

SUPPLEMENTARY MATERIAL

CONTROL, COERCION, AND COOPTATION
How Rebels Govern after Winning Civil War

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Supplementary material:

Statebuilding Through Rebel-Civilian Relations: Evidence from Zimbabwe

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A.1 Sources for coding strongholds and secured areas

Strongholds and secured areas are coded on a case-by-case basis at the *district* level for rural areas. Coding decisions are made based on materials collected from the Zimbabwe National Archives, the Zimbabwe Jesuit Archives, the Mafela Trust Archives, and the official ZANU/ZANLA death records (*The Fallen Heroes of Zimbabwe*). I then cross-check this coding with secondary sources from academics who have conducted extensive fieldwork in different parts of Zimbabwe during the immediate post-war period, to confirm that the final dataset matches up with published accounts of rural rebel-civilian relations. I describe the archival sources in detail here:

Zimbabwe National Archives: The Zimbabwe National Archives contain documents primarily from the Rhodesian period of Zimbabwean history, up to 1979, with the exception of oral interviews conducted in the last two decades.¹ I use oral interviews conducted with civilians and ex-combatants to determine the ways in which civilians and rebels interacted, as well as the length of contact and strength of wartime institutions. The Archives also contain Rhodesian military documents, including the military coordinates and population moved into Protected Villages (PVs) — a Rhodesian counterinsurgency tactic that involved forcibly displacing civilians who aided ZANU/ZANLA during the civil war. Because PVs were only implemented in areas that fell under ZANLA's control, I geocode this data to code for intensity of support for ZANU and the influence of ZANU ideology.

Jesuit Archives: The Jesuit Archives contain materials collected by the Catholic churches and missions in Zimbabwe. Documents from the Liberation War primarily detail relationships with ZANU/ZANLA, which is consistent with historical and anthropological research on ZANLA's strong relationship with the Catholic church during the civil war. I use memoirs from missionaries and church staff to determine the frequency of contact with ZANU/ZANLA at different missions in Zimbabwe, as well as the relationships between the church, local civilians, and the ZANLA forces during civil war. The Jesuit Archives also contained newspaper clippings, government propaganda, and independent research conducted by the Catholic church on wartime atrocities and rebel activity across Zimbabwe. I use this set of materials to code for ZANU/ZANLA and ZAPU/ZPRA operation in different districts. Finally, the Archives contain yearly Catholic church directories, which provide information about whether missions closed down or were downsized due to increased intensity of guerrilla activity. This is used to code for ZANU/ZANLA presence.

Mafela Trust Archives: The Mafela Trust Archives, currently housed at the South African History Archive, contain wartime materials from ZAPU. These were collected from 1989 onward in an effort to remember and catalogue ZAPU and ZPRA's place in Zimbabwe's struggle for

¹Post-war government documents exist but are not accessible to the public.

independence. I use interviews conducted by the Mafela Trust to identify ZPRA operational zones during the civil war, as well as relationships with civilians and local leaders and evidence of struggle against ZANU/ZANLA soldiers in different parts of the country. The Mafela Trust Archives also contain information about ZAPU/ZPRA ex-combatants who were killed during the civil war, along with information about their location and method of death. For some individuals, there was also information about place of birth. I use these death records to determine the frequency of ZPRA operations in different districts as well as evidence of recruitment and local support into ZAPU/ZPRA.

The Fallen Heroes of Zimbabwe: The *Fallen Heroes of Zimbabwe* provides the official death records for ZANU/ZANLA ex-combatants. The book, published in 1983 by the Zimbabwean government, provides details about the name and the war name of the deceased, as well as the individual's general operational zone. There are incomplete details about a more exact location of death — for example, the district, chiefdom, or communal area — and method of death. This information is used to code for ZANLA operational intensity.

A.2 Selection of Coding Narratives

In this section, I provide narratives for six of the rural districts in Zimbabwe to illustrate the types of evidence used and to explain typical coding decisions for rebel strongholds and unsecured areas. I present two cases for each type. In each type, I choose one district that might be considered the ideal type, and another district is chosen by random sample. In all cases, I use Rhodesian records to provide some context about the size of the potential affected population, which are primarily black Zimbabweans living in native communal lands.

A.2.1 ZANU Strongholds

Mount Darwin (Mashonaland Central) Mount Darwin district lies at the border of northeastern Zimbabwe and Mozambique. It was one of the first ZANU strongholds: evidence suggests that ZANLA entered the district from their Zambian camps and began consistent operations here around 1972, although there was earlier sporadic presence as well. In two early Rhodesian publications found in the Jesuit Archives — “Anatomy of Terror” and “Harvest of Fear” (Government of Rhodesia 1978a,b), the Rhodesian government described numerous encounters with ZANLA, suggesting high rebel presence from 1973 onward.

Mount Darwin district was served by the Sinoia diocese of the Catholic Mission, specifically the Marymount Mission located within the district, and the St. Albert's Mission located in the adjacent Centenary district. These two missions were hotbeds of ZANLA activity throughout the conflict: From 1973 onward, rebels maintained a base near St. Albert's Mission and routinely had

contact with civilians at night while looting empty farm stores for supplies (Fr. L. Von Walter SJ, JA N.d.). There was also a written account about an incident in 1979, when missionary workers from Marymount Mission Hospital were abducted by the rebels and forced to walk to Mozambique. According to the account, civilian collaborators (*mujibas*) had entered the mission that morning, but the mission was surprised that “there was a larger than normal group of mujibhas” (Sr Gregor Munyaradzi Dakudzwa, JA 1979, 1). The *mujibas* asked their usual questions about the existence of Rhodesian forces, but the missionaries were not worried because “we were used to such questions” (Sr Gregor Munyaradzi Dakudzwa, JA 1979, 1). The missionaries also reported that Marymount Mission had a good relationship with the ZANLA soldiers during the war (Sr Gregor Munyaradzi Dakudzwa, JA 1979, 9). These accounts of missionary contact with rebels suggest high levels of presence.

According to an independent report conducted by the Catholic Commission for Justice and Peace in Rhodesia (CCJP) in 1978, there was collaboration between local civilians and the ZANLA rebels (Catholic Commission for Justice and Peace, JA N.d.); investigators for the CCJP also noted various rebel checkpoints in or near Mount Darwin (Bottriell’s 1975). A clear indicator for high rebel influence and activity is the existence of Protected Villages, a counterinsurgency tactic to prevent civilians from maintaining contact with rebels. Based on protected villages data collected from the NAZ’s collection of Rhodesian files, in Mount Darwin, 63 protected villages established in total, out of a total of 231 established during the conflict (Ministry of Internal Affairs, NAZ N.d.). Of these, 40 were created in 1975: it was the 4th district to be subjected to the program. An additional 23 were created in 1978, given spreading support in the district despite counterinsurgency measures. All wards covering native areas were forced into protected villages. Finally, of the three chiefdoms in Mount Darwin that existed throughout the war (two more were promoted to chieftaincy during the war), all three experienced wartime chief turnover (Government of Rhodesia, NAZ N.d.). One saw two turnovers — 3 chiefs in total due to one death and one abduction— while the other two saw one turnover due to death. Prior to the war, chiefs in Mount Darwin had an average tenure length of around 11 years, while chiefs who were in power during the war had a tenure of around 5 years only. While chief deaths may have occurred due to natural causes or other causes not related to the war, there is good reason to suspect that chiefs were killed or harmed by ZANLA rebels, as the rebels were well known for killing chiefs who were seen as Rhodesian administrators.

Makoni (Manicaland) Makoni district is located in the eastern-most province Manicaland, close (not not adjacent) to the border of Mozambique. Prior to the start of the liberation war, civilians in Makoni district were already being politicized by early ZAPU nationalist party structures, which had held secret meetings in rural villages throughout the 1960s (Ranger 1985). ZANU/ZANLA entered Makoni district in late 1975, when the entire eastern front was opened up to the rebel

group after Mozambican independence. High ZANLA presence as a result of Makoni's proximity to Mozambique meant that the ZAPU party structures were destroyed (Elite interview, 2017). Under ZANLA command, Makoni district fell under the Manica war zone, Tangwena sector. The ZANLA deaths register ("Fallen Heroes of Zimbabwe") lists an estimated 189 ZANLA casualties in Makoni district alone, out of a total 3304 deaths with location information across the country and in the Mozambique bases (Prime Minister's Office 1983).

Makoni district contains five communal native areas — Chiduku, Weya, Makoni, Tandi, and Chikori — and three additional native purchase areas. While the Rhodesian government only established no protected villages, there were five protected sub-offices in Makoni within these native areas, suggesting that there was high rebel presence (Ministry of Internal Affairs, NAZ N.d.). Of the five chiefdoms in Makoni, there were turnovers in power in four of them. One, Chief Chiduku, saw one turnover while Chiefs Chikore, Chipunza, and Tandi saw two turnovers in power between 1975 and 1980. Two chiefs were killed during the war and one was removed from power. The remainder were recorded as having died, but with no reason provided (Government of Rhodesia, NAZ N.d.). Some headmen (one administrative level lower level than chiefs) were also killed because they did not support ZANU (Ranger 1985, 284). Similarly, there were three Catholic missions in Makoni district, and all three closed down non-medical services and schools in 1977 and 1978 due to heightened rebel activity (Catholic Directory of Rhodesia 1978/9 1978). These pieces of evidence suggest high levels of rebel presence during the conflict. Ranger (1982); Ranger (1985)'s fieldwork in Makoni district remains one of the most comprehensive studies on peasant ideology and politicization, from the early 1900s until the end of the liberation war. In particular, the book demonstrated the strong levels of influence rebels had (at least in Makoni district) and describes various ways in which ZANLA rebels consulted and worked with spirit mediums to gain legitimacy in the area. In some cases even brought spirit mediums from one native area to another in order to "make the land safe." On the civilians' end, by deriving legitimacy from spirit mediums, rebels were forced to comply with customs and ensured that the "actions of the fighting men observed some local rules." Finally, spirit mediums had an incentive to participate in this cooperative relationship because "an alliance with the guerrillas ensured that they would be given proper respect" after having been sidelined by the Rhodesian administration (Ranger 1982, 367).

A.2.2 ZAPU Strongholds

Lupane (Matabeleland North) Lupane is a district close (but not adjacent to) the Zambia border and the Botswana border. The district was an early ZAPU stronghold during the liberation war, and fell under the Northern Front 2 (NF2) operation zone. Out of the estimated 1185 ZPRA casualties, 125 were part of operations in Lupane (*Actual Grave Locations of ZPRA Guerillas*

2006). These lists are noted as incomplete and should be taken as only a very rough estimate, but provides some indication of the intensity of rebel operations in different parts of the country. Since the Rhodesian government did not establish protected villages in ZPRA strongholds (some were planned in Hwange district but the program had ended before implementation), there were no protected villages in Lupane; however, there were 2 protected sub-offices in Lupane. In the 1990s, there was also an unsuccessful push towards building a war memorial at the Pupu Shrine in Lupane, in commemoration of ZAPU/ZPRA efforts in the Liberation War.

There are four native tribal trust lands in Lupane: Lupane, Lubimbi, Dandanda, and Mzola. There is also one native purchase area, Gwaai. These areas cover 25 of the 30 wards in Lupane while European lands were limited, suggesting high potential for ZPRA presence and influence. In a Mafela Trust interview, [Richard Dube, Interview, MT \(2011\)](#) — a soldier in the NF2 zone — reported that there were ZAPU *mujibas* in Lupane, and that Lupane was a central semi-liberated zone in which ZPRA soldiers could walk freely. Similarly, [\(McGregor 2017\)](#) writes, “Guerrillas had entered Lupane in serious numbers in 1977 and by late 1978, much of the district was semi-liberated and under the control of ZIPRA guerrillas operating through ZAPU party structures.” Of the four Catholic missions in Lupane, two closed their hospitals and/or schools due to an increase in fighting during latter half of the liberation war ([Catholic Directory of Rhodesia 1978/9 1978](#)). These evidence suggest that ZPRA had a large and important presence in Lupane.

Bulilima-Mangwe (Matabeleland South) Bulilima-Mangwe district, which lies at the western border of Zimbabwe along the Botswana border, was one of the most important ZAPU strongholds during the liberation war and one of the guerrillas’ main entryways from external bases into Zimbabwe. While there were no protected villages in Bulilima, there were 5 protected sub-offices established. Bulilima falls under the Southern Front 1 operation zone, and saw an estimated 28 ZPRA casualties ([Actual Grave Locations of ZPRA Guerillas 2006](#)). Despite the low number of casualties as compared to Lupane however, there is strong evidence that ZAPU/ZPRA presence was high and that the guerrillas had strong influence over local politicization and civilian support ([Ngwenya 2017](#)).

Because civilians living on either side of the Zimbabwe-Botswana border in Bulilima-Mangwe were from the Kalanga tribe, borders were guarded only very loosely and both rebels and civilians were free to cross between the two countries frequently. Ammunition smuggling routes also went through Bulilima-Mangwe for the same reason, leading to near-constant ZPRA presence ([Ngwenya 2017, 160](#)). Based on various interviews conducted by the Mafela Trust, it is clear that the town of Plumtree was one of the main routes through which ZPRA soldiers would travel between their Francistown base in Botswana and rural villages in Zimbabwe. It was also common for new ZPRA recruits to travel from Plumtree to the Botswana border, where they were taken to Francistown before heading north to guerrilla training camps in Zambia. [Longman Ndebele,](#)

Interview, MT (2011) describes his situation, which seems to typify recruits from the Bulilima-Mangwe area based on the Mafela Trust interviews: As a native of rural Plumtree area, he grew up as a farmer 2km from the Zimbabwe-Botswana border. When he decided to join the struggle with his friends, he crossed the border into Botswana — where he was mistaken as a cattle herder — and was brought to Francistown on ZAPU vehicles. Eventually, ZAPU made the decision that he could be a soldier, so he boarded a plane and was flown Nampundwe Transit Camp in Zambia.

In Bulilima-Mangwe — and in particular, the areas around Plumtree — there was significantly high ZAPU and ZPRA presence. For example, one interviewee in the Mafela Trust reported: “there were a lot of political activities taking place there, taking into account also that there were a number also of senior ZAPU leaders... So as such it is common knowledge that those people they have cultivated a lot of political activity in their areas” (Edward Nare, Interview, MT 2011). There was high recruitment activity in Bulilima-Mangwe’s villages Ngwenya (2017, 165). This was in part due to the easy border crossing: Ngwenya (2017, 158-159) reported that “ZIPRA guerrillas were always present” and that the lack of border controls from Bulilima-Mangwe “minimised danger for Bulilima youths” while recruitment in the North was “dangerous, risky, and therefore fatal.”

A.2.3 Unsecured Territories

Gokwe (Midlands) Gokwe district in Midlands province saw contestation for civilian support not just between ZANLA and ZPRA, but also other smaller militias, such as Bishop Muzorewa’s breakaway faction of ZANU and Reverend Sithole’s militia. These militias maintained a foothold in the area (New York Times 1979; Rich 1982) and while they had little effect outside of Gokwe, they added to the chaotic dynamic within Gokwe district as citizens were compelled to aid and support different armed groups that operated in the rural area. In fact, the Muzorewa militia was the first group to have gained supporters in Gokwe (Preston 2004, 59).

With the exception of some forest lands, Gokwe is made up of native tribal trust lands and some native purchase lands. It is bordered on the north, south, and west by ZPRA strongholds, and on the east are territories that saw moderate ZANLA operational presence (Alexander, McGregor and Ranger 2000). During the conflict, Gokwe saw more long-standing ZPRA operational presence and lower levels (and shorter periods) of ZANLA presence. Gokwe had been the farthest west that ZANLA could penetrate from the Mozambique border (Chitiyo and Rupiya 2005). ZPRA maintained bases in Gokwe from 1975 (Catholic Commission for Justice and Peace, JA N.d., 55), while it seems that ZANLA did not penetrate the district until late 1977 (Prime Minister’s Office 1983). Alexander (1998) writes that Gokwe district was “entirely under Zipra control in the 1970s,” but also that there were hardened Shona/Ndebele divisions because of the

Shona-dominated Sithole militias that were recruited in Gokwe and used “explicitly tribal attacks” (Alexander 1998, 179). There is also some evidence of usual ZANLA activities such as *pungwes* (Mwale 2018), and “especially in 1977/78, ...Gokwe was a ‘grey’ area as far as encounters of Zanla and Zipra forces were concerned and also those of the Rhodesian soldiers...” (Zimbabwe Standard 2001). Cliffe, Mpfu and Munslow (1980, 59) noted that Gokwe district was one of the “borders” between ZANLA and ZPRA, which saw “contestation for control.” Because of the additional militias in operation in Gokwe, I code ZPRA as having moderate presence and influence, while ZANLA had little presence and influence. Overall, contestation in the district is fairly high owing not just to ZANLA and ZPRA presence but also the increased presence and influence of additional militias.

Beitbridge (Matabeleland South) Beitbridge is located in Matabeleland South, and was an important area for both ZANU and ZAPU especially during the latter half of the war. On the southern half of Matabeleland South, ZPRA maintained an early stronghold in Gwanda, which is adjacent to the western border of Beitbridge. It seems that both ZANLA and ZPRA extended military operations into Beitbridge in 1977, although it seems plausible that ZPRA entered earlier than ZANLA given ZPRA’s early control over Gwanda. Beitbridge fell under ZANLA’s Gaza war zone, Dubula sector, Detachment 2. Under ZPRA, it was part of the Southern Front 2 operation zone.

In Beitbridge, 13 out of the 16 current-day wards were part of native lands. Of the 13 wards that fell under native areas during Rhodesian rule, 6 — on the eastern half of the district that were controlled by ZANU — were subject to protected villages (Ministry of Internal Affairs, NAZ N.d.). The remaining 7 on the western half, which saw heavier ZPRA presence, were not affected by protected villages. All protected villages in Beitbridge were created in 1977, and the areas subject to them make up approximately 53.7% of the native lands. According to Cliffe, Mpfu and Munslow (1980), ZANU/ZANLA likely had approximately controlled 40% of the civilian population in Beitbridge, although this number is a rough estimate.

Contested territories in Matabeleland South, primarily in Gwanda, and Beitbridge, is best conceptualized at a broader operational level rather than within districts specifically. While ZPRA’s Southern Front came from the west, ZANLA’s Gaza war zone came from the east. The two rebel groups clashed in Gwanda and Beitbridge: ZPRA had strong operations in Beitbridge but was unable to push past ZANLA-controlled territories in the eastern part of the district, while ZANLA penetrated ZPRA’s stronghold in Gwanda in 1977 (Bhebe 1999) and pushed very briefly into Kezi in Matobo district to the west of Gwanda (Prime Minister’s Office 1983). There were reports of clashes in all three of these districts, although it was clear that contestation between the two groups in the latter years was highest in Gwanda — where ZANLA managed to control a small portion of the native areas — and slightly less so in Beitbridge. While ZANLA entered the

Kezi area of Matobo from the east and fought against ZPRA combatants (Alexander 1998), it does not seem like ZANLA maintained much presence or gained semi-permanent foothold into Matobo district (Cliffe, Mpofu and Munslow 1980). I thus code Matobo as being under ZAPU control, Gwanda as being unsecured (high value) despite stronger and longer-term presence from ZAPU, and Beitbridge as being unsecured (moderate value) with higher presence from ZANU than from ZAPU.

A.3 Fieldwork

Due to the heightened political tensions in Zimbabwe, it was not possible to conduct extensive interviews with civilians or rank-and-file combatants. Even though the Liberation War itself is not a contentious subject in the country — in fact, the government actively works to keep discourse on the war alive for political purposes — politics itself is considered to be an uncomfortable discussion among non-elites in Zimbabwe. In this context, I took care to minimize the need for interview data and instead focused on collecting data from archives.

Archival data was collected in-country with the help of two research assistants. Foreign researchers in Zimbabwe face restrictions on the length of time (3 days) that can be spent in the National Archives of Zimbabwe (NAZ). In consultation with individuals at: (1) the NAZ, (2) two Zimbabwe government ministries, and (3) the University of Zimbabwe, I determined the best course forward and engaged two research assistants to help me to retrieve materials from the NAZ and to translate/transcribe the interviews housed at the NAZ as part of their oral history collection. The research assistants who worked with me were masters students in Economic History, and had concurrently been engaged in projects for their own research as well as for other foreign researchers, all at the NAZ. Archival access and research is open to all Zimbabwean nationals, and thus they faced no risk in conducting research on behalf of this project.

The National Archives of Zimbabwe and the Mafela Trust both held a large number of interviews with ex-combatants from both ZANU and ZAPU as well as civilians living in rural areas during and after the Liberation War. These, combined with memoirs and qualitative history from the Jesuit Archives, meant that the need to conduct additional interviews was minimized. However, there were outstanding questions that I about which I hoped to inquire. To do so, I reached out to several other scholars in the United States with expertise in Zimbabwe, to inquire about who I should contact in-country and what I should keep in mind as I make my inquiries. Through their contacts, I eventually reached other scholars in Zimbabwe, who helped to put me in contact with a few people I eventually interviewed. Interviewees introduced me to other potential interviewees whose stories they felt I might find useful for my research.

In total, I was able to reach eight interviewees. Among these, five were ex-combatants; two were

ex-government employees; one is an expert on Zimbabwean politics. All interviewees consented to participating in my research twice: first through the initial phone call, WhatsApp message, or email, in which I explained the purpose of my research and my request for an interview; second during the interview, during which I once again explained the interview purpose as part of the informed consent process.

Importantly, I focused only on requesting interviews with key individuals who are of high political or social standing and would face no negative repercussions from speaking to a foreign researcher. They were primarily ex-combatants who later found good positions in government or who actively work with the government in the capacity of another private organization such as an NGO. A few others have since moved abroad. To give an indication of the types of people I was contacting for an interview, many individuals turned my interview request down not because they were afraid to speak, but because they were too often contacted by journalists or interviewers. Several people I contacted directed me to their already-published books or memoirs of their experiences during this period of Zimbabwe's history, while another sent me a copy of his working memoir manuscript to use for my research in lieu of an interview. In short, these are not ordinary citizens or ex-combatants who have exited politics to live a civilian life. For primary evidence of those experiences, I gratefully relied on collections of interviews and memoirs made available in archives.

A.4 Descriptive Statistics

Table A1: Public Goods Provision (Census Rural Sample 1950-1971)

	Count	Mean	SD	Min	Max
ZANU control	48602	0.515	0.438	0	1
Unsecured	48602	0.170	0.331	0	1
ZAPU control	48602	0.090	0.274	0	1
Education (0-3 coding)	49948	1.766	1.087	0	3
Education (0-4 coding)	49948	1.820	1.169	0	4
Education (0-13 coding)	49873	6.395	3.931	0	13
Education (0-11 coding)	49873	6.278	3.758	0	11
Post	50301	0.300	0.408	0	1
Post (Croke et al. 2016)	50301	0.346	0.447	0	1
Male	50301	0.425	0.494	0	1
Did not migrate	49806	0.815	0.388	0	1
Children ever born	12609	3.893	1.487	0	5
Labor force participation	50301	0.062	0.243	0	2
Owns home	45080	0.838	0.368	0	1
Disabled	50270	0.161	0.367	0	1

A.5 Robustness Checks for Education Attainment

Table A2: Education Attainment Robustness Checks

	Scale from 0-4	
	Full Sample	Excluding 1960-1969 Births
Unsecured \times Educated Post-war	0.259*** (0.070)	0.256*** (0.073)
ZANU Stronghold \times Educated Post-war	0.124** (0.053)	0.134** (0.054)
Observations	48262	27896

	Scale from 0-13	
	Full Sample	Excluding 1960-1969 Births
Unsecured \times Post	0.968*** (0.276)	0.953*** (0.275)
ZANU Stronghold \times Post	0.497** (0.216)	0.533** (0.220)
Observations	48185	27843

	Scale from 0-11	
	Full Sample	Excluding 1960-1969 Births
Unsecured \times Post	0.960*** (0.266)	0.971*** (0.269)
ZANU Stronghold \times Post	0.453** (0.213)	0.517** (0.218)
Observations	48185	27843

Notes: * $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$. Robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered at the district level. Sample is attenuated to respondents born from 1950 to 1971. Regressions include district, birth year, and gender fixed effects. *Education* is coded as: “0” = no formal education, “1” = incomplete primary, “2” = complete primary, “3” = incomplete secondary, and “4” = complete secondary for the 0-4 scale. The scale from 01113 is coded simply as the highest grade level from no education to completing secondary school. The scale from 0-11 is coded as the highest grade level from no education to completing lower secondary school. For these latter two codings, all individuals who responded as no knowing the exact grade level that they have completed are dropped from analysis.

Table A3: Education Attainment Robustness Checks

	Excluding Moved in Last 10 Years	
	Full Sample	Excluding 1960-1969 Births
Unsecured \times Educated Post-war	0.246*** (0.071)	0.265*** (0.068)
ZANU Stronghold \times Educated Post-war	0.120** (0.050)	0.141*** (0.051)
Observations	39170	22901

	Post based on Croke et al. (2016)	
	Education (0-3 scale)	Education (0-4 scale)
Unsecured \times Educated Post-war	0.242*** (0.064)	0.248*** (0.068)
ZANU Stronghold \times Educated Post-war	0.100** (0.049)	0.122** (0.050)
Observations	48262	48262

Notes: * $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$. Robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered at the district level. Sample is attenuated to respondents born from 1950 to 1971. Regressions include district, birth year, and gender fixed effects. The first panel excludes individuals who reportedly migrated within the past 10 years. In the second panel, *Post* based on Croke et al. (2016) is coded as: “0” if the respondent is born before 1964, “1” if the respondent is born from 1967 onward, and increments of 1/4 for respondents born between 1964-1967.

Table A4: Education Attainment Robustness Checks (Different Samples)

	Including Migrated Population	
	Full Sample	Excluding 1960-1969 Births
Unsecured \times Post	0.257*** (0.070)	0.253*** (0.072)
ZANU Control \times Post	0.127** (0.053)	0.137*** (0.054)
Observations	48262	27896

	Only Districts Where Shona \geq 80%	
	Full Sample	Excluding 1960-1969 Births
Unsecured \times Post	0.320*** (0.056)	0.268*** (0.087)
Observations	31778	18477

	Interacting Unsecured Areas With ZANU Presence	
	Full Sample	Excluding 1960-1969 Births
Unsecured \times Post	0.216* (0.123)	0.245** (0.116)
ZANU Presence \times Post	0.134*** (0.050)	0.156*** (0.053)
Unsecured \times Post \times ZANU Presence	-0.017 (0.221)	-0.084 (0.213)
Observations	48262	27896

Notes: * $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$. Robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered at the district level. Sample is attenuated to respondents born from 1950 to 1971. In the first panel, sample is attenuated to those who reported that they did not migrate in the past 10 years. In the second panel, sample is attenuated to individuals who reside in a district that is \geq 80% Shona based on an estimate calculated using Afrobarometer data. Regressions include district, birth year, and gender fixed effects. *Education* is coded as: “0” = no formal education, “1” = incomplete primary, “2” = complete primary, “3” = incomplete secondary for the 0-3 scale.

A.6 Placebo Outcomes for Education Attainment

Table A5: Placebo Outcomes for Educational Attainment DiD

	(1) Children ever born	(2) Deaths in family (year)	(3) Owns home	(4) Disabled	(5) Did not migrate
Unsecured \times Post	0.070 (0.174)	-0.008 (0.009)	0.011 (0.023)	0.013 (0.018)	-0.003 (0.018)
ZANU Control \times Post	0.077 (0.156)	-0.010 (0.007)	-0.020 (0.018)	0.022 (0.014)	0.016 (0.013)
Observations	12140	48602	43574	48572	48120

	Age	Never married	Married	Divorced	Widowed
Contested \times Post	-0.000 (0.000)	-0.004 (0.008)	-0.004 (0.017)	-0.007 (0.011)	0.015 (0.017)
ZANU Control \times Post	-0.000 (0.000)	-0.012* (0.006)	-0.011 (0.014)	0.011 (0.009)	0.011 (0.010)
Observations	48602	48506	48506	48506	48506

Notes: * $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$. Robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered at the district level. In models 1-4, the sample is attenuated to respondents born from 1950 to 1971.

A.7 Placebo Cutoffs for Education Attainment

Table A6: Education Placebo Checks

	(1) 1940-1962 Sample	(2) 1934-1956 Sample
ZANU Control \times Placebo Post	-0.007 (0.034)	-0.041 (0.032)
Unsecured \times Placebo Post	-0.014 (0.046)	-0.097** (0.039)
Observations	38854	29553

Notes: * $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$. Robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered at the district level. Sample is attenuated to respondents born from 1940 to 1961 in the first model, and from 1934-1956 in the second model. In the first model, the placebo *post* is coded as “0” if the respondent is born prior to 1951, “1” if born 1956 and after, and in increments of 1/6 in between. In the second model, the placebo *post* is coded as “0” if the respondent is born prior to 1945, “1” if born 1950 and after, and in increments of 1/6 in between. Regressions include district, birth year, and gender fixed effects.

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