**ONLINE SUPPORTING MATERIAL**

**Portfolio-specific accountability and retrospective voting: The case of Italy**

*Additional tests on the effect of knowledge on retrospective evaluations and party support*

**Table S1: The impact of retrospective evaluations on party support (across samples): OLS models**

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
|  | **Dependent variable: Probability to vote for:** |
|  | *Sample 1* | *Sample 2* | *Sample 3* |
|  | FI | AN | UDC | LN | FI | AN | UDC | LN | FI | AN | UDC | LN |
|  | (M1) | (M2) | (M3) | (M4) | (M5) | (M6) | (M7) | (M8) | (M9) | (M10) | (M11) | (M12) |
| (Overall) performance evaluation | -1.412\*\*\* | -0.802\*\*\* | -0.753\*\*\* | -0.710\*\*\* | -1.484\*\*\* | -0.835\*\*\* | -0.736\*\*\* | -0.797\*\*\* | -1.464\*\*\* | -0.835\*\*\* | -0.815\*\*\* | -0.656\*\*\* |
|  | (0.081) | (0.089) | (0.094) | (0.086) | (0.097) | (0.106) | (0.104) | (0.115) | (0.108) | (0.120) | (0.131) | (0.118) |
| Female | 0.060 | -0.153 | -0.014 | 0.010 | -0.015 | -0.550\*\* | -0.116 | -0.252 | -0.023 | -0.432 | -0.190 | -0.108 |
|  | (0.151) | (0.169) | (0.178) | (0.163) | (0.189) | (0.210) | (0.205) | (0.226) | (0.221) | (0.246) | (0.268) | (0.244) |
| Education | 0.053 | -0.057 | 0.109 | -0.127 | 0.065 | -0.089 | -0.177 | 0.022 | 0.088 | -0.155 | -0.023 | -0.172 |
|  | (0.087) | (0.097) | (0.103) | (0.094) | (0.104) | (0.116) | (0.113) | (0.126) | (0.117) | (0.131) | (0.143) | (0.129) |
| Age | 0.007 | -0.012\* | 0.001 | -0.002 | 0.003 | -0.014\* | -0.006 | 0.002 | 0.006 | -0.018\* | -0.005 | -0.012 |
|  | (0.005) | (0.006) | (0.006) | (0.005) | (0.006) | (0.007) | (0.007) | (0.007) | (0.007) | (0.008) | (0.008) | (0.008) |
| Religiosity | 0.047 | 0.162+ | 0.252\*\* | -0.078 | 0.037 | 0.238\* | -0.074 | 0.238\* | 0.021 | 0.135 | 0.160 | -0.147 |
|  | (0.082) | (0.091) | (0.096) | (0.088) | (0.097) | (0.107) | (0.105) | (0.117) | (0.108) | (0.120) | (0.131) | (0.119) |
| Ideology | 0.322\*\*\* | 0.590\*\*\* | 0.105\* | 0.175\*\*\* | 0.301\*\*\* | 0.611\*\*\* | 0.181\*\*\* | 0.136\* | 0.317\*\*\* | 0.614\*\*\* | 0.147\* | 0.262\*\*\* |
|  | (0.038) | (0.044) | (0.044) | (0.041) | (0.044) | (0.051) | (0.048) | (0.053) | (0.050) | (0.057) | (0.059) | (0.054) |
| Interest in government activities | 0.063 | 0.013 | 0.079 | -0.250\* | -0.116 | 0.016 | -0.377\*\* | -0.140 | -0.237 | -0.121 | -0.194 | -0.393\* |
|  | (0.101) | (0.112) | (0.119) | (0.109) | (0.123) | (0.137) | (0.134) | (0.149) | (0.139) | (0.155) | (0.170) | (0.154) |
| Previous vote choice | 1.195\*\*\* | 1.141\*\*\* | 2.475\*\*\* | 4.567\*\*\* | 1.372\*\*\* | 0.942\*\* | 4.771\*\*\* | 2.515\*\*\* | 1.360\*\*\* | 1.080\*\* | 1.844\* | 4.889\*\*\* |
|  | (0.185) | (0.257) | (0.581) | (0.567) | (0.235) | (0.313) | (0.659) | (0.703) | (0.265) | (0.351) | (0.820) | (0.786) |
| Constant | 4.780\*\*\* | 3.653\*\*\* | 3.963\*\*\* | 4.152\*\*\* | 5.641\*\*\* | 3.758\*\*\* | 4.805\*\*\* | 4.686\*\*\* | 5.635\*\*\* | 4.502\*\*\* | 5.346\*\*\* | 4.731\*\*\* |
|  | (0.506) | (0.563) | (0.597) | (0.546) | (0.633) | (0.706) | (0.691) | (0.763) | (0.722) | (0.813) | (0.883) | (0.804) |
| *N* | 766 | 760 | 758 | 765 | 515 | 511 | 514 | 514 | 391 | 387 | 391 | 390 |
| Adj-R2 | 0.640 | 0.571 | 0.234 | 0.310 | 0.666 | 0.613 | 0.354 | 0.275 | 0.679 | 0.621 | 0.273 | 0.376 |
| BIC | 3235.3 | 3368.4 | 3445.6 | 3347.9 | 2160.4 | 2244.7 | 2237.8 | 2342.1 | 1631.7 | 1694.4 | 1783.0 | 1701.2 |
| AIC | 3193.5 | 3326.7 | 3403.9 | 3306.1 | 2122.2 | 2206.6 | 2199.6 | 2303.9 | 1595.9 | 1658.8 | 1747.3 | 1665.5 |

Note: Table A1 includes only respondents who evaluated parties on all issues. Models 1-4 restrict the sample only to those who answered correctly the PM question. Models 5-8 restrict the sample further to those who also answered correctly the question about the speaker and Models 9-12 restrict the sample further to those who also know the name of the foreign affairs minister. Standard errors in parentheses: \* p<.05, \*\* p<.01, \*\*\* p<.001.

**Table S2: The impact of retrospective evaluations on party support mediated by knowledge (all respondents): OLS models**

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
|  | **Dependent variable: Probability to vote for:** |
|  | FI | AN | UDC | LN | FI | AN | UDC | LN |
|  | (M1) | (M2) | (M3) | (M4) | (M1) | (M2) | (M3) | (M4) |
| (Overall) performance evaluation | -1.190\*\*\* | -0.472\*\*\* | -0.560\*\*\* | -0.483\*\*\* | -1.062\*\*\* | -0.350\* | -0.287 | -0.560\*\*\* |
|  | (0.104) | (0.113) | (0.117) | (0.108) | (0.155) | (0.171) | (0.176) | (0.165) |
| Knowledge | 0.182 | 0.356\* | 0.350\* | 0.275\* | -0.011 | -0.018 | 0.094 | 0.014 |
|  | (0.129) | (0.142) | (0.146) | (0.136) | (0.058) | (0.064) | (0.066) | (0.061) |
| (Overall) performance evaluation× Knowledge | -0.073 | -0.144\*\* | -0.096 | -0.101\* |  |  |  |  |
|  | (0.045) | (0.049) | (0.051) | (0.047) |  |  |  |  |
| Interest in government activities | 0.065 | 0.074 | 0.031 | -0.142 | 0.397\* | 0.552\* | 0.603\*\* | -0.021 |
|  | (0.085) | (0.094) | (0.097) | (0.090) | (0.201) | (0.221) | (0.227) | (0.214) |
| (Overall) performance evaluation× Interest in government activities |  |  |  |  | -0.127 | -0.183\* | -0.219\*\* | -0.047 |
|  |  |  |  |  | (0.070) | (0.077) | (0.079) | (0.074) |
| Female | -0.004 | -0.207 | -0.052 | -0.114 | -0.001 | -0.195 | -0.051 | -0.105 |
|  | (0.132) | (0.144) | (0.148) | (0.137) | (0.131) | (0.144) | (0.148) | (0.138) |
| Education | 0.027 | -0.063 | 0.090 | -0.173\* | 0.032 | -0.053 | 0.098 | -0.163\* |
|  | (0.079) | (0.087) | (0.089) | (0.083) | (0.079) | (0.087) | (0.089) | (0.083) |
| Age | 0.003 | -0.012\* | -0.002 | -0.001 | 0.003 | -0.011\* | -0.002 | -0.000 |
|  | (0.004) | (0.005) | (0.005) | (0.005) | (0.004) | (0.005) | (0.005) | (0.005) |
| Religiosity | -0.023 | 0.184\* | 0.234\*\* | -0.138 | -0.027 | 0.181\* | 0.226\*\* | -0.135 |
|  | (0.073) | (0.079) | (0.081) | (0.076) | (0.073) | (0.079) | (0.081) | (0.076) |
| Ideology | 0.366\*\*\* | 0.555\*\*\* | 0.086\* | 0.163\*\*\* | 0.364\*\*\* | 0.553\*\*\* | 0.082\* | 0.166\*\*\* |
|  | (0.033) | (0.037) | (0.037) | (0.034) | (0.033) | (0.037) | (0.037) | (0.035) |
| Previous vote choice | 1.053\*\*\* | 1.319\*\*\* | 2.532\*\*\* | 4.378\*\*\* | 1.038\*\*\* | 1.337\*\*\* | 2.530\*\*\* | 4.437\*\*\* |
|  | (0.155) | (0.228) | (0.510) | (0.517) | (0.155) | (0.228) | (0.508) | (0.517) |
| Constant | 4.443\*\*\* | 2.814\*\*\* | 3.672\*\*\* | 3.535\*\*\* | 4.094\*\*\* | 2.442\*\*\* | 2.953\*\*\* | 3.665\*\*\* |
|  | (0.455) | (0.495) | (0.511) | (0.474) | (0.542) | (0.593) | (0.612) | (0.572) |
| *N* | 1090 | 1078 | 1066 | 1089 | 1090 | 1078 | 1066 | 1089 |
| Adj-R2 | 0.595 | 0.519 | 0.211 | 0.263 | 0.596 | 0.518 | 0.214 | 0.260 |
| BIC | 4675.68 | 4801.78 | 4805.69 | 4768.59 | 4675.02 | 4804.61 | 4801.61 | 4772.79 |
| AIC | 4620.75 | 4746.97 | 4750.99 | 4713.67 | 4620.08 | 4749.80 | 4746.92 | 4717.86 |

Note: Standard errors in parentheses: \* p<.05, \*\* p<.01, \*\*\* p<.001. The knowledge variable ranges from 0 to 3 and takes into account how many of the knowledge questions the respondent answered correctly. The questions ask respondents the name of the PM, of the speaker and that of the foreign affairs minister.

*Tests on the effect of partisanship on retrospective evaluations and party support*

Several works provide evidence that backward reasoning and partisan preferences influence retrospective evaluations (e.g., Evans and Andersen 2006; Evans and Pickup 2010). Although recent works by Lewis-Beck et al. (2008) - using real-world data - and Tilley and Hobolt (2011) - using an experimental set-up - show that partisan loyalties have only limited effects on performance evaluations, we control for previous vote choice in all models presented in the paper and run several robustness checks. First, we check for multicollinearity between past vote choice, party identification, and retrospective evaluations. Table S3 below shows that correlation coefficients are usually below 0.5. Second, we interact previous vote choice with retrospective evaluations to check whether or not the effect of evaluation on vote choice is mediated by political predispositions. Table S4 shows that an interaction between retrospective evaluations and previous vote choice is not statistically significant. We then re-run the same analyses using party identification instead of previous vote choice. The results, which confirm the findings using previous vote choice, are shown in Tables S5–S6. In particular, we test whether our findings hold when we control for partisanship measured at time *t-1*, i.e. 2001 (Table S5) and at time *t*, i.e. 2004 (Table S6). Both tables show that while identifiers tend sometimes to be more benign with their own party, an interaction between retrospective evaluations and party identification is not statistically significant.

To face possible endogeneity concerns, we also re-run our empirical models measuring party identification in 2001, retrospective evaluations in 2004 and vote choice in 2006. Measuring voters’ overall performance evaluations before the elections enables us to grasp the causal necessity that performance evaluations must precede vote choice, and not vice versa. In other words, we take full advantage of our panel data to provide an ultimate test for our hypotheses. The results need to be interpreted with some caution because (1) the 2006 elections were more than two years away from when government evaluations have been asked, i.e., 2004 and (2) as discussed in the paper, in 2005 a government reshuffle took place which saw, among some changes to undersecretaries, the passage of the minister for foreign affairs from FI to AN. Table S7 shows the results of a model that predicts vote choice in 2006 national elections controlling for party identification in 2001 and retrospective evaluations in 2004. Looking first at Models 1-4, the results again confirm H2 while H1 is soundly rejected: retrospective evaluations have a stronger effect on the PM party compared to all other coalition partners. We also find again that party size matters since AN and UDC appear to suffer more than the LN party. Models 5-8 indicate that the party of the PM is the one who suffers the most and almost regardless of ministerial prerogatives. Overall however, it is clear that the effect of retrospective evaluations on vote choice is much reduced after two years of government.

**Table S3: Correlation between previous vote choice, party identification and retrospective evaluations**

|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | Performance evaluation | E | C | W | U | P | J | L | TV | D | I | PID |
|  | (Overall) | Mean (FI) | Mean (LN) | Mean (AN) | (FI) | (FI) | (FI) | (LN) | (LN) | (LN) | (LN) | AN) | (non-party) | (Fini) | 2004 | 2001 |
| *FI* |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Previous vote  | -0.38 | -0.28 | -0.29 | -0.24 | -0.26 | -0.20 | -0. | -0.26 | -0.30 | -0.19 | -0.23 | -0.24 | -0.01 | 0.17 | 0.44 | 0.79 |
| PID (2004) | -0.46 | -0.38 | -0.39 | -0.35 | -0.33 | -0.28 | -0.37 | -0.33 | -0.35 | -0.31 | -0.34 | -0.35 | -0.15 | 0.07 |   |   |
| PID (2001) | -0.40 | -0.31 | -0.32 | -0.26 | -0.29 | -0.23 | -0.30 | -0.26 | -0.32 | -0.25 | -0.27 | -0.26 | -0.00 | 0.12 | 0.43 |   |
| *AN* |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Previous vote  | -0.32 | -0.29 | -0.29 | -0.27 | -0.18 | -0.28 | -0.32 | -0.23 | -0.21 | -0.27 | -0.30 | -0.27 | -0.10 | -0.09 | 0.55 | 0.81 |
| PID (2004) | -0.37 | -0.31 | -0.32 | -0.29 | -0.23 | -0.24 | -0.31 | -0.24 | -0.23 | -0.29 | -0.34 | -0.29 | -0.14 | -0.08 |   |   |
| PID (2001) | -0.33 | -0.29 | -0.30 | -0.27 | -0.22 | -0.23 | -0.32 | -0.25 | -0.22 | -0.25 | -0.30 | -0.27 | -0.11 | -0.07 | 0.55 |   |
| *UDC* |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Previous vote  | -0.11 | -0.09 | -0.12 | -0.08 | -0.09 | -0.09 | -0.11 | -0.09 | -0.08 | -0.07 | -0.15 | -0.08 | -0.04 | -0.01 | 0.25 | 0.80 |
| PID (2004) | -0.07 | -0.01 | 0.02 | -0.02 | 0.02 | -0.02 | -0.02 | 0.03 | 0.07 | -0.01 | -0.03 | -0.02 | 0.02 | 0.04 |   |   |
| PID (2001) | -0.10 | -0.08 | -0.11 | -0.08 | -0.09 | -0.07 | -0.11 | -0.09 | -0.06 | -0.09 | -0.14 | -0.08 | 0.02 | 0.00 | 0.28 |   |
| *LN* |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Previous vote  | -0.11 | -0.11 | -0.11 | -0.05 | -0.12 | -0.10 | -0.09 | -0.08 | -0.10 | -0.12 | -0.09 | -0.05 | -0.03 | 0.07 | 0.69 | 0.67 |
| PID (2004) | -0.08 | -0.08 | -0.09 | -0.03 | -0.10 | -0.06 | -0.08 | -0.07 | -0.09 | -0.09 | -0.07 | -0.03 | -0.02 | 0.13 |   |   |
| PID (2001) | -0.07 | -0.08 | -0.09 | -0.04 | -0.07 | -0.07 | -0.07 | -0.07 | -0.11 | -0.07 | -0.07 | -0.04 | -0.03 | 0.11 | 0.64 |   |

Notes: E: Economy; C: Criminality; W: Iraqi War; U: Unemployment; P: Pensions; J: Justice; L:Labour; TV: TV License; D: Driving license; I: Immigration.

PID: Party identification.

**Table S4: The impact of retrospective evaluations on party support mediated by previous vote choice: OLS models**

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
|  | **Dependent variable: Probability to vote for:** |
|  | FI | AN | UDC | LN | FI | AN | UDC | LN |
|  | (M1) | (M2) | (M3) | (M4) | (M5) | (M6) | (M7) | (M8) |
| (Overall) performance evaluation | -1.238\*\*\* | -0.682\*\*\* | -0.719\*\*\* | -0.644\*\*\* |  |  |  |  |
|  | (0.078) | (0.079) | (0.079) | (0.073) |  |  |  |  |
| Previous vote choice | 1.668\*\*\* | 1.931\*\*\* | 1.595 | 5.631\*\*\* | 1.731\*\*\* | 1.449\*\* | 2.514\*\*\* | 4.259\* |
|  | (0.317) | (0.437) | (1.366) | (1.109) | (0.456) | (0.456) | (0.508) | (1.673) |
| (Overall) performance evaluation×Previous vote choice | -0.296\* | -0.314 | 0.570 | -0.700 |  |  |  |  |
|  | (0.134) | (0.203) | (0.721) | (0.574) |  |  |  |  |
| Female | 0.002 | -0.179 | -0.104 | -0.116 | -0.000 | -0.199 | -0.090 | -0.139 |
|  | (0.127) | (0.139) | (0.143) | (0.133) | (0.131) | (0.141) | (0.143) | (0.131) |
| Education | 0.026 | -0.056 | 0.143 | -0.155\* | 0.000 | -0.077 | 0.116 | -0.150 |
|  | (0.075) | (0.082) | (0.085) | (0.079) | (0.078) | (0.084) | (0.086) | (0.078) |
| Age | 0.002 | -0.012\* | -0.001 | -0.000 | 0.002 | -0.012\*\* | -0.002 | -0.001 |
|  | (0.004) | (0.005) | (0.005) | (0.004) | (0.004) | (0.005) | (0.005) | (0.004) |
| Religiosity | -0.013 | 0.201\* | 0.234\*\* | -0.133 | 0.004 | 0.198\* | 0.227\*\* | -0.135 |
|  | (0.072) | (0.079) | (0.081) | (0.076) | (0.075) | (0.080) | (0.081) | (0.074) |
| Ideology | 0.377\*\*\* | 0.562\*\*\* | 0.092\* | 0.169\*\*\* | 0.491\*\*\* | 0.627\*\*\* | 0.133\*\*\* | 0.191\*\*\* |
|  | (0.033) | (0.037) | (0.037) | (0.034) | (0.031) | (0.034) | (0.033) | (0.031) |
| Interest in government activities | 0.039 | 0.061 | 0.067 | -0.142 | 0.088 | 0.091 | 0.080 | -0.116 |
|  | (0.084) | (0.092) | (0.095) | (0.088) | (0.087) | (0.094) | (0.096) | (0.087) |
| (Mean) performance evaluation |  |  |  |  | -0.581\*\*\* | -0.374\* | -0.189 | -0.264 |
| (FI ministers) |  |  |  |  | (0.154) | (0.157) | (0.160) | (0.147) |
| (Mean) performance evaluation (FI ministers) ×Previous vote choice |  |  |  |  | -0.251 |  |  |  |
|  |  |  |  |  | (0.182) |  |  |  |
| (Mean) performance evaluation |  |  |  |  | -0.727\*\*\* | -0.164 | -0.667\*\*\* | -0.625\*\*\* |
| (LN ministers) |  |  |  |  | (0.142) | (0.152) | (0.155) | (0.143) |
| (Mean) performance evaluation (LN ministers) ×Previous vote choice |  |  |  |  |  |  |  | -0.079 |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  | (0.855) |
| (Mean) performance evaluation (AN ministers) |  |  |  |  | -0.156 | -0.285\*\* | -0.063 | -0.027 |
|  |  |  |  |  | (0.082) | (0.092) | (0.089) | (0.082) |
| (Mean) performance evaluation (AN ministers) ×Previous vote choice |  |  |  |  |  | -0.070 |  |  |
|  |  |  |  |  |  | (0.194) |  |  |
| Driving license (non-party) |  |  |  |  | 0.015 | -0.029 | -0.087 | -0.079 |
|  |  |  |  |  | (0.060) | (0.064) | (0.065) | (0.060) |
| Immigration (Fini) |  |  |  |  | 0.198\*\*\* | 0.095 | 0.151\*\* | 0.319\*\*\* |
|  |  |  |  |  | (0.054) | (0.057) | (0.058) | (0.053) |
| Constant | 4.554\*\*\* | 3.247\*\*\* | 4.012\*\*\* | 3.871\*\*\* | 4.234\*\*\* | 3.237\*\*\* | 4.269\*\*\* | 3.947\*\*\* |
|  | (0.430) | (0.467) | (0.478) | (0.444) | (0.473) | (0.502) | (0.503) | (0.462) |
| *N* | 1090 | 1078 | 1066 | 1089 | 1090 | 1078 | 1066 | 1089 |
| Adj-R2 | 0.596 | 0.517 | 0.208 | 0.262 | 0.575 | 0.510 | 0.218 | 0.290 |
| BIC | 4666.5 | 4800.9 | 4804.1 | 4764.8 | 4747.6 | 4840.3 | 4808.5 | 4746.6 |
| AIC | 4616.6 | 4751.1 | 4754.4 | 4714.8 | 4677.6 | 4770.6 | 4743.8 | 4676.7 |

Note: Standard errors in parentheses: \* p<.05, \*\* p<.01, \*\*\* p<.001. The supporting material shows the same analyses using party identification.

**Table S5: The impact of retrospective evaluations on party support mediated by party identification (2001): OLS models**

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
|  | **Dependent variable: Probability to vote for:** |
|  | FI | AN | UDC | LN | FI | AN | UDC | LN |
|  | (M1) | (M2) | (M3) | (M4) | (M5) | (M6) | (M7) | (M8) |
| (Overall) performance evaluation | -1.115\*\*\* | -0.671\*\*\* | -0.666\*\*\* | -0.621\*\*\* |  |  |  |  |
|  | (0.099) | (0.103) | (0.102) | (0.096) |  |  |  |  |
| Party identification | 1.943\*\*\* | 1.439\*\* | 4.858\*\* | 6.181\*\*\* | 2.276\*\*\* | 1.574\*\* | 3.045\*\*\* | 4.055\* |
|  | (0.382) | (0.450) | (1.513) | (1.063) | (0.563) | (0.483) | (0.554) | (1.751) |
| (Overall) performance evaluation×Party identification (2001) | -0.159 | 0.016 | -0.979 | 0.974\* |  |  |  |  |
|  | (0.176) | (0.212) | (0.769) | (0.457) |  |  |  |  |
| Female | 0.047 | -0.050 | -0.139 | -0.090 | 0.028 | -0.041 | -0.113 | -0.111 |
|  | (0.160) | (0.175) | (0.183) | (0.172) | (0.166) | (0.178) | (0.185) | (0.173) |
| Education | 0.070 | -0.045 | 0.205+ | -0.209\* | 0.061 | -0.072 | 0.195+ | -0.211\* |
|  | (0.093) | (0.102) | (0.107) | (0.101) | (0.097) | (0.104) | (0.108) | (0.101) |
| Age | 0.005 | -0.015\*\* | 0.003 | -0.004 | 0.004 | -0.016\*\* | 0.002 | -0.005 |
|  | (0.005) | (0.006) | (0.006) | (0.006) | (0.005) | (0.006) | (0.006) | (0.006) |
| Religiosity | 0.126 | 0.324\*\*\* | 0.316\*\* | -0.015 | 0.130 | 0.314\*\* | 0.305\*\* | -0.028 |
|  | (0.087) | (0.095) | (0.099) | (0.094) | (0.090) | (0.096) | (0.100) | (0.093) |
| Ideology | 0.403\*\*\* | 0.570\*\*\* | 0.137\*\* | 0.175\*\*\* | 0.512\*\*\* | 0.632\*\*\* | 0.179\*\*\* | 0.213\*\*\* |
|  | (0.040) | (0.045) | (0.045) | (0.043) | (0.037) | (0.041) | (0.040) | (0.038) |
| Interest in government activities | 0.164 | 0.075 | 0.041 | -0.146 | 0.239\* | 0.108 | 0.085 | -0.105 |
|  | (0.108) | (0.118) | (0.124) | (0.116) | (0.112) | (0.120) | (0.125) | (0.116) |
| (Mean) performance evaluation |  |  |  |  | -0.502\*\* | -0.400\* | -0.283 | -0.284 |
| (FI ministers) |  |  |  |  | (0.187) | (0.194) | (0.202) | (0.189) |
| (Mean) performance evaluation (FI ministers) ×Party identification (2001) |  |  |  |  | -0.218 |  |  |  |
|  |  |  |  |  | (0.241) |  |  |  |
| (Mean) performance evaluation |  |  |  |  | -0.527\*\* | -0.081 | -0.444\* | -0.493\*\* |
| (LN ministers) |  |  |  |  | (0.174) | (0.186) | (0.195) | (0.182) |
| (Mean) performance evaluation (LN ministers) ×Party identification (2001) |  |  |  |  |  |  |  | -0.125 |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  | (0.801) |
| (Mean) performance evaluation |  |  |  |  | -0.176+ | -0.288\*\* | -0.112 | -0.018 |
| (AN ministers) |  |  |  |  | (0.095) | (0.111) | (0.106) | (0.100) |
| (Mean) performance evaluation (AN ministers) ×Party identification (2001) |  |  |  |  |  | -0.072 |  |  |
|  |  |  |  |  |  | (0.205) |  |  |
| Driving license (non-party) |  |  |  |  | -0.020 | -0.014 | -0.043 | -0.086 |
|  |  |  |  |  | (0.074) | (0.079) | (0.083) | (0.078) |
| Immigration (Fini) |  |  |  |  | 0.188\*\* | 0.045 | 0.143\* | 0.316\*\*\* |
|  |  |  |  |  | (0.063) | (0.068) | (0.070) | (0.066) |
| Constant | 3.368\*\*\* | 2.949\*\*\* | 3.269\*\*\* | 3.804\*\*\* | 2.716\*\*\* | 2.949\*\*\* | 3.304\*\*\* | 3.599\*\*\* |
|  | (0.560) | (0.612) | (0.632) | (0.601) | (0.612) | (0.652) | (0.665) | (0.623) |
| *N* | 684 | 680 | 675 | 685 | 684 | 680 | 675 | 685 |
| Adj-R2 | 0.657 | 0.592 | 0.271 | 0.301 | 0.638 | 0.588 | 0.270 | 0.310 |
| BIC | 2907.4 | 3012.9 | 3046.6 | 3023.0 | 2965.4 | 3041.8 | 3064.6 | 3036.0 |
| AIC | 2862.2 | 2967.7 | 3001.4 | 2977.7 | 2902.0 | 2978.5 | 3005.9 | 2972.6 |

Note: Standard errors in parentheses: \* p<.05, \*\* p<.01, \*\*\* p<.001.

**Table S6: The impact of retrospective evaluations on party support mediated by party identification (2004): OLS models**

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
|  | **Dependent variable: Probability to vote for:** |
|  | FI | AN | UDC | LN | FI | AN | UDC | LN |
|  | (M1) | (M2) | (M3) | (M4) | (M5) | (M6) | (M7) | (M8) |
| (Overall) performance evaluation | -1.121\*\*\* | -0.702\*\*\* | -0.642\*\*\* | -0.700\*\*\* |  |  |  |  |
|  | (0.069) | (0.076) | (0.071) | (0.077) |  |  |  |  |
| Party identification | 2.841\*\*\* | 2.049\*\*\* | 4.706\*\*\* | 5.490\*\*\* | 3.423\*\*\* | 2.453\*\*\* | 4.328\*\* | 4.111\*\*\* |
|  | (0.400) | (0.459) | (0.976) | (1.177) | (0.548) | (0.475) | (1.447) | (0.441) |
| (Overall) performance evaluation×Party identification (2001) | 0.055 | 0.440 | 0.469 | -0.783 |  |  |  |  |
|  | (0.275) | (0.274) | (0.488) | (0.514) |  |  |  |  |
| Female | 0.012 | -0.176 | -0.083 | -0.086 | 0.010 | -0.193 | -0.101 | -0.043 |
|  | (0.118) | (0.133) | (0.129) | (0.140) | (0.121) | (0.135) | (0.128) | (0.139) |
| Education | -0.012 | -0.054 | -0.099 | 0.121 | -0.033 | -0.071 | -0.095 | 0.083 |
|  | (0.070) | (0.079) | (0.076) | (0.083) | (0.072) | (0.081) | (0.076) | (0.083) |
| Age | -0.001 | -0.011\* | -0.001 | -0.001 | -0.002 | -0.012\*\* | -0.002 | -0.003 |
|  | (0.004) | (0.004) | (0.004) | (0.005) | (0.004) | (0.005) | (0.004) | (0.005) |
| Religiosity | 0.042 | 0.197\*\* | -0.133 | 0.221\*\* | 0.066 | 0.204\*\* | -0.134 | 0.197\* |
|  | (0.068) | (0.076) | (0.074) | (0.080) | (0.069) | (0.077) | (0.072) | (0.079) |
| Ideology | 0.344\*\*\* | 0.484\*\*\* | 0.166\*\*\* | 0.097\*\* | 0.447\*\*\* | 0.543\*\*\* | 0.188\*\*\* | 0.126\*\*\* |
|  | (0.031) | (0.037) | (0.033) | (0.036) | (0.029) | (0.034) | (0.030) | (0.032) |
| Interest in government activities | -0.041 | 0.019 | -0.191\* | 0.041 | -0.013 | 0.042 | -0.164 | 0.057 |
|  | (0.079) | (0.089) | (0.085) | (0.093) | (0.081) | (0.090) | (0.085) | (0.093) |
| (Mean) performance evaluation |  |  |  |  | -0.496\*\*\* | -0.375\* | -0.261 | -0.160 |
| (FI ministers) |  |  |  |  | (0.141) | (0.151) | (0.143) | (0.155) |
| (Mean) performance evaluation (FI ministers) ×Party identification (2001) |  |  |  |  | -0.192 |  |  |  |
|  |  |  |  |  | (0.276) |  |  |  |
| (Mean) performance evaluation |  |  |  |  | -0.672\*\*\* | -0.157 | -0.638\*\*\* | -0.740\*\*\* |
| (LN ministers) |  |  |  |  | (0.132) | (0.146) | (0.139) | (0.151) |
| (Mean) performance evaluation (LN ministers) ×Party identification (2001) |  |  |  |  |  |  |  | 0.451 |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  | (0.677) |
| (Mean) performance evaluation |  |  |  |  | -0.107 | -0.294\*\*\* | -0.013 | -0.066 |
| (AN ministers) |  |  |  |  | (0.076) | (0.087) | (0.079) | (0.087) |
| (Mean) performance evaluation (AN ministers) ×Party identification (2001) |  |  |  |  |  | 0.146 |  |  |
|  |  |  |  |  |  | (0.222) |  |  |
| Driving license (non-party) |  |  |  |  | 0.049 | 0.001 | -0.051 | -0.090 |
|  |  |  |  |  | (0.055) | (0.062) | (0.058) | (0.064) |
| Immigration (Fini) |  |  |  |  | 0.174\*\*\* | 0.112\* | 0.287\*\*\* | 0.142\* |
|  |  |  |  |  | (0.050) | (0.055) | (0.052) | (0.056) |
| Constant | 3.466\*\*\* | 2.956\*\*\* | 3.130\*\*\* | 3.416\*\*\* | 2.369\*\*\* | 2.724\*\*\* | 3.109\*\*\* | 3.146\*\*\* |
|  | (0.616) | (0.686) | (0.722) | (0.680) | (0.678) | (0.729) | (0.747) | (0.694) |
| *N* | 1090 | 1078 | 1089 | 1066 | 1090 | 1078 | 1089 | 1066 |
| Adj-R2 | 0.648 | 0.552 | 0.302 | 0.242 | 0.634 | 0.548 | 0.328 | 0.261 |
| BIC | 4517.1 | 4718.7 | 4702.7 | 4756.6 | 4585.1 | 4752.4 | 4685.5 | 4748.6 |
| AIC | 4467.1 | 4668.8 | 4652.8 | 4706.9 | 4515.2 | 4682.7 | 4615.6 | 4683.9 |

Note: Standard errors in parentheses: \* p<.05, \*\* p<.01, \*\*\* p<.001.

**Table S7: The impact of retrospective evaluations on vote choice in 2006: OLS models**

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
|  | **Dependent variable: Vote choice** |
|  | FI | AN | UDC | LN | FI | AN | UDC | LN |
|  | (M1) | (M2) | (M3) | (M4) | (M5) | (M6) | (M7) | (M8) |
| (Overall) performance evaluation | -1.189\*\*\* | -0.439\*\* | -0.503\* | -0.227 |  |  |  |  |
|  | (0.143) | (0.147) | (0.215) | (0.319) |  |  |  |  |
| (Mean) performance evaluation |  |  |  |  | -0.713\*\* | -0.311 | -0.144 | 0.268 |
| (FI ministers) |  |  |  |  | (0.235) | (0.268) | (0.406) | (0.575) |
| (Mean) performance evaluation |  |  |  |  | -0.423+ | 0.057 | 0.178 | -0.534 |
| (LN ministers) |  |  |  |  | (0.220) | (0.249) | (0.391) | (0.528) |
| TV license (AN) |  |  |  |  | -0.175 | -0.029 | -0.112 | 0.051 |
|  |  |  |  |  | (0.131) | (0.148) | (0.233) | (0.315) |
| Driving license (non-party) |  |  |  |  | 0.046 | -0.112 | -0.115 | -0.161 |
|  |  |  |  |  | (0.107) | (0.126) | (0.181) | (0.245) |
| Immigration (Fini) |  |  |  |  | 0.104 | -0.115 | 0.226 | 0.716\*\* |
|  |  |  |  |  | (0.090) | (0.102) | (0.152) | (0.259) |
| Female | 0.111 | -0.254 | -0.292 | -0.660 | 0.122 | -0.187 | -0.390 | -0.970 |
|  | (0.216) | (0.256) | (0.378) | (0.605) | (0.214) | (0.258) | (0.383) | (0.636) |
| Education | 0.122 | 0.067 | 0.292 | -0.393 | 0.089 | 0.026 | 0.288 | -0.288 |
|  | (0.123) | (0.149) | (0.209) | (0.327) | (0.123) | (0.153) | (0.212) | (0.343) |
| Age | 0.016\* | -0.017\* | 0.016 | 0.009 | 0.015\* | -0.018\* | 0.016 | 0.013 |
|  | (0.007) | (0.008) | (0.012) | (0.019) | (0.007) | (0.008) | (0.012) | (0.020) |
| Religiosity | -0.179 | -0.010 | 0.739\*\* | -0.001 | -0.113 | -0.039 | 0.751\*\* | 0.011 |
|  | (0.134) | (0.153) | (0.269) | (0.349) | (0.133) | (0.156) | (0.266) | (0.352) |
| Ideology | 0.238\*\*\* | 0.609\*\*\* | -0.165+ | 0.197 | 0.354\*\*\* | 0.683\*\*\* | -0.027 | 0.232+ |
|  | (0.057) | (0.078) | (0.100) | (0.155) | (0.053) | (0.076) | (0.090) | (0.138) |
| Interest in government activities | -0.002 | 0.064 | 0.163 | 0.072 | 0.004 | 0.044 | 0.149 | -0.154 |
|  | (0.150) | (0.175) | (0.256) | (0.345) | (0.151) | (0.179) | (0.261) | (0.360) |
| Previous vote choice | 1.368\*\*\* | 1.365\*\*\* | 2.517\*\*\* | 4.368\*\*\* | 1.433\*\*\* | 1.305\*\*\* | 2.694\*\*\* | 4.197\*\*\* |
|  | (0.210) | (0.265) | (0.548) | (0.620) | (0.210) | (0.267) | (0.570) | (0.673) |
| Constant | -1.725\* | -4.353\*\*\* | -4.858\*\*\* | -4.818\* | -2.019\*\* | -4.437\*\*\* | -6.735\*\*\* | -6.598\*\* |
|  | (0.702) | (0.852) | (1.260) | (1.901) | (0.725) | (0.921) | (1.444) | (2.150) |
| *N* | 1138 | 1138 | 1138 | 1138 | 1138 | 1138 | 1138 | 1138 |
| Adj-R2 | 0.378 | 0.383 | 0.147 | 0.314 | 0.360 | 0.381 | 0.138 | 0.363 |
| BIC | 683.6 | 533.6 | 330.1 | 201.4 | 729.5 | 563.5 | 360.9 | 219.7 |
| AIC | 638.3 | 488.2 | 284.7 | 156.0 | 664.0 | 498.1 | 295.4 | 154.3 |

Note: Standard errors in parentheses: + p<0.1, \* p<.05, \*\* p<.01, \*\*\* p<.001.

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