Appendix: The Evolution of Public Policy Attitudes: Comparing the Mechanisms of Policy Support Across the Stages of a Policy Cycle

Appendix 1.1. Socioeconomic Characteristics

|  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | May 2012 | May 2013 | Sept. 2014 | Subsample |
| Female | 0.34 | 0.33 | 0.34 | 0.33 |
| Education (1 = 9+ years, 7 = graduate studies) | 5.0 | 5.1 | 5.2 | 5.0 |
| Age (2013) | 48 | 48 | 49 | 50 |
| Subjective income (1=very bad, 5=very good) | 4.02 | 4.03 | 4.02 | 4.01 |
| Gothenburg resident | 0.63 | 0.63 | 0.61 | 0.63 |
| Number of obs. | 5,512 | 4,399 | 1,399 | 980 |

Appendix 1.2. Attitudes toward the Congestion Tax (Range 1 – 7: 1=very negative, 7=very positive)

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
|  | Total | Subsample  |
|  | May 2012 | May 2013 | Sept. 2014 | May 2012 | May 2013 | Sept. 2014 |
| Total mean (7 steps) | 2.62 | 3.06\*\*\* | 3.39\*\*\* | 2.74 | 3.05\*\*\* | 3.25\*\*\* |
| Share against | 72.9% | 64.4%\*\*\* | 56.5%\*\*\* | 69.0% | 61.3%\*\*\* | 56.9%\*\*\* |
| Number of obs. | 5,493 | 4,703 | 1,422 | 980 | 980 | 980 |

Note: \*\*\* indicates significant difference from the mean in the previous wave at the 1% level according to *t*-tests. The first three columns display the figures for the total samples in the three waves, while the last three columns contain the subsample data, i.e. those who participated in all three phases. Consistent with previous studies, support for the congestion tax increased with experience, as the respondents became less negative post-implementation. However, 21 months after the implementation, a majority of respondents still displayed negative attitudes. This was also evident when asked for the dichotomous choice, whether one is generally for or against the tax, as displayed in the second row of the table.

Appendix 1.3. Attitudes toward the Congestion Tax in all Seven Waves among Those Remaining in the Panel throughout the Whole Period (Range 1 – 7: 1=very negative, 7=very positive)

|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | May 2012 | Dec. 2012 | May 2013 | Nov. 2013 | June 2014 | Sept. 2014 | Oct. 2014 |
| Total mean (7 steps) | 2.74 | 2.70 | 3.05\*\*\* | 3.13 | 3.10 | 3.25\*\*\* | 3.26 |
| Number of obs. | 874 | 874 | 874 | 874 | 874 | 874 | 874 |

Note: \*\*\* indicates significant difference from the mean in waves 1 and 2 at the 1% level according to *t*-tests. All steps are included thus reducing the sample. The major changes in attitudes occur after the implementation (January 2013) and just before the referendum (September 2014), when support increases significantly.

Appendix 1.4. Attitudes toward the Congestion Tax by City of Residence (total sample) (Range 1 – 7: 1=very negative, 7=very positive)

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | May 2012 | May 2013 | Sept. 2014 |
|  | Gothenburg | Outside | Gothenburg | Outside | Gothenburg | Outside |
| Total mean (7 steps) | 2.78 | 2.34\*\*\* | 3.14 | 2.83\*\*\* | 3.52 | 3.18\*\*\* |
| Share against | 69.2% | 79.1%\*\*\* | 62.5% | 69.7%\*\*\* | 53.9% | 62.1%\*\*\* |
| Share of obs. | 63% | 37% | 63% | 37% | 64% | 36% |

Note: \*\*\* indicates that those residing in and outside of Gothenburg have significantly different attitudes at the 1% level according to t-tests.

Appendix 1.5. Procedural Factors. Mean Values (Range 1 – 7: 1=not at all, 7=completely)

|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  |  | Total |  |  | Subsample |  |
|  | May 2012 | May 2013 | Sept. 2014 | May 2012 | May 2013 | Sept. 2014 |
| Democratic?  | 2.38 | 2.53\*\*\* | 2.59 | 2.49 | 2.57\*\*\* | 2.50\*\*\* |
| Open?  | 2.41 | 2.36\*\* |  |  |  |  |
| Fair?  | 2.54 | 2.60\*\*\* |  |  |  |  |
| Number of obs. | 4,094 | 4,094 | 1,418 | 980 | 980 | 980 |

Note: \*\*\* indicates significant difference from the mean in the previous wave at the 1% level according to *t*-tests.

Appendix 1.6. Institutional Trust. Mean Values (1 = high trust, 5 = low trust)

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
|  | May 2012 | May 2013 |
| Trust in central government | 2.64 (2.66) | 2.6 (2.67) |
| Trust in parliament | 2.72 (2.72) | 2.71 (2.70) |
| Trust in municipal government | 3.53 (3.68) | 3.66\*\*\* (3.81\*\*\*) |
| Trust in municipal council | 3.51 (3.64) | 3.63\*\*\* (3.77\*\*\*) |
| Trust in municipal administration | 3.44 (3.56) | 3.50\*\* (3.62\*\*\*) |
| Number of obs. | 3,790 (2,393) | 3,790 (2,393) |

Note: \*\*\* indicates significant difference from the mean in the previous wave at the 1% level according to *t*-tests. Results for Gothenburg residents in parentheses.

Appendix 1.7. Personal and Political Outcomes. Mean Values (1 = do not agree, 7 = fully agree)

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | May 2012 | May 2013 | Sept 2014 |
| The congestion tax goes against my values | 4.66 | 4.45\*\*\* |  |
| I will have it better than before | 2.41 | 2.93\*\*\* | 2.62\*\*\* |
| My economic situation will be worse | 4.29 | 4.12\*\*\* | 3.70\*\*\* |
| It violates my sense of freedom | 4.30 | 4.08\*\*\* |  |
| I think it will affect my quality of life negatively | 3.98 | 3.76\*\*\* | 3.76 |
| My travel time will be shorter after introduction  | 2.13 | 2.93\*\*\* | 2.42\*\*\* |
|  |  |  |  |
| It is a necessary measure | 2.72 | 3.03\*\*\* | 3.11\*\* |
| It is a fair measure | 2.70 | 2.84\*\*\* | 2.84 |
| It contributes to protect future generations  | 2.91 | 3.13\*\*\* | 3.10 |
| It contributes to protect the environment | 2.98 | 3.17\*\*\* | 3.12 |
| It affects primarily those causing the problems | 3.09 | 3.17\*\* |  |
|  |  |  |  |
| It will be very cumbersome to pay | 3.22 | 2.41\*\*\* |  |
| How will the tax affect the congestion (1 = diminish, 7 = increase) | 3.22 | 3.07\*\*\* | 3.69\*\*\* |
| How will the tax affect the pollution (1 = diminish, 7 = increase) | 3.32 | 3.26\*\* |  |
| How will the tax affect the noise (1 = diminish, 7 = increase) | 3.58 | 3.55  |  |
| How will the tax affect the city’s economy (1 = diminish, 7 = increase) | 4.18 | 4.28\*\*\* | 4.35\*\* |
| Number of obs.A | 3,580/976 | 3,580/976 | 976 |

Note: \*\*\* and \*\* indicate a significant difference from the means in the previous wave at the 1% and 5% level, respectively, according to *t*-tests.

A For variables covered in the two first waves only, the sample is 3,580. The sample for questions covered in all waves consists of 976 respondents.

Appendix 1.8. Correlation Matrix for Variables in May 2012

|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | Support | Instrumented Legitimacy | Tax Has Neg. Effect on Personal Economy | Travel Time Will be Shorter | Tax Increases Congestion | City’s Economy Will Improve |
| Support | 1 |  |  |  |  |  |
| Instrumented legitimacy | 0.42 | 1 |  |  |  |  |
| Tax has neg. effect on personal economy | -0.61 | -0.30 | 1 |  |  |  |
| Travel time will be shorter | -0.48 | -0.28 | 0.34 | 1 |  |  |
| Tax increases congestion | 0.47 | 0.22 | -0.28 | -0.29 | 1 |  |
| City’s economy will improve | 0.16 | 0.12 | -0.09 | -0.12 | 0.08 | 1 |