# APPENDIX

# A. Majority and Opposition Parties from the IX to the XVI legislative terms (1983-2008).

This table shows changing majority and opposition parties/coalitions during the period covered in our analysis, which comprises two First Republic legislative terms, two “transition” terms and four Second Republic terms.

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Legislative term | Election year | Majority (% seats in Lower Chamber) | Main opposition parties (% seats in Lower Chamber) |
| IX | 1983 | Dc (35.9%); Psi (11.7%); Pri (4.6%); Psdi (3.5%); Pli (2.5%) | Pci (28.1%) |
| X | 1987 | Dc (37.2%); Psi (15.9%); Pri (3.2%); Psdi (1.9%); Pli (1.7%) | Pci/Pds (23.7%) |
| XI | 1992 | Dc (28.4%); Psi (14.4%); Psdi (2.4%); Pli (2.7%) | Pds (16.7%) |
| XII | 1994 | Fi (17.9%); Ln (18.6%); Ccd (4.3%); AN (17.3%) | Progressisti (17.3%); Rc (6.2%) |
| XIII | 1996 | Ulivo (38%); Rc/Pdci (5.7%) | Fi (18.8%); Ccd/Cdu (2%) |
| XIV | 2001 | Cdl (53.3%) | Ulivo (36.1%); Rc (2%) |
| XV | 2006 | Unione (44.9%) | CdL (41.7%) |
| XVI | 2008 | Pdl (44%); Ln (9.5%) | Pd (34%); Idv (4.5%) |

# B- Italian Policy Agendas codebook

A version of the codebook including subtopics is available at “https://goo.gl/hFWnDy”

1 Domestic Macroeconomic Issues

2 Civil Rights, Minority Issues, and Civil Liberties

3 Health

4 Agriculture

5 Labor and Employment

6 Education

7 Environment

8 Energy

9 Immigration and Refugee Issues

10 Transportation

12 Law, Crime, and Family Issues

13 Social Welfare

14 Community Development and Housing Issues

15 Banking, Finance, and Domestic Commerce

16 Defense

17 Space, Science, Technology, and Communications

18 Foreign Trade

19 International Affairs and Foreign Aid

20 Government Operations

21 Public Lands, Water Management, and Territorial Issues

23 Cultural Policy Issues

# C- Alternative models

There is another possibility rooted in the veto players theory (Tsebelis 2002) expecting all parties to hold some veto power in the coalition regardless of their size. To verify this alternative operationalisation of our main independent variable, we aggregated party agendas by taking the simple mean across parties for each issue in the overall agenda of the coalition. In the following tables, we conducted analyses using an unweighted version of our majority variable alongside an opposition measure including just the main (largest) opposition party. Table A3 and A4 present these combined results using the same dependent variables included in Tables 2 and 3 in the main text.

Table A3: Majority and Opposition Agendas (unweighted)

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
|  | All Laws | All Executive Sponsored Laws |
| Majority | 0.849\*\*\* | 0.772\*\*\* |
|  | (0.236) | (0.216) |
| Majority \* 1st | -0.602\* | -0.478+ |
|  | (0.262) | (0.255) |
| Majority \* 2nd | -0.609\* | -0.497\* |
|  | (0.244) | (0.227) |
| Opposition | -0.013 | 0.040 |
|  | (0.116) | (0.110) |
| Opposition \* 1st | 0.176 | 0.128 |
|  | (0.150) | (0.157) |
| Opposition \* 2nd | 0.226+ | 0.134 |
|  | (0.131) | (0.131) |
| 1st | 0.020\*\* | 0.017\* |
|  | (0.008) | (0.008) |
| 2nd | 0.018\* | 0.017\* |
|  | (0.007) | (0.008) |
| Government Seats | 0.001 | -0.000 |
|  | (0.002) | (0.002) |
| Effective Number of Parties | -0.105 | -0.170\* |
|  | (0.066) | (0.079) |
| Rile Score | 0.007+ | 0.011\* |
|  | (0.004) | (0.005) |
| Constant | 0.008 | 0.009 |
|  | (0.007) | (0.007) |
| *R*2 | 0.31 | 0.29 |
| *N* | 630 | 630 |

Note: + *p*<0.1; \* *p*<0.05; \*\* *p*<0.01; \*\*\* *p*<0.001

Table A4: Marginal Effect of Majority and Opposition Agendas (unweighted)

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
|  | Marginal Effects – All Laws | Marginal Effects – All Executive Sponsored Laws |
| Majority 1st Republic | 0.247\* | 0.294\* |
|  | (0.113) | (0.135) |
| Majority Transition | 0.849\*\*\* | 0.772\*\*\* |
|  | (0.236) | (0.216) |
| Majority 2nd Republic | 0.241\*\*\* | 0.275\*\*\* |
|  | (0.063) | (0.070) |
| Opposition 1st Republic | 0.164+ | 0.167 |
|  | (0.096) | (0.111) |
| Opposition Transition | -0.013 | 0.040 |
|  | (0.116) | (0.110) |
| Opposition 2nd Republic | 0.213\*\*\* | 0.173\* |
|  | (0.060) | (0.70) |

Note: + *p*<0.1; \* *p*<0.05; \*\* *p*<0.01; \*\*\* *p*<0.001

The results for the unweighted versions of the independent variables lend support to H1 and partly H2. As for H3, we observe an overtime increase only for the new measure of opposition. The electoral agendas of main opposition parties in the Second Republic have a stronger impact than the agenda of the Italian Communist Party in the First. This is unsurprising considering the greater programmatic proximity of the two main post-1994 centre-left and centre-right coalitions in comparison with the Christian Democrats and the Communists. The lack of substantial increase in the influence of the Majority in the Second Republic is also predictable: in the Second Republic, the policy agenda is mainly driven by the pre-electoral coalition agreement, to the detriment of partners’ personal agendas. This justifies our choice in the main manuscript to weigh the contribution of party platforms to the coalition agenda by their share of parliamentary seats.

Finally, like in the main text we have also graphed these variables, this time in comparison to the all executive sponsored laws dependent variable. Due to the time series cross-sectional nature of our data, graphical representations are few more useful than summary statistics for understanding the overall patterns in our data due to the inability of summary statistics to represent dynamic change over time. These graphs are presented in Figure A1.

Figure A1: Percent attention to single topics in the government majority and opposition agendas and in legislation (executive sponsored laws)

