

SUPPLEMENTARY MATERIAL

FOREIGN OCCUPATION AND SUPPORT FOR INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION

Evidence from Denmark

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World Politics

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A Examples of Terror incidents from court documents



Figure A.1: Examples of Terror incidents from court documents

The text above can be translated in the following way with the location of the incident in italics:

"6. The 3th of February 1944 Murder of High Court lawyer Holger Christensen, *Aarhus*."

"7. The 7th of February 1944 Blasting of the film company "Asa", *Lyngby*, where there were damages amounting to 92,397 DKK."

"8. The 7th of February 1944 Blasting of Nordic Film Company, *Copenhagen*, where there were damages amounting to 203,000 DKK."

"9. The 9th of February 1944 Blasting of the property *Møllegade 22, Svendborg*, where there were damages amounting to 62,908 DKK."

"10. The 9th of February 1944 Blasting of the Court House in *Svendborg*, where there were damages amounting to 57,150 DKK."

"11. The 14th of February 1944 Attempted murder of Professor Erik Warburg

in *Copenhagen*.”

B Components of the Terror Index

Table B.1: Components of the Terror Index and share "no" votes in the 1972 referendum: Bivariate relationship

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Number of people killed	0.63 (0.13)***			
Number of attempted murders		4.16 (0.35)***		
People wounded			0.76 (0.20)***	
Damages in millions of DKK				0.84 (0.19)***
County-fixed effects				
N	278	278	278	278
R^2	0.07	0.08	0.04	0.08

Dependent variable is share of "no" votes in the 1972 referendum.

Robust standard errors in parentheses.

* $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Table B.2: Components of the Terror Index and share "no" votes in the 1972 referendum: County-fixed effects

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Number of people killed	0.59 (0.25)**			
Number of attempted murders		4.26 (0.62)***		
People wounded			0.52 (0.10)***	
Damages in millions of DKK				2.20 (0.49)***
County-fixed effects	✓	✓	✓	✓
N	278	278	278	278
R^2	0.49	0.50	0.48	0.53

Dependent variable is share of "no" votes in the 1972 referendum.

Robust standard errors in parentheses.

* $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Table B.3: Components of the Terror Index and share "no" votes in the 1972 referendum: Pre-Terror covariates

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Number of people killed	0.60 (0.25)**			
Number of attempted murders		4.24 (0.68)***		
People wounded			0.50 (0.12)***	
Damages in millions of DKK				2.28 (0.48)***
Urbanization (1940)	8.12 (11.28)	10.40 (10.32)	12.45 (11.02)	13.87 (9.78)
Log of population (1940)	-4.36 (5.93)	-1.84 (5.33)	-1.47 (5.63)	-1.16 (5.25)
Communist vote share, 1939 election	0.34 (1.06)	0.35 (0.94)	0.14 (1.01)	-0.55 (0.99)
Nationalist Right vote share, 1939 election	1.15	-6.86	-4.32	-6.52
Nazi Party vote share, 1939 election	3.99 (2.58)	2.48 (2.75)	2.52 (2.68)	2.32 (2.81)
County-fixed effects	✓	✓	✓	✓
N	278	278	278	278
R^2	0.50	0.51	0.48	0.54

Dependent variable is share of "no" votes in the 1972 referendum.

Robust standard errors in parentheses.

* $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Table B.4: Components of the Terror Index and share "no" votes in the 1972 referendum: Full set of controls

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Number of people killed	0.27 (0.22)			
Number of attempted murders		2.78 (0.75)***		
People wounded			0.20 (0.15)	
Damages in millions of DKK				1.55 (0.41)***
Urbanization (1940)	7.86 (8.98)	8.20 (8.72)	9.69 (9.02)	10.88 (8.62)
Log of population (1940)	-0.84 (4.74)	-0.35 (4.67)	0.68 (4.89)	-0.16 (4.70)
Communist vote share, 1939 election	-0.01 (0.91)	-0.04 (0.83)	-0.10 (0.90)	-0.61 (0.87)
Nationalist Right vote share, 1939 election	-1.40 (8.82)	-4.33 (8.32)	-4.15 (8.79)	-4.00 (8.42)
Nazi Party vote share, 1939 election	1.93 (2.08)	1.44 (2.27)	1.18 (2.27)	1.44 (2.33)
Urbanization (1970s)	17.32 (2.68)***	17.56 (2.67)***	17.30 (2.68)***	17.51 (2.64)***
Log of population (1970s)	-0.20 (0.77)	-0.42 (0.74)	-0.01 (0.80)	-0.77 (0.76)
County-fixed effects	✓	✓	✓	✓
N	278	278	278	278
R^2	0.64	0.65	0.64	0.66

Dependent variable is share of "no" votes in the 1972 referendum.

Robust standard errors in parentheses.

* $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

C Terror Index with alternative weights

In table C.1.-C.4., the results for the alternative weighted Terror Indexes are reported. In column 1, relative weights of the number attempted killings and number wounded are increased such that they have the same weight as the number of people killed. In column 2, the relative weights of attempted killings and wounded are decreased, such that they are divided by 4 instead of 2. Finally, in column 3, damages are added to the index in log points instead of millions of DKK. However, even with these alternative Terror Indexes, the effect of German Terror on the "no" vote share in the 1972 referendum remains both in terms for substantive size and statistical significance.

Table C.1: German terror and "no" votes in the 1972 EEC referendum:
Bivariate relationship

	(1)	(2)	(3)
Terror Index (attempts and wounded with higher weights)	0.26 (0.03) ^{***}		
Terror Index (attempts and wounded with lower weights)		0.35 (0.05) ^{***}	
Terror Index (damages in log points)			0.33 (0.05) ^{***}
County-fixed effects			
N	278	278	278
R^2	0.07	0.08	0.10

Dependent variable is share of "no" votes in the 1972 referendum.

Robust standard errors in parentheses.

* $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Table C.2: German terror and "no" votes in the 1972 EEC referendum:
County-fixed effects

	(1)	(2)	(3)
Terror Index (attempts and wounded with higher weights)	0.30 (0.09)***		
Terror Index (attempts and wounded with lower weights)		0.44 (0.14)***	
Terror Index (damages in log points)			0.28 (0.07)***
County-fixed effects	✓	✓	✓
N	278	278	278
R^2	0.50	0.50	0.51

Dependent variable is share of "no" votes in the 1972 referendum.

Robust standard errors in parentheses.

* $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Table C.3: German terror and "no" votes in the 1972 EEC referendum: Pre-Terror covariates

	(1)	(2)	(3)
Terror Index (attempts and wounded with higher weights)	0.30 (0.10) ^{***}		
Terror Index (attempts and wounded with lower weights)		0.45 (0.14) ^{***}	
Terror Index (damages in log points)			0.28 (0.07) ^{***}
Urbanization (1940)	9.63 (11.05)	8.97 (11.17)	9.22 (11.19)
Log of population (1940)	-3.56 (5.84)	-4.02 (5.94)	-3.16 (5.97)
Communist vote share, 1939 election	0.03 (1.04)	0.07 (1.06)	0.27 (1.01)
Nationalist Right vote share, 1939 election	-0.37 (10.69)	0.38 (10.91)	-1.81 (11.08)
Nazi Party vote share, 1939 election	3.46 (2.68)	3.73 (2.69)	3.57 (2.69)
County-fixed effects	✓	✓	✓
N	278	278	278
R^2	0.50	0.51	0.52

Dependent variable is share of "no" votes in the 1972 referendum.

Robust standard errors in parentheses.

* $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Table C.4: German terror and "no" votes in the 1972 EEC referendum: Full set of controls

	(1)	(2)	(3)
Terror Index (attempts and wounded with higher weights)	0.16 (0.08)**		
Terror Index (attempts and wounded with lower weights)		0.24 (0.12)**	
Terror Index (damages in log points)			0.13 (0.08)*
Urbanization (1940)	8.27 (9.18)	7.93 (9.25)	8.47 (9.31)
Log of population (1940)	-0.83 (4.91)	-1.17 (4.93)	-0.52 (4.95)
Communist vote share, 1939 election	-0.18 (0.92)	-0.16 (0.92)	-0.03 (0.89)
Nationalist Right vote share, 1939 election	-1.39 (9.15)	-0.86 (9.24)	-2.52 (9.31)
Nazi Party vote share, 1939 election	1.83 (2.25)	2.01 (2.23)	1.84 (2.23)
Urbanization (1970s)	17.41 (2.67)***	17.40 (2.67)***	17.23 (2.66)***
Log of population (1970s)	-0.30 (0.77)	-0.36 (0.77)	-0.39 (0.79)
County-fixed effects	✓	✓	✓
N	278	278	278
R^2	0.65	0.65	0.65

Dependent variable is share of "no" votes in the 1972 referendum.

Robust standard errors in parentheses.

* $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Then, in Table C.5, I present the effects of the version of the Terror Index, where all components of the Terror Index have been divided by the log of the 1972 municipal population in order to take into account that the severity of each terror incident, and thus its political consequences, might have been felt more in smaller areas. Even with this amendment of the Terror Index, there is substantial evidence for the effect of German Terror in the 1972 referendum, although the (log) population-weighted Terror Index is narrowly above the $p < 0.10$ significance level when the 1970s variables are included in columns 5 and 6.

Table C.5: German terror and "no" votes in the 1972 EEC referendum: 1972 log-population-weighted Terror Index

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
1972 log population-weighted Terror Index	3.99 (0.59)***	4.34 (1.49)***	4.26 (1.49)***	4.42 (1.50)***	2.13 (1.30)	2.16 (1.33)
Urbanization (1940)			6.75 (7.34)	8.43 (11.27)		7.83 (9.15)
Log of population (1940)			-0.95 (3.14)	-4.26 (5.96)		-1.04 (4.84)
Communist vote share, 1939 election				0.92 (11.03)		-0.08 (0.92)
Nationalist Right vote share, 1939 election				0.21 (1.06)		-1.06 (9.05)
Nazi Party vote share, 1939 election				3.86 (2.66)		1.97 (2.17)
Urbanization (1970s)					17.43 (2.68)***	17.34 (2.67)***
Log of population (1970s)					-0.25 (0.77)	-0.28 (0.77)
County-fixed effects		✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
N	278	278	278	278	278	278
R^2	0.07	0.50	0.50	0.51	0.64	0.65

Dependent variable is share of "no" votes in the 1972 referendum.

Robust standard errors in parentheses.

* $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

D Using the distance-weighted Terror Index

The distance-weighted Terror Index, whose construction is inspired by the methodology of Homola et al.¹ is constructed by calculating municipality i 's distance (in 100 km) to the nearest municipality (denoted municipality n) with a non-zero value on the Terror Index and inserting the distance-weighted Terror Index of this municipality n for municipality i . The weighting is done by dividing the Terror Index' value by the distance between the two municipalities in 100 km plus 1. Consequently, municipalities where one or more terror incidents took place, receive the same score for their distance-weighted Terror Index as for the Terror Index, since the distance in this case is 0. The equation for this weighting scheme can be seen in equation 3. Distances were calculated using the website <https://dk.afstand.org>, using the main town/city in each municipality as the starting/end point. Where this could not be done the largest available town/city was used.

$$WeightedTerrorindex_i = Terrorindex_n / (distance_{i-n} + 1) \quad (1)$$

The results using the distance-weighted Terror Index can be seen in Table D.1, which show similar results as when the main Terror Index was used. Geographical proximity to the German Terror during the German occupation of Denmark increases the "no" vote share in the 1972 EEC referendum, even controlling for pre-war Communist, Nationalist Right and Nazi Party vote share as well as for pre-war and post-war demographic variables.

¹Homola et al. 2020.

Table D.1: German terror and "no" votes in the 1972 EEC referendum

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Distance-weighted Terror Index	0.16 (0.03)***	0.07 (0.03)**	0.08 (0.03)**	0.07 (0.03)**	0.06 (0.03)*	0.06 (0.03)*
Urbanization (1940)			9.76 (7.74)	15.40 (10.96)		11.05 (9.05)
Log of population (1940)			-1.56 (3.13)	-0.50 (5.64)		0.69 (4.88)
Communist vote share, 1939 election				0.27 (1.14)		-0.18 (0.89)
Nationalist Right vote share, 1939 election				-8.15 (9.96)		-5.14 (8.87)
Nazi Party vote share, 1939 election				1.60 (2.85)		0.72 (2.39)
Urbanization (1970s)					17.02 (2.64)***	16.91 (2.64)***
Log of population (1970s)					0.17 (0.76)	0.15 (0.77)
County-fixed effects		✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
N	278	278	278	278	278	278
R^2	0.10	0.48	0.48	0.48	0.64	0.65

Dependent variable is share of "no" votes in the 1972 referendum.

Robust standard errors in parentheses.

* $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

E Differences between municipalities which experienced Terror and those which did not

Table E.1: Characteristics of municipalities with Terror and municipalities without

Mean	German Terror during occupation	No German Terror during occupation
Urbanization (1940)	0.43	0.34
Log of population (1940)	12.34	11.98
Urbanization (1970s)	0.84	0.59
Log of population (1970s)	10.53	9.11
Communist vote share, 1939 election	1.90	1.53
Nationalist Right vote share, 1939 election	0.57	0.45
Nazi Party vote share, 1939 election	1.94	1.87

F Main results with county-clustered standard errors

Table F.1: German terror and "no" votes in the 1972 EEC referendum

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Terror Index	0.32 (0.05)***	0.38 (0.11)***	0.38 (0.11)***	0.39 (0.11)***	0.20 (0.10)*	0.21 (0.10)**
Urbanization (1940)			6.73 (9.44)	9.22 (11.10)		8.07 (11.64)
Log of population (1940)			-1.09 (3.55)	-3.85 (10.49)		-1.04 (9.96)
Communist vote share, 1939 election				0.05 (0.93)		-0.17 (0.86)
Nationalist Right vote share, 1939 election				0.11 (14.01)		-1.06 (13.87)
Nazi Party vote share, 1939 election				3.62 (4.77)		1.94 (4.11)
Urbanization (1970s)					17.49 (2.82)***	17.41 (2.89)***
Log of population (1970s)					-0.31 (0.55)	-0.34 (0.56)
County-fixed effects		✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
N	278	278	278	278	278	278
R^2	0.08	0.50	0.50	0.51	0.64	0.65

Dependent variable is share of "no" votes in the 1972 referendum.

County-clustered standard errors in parentheses.

* $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Table F.2: German terror and "no" votes in the 1972 EEC referendum

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Terror Index	0.32 (0.05)***	0.38 (0.12)***	0.38 (0.12)***	0.39 (0.12)***	0.20 (0.11)*	0.21 (0.11)*
Urbanization (1940)			6.73 (6.29)	9.22 (9.06)		8.07 (9.27)
Log of population (1940)			-1.09 (2.42)	-3.85 (8.55)		-1.04 (8.16)
Communist vote share, 1939 election				0.05 (0.60)		-0.17 (0.53)
Nationalist Right vote share, 1939 election				0.11 (13.44)		-1.06 (12.66)
Nazi Party vote share, 1939 election				3.62 (3.27)		1.94 (2.93)
Urbanization (1970s)					17.49 (2.74)***	17.41 (2.79)***
Log of population (1970s)					-0.31 (0.60)	-0.34 (0.62)
County-fixed effects		✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
N	278	278	278	278	278	278
R^2	0.08	0.50	0.50	0.51	0.64	0.65

Dependent variable is share of "no" votes in the 1972 referendum.

County(pre-1970)-clustered standard errors in parentheses.

* $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

G Removal of largest cities

Table G.1: Terror Index and share "no" votes in the 1972 referendum: Bi-variate relationship

	Excluding Copenhagen	Excluding Aarhus	Excluding Odense	Excluding Aalborg	Excluding Frederiksberg
Terror Index	0.39 (0.12)***	0.33 (0.06)***	0.29 (0.03)***	0.31 (0.04)***	0.31 (0.04)***
County-fixed effects					
N	277	277	277	277	277
R^2	0.04	0.06	0.06	0.07	0.07

Dependent variable is share of "no" votes in the 1972 referendum.

Robust standard errors in parentheses.

* $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Table G.2: Terror Index and share "no" votes in the 1972 referendum: County-fixed effects

	Excluding Copenhagen	Excluding Aarhus	Excluding Odense	Excluding Aalborg	Excluding Frederiksberg
Terror Index	0.38 (0.12)***	0.56 (0.29)*	0.30 (0.08)***	0.36 (0.11)***	0.38 (0.12)***
County-fixed effects	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
N	277	277	277	277	277
R^2	0.48	0.50	0.50	0.50	0.50

Dependent variable is share of "no" votes in the 1972 referendum.

Robust standard errors in parentheses.

* $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Table G.3: Terror Index and share "no" votes in the 1972 referendum: Pre-Terror covariates

	Excluding Copenhagen	Excluding Aarhus	Excluding Odense	Excluding Aalborg	Excluding Frederiksberg
Terror Index	0.39 (0.12)***	0.57 (0.27)**	0.31 (0.09)***	0.36 (0.12)***	0.39 (0.12)***
Urbanization (1940)	9.22 (11.10)	7.36 (11.25)	8.02 (10.93)	11.35 (10.92)	9.22 (11.10)
Log of population (1940)	-3.85 (5.89)	-4.94 (6.00)	-3.69 (5.70)	-3.20 (5.86)	-3.85 (5.89)
Communist vote share, 1939 election	0.05 (1.05)	0.54 (0.97)	0.32 (1.01)	-0.00 (1.03)	0.05 (1.05)
Nationalist Right vote share, 1939 election	0.11 (10.81)	1.03 (11.46)	-1.43 (10.32)	-2.64 (10.65)	0.11 (10.81)
Nazi Party vote share, 1939 election	3.62 (2.69)	4.27 (2.58)*	3.50 (2.61)	3.47 (2.67)	3.62 (2.69)
County-fixed effects	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
N	277	277	277	277	277
R^2	0.49	0.51	0.51	0.51	0.50

Dependent variable is share of "no" votes in the 1972 referendum.

Robust standard errors in parentheses.

* $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Table G.4: Terror Index and share "no" votes in the 1972 referendum: Full set of controls

	Excluding Copenhagen	Excluding Aarhus	Excluding Odense	Excluding Aalborg	Excluding Frederiksberg
Terror Index	0.21 (0.10)**	0.25 (0.26)	0.14 (0.09)	0.19 (0.10)*	0.21 (0.10)**
Urbanization (1940)	8.07 (9.20)	7.65 (8.97)	7.00 (9.04)	9.38 (9.18)	8.07 (9.20)
Log of population (1940)	-1.04 (4.91)	-1.33 (4.74)	-1.07 (4.79)	-0.74 (4.92)	-1.04 (4.91)
Communist vote share, 1939 election	-0.17 (0.92)	-0.06 (0.85)	0.06 (0.91)	-0.21 (0.92)	-0.17 (0.92)
Nationalist Right vote share, 1939 election	-1.06 (9.19)	-0.80 (9.11)	-2.15 (8.84)	-2.62 (9.24)	-1.06 (9.19)
Nazi Party vote share, 1939 election	1.94 (2.24)	2.10 (2.07)	1.90 (2.19)	1.89 (2.23)	1.94 (2.24)
Urbanization (1970s)	17.41 (2.67)***	17.36 (2.70)***	17.53 (2.68)***	17.42 (2.67)***	17.41 (2.67)***
Log of population (1970s)	-0.34 (0.76)	-0.36 (0.77)	-0.45 (0.76)	-0.40 (0.77)	-0.34 (0.76)
County-fixed effects	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
N	277	277	277	277	277
R^2	0.63	0.64	0.65	0.65	0.64

Dependent variable is share of "no" votes in the 1972 referendum.

Robust standard errors in parentheses.

* $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

H Instrumenting the German Terror

The main results show substantial evidence in favor of an effect of previous exposure to the German Terror on opposition to Danish EEC membership in the 1972 referendum. This is even robust to controlling for the pre-war vote share of the parties associated with both armed resistance to German rule and later opposition to Danish EEC membership, which suggests that the results are not merely an artefact of the German occupation forces targeting areas with higher Communist and Nationalist support. Historical evidence also suggests a great deal of random variation in terror intensity at least within Danish regions. However, in order to further address the potential endogeneity of the German Terror to factors which might have impacted the later lack of support for the EEC, I analyze the effect of the German Terror using a two-stage least squares estimator. As instrument for the German Terror, I use whether the municipality was home to one of five Danish headquarters of the German secret police, the Gestapo, during the German occupation of Denmark.² Since the Gestapo and its sister organization the SD were among the German organizations responsible for the Terror,⁴ areas close to a Gestapo headquarter were much more likely to be targeted with German terror. Furthermore, the Gestapo headquarters were established in early fall of 1943 near large Danish population centers before the official decision to initiate the Terror was taken later in 1943⁵ and should not be able to affect the "no" vote share in 1972 in any other way than through their effect on the level of German Terror and other occupation repression, once population size and urbanization rate are controlled for.⁶ The locations of the headquarters of the Gestapo in Denmark⁷ were found on the Danish

²An instrument somewhat similar to that of Bautista et al.³ who use distance to military bases as the instrument for repression during the Pinochet military dictatorship.

⁴Including by providing targets to the German-Danish hit squad "Petergruppen", of which several Gestapo men were also members, Lundtofte 2003, p. 168).

⁵Lundtofte 2003, pp. 45 and 157-162.

⁶Thereby fulfilling the exclusion restriction, Angrist and Pischke 2009, p. 116, especially given that the estimation additionally contains controls for pre-war Communist and Nationalist Right vote share.

⁷The so-called *Aussendienststellen* which were placed in the Danish cities of Copenhagen, Odense, Kolding, Aarhus and Aalborg. The towns of Esbjerg and Rønne, which only had head quarter status during part of the time the Gestapo was active in Denmark is not counted as head quarters, Lundtofte 2003, p. 44. However, the two-stage results are similar if these two towns are counted as having Gestapo headquarters. Results are

town of Kolding's local archive's website.⁸ The results of the two-stage least square estimation can be seen in table H.1. When the level of German Terror is instrumented by the presence of a local Gestapo headquarter, the German Terror has an even larger and more statistically significant effect on the share of "no" votes in the 1972 EEC referendum than in the case of the pure OLS estimates from table 2 in the main analysis. A one unit increase in the Terror Index translate into an about half percentage point increase in the share of "no" votes in the 1972 referendum.

available upon request.

⁸See also Lundtofte 2003 for more information about the role played by the Gestapo during the German occupation of Denmark.

Table H.1: Instrumenting the German Terror

	<i>Panel A: Second stage</i>
Terror Index	0.51 (0.18) ^{***}
Urbanization (1940)	4.53 (11.11)
Log of population (1940)	-5.00 (6.47)
Communist vote share, 1939 election	-0.52 (1.06)
Nationalist Right vote share, 1939 election	6.82 (12.80)
Nazi Party vote share, 1939 election	3.55 (3.01)
Urbanization (1970s)	17.74 (2.59) ^{***}
Log of population (1970s)	-1.04 (0.76)
County-fixed effects	✓
R^2	0.63
	<i>Panel B: First stage</i>
Gestapo headquarter	20.55 (7.76) ^{***}
County-fixed effects	✓
First stage F-statistic	7.02
R^2	0.86
N	278

Dependent variable in panel A is share of "no" votes in the 1972 referendum.

Dependent variable in panel B is the Terror Index.

Coefficients for urbanization, log of population, Nationalist, Communist and Nazi votes not shown in panel B.

Robust standard errors in parentheses. * $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

I German Terror and turnout in the 1972 referendum

Table I.1: German terror and turnout in the 1972 EEC referendum

	(1)
Terror Index	-0.01 (0.02)
Urbanization (1940)	3.20 (3.01)
Log of population (1940)	4.62 (1.69)***
Communist vote share, 1939 election	0.33 (0.26)
Nationalist Right vote share, 1939 election	-5.45 (2.61)**
Nazi Party vote share, 1939 election	-1.83 (0.69)***
Urbanization (1970s)	-2.60 (1.08)**
Log of population (1970s)	0.41 (0.26)
County-fixed effects	✓
N	278
R^2	0.36

Dependent variable is turnout in the 1972 referendum.

Robust standard errors in parentheses.

* $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$