**ONLINE APPENDIX**

What Drives Partisan Conflict and Consensus on Welfare State Issues?

**Table A1 Means of dependent and independent variables**

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
| **Variable** | **Category** | **Mean** |
| Pro-retrenchment statement | - | 0.217 |
| Left party | - | 0.472 |
| Revenue & expenditure | Generic | 0.482 |
| Revenue | 0.058 |
| Expenditure | 0.461 |
| Perceived deservingness | Generic | 0.153 |
| High | 0.756 |
| Low | 0.091 |
| Redistribution | Generic | 0.379 |
| Earnings-related | 0.131 |
| Universal | 0.424 |
| Means-tested | 0.066 |
| Benefit design | Generic | 0.258 |
| Cash transfers | 0.227 |
| In-kind benefits | 0.344 |
| Social regulation | 0.170 |
| Institutional reform | - | 0.070 |
| Cross-cutting coalition | - | 0.693 |
| Time | 1970s | 0.070 |
| 1980s | 0.050 |
| 1990s | 0.250 |
| 2000s | 0.266 |
| 2010s | 0.365 |

Note: N = 18,219, all variables are dichotomous (0/1).

**Table A2a Cross-tabulation of key independent variables**

|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  |  | Generic |  |  |  | Revenue |  |  |  | Expen-diture |  |
|  | Generic | High deserv. | Low deserv. |  | Generic | High deserv. | Low deserv. |  | Generic | High deserv. | Low deserv. |
| Generic | 2,715 | 1,469 | 411 |  |  | 30 |  |  | 68 | 1,873 | 345 |
| Earnings-  related |  | 468 |  |  |  | 768 |  |  |  | 956 | 190 |
| Universal |  | 3,712 |  |  |  | 169 |  |  |  | 3,605 | 235 |
| Means-  tested |  |  |  |  |  | 87 |  |  |  | 635 | 483 |

Note: Figures are numbers of statements per cell.

**Table A2b Cross-tabulation of key independent variables: right-wing parties only**

|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  |  | Generic |  |  |  | Revenue |  |  |  | Expen-diture |  |
|  | Generic | High deserv. | Low deserv. |  | Generic | High deserv. | Low deserv. |  | Generic | High deserv. | Low deserv. |
| Generic | 1,543 | 669 | 233 |  |  | 20 |  |  | 49 | 807 | 238 |
| Earnings-  related |  | 358 |  |  |  | 551 |  |  |  | 699 | 85 |
| Means-  tested |  | 1,641 |  |  |  | 44 |  |  |  | 2,084 | 86 |
| Universal |  |  |  |  |  | 35 |  |  |  | 260 | 220 |

Note: Figures are numbers of statements per cell.

**Table A2c Cross-tabulation of key independent variables: left-wing parties only**

|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  |  | Generic |  |  |  | Revenue |  |  |  | Expen-diture |  |
|  | Generic | High deserv. | Low deserv. |  | Generic | High deserv. | Low deserv. |  | Generic | High deserv. | Low deserv. |
| Generic | 1,172 | 800 | 178 |  |  | 10 |  |  | 19 | 1,066 | 107 |
| Earnings-  related |  | 110 |  |  |  | 217 |  |  |  | 257 | 105 |
| Means-  tested |  | 2,071 |  |  |  | 125 |  |  |  | 1,521 | 149 |
| Universal |  |  |  |  |  | 52 |  |  |  | 375 | 263 |

Note: Figures are numbers of statements per cell.

**Table A3 Binary logistic regression model with alternative dependent variable (statements with predicate zero coded as pro-retrenchment)**

|  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | Linear term | | Interaction with left party | |
| Left party | -1.840\*\*\* | (0.453) |  |  |
|  |  |  |  |  |
| *Revenue & expenditure (H1)* |  |  |  |  |
| Generic | *reference* |  |  |  |
| Revenue | 0.0567 | (0.474) | -2.022\*\*\* | (0.586) |
| Expenditure | -2.271\*\*\* | (0.197) | -0.640\* | (0.249) |
|  |  |  |  |  |
| *Perceived deservingness (H2)* |  |  |  |  |
| Generic | *reference* |  |  |  |
| High | 0.766\*\* | (0.270) | 1.915\*\*\* | (0.406) |
| Low | 0.969\*\* | (0.324) | -1.251\*\* | (0.469) |
|  |  |  |  |  |
| *Redistribution (H3)* |  |  |  |  |
| Generic | *reference* |  |  |  |
| Earnings-related | 0.281 | (0.283) | 0.467 | (0.436) |
| Universal | -0.558\*\*\* | (0.150) | -0.0483 | (0.266) |
| Means-tested | -0.510 | (0.292) | -0.157 | (0.567) |
|  |  |  |  |  |
| *Benefit design* |  |  |  |  |
| Generic | *reference* |  |  |  |
| Cash transfers | 0.132 | (0.446) | -0.547 | (0.710) |
| In-kind benefits | -0.561\* | (0.273) | -0.667 | (0.455) |
| Social regulation | -0.711\*\* | (0.233) | -1.528\*\* | (0.508) |
|  |  |  |  |  |
| *Reform type* |  |  |  |  |
| Institutional reform | 1.619\*\*\* | (0.213) | 0.794 | (0.739) |
|  |  |  |  |  |
| *Government type* |  |  |  |  |
| Cross-cutting coalition | -0.842\*\* | (0.324) | 1.067\*\* | (0.376) |
|  |  |  |  |  |
| *Time* |  |  |  |  |
| 1970s | *reference* |  |  |  |
| 1980s | 0.385 | (0.439) | -0.336 | (0.556) |
| 1990s | 1.425\*\* | (0.447) | -1.775\*\* | (0.585) |
| 2000s | -0.0243 | (0.405) | -0.665 | (0.517) |
| 2010s | 1.302\*\* | (0.446) | -1.571\*\* | (0.596) |
|  |  |  |  |  |
| Constant | 0.0146 | (0.323) |  |  |
| Variance of random slopes | 0.222\*\*\* | (0.0592) |  |  |
| N (observations) | 18,219 |  |  |  |
| N (manifestos) | 65 |  |  |  |
| Log likelihood | -7350.0 |  |  |  |

Note: Figures are unstandardized coefficients and manifesto-clustered standard errors (in parentheses) from binary logistic regression with random effects at the manifesto level, \* *p* < 0.05, \*\* *p* < 0.01, \*\*\* *p* < 0.001.

**Figure A1 Average marginal effects (AMEs) of left party by revenue/expenditure, deservingness, and redistribution (alternative dependent variable: statements with predicate zero coded as pro-retrenchment)**

**Y:\Democratic Governance\Projekte\Papiere\Welfare Policy\25 Partisan conflict\01 data\graphs\Figure A1 - AME plot (alt DV).tif**

Note: AMEs with 95-percent confidence intervals, calculated based on regression model in Table A3.

**Table A4 Separate regression models for left-wing and right-wing parties**

|  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | Right-wing parties only | | Left-wing parties only | |
|  |  |  |  |  |
| *Revenue & expenditure (H1)* |  |  |  |  |
| Generic | *reference* |  |  |  |
| Revenue | 1.034\* | (0.439) | -0.455 | (0.433) |
| Expenditure | -1.455\*\*\* | (0.230) | -2.727\*\*\* | (0.431) |
|  |  |  |  |  |
| *Perceived deservingness (H2)* |  |  |  |  |
| Generic | *reference* |  |  |  |
| High | 0.389 | (0.277) | 2.551\*\*\* | (0.400) |
| Low | 1.193\*\*\* | (0.347) | -2.175\*\* | (0.789) |
|  |  |  |  |  |
| *Redistribution (H3)* |  |  |  |  |
| Generic | *reference* |  |  |  |
| Earnings-related | 0.0775 | (0.307) | 0.206 | (0.765) |
| Universal | -1.045\*\* | (0.394) | -2.782\* | (1.209) |
| Means-tested | -0.436 | (0.239) | -0.666 | (0.504) |
|  |  |  |  |  |
| *Benefit design* |  |  |  |  |
| Generic | *reference* |  |  |  |
| Cash transfers | -0.574 | (0.379) | -0.958 | (0.959) |
| In-kind benefits | -2.055\*\*\* | (0.180) | -3.598\*\*\* | (0.334) |
| Social regulation | -0.513 | (0.277) | -2.316\*\*\* | (0.623) |
|  |  |  |  |  |
| *Reform type* |  |  |  |  |
| Institutional reform | 0.517\* | (0.234) | 1.365\* | (0.677) |
|  |  |  |  |  |
| *Government type* |  |  |  |  |
| Cross-cutting coalition | -1.026\*\* | (0.332) | -0.361 | (0.294) |
|  |  |  |  |  |
| *Time* |  |  |  |  |
| 1970s | *reference* |  |  |  |
| 1980s | 0.682 | (0.475) | 0.431 | (0.408) |
| 1990s | 1.722\*\*\* | (0.453) | 0.255 | (0.461) |
| 2000s | 0.0503 | (0.432) | -0.512 | (0.372) |
| 2010s | 1.333\*\* | (0.467) | 0.0250 | (0.473) |
|  |  |  |  |  |
| Constant | 0.0137 | (0.324) | -1.692\*\*\* | (0.358) |
| Variance of random slopes | 0.283\*\* | (0.104) | 0.0629 | (0.0483) |
| N (observations) | 9,622 |  | 8,597 |  |
| N (manifestos) | 40 |  | 25 |  |
| Log likelihood | -4426.2 |  | -1915.8 |  |

Note: Figures are unstandardized coefficients and manifesto-clustered standard errors (in parentheses) from binary logistic regression with random effects at the manifesto level, \* *p* < 0.05, \*\* *p* < 0.01, \*\*\* *p* < 0.001.

**Figure A2 Average marginal effects (AMEs) of revenue/expenditure, deservingness, and redistribution from separate models for left-wing and right-wing parties (based on Table A4)**

**X:\Democratic Governance\Projekte\Papiere\Welfare Policy\25 Partisan conflict\01 data\graphs\Figure A2 - AME plot sep models.tif**

Note: AMEs with 95-percent confidence intervals, calculated based on regression model in Table A4.

**Table A5 Separate regression models for individual parties**

|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | Greens | | SPÖ | | ÖVP | | FPÖ | | BZÖ | | LF/Neos | |
| Generic | *reference* |  | *reference* |  | *reference* |  | *reference* |  | *reference* |  | *reference* |  |
| Revenue | 0.119 | (0.815) | -0.0814 | (0.408) | 0.327 | (0.547) | 1.597 | (0.999) | 1.711 | (1.204) | 0.810 | (0.482) |
| Expenditure | -2.328\*\*\* | (0.636) | -2.650\*\*\* | (0.445) | -1.658\*\*\* | (0.412) | -1.863\*\*\* | (0.259) | -0.483 | (0.562) | -1.081\* | (0.460) |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Generic | *reference* |  | *reference* |  | *reference* |  | *reference* |  | *reference* |  | *reference* |  |
| High deservingness | 1.665\*\*\* | (0.286) | 3.236\*\*\* | (0.377) | 0.637 | (0.412) | 0.154 | (0.278) | -0.274 | (1.802) | 1.149\*\*\* | (0.115) |
| Low deservingness | -2.615\*\* | (0.968) | -1.825 | (1.140) | 1.305\*\* | (0.426) | 1.424\*\* | (0.516) | -1.347 | (1.014) | -2.114 | (1.205) |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Generic | *reference* |  | *reference* |  | *reference* |  | *reference* |  | *reference* |  | *reference* |  |
| Earnings-related | -0.630 | (0.505) | 2.714\*\*\* | (0.810) | 0.407 | (0.293) | -1.098 | (0.577) | 0.836 | (1.061) | 3.327\*\*\* | (0.753) |
| Universal | -1.253\* | (0.491) | 0.394 | (0.668) | -0.457 | (0.315) | -0.721 | (0.522) | 0.756 | (1.015) | -0.0435 | (0.974) |
| Means-tested | -2.887\* | (1.446) | 0 | (.) | -0.289 | (0.279) | -1.702\* | (0.678) | -0.853 | (1.102) | 0 | (.) |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Generic | *reference* |  | *reference* |  | *reference* |  | *reference* |  | *reference* |  | *reference* |  |
| Cash benefits | 1.477\*\* | (0.537) | -4.329\*\*\* | (0.660) | -0.348 | (0.519) | -0.0510 | (0.705) | -2.451 | (2.012) | -4.214\*\*\* | (0.917) |
| In-kind benefits | -3.154\*\*\* | (0.474) | -4.490\*\*\* | (0.373) | -2.149\*\*\* | (0.213) | -2.053\*\*\* | (0.395) | -1.924 | (1.382) | -2.662\*\*\* | (0.446) |
| Social regulation | -1.056\* | (0.445) | -3.940\*\*\* | (1.055) | -0.171 | (0.296) | -1.257\* | (0.614) | -2.539\*\*\* | (0.207) | -1.714\* | (0.716) |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Institutional reform | 2.970\*\*\* | (0.520) | -0.214 | (0.352) | 0.275 | (0.259) | 0.991\* | (0.467) | 0.883 | (1.136) | -0.418 | (0.590) |
| Cross-cutting coalition | -0.360 | (0.344) | -0.149 | (0.462) | -1.380\* | (0.572) | -0.758\*\* | (0.246) | 0.222 | (0.255) | -2.339\*\*\* | (0.199) |
| 1970s |  |  | *reference* |  | *reference* |  | *reference* |  |  |  |  |  |
| 1980s | *reference* |  | 0.630 | (0.526) | 1.636\* | (0.734) | 0.0548 | (0.299) |  |  |  |  |
| 1990s | 0.216\*\*\* | (0.0622) | 0.252 | (0.645) | 2.493\*\*\* | (0.751) | 1.120\* | (0.437) |  |  | *reference* |  |
| 2000s | -0.435\*\*\* | (0.0995) | -0.623 | (0.450) | 0.111 | (0.478) | -0.687 | (0.356) | *reference* |  | -1.703\*\*\* | (0.210) |
| 2010s | -0.0656 | (0.112) | -0.0366 | (0.574) | 1.827\* | (0.709) | 0.402 | (0.482) | 1.168\*\*\* | (0.283) | -0.0837 | (0.859) |
| Constant | -2.009\*\*\* | (0.466) | -1.823\*\*\* | (0.396) | -0.578 | (0.482) | 0.842\* | (0.358) | -0.273 | (0.674) | 3.138\*\*\* | (0.441) |
| lnsig2u | 5.29e-32 | (1.00e-31) | 0.125\* | (0.0579) | 0.234 | (0.135) | 0.0230 | (0.0519) | 8.94e-33 | (2.94e-32) | 0.0757 | (0.189) |
| N (observations) | 3683 |  | 4532 |  | 5549 |  | 2425 |  | 415 |  | 1149 |  |
| N (manifestos) | 10 |  | 15 |  | 15 |  | 15 |  | 3 |  | 7 |  |
| Log likelihood | -618.0 |  | -1169.1 |  | -2431.7 |  | -1067.1 |  | -158.4 |  | -580.5 |  |

**Figure A3 Average marginal effects (AMEs) of revenue/expenditure, deservingness, and redistribution from regression models by party (based on Table A5)**

**X:\Democratic Governance\Projekte\Papiere\Welfare Policy\25 Partisan conflict\01 data\graphs\Figure A3 - AME plot by party.tif**

Note: AMEs with 95-percent confidence intervals, calculated based on regression model in Table A5. Party abbreviations: G = Greens, S = SPÖ, V = ÖVP, F = FPÖ, B = BZÖ, L = LF/Neos.

**Table A6 Binary logistic regression model weighting observations to give equal weight to each manifesto**

|  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | Linear term | | Interaction with left party | |
| Left party | -2.104\*\*\* | (0.462) |  |  |
|  |  |  |  |  |
| *Revenue & expenditure (H1)* |  |  |  |  |
| Generic | *reference* |  |  |  |
| Revenue | 1.495\*\*\* | (0.355) | -1.796\*\* | (0.590) |
| Expenditure | -1.287\*\*\* | (0.307) | -0.957 | (0.618) |
|  |  |  |  |  |
| *Perceived deservingness (H2)* |  |  |  |  |
| Generic | *reference* |  |  |  |
| High | -0.0785 | (0.262) | 2.797\*\*\* | (0.560) |
| Low | 0.397 | (0.518) | -3.070\*\*\* | (0.916) |
|  |  |  |  |  |
| *Redistribution (H3)* |  |  |  |  |
| Generic | *reference* |  |  |  |
| Earnings-related | -0.0630 | (0.560) | 2.114 | (1.139) |
| Universal | -0.360 | (0.294) | 0.275 | (0.745) |
| Means-tested | -2.019\*\*\* | (0.606) | 0.263 | (1.094) |
|  |  |  |  |  |
| *Benefit design* |  |  |  |  |
| Generic | *reference* |  |  |  |
| Cash transfers | -0.655 | (0.503) | -1.870 | (1.077) |
| In-kind benefits | -1.542\*\*\* | (0.247) | -1.881\*\*\* | (0.568) |
| Social regulation | -0.723\*\* | (0.261) | -2.439\*\* | (0.851) |
|  |  |  |  |  |
| *Reform type* |  |  |  |  |
| Institutional reform | 0.553\* | (0.276) | 0.225 | (0.753) |
|  |  |  |  |  |
| *Government type* |  |  |  |  |
| Cross-cutting coalition | -1.265\*\*\* | (0.349) | 0.951\* | (0.480) |
|  |  |  |  |  |
| *Time* |  |  |  |  |
| 1970s | *reference* |  |  |  |
| 1980s | 0.728 | (0.478) | -0.396 | (0.593) |
| 1990s | 1.940\*\*\* | (0.419) | -1.905\*\* | (0.635) |
| 2000s | 0.114 | (0.378) | -0.803 | (0.496) |
| 2010s | 1.663\*\*\* | (0.468) | -1.844\*\* | (0.635) |
|  |  |  |  |  |
| Constant | 0.361 | (0.321) |  |  |
| Variance of random slopes | 6.98e-34 | (3.20e-33) |  |  |
| N (observations) | 18,219 |  |  |  |
| N (manifestos) | 65 |  |  |  |
| Log likelihood | -250.7 |  |  |  |

Note: Figures are unstandardized coefficients and manifesto-clustered standard errors (in parentheses) from binary logistic regression with random effects at the manifesto level. Weights were calculated as 10 / number of social policy-related statements per manifesto. \* *p* < 0.05, \*\* *p* < 0.01, \*\*\* *p* < 0.001.

**Table A7 Binary logistic regression model with standard errors clustered on party-decades**

|  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | Linear term | | Interaction with left party | |
| Left party | -1.680\*\*\* | (0.404) |  |  |
|  |  |  |  |  |
| *Revenue & expenditure (H1)* |  |  |  |  |
| Generic | *reference* |  |  |  |
| Revenue | 1.029\* | (0.431) | -1.493\*\* | (0.538) |
| Expenditure | -1.456\*\*\* | (0.174) | -1.293\*\*\* | (0.346) |
|  |  |  |  |  |
| *Perceived deservingness (H2)* |  |  |  |  |
| Generic | *reference* |  |  |  |
| High | 0.384 | (0.333) | 2.208\*\*\* | (0.522) |
| Low | 1.185\*\* | (0.384) | -3.349\*\*\* | (0.647) |
|  |  |  |  |  |
| *Redistribution (H3)* |  |  |  |  |
| Generic | *reference* |  |  |  |
| Earnings-related | 0.0796 | (0.367) | 0.124 | (0.926) |
| Universal | -0.434\* | (0.198) | -0.241 | (0.519) |
| Means-tested | -1.040\* | (0.405) | -1.758 | (1.476) |
|  |  |  |  |  |
| *Benefit design* |  |  |  |  |
| Generic | *reference* |  |  |  |
| Cash transfers | -0.570 | (0.372) | -0.412 | (1.280) |
| In-kind benefits | -2.047\*\*\* | (0.208) | -1.582\*\*\* | (0.403) |
| Social regulation | -0.511 | (0.296) | -1.831\*\* | (0.702) |
|  |  |  |  |  |
| *Reform type* |  |  |  |  |
| Institutional reform | 0.517\* | (0.234) | 0.861 | (0.743) |
|  |  |  |  |  |
| *Government type* |  |  |  |  |
| Cross-cutting coalition | -1.004\*\* | (0.381) | 0.625 | (0.510) |
|  |  |  |  |  |
| *Time* |  |  |  |  |
| 1970s | *reference* |  |  |  |
| 1980s | 0.664 | (0.437) | -0.260 | (0.479) |
| 1990s | 1.691\*\*\* | (0.483) | -1.461\* | (0.619) |
| 2000s | 0.0357 | (0.457) | -0.613 | (0.486) |
| 2010s | 1.295\* | (0.508) | -1.310\* | (0.635) |
|  |  |  |  |  |
| Constant | 0.0198 | (0.377) |  |  |
| Variance of random slopes | 0.211\*\* | (0.0727) |  |  |
| N (observations) | 18,219 |  |  |  |
| N (manifestos) | 24 |  |  |  |
| Log likelihood | -6344.7 |  |  |  |

Note: Figures are unstandardized coefficients and party-decade-clustered standard errors (in parentheses) from binary logistic regression with random effects at the manifesto level, \* *p* < 0.05, \*\* *p* < 0.01, \*\*\* *p* < 0.001.

**Figure A4 Average marginal effects (AMEs) of left party by revenue/expenditure, deservingness, and redistribution (standard errors clustered on party-decades, based on Table A7)**

X:\Democratic Governance\Projekte\Papiere\Welfare Policy\25 Partisan conflict\01 data\graphs\Figure A4 - AME plot other SEs.tif

Note: AMEs with 95-percent confidence intervals, calculated based on regression model in Table A7.

**Table A8 Regression model with economic control variables (GDP growth, unemployment rate, inflation)**

|  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | Linear term | | Interaction with left party | |
| Left party | -2.318 | (1.189) |  |  |
|  |  |  |  |  |
| *Revenue & expenditure (H1)* |  |  |  |  |
| Generic | *reference* |  |  |  |
| Revenue | 1.029\*\* | (0.380) | -1.490\*\*\* | (0.387) |
| Expenditure | -1.456\*\*\* | (0.0776) | -1.302\*\*\* | (0.0886) |
|  |  |  |  |  |
| *Perceived deservingness (H2)* |  |  |  |  |
| Generic | *reference* |  |  |  |
| High | 0.384\* | (0.160) | 2.223\*\*\* | (0.588) |
| Low | 1.184\*\*\* | (0.166) | -3.349\*\*\* | (0.305) |
|  |  |  |  |  |
| *Redistribution (H3)* |  |  |  |  |
| Generic | *reference* |  |  |  |
| Earnings-related | 0.0794 | (0.428) | 0.114 | (1.348) |
| Universal | -0.431\*\* | (0.149) | -0.249 | (0.622) |
| Means-tested | -1.040 | (0.543) | -1.774\*\* | (0.557) |
|  |  |  |  |  |
| *Benefit design* |  |  |  |  |
| Generic | *reference* |  |  |  |
| Cash transfers | -0.566\* | (0.230) | -0.420 | (2.149) |
| In-kind benefits | -2.045\*\*\* | (0.0991) | -1.586\*\*\* | (0.440) |
| Social regulation | -0.511 | (0.302) | -1.841 | (1.117) |
|  |  |  |  |  |
| *Reform type* |  |  |  |  |
| Institutional reform | 0.515\* | (0.240) | 0.869 | (1.117) |
|  |  |  |  |  |
| *Government type* |  |  |  |  |
| Cross-cutting coalition | -0.917\*\* | (0.289) | 0.606 | (0.350) |
|  |  |  |  |  |
| *Economic trends* |  |  |  |  |
| GDP growth | 0.105\*\* | (0.0391) | -0.0826\* | (0.0416) |
| Unemployment rate | 0.0937 | (0.153) | 0.253 | (0.300) |
| Inflation | 0.0910 | (0.0552) | 0.0972 | (0.0952) |
|  |  |  |  |  |
| *Time* |  |  |  |  |
| 1970s | *reference* |  |  |  |
| 1980s | 0.769\* | (0.376) | -0.857 | (0.527) |
| 1990s | 1.589\*\* | (0.483) | -2.319\* | (1.008) |
| 2000s | 0.0815 | (0.416) | -1.653 | (1.043) |
| 2010s | 1.271\* | (0.553) | -2.810 | (1.461) |
|  |  |  |  |  |
| Constant | 0.0198 | (0.377) |  |  |
| Variance of random slopes | 0.211\*\* | (0.0727) |  |  |
| N (observations) | 18,219 |  |  |  |
| N (manifestos) | 24 |  |  |  |
| Log likelihood | -6344.7 |  |  |  |

Note: Figures are unstandardized coefficients and party-clustered standard errors (in parentheses) from binary logistic regression with random effects at the manifesto level, \* *p* < 0.05, \*\* *p* < 0.01, \*\*\* *p* < 0.001. Data on economic indicators (measured in the election year) were obtained from the Federal Ministry of Labour, Family and Youth ([www.dnet.at/elis](http://www.dnet.at/elis)).

**Figure A5 Average marginal effects (AMEs) of left party by revenue/expenditure, deservingness, and redistribution (based on model in Table A8, including economic controls)**

X:\Democratic Governance\Projekte\Papiere\Welfare Policy\25 Partisan conflict\01 data\graphs\Figure A5 - AME plot econ controls.tif

**Table A9 Issues in the coding scheme & coding of independent variables**

|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| **DIR** | **CODE** | **ISSUE** | **REV/EXP** | **REDIST** | **DESERV** |
| -1 | 10206 | Right to work | G | UN | G |
| -1 | 10207 | Active labor market policy | EXP | UN | LO |
| 1 | 10315 | Liberalization / competition in health care sector | G | UN | HI |
| -1 | 10701 | Employment protection (general) | G | UN | G |
| -1 | 10702 | Strict labor regulation / against flexible working environment | G | UN | G |
| -1 | 10703 | Marginally / part-time employed (people) | G | G | G |
| 1 | 10704 | Marginal / part-time employment (labor contract) | G | G | G |
| 1 | 10705 | 'black labor' / illicit work / illegal employment | G | G | G |
| -1 | 10706 | (strong) protection from dismissals | G | UN | G |
| -1 | 10707 | Short-time work | G | UN | G |
| -1 | 10708 | Collective labor contract | G | UN | G |
| -1 | 10710 | Minimum wage | G | UN | G |
| -1 | 10711 | Combined wages / subsidized wages | EXP | UN | G |
| -1 | 10712 | Mandatory dismissal pay | G | ER | G |
| -1 | 10713 | Trade unions | G | G | G |
| -1 | 10714 | Codetermination / workers' participation / employee participation | G | G | G |
| -1 | 10715 | Strike | G | G | G |
| -1 | 10716 | Levelling of legal status of blue-collar and white-collar workers | G | G | G |
| 1 | 10717 | Working hours | G | UN | G |
| 1 | 10718 | Flexible working hours (general) | G | UN | G |
| 1 | 10719 | Flexible working hours (except on Sunday) | G | UN | G |
| -1 | 10720 | Paid vacation | G | UN | G |
| -1 | 10721 | Health and safety in the workplace (noise / chemicals etc.) | G | UN | G |
| -1 | 10806 | Rent control / protection of tenants | G | UN | G |
| -1 | 10807 | Public housing / social housing / housing allowance | EXP | MT | G |
| -1 | 11103 | Social policy / welfare state (general) | G | G | G |
| -1 | 11105 | Redistribution (specific) | G | G | G |
| 1 | 11106 | Targeting of social policies / against indiscriminate distribution of benefits | EXP | G | G |
| -1 | 11107 | Basic income | EXP | MT | LO |
| 1 | 11108 | Choice / individual responsibility / effort (general) | G | G | G |
| -1 | 11109 | Social security contributions / nonwage labor costs (general) | REV | ER | G |
| -1 | 11110 | Social security contributions / nonwage labor costs (employers) | REV | ER | G |
| -1 | 11111 | Social security contributions / nonwage labor costs (employees) | REV | ER | G |
| -1 | 11112 | Benefit fraud (general / Austrian natives) | G | G | G |
| 1 | 11113 | Poverty (general) | G | G | LO |
| -1 | 11114 | Payments to the poor / social assistance / emergency assistance / inflation compensation payments | EXP | MT | LO |
| 1 | 11117 | Reform of / mergers of / cut-backs in social insurance | G | G | G |
| -1 | 11201 | Support for the unemployed / unemployment benefits | EXP | ER | LO |
| -1 | 11202 | Expansion of unemployment insurance | EXP | ER | LO |
| -1 | 11203 | Improvement / acceleration of public employment service | EXP | G | LO |
| 1 | 11204 | Privatization of public employment service | G | G | LO |
| 1 | 11205 | Cuts in unemployment benefits in case of turning down job offers | EXP | G | LO |
| 1 | 11206 | Mandatory community service for unemployed | G | G | LO |
| -1 | 11301 | Health care system (general) | G | UN | HI |
| 0 | 11302 | Health care system reform (general) | G | UN | HI |
| -1 | 11304 | Health care spending | EXP | UN | HI |
| -1 | 11305 | Improve quality of health care | EXP | UN | HI |
| 1 | 11306 | Merging of public health insurance agencies / economization of administration | G | UN | HI |
| -1 | 11307 | Services for the health-insured | EXP | UN | HI |
| 1 | 11308 | Patient contributions / fees for outpatient care / prescription fees | REV | UN | HI |
| -1 | 11309 | Health insurance contributions | REV | ER | HI |
| -1 | 11310 | (in part) financing by state / taxes / budget / subsidies (health care) | REV | UN | HI |
| 1 | 11311 | Private health insurance | REV | G | HI |
| 1 | 11312 | ‘two-class’ health care | G | G | HI |
| 0 | 11313 | Supervision / quality control in the public health sector | G | G | HI |
| -1 | 11314 | Service-orientation in the public health sector (e.g. opening times, waiting times) | EXP | G | HI |
| 0 | 11315 | Linking health data (electronic health record ELGA, e-card) | G | G | HI |
| -1 | 11401 | Individual patients' rights (e.g. patient's provision) | G | G | HI |
| -1 | 11402 | Collective patients' rights (e.g. co-determination in health insurance companies) | G | G | HI |
| 1 | 11403 | Prevention / personal responsibility / healthy way of living (general) | G | G | HI |
| -1 | 11406 | Sick pay | EXP | ER | HI |
| -1 | 11501 | Geriatric care (general) | EXP | G | HI |
| -1 | 11502 | Care allowance | EXP | UN | HI |
| 1 | 11503 | Means-testing care allowances / contribution by relatives | REV | MT | HI |
| -1 | 11504 | Expansion of geriatric care (retirement homes) | EXP | UN | HI |
| -1 | 11505 | Private / home care (e.g. financial support) | EXP | UN | HI |
| -1 | 11506 | Private / home care by illegal immigrants | EXP | UN | HI |
| -1 | 11508 | Integration / support for disabled | EXP | G | HI |
| -1 | 11509 | Care: financing by taxes / privatization gains | REV | UN | HI |
| -1 | 11510 | Care: financing by social contributions / care insurance | REV | ER | HI |
| -1 | 11511 | Hospice / terminal care / palliative medicine | EXP | UN | HI |
| 1 | 11602 | Pension reform (general) | G | ER | HI |
| 0 | 11603 | Uniform pension scheme | G | ER | HI |
| 1 | 11604 | Raise of retirement age / longer working life | EXP | ER | HI |
| -1 | 11605 | Partial retirement | EXP | ER | HI |
| -1 | 11606 | Early retirement | EXP | ER | HI |
| -1 | 11607 | ‘Hacklerregelung’ (a specific early retirement plan) | EXP | ER | HI |
| -1 | 11608 | Pension increase (general) | EXP | ER | HI |
| -1 | 11609 | Pension increase: small pensions / widows | EXP | ER | HI |
| -1 | 11610 | Pension financing: insurance contributions | REV | ER | HI |
| -1 | 11611 | Pension financing: budget / taxes | REV | ER | HI |
| 1 | 11612 | Taxation of pensions | EXP | ER | HI |
| 1 | 11613 | Company pension / private pension (via employer) | REV | ER | HI |
| 1 | 11614 | Private pension | REV | ER | HI |
| -1 | 11615 | Crediting periods of child/geriatric care for pensions / pension for mothers | EXP | ER | HI |
| -1 | 11616 | Pension scheme: pay-as-you-go scheme / intergenerational contract | REV | ER | HI |
| 1 | 11617 | Pension scheme: three-pillar model | REV | ER | HI |
| -1 | 11702 | Support for families / family allowance | EXP | UN | HI |
| -1 | 11704 | Salary for mothers | EXP | UN | HI |
| -1 | 11705 | Tax deduction for families with children | EXP | ER | HI |
| -1 | 11706 | Child care benefit / maternity pay / maternity leave (general) | EXP | UN | HI |
| -1 | 11707 | Income-related child care benefit / maternity pay (specific) | EXP | ER | HI |
| 1 | 11708 | Limits for additional income on parental leave / child care payments (specific) | EXP | UN | HI |
| -1 | 11709 | Paternity leave (specific) | G | UN | HI |
| -1 | 11710 | Support for single parents (e.g. higher child care benefit) | EXP | MT | HI |
| -1 | 11711 | Right to part-time work for parents | G | UN | HI |
| -1 | 13201 | Kindergarten / child care / day care | EXP | UN | HI |
| -1 | 13202 | Childcare / day care for toddlers (nurseries, day care...) | EXP | UN | HI |
| -1 | 13203 | Extended opening times for kindergarten, nurseries, day care | EXP | UN | HI |
| -1 | 13204 | Cost-free kindergarten | EXP | UN | HI |
| -1 | 13205 | Compulsory pre-school / kindergarten year | EXP | UN | HI |
| -1 | 13206 | Extension of domestic child care / childminders / nannies | EXP | UN | HI |
| -1 | 13409 | Financial support for university students / grants / scholarships | EXP | MT | HI |
| -1 | 17507 | Social Europe | G | G | G |
| -1 | 19102 | Social protection of women | G | G | G |
| 1 | 19111 | Harmonization of retirement ages of men and women | EXP | ER | HI |
| -1 | 21106 | Social partnership / corporatism / compulsory membership in chambers | G | G | G |
| 1 | 21113 | Reform of chambers (Chamber of Labor, Austrian Economic Chamber, …) | G | G | G |
| 1 | 22701 | Welfare benefits only for Austrian citizens | EXP | G | LO |
| 1 | 22702 | Special welfare system for foreigners | G | G | LO |
| -1 | 22703 | Benefit fraud by foreigners | G | G | LO |

Note: DIR = Direction of issue: -1 indicates that support for an issue (i.e. a predicate of +1) implies an expansion/maintainance of benefit or regulatory levels, whereas +1 indicates that support for an issue implies a pro-retrenchment statement. REV/EXP = Revenue & expenditure: REV = revenue, EXP = expenditure, G = generic. REDIST = Degree of redistribution: ER = earnings-related, UN = universal, MT = means-tested, G = generic. DESERV = Perceived deservingness of benefit target group: HI = high, LO = low, G = generic