

# A Heavy Hand or a Helping Hand? Information Provision and Citizen Preferences for Anti-Crime Policies

## Supplementary material

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# Appendix A. Tables

Table A1: Descriptive Statistics and Balance Table

	Average and Standard Deviation	Difference w.r.t. control		p-value Wald Test	Observations
		T1	T2		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
1(Female)	0.510 (0.018)	0.003 (0.035)	-0.017 (0.034)	0.573	1,521
1(Single)	0.341 (0.022)	0.031 (0.033)	0.028 (0.034)	0.921	1,521
1(Married)	0.284 (0.019)	-0.059** (0.028)	-0.065** (0.029)	0.821	1,521
Number Children	2.039 (0.103)	-0.184 (0.123)	0.166 (0.151)	0.0147	1,521
Age	39.652 (0.584)	-0.543 (0.932)	2.043* (1.050)	0.0131	1,521
Education Level	11.153 (0.177)	-0.159 (0.251)	-0.601** (0.265)	0.0904	1,487
1(Rural)	0.291 (0.034)	-0.019 (0.025)	0.035* (0.022)	0.0553	1,521
1(White)	0.195 (0.019)	0.010 (0.023)	-0.016 (0.023)	0.350	1,455
1(Mestizo)	0.395 (0.026)	0.051 (0.036)	0.066** (0.032)	0.635	1,455
1(Indigenous)	0.081 (0.020)	-0.021 (0.018)	-0.026 (0.016)	0.667	1,455
1(Black)	0.197 (0.023)	-0.023 (0.025)	-0.024 (0.023)	0.955	1,455
1(Mulatto)	0.091 (0.014)	-0.002 (0.017)	0.001 (0.017)	0.862	1,455
1(Other Ethnic)	0.041 (0.009)	-0.016 (0.011)	-0.001 (0.012)	0.202	1,455
1(Employed)	0.451 (0.023)	-0.038 (0.028)	-0.066** (0.032)	0.325	1,521
1(Unemployed)	0.120 (0.015)	0.004 (0.023)	0.007 (0.021)	0.877	1,521
1(Household Activ.)	0.197 (0.019)	0.016 (0.025)	0.009 (0.024)	0.802	1,521
1(Retired)	0.088 (0.013)	0.019 (0.020)	0.040* (0.021)	0.299	1,521
Econ Situation	2.441 (0.039)	-0.090 (0.067)	0.064 (0.062)	0.0194	1,481
1(Gov. Assist.)	0.094 (0.012)	0.039* (0.020)	0.034** (0.017)	0.822	1,521
1(Victim)	0.145 (0.016)	0.020 (0.022)	0.025 (0.024)	0.798	1,520
1(Bribed Police)	0.091 (0.013)	-0.019 (0.020)	-0.021 (0.018)	0.893	1,519
1(Informed)	0.848 (0.016)	-0.011 (0.024)	0.017 (0.020)	0.154	1,521
1(Voted)	1.310 (0.025)	0.008 (0.034)	0.003 (0.033)	0.855	1,518
1(Partic Protest)	0.064 (0.010)	-0.011 (0.015)	-0.001 (0.015)	0.452	1,521

Notes: Each row shows summary statistics for a different variable. Column (1) shows the sample average and standard deviation in parenthesis. Columns (2) and (3) shows regression coefficients and clustered standard errors (primary sample unit) corresponding to an OLS regression. The p-value in column (4) corresponds to a Wald test of equality of coefficients. Column (5) shows the sample size. The indicator function 1(.) equals to one if the condition inside the parenthesis is true and zero otherwise. \*, \*\*, and \*\*\* denote statistical significance at the 10, 5 and 1 percent level, respectively.


Table A2: Impact of Crime Information on Policy Preferences - individual social policy components (OLS Regressions)

	Punishment - Soc Pol 1		Punishment - Soc Pol 2		Detection - Soc Pol 1		Detection - Soc Pol 2	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
T1 (homicides increasing)	0.417*	0.489**	0.614**	0.69**	-0.057	0.014	0.139	0.220
	(0.221)	(0.240)	(0.263)	(0.287)	(0.154)	(0.163)	(0.203)	(0.214)
T2 (homicides decreasing)	0.429*	0.398	0.267	0.234	0.013	0.043	-0.149	-0.121
	(0.229)	(0.270)	(0.255)	(0.284)	(0.145)	(0.153)	(0.216)	(0.219)
Constant	1.337***	1.744*	0.130	-0.080	-0.618***	0.830	-1.825***	-0.994
	(0.169)	(0.997)	(0.181)	(1.507)	(0.119)	(0.585)	(0.152)	(1.101)
Observations	1,494	1,358	1,494	1,358	1,404	1,358	1,494	1,358
Controls	No	Broad	No	Broad	No	Broad	No	Broad
p-value T1=T2	0.953	0.688	0.180	0.115	0.662	0.849	0.147	0.114
Control mean	1.34	1.34	0.13	0.13	-0.62	-0.62	-1.82	-1.82

Notes: Table displays the estimate of OLS regression models when outcome  $Y$  of individual  $i$  is regressed on the treatments and a set of covariates. Each column in the table corresponds to a different specification. First column in each set has no controls. Broad corresponds to the full set of covariates. Clustered standard errors (at the primary sampling unit) in parentheses. \*\*\*  $p < 0.01$ , \*\*  $p < 0.05$ , \*  $p < 0.1$



## Appendix B. Figures

Figure A1: Distribution of coins - control group




Note: Distribution of coins to the different public policies in the control group.

Figure A2: Distribution of coins - treatment 1 vs control group




Note: Distribution of coins to punishment and to social policies in the control and treatment 1 groups.

Figure A3: The Homicide Rate in Central America



Note: Information corresponds to latest available data from UN-ODC. 2015 for Costa Rica, Honduras, El Salvador and Panama; 2014 for Belize and Guatemala; 2012 for Nicaragua.

Figure A4: Share of People Considering Crime and Violence as the Main Problem)



Note: Information corresponds to responses to question A4 in LAPOP surveys for each year. The question is A4. *En su opinión ¿cuál es el problema más grave que está enfrentando el país?* and individuals can choose from a list of 38 options. Crime, violence, and gangs are three of this 38 different alternatives.