

SUPPLEMENTARY MATERIAL

**POLITICAL COMPETITION AND
AUTHORITARIAN REPRESSION**
Evidence from Pinochet's Chile

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Online Appendix

In the appendix, find the following information which supports the main text, including robustness tests and supplementary information.

Descriptive Statistics

1. Descriptive statistics for municipality-level variables, Table A.1
2. Comparing values of covariates between competitive and uncompetitive municipalities, Table A.2

Robustness Tests

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2. Zero-inflated negative binomial models for main results, Table B.2.
3. Main results with killings per 100,000 population, Table B.3.
4. Main results using varying operationalizations of non-dissidents, in Table B.4. In the more restrictive operationalization, students are reclassified as dissidents rather than non-dissidents. In the less restrictive operationalization, rank-and-file party members are reclassified as non-dissidents rather than dissidents.
5. Placebo close election windows for total victims part 1, Table B.5.
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12. Varying electoral margins, 60%-67% UP vote share for non-dissident victims, Table B.12.
13. Main results using a close election explanatory variable constructed according to Balcells (2010) in Table B.13. This measurement uses the following formula, which ranges from zero (election not competitive) to one (election maximally competitive). A normalized Balcells index is taken given the left skew of the values of this index.

$$1 - \left(\frac{\text{Popular Unity Vote} - \text{Non-Popular Unity Vote}}{100} \right)^2$$

14. Main results using a continuous Popular Unity vote margin explanatory variable instead of a close election dummy. This variable takes a lower value if the election was more competitive. Using a continuous measure therefore attenuates the relationship. Results are in Table B.14, with vote margin logged due to right skew.

15. Subset of data to September 13 and later for main results, Table B.15.
16. Sensitivity analysis for main results: total victims and non-dissident victims, Figure B.1.

Mechanism Tests

1. Difference in means between municipalities with and without civilian collaboration in repression, Table C.1. For the eight municipalities identified in the Truth and Reconciliation report in which civilians collaborated with repression, there are descriptively closer elections, more non-dissident victims, and more total victims.
2. Results from mediation analysis, Table C.2.
3. Results from sensitivity analysis for violations of sequential ignorability assumption, Figure C.1.

Alternative Explanations

Alternative Explanation: Regime Strategy

1. Placebo test with militant victims outcome, Table D.1.
2. Caravan of Death and victim type, Table D.2.
3. Caravan of Death and victim type (negative binomial), Table D.3.

Alternative Explanation: Different Victim Behavior

1. Exclusion of dissident party leaders and officials from sample, Table D.4.
2. Exclusion of Santiago and other urban areas, Tables D.5 and D.6.

Discussion: Repression during Regime Change

1. Relationship between political competition and killings, disaggregated by month, Table E.1.

| Variable | Minimum | Maximum | Mean | Median | Std. Dev | Missing |
|------------------------|---------|---------|-------|--------|----------|---------|
| Total Victims | 0 | 121 | 2.49 | 0 | 8.49 | 0 |
| Non-Militant Victims | 0 | 72 | 1.43 | 0 | 5.5 | 0 |
| Close Election, 1973 | 0 | 1 | 0.16 | 0 | 0.36 | 8 |
| Log(1970 Population) | 3.85 | 12.58 | 8.96 | 8.96 | 1.4 | 8 |
| Infant Mortality, 1972 | 0 | 77.78 | 10.05 | 8.75 | 7.93 | 2 |
| Allende Support | 2.8 | 79.1 | 33.86 | 32.6 | 13.85 | 3 |
| Polarized | 0 | 1 | 0.39 | 0 | 0.49 | 4 |
| Voter Share | 0.03 | 5.42 | 0.33 | 0.28 | 0.36 | 9 |
| Caravan of Death | 0 | 1 | 0.05 | 0 | 0.21 | 1 |
| Army Base | 0 | 1 | 0.02 | 0 | 0.15 | 1 |

Table A.1: Descriptive Statistics, Municipality Level

| Variable | Difference of Means | t | Standard Error | P-value |
|------------------------|---------------------|---------|----------------|---------|
| Voter Share | -0.0018 | -0.0585 | 0.0316 | 0.95 |
| Allende Support | 6.8322 | 6.1361 | 1.1134 | 0.00 |
| Army Base | 0.0211 | 0.8406 | 0.0252 | 0.40 |
| Infant Mortality, 1972 | -1.4248 | -1.8475 | 0.7712 | 0.07 |
| Log(1970 Population) | 0.5912 | 3.4848 | 0.1696 | 0.00 |

Table A.2: Comparing Covariates, Competitive and Uncompetitive Municipalities

| | <i>Dependent variable:</i> | | | |
|------------------------|----------------------------|----------------------|------------------------------|------------------------------|
| | Total Victims (1) | Total Victims (2) | Non-Dissident Victims (3) | Non-Dissident Victims (4) |
| Close Election, 1973 | 1.07** (0.37) | 0.82** (0.24) | 1.06* (0.43) | 0.99** (0.25) |
| Log(1970 Population) | | 0.98** (0.09) | | 1.10** (0.11) |
| Infant Mortality, 1972 | | 0.02 (0.01) | | -0.00 (0.02) |
| Allende Support | | -0.01 (0.01) | | -0.02 (0.01) |
| Polarized | | 0.48* (0.21) | | 0.18 (0.23) |
| Voter Share | | 0.61** (0.21) | | 0.46* (0.23) |
| Army Base | | 0.56 (0.46) | | 0.06 (0.45) |
| (Intercept) | 0.64** (0.15) | -9.96** (1.18) | 0.09 (0.17) | -12.08** (1.48) |
| Log Likelihood | -661.67 | -529.04 | -496.95 | -362.12 |
| Observations | 450 | 444 | 450 | 444 |
| Region Dummies | | ✓ | | ✓ |

** $p < 0.01$, * $p < 0.05$, † $p < 0.1$

Table B.1: Political Killings and Political Competition (Count)

| | <i>Dependent variable:</i> | | | |
|-------------------------------------|----------------------------|----------------------|------------------------------|------------------------------|
| | Total Victims (1) | Total Victims (2) | Non-Dissident Victims (3) | Non-Dissident Victims (4) |
| Count model: Close Election, 1973 | 0.61* (0.24) | 0.81** (0.23) | 0.58* (0.26) | 0.96** (0.26) |
| Count model: Log(1970 Population) | 0.72** (0.09) | 0.59** (0.11) | 0.92** (0.13) | 0.97** (0.15) |
| Count model: Infant Mortality, 1972 | | 0.05* (0.02) | | -0.00 (0.02) |
| Count model: Allende Support | | 0.00 (0.01) | | -0.01 (0.01) |
| Count model: Polarized | | 0.48* (0.19) | | 0.13 (0.23) |
| Count model: Voter Share | | 0.38* (0.15) | | 0.42 (0.22) |
| Count model: Army Base | | 0.46 (0.35) | | -0.02 (0.40) |
| Count model: Log(theta) | -0.26 (0.19) | 0.34 (0.22) | -0.18 (0.25) | 0.25 (0.29) |
| Count model: (Intercept) | -6.00** (0.90) | -5.79** (1.32) | -8.63** (1.43) | -10.63** (1.81) |
| Zero model: Log(1970 Population) | -1.15** (0.17) | -1.14** (0.18) | -0.96** (0.20) | -0.77** (0.25) |
| Zero model: (Intercept) | 10.64** (1.67) | 10.50** (1.73) | 9.25** (2.09) | 6.21* (2.72) |
| Log Likelihood | -560.31 | -518.30 | -406.36 | -361.31 |
| Observations | 445 | 444 | 445 | 444 |
| Region Dummies | | ✓ | | ✓ |

** $p < 0.01$, * $p < 0.05$, † $p < 0.1$

Table B.2: Political Killings and Political Competition (Zero-Inflated Negative Binomial)

| | <i>Dependent variable:</i> | | | |
|------------------------|-----------------------------------|-----------------------------------|---|---|
| | Log(Total Victims/100,000) (1) | Log(Total Victims/100,000) (2) | Log(Non-Dissident Victims/100,000) (3) | Log(Non-Dissident Victims/100,000) (4) |
| Close Election, 1973 | 0.54* (0.21) | 0.38* (0.17) | 0.36* (0.17) | 0.26† (0.14) |
| Log(1970 Population) | | 0.31** (0.05) | | 0.18** (0.04) |
| Infant Mortality, 1972 | | 0.00 (0.01) | | -0.00 (0.00) |
| Allende Support | | -0.01 (0.00) | | -0.00 (0.00) |
| Polarized | | 0.26 (0.14) | | 0.18 (0.10) |
| Voter Share | | 0.83** (0.17) | | 0.33 (0.31) |
| Army Base | | 0.71* (0.30) | | 0.42 (0.24) |
| (Intercept) | 0.78** (0.07) | -1.74* (0.74) | 0.51** (0.06) | -1.22** (0.33) |
| Adj. R ² | 0.02 | 0.32 | 0.01 | 0.34 |
| Observations | 445 | 444 | 445 | 444 |
| Region Dummies | | ✓ | | ✓ |

** $p < 0.01$, * $p < 0.05$, † $p < 0.1$

Table B.3: Political Killings and Political Competition (Killings per 100,000)

| | <i>Dependent variable:</i> | | | |
|------------------------|---|---|---|---|
| | Log(Non-Dissident Victims + 1) (Less Strict) (1) | Log(Non-Dissident Victims + 1) (Less Strict) (2) | Log(Non-Dissident Victims + 1) (More Strict) (3) | Log(Non-Dissident Victims + 1) (More Strict) (4) |
| Close Election, 1973 | 0.49** (0.15) | 0.32** (0.10) | 0.39** (0.14) | 0.25** (0.09) |
| Log(1970 Population) | | 0.35** (0.06) | | 0.25** (0.06) |
| Infant Mortality, 1972 | | 0.00 (0.00) | | -0.00 (0.00) |
| Allende Support | | -0.08 (0.05) | | -0.05 (0.04) |
| Polarized | | 0.15* (0.06) | | 0.12* (0.05) |
| Voter Share | | 0.24** (0.08) | | 0.10 (0.06) |
| Army Base | | 1.02** (0.22) | | 0.86** (0.21) |
| (Intercept) | 0.41** (0.04) | -1.80** (0.26) | 0.30** (0.04) | -1.36** (0.22) |
| Adj. R ² | 0.04 | 0.59 | 0.03 | 0.60 |
| Observations | 450 | 444 | 450 | 444 |
| Region Dummies | | ✓ | | ✓ |

** $p < 0.01$, * $p < 0.05$, † $p < 0.1$

Table B.4: Varying Operationalizations of Non-Dissident Victims

| | <i>Dependent variable:</i> | | | | | | | |
|-------------------------------------|----------------------------|-------------------|-------------------|------------------------|-------------------|-------------------|-------------------|-------------------|
| | (1) | (2) | (3) | Log(Total Victims + 1) | | (6) | (7) | (8) |
| | | | | (4) | (5) | | | |
| Close Election Placebo (60-54 pct.) | 0.06 (0.11) | | | | | | | |
| Close Election Placebo (59-53 pct.) | | 0.08 (0.12) | | | | | | |
| Close Election Placebo (58-52 pct.) | | | 0.11 (0.12) | | | | | |
| Close Election Placebo (57-51 pct.) | | | | 0.17 (0.10) | | | | |
| Close Election Placebo (56-50 pct.) | | | | | 0.17 (0.10) | | | |
| Close Election Placebo (55-49 pct.) | | | | | | 0.23* (0.10) | | |
| Close Election Placebo (54-48 pct.) | | | | | | | 0.37** (0.11) | |
| Close Election (Actual) | | | | | | | | 0.31** (0.11) |
| (Intercept) | -2.01** (0.28) | -2.00** (0.28) | -1.99** (0.28) | -1.99** (0.28) | -1.98** (0.27) | -1.97** (0.27) | -1.89** (0.26) | -1.91** (0.26) |
| Adj. R ² | 0.58 | 0.58 | 0.58 | 0.58 | 0.58 | 0.58 | 0.59 | 0.59 |
| Observations | 444 | 444 | 444 | 444 | 444 | 444 | 444 | 444 |
| Region Dummies | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ |
| Covariates | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ |

** $p < 0.01$, * $p < 0.05$, † $p < 0.1$

Table B.5: Placebo Windows for Close Election Variable, 60-54 to 53-47 UP Vote Share Ranges (Total Killings)

| | <i>Dependent variable:</i> | | | | | | | |
|-------------------------------------|----------------------------|-------------------|-------------------|------------------------|-------------------|-------------------|-------------------|-------------------|
| | (1) | (2) | (3) | Log(Total Victims + 1) | | (6) | (7) | (8) |
| | | | | (4) | (5) | | | |
| Close Election Placebo (52-46 pct.) | 0.29** (0.10) | | | | | | | |
| Close Election Placebo (51-45 pct.) | | 0.21* (0.09) | | | | | | |
| Close Election Placebo (50-44 pct.) | | | 0.20* (0.09) | | | | | |
| Close Election Placebo (49-43 pct.) | | | | 0.10 (0.09) | | | | |
| Close Election Placebo (48-42 pct.) | | | | | -0.00 (0.08) | | | |
| Close Election Placebo (47-41 pct.) | | | | | | -0.05 (0.08) | | |
| Close Election Placebo (46-40 pct.) | | | | | | | -0.14 (0.08) | |
| Close Election Placebo (45-39 pct.) | | | | | | | | -0.17* (0.08) |
| (Intercept) | -1.94** (0.27) | -1.95** (0.27) | -1.97** (0.27) | -1.98** (0.27) | -2.01** (0.28) | -2.02** (0.28) | -2.03** (0.28) | -2.04** (0.28) |
| Adj. R ² | 0.59 | 0.58 | 0.58 | 0.58 | 0.57 | 0.58 | 0.58 | 0.58 |
| Observations | 444 | 444 | 444 | 444 | 444 | 444 | 444 | 444 |
| Region Dummies | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ |
| Covariates | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ |

** $p < 0.01$, * $p < 0.05$, † $p < 0.1$

Table B.6: Placebo Windows for Close Election Variable, 52-46 to 45-39 UP Vote Share Ranges (Total Killings)

| | <i>Dependent variable:</i> | | | | | | | |
|-------------------------------------|--------------------------------|-------------------|-------------------|-------------------|-------------------|-------------------|-------------------|-------------------|
| | Log(Non-Dissident Victims + 1) | | | | | | | |
| | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) | (7) | (8) |
| Close Election Placebo (60-54 pct.) | 0.07 (0.08) | | | | | | | |
| Close Election Placebo (59-53 pct.) | | 0.04 (0.08) | | | | | | |
| Close Election Placebo (58-52 pct.) | | | 0.04 (0.08) | | | | | |
| Close Election Placebo (57-51 pct.) | | | | 0.05 (0.09) | | | | |
| Close Election Placebo (56-50 pct.) | | | | | 0.07 (0.08) | | | |
| Close Election Placebo (55-49 pct.) | | | | | | 0.11 (0.08) | | |
| Close Election Placebo (54-48 pct.) | | | | | | | 0.24** (0.09) | |
| Close Election (Actual) | | | | | | | | 0.21* (0.09) |
| (Intercept) | -1.39** (0.21) | -1.39** (0.21) | -1.39** (0.21) | -1.39** (0.21) | -1.38** (0.21) | -1.37** (0.21) | -1.31** (0.20) | -1.32** (0.20) |
| Adj. R ² | 0.56 | 0.56 | 0.56 | 0.56 | 0.56 | 0.57 | 0.58 | 0.57 |
| Observations | 444 | 444 | 444 | 444 | 444 | 444 | 444 | 444 |
| Region Dummies | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ |
| Covariates | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ |

** $p < 0.01$, * $p < 0.05$, † $p < 0.1$

Table B.7: Placebo Windows for Close Election Variable, 60-54 to 53-47 UP Vote Share Ranges (Non-Dissident Victims)

| | <i>Dependent variable:</i> | | | | | | | |
|-------------------------------------|--------------------------------|-------------------|-------------------|-------------------|-------------------|-------------------|-------------------|-------------------|
| | Log(Non-Dissident Victims + 1) | | | | | | | |
| | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) | (7) | (8) |
| Close Election Placebo (52-46 pct.) | 0.22* (0.09) | | | | | | | |
| Close Election Placebo (51-45 pct.) | | 0.16* (0.08) | | | | | | |
| Close Election Placebo (50-44 pct.) | | | 0.14 (0.08) | | | | | |
| Close Election Placebo (49-43 pct.) | | | | 0.06 (0.08) | | | | |
| Close Election Placebo (48-42 pct.) | | | | | -0.03 (0.07) | | | |
| Close Election Placebo (47-41 pct.) | | | | | | -0.04 (0.07) | | |
| Close Election Placebo (46-40 pct.) | | | | | | | -0.11 (0.06) | |
| Close Election Placebo (45-39 pct.) | | | | | | | | -0.12 (0.07) |
| (Intercept) | -1.34** (0.21) | -1.34** (0.21) | -1.36** (0.21) | -1.37** (0.21) | -1.40** (0.21) | -1.40** (0.21) | -1.41** (0.21) | -1.41** (0.21) |
| Adj. R ² | 0.57 | 0.57 | 0.57 | 0.56 | 0.56 | 0.56 | 0.57 | 0.57 |
| Observations | 444 | 444 | 444 | 444 | 444 | 444 | 444 | 444 |
| Region Dummies | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ |
| Covariates | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ |

** $p < 0.01$, * $p < 0.05$, † $p < 0.1$

Table B.8: Placebo Windows for Close Election Variable, 52-46 to 45-39 UP Vote Share Ranges (Non-Dissident Victims)

| | <i>Dependent variable:</i> | | | | | | | |
|-----------------------------|----------------------------|-------------------|-------------------|------------------------|-------------------|-------------------|-------------------|-------------------|
| | 52-48 | 53-47 | 54-46 | Log(Total Victims + 1) | | 57-43 | 58-42 | 51-49 |
| | | | | 55-45 | 56-44 | | | |
| Close Election, 1973 (2 pt) | 0.39** (0.13) | | | | | | | |
| Close Election, 1973 (3 pt) | | 0.31** (0.11) | | | | | | |
| Close Election, 1973 (4 pt) | | | 0.30** (0.09) | | | | | |
| Close Election, 1973 (5 pt) | | | | 0.30** (0.08) | | | | |
| Close Election, 1973 (6 pt) | | | | | 0.26** (0.07) | | | |
| Close Election, 1973 (7 pt) | | | | | | 0.17* (0.07) | | |
| Close Election, 1973 (8 pt) | | | | | | | 0.20** (0.07) | |
| Close Election, 1973 (9 pt) | | | | | | | | 0.18** (0.07) |
| (Intercept) | -1.92** (0.27) | -1.91** (0.26) | -1.91** (0.26) | -1.89** (0.26) | -1.91** (0.27) | -1.93** (0.27) | -1.91** (0.27) | -1.90** (0.27) |
| Adj. R ² | 0.59 | 0.59 | 0.59 | 0.59 | 0.59 | 0.58 | 0.58 | 0.58 |
| Observations | 444 | 444 | 444 | 444 | 444 | 444 | 444 | 444 |
| Region Dummies | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ |
| Covariates | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ |

** $p < 0.01$, * $p < 0.05$, † $p < 0.1$

Table B.9: Changing Margins for Close Election Variable, 52-48 to 59-41 UP Vote Share Ranges (Total Killings)

| | <i>Dependent variable:</i> | | | | | | | |
|------------------------------|----------------------------|-------------------|-------------------|------------------------|-------------------|-------------------|-------------------|-------------------|
| | 60-40 | 61-39 | 62-38 | Log(Total Victims + 1) | | 65-35 | 66-34 | 67-33 |
| | | | | 63-37 | 64-36 | | | |
| Close Election, 1973 (10 pt) | 0.12† (0.06) | | | | | | | |
| Close Election, 1973 (11 pt) | | 0.12* (0.06) | | | | | | |
| Close Election, 1973 (12 pt) | | | 0.13* (0.06) | | | | | |
| Close Election, 1973 (13 pt) | | | | 0.11 (0.06) | | | | |
| Close Election, 1973 (14 pt) | | | | | 0.08 (0.06) | | | |
| Close Election, 1973 (15 pt) | | | | | | 0.10 (0.06) | | |
| Close Election, 1973 (16 pt) | | | | | | | 0.09 (0.06) | |
| Close Election, 1973 (17 pt) | | | | | | | | 0.13* (0.06) |
| (Intercept) | -1.94** (0.27) | -1.93** (0.27) | -1.94** (0.27) | -1.94** (0.28) | -1.97** (0.28) | -1.95** (0.27) | -1.95** (0.28) | -1.94** (0.28) |
| Adj. R ² | 0.58 | 0.58 | 0.58 | 0.58 | 0.58 | 0.58 | 0.58 | 0.58 |
| Observations | 444 | 444 | 444 | 444 | 444 | 444 | 444 | 444 |
| Region Dummies | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ |
| Covariates | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ |

** $p < 0.01$, * $p < 0.05$, † $p < 0.1$

Table B.10: Changing Margins for Close Election Variable, 60-40 to 67-33 UP Vote Share Ranges (Total Killings)

| | <i>Dependent variable:</i> | | | | | | | |
|-----------------------------|--------------------------------|-------------------|-------------------|-------------------|-------------------|-------------------|-------------------|-------------------|
| | Log(Non-Dissident Victims + 1) | | | | | | | |
| | 52-48 | 53-47 | 54-46 | 55-45 | 56-44 | 57-43 | 58-42 | 51-49 |
| Close Election, 1973 (2 pt) | 0.30** (0.11) | | | | | | | |
| Close Election, 1973 (3 pt) | | 0.21* (0.09) | | | | | | |
| Close Election, 1973 (4 pt) | | | 0.19* (0.08) | | | | | |
| Close Election, 1973 (5 pt) | | | | 0.17** (0.07) | | | | |
| Close Election, 1973 (6 pt) | | | | | 0.14* (0.06) | | | |
| Close Election, 1973 (7 pt) | | | | | | 0.09 (0.06) | | |
| Close Election, 1973 (8 pt) | | | | | | | 0.11* (0.05) | |
| Close Election, 1973 (9 pt) | | | | | | | | 0.12* (0.05) |
| (Intercept) | -1.32** (0.20) | -1.32** (0.20) | -1.33** (0.20) | -1.32** (0.20) | -1.34** (0.21) | -1.35** (0.21) | -1.33** (0.21) | -1.32** (0.21) |
| Adj. R ² | 0.58 | 0.57 | 0.57 | 0.57 | 0.57 | 0.57 | 0.57 | 0.57 |
| Observations | 444 | 444 | 444 | 444 | 444 | 444 | 444 | 444 |
| Region Dummies | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ |
| Covariates | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ |

** $p < 0.01$, * $p < 0.05$, † $p < 0.1$

Table B.11: Changing Margins for Close Election Variable, 52-48 to 59-41 UP Vote Share Ranges (Non-Dissident Victims)

| | <i>Dependent variable:</i> | | | | | | | |
|------------------------------|--------------------------------|-------------------|-------------------|-------------------|-------------------|-------------------|-------------------|-------------------|
| | Log(Non-Dissident Victims + 1) | | | | | | | |
| | 60-40 | 61-39 | 62-38 | 63-37 | 64-36 | 65-35 | 66-34 | 67-33 |
| Close Election, 1973 (10 pt) | 0.07 (0.05) | | | | | | | |
| Close Election, 1973 (11 pt) | | 0.06 (0.05) | | | | | | |
| Close Election, 1973 (12 pt) | | | 0.08 (0.05) | | | | | |
| Close Election, 1973 (13 pt) | | | | 0.06 (0.05) | | | | |
| Close Election, 1973 (14 pt) | | | | | 0.03 (0.05) | | | |
| Close Election, 1973 (15 pt) | | | | | | 0.06 (0.05) | | |
| Close Election, 1973 (16 pt) | | | | | | | 0.05 (0.05) | |
| Close Election, 1973 (17 pt) | | | | | | | | 0.09 (0.05) |
| (Intercept) | -1.35** (0.21) | -1.36** (0.21) | -1.35** (0.21) | -1.35** (0.21) | -1.37** (0.21) | -1.36** (0.21) | -1.36** (0.21) | -1.35** (0.21) |
| Adj. R ² | 0.57 | 0.56 | 0.57 | 0.57 | 0.56 | 0.56 | 0.56 | 0.57 |
| Observations | 444 | 444 | 444 | 444 | 444 | 444 | 444 | 444 |
| Region Dummies | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ |
| Covariates | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ |

** $p < 0.01$, * $p < 0.05$, † $p < 0.1$

Table B.12: Changing Margins for Close Election Variable, 60-40 to 67-33 UP Vote Share Ranges (Non-Dissident Victims)

| | <i>Dependent variable:</i> | | | |
|-----------------------------|----------------------------|-------------------|--------------------------------|-------------------|
| | Log(Total Victims + 1) | | Log(Non-Dissident Victims + 1) | |
| | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) |
| Balcells Index (Normalized) | 0.10** (0.02) | 0.06** (0.02) | 0.07** (0.02) | 0.03* (0.01) |
| Log(1970 Population) | | 0.41** (0.07) | | 0.25** (0.05) |
| Infant Mortality, 1972 | | 0.00 (0.00) | | -0.00 (0.00) |
| Allende Support | | -0.13* (0.06) | | -0.06 (0.04) |
| Polarized | | 0.16* (0.07) | | 0.10 (0.05) |
| Voter Share | | 0.35** (0.13) | | 0.10 (0.06) |
| Army Base | | 1.06** (0.24) | | 0.58** (0.21) |
| (Intercept) | 0.13 (0.08) | -1.87** (0.28) | 0.09 (0.06) | -1.32** (0.22) |
| Adj. R ² | 0.06 | 0.58 | 0.04 | 0.56 |
| Observations | 448 | 442 | 448 | 442 |
| Region Dummies | | ✓ | | ✓ |

** $p < 0.01$, * $p < 0.05$, † $p < 0.1$

Table B.13: Main Results with Balcells (2010) Close Election Measure

| | <i>Dependent variable:</i> | | | |
|------------------------|----------------------------|-------------------|--------------------------------|-------------------|
| | Log(Total Victims + 1) | | Log(Non-Dissident Victims + 1) | |
| | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) |
| Abs(Vote Margin) | -0.03** (0.00) | -0.01** (0.00) | -0.02** (0.00) | -0.00 (0.00) |
| Log(1970 Population) | | 0.41** (0.07) | | 0.24** (0.06) |
| Infant Mortality, 1972 | | 0.00 (0.00) | | -0.00 (0.00) |
| Allende Support | | -0.13* (0.06) | | -0.05 (0.05) |
| Polarized | | 0.17** (0.07) | | 0.12* (0.05) |
| Voter Share | | 0.35** (0.13) | | 0.09 (0.06) |
| Army Base | | 1.05** (0.24) | | 0.57** (0.21) |
| (Intercept) | 0.85** (0.08) | -1.57** (0.30) | 0.57** (0.07) | -1.18** (0.25) |
| Adj. R ² | 0.07 | 0.58 | 0.05 | 0.57 |
| Observations | 450 | 444 | 450 | 444 |
| Region Dummies | | ✓ | | ✓ |

** $p < 0.01$, * $p < 0.05$, † $p < 0.1$

Table B.14: Main Results with Abs(Vote Margin)

| | <i>Dependent variable:</i> | | | |
|------------------------|-------------------------------|-------------------------------|---------------------------------------|---------------------------------------|
| | Log(Total Victims + 1) (1) | Log(Total Victims + 1) (2) | Log(Non-Dissident Victims + 1) (3) | Log(Non-Dissident Victims + 1) (4) |
| Close Election, 1973 | 0.51** (0.15) | 0.34** (0.10) | 0.36** (0.13) | 0.24** (0.09) |
| Log(1970 Population) | | 0.43** (0.06) | | 0.26** (0.05) |
| Infant Mortality, 1972 | | 0.00 (0.00) | | -0.00 (0.00) |
| Allende Support | | -0.14** (0.05) | | -0.07 (0.04) |
| Polarized | | 0.18** (0.07) | | 0.11* (0.05) |
| Voter Share | | 0.35** (0.13) | | 0.09 (0.06) |
| Army Base | | 1.07** (0.23) | | 0.58** (0.21) |
| (Intercept) | 0.42** (0.04) | -1.82** (0.26) | 0.28** (0.03) | -1.23** (0.20) |
| Adj. R ² | 0.04 | 0.58 | 0.03 | 0.55 |
| Observations | 450 | 444 | 450 | 444 |
| Region Dummies | | ✓ | | ✓ |

** $p < 0.01$, * $p < 0.05$, † $p < 0.1$

Table B.15: Political Killing Victims and Political Competition, September 13 and Later




Figure B.1: Sensitivity Analysis

Note: Figure shows results of a sensitivity analysis which displays the impact an omitted variable equivalent to the log of 1970 population (diamond) would have on the coefficient estimate for political competition with the total killings outcome (left panel) and non-dissident victims outcome (right panel) in the baseline results.

| Variable | Participation Mean | No Participation Mean | p-value |
|-----------------------|--------------------|-----------------------|---------|
| UP Vote Share | 48.15% | 42.63% | 0.058 |
| Total Victims | 5.63 | 2.37 | 0.181 |
| Non-Dissident Victims | 4.25 | 1.35 | 0.158 |

Table C.1: Difference in Municipalities with Civilian Participation in Repression

| Estimand | Estimate | CI Lower 95% | CI Upper 95% | p-value |
|-------------------------------|----------|--------------|--------------|---------|
| ACME (Civilian Participation) | -0.001 | -0.003 | 0.000 | 0.11 |
| ADE (Close Election, 1973) | -0.023 | -0.04 | -0.02 | 0.00 |
| Total Effect | -0.03 | -0.04 | -0.02 | 0.00 |
| Prop. Mediated | 0.045 | -0.01 | 0.12 | 0.11 |

Sample Size Used: 450
Simulations: 10,000

Table C.2: Mediation Analysis, Civilian Participation in Repression




Figure C.1: Sensitivity Analysis, Mediation through Civilian Participation

Note: Figure shows results of a sensitivity analysis which displays the impact of violations of the sequential ignorability assumption for the causal mediation analysis.

| | <i>Dependent variable:</i> | |
|------------------------|--------------------------------|------------------|
| | Log(Militant Victims+1) (1) | (2) |
| Close Election, 1973 | 0.08* (0.04) | 0.06 (0.03) |
| Log(1970 Population) | | 0.07** (0.03) |
| Infant Mortality, 1972 | | 0.00 (0.00) |
| Allende Support | | -0.04 (0.02) |
| Polarized | | 0.03 (0.03) |
| Voter Share | | 0.15 (0.14) |
| Army Base | | 0.39** (0.14) |
| (Intercept) | 0.05** (0.01) | -0.21* (0.09) |
| Adj. R ² | 0.01 | 0.20 |
| Observations | 450 | 444 |
| Region Dummies | | ✓ |

** $p < 0.01$, * $p < 0.05$, † $p < 0.1$

Table D.1: Placebo Test: Militant Victims Outcome

| | <i>Dependent variable:</i> | | | |
|------------------------|---------------------------------|---------------------------------|---------------------------------------|---------------------------------------|
| | Log(Dissident Victims+1) (1) | Log(Dissident Victims+1) (2) | Log(Non-Dissident Victims + 1) (3) | Log(Non-Dissident Victims + 1) (4) |
| Caravan of Death | 1.23** (0.17) | 0.82** (0.16) | 0.58** (0.18) | 0.24 (0.17) |
| Log(1970 Population) | | 0.18** (0.05) | | 0.20** (0.05) |
| Infant Mortality, 1972 | | 0.00 (0.00) | | -0.00 (0.00) |
| Allende Support | | -0.02 (0.03) | | -0.02 (0.04) |
| Polarized | | 0.10 (0.06) | | 0.12* (0.05) |
| Voter Share | | 0.23 (0.14) | | 0.06 (0.05) |
| Army Base | | 0.74** (0.27) | | 0.49* (0.22) |
| (Intercept) | 0.26** (0.03) | -1.20** (0.20) | 0.31** (0.04) | -1.35** (0.21) |
| Adj. R ² | 0.15 | 0.50 | 0.03 | 0.57 |
| Observations | 457 | 448 | 457 | 448 |
| Region Dummies | | ✓ | | ✓ |

** $p < 0.01$, * $p < 0.05$, † $p < 0.1$

Table D.2: Caravan of Death and Victim Type

| | <i>Dependent variable:</i> | | | |
|------------------------|----------------------------|--------------------------|------------------------------|------------------------------|
| | Dissident Victims (1) | Dissident Victims (2) | Non-Dissident Victims (3) | Non-Dissident Victims (4) |
| Caravan of Death | 1.84** (0.63) | 1.73** (0.49) | 0.56 (0.74) | 0.62 (0.44) |
| Log(1970 Population) | | 0.81** (0.12) | | 1.12** (0.12) |
| Infant Mortality, 1972 | | 0.03* (0.01) | | 0.00 (0.02) |
| Allende Support | | 0.01 (0.01) | | -0.01 (0.01) |
| Polarized | | 0.63* (0.25) | | 0.35 (0.23) |
| Voter Share | | 0.58* (0.24) | | 0.42 (0.23) |
| Army Base | | 0.57 (0.56) | | -0.21 (0.47) |
| (Intercept) | -0.19 (0.15) | -10.34** (1.43) | 0.30 (0.16) | -12.71** (1.53) |
| Log Likelihood | -478.67 | -383.40 | -506.96 | -370.78 |
| Observations | 457 | 448 | 457 | 448 |
| Region Dummies | | ✓ | | ✓ |

** $p < 0.01$, * $p < 0.05$, † $p < 0.1$

Table D.3: Caravan of Death and Victim Type (Count)

| | <i>Dependent variable:</i> | |
|------------------------|-------------------------------|-------------------------------|
| | Log(Total Victims + 1) (1) | Log(Total Victims + 1) (2) |
| Close Election, 1973 | 0.46** (0.15) | 0.30** (0.10) |
| Log(1970 Population) | | 0.33** (0.06) |
| Infant Mortality, 1972 | | 0.00 (0.00) |
| Allende Support | | -0.09 (0.05) |
| Polarized | | 0.12* (0.06) |
| Voter Share | | 0.25* (0.11) |
| Army Base | | 0.94** (0.22) |
| (Intercept) | 0.38** (0.04) | -1.67** (0.24) |
| Adj. R ² | 0.03 | 0.59 |
| Observations | 450 | 444 |
| Region Dummies | | ✓ |

** $p < 0.01$, * $p < 0.05$, † $p < 0.1$

Table D.4: Results with Sample Excluding Party Leaders and Officials

| | <i>Dependent variable:</i> | | | |
|------------------------|-------------------------------|-------------------------------|---------------------------------------|---------------------------------------|
| | Log(Total Victims + 1) (1) | Log(Total Victims + 1) (2) | Log(Non-Dissident Victims + 1) (3) | Log(Non-Dissident Victims + 1) (4) |
| Close Election, 1973 | 0.39** (0.14) | 0.28** (0.11) | 0.21* (0.09) | 0.17* (0.08) |
| Log(1970 Population) | | 0.33** (0.06) | | 0.17** (0.05) |
| Infant Mortality, 1972 | | 0.00 (0.00) | | -0.00 (0.00) |
| Allende Support | | -0.10* (0.05) | | -0.04 (0.04) |
| Polarized | | 0.14* (0.06) | | 0.06 (0.04) |
| Voter Share | | 0.41** (0.07) | | 0.07 (0.11) |
| Army Base | | 1.21** (0.25) | | 0.76** (0.23) |
| (Intercept) | 0.25** (0.03) | -1.44** (0.24) | 0.13** (0.02) | -0.80** (0.17) |
| Adj. R ² | 0.04 | 0.39 | 0.03 | 0.29 |
| Observations | 402 | 396 | 402 | 396 |
| Region Dummies | | ✓ | | ✓ |

** $p < 0.01$, * $p < 0.05$, † $p < 0.1$

Table D.5: Results with Sample Excluding Santiago

| | <i>Dependent variable:</i> | | | |
|------------------------|-------------------------------|-------------------------------|---------------------------------------|---------------------------------------|
| | Log(Total Victims + 1) (1) | Log(Total Victims + 1) (2) | Log(Non-Dissident Victims + 1) (3) | Log(Non-Dissident Victims + 1) (4) |
| Close Election, 1973 | 0.41** (0.15) | 0.27** (0.11) | 0.26* (0.11) | 0.18* (0.09) |
| Log(1970 Population) | | 0.37** (0.07) | | 0.21** (0.05) |
| Infant Mortality, 1972 | | 0.00 (0.00) | | -0.00 (0.00) |
| Allende Support | | -0.11* (0.05) | | -0.05 (0.04) |
| Polarized | | 0.17** (0.06) | | 0.11* (0.05) |
| Voter Share | | 0.32** (0.12) | | 0.08 (0.05) |
| Army Base | | 1.12** (0.24) | | 0.48* (0.24) |
| (Intercept) | 0.36** (0.04) | -1.66** (0.26) | 0.23** (0.03) | -1.06** (0.19) |
| Adj. R ² | 0.03 | 0.50 | 0.02 | 0.48 |
| Observations | 427 | 426 | 427 | 426 |
| Region Dummies | | ✓ | | ✓ |

** $p < 0.01$, * $p < 0.05$, † $p < 0.1$

Table D.6: Results with Sample Excluding Urban Municipalities over 100,000 Population

| | <i>Dependent variable:</i> | | | | | | | |
|------------------------|----------------------------|-------------------|-------------------|-------------------|--------------------------------|-------------------|-------------------|-------------------|
| | Log(Total Victims + 1) | | | | Log(Non-Dissident Victims + 1) | | | |
| | Sept. | Oct. | Nov. | Dec. | Sept. | Oct. | Nov. | Dec. |
| Close Election, 1973 | 0.18* (0.09) | 0.23* (0.09) | -0.01 (0.03) | 0.05 (0.05) | 0.10 (0.08) | 0.18* (0.07) | -0.00 (0.03) | 0.03 (0.03) |
| Log(1970 Population) | 0.18** (0.05) | 0.34** (0.06) | 0.04 (0.02) | 0.04* (0.02) | 0.11** (0.04) | 0.20** (0.05) | 0.03 (0.02) | 0.03 (0.02) |
| Infant Mortality, 1972 | -0.00 (0.00) | 0.00 (0.00) | 0.00 (0.00) | 0.00 (0.00) | -0.00 (0.00) | 0.00 (0.00) | 0.00 (0.00) | 0.00 (0.00) |
| Allende Support | -0.05 (0.03) | -0.12* (0.05) | -0.00 (0.02) | 0.00 (0.01) | -0.02 (0.03) | -0.06 (0.04) | 0.00 (0.01) | -0.00 (0.01) |
| Polarized | 0.08 (0.05) | 0.15* (0.06) | 0.01 (0.03) | 0.01 (0.03) | 0.06 (0.04) | 0.09* (0.04) | 0.01 (0.02) | 0.00 (0.02) |
| Voter Share | 0.12 (0.07) | 0.27 (0.16) | 0.07 (0.08) | -0.00 (0.03) | 0.06 (0.05) | 0.07 (0.04) | 0.00 (0.02) | -0.00 (0.02) |
| Army Base | 0.48 (0.28) | 0.77** (0.26) | 0.43* (0.20) | 0.27 (0.18) | 0.31 (0.23) | 0.29 (0.18) | 0.07 (0.11) | 0.21 (0.16) |
| (Intercept) | -0.82** (0.18) | -1.43** (0.24) | -0.29** (0.11) | -0.34** (0.09) | -0.63** (0.16) | -0.90** (0.17) | -0.25** (0.09) | -0.19** (0.06) |
| Adj. R ² | 0.52 | 0.45 | 0.22 | 0.15 | 0.46 | 0.44 | 0.14 | 0.13 |
| Observations | 444 | 444 | 444 | 444 | 444 | 444 | 444 | 444 |
| Region Dummies | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ |

** $p < 0.01$, * $p < 0.05$, † $p < 0.1$

Table E.1: Political Competition and Political Killings by Month