bargaining leverage to get floor votes on their proposals, in the form of both amendments and bills. We test our theoretical expectations with a novel design utilizing whip count data from the House and show that when a whip count on a bill occurs, the likelihood of a minority amendment disappointment and a majority amendment roll increases, respectively. This suggests that the more leverage the minority party has, the more we see their legislative proposals on the floor.

**Online Appendices**

**for**

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**Appendix A: Summary Statistics**

**Table A1: Summary Statistics**

|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|   | **Mean** | **St. Dev.** | **Min** | **Max** | **N** |
|  Whip | .205 | .404 | 0 | 1 | 1630 |
|  Majority Roll | .261 | .44 | 0 | 1 | 1630 |
|  Minority Disappointment | .461 | .499 | 0 | 1 | 1630 |
|  Days in Session | 178.704 | 81.093 | 1 | 353 | 1630 |
|  Difference Party Ideology | .653 | .071 | .549 | .786 | 1630 |
|  Difference Party Size | 80.391 | 43.813 | 12 | 158 | 1630 |
|  President Position | .905 | .293 | 0 | 1 | 1630 |
|  Divided Government | .739 | .44 | 0 | 1 | 1630 |
|  Party Unity | .471 | .10 | .284 | .664 | 1630 |
|  Symbolic & Procedural | .018 | .134 | 0 | 1 | 1630 |
|  Appropriations | .266 | .442 | 0 | 1 | 1630 |
|  Defense | .072 | .258 | 0 | 1 | 1630 |
|  Foreign Policy | .085 | .279 | 0 | 1 | 1630 |
|  Economy, Taxes, & Budget | .146 | .353 | 0 | 1 | 1630 |
|  Energy & Environment | .107 | .309 | 0 | 1 | 1630 |
|  Gov. Op., Civil Rights, & Justice | .114 | .318 | 0 | 1 | 1630 |
|  Welfare & Human Services | .097 | .296 | 0 | 1 | 1630 |
|  Miscellaneous Domestic | .161 | .367 | 0 | 1 | 1630 |

**Appendix B: Alternative Model Specifications and Robustness Checks**

**Table B1: Summary Statistics for Variations of the Dependent and Explanatory Variables**

|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  |   |  **Mean** |  **St. Dev.** |  **Min** |  **Max** |  **N** |
| *Whip Counts* |  Whip | .205 | .404 | 0 | 1 | 1630 |
|  Question Count | 1.847 | 1.300 | 1 | 14 | 334 |
|  Poll Count | 1.317 | 2.826 | 1 | 33 | 334 |
| *Majority Rolls* |  Binary | .261 | .440 | 0 | 1 | 1630 |
|  Proportion | .124 | .269 | 0 | 1 | 1630 |
|  Count | .365 | .750 | 0 | 7 | 1630 |
| *Minority Disappointments* |  Binary | .461 | .499 | 0 | 1 | 1630 |
|  Proportion | .290 | .386 | 0 | 1 | 1630 |
|  Count | .853 | 1.489 | 0 | 28 | 1630 |

Note: Table A1 displays the summary statistics for variations of our main explanatory variable (whip count) and dependent variables (majority rolls and minority disappoint). These variables are included in Table A2 - Table A5. We include three variations of our main explanatory variables for whip counts: (a) *Whip* is coded as 1 if whip count is conducted on a given bill, and 0 otherwise, (b) *Question Count* is coded as the number of questions where there were whip counts for on a given bill (c) *Poll Count* is coded as the number of polls taken across all questions associated with a given bill. We include three variations of our main dependent variables for majority rolls and minority disappointments: (a) *binary* is coded as 1 if, for a given bill, there was at least 1 amendment where there was a majority roll (minority disappointment) and the majority of Southern Democrats voted against the minority party, and 0 otherwise, (b)  *Proportion* is the proportion of amendments for which there was a majority roll (minority disappointment) and the majority of southern democrats voted against the minority party for a given bill, and (c) *Count* is the number of amendments for which there was a majority roll (minority disappointment) and the majority of southern democrats voted against the minority party for a given bill.

**Table B2: Predicting Minority Amendment Disappointments, While Varying Key Explanatory Variable**

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | **Model 1** | **Model 2** | **Model 3** |
| Whip | 0.1094\*\*\* |  |  |
|  | (0.0307) |  |  |
| Question Count |  | 0.0133 |  |
|  |  | (0.0334) |  |
| Poll Count |  |  | 0.0226 |
|  |  |  | (0.0196) |
| Days in Session | -0.0002 | -0.0012\*\* | -0.0015 |
|  | (0.0001) | (0.0005) | (0.0013) |
| Difference Party Ideology | 3.2516\*\* | 6.0472 | 20.2039 |
|  | (1.5160) | (4.8663) | (12.3904) |
| Difference Party Size | 0.0157 | 0.0181 | -0.0098 |
|  | (0.0156) | (0.0380) | (0.0089) |
| President Position | 0.1408\*\*\* | 0.8426\*\* | 1.0583\* |
|  | (0.0364) | (0.4092) | (0.6279) |
| Divided Government | 0.3689 | 0.4665 | -1.0425 |
|  | (0.8310) | (2.0663) | (0.7237) |
| Party Unity | -1.8681\* | -1.2728 | -2.5598 |
|  | (1.0273) | (2.4488) | (2.6763) |
| Symbolic & Procedural | 0.1535 | 0.1933 | 1.2466\*\*\* |
|  | (0.1017) | (0.4096) | (0.4803) |
| Appropriations | 0.1390\*\*\* | 0.0182 | 0.1451 |
|  | (0.0493) | (0.1699) | (0.3553) |
| Defense | 0.0006 | 0.0402 | -0.0071 |
|  | (0.0519) | (0.1770) | (0.4239) |
| Foreign Policy | 0.0407 | 0.1741 | 0.2562 |
|  | (0.0511) | (0.1645) | (0.3578) |
| Economy, Taxes, & Budget | 0.1395\*\*\* | 0.0345 | -0.2310 |
|  | (0.0523) | (0.1690) | (0.3434) |
| Energy & Environment | 0.0972\* | 0.5098\*\*\* | 0.7621\*\* |
|  | (0.0533) | (0.1681) | (0.3248) |
| Gov. Op., Civil Rights, & Justice | 0.1578\*\*\* | 0.2285 | 0.3910 |
|  | (0.0524) | (0.1727) | (0.3252) |
| Welfare & Human Services | 0.2257\*\*\* | 0.1966 | -0.3294 |
|  | (0.0536) | (0.1732) | (0.4928) |
| Miscellaneous Domestic | 0.1155\*\* | -0.0710 | 0.2960 |
|  | (0.0476) | (0.1542) | (0.2706) |
| Constant | -1.9572 | -5.9293 | -11.3458\* |
|  | (1.8924) | (5.0193) | (6.4423) |
| Congress Fixed Effects  | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| Observations | 1630 | 334 | 118 |
| *AIC* | 2145.30 | 628.82 | 207.66 |
| *BIC* | 2339.57 | 758.40 | 282.47 |

Note: GLM estimates with robust standard errors in parentheses and congress fixed effects. The *dependent variable* is coded 1 if, for a given bill, there was at least 1 amendment where there was a minority disappointment and the majority of Southern Democrats voted against the minority party, and 0 otherwise. The *explanatory variable* in Model 1 is coded as 1 if whip count is conducted, and 0 otherwise. The *explanatory variable* in Model 2 is coded as the number of questions where there were whip counts for on a given bill. The *explanatory variable* in Model 3 is coded as the number of polls taken for all questions associated with a given bill.

\**p* < .10, \*\* *p* < .05, \*\*\* *p* < .01

**Table B3: Predicting Majority-Party Amendment Rolls, While Varying Key Explanatory Variable**

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | **Model 1** | **Model 2** | **Model 3** |
| Whip | 0.1802\*\*\* |  |  |
|  | (0.0306) |  |  |
| Question Count |  | 0.0567\*\*\* |  |
|  |  | (0.0195) |  |
| Poll Count |  |  | 0.0203\* |
|  |  |  | (0.0105) |
| Days in Session | 0.0001 | 0.0003 | 0.0006 |
|  | (0.0001) | (0.0003) | (0.0006) |
| Difference Party Ideology | 0.1994 | -2.0450 | 0.4716 |
|  | (1.2808) | (2.6224) | (4.1064) |
| Difference Party Size | 0.0036 | -0.0083 | -0.0042 |
|  | (0.0129) | (0.0261) | (0.0036) |
| President Position | 0.0358 | -0.1724 | -0.3213\*\* |
|  | (0.0359) | (0.1195) | (0.1425) |
| Divided Government | 0.1866 | -0.2329 | -0.2259 |
|  | (0.6864) | (1.3662) | (0.3174) |
| Party Unity | 0.1349 | 0.9864 | -0.0811 |
|  | (0.8666) | (1.7954) | (1.2171) |
| Symbolic & Procedural | 0.0604 | -0.2138 | -0.6240\*\*\* |
|  | (0.0821) | (0.2774) | (0.1741) |
| Appropriations | 0.2223\*\*\* | 0.0942 | -0.0978 |
|  | (0.0517) | (0.0983) | (0.1315) |
| Defense | 0.0713 | 0.0602 | 0.2787 |
|  | (0.0524) | (0.1174) | (0.1749) |
| Foreign Policy | 0.1841\*\*\* | 0.0109 | 0.2036 |
|  | (0.0556) | (0.1131) | (0.1727) |
| Economy, Taxes, & Budget | 0.1168\*\* | -0.2295\*\* | -0.0770 |
|  | (0.0528) | (0.0967) | (0.1496) |
| Energy & Environment | 0.1378\*\*\* | 0.1231 | 0.2416 |
|  | (0.0535) | (0.1174) | (0.1479) |
| Gov. Op., Civil Rights, & Justice | 0.1433\*\*\* | -0.1672 | -0.1485 |
|  | (0.0539) | (0.1053) | (0.1367) |
| Welfare & Human Services | 0.1315\*\* | -0.1524 | 0.0401 |
|  | (0.0547) | (0.1123) | (0.1579) |
| Miscellaneous Domestic | 0.1561\*\*\* | -0.1146 | -0.0702 |
|  | (0.0513) | (0.0966) | (0.1310) |
| Constant | -0.5135 | 1.9042 | 0.7445 |
|  | (1.5736) | (3.0767) | (2.0061) |
| Congress Fixed Effects  | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| Observations | 1630 | 334 | 118 |
| *AIC* | 1889.58 | 491.77 | 188.81 |
| *BIC* | 2083.84 | 621.34 | 260.85 |

Note: GLM estimates with robust standard errors in parentheses and congress fixed effects. The *dependent variable* is coded 1 if, for a given bill, there was at least 1 amendment where there was a majority roll, and 0 otherwise. The *explanatory variable* in Model 1 is coded as 1 if whip count is conducted, and 0 otherwise. The *explanatory variable* in Model 2 is coded as the number of questions where there were whip counts for on a given bill. The *explanatory variable* in Model 3 is coded as the number of polls taken for all questions associated with a given bill.

\**p* < .10, \*\* *p* < .05, \*\*\* *p* < .01

**Table B4: Varying Minority-Party Disappointments Dependent Variable**

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | **Model 1** | **Model 2** | **Model 3** |
| Whip | 0.1094\*\*\* | -0.0109 | 0.3564\*\*\* |
|  | (0.0307) | (0.0233) | (0.0963) |
| Days in Session | -0.0002 | -0.0002 | -0.0010\*\* |
|  | (0.0001) | (0.0001) | (0.0005) |
| Difference Party Ideology | 3.2516\*\* | 2.7595\*\* | 12.0479\*\*\* |
|  | (1.5160) | (1.3259) | (4.2696) |
| Difference Party Size | 0.0157 | 0.0203 | 0.0615 |
|  | (0.0156) | (0.0129) | (0.0402) |
| President Position | 0.1408\*\*\* | 0.0498 | 0.8197\*\*\* |
|  | (0.0364) | (0.0322) | (0.1601) |
| Divided Government | 0.3689 | 0.8061 | 2.1442 |
|  | (0.8310) | (0.6786) | (2.1613) |
| Party Unity | -1.8681\* | -2.0790\*\* | -3.4636 |
|  | (1.0273) | (0.9231) | (2.8540) |
| Symbolic & Procedural | 0.1535 | 0.0295 | 1.3606\*\*\* |
|  | (0.1017) | (0.0788) | (0.3833) |
| Appropriations | 0.1390\*\*\* | -0.0905\*\*\* | 0.6337\*\*\* |
|  | (0.0493) | (0.0327) | (0.1355) |
| Defense | 0.0006 | -0.1559\*\*\* | 0.2046 |
|  | (0.0519) | (0.0347) | (0.1579) |
| Foreign Policy | 0.0407 | -0.1279\*\*\* | 0.4420\*\*\* |
|  | (0.0511) | (0.0340) | (0.1519) |
| Economy, Taxes, & Budget | 0.1395\*\*\* | -0.0018 | 0.5362\*\*\* |
|  | (0.0523) | (0.0367) | (0.1485) |
| Energy & Environment | 0.0972\* | -0.0422 | 0.4597\*\*\* |
|  | (0.0533) | (0.0366) | (0.1551) |
| Gov. Op., Civil Rights, & Justice | 0.1578\*\*\* | 0.0022 | 0.6483\*\*\* |
|  | (0.0524) | (0.0378) | (0.1550) |
| Welfare & Human Services | 0.2257\*\*\* | 0.0888\*\* | 0.7473\*\*\* |
|  | (0.0536) | (0.0394) | (0.1526) |
| Miscellaneous Domestic | 0.1155\*\* | -0.0036 | 0.4837\*\*\* |
|  | (0.0476) | (0.0336) | (0.1248) |
| Constant | -1.9572 | -1.8987 | -12.2702\*\* |
|  | (1.8924) | (1.5568) | (5.0383) |
| Congress Fixed Effects  | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| Observations | 1630 | 1630 | 1630 |
| *R*2 |  | 0.1161 |  |
| *AIC* | 2145.30 | 1395.67 | 3883.45 |
| *BIC* | 2339.57 | 1589.93 | 4083.12 |
| F-Statistic |  | 6.8457 |  |
| Chi-Squared | 462.4188 |  | 323.6206 |

Note: GLM estimates with robust standard errors in parentheses and congress fixed effects. The *dependent variable in Model 1* is coded 1 if, for a given bill, there was at least 1 amendment where there was a minority disappointment and the majority of Southern Democrats voted against the minority party, and 0 otherwise. The *dependent variable in Model 2* is the proportion of amendments for which there was a minority disappointment and the majority of southern democrats voted against the minority party for a given bill. The d*ependent variable in Model 3* is the number of amendments for which there was a minority disappointment and the majority of southern democrats voted against the minority party for a given bill.

\**p* < .10, \*\* *p* < .05, \*\*\* *p* < .01

**Table B5: Varying Majority-Party Rolls Dependent Variable**

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | **Model 1** | **Model 2** | **Model 3** |
| Whip | 0.1802\*\*\* | 0.0515\*\*\* | 0.8190\*\*\* |
|  | (0.0306) | (0.0172) | (0.1185) |
| Days in Session | 0.0001 | 0.0001 | 0.0007 |
|  | (0.0001) | (0.0001) | (0.0006) |
| Difference Party Ideology | 0.1994 | -0.1797 | 4.6544 |
|  | (1.2808) | (0.7619) | (6.7331) |
| Difference Party Size | 0.0036 | 0.0030 | 0.0290 |
|  | (0.0129) | (0.0067) | (0.0691) |
| President Position | 0.0358 | -0.0488 | 0.2662\* |
|  | (0.0359) | (0.0301) | (0.1601) |
| Divided Government | 0.1866 | 0.0980 | 0.4883 |
|  | (0.6864) | (0.3474) | (3.6210) |
| Party Unity | 0.1349 | -0.4624 | -4.0876 |
|  | (0.8666) | (0.4927) | (4.6270) |
| Symbolic & Procedural | 0.0604 | 0.0118 | -0.0178 |
|  | (0.0821) | (0.0628) | (0.4591) |
| Appropriations | 0.2223\*\*\* | 0.0050 | 1.0601\*\*\* |
|  | (0.0517) | (0.0234) | (0.1808) |
| Defense | 0.0713 | -0.0321 | 0.1478 |
|  | (0.0524) | (0.0250) | (0.2301) |
| Foreign Policy | 0.1841\*\*\* | 0.0035 | 0.7378\*\*\* |
|  | (0.0556) | (0.0253) | (0.2141) |
| Economy, Taxes, & Budget | 0.1168\*\* | 0.0023 | 0.3255\* |
|  | (0.0528) | (0.0250) | (0.1963) |
| Energy & Environment | 0.1378\*\*\* | 0.0013 | 0.6176\*\*\* |
|  | (0.0535) | (0.0254) | (0.2010) |
| Gov. Op., Civil Rights, & Justice | 0.1433\*\*\* | 0.0040 | 0.7538\*\*\* |
|  | (0.0539) | (0.0255) | (0.2042) |
| Welfare & Human Services | 0.1315\*\* | 0.0082 | 0.6500\*\*\* |
|  | (0.0547) | (0.0260) | (0.2024) |
| Miscellaneous Domestic | 0.1561\*\*\* | 0.0101 | 0.5173\*\*\* |
|  | (0.0513) | (0.0236) | (0.1632) |
| Constant | -0.5135 | 0.3008 | -5.2421 |
|  | (1.5736) | (0.8171) | (8.1744) |
| Congress Fixed Effects  | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| Observations | 1630 | 1630 | 1630 |
| *R*2 |  | 0.0936 |  |
| *AIC* | 1889.58 | 255.21 | 2515.28 |
| *BIC* | 2083.84 | 449.48 | 2714.95 |
| F-Statistic |  | 2.4741 |  |
| Chi-Squared | 128.8382 |  | 161.6682 |

Note: GLM estimates with robust standard errors in parentheses and congress fixed effects. The *dependent variable in Model 1* is coded 1 if, for a given bill, there was at least 1 amendment where there was a majority roll, and 0 otherwise. The *dependent variable in Model 2* is the proportion of amendments for which there was a majority roll. The *dependent variable in Model 3* is the number of amendments for which there was a majority roll for a given

\**p* < .10, \*\* *p* < .05, \*\*\* *p* < .01

**Table B6: Predicting Minority-Party Amendment Disappointments, While Varying Time Period**

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | **84th – 89th** | **90th – 99th** | **100th – 107th** |
| Whip | -0.0638 | 0.1007\*\* | 0.1540\*\*\* |
|  | (0.0748) | (0.0485) | (0.0425) |
| Days in Session | -0.0001 | -0.0004\* | 0.0000 |
|  | (0.0006) | (0.0002) | (0.0002) |
| Difference Party Ideology | 1.9201 | -102.2905 | 42.3166\* |
|  | (4.0092) | (75.9736) | (24.4506) |
| Difference Party Size | 0.0004 | -0.0220 | -0.0555 |
|  | (0.0011) | (0.0157) | (0.0510) |
| President Position | 0.1094 | 0.1143\*\* | 0.2832\*\*\* |
|  | (0.0707) | (0.0470) | (0.0881) |
| Divided Government | 0.0474 | 2.2463 | -5.5846 |
|  | (0.0954) | (1.7050) | (4.1222) |
| Party Unity | -1.4661 | 20.7859 | 6.2148 |
|  | (1.0807) | (14.6481) | (4.8297) |
| Symbolic & Procedural | 0.0000 | 0.1702 | 0.0608 |
|  | (.) | (0.1285) | (0.1643) |
| Appropriations | 0.1062 | 0.1135\* | 0.1007 |
|  | (0.1332) | (0.0668) | (0.0797) |
| Defense | 0.2316 | -0.1663\*\* | 0.1414\* |
|  | (0.2104) | (0.0686) | (0.0762) |
| Foreign Policy | -0.0623 | -0.0399 | 0.1012 |
|  | (0.1254) | (0.0693) | (0.0805) |
| Economy, Taxes, & Budget | -0.1041 | 0.1129 | 0.1316 |
|  | (0.1672) | (0.0698) | (0.0847) |
| Energy & Environment | 0.0426 | 0.0643 | 0.0988 |
|  | (0.1836) | (0.0684) | (0.0873) |
| Gov. Op., Civil Rights, & Justice | -0.0667 | 0.2108\*\*\* | 0.0872 |
|  | (0.1195) | (0.0699) | (0.0866) |
| Welfare & Human Services | -0.0250 | 0.2024\*\*\* | 0.2381\*\*\* |
|  | (0.1153) | (0.0744) | (0.0838) |
| Miscellaneous Domestic | 0.2575\* | 0.1230\* | -0.0318 |
|  | (0.1540) | (0.0635) | (0.0807) |
| Constant | -0.4396 | 55.6188 | -29.2425\* |
|  | (2.2145) | (41.3428) | (16.4893) |
| Congress Fixed Effects  | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| Observations | 92 | 880 | 658 |
| *AIC* | 78.04 | 1139.87 | 908.03 |
| *BIC* | 120.91 | 1245.03 | 997.82 |

Note: GLM estimates with robust standard errors in parentheses and congress fixed effects. The *dependent variable* is coded 1 if, for a given bill, there was at least 1 amendment where there was a minority disappointment and the majority of Southern Democrats voted against the minority party, and 0 otherwise.

\**p* < .10, \*\* *p* < .05, \*\*\* *p* < .01

**Table B7: Predicting Majority-Party Amendment Rolls, While Varying Time Period**

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | **84th – 89th** | **90th – 99th** | **100th – 107th** |
| Whip | 0.0829 | 0.1957\*\*\* | 0.1393\*\*\* |
|  | (0.1417) | (0.0499) | (0.0394) |
| Days in Session | 0.0007 | 0.0002 | 0.0000 |
|  | (0.0006) | (0.0002) | (0.0002) |
| Difference Party Ideology | -3.1496 | -50.5444 | -15.5662 |
|  | (4.4249) | (69.6728) | (20.6331) |
| Difference Party Size | 0.0016 | -0.0101 | 0.0316 |
|  | (0.0015) | (0.0144) | (0.0429) |
| President Position | -0.1061 | 0.0662 | 0.0480 |
|  | (0.0980) | (0.0441) | (0.0719) |
| Divided Government | 0.2207\*\* | 1.0818 | 2.5620 |
|  | (0.1117) | (1.5669) | (3.4719) |
| Party Unity | 0.5589 | 9.6504 | -3.0188 |
|  | (1.3929) | (13.4394) | (4.0726) |
| Symbolic & Procedural | 0.0000 | 0.1771 | -0.0266 |
|  | (0.0000) | (0.1241) | (0.0907) |
| Appropriations | -0.2370 | 0.2360\*\*\* | 0.2673\*\*\* |
|  | (0.1899) | (0.0708) | (0.0843) |
| Defense | -0.0444 | 0.0986 | 0.0752 |
|  | (0.2240) | (0.0725) | (0.0781) |
| Foreign Policy | -0.3452\* | 0.2855\*\*\* | 0.1172 |
|  | (0.1796) | (0.0768) | (0.0870) |
| Economy, Taxes, & Budget | -0.0802 | 0.1996\*\*\* | 0.0549 |
|  | (0.3497) | (0.0734) | (0.0840) |
| Energy & Environment | -0.2513 | 0.2086\*\*\* | 0.0910 |
|  | (0.2568) | (0.0689) | (0.0875) |
| Gov. Op., Civil Rights, & Justice | -0.1343 | 0.2247\*\*\* | 0.0769 |
|  | (0.1891) | (0.0735) | (0.0869) |
| Welfare & Human Services | 0.0404 | 0.2549\*\*\* | 0.0229 |
|  | (0.2428) | (0.0749) | (0.0849) |
| Miscellaneous Domestic | -0.1276 | 0.2145\*\*\* | 0.1197 |
|  | (0.1971) | (0.0690) | (0.0831) |
| Constant | 1.6256 | 27.4838 | 10.4681 |
|  | (2.5236) | (37.9119) | (13.9092) |
| Congress Fixed Effects  | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| Observations | 92 | 880 | 658 |
| *AIC* | 135.42 | 1032.85 | 732.71 |
| *BIC* | 178.29 | 1138.01 | 822.49 |

Note: GLM estimates with robust standard errors in parentheses and congress fixed effects. The *dependent variable* is coded 1 if, for a given bill, there was at least 1 amendment where there was a majority roll, and 0 otherwise. \**p* < .10, \*\* *p* < .05, \*\*\* *p* < .01

**Appendix C: Matching Analysis**

Our regression analysis provides evidence in support of our theoretical argument, and the results are in line with the expectation presented in our hypothesis. However, these results are only correlational (between majority whip counts and minority disappointments and majority rolls, respectively). Although our multivariate analysis includes controls to account for obvious threats to inference, we adopt a matching approach in Appendix B as a second round of analyses to better understand the degree to which minority leverage causes minority floor proposals to be considered. Matching provides a complementary test to our regression analysis by allowing us to deal with the potential insufficient overlap of covariates between bills that do and do not receive whip counts (Stuart 2010). Matching has been used in other works focusing on legislative politics to deal with concerns about nonrandom assignment of the treatment (Malhotra 2008).

In Table C1, we present *t*-test results where we match bills on a variety of covariates. In this analysis, the goal is to look at the difference in the mean rate of minority amendment disappointments (as measured in the previous section) across bills that did and did not receive a majority whip count, respectively. In other words, this analysis shows whether the whip count “treatment” predicts a different rate of minority amendment disappointments, even when many confounding factors are eliminated by creating matched samples of “whipped” and “not whipped” bills. Column 1 displays the results of basic propensity score matching and shows no statistically significant difference between bills that received a majority whip count and those that did not. Column 2 uses propensity score matching using nearest neighbors (with up to three matches), where there is a statistically significant difference (*p* < .05).[[1]](#footnote-1)

**Table C1: Minority-Party Disappointments Propensity Score Matching and Propensity Score Matching using Nearest Neighbor Approach**

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
|  | Propensity Score Matching | Propensity Score Matching using Nearest Neighbor (3) |
| ATE | 0.058 | 0.103\*\* |
|  | (1.30) | (3.03) |
| Observations | 1630 | 1630 |

Note: *t* statistics in parentheses.

\**p* < .10, \*\* *p* < .05, \*\*\* *p* < .01

In Table C2, we present a similar set of *t*-test results, but now split the groups by whether there was at least one majority amendment roll on a given bill. Column 1 and Column 2 display the results for the ATE using propensity score matching on the same covariates as in Table B1. Column 1 uses basic propensity score matching while Column 2 uses propensity score matching using nearest neighbors (with up to three matches). The results in both columns reflect a statistically significant difference (*p* < .01) between the majority amendment roll rate of bills that received a whip count and those that did not.[[2]](#footnote-2)

**Table C2: Majority-Party Rolls Propensity Score Matching and Propensity Score Matching using Nearest Neighbor Approach**

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
|  | Propensity Score Matching | Propensity Score Matching using Nearest Neighbor (3) |
| ATE | 0.187\*\*\* | 0.174\*\*\* |
|  | (3.98) | (4.54) |
| Observations | 1630 | 1630 |

Note: *t* statistics in parentheses.

\**p* < .10, \*\* *p* < .05, \*\*\* *p* < .01

The results of these matching analyses provide greater causal support for our argument that the majority party will let the minority party have an amendment on a bill, even though it will not likely pass, when the majority faces a vote shortage on bill they would like to pass. That is, when the minority party has leverage that may inhibit the majority party’s ability to achieve their desired policy outcome, the majority will allow the minority a concession – in this case a vote on an amendment – in order to secure passage and, in some cases, do so while releasing their moderate members to vote against the bill.

1. Propensity Score Matching creates sets of cases based on the similarities of the distributions of covariates but does not require exact matches on all covariates. When using nearest neighbors, we are able to find multiple proficient matches for each treated case. For more information on propensity score matching see Stuart (2010), Caliendo and Kopeinig (2008), and Dehejia and Wahba (2002). [↑](#footnote-ref-1)
2. Due to the matching methods that we use there is no loss of observations across tests. [↑](#footnote-ref-2)