**Online appendix**

**Table 1: Average Marginal Effects of Deservingness Perceptions and Traditional Family Values – Partial Proportional Odds Model Estimates**

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| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Dependent variable: “It’s a role of the state to support single mothers” | not agree at all or somewhat disagree(N=96) | somewhat agree(N=356) | absolutely agree(N=273) |
| *Independent variables* |  |  |  |  |
| Control *(sm. are not responsible)* | AME | -0.00 | -0.01 | 0.01 |
| p-value | 0.86 | 0.86 | 0.86 |
| 95% CI | [-0.05,0.04] | [-0.10,0.09] | [-0.13,0.15] |
| Reciprocity + Control(*sm. work hard*) | AME | -0.14 | 0.06 | 0.08 |
| p-value | 0.02 | 0.53 | 0.43 |
| 95% CI | [-0.26,-0.03] | [-0.13,0.24] | [-0.13,0.30] |
| Attitude (*sm. are not demanding*) | AME | -0.13 | -0.00 | 0.13 |
| p-value | 0.00 | 0.95 | 0.06 |
| 95% CI | [-0.21,-0.04] | [-0.12,0.11] | [-0.00,0.27] |
| Need *(sm. have bad financial sit.)* | AME | -0.15 | -0.16 | 0.31 |
| p-value | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 |
| 95% CI | [-0.24,-0.06] | [-0.21,-0.11] | [0.19,0.42] |
| Identity *(sm. is not an uncommon sit.)* | AME | 0.00 | 0.00 | -0.00 |
| p-value | 0.94 | 0.94 | 0.94 |
| 95% CI | [-0.03,0.04] | [-0.07,0.07] | [-0.11,0.10] |
| Accept divorce | AME | -0.11 | 0.10 | 0.01 |
| p-value | 0.01 | 0.10 | 0.91 |
| 95% CI | [-0.19,-0.03] | [-0.02,0.23] | [-0.12,0.14] |
| Women’s right to single motherhood *(agree)* | AME | -0.04 | -0.07 | 0.11 |
| p-value | 0.11 | 0.07 | 0.08 |
| 95% CI | [-0.08,0.01] | [-0.14,0.01] | [-0.01,0.23] |
| Need of both parents *(disagree)* | AME | 0.15 | -0.13 | -0.02 |
| p-value | 0.00 | 0.06 | 0.78 |
| 95% CI | [0.05,0.26] | [-0.27,0.01] | [-0.16,0.12] |
| N | 725 |
| Pseudo R2 | 0.20 |

Notes: AME = average marginal effects, CI=confidence intervals. Models controlled for demographic variables. The first and second categories (not agree at all & somewhat disagree) were collapsed due to the low number of respondents (N=20) in the first category. Average marginal effects were calculated based on the two partial proportional odds ordered models (1st category vs. 2nd & 3rd categories; 1st & 2nd categories vs. 3rd category). Post estimation tests show that the coefficient of need is not significantly different from the coefficients of attitude and reciprocity in any of these models, and not significantly different from the coefficients of accepting divorce in the first model.

**Online appendix, Table 2: Cross-level Interactions between Respondent Characteristics and Vignette Attributes**

|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | Model without interaction | Gender of the respondent # Age of the mother | Age group of the respondent # Age of the mother | Need of both parents (disagree)# Amount of maintenance  | Women’s right to single motherhood (agree)*#)* Marital status |
|  | b | p | 95% CI | b | p | 95% CI | b | p | 95% CI | b | p | 95% CI | b | p | 95% CI |
| Intercept | 8.23 | 0.00 | 7.29,9.16 | 8.24 | 0.00 | 7.31, 9.17 | 8.27 | 0.00 | 7.32, 9.22 | 8.31 | 0.00 | 7.74, 8.87 | 8.46 | 0.00 | 7.91,9.01 |
| ***Vignette variables*** |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| **Age** (ref. 22-year-old) |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| 40-year-old | -0.11 | 0.07 | -0.23,0.01 | -0.25 | 0.01 | -0.43,-0.06 | -0.32 | 0.03 | -0.61,-0.02 |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| **Marital status** (ref.: Widow)Never-married | -0.11 | 0.12 | -0.26,0.03 |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  | -0.44 | 0.00 | -0.75,-0.13 |
| **Maintenance / orphan’s allowance** (ref.: Does not get any)Gets 50.000 forints/child/month | -1.48 | 0.00 | -1.64,-1.31 |  |  |  |  |  |  | -1.58 | 0.00 | -1.77,-1.39 |  |  |  |
| ***Respondent variables*** |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| **Gender (ref. Female)** |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Male | -0.29 | 0.11 | -0.65,0.07 | -0.41 | 0.04 | -0.79,-0.02 |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| **Age groups (ref. 18-29 years)**50-65 years | 0.53 | 0.04 | 0.01,1.05 |  |  |  | 0.39 | 0.18 | -0.18,0.95 |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| **Need of both parents**(*disagree*) | -0.11 | 0.68 | -0.66,0.43 |  |  |  |  |  |  | -0.28 | 0.35 | -0.87,0.30 |  |  |  |
| **Women’s right to single motherhood** *(agree)* | 0.21 | 0.38 | -0.26,0.67 |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  | 0.03 | 0.91 | -0.46,0.51 |
| ***Cross-level interactions*** |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Male # 40-year-old mother |  |  |  | 0.28 | 0.02 | 0.04,0.52 |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| 50-65 years # 40-year-old mother |  |  |  |  |  |  | 0.35 | 0.04 | 0.02,0.68 |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Need of both parents(*disagree*) # 50.000 forints/child/month |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  | 0.49 | 0.02 | 0.07,0.92 |  |  |  |
| Women’s right to single motherhood *(agree)*# Never-married |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  | 0.42 | 0.02 | 0.08,0.77 |
| AIC | 37409.34 | 37393.86 | 37398.42 | 37283.69 | 37386.71  |
| Number of respondents | 910 | 910 | 910 | 910 | 910 |
| Number of vignettes | 9100 | 9100 | 9100 | 9100 | 9100 |

*Notes: Dependent variable: ‘In your opinion, the amount of family allowance of (name of the mother) is fair, unfairly too low, or unfairly too high?’ (11-point scale); All of the models are controlled for vignette attributes, family values, and demographic variables.*