

Supplementary Material for:
“Government Policies, New Voter Coalitions, and the Emergence
of an Ethnic Dimension in Party Systems”

Maayan Mor

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A The Historical Context

This section describes the electoral rules, political culture, and Catholic entrepreneurs' capacity to mobilize voters in Prussia.

A.1. Electoral Rules and Political Culture in Prussia

The franchise in Prussia in the middle of the 19th century was broad in comparison to the franchise in other European countries. All Prussian citizens who were over 24 years old, and were men who lived in Prussia for more than six months before the election and did not receive poor relief were eligible to vote (Kühne 1994, 17). In the first Prussian state election, held in January 1849, all the votes that were cast had an equal weight in determining the election's outcome (Sperber 1984, 50). But in the following elections and up until 1918, voters were assigned to one of three voting classes based on income, so that the wealthiest voters were in the first class and the poorest voters were in the third class. In the Prussian three-class franchise, the votes that were cast in the first class counted more than the votes cast in second and third classes. Local elites, who had the authority to determine what voters were assigned to each group, used their power to suppress the political representation of the lower classes in their local communities (Kühne 1994, 18).

Prussian state elections were indirect and took place in a mix of single-member and multi-member districts (Kühne 1994, 15). Several weeks before each election, the voters gathered to select the electors, who were typically public figures like priests, teachers, and noblemen. A day before the direct election, the electors gathered to discuss the candidates. Electors were free to select the candidates they preferred and to change their votes in the runoff election (Kühne 1994, 22). Unlike the indirect first stage of the election (by voters), the direct stage (by electors) involved party campaigns. But only from the mid-1870s did state elections become dominated by parties (Kühne 1994, 22–23). Therefore, it is plausible to assume that the vote choices of electors between 1849 and 1873 were sincere.

The Prussian state was notorious for placing limitations on political competition and participation, banning political associations, and censoring the press. The severity of the limitations changed over time. After 1849, Prussia entered a counter-revolutionary era and outlawed parties that supported the democratization of the regime (Sperber 1984, 102). The political climate changed after 1859, when a moderate liberal was appointed head of government and allowed broader political liberties. The climate changed again in 1862 when Otto von Bismarck was appointed prime minister. By 1863, a constitutional conflict erupted between the liberals, who wanted to advance the rule of law, and the conservatives, who supported Bismarck and the Prussian king. Between 1863 and 1866, the liberals, who held the majority of the seats in the Prussian lower house, refused to pass the state budget. Consequently, Bismarck ruled unconstitutionally until the end of the war with Austria in 1866 (Anderson 1968).

Despite limitations on political competition and participation, legislative elections had meaningful consequences and the decisions passed by the lower house were binding. In the 1850s and early 1860s, elections centered on local elites (Sperber 1984, 100), but from the late 1860s, civic associations and lobbying groups played an increasingly important role in Prussian and German politics. The political culture in Prussia can be sketched from research about electoral practices in the early years of Imperial Germany. Margaret Lavinia Anderson (2000) portrays a vibrant and politically engaged electorate despite the limited experience with direct voting and demonstrates that elections were competitive. For

example, in the election of 1871, the first in Imperial Germany, in only 8 of the 382 Reichstag constituencies did candidates run unopposed (Anderson 2000, 8). Research by Robert Arsenschek (2003) and Isabela Mares (2015) about voting irregularities illustrates that voter intimidation was a common practice, and therefore, that the results of the elections were viewed by contemporaries as consequential.

A.2. Catholic Political Entrepreneurs and their Capacity to Mobilize Voters

As early as 1848, Catholics' societal organization created suitable conditions for the emergence of an organized, grassroots Catholic political movement. Catholics were organized in a variety of confessional organizations, which were common in both rural and urban areas, and created spaces and opportunities for Catholic entrepreneurs to reach voters (Sperber 1984, 171–172). Among those organizations were the religious brotherhoods, which were the most common confessional organization in rural areas and were led by lay Catholics. The brotherhoods were deeply involved in the lives of Catholic communities; they celebrated the birthdays of saints and organized public festivals (Sperber 1981, 253). The other organizations that were active in Catholic areas were the journeymen's associations that tutored middle-class (*Mittelstand*) parishioners in reading, writing, and arithmetic (Sperber 1984, 85), and the sodalities, which were popular among the younger generation and were organized by the parish priest (Sperber 1981, 256). In industrializing areas, which attracted rural Catholic workers, the Catholic associations had several advantages over the socialist organizations. First, the meetings of the Catholic associations were scheduled for weeknights and Sunday afternoons, when they did not conflict with workers' schedule. Second, the associations were organized by priests, who could guarantee the continuity of the organization (Sperber 1981, 258), and third, the associations were popular among Catholic workers because the clergymen shared the rural background of the workers and were thus able to understand their grievances (Rohe 1990, 112). Similarly to Catholic workers in the cities who were organized by class *and* religion, middle class Catholics were organized in professional Catholic associations for businessmen, craftsmen, teachers, and intellectuals (Nipperdey 1990, 439).

In addition to the civic activity in the local organizations, the chairmen of local Catholic associations met annually, starting in 1848, in a general assembly for Catholics in Prussia. After the state restrictions on political organizations were relaxed in 1858, the assemblies became the unofficial representative organization of Catholics. They brought together a heterogeneous group of Catholics that included clergymen, lay Catholics, and Catholic notables. In the meetings, the participants discussed ways to advance the freedom of religion and the freedom of the Church, made speeches, and voted on statements that were supposed, in principle, to be sent to the state administration, wider society, the church and lay Catholic organizations (Morsey 1985, 10; Ruppert 2015, 49–50). These assemblies became political only several years after the Catholic cleavage emerged, in 1879, when the Zentrum recognized their potential for mobilization and appropriated them (Ruppert 2015, 58).

B Coding Delegates' Religion and Party

I coded the information about delegates' religion and party between 1849 and 1866 from Brend Haunfelder's (1994) handbook of Prussian delegates. The handbook contains short biographical information about each lower house member and includes the MP's religion, party affiliation, constituency, and legislative period. Although the boundaries of Prussian constituencies changed from 1849 to 1866,

Haunfelder reports the information according to the 1860 constituencies, the same units I use in the statistical analysis. The dataset includes all Catholic and Zentrum delegates who were elected in the general elections and served in the first legislative session of each legislative period. In the very rare case that the handbook does not report the religion of a Zentrum delegate, the delegate was coded as a Zentrum representative but not as a Catholic.

I calculated the share of Zentrum delegates from 1867 to 1873 based on election results reported in Thomas Kühne's (1994) handbook of Prussian elections. Because Kühne's handbook does not include information about delegates' religion, I took the number of Catholic delegates from Heinrich Best's (1990) Members of the Reichstag Dataset. I calculated the percentage of Catholic delegates in the Reichstag as the ratio between the sum of Catholic delegates and the sum of legislative seats in the constituencies that were part of Prussia in 1864.

C Catholic Realignment in Two Reichstag Elections in 1867

In 1867, there were two elections to the Reichstag of the North German Confederation. Given that these elections were direct *and* equal, their outcomes provide complementary evidence for the political realignment of Catholics regardless of the actions of Catholic entrepreneurs. Figure C1 shows box plots with the party affiliation of the 192 Reichstag delegates, based on information from Best (1990), who were elected in constituencies that were part of Prussia in 1864. The vertical axes show the percentage of Catholics.




Figure C1. Religious Bases of Party Support in the Reichstag 1867

Note: C=Conservative; I=Independent; L=Left Liberal; NL=National Liberal Party; P=Polish Party

The box plots show that in the elections of February and August, constituencies with a Catholic majority showed little support for candidates that were affiliated with the Conservative Party or the National Liberal Party (or NLP). The Catholic vote was aligned regardless of whether Catholic entrepreneurs were allowed to mobilize Catholics: in the election that took place in February, the clergy was mobilizing Catholics to vote for pro-Catholic candidates. By the next election in August, the Church banned political organizations.

D The Constituencies in the Sample

In the full sample, I include all the constituencies that were part of Prussia before 1864. Hesse-Nassau, Hanover, and Schleswig-Holstein, which are represented in diagonal lines in Figure D1, became part of Prussia in 1864 and are therefore excluded from the analysis. The single constituency of Sigmaringen is excluded due to data availability. The map also shows the percentage of Catholics in 1864 in the constituencies that are in the sample. The five values range from 0-20 percent Catholic (light gray) to 80-100 percent Catholic (black).




Figure D1. The Constituencies in the Sample

E Coding Party Vote Shares

E.1. The Liberal Vote Share in 1863

I calculated the votes share of liberal candidates in 1863 from Eugene Newton Anderson's (1954) report, which is based on official Prussian statistics that were published in 1865 and 1867. Anderson discusses the inaccuracy of the official results in length: in some cases, when candidates from several parties were elected, Prussian officials recorded only the vote share of the winner (Anderson 1954, ix). In other cases, the number of electors in the official records did not match the number that was reported in other sources (Anderson 1954, p. xi). To improve the accuracy of the data, Anderson cross-referenced the results with information that he gathered from legislative debates and reports in contemporary newspapers. Based on this information, he amended the figures (Anderson 1954, p. viii).

The Prussian bureaucracy collected information about the results of the elections to assess the size of the opposition (Anderson 1954, ix). In almost all cases, election returns were counted as votes for one of two ideological groups: liberal (opposition) or conservative (government party). The results have a systematic measurement error because the Prussian bureaucrats in the administrative districts (*Regierungsbezirke*) who recorded the official results had to decide, based on the reports of state officials in each county, if the candidate supported the government or opposed it (Anderson 1954, vii). When the

bureaucrats thought that the candidate opposed the government, his votes were counted with the votes that were cast for the liberal candidates. In other cases, the votes that were cast for a liberal candidate who was not elected were recorded with the votes for a liberal who won a seat because both candidates opposed the government. The votes for the candidates of the Zentrum were recorded in some cases with the votes for the liberals and in other cases with the votes for the conservatives, depending on the state official's assessment of the candidate's position (Anderson 1954, vii–x). To address the bias from the measurement error, all the regressions include fixed effects.

Specifically, I took the election results from Table III, column 4, which reports the share (percentage) of direct votes for liberals and conservatives in each county (*Kreis*). To aggregate the results to the constituency level, I use the information about the structure of electoral districts in Kühne's handbook. Because I do not have information about the number of votes that were cast but only vote shares, I take the average. Given that Anderson had more confidence in the accuracy of the conservatives' vote share—because Prussian officials faced less ambiguity in recording the votes for the government party (Anderson 1968, ix)—I calculated the vote share of the liberals in each constituency as the difference between 1 and the conservative vote share.

E.2. The Liberal Vote Share in 1867, 1870, and 1873

As noted in the article, I took the vote shares of the liberals from Thomas Kühne's handbook of Prussian elections. The liberal vote share includes votes that were cast for the NLP, the Progressive Party (or PP), Liberal Center (Linkes Zentrum), Old Liberals (Altliberale), and other left parties. The elections of 1867, 1870, and 1873 were characterized by electoral alliances between the NLP and left-liberal parties against the Zentrum and right-wing parties (Kühne 1994, 27). Kühne reports the share of votes cast by electors for each candidate in a given constituency. I calculate the vote share of liberals by averaging the vote shares of all liberal candidates that competed in the first round of the general elections in a given constituency. In the few cases that the vote share of a candidate was not reported (0.03 percent of the sample), I calculated it based on the number of electors that voted for the candidate. In several constituencies, Berlin for example, only liberal candidates competed in the elections, and the vote share of the liberals is 100 percent.

F Data Sources, Measurement, and Summary Statistics

Table F1 provides information about the data sources and the measurement of the variables in the main analysis. The data from iPEHD (Becker et al. 2014) were available at the county level and aggregated to the level of Prussian state constituencies based on the information in Kühne's handbook. All the analyses were done in Stata version 16.1. Table F2 presents descriptive statistics.

Table F1. Measurement and Data Sources

Variable	Measurement	Source
Percentage of Catholics	Share of Catholic residents in 1864	Calculated from iPEHD
Change in the liberal vote share	The difference between the vote share of the liberals in year t and year $t + 1$	Own calculation based on data compiled by Anderson for 1863 and by Kühne for 1867, 1870, and 1873
City	Equals 1 if the constituency is composed of at least one city county (<i>Stadtkreis</i>)	Own coding based on information from Kühne
Industry	Share of men and women employed in industry in 1864	Calculated from iPEHD
DM	District magnitude. Takes the value 1, 2, or 3. Because of limited demographic data, the four Berlin constituencies were grouped into a single synthetic constituency with the district magnitude of 3.	Own coding based on information from Kühne
Monasteries	The number of Catholic monasteries per one hundred thousand Catholics in 1864. Available only at the level of the administrative district.	Own coding from a Prussian statistical yearbook published in 1867 by the Königlichen statistischen Bureau in Berlin. Access was granted through HathiTrust. The relevant information is reported in volume 10, pp. 136-137.
Paris	Minimal (linear) distance in kilometers between the geometric center of each constituency and the geometric center of Paris	Own calculation using a shapefile of German counties from Census Mosaic (Hubatsch and Klein 1975; MPIDR and CGG 2011) and another shapefile of French <i>Départements</i> from the Open Street Map Project
Priests	The number of Catholic priests and vicars per ten thousand Catholic residents in 1849	Calculated from iPEHD
Wittenberg	Minimal (linear) distance in kilometers between the geometric center of each constituency and the geometric center of the constituency Merseburg	Own calculation using the shapefile from Census Mosaic

Table F2. Summary Statistics: Prussian State Elections

Variable	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min.	Max.	N
<i>Full Sample</i>					
Percentage of Catholics	29.25	33.93	0.1	97.36	124
Change in the liberal vote share 1863-67	18.73	22.95	-56.6	78.29	124
Change in the liberal vote share 1867-70	1.58	24.94	-76.05	69.03	124
Change in the liberal vote share 1863-70	-17.15	21.63	-63.42	44.53	124
Change in the liberal vote share 1863-73	-5.37	26	-71.72	57.08	124
City	0.13	0.34	0	1	124
DM	2.05	0.55	1	3	124
Industry	14.98	6.45	0	34.22	124
Monasteries	2.07	2.68	0	9.27	124
Paris	1134.76	479.23	399.72	2035.12	124
Priests	8.74	7.56	0	36.65	124
Wittenberg	299.12	184.62	0	747.39	124
<i>Subsample</i>					
Percentage of Catholics	26.75	34.64	0.1	97.36	100
Change in the liberal vote share 1863-67	20.01	22.96	-56.6	78.29	100
Change in the liberal vote share 1867-70	2.31	25.51	-76.05	69.03	100
Change in the liberal vote share 1863-70	-17.7	22.16	-63.42	44.53	100
Change in the liberal vote share 1863-73	-7.64	26.94	-71.72	57.08	100
City	0.14	0.35	0	1	100
DM	2.01	0.54	1	3	100
Industry	14.71	6.12	0	34.22	100
Monasteries	2.15	2.97	0	9.27	100
Paris	1069.33	510.28	399.72	2035.12	100
Priests	8.41	8.17	0	36.65	100
Wittenberg	301.49	201.99	0	747.39	100

G Full Results: OLS with Fixed Effects

Table G1. Change in Party Alignment of Catholics 1863-1873 (Incl. Province Fixed Effects)

	Δ Lib VS 1863-67 (1)	Δ Lib VS 1867-70 (2)	Δ Lib VS 1863-70 (3)	Δ Lib VS 1863-73 (4)	Δ Lib VS 1863-67 (5)	Δ Lib VS 1867-70 (6)	Δ Lib VS 1863-70 (7)	Δ Lib VS 1863-73 (8)
Percentage of Catholics	-0.070 (0.123)	-0.243 (0.124)	-0.173 (0.108)	-0.467*** (0.091)	0.060 (0.158)	-0.365* (0.155)	-0.426** (0.134)	-0.616*** (0.116)
Industry	-0.475 (0.461)	-0.248 (0.463)	0.227 (0.404)	0.098 (0.340)	-0.174 (0.567)	0.273 (0.553)	0.447 (0.479)	-0.040 (0.415)
Priests	0.171 (0.914)	1.099 (0.918)	0.927 (0.800)	0.913 (0.674)	0.231 (0.968)	1.584 (0.945)	1.353 (0.818)	1.019 (0.708)
Priests \times Priests	-0.003 (0.033)	-0.032 (0.033)	-0.029 (0.029)	-0.042 (0.024)	-0.007 (0.035)	-0.050 (0.034)	-0.043 (0.029)	-0.043 (0.025)
Wittenberg	-0.047 (0.066)	-0.066 (0.066)	-0.019 (0.057)	-0.003 (0.048)	-0.058 (0.073)	-0.105 (0.071)	-0.047 (0.061)	-0.022 (0.053)
Paris	-0.022 (0.041)	0.061 (0.041)	0.083* (0.036)	0.070* (0.030)	-0.001 (0.046)	0.033 (0.045)	0.034 (0.039)	0.043 (0.034)
DM	0.040 (4.007)	1.528 (4.023)	1.488 (3.505)	7.493* (2.957)	3.919 (4.744)	4.228 (4.629)	0.309 (4.010)	8.340* (3.471)
City	-1.997 (7.689)	16.501* (7.719)	18.498** (6.726)	10.959 (5.674)	-4.034 (8.415)	14.936 (8.210)	18.969** (7.112)	11.754 (6.156)
Monasteries	-4.351 (3.988)	-6.347 (4.004)	-1.996 (3.489)	2.462 (2.943)	-4.297 (4.265)	-8.032 (4.161)	-3.735 (3.605)	1.561 (3.120)
Monasteries \times Monasteries	0.388 (0.433)	0.561 (0.435)	0.173 (0.379)	-0.209 (0.320)	0.361 (0.463)	0.749 (0.452)	0.388 (0.391)	-0.114 (0.339)
Constant	63.822 (46.017)	-63.569 (46.199)	-127.392** (40.254)	-101.384** (33.958)	28.774 (54.590)	-37.923 (53.259)	-66.697 (46.137)	-66.995 (39.933)
Province FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
R^2	.12	.25	.24	.63	.08	.29	.29	.64
Adjusted R^2	-.03	.12	.11	.56	-.1	.15	.16	.57
Observations	124	124	124	124	100	100	100	100

* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$.

Note: Full results from Table 2. OLS with province fixed effects and standard errors in parentheses. Columns 1-4 report results based on the full sample and columns 5-8 report results based on the subsample. The dependent variable is the change in the liberal vote share. Lib == Liberal; VS = vote share; FE = fixed effects.

H Full Results: OLS without Fixed Effects

Table H1. Change in Party Alignment of Catholics 1863-1873 (Without Fixed Effects)

	Δ Lib VS 1863-67 (1)	Δ Lib VS 1867-70 (2)	Δ Lib VS 1863-70 (3)	Δ Lib VS 1863-73 (4)	Δ Lib VS 1863-67 (5)	Δ Lib VS 1867-70 (6)	Δ Lib VS 1863-70 (7)	Δ Lib VS 1863-73 (8)
Percentage of Catholics	-0.056 (0.088)	-0.223* (0.088)	-0.167* (0.079)	-0.450*** (0.070)	0.100 (0.115)	-0.273* (0.118)	-0.373*** (0.100)	-0.606*** (0.089)
Industry	-0.646 (0.434)	-0.178 (0.437)	0.468 (0.392)	0.478 (0.347)	-0.111 (0.541)	0.368 (0.552)	0.479 (0.472)	0.064 (0.416)
Priests	0.058 (0.823)	1.050 (0.829)	0.992 (0.743)	1.097 (0.659)	0.091 (0.897)	1.479 (0.915)	1.388 (0.782)	1.175 (0.689)
Priests \times Priests	-0.000 (0.030)	-0.033 (0.030)	-0.033 (0.027)	-0.047* (0.024)	-0.004 (0.032)	-0.051 (0.033)	-0.047 (0.028)	-0.047 (0.025)
Wittenberg	-0.006 (0.018)	0.001 (0.018)	0.006 (0.016)	-0.032* (0.014)	-0.025 (0.023)	-0.001 (0.023)	0.024 (0.020)	-0.014 (0.018)
Paris	-0.003 (0.008)	0.005 (0.009)	0.008 (0.008)	0.027*** (0.007)	0.011 (0.012)	0.008 (0.012)	-0.003 (0.010)	0.013 (0.009)
DM	-0.598 (3.793)	-0.043 (3.823)	0.556 (3.425)	7.043* (3.037)	3.982 (4.529)	2.900 (4.621)	-1.082 (3.948)	6.898 (3.478)
City	-2.653 (7.401)	17.782* (7.458)	20.434** (6.683)	12.738* (5.925)	-3.248 (7.987)	16.194* (8.149)	19.441** (6.962)	11.820 (6.133)
Monasteries	-3.308 (3.277)	-4.982 (3.302)	-1.674 (2.959)	3.560 (2.623)	-2.658 (3.841)	-4.830 (3.919)	-2.172 (3.348)	2.609 (2.949)
Monasteries \times Monasteries	0.305 (0.368)	0.569 (0.371)	0.265 (0.333)	-0.270 (0.295)	0.238 (0.420)	0.588 (0.429)	0.350 (0.366)	-0.173 (0.323)
Constant	39.878* (15.336)	1.837 (15.455)	-38.042** (13.849)	-44.068*** (12.279)	9.189 (20.872)	-15.076 (21.296)	-24.265 (18.194)	-24.726 (16.026)
Province FE	No	No	No	No	No	No	No	No
R^2	.07	.2	.14	.53	.06	.21	.24	.6
Adjusted R^2	-.01	.13	.07	.49	-.04	.12	.15	.55
Observations	124	124	124	124	100	100	100	100

* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$.

Note: OLS with standard errors in parentheses. Columns 1-4 report results based on the full sample and columns 5-8 report results based on the subsample. The dependent variable is the change in the liberal vote share. Lib == Liberal; VS = vote share; FE = fixed effects.

I Entrepreneurs' Mobilization Capacity and the Zentrum's Performance

Using information on the density of confessional and non-confessional associations, I test the hypothesis that Catholic voters coordinated around their shared identity in response to government policies, not entrepreneurs. I proxy for the density of Church-run associations using the number of Catholic priests per ten thousand Catholics in 1849. I expect to find a strong and positive relationship between the number of priests and the Zentrum's electoral performance when Catholics are collectively aggrieved by government policies. But when government policies are neutral to Catholics, I do not expect to find a systematic relationship. I follow the strategy of Johannes Buggle (2016) and proxy for the density of non-confessional associations using fine-grained data on the number of rifle clubs (Schützenvereine) from Walter Plett's (1995) dataset. The clubs brought together middle-class voters for recreational activities but also provided space for political conversations. Because I am interested in the density of non-confessional associations, I calculate the ratio of clubs to all residents, including Catholics and non-Catholics. Figure I1 shows that the number of associations increased gradually from 1849 to 1873. I expect to find a positive relationship between the density of the associations and the success of the Zentrum only after 1867, when many middle-class Catholics began to feel a conflict between their social class and their religion.




Figure I1. Growth in the Number of Rifle Clubs 1849-1873

Using the information about the rifle clubs narrows the sample to the two most western provinces, Rhineland and Westphalia, which had a large share of Catholics and where the number of Zentrum delegates fluctuated over time, as can be seen in Figure I2. The change in the size of the Zentrum is consistent with the patterns of cleavage formation (1852), decline (1855 to 1866), and re-emergence (from 1870). Treating the dataset as a panel, I estimate the effect of the two types of associations on the number of Zentrum delegates. I include only a subset of covariates because of the small number of observations. I assume that the effect of associations on the electoral success of the Zentrum is non-linear, especially when the number of associations is small, and therefore take the natural log. I also include the percentage of Catholics and the district magnitude from the main analysis. I ran two regression models. In the first model, I interacted the number of priests with election year dummies. The second model includes an interaction between the number of rifle clubs and election year.




Figure I2. The Electoral Fortunes of the Zentrum 1852-1873

Note: In the maps, the number of Zentrum delegates ranges from 0 (light gray) to 3 (black).

Figure I3 shows the coefficients of the interaction terms from the two regressions. Election years with especially intensive attempts by entrepreneurs to craft a Catholic voter coalition are marked by dashed vertical lines. In panel (a), the results indicate that the effect of priests on the number of Zentrum delegates was positive and meaningful when priests were especially active in organizing voters: in 1852, 1861, 1870, and 1873. Consistent with the theory advanced in the article, the effect of priests was strong in 1852, when the cleavage emerged, but fluctuated in the following years when the state was neutral to Catholics. As already discussed in the article, the effect of priests on the electoral success of the Zentrum weakened after 1852 despite the improvement in the priest's moral authority. In 1861, when Catholic entrepreneurs were alarmed by the rise of the PP and called on Catholics to vote for the Zentrum, the coefficient of the interaction term indicates a strong and positive relationship, reflecting the local influence of the priests in some parishes. The coefficient estimates in 1870 and 1873, when Catholics were aggrieved by government policies, are strong and positive, as expected.

In panel (b), the coefficients of the interaction between the rifle clubs and election years do not show a systematic effect. When Catholic entrepreneurs engaged in the mobilization of Catholics in 1852 and 1861, the clubs had a weak effect on the number of seats won by the Zentrum. From 1870, the relationship becomes positive and statistically significant. These results are consistent with the evidence from historical research that after 1867, the Catholic political movement used urban and middle-class associations to mobilize Catholics.




Figure I3. Entrepreneurs' Mobilization Capacity and the Zentrum's Performance 1852-1873

Note: OLS with province fixed effects. The dependent variable is the number of seats won by the Zentrum. All regressions include the percentage of Catholics and the district magnitude. Panel (a) shows the coefficients of the interaction between the number of priests and election year dummies. Panel (b) shows the coefficients of the interaction between the number of rifle clubs and election year dummies. The vertical lines mark years with heightened attempts by entrepreneurs to craft a Catholic coalition.

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