## Table A2: Robustness tests of Table 1 models, inclusion of regional fiscal autonomy

|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | **(1)** | **(2)** | **(3)** | **(4)** | **(5)** | **(6)** |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| District Magnitude | -0.01\*\* | -0.01\*\*\* | -0.20\*\*\* | -0.23\*\*\* | -0.20\*\*\* | -0.23\*\*\* |
|  | (0.004) | (0.003) | (0.055) | (0.045) | (0.055) | (0.045) |
| Ballot Control |  |  | 10.16\* | 9.89\* | 10.16\* | 9.89\* |
|  |  |  | (5.387) | (5.088) | (5.387) | (5.088) |
| District Magnitude × Ballot Control |  |  | 0.19\*\*\* | 0.22\*\*\* | 0.19\*\*\* | 0.22\*\*\* |
|  |  |  | (0.058) | (0.048) | (0.058) | (0.048) |
| Poll-Vote Rules |  |  | -16.33 | -14.85 | -8.17 | -7.43 |
|  |  |  | (11.920) | (11.350) | (5.960) | (5.675) |
| District Magnitude × Poll-Vote Rules |  |  | 0.76\*\*\* | 0.88\*\*\* | 0.38\*\*\* | 0.44\*\*\* |
|  |  |  | (0.191) | (0.159) | (0.096) | (0.080) |
| Election  | -0.57 | 0.20 | -0.68 | -0.11 | -0.68 | -0.11 |
|  | (1.870) | (1.735) | (1.943) | (1.810) | (1.943) | (1.810) |
| Government Preference | -0.24 | -0.32 | -0.28 | -0.35 | -0.28 | -0.35 |
|  | (0.328) | (0.275) | (0.343) | (0.296) | (0.343) | (0.296) |
| Years in EU | -13.35\*\*\* | -16.23\*\*\* | -13.36\*\*\* | -17.12\*\*\* | -13.36\*\*\* | -17.12\*\*\* |
|  | (3.590) | (4.022) | (3.763) | (4.242) | (3.763) | (4.242) |
| GDP per capita at t-1 | -0.40 | -0.30 | -0.34 | -0.13 | -0.34 | -0.13 |
|  | (0.792) | (0.754) | (0.764) | (0.737) | (0.764) | (0.737) |
| Regional Fiscal Autonomy at t-1 | -9.04 | 0.24 | -10.05 | -4.43 | -10.05 | -4.43 |
|  | (34.530) | (34.090) | (33.830) | (33.200) | (33.830) | (33.200) |
| Constant | 80.71 | 65.11 | 87.93 | 76.22 | 87.93 | 76.22 |
|  | (56.220) | (54.360) | (56.580) | (54.100) | (56.580) | (54.100) |
| R-squared | 0.231 | 0.294 | 0.254 | 0.317 | 0.254 | 0.317 |
| Wald chi2 | 506.6 | 2721 | 631.0 | 222.8 | 631.0 | 922.9 |
| AR1 error correction | common | unit-specific | common | unit-specific | common | unit-specific |

Notes: See Table 1, Model 1 rho: 0.024, Model 3 and 5 rho: -0.015. Data on regional fiscal autonomy are collected from Hooghe, Marks, and Schakel. (2010)

## Table A3: Robustness tests of Table 1 models, number unlawful aid measures as dependent variable

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | **(1)** | **(2)** | **(3)** |
|  |  |  |  |
| District Magnitude | -0.102\*\*\* | -2.616\*\*\* | -2.616\*\*\* |
|  | (0.0139) | (0.314) | (0.314) |
| Ballot Control |  | 83.63\*\*\* | 83.63\*\*\* |
|  |  | (7.298) | (7.298) |
| District Magnitude × Ballot Control |  | 2.951\*\*\* | 2.951\*\*\* |
|  |  | (0.354) | (0.354) |
| Poll-Vote Rules |  | -13.87 | -6.933 |
|  |  | (26.08) | (13.04) |
| District Magnitude × Poll-Vote Rules |  | 11.22\*\*\* | 5.608\*\*\* |
|  |  | (1.256) | (0.628) |
| Election  | 10.59 | 16.09 | 16.09 |
|  | (14.78) | (14.51) | (14.51) |
| Government Preference | -5.424\* | -3.466 | -3.466 |
|  | (2.954) | (2.588) | (2.588) |
| Years in EU | -95.96\*\*\* | -106.2\*\*\* | -106.2\*\*\* |
|  | (14.24) | (17.32) | (17.32) |
| GDP per capita at t-1 | -3.821 | -0.516 | -0.516 |
|  | (3.599) | (3.024) | (3.024) |
| Number of Aid Measures | 2.804\*\*\* | 2.693\*\*\* | 2.693\*\*\* |
|  | (0.449) | (0.382) | (0.382) |
| Constant | 411.6\*\*\* | 269.6\*\*\* | 269.6\*\*\* |
|  | (123.0) | (96.30) | (96.30) |
| Log-likelihood | -383.2 | -375.0 | -375.0 |
| Lnalpha | -2.781 | -12.81 | -12.80 |

Notes: Negative binomial regressions with country fixed effects and standard errors clustered on countries. N=297. Coefficient and standard errors, in parentheses, scaled up by a factor of 100. \*\*\*p < 0.01, \*\*p< 0.05, \*p < 0.1. Average of scores of ‘pool’ and ‘vote’ in Model 2, sum of scores in Model 3.

## Table A4: Robustness tests of Table 1 models, inclusion of public expenditure

|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | **(1)** | **(2)** | **(3)** | **(4)** | **(5)** | **(6)** |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| District Magnitude | -0.00873\* | -0.00777\*\*\* | -0.201\*\*\* | -0.230\*\*\* | -0.201\*\*\* | -0.230\*\*\* |
|  | (0.00449) | (0.00265) | (0.0545) | (0.0428) | (0.0545) | (0.0428) |
| Ballot Control |  |  | 10.23\* | 9.985\*\* | 10.23\* | 9.985\*\* |
|  |  |  | (5.387) | (5.033) | (5.387) | (5.033) |
| District Magnitude × Ballot Control |  |  | 0.190\*\*\* | 0.232\*\*\* | 0.190\*\*\* | 0.232\*\*\* |
|  |  |  | (0.0537) | (0.0436) | (0.0537) | (0.0436) |
| Poll-Vote Rules |  |  | -14.93 | -12.38 | -7.464 | -6.190 |
|  |  |  | (11.89) | (10.95) | (5.944) | (5.477) |
| District Magnitude × Poll-Vote Rules |  |  | 0.773\*\*\* | 0.901\*\*\* | 0.386\*\*\* | 0.450\*\*\* |
|  |  |  | (0.176) | (0.142) | (0.0881) | (0.0711) |
| Election  | -0.582 | 0.153 | -0.657 | -0.104 | -0.657 | -0.104 |
|  | (1.882) | (1.730) | (1.946) | (1.800) | (1.946) | (1.800) |
| Government Preference | -0.230 | -0.310 | -0.265 | -0.329 | -0.265 | -0.329 |
|  | (0.327) | (0.271) | (0.340) | (0.289) | (0.340) | (0.289) |
| Years in EU | -13.60\*\*\* | -16.76\*\*\* | -13.66\*\*\* | -17.79\*\*\* | -13.66\*\*\* | -17.79\*\*\* |
|  | (3.457) | (3.768) | (3.603) | (3.920) | (3.603) | (3.920) |
| GDP per capita at t-1 | -0.396 | -0.282 | -0.335 | -0.105 | -0.335 | -0.105 |
|  | (0.770) | (0.724) | (0.743) | (0.705) | (0.743) | (0.705) |
| Public expenditure at t-1 | -0.107 | -0.157 | -0.0940 | -0.161 | -0.0940 | -0.161 |
|  | (0.237) | (0.231) | (0.228) | (0.228) | (0.228) | (0.228) |
| Constant | 67.25\*\* | 72.27\*\*\* | 70.99\*\* | 72.81\*\*\* | 70.99\*\* | 72.81\*\*\* |
|  | (28.59) | (26.81) | (28.05) | (26.37) | (28.05) | (26.37) |
| R-squared | 0.233 | 0.298 | 0.255 | 0.320 | 0.255 | 0.320 |
| Wald chi2 | 409.7 | 296.9 | 405.7 | 312.1 | 405.7 | 420.9 |
| AR1 error correction | common | unit-specific | common | unit-specific | common | unit-specific |

Notes: See Table 1, Model 1 rho: 0.024, Model 3 and 5 rho: -0.015 Public expenditure as % of GDP, Source: IMF, Government Finance Statistics.

## Table A5: Robustness tests of Table 1 models, inclusion of aid expenditure

|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | **(1)** | **(2)** | **(3)** | **(4)** | **(5)** | **(6)** |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| District Magnitude | -0.00936\*\* | -0.00847\*\*\* | -0.203\*\*\* | -0.229\*\*\* | -0.203\*\*\* | -0.229\*\*\* |
|  | (0.00427) | (0.00262) | (0.0547) | (0.0444) | (0.0547) | (0.0444) |
| Ballot Control |  |  | 10.17\* | 9.881\* | 10.17\* | 9.881\* |
|  |  |  | (5.408) | (5.093) | (5.408) | (5.093) |
| District Magnitude × Ballot Control |  |  | 0.188\*\*\* | 0.225\*\*\* | 0.188\*\*\* | 0.225\*\*\* |
|  |  |  | (0.0578) | (0.0483) | (0.0578) | (0.0483) |
| Poll-Vote Rules |  |  | -16.37 | -14.91 | -8.185 | -7.454 |
|  |  |  | (11.95) | (11.37) | (5.975) | (5.684) |
| District Magnitude × Poll-Vote Rules |  |  | 0.769\*\*\* | 0.878\*\*\* | 0.385\*\*\* | 0.439\*\*\* |
|  |  |  | (0.191) | (0.160) | (0.0957) | (0.0801) |
| Election  | -0.552 | 0.194 | -0.667 | -0.116 | -0.667 | -0.116 |
|  | (1.861) | (1.722) | (1.929) | (1.793) | (1.929) | (1.793) |
| Government Preference | -0.237 | -0.316 | -0.277 | -0.347 | -0.277 | -0.347 |
|  | (0.326) | (0.278) | (0.341) | (0.299) | (0.341) | (0.299) |
| Years in EU | -13.37\*\*\* | -16.24\*\*\* | -13.41\*\*\* | -17.12\*\*\* | -13.41\*\*\* | -17.12\*\*\* |
|  | (3.592) | (4.030) | (3.775) | (4.256) | (3.775) | (4.256) |
| GDP per capita at t-1 | -0.401 | -0.295 | -0.341 | -0.132 | -0.341 | -0.132 |
|  | (0.774) | (0.731) | (0.748) | (0.715) | (0.748) | (0.715) |
| Aid expenditure at t-1 | -5.52e-05 | -2.51e-05 | -0.000110 | -6.32e-05 | -0.000110 | -6.32e-05 |
|  | (0.000190) | (0.000193) | (0.000191) | (0.000188) | (0.000191) | (0.000188) |
| Constant | 62.91\*\* | 65.54\*\* | 68.09\*\* | 67.73\*\*\* | 68.09\*\* | 67.73\*\*\* |
|  | (28.12) | (26.26) | (27.72) | (25.96) | (27.72) | (25.96) |
| R-squared | 0.231 | 0.294 | 0.253 | 0.316 | 0.253 | 0.316 |
| Wald chi2 | 77.25 | 230.4 | 985.7 | 317.8 | 985.7 | 317.8 |
| AR1 error correction | common | unit-specific | common | unit-specific | common | unit-specific |

Notes: See Table 1, Model 1 rho: 0.026, Model 3 and 5 rho: -0.011.Expenditure aid is non-crisis state aid, excluding railways, in millions of euros. Source: EU Commission.

## Table A6: Robustness tests of Table 1 models, government left-right position from Chapel Hill Surveys data

|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | **(1)** | **(2)** | **(3)** | **(4)** | **(5)** | **(6)** |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| District Magnitude | -0.00887\*\* | -0.00846\*\*\* | -0.199\*\*\* | -0.227\*\*\* | -0.199\*\*\* | -0.227\*\*\* |
|  | (0.00436) | (0.00267) | (0.0516) | (0.0417) | (0.0516) | (0.0417) |
| Ballot Control |  |  | 10.30\* | 10.10\* | 10.30\* | 10.10\* |
|  |  |  | (5.685) | (5.394) | (5.685) | (5.394) |
| District Magnitude × Ballot Control |  |  | 0.189\*\*\* | 0.226\*\*\* | 0.189\*\*\* | 0.226\*\*\* |
|  |  |  | (0.0523) | (0.0415) | (0.0523) | (0.0415) |
| Poll-Vote Rules |  |  | -14.52 | -13.47 | -7.261 | -6.735 |
|  |  |  | (11.77) | (11.35) | (5.886) | (5.675) |
| District Magnitude × Poll-Vote Rules |  |  | 0.777\*\*\* | 0.890\*\*\* | 0.388\*\*\* | 0.445\*\*\* |
|  |  |  | (0.172) | (0.134) | (0.0860) | (0.0671) |
| Election  | -0.119 | 0.485 | -0.139 | 0.190 | -0.139 | 0.190 |
|  | (1.976) | (1.785) | (2.025) | (1.841) | (2.025) | (1.841) |
| Government Preference | 0.125 | -0.115 | 0.0353 | -0.285 | 0.0353 | -0.285 |
|  | (0.818) | (0.735) | (0.809) | (0.727) | (0.809) | (0.727) |
| Years in EU | -13.70\*\*\* | -15.96\*\*\* | -13.99\*\*\* | -17.34\*\*\* | -13.99\*\*\* | -17.34\*\*\* |
|  | (3.281) | (3.502) | (3.436) | (3.661) | (3.436) | (3.661) |
| GDP per capita at t-1 | -0.488 | -0.360 | -0.361 | -0.0726 | -0.361 | -0.0726 |
|  | (0.884) | (0.787) | (0.869) | (0.776) | (0.869) | (0.776) |
| Constant | 62.98\*\* | 63.86\*\* | 65.12\*\* | 62.20\*\* | 65.12\*\* | 62.20\*\* |
|  | (30.35) | (27.20) | (30.74) | (27.58) | (30.74) | (27.58) |
| R-squared | 0.252 | 0.316 | 0.281 | 0.342 | 0.281 | 0.342 |
| Wald chi2 | 559.8 | 457.5 | 501.6 | 4759 | 699.1 | 4759 |
| AR1 error correction | common | unit-specific | common | unit-specific | common | unit-specific |

Notes: N= 266, groups 24, see Table 1 for other details, Model 1 rho: 0.012, Model 3 and 5 rho: -0.034. Chapel Hill Surveys data (1999; 2002; 2006; 2010)

## Table A7: Robustness tests of Table 1 models, government position on left-right and EU integration from Chapel Hill Surveys data

|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | **(1)** | **(2)** | **(3)** | **(4)** | **(5)** | **(6)** |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| District Magnitude | -0.00939\*\* | -0.00807\*\*\* | -0.197\*\*\* | -0.229\*\*\* | -0.197\*\*\* | -0.229\*\*\* |
|  | (0.00410) | (0.00306) | (0.0517) | (0.0452) | (0.0517) | (0.0452) |
| Ballot Control |  |  | 9.937\* | 10.29\* | 9.937\* | 10.29\* |
|  |  |  | (5.767) | (5.403) | (5.767) | (5.403) |
| District Magnitude × Ballot Control |  |  | 0.185\*\*\* | 0.228\*\*\* | 0.185\*\*\* | 0.228\*\*\* |
|  |  |  | (0.0521) | (0.0463) | (0.0521) | (0.0463) |
| Poll-Vote Rules |  |  | -14.69 | -13.69 | -7.345 | -6.846 |
|  |  |  | (11.78) | (11.35) | (5.891) | (5.675) |
| District Magnitude × Poll-Vote Rules |  |  | 0.753\*\*\* | 0.906\*\*\* | 0.376\*\*\* | 0.453\*\*\* |
|  |  |  | (0.172) | (0.151) | (0.0860) | (0.0757) |
| Election  | -0.227 | 0.463 | -0.266 | 0.147 | -0.266 | 0.147 |
|  | (1.949) | (1.778) | (2.005) | (1.843) | (2.005) | (1.843) |
| Government Left-Right Preference | 0.0264 | 0.00855 | -0.0490 | -0.183 | -0.0490 | -0.183 |
|  | (0.793) | (0.735) | (0.781) | (0.731) | (0.781) | (0.731) |
| Government Preference on EU Integration | 2.009 | -0.418 | 1.459 | -0.430 | 1.459 | -0.430 |
|  | (1.468) | (0.879) | (1.417) | (0.838) | (1.417) | (0.838) |
| Years in EU | -13.29\*\*\* | -15.70\*\*\* | -13.78\*\*\* | -17.07\*\*\* | -13.78\*\*\* | -17.07\*\*\* |
|  | (3.174) | (3.524) | (3.385) | (3.691) | (3.385) | (3.691) |
| GDP per capita at t-1 | -0.488 | -0.354 | -0.377 | -0.0646 | -0.377 | -0.0646 |
|  | (0.877) | (0.815) | (0.863) | (0.805) | (0.863) | (0.805) |
| Constant | 50.62 | 63.93\*\* | 56.82\* | 62.41\*\* | 56.82\* | 62.41\*\* |
|  | (32.26) | (27.72) | (32.23) | (28.08) | (32.23) | (28.08) |
| R-squared | 0.255 | 0.313 | 0.282 | 0.339 | 0.282 | 0.339 |
| Wald chi2 | 204.0 | 260.8 | 4066 | 682.5 | 4066 | 682.5 |
| AR1 error correction | common | unit-specific | common | unit-specific | common | unit-specific |

Notes: N= 266, groups 24, see Table 1 for other details, Model 1 rho: 0.012, Model 3 and 5 rho: -0.030. Chapel Hill Surveys data (1999; 2002; 2006; 2010).

## Table A8: Robustness tests of Table 1 models, inclusion of all control variables

|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | **(1)** | **(2)** | **(3)** | **(4)** | **(5)** | **(6)** |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| District Magnitude | -0.00898\*\* | -0.00786\*\*\* | -0.203\*\*\* | -0.230\*\*\* | -0.203\*\*\* | -0.230\*\*\* |
|  | (0.00449) | (0.00277) | (0.0544) | (0.0427) | (0.0544) | (0.0427) |
| Ballot Control |  |  | 10.27\* | 9.982\*\* | 10.27\* | 9.982\*\* |
|  |  |  | (5.402) | (5.037) | (5.402) | (5.037) |
| District Magnitude × Ballot Control |  |  | 0.192\*\*\* | 0.232\*\*\* | 0.192\*\*\* | 0.232\*\*\* |
|  |  |  | (0.0538) | (0.0437) | (0.0538) | (0.0437) |
| Poll-Vote Rules |  |  | -14.95 | -12.44 | -7.474 | -6.221 |
|  |  |  | (11.92) | (10.96) | (5.962) | (5.478) |
| District Magnitude × Poll-Vote Rules |  |  | 0.780\*\*\* | 0.901\*\*\* | 0.390\*\*\* | 0.451\*\*\* |
|  |  |  | (0.177) | (0.143) | (0.0883) | (0.0715) |
| Election  | -0.606 | 0.160 | -0.692 | -0.121 | -0.692 | -0.121 |
|  | (1.891) | (1.747) | (1.955) | (1.815) | (1.955) | (1.815) |
| Government Preference | -0.229 | -0.309 | -0.262 | -0.330 | -0.262 | -0.330 |
|  | (0.326) | (0.274) | (0.339) | (0.293) | (0.339) | (0.293) |
| Years in EU | -13.63\*\*\* | -16.75\*\*\* | -13.73\*\*\* | -17.78\*\*\* | -13.73\*\*\* | -17.78\*\*\* |
|  | (3.466) | (3.785) | (3.620) | (3.939) | (3.620) | (3.939) |
| GDP per capita at t-1 | -0.387 | -0.286 | -0.320 | -0.107 | -0.320 | -0.107 |
|  | (0.788) | (0.747) | (0.762) | (0.728) | (0.762) | (0.728) |
| Regional Fiscal Autonomy at t-1 | -6.570 | 4.350 | -7.444 | 0.448 | -7.444 | 0.448 |
|  | (35.17) | (35.33) | (34.53) | (34.89) | (34.53) | (34.89) |
| Public expenditure at t-1 | -0.106 | -0.157 | -0.0928 | -0.161 | -0.0928 | -0.161 |
|  | (0.237) | (0.231) | (0.229) | (0.229) | (0.229) | (0.229) |
| Aid expenditure at t-1 | -4.25e-05 | -1.38e-05 | -9.90e-05 | -5.04e-05 | -9.90e-05 | -5.04e-05 |
|  | (0.000192) | (0.000194) | (0.000194) | (0.000189) | (0.000194) | (0.000189) |
| Constant | 80.16 | 63.73 | 85.56 | 72.10 | 85.56 | 72.10 |
|  | (57.27) | (57.06) | (57.61) | (57.27) | (57.61) | (57.27) |
| R-squared | 0.233 | 0.298 | 0.254 | 0.320 | 0.254 | 0.320 |
| Wald chi2 | 281.5 | 385.3 | 5502 | 577.8 | 2170 | 1354 |
| AR1 error correction | common | unit-specific | common | unit-specific | common | unit-specific |

Notes: See Table 1, Model 1 rho: 0.026, Model 3 and 5 rho: -0.011.

## Table A9: Robustness tests of Table 1 models, fractional logit models

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | **(1)** | **(2)** | **(3)** |
|  |  |  |  |
| District Magnitude | -0.133 | -16.09\*\*\* | -16.09\*\*\* |
|  | (0.161) | (1.409) | (1.409) |
| Ballot Control |  | 55.51 | 55.51 |
|  |  | (115.6) | (115.6) |
| District Magnitude × Ballot Control |  | 17.42\*\*\* | 17.42\*\*\* |
|  |  | (1.499) | (1.499) |
| Poll-Vote Rules |  | -908.5\*\*\* | -454.2\*\*\* |
|  |  | (193.8) | (96.89) |
| District Magnitude × Poll-Vote Rules |  | 61.43\*\*\* | 30.71\*\*\* |
|  |  | (4.872) | (2.436) |
| Election  | -11.99 | -12.84 | -12.84 |
|  | (22.20) | (23.30) | (23.30) |
| Government Preference | -5.649 | -3.010 | -3.010 |
|  | (4.360) | (4.641) | (4.641) |
| Years in EU | -135.6\*\*\* | -133.8\*\*\* | -133.8\*\*\* |
|  | (24.87) | (27.18) | (27.18) |
| GDP per capita at t-1 | -1.787 | 0.603 | 0.603 |
|  | (5.246) | (5.557) | (5.557) |
| Number of Aid Measures | 252.9 | 477.9\*\* | 477.9\*\* |
|  | (187.5) | (228.0) | (228.0) |
| Constant | -0.133 | -16.09\*\*\* | -16.09\*\*\* |
|  | (0.161) | (1.409) | (1.409) |

Notes: Fractional logit models with country fixed effects. N=297. Coefficient and standard errors, in parentheses, scaled up by a factor of 100. \*\*\*p < 0.01, \*\*p< 0.05, \*p < 0.1. Average of scores of ‘pool’ and ‘vote’ in Model 2, sum of scores in Model 3.

**Data Sources for the Robustness Tests**

Regional Fiscal Autonomy:

Hooghe L., Marks G. and Schakel A. H. (2010) *The Rise of Regional Authority: A Comparative Study of 42 Democracies*. London: Routledge.

Public expenditure:

World Bank - World Development Indicators, http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/GC.XPN.TOTL.GD.ZS

Aid expenditure:

EU Commission - DG Competition,

http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/tgm\_comp/table.do?tab=table&init=1&language=en&pcode=comp\_ncr\_xrl\_01&plugin=1

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