**Appendix Online.**

*IDV: Electoral Programs and Party Statute*

In terms of *ideology*, the ‘us’-‘them’ pattern is discerned in three programs of the IDV, although with a peculiar definition. The category ‘the people’ is not the most prominent way in which the ‘we’ are defined, instead numerous references are made in the texts to ‘citizens’ and ‘Italy/Italians’, which means that ‘us’ is defined in national, civic and juridical terms. However, a closer looks reveals that, beyond being defined as savers and unemployed, the citizens are also defined according to the typically populistic appeal as ‘ordinary men’, ‘men of the street’. Secondly, the second most important ‘us’ in the discourse of the IDV is represented by the EU (that appears 35, 8 and 65 times respectively in 2004, 2009 and 2014), with no longer the anti-establishment contrast between Europe of the citizens and the EU of institutions/elites seen in other parties. Europe instead has a positive connotation (as instrument to reinforce citizens’ rights) and an increase in its decisional power is called for. Only in 2014, a Europe of capital, bankers, and economic (‘austerity policies’) is sharply criticized and opposed to the European citizens. Another big ‘enemy’ of citizens pictured is Germany, as the country that opposes in a hegemonic way the overall European community and Italy. The IDV, identified with citizens, is a “party which acts concretely in defence of citizens”), against this Europe and the Italian government if it does not take appropriate measures.

However (especially for the years 2004 and 2009) the ‘conflict of interest’ and in particular the person of ‘the Prime Minister’ (Berlusconi) on the one hand, and the fight against the corruption and fiscal evasion, namely against ‘criminals’ convicts on the other hand, are by far the most frequently and most important ‘them’ when it comes to defining enemies of citizens and Italy. Especially, when the party talks about these two actors/issues also the *style* assumes the typical traits of populism, with some apocalyptic tones and references to resentment and sentiments of fear. It is stated that the citizens and the democracy “are in danger” because of this conflict of interest. Concerning the fight against corruption and the crimes in general, it is stressed that it is necessary “to defend the rights of citizens vis-à-vis the law”, “defend the victims of offences”. In 2009 is less apocalyptic than in 2004 document, however the references to the concept of ‘control’ (transparency, verify, supervision, sentence) are very frequent; whereas in 2014 the language of the ‘catastrophe’ (Härmänmaa 2002), prevails (crisis recur 12 times, debt 11, against 8, necessary 5, and battle/e 4).

Less prominent (and ambiguous) is a vague reference to the other parties of the establishment (as antagonistic to citizens), where there is also, *in terms of rhetoric*, a delegitimation of the others: it is said indeed that they are “necessary to the functioning of democracy” (therefore without any appeal to the bypassing of representative institutions typical of the populist ideology), however itis also said that they need an ethical code of behaviour, and that “they seem all alike”. In *terms of organisation* however it is worth noticing that the IDV is largely considered as a single -issue party due to the fact that the fight against corruption was the first motivation of its founders, Di Pietro (Conti and Memoli 2009, p.12). Indeed (especially in 2009), the personalistic leadership of the leader of the party emerges from the program, that is all focused on the person of Di Pietro, whose name is present also in the electoral symbol, together with the name of the party (‘Italia dei Valori’).

In terms of *organisational style*, the statute stresses from the very beginning that the IDV party “adheres to democratic principle in its internal life, especially for what concerns the selection of candidates and the rights of the members” (art. 1). In addition it is also explicitly said that the party is meant to be “a place for participation, proposals, elaboration of ideas and democratic exchange” (art. 2). The General Secretary is elected on a primary open system by the General Assembly (according to the rules established in the Statute) by a majority in a one-round system, for a 4-year period (and he is not eligible for more than two times), but in case of parity is vote account for two. There are no indications in the statute of the rules according to which he can be removed. Hence, from an organisational point of view, IDV’s leader is a *primus inter pares* among the party leadership. However, the action of all the three key state level bodies of the party exert reciprocal constrains and control over each other. The general Assembly can dissolve the party (art.6). The General Secretary convenes the national executive and the Secretariat, under urgency and ratification by the Secretariat, can revoke the appointments within the party and impose sanction in case of statute’s violation; the executive can modify the Statute; and the Secretariat can approve the electoral lists. In addition, the IDV is territorially composed of regional and provincial independent structures (art.3). The IDV organisational structure is therefore based on a check and balance system, which can eventually constrain the power of the leader. In sum, considering our analytical dimensions (rules for the election/removal of the leader; tasks of the leader vs. other party bodies; rules for membership and member participation opportunities) the leadership is not as personalistic as in other parties (for example, NL, FSM, or FI).

*Table B. IDV: Ideological dimension*

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| *‘Us’* |  | *‘Them’* |  |
| 2004 |
| Europe/EU/EU Constitution | 35 | Conflicts of interest/Prime Minister  | 4 |
| Citizen/s | 18 | Convicts/criminals | 4 |
| Italy/Italian | 8 | Parties /politicians | 3 |
| Democracy/democratic | 7 | Terrorism | 2 |
| Countr\* | 5 |  |  |
|  |
| 2009 |  |  |  |
| Europe /European | 8 | Convicts | 3 |
| Italy | 3 |  |  |
| Citizens | 3 |  |  |
|  |
| 2014 |  |  |  |
| Europe/EU | 65 | Germans/Germany | 45 |
| Italy/Italians | 32 | Banks, Finance | 20 |
| IDV /our party | 28 | Mafia/criminals/ fiscal evader | 19 |
| Citizens | 23 | Austerity/fiscal compact/EU economic policies | 18 |
| EU Parliament | 17 | EU Commission  | 18 |

*UDC: Electoral Programs and Party Statute*

Analysing the European electoral programs of the UDC a completely different picture with respect to the other parties emerge. First of all (*ideology*): there is not the antagonistic dichotomy ‘us-them’, the only ‘them’ which are depicted are mainly the ‘Localisms and regional selfishness’ (accused to divide the country with centrifuge dynamics); the economic crisis and the precariousness this provokes; and finally a bit of criticism is addressed (but only for the year 2014) against some European institutions, and the bank and finance. On this regard, the appeal is for an EU as “a house made of glass” with “more transparency and participation to decisions of the citizens”. The criticism is (addressing a rather populistic topic, but with always very moderate terms) against the “wasted money of politics, also in Europe” and a contrast between Italy (and its “legitimate interests”) and the part of EU that “does not help” is depicted. Against the domestic political class the position of UDC is never critical, with only few remarks directed to the previous centre–left governments (“disappointing”).

However it is worth noticing that in *terms of style and rhetoric*, the UDC, although stressing its ‘firm position’ on the issues raised, never appeals to and use instrumentally resentment, fears and anxiety, nor is there a delegitimation of the political adversaries and the political system overall. On the contrary, also when the critique against some ‘them’ is expressed, the language is very institutional, formal and polite. Secondly, focusing on the *ideological dimension*, there is not a category ‘people’ to defend (the term is never present in the documents; instead, those for whom the party wants to work for are all the ‘Italians’ (the workers, the businesses, the, young, the unemployed, the consumers) – although sometimes this category is defined in a rather conservative manner, with a special emphasis of the family/ies (which account for 6 citations in 2004 and 2009). Indeed the goal is to put the “the unity of the country at the heart of the political agenda”, working for the defence of the “economic, social and institutional solidarity among the various areas of the country”.

Looking at the *organisational dimension*, however, we can find a bit of personalization (especially in 2004), where the term ‘Centre’, which is also the label of the party, recurs for several times in the program (11).

*Table C. UDC: Ideological dimension*

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| *‘Us’* |  | *‘Them’* |  |
| 2004 |
| Centre | 11 | Localisms | 1 |
| Nation/Country | 8 |  |  |
| Family | 6 |  |  |
| Italy/South  | 4 |  |  |
| Government | 3 |  |  |
| 2009 |
| Family/society | 6 | Precariousness/crisis | 3 |
| State | 6 | Regionalism(s) (NL) | 2 |
| Italy | 3 |  |  |
| 2014 |
| Work, businesses, families, young, unemployed, consumers | 5 | Europe, EU Commission, Brussels | 7 |
| Italy | 3 | Finance/banks | 2 |
| EP, ECB | 3 |  |  |
| Citizens | 2 |  |  |

The UDC does not appear as characterized by a personalistic leadership centralizing decision-making. Similarly to traditional parties, there is a formalized membership, according to which “the rules for becoming a member” are established collegially by the National Direction (art.4). The members appear quite influencing the life of the party, they “contribute to the determination of the political line and at the elections for the main bodies of the party. They can access party positions and be candidates for elections on the basis of regulations established in the Statute” (art.2). There is a mediation between the members of the party and the party and its leadership, though the sections (the members participate to the life of the party through the Section), which are the organs/entities/bodies at the basis of the party (art. 22). Like traditional parties, there are several organisational structures, at any territorial level, from the local to the national, mainly ruled by the principle of collegiality and check and balance of power between the main decision-making bodies at any level. In particular, as for the national level, the key decision – making bodies are represented by the Political Secretary and the National Council, which are elected by the respective congresses, with secret ballot (art. 15). In terms of tasks, the former is the political representative of the party and carries out the political line determined by the Congress, by leading and coordinating the activities of the party (art.55); the latter is the deliberative body of the party (art. 57). In addition, there are the national Congress (which is the assembly of the delegates elected by regional congresses, art. 54), whose main task is to propose the program and the general political line of the party and to elect the political Secretary and National Council, art. 54; the national Direction and the political Office (art.16). Between the Secretary and the Council there is a reciprocal control, although the Council activities have to be made within the framework of the political line determined by the Congress (art. 15). In sum, the analyzed organisational structure includes therefore many limitations to personalistic leadership and with respect to our analytical dimensions (see above) the UDC is one of the best examples of no populist, personalistic leadership.