SUPPLEMENTARY MATERIAL

BUYING BROKERS
Electoral Handouts Beyond Clientelism in a Weak-Party State

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World Politics

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Data sources[1]

National survey

We conducted a national election survey in Indonesia in conjunction with the 2014 legislative election, held April 9, 2014. Our partner for the survey was Indikator Politik Indonesia, a leading political survey firm affiliated with the Lembaga Survei Indonesia (LSI) (https://indikator.co.id/). The survey was carried out from April 20–26, roughly two weeks after the election. The sampling frame consisted of all Indonesian citizens who are eligible to vote. To create a nationally representative sample, Indikator selected respondents using a stratified multistage probability sample. In the first stage they grouped the population by province and assigned each province a quota based on its number of voters. In the second stage, Indikator grouped the population by gender, to ensure a 50:50 distribution in the sample. Finally, they further stratified the sample to ensure that we included an equal number of urban and rural voters. Within each province, villages were randomly selected, with the number of villages sampled corresponding to the number of voters in the province. Indikator randomly selected ten voters per village (five women and five men), clustering them in five randomly selected *rukun tetangga* (RT, sub-neighborhoods). Within each RT, Indikator randomly selected two households, then, also randomly, one respondent from the list of registered voters in each household, with a requirement of gender balance in each RT. The resulting sample consists of 1,210 respondents.

CJ3 survey of brokers and voters

In connection with the 2014 election, we worked with our local research partners to collect broker and voter lists from candidates running for office in the Central Java III constituency (CJ3), a rural, rice-growing area, dotted with towns and industrial pockets, that is fairly typical of

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[1] These descriptions draw on Aspinall et al. (forthcoming).

constituencies in Indonesia (more details below). Our team was able to collect lists from eleven of the approximately 1,200 candidates running for office at the three legislative levels in CJ3. We focused on specific administrative regions (usually sub-districts) within CJ3, collecting the relevant parts of each list. As we discuss in the main article, we used our digitized list of brokers and voters as a sampling frame for a random-sample, face-to-face survey of voters and brokers appearing on the lists. Working with a local survey firm, we surveyed 383 voters and 332 brokers three months after the April 9, 2014 election.

Provincial survey of winning candidates and brokers[2]

Between September 30 and October 14, 2014 one of the authors conducted face to face surveys with members of the local parliament (DPRD) and their brokers in four provinces (West Sumatra, Central Java, East Java, and North Sulawesi). For members of the DPRD (winning candidates) Muhtadi collected a sample of 300 respondents in four provinces—100 from the provincial DPRD level and 199 from regent/city-level DPRDs. For provincial-DPRD MPs, the population in each province was stratified by provincial-DPRD electoral district, with a sample of provincial DPRD members randomly selected based on the proportion of seats from that district. A similar procedure was used to selected regent/city-DPRD MPs: the population in each province was stratified into four zones, then one regency/city (*kabupaten/kota*) was selected randomly within each zone, for a total of ten. In each selected regency/city, five regency/city-DPRD members were randomly selected as respondents.

To build the broker sample, interviewers asked surveyed MPs to supply the names of members of their core success-team members (who presumably had close ties to the candidate). One core member was then randomly selected from the names provided and interviewed. Core campaign

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[2] See Muhtadi 2018, 2019 Appendix B for more details.

brokers who were interviewed were then asked for names of grassroots brokers; interviewers usually received a print-out of all campaign workers. Two more names were then randomly selected from each campaign's list of grassroots brokers.

Central Java III constituency

The geographic area from which we draw most of our broker and voter data is Central Java III (CJ3). CJ3 consists of the four rural regencies (*kabupaten*) of Grobogan, Pati, Blora, and Rembang (see Figure 1). In 2014, CJ3 had about 3.3 million registered voters for the national and provincial parliaments. (On Java the boundaries of the national and provincial electoral constituencies coincide. This is not the case for areas outside of Java.) Constituencies for district-parliament seats are much smaller, with most in CJ3 having between 120,000 and 250,000 registered voters. In total, CJ3 includes 22 such constituencies.

CJ3 is located in Java's rural rice-growing heartland. However, as in all parts of densely populated Java, small- and medium-sized towns are scattered through the constituency, as are upland, timber, and horticultural regions, as well as other scattered industries. In socio-economic terms, CJ3 is fairly typical. Compared to other constituencies in Indonesia overall and Java specifically (excluding Jakarta), the four regencies in CJ3 are slightly wealthier and report marginally better life-expectancy and human-development scores, but lag behind other districts in terms of literacy rates and number of years of school completed. In socio-cultural terms the constituency is also fairly typical, with a mixed population of *abangan*, or non-devout Muslims who adhere to a heterodox or syncretist form of the Islamic faith, as well as more pious and traditionalist *santri* Muslims affiliated with the mass-based Islamic institution, Nahdlatul Ulama (NU), and *kyai* or religious scholars (Geertz 1976).

Figure 1: Map of Central Java III

Source: CartoGIS, ANU College of Asia and the Pacific, The Australian National University

Electioneering in CJ3

As discussed in the article, candidates for office across Indonesia are highly dependent on large networks of brokers, usually termed success teams (*tim sukses*). Though the precise structure of these teams varies across campaigns, they share a pyramid-like structure, with the candidate and his or her core team of advisors at the top, ground-level brokers at the bottom, and usually layers of

coordinators in between (e.g., district, sub-district, and village coordinators). National and provincial candidates have the largest and most complex organizations. A well-resourced DPR candidate could employ as many as 100 brokers in a single village and 10,000 in total (Aspinall et. al. 2017). By contrast, poorly resourced local candidates sometimes secure a mere handful of brokers.

The ground-level brokers at the base of the pyramid have the task of targeting and persuading voters. These brokers are known by a variety of terms, with the most common being *kader* (or cadres) and *korlap* (field coordinators); some campaigns in CJ3 instead used *sabet* or *gapit*, Javanese terms meaning "whip" (Aspinall et. al. 2015). The diversity in network size and density is clear from the voter–broker lists we obtained. Table 1 shows information on brokers and voters from our set of sampled CJ3 administrative areas. The number of brokers in these areas ranges from a high of 509 for our candidate for the national parliament, to a mere 11 for our provincial-parliament candidate. (The latter is a small number of brokers for a provincial-level candidate and reflects a strategic choice by this particular candidate to collaborate with district-parliament candidates, "borrowing" their team members.) The number of brokers per candidate for district parliament in our sample ranges from 490, rivaling the size of our well-resourced national-level candidate, to just 46.

Table A1: Brokers by Candidate

Candidate Number	Type of Candidate	Number of brokers
1	District	171
2	Provincial	46
3	Provincial	358
4	Provincial	56
5	Provincial	142
6	Provincial	150
7	Provincial	355
8	Provincial	490
9	Provincial	11
10	National	509

Constituency size has a substantial effect on candidate strategies. Candidates contesting for national- and provincial-level seats had to win hundreds of thousands of votes to secure victory. By contrast, the smaller size of district-level constituencies meant that candidates could win with as few as 3,000–10,000 votes, depending on the constituency. Not surprisingly, our researchers found that district-level candidates typically offered much larger inducements to voters than did candidates for the national- or provincial-level seats—as much as ten times more, though a typical difference was a magnitude of between three and five. Though there was significant variation, most national- and provincial-level candidates we encountered offered payments of about 10,000 rupiah (approximately USD0.75) per voter, while most district-level candidates offered payments that ranged between 15,000 and 50,000 rupiah (USD1.10 to USD3.75). In total, however, national and provincial candidates spend much more on vote-buying efforts than their local counterparts, given that they target many more voters. While the sums spent on vote-buying varied, our researchers found that most district-level candidates in CJ3 who engaged in the practice spent between 400 and 700 million rupiah for vote-buying (approximately USD40–70,000). A few, most of them not serious contenders but standing just to fill out party lists, did not engage in the practice at all; a small number spent over 1 billion rupiah. Serious candidates for the national parliament could spend 1 to 5 billion rupiah (USD100–500,000) (Aspinall et. al. 2015).

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