

SUPPLEMENTARY MATERIAL

**WHY NON-DEMOCRACY ENGAGES
WITH WESTERN DEMOCRACY-PROMOTION PROGRAMS**
The China Model

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Appendix 1: The Western Democracy Assistance NGOs in China from 1979 to 2012

This appendix shows a dataset used to create Figure 1 “The Number of Western Democracy Assistance Organizations in China” in the main article. It explains the contents of the dataset, the method of extracting the dataset from raw data, its limitations, and the method of creating the Figure 1.

The China Development Brief (CDB), established in 1996, is a non-profit publication devoted to facilitating communication among international organizations, especially the NGOs that finance or implement development programs in China. CDB's free online directory features hundreds of listings for Chinese and international NGOs operating in China. (<http://chinadevelopmentbrief.cn/directory/>). Using the filtering system, I sort out international NGOs that promote rule of law, election, good governance, and civil society in China, as broadly defined as shown in Figure A1.




Figure A1. Captured Images for CDB’s Filtering of NGO Directory

With this input, the filtering system returns 102 foreign NGOs (accessed in June 2016). I checked the website of each NGO to sort out the organizations which make clear commitment for the causes of democracy in their mission statements. Through this approach, I drew the list of 30 foreign NGOs that operated democracy-related programs in China (Table A1). Figure 1 of the main article is created with reference to their entry year in China.

Two caveats need to be addressed. First, since the “foreign NGO law” entered into effect in 2017, some of these NGOs, such as the American Bar Association, closed their offices in China. CDB’s latest data do not include their information anymore when checked in January 2021. I explain the trends of Western NGOs’ withdrawal from China in Section 5 of the main article. Second, as Sarah Bush acknowledged in her work on democracy assistance programs worldwide, I also should mention at the outset that classifying democracy-assistance programs in China is ultimately a subjective exercise.¹ Despite my efforts to be accurate, some judgements are simply more clear-cut than others.

Even with these limits in accuracy and completeness, however, the dataset still serves its purpose to show the increasing trend of Western democracy assistance activities in China from the 1990s to the early-2010s.

Table A1. The List of Western Democracy NGOs in China from 1979 to 2012.

#	Name	Year of Entry	Branch Office
1	Konrad Adenauer Stiftung (CDU/CSU affiliated)	1979	office in Beijing
2	The Asia Foundation	1979	office in Beijing
3	The Hong Kong Council of Social Service	1985	
4	Friedrich-Ebert Stiftung	1987	office in Beijing
5	The Ford Foundation	1988	office in Beijing
6	CCA (Canadian Cooperative Association)	1993	
7	International Republican Institute	1993	
8	EU-China Human Rights Network (EIDHR)	1994	office in Beijing
9	National Endowment for Democracy (NED)	1995	
10	Heinrich-Böll-Stiftung (Green Party affiliated)	1996	office in Beijing
11	CWWN (Chinese Working Women's Network)	1996	
12	Norwegian Agency for Development	1996	
13	Alpha Communities	1997	office in Chengdu
14	Badi Foundation	1997	office in Beijing
15	The Carter Center	1997	
16	Public Media Center	1997	
17	Japan International Labor Foundation	1997	

¹ Bush, Sarah. 2015. *The Taming of Democracy Assistance: Why Democracy Promotion Does Not Confront Dictators*. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press. p.55.

18	ActionAid	1998	office in Beijing
19	National Democratic Institute	2000	office in Hong Kong
20	International Bridges to Justice	2001	
21	Institute of International Education	2001	office in Beijing
22	The Rights Practice	2002	
23	American Bar Association	2002	office in Beijing
24	Global Links Initiative	2003	
25	Starfish Project	2006	
26	American Friends Service Committee	2006	office in Dalian
27	Asia Catalyst	2007	
28	USAID	2008	
29	UN Democracy Fund	2009	
30	Yigongyi Center for Nonprofits	2010	office in Chongqing

Appendix 2: Comparing the Western Democracy Assistance Programs in Authoritarian Countries between 1991 and 2016

This appendix explains the two dataset that were used to create Table 1 in the main article. It explains the contents of the data, the method of extracting the data from the raw data, and the method of obtaining the raw data.

1. Polity 5 Data and the Five Most Durable Autocracies

Table A2 below shows the top five autocracies ranked by the regime durability, measured with *the number of years since the last substantive change in authority characteristic*, for “Polity 5 Project; Political Regime Characteristics and Transitions, 1800-2018,” available at <http://www.systemicpeace.org/inscrdata.html>²

Table A2. The List of Five Most Durable Authoritarian Countries

country	(as of) year	democ	autoc	polity	polity2	durable
Saudi Arabia	2018	0	10	-10	-10	92
Korea North	2018	0	10	-10	-10	70
China	2018	0	7	-7	-7	69
Vietnam	2018	0	7	-7	-7	64

² From this website, managed by Center for Systemic Peace, interested readers may scroll down to the middle for the section of “Polity5: Regime Authority Characteristics and Transitions Datasets,” and find the link for the “SPSS Series,” or “Excel Series” dataset.

Oman	2018	0	8	-8	-8	61
Cuba	2018	1	6	-5	-5	57
Syria	2018	0	9	-9	-9	55
Kuwait	2018	0	7	-7	-7	54

2. The Democracy Assistance Programs Implemented by the US Department of State and the USAID (United States Agency for International Development)

In order to extract a sample data for the Western democracy assistance programs for these authoritarian countries, I use the database for the US foreign aid programs as a proxy indicator. The database is accessible from the USAID’s Data Query website (<https://explorer.usaid.gov/query>). (Figure A2) In the filtering, I input (1) “economic” for the assistance category, (2) the five most enduring authoritarian countries for the country section, (3) “(US) department of state,” and “USAID” as the implementing agencies, and (4) “Democratic participation and civil society,” “Elections,” “Legal and judicial development,” and “Public sector policy and administrative management,” for the purpose categories. Lastly, I chose the years between 1991 and 2016, which covers the period between the end of the Cold War and the enactment of Xi Jinping’s “foreign NGO law” in 2017. The captured image below shows how the filtering process looks like in the website. (accessed January 17, 2021)




Figure A2. Captured Images for the Filtering of USAID’s Data Query

The filtering generates a dataset downloadable in the MS-excel format. I sort out the raw dataset by country and by purpose of the projects to create Table 1 in the main article.

The two raw data, extracted from the Polity 5 Project and USAID Foreign Aid Data, are available for replication at the World politics Dataverse site.

Appendix 3: Rule of Law in Authoritarian States.

This appendix shows a data to support the footnote 55 of the main article, which states that Chinese people tend to positively assess the democratic progress made in the rule of law sector.

The data shows the rule of law scores of selected authoritarian states, drawn from the Worldwide Governance Indicators (WGI), compiled by the World Bank. (<https://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/>) The WGI reports governance indicators for over 200 countries and territories in six dimensions of governance: (1) Voice and Accountability, (2) Political Stability and Absence of Violence, (3) Government Effectiveness, (4) Regulatory Quality, (5) Rule of Law, and (6) Control of Corruption. Using the “interactive data access” function, I extract the rule of law score for China. Then I choose Cuba, Iran, and Russia as a sample of authoritarian states that are often at odds with Western liberal democracies for comparison.




Figure A3. Percentile Rank of Selected Authoritarian Countries in Rule of Law.

According to the description of WGI project, “rule of law indicator captures the *perceptions* (emphasis added by the author) of the extent to which agents have confidence in and abide by the rules of society, and in particular the quality of contract enforcement, property rights, the police, and the courts, as well as the likelihood of crime and violence.”³ The percentile rank indicates rank of country among all countries in the world; 0 corresponds to lowest rank and 100 corresponds to higher rank.

Figure A3 demonstrates that China ranks higher than other authoritarian countries in the level of rule of law. It also shows that China has constantly made progress over time, whereas the other authoritarian countries show a pattern of fluctuation. The relative decline around the year of 2012 can be attributed to Xi Jinping’s anti-corruption campaign, and its impacts on the negative perception of the legal system in China due to the numerous corruption cases made public during the campaign. However, China’s ranking recovered the pattern of linear progress in 2016.

The caveat is that what is measured is not the actual level of rule of law, but people’s perception of it. The data above does not provide much information about the actual status or progress for the rule of law regime in each country. Despite the limit, the data serves its purpose to show that the CCP was relatively successful to create the perception among the Chinese people that the rule of law regime made progress in China.

³ <https://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/Home/Documents>