

SUPPLEMENTARY MATERIAL

TECHNOLOGICAL CHANGE AND THE INTERNATIONAL SYSTEM

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World Politics

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Online Appendix: Technological Change and the International System

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1 Proofs

1.1 Proof of Proposition 1

It is straightforward to check that *escalate* is the unique best response to *back down* for both countries. The home country's unique best response to *escalate* is *escalate* if $\Phi^{-1}(s - \lambda) > c$ and *back down* if the inequality is reversed. The adversary's unique best response to *escalate* is *escalate* if $\Phi^{-1}(s - \lambda) < 1 - c$ and *back down* if the inequality is reversed. Because $\Phi(\cdot)$ is strictly increasing and $-\Phi^{-1}(c) = \Phi^{-1}(1 - c) = \Delta > 0$, these conditions can be expressed as $-(s - \lambda) < \Delta$ for the home country and $(s - \lambda) < \Delta$ for the adversary. Thus if $|s - \lambda| < \Delta$, *escalate* is a strictly dominant strategy for both countries and the unique equilibrium is for both to *escalate*. If $|s - \lambda| > \Delta$, then either $-(s - \lambda) < \Delta < (s - \lambda)$ or $(s - \lambda) < \Delta < -(s - \lambda)$. In the first (second) case, the home country (adversary) is stronger and *escalate* is its strictly dominant strategy. The adversary's (home country's) unique best response to *escalate* is *back down*. Therefore if $|s - \lambda| > \Delta$, the unique equilibrium is for the stronger country to *escalate* and the weaker country to *back down*. \square

2 List of Technologies

- | | | |
|---|---|---|
| 1. Agricultural Tractors | 8. Communication Radios | 15. Steel Tons from Blast Oxygen |
| 2. ATMs | 9. Computers | 16. Steel Tons from Electric-arc |
| 3. Aviation Passengers \times kilometer | 10. Electricity production | 17. Telegrams |
| 4. Aviation Tons \times kilometer | 11. Internet users | 18. Telephones |
| 5. Cars | 12. Rail Passengers \times kilometers | 19. Transportation Rail Line kilometers |
| 6. Cellphones | 13. Rail Tons \times kilometers | 20. Televisions |
| 7. Commercial Trucks | 14. Ships | |

Note: Technologies are measured in number of units, while technology adoption (which we use in our models) are the log of these numbers scaled by population. Our dataset extends the series recorded in Comin and Hobijn (2009), and follow its definitions. Additional information regarding the country and year temporal distribution can be made available upon request.

3 Validity Check: System Concentration as Measure of System Competitiveness

Table S1: Worldwide Military Spending / Wars / MIDs as Dependent Variable

| | Dependent variable: Worldwide Military Spending, Logged | | | Dependent variable: Worldwide Wars, Logged | | | Dependent variable: Worldwide MIDs, Logged | | | Dependent variable: % of States Entering MIDs | | |
|-------------------------------|---|----------------------|-----------------------|--|---------------------|----------------------|--|---------------------|----------------------|---|---------------------|----------------------|
| | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) | (7) | (8) | (9) | (10) | (11) | (12) |
| Syscon | -54.097*** (7.101) | | | -6.607*** (1.424) | | | -13.216*** (1.647) | | | -0.310* (0.174) | | |
| Viable Great Power Coalitions | | 0.130** (0.051) | | | 0.009 (0.011) | | | 0.039*** (0.013) | | | 0.004** (0.002) | |
| C4 | | | -34.672*** (2.062) | | | -4.380*** (0.555) | | | -8.279*** (0.574) | | | -0.229*** (0.079) |
| Constant | 32.142*** (2.108) | 14.325*** (0.472) | 35.702*** (1.115) | 4.089*** (0.436) | 1.959*** (0.093) | 4.610*** (0.316) | 6.594*** (0.489) | 2.193*** (0.123) | 7.350*** (0.318) | 0.326*** (0.051) | 0.203*** (0.013) | 0.364*** (0.043) |
| Observations | 189 | 189 | 189 | 189 | 189 | 189 | 189 | 189 | 189 | 189 | 189 | 189 |
| R ² | 0.356 | 0.030 | 0.587 | 0.125 | 0.003 | 0.221 | 0.309 | 0.039 | 0.487 | 0.013 | 0.031 | 0.029 |
| Adjusted R ² | 0.352 | 0.025 | 0.585 | 0.121 | -0.002 | 0.217 | 0.305 | 0.034 | 0.485 | 0.008 | 0.026 | 0.024 |
| Residual Std. Error | 2.948 | 3.618 | 2.360 | 0.707 | 0.754 | 0.667 | 0.800 | 0.944 | 0.689 | 0.107 | 0.106 | 0.107 |
| F Statistic (df = 1, 187) | 58.041*** | 6.444** | 282.822*** | 21.532*** | 0.720 | 62.364*** | 64.351*** | 9.258*** | 207.871*** | 3.173* | 6.512** | 8.383*** |

*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01
(Robust Standard Errors in Parentheses)

In this section, we test if our measure of system concentration (and two closely related alternatives we use for robustness checks) are statistically related to other plausible proxies for system competitiveness. Like many others, we argue that lower concentration can be related to a more competitive international system, or in the context of our theory, higher p .

Table S2: Conflict Links to Technology Adoption

| | <i>Dependent variable: ΔTech. Adoption Level</i> | | | |
|---|--|----------------------|----------------------|----------------------|
| Worldwide Military Spending (Logged) | 0.006*** (0.001) | | | |
| Worldwide Wars (Logged) | | 0.011*** (0.002) | | |
| Worldwide MIDs (Logged) | | | 0.018*** (0.002) | |
| Proportion of Countries Entering MIDs | | | | 0.039*** (0.007) |
| Spatial Distance to Technology Adoption | -0.042*** (0.002) | -0.043*** (0.002) | -0.043*** (0.002) | -0.043*** (0.002) |
| Polity2 score | 0.001*** (0.000) | 0.001*** (0.000) | 0.001*** (0.000) | 0.001*** (0.000) |
| War (lagged one year) | -0.002 (0.003) | -0.007*** (0.003) | -0.003 (0.003) | -0.006** (0.003) |
| Civil War (lagged one year) | -0.006* (0.003) | -0.004 (0.003) | -0.005 (0.003) | -0.002 (0.003) |
| Δ Neighboring Countries' Military Spending | 0.001*** (0.000) | 0.001*** (0.000) | 0.001*** (0.000) | 0.002*** (0.000) |
| Constant | -0.100*** (0.011) | -0.013*** (0.004) | -0.045*** (0.006) | 0.005*** (0.002) |
| Observations | 80591 | 80591 | 80591 | 80591 |
| R ² | 0.090 | 0.085 | 0.088 | 0.083 |
| Adjusted R ² | 0.090 | 0.085 | 0.088 | 0.083 |
| Residual Std. Error | 0.130 | 0.130 | 0.130 | 0.130 |

*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01
Country-Technology-Clustered Standard Errors in Parentheses

4 Reliability Check: Alternative System Concentration Measures

The first alternative measure is original, and looks at the number of great power coalitions possible at any time. It increases as the number of great powers grow or these become more equal in strength, and hence a larger number means less concentration, and thus us to expect more technology adoption.

Number of Viable Great Power Coalitions - The number of possible great power coalitions which satisfy two criteria: the coalition (1) controls at least 50 percent of great powers' resources (CINC), and (2) no member of the coalition is superfluous to doing so.¹

Our next alternative measure is from the economics literature on competition among firms and industry concentration.

C4 index - Proportion of power resources (CINC) controlled by the top four countries. This measure is widely used in industrial economics to assess market concentration.

4.1 Robustness Checks: Additional Models

Table S3: Systemic Analysis with Alternative IVs

| | <i>Dependent variable:</i> | | | | | |
|----------------------------------|--|---------------------|----------------------|----------------------|---------------------|----------------------|
| | $\Delta \text{Log (Tech. Adoption per capita), Worldwide}$ | | | | | |
| | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) |
| Syscon | -0.352*** (0.049) | | | -0.225*** (0.034) | | |
| Viable Great Power Coalitions | | 0.002*** (0.000) | | | 0.000 (0.000) | |
| C4 | | | -0.206*** (0.021) | | | -0.141*** (0.018) |
| Polity2 (World average) | | | | 0.005*** (0.000) | 0.006*** (0.001) | 0.004*** (0.000) |
| Constant | 0.132*** (0.016) | 0.009*** (0.002) | 0.144*** (0.013) | 0.098*** (0.011) | 0.028*** (0.002) | 0.110*** (0.011) |
| Observations | 188 | 188 | 188 | 188 | 188 | 188 |
| R ² | 0.396 | 0.181 | 0.544 | 0.643 | 0.510 | 0.697 |
| Adjusted R ² | 0.393 | 0.176 | 0.541 | 0.639 | 0.505 | 0.694 |
| Residual Std. Error | 0.018 | 0.021 | 0.015 | 0.014 | 0.016 | 0.013 |
| F Statistic | 51.518*** | 23.614*** | 98.400*** | 101.016*** | 68.801*** | 119.648*** |

Note:

*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01
(Robust Standard Errors in Parentheses)

¹We follow Correlates of War (2016) in our definition of great powers. These are: Austria/Austria-Hungary (1816-1918), China (1950-2016), France (1816-1940, 1945-2016), Prussia/Germany (1816-1918, 1925-1945, 1991-2016), Italy (1860-1943), Japan (1895-1945, 1991-2016), Russia/USSR (1816-1917, 1922-2016), The United Kingdom (1816-2016), The United States (1898-2016).

Table S4: Viable Great Power Coalitions / C4

| | <i>Dependent variable:</i> | | | |
|---|-------------------------------------|----------------------|----------------------|----------------------|
| | Change in Technology Adoption Level | | | |
| | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) |
| Viable Great Power Coalitions | 0.003*** (0.000) | 0.003*** (0.000) | | |
| C4 | | | -0.206*** (0.016) | -0.206*** (0.016) |
| Spatial Distance to Technology Adoption | -0.041*** (0.001) | -0.042*** (0.002) | -0.041*** (0.002) | -0.042*** (0.002) |
| Log (GDP pc) | | 0.001 (0.001) | | -0.002 (0.001) |
| Polity2 score | 0.000 (0.000) | 0.000 (0.000) | 0.001*** (0.000) | 0.001*** (0.000) |
| War (lagged one year) | -0.003 (0.003) | -0.003 (0.003) | 0.005* (0.003) | 0.005** (0.003) |
| Civil War (lagged one year) | -0.003 (0.003) | -0.003 (0.003) | -0.008** (0.003) | -0.009*** (0.004) |
| Neighbors Mil. Spending | | 0.000** (0.000) | | 0.001*** (0.000) |
| Constant | -0.006*** (0.002) | -0.018* (0.010) | 0.119*** (0.008) | 0.131*** (0.014) |
| Observations | 82567 | 77589 | 82567 | 77589 |
| R ² | 0.093 | 0.099 | 0.092 | 0.098 |
| Adjusted R ² | 0.093 | 0.099 | 0.092 | 0.098 |
| Residual Std. Error | 0.129 | 0.128 | 0.129 | 0.128 |

Note:

*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01
(Country-Technology-Clustered Standard Errors in Parentheses)

5 Granger Causality

Table S5: Granger Causality Analysis

| | <i>Temporal Causality Direction</i> | | | |
|--------------------|-------------------------------------|----------------------------|---|---|
| | System Conc. → Tech. Adoption | Tech. Adoption → System | System Conc. → Tech. Adoption [†] | Tech. Adoption [†] → System |
| Lag 1 (N = 172) | 17.72*** | 0.803 | 9.18*** | 0.19 |
| Lags 1-2 (N = 168) | 16.40*** | 3.25 | 10.59*** | 0.46 |
| Lags 1-3 (N = 164) | 25.35*** | 6.23 | 12.61*** | 2.01 |
| Lags 1-4 (N = 160) | 24.80*** | 4.42 | 13.88*** | 1.43 |

Note:

*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Reported statistic is the Granger causality Wald test χ^2 statistic

[†] Accounting for the effects of war, civil war (both lagged one year), and polity2 via linear model.

6 Robustness Check: Alternative Samples & Controls

Table S6: Main Specification With Alternative Samples

| Sample: | Dependent variable: Δ Technology Adoption Level | | | | | | | | | | |
|--------------------------------|--|----------------------|----------------------|---------------------|----------------------|------------------------|----------------------|------------------------------------|-----------------------------|------------------------|----------------------|
| | Imputed Data | 1900 - 2000 | Minor Powers | Major Powers | European Countries | Non-European Countries | Network & Passengers | Without Other Transportation Tech. | Without Communication Tech. | Without Industry Tech. | Without TV & ATM |
| Syscon | -0.262*** (0.070) | -0.270*** (0.028) | -0.345*** (0.029) | -0.267** (0.107) | -0.291*** (0.055) | -0.336*** (0.033) | -0.239*** (0.029) | -0.465*** (0.036) | -0.209*** (0.032) | -0.349*** (0.029) | -0.404*** (0.030) |
| Spatial Distance to Technology | -0.044*** (0.003) | -0.030*** (0.001) | -0.044*** (0.002) | -0.009* (0.005) | -0.031*** (0.002) | -0.049*** (0.002) | -0.044*** (0.002) | -0.045*** (0.002) | -0.028*** (0.002) | -0.041*** (0.002) | -0.045*** (0.002) |
| Polity2 Score | 0.000 (0.000) | 0.001*** (0.000) | 0.001*** (0.000) | -0.000 (0.001) | 0.000 (0.000) | 0.001*** (0.000) | 0.001*** (0.000) | 0.001*** (0.000) | 0.000*** (0.000) | 0.001*** (0.000) | 0.001*** (0.000) |
| War (Lagged One Year) | 0.003 (0.039) | 0.003 (0.002) | 0.005 (0.003) | -0.001 (0.005) | 0.005 (0.005) | 0.001 (0.003) | 0.002 (0.003) | 0.008** (0.003) | 0.003 (0.002) | 0.004 (0.003) | 0.005** (0.002) |
| Civil War (Lagged One Year) | 0.007 (0.028) | -0.012*** (0.003) | -0.009*** (0.003) | 0.042 (0.029) | 0.009 (0.022) | -0.012*** (0.003) | -0.008** (0.004) | -0.007 (0.005) | -0.009*** (0.003) | -0.008** (0.004) | -0.007* (0.004) |
| Constant | 0.083*** (0.021) | 0.094*** (0.008) | 0.108*** (0.008) | 0.108*** (0.031) | 0.097*** (0.016) | 0.109*** (0.009) | 0.084*** (0.008) | 0.141*** (0.010) | 0.071*** (0.009) | 0.112*** (0.008) | 0.125*** (0.008) |
| Observations | 240121 | 68615 | 75374 | 7193 | 25421 | 57146 | 73459 | 58488 | 58107 | 78110 | 77235 |
| Adjusted R ² | | 0.052 | 0.099 | 0.020 | 0.061 | 0.111 | 0.090 | 0.086 | 0.053 | 0.086 | 0.106 |
| Residual Std. Error | | 0.122 | 0.130 | 0.115 | 0.125 | 0.130 | 0.136 | 0.146 | 0.105 | 0.132 | 0.124 |

* p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01
(Country-Technology clustered standard errors in parentheses)

Table S7: Main Specification With Alternative Controls

| <i>Dependent variable: Δ Technology Adoption Level</i> | | | | | |
|--|----------------------|----------------------|----------------------|----------------------|----------------------|
| Syscon | -0.331*** (0.029) | -0.293*** (0.029) | -0.338*** (0.029) | -0.377*** (0.030) | -0.318*** (0.031) |
| Spatial Distance to Technology | -0.042*** (0.002) | -0.041*** (0.001) | -0.041*** (0.002) | -0.041*** (0.002) | -0.041*** (0.001) |
| Polity2 Score | 0.001*** (0.000) | 0.000** (0.000) | 0.001*** (0.000) | 0.001*** (0.000) | 0.000 (0.000) |
| War (Lagged One Year) | 0.002 (0.003) | 0.003 (0.003) | 0.004 (0.003) | 0.005** (0.003) | 0.002 (0.003) |
| Civil War (Lagged One Year) | -0.009** (0.003) | -0.006* (0.003) | -0.007** (0.003) | -0.007** (0.003) | -0.008** (0.003) |
| Log(Population) | 0.002*** (0.001) | | | | 0.002*** (0.001) |
| Cold War (Indicator) | | -0.018*** (0.002) | | | -0.017*** (0.002) |
| Democracy (Indicator) | | | -0.004 (0.004) | | -0.001 (0.004) |
| Post World War (5-year interval) | | | | 0.024*** (0.003) | 0.016*** (0.003) |
| Constant | 0.087*** (0.011) | 0.106*** (0.008) | 0.110*** (0.008) | 0.118*** (0.008) | 0.093*** (0.012) |
| Observations | 82567 | 82567 | 82567 | 82567 | 82567 |
| R ² | 0.089 | 0.093 | 0.089 | 0.090 | 0.094 |
| Adjusted R ² | 0.089 | 0.093 | 0.089 | 0.090 | 0.094 |
| Residual Std. Error | 0.129 | 0.129 | 0.129 | 0.129 | 0.129 |

*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01 – (Country-Tech. clustered standard errors in parentheses)

Table S8: New Systemic Controls: Inventions & Military Spending

| | <i>Dependent variable: Average Δ Tech. Adoption Level, Worldwide</i> | | | | |
|---------------------------------------|--|---------------------------------|--------------------------|----------------------|----------------------|
| | Main Tech. Selection | Expanded Tech. Selection | Military Spending | | |
| Syscon | -0.202*** (0.066) | -0.182*** (0.064) | -0.108*** (0.025) | -0.094*** (0.021) | -0.193*** (0.046) |
| Inventions (Yearly Average) | 0.000*** (0.000) | | 0.000*** (0.000) | | |
| Inventions (5-year Moving Average) | | 0.000*** (0.000) | | 0.000*** (0.000) | |
| Log(Global Military Spending) | | | | | 0.003*** (0.000) |
| Constant | 0.087*** (0.022) | 0.081*** (0.021) | 0.046*** (0.008) | 0.041*** (0.007) | 0.038*** (0.017) |
| Observations | 188 | 185 | 188 | 185 | 188 |
| R ² | 0.330 | 0.398 | 0.488 | 0.597 | 0.542 |
| Adjusted R ² | 0.322 | 0.392 | 0.482 | 0.593 | 0.537 |
| Residual Std. Error | 0.021 | 0.018 | 0.010 | 0.008 | 0.015 |

*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01 – (Robust Standard Errors in Parentheses)

Table S9: Alternative System Concentration Variable Calculations

| <i>Dependent variable:</i> $\Delta \text{Log(Tech. Adoption Level per capita)}$ | | | | | | |
|--|---|----------------------|----------------------|---|----------------------|----------------------|
| | Without Country i 's Contribution | | | Without Iron and Steel Production | | |
| Syscon (Singer 1972) | -0.317*** (0.028) | | | -0.382*** (0.030) | | |
| Viable Great Power Coalitions | 0.003*** (0.000) | | | 0.002*** (0.000) | | |
| C4 | -0.416*** (0.065) | | | -0.212*** (0.015) | | |
| Spatial Distance To Technology | -0.042*** (0.002) | -0.041*** (0.001) | -0.043*** (0.002) | -0.042*** (0.002) | -0.041*** (0.002) | -0.041*** (0.001) |
| Polity2 Score | 0.001*** (0.000) | 0.000** (0.000) | 0.001*** (0.000) | 0.001*** (0.000) | 0.000*** (0.000) | 0.000*** (0.000) |
| War (Lagged One Year) | 0.000 (0.003) | 0.000 (0.003) | -0.005** (0.003) | 0.003 (0.003) | -0.004 (0.003) | 0.004 (0.003) |
| Civil War (Lagged One Year) | -0.006* (0.003) | -0.003 (0.003) | -0.002 (0.003) | -0.007** (0.003) | -0.002 (0.003) | -0.008** (0.003) |
| Constant | 0.102*** (0.008) | -0.006*** (0.002) | 0.429*** (0.065) | 0.116*** (0.008) | -0.000 (0.001) | 0.121*** (0.008) |
| Observations | 81402 | 82366 | 81402 | 82567 | 82567 | 82567 |
| R ² | 0.090 | 0.092 | 0.082 | 0.091 | 0.086 | 0.093 |
| Adjusted R ² | 0.090 | 0.092 | 0.082 | 0.091 | 0.086 | 0.093 |
| Residual Std. Error | 0.129 | 0.129 | 0.130 | 0.129 | 0.129 | 0.129 |
| | In these regressions, the system concentration score for country i in year t was calculated using only data from other countries. For instance, system concentration for France in 1995 is the concentration of an international system composed of all countries except France in that year. | | | In these regressions, systemic variables were calculated using modified CINC scores which did not include iron and steel production nor energy consumption as components. | | |

*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01
(Country-Technology clustered standard errors in parentheses)

7 Additional Models with Lagged Dependent Variable

Although the use of the change in technology adoption as opposed to levels allows (to some extent) our analyses to take into account an over-time effect for a particular technology being in a country, to further attempt to delineate the shorter-term impact of system concentration on technology adoption, we have added models – at both the systemic level and technology-country-year level – with a lagged dependent variable, yielding similar results.

Table S10: Lagged Dependent Variable Models

(a) Lagged Dependent Variable Analysis: Country-Technology Year

| | <i>Dependent variable:</i> Change in Technology Adoption Level | | | | | |
|--|---|----------------------|----------------------|----------------------|----------------------|----------------------|
| | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) |
| Syscon (Singer 1972) | -0.195*** (0.018) | | | -0.193*** (0.018) | | |
| Viable Great Power Coalitions | | 0.002*** (0.000) | | | 0.002*** (0.000) | |
| C4 | | | -0.121*** (0.010) | | | -0.121*** (0.010) |
| Spatial Distance to Technology Adoption | -0.024*** (0.001) | -0.024*** (0.001) | -0.024*** (0.001) | -0.025*** (0.001) | -0.024*** (0.001) | -0.025*** (0.001) |
| Polity2 score | 0.000*** (0.000) | 0.000 (0.000) | 0.000*** (0.000) | 0.000*** (0.000) | 0.000 (0.000) | 0.000*** (0.000) |
| War (lagged one year) | 0.002 (0.002) | -0.002 (0.002) | 0.003 (0.002) | 0.002 (0.002) | -0.002 (0.002) | 0.003 (0.002) |
| Civil War (lagged one year) | -0.000 (0.003) | 0.002 (0.002) | -0.001 (0.003) | -0.000 (0.003) | 0.002 (0.002) | -0.001 (0.003) |
| Change in Neighboring Countries' Military Spending | | | | 0.001*** (0.000) | 0.000 (0.000) | 0.000** (0.000) |
| Change in Technology Adoption, Lagged | 0.384*** (0.020) | 0.381*** (0.020) | 0.382*** (0.020) | 0.384*** (0.021) | 0.381*** (0.021) | 0.381*** (0.021) |
| Constant | 0.061*** (0.005) | -0.006*** (0.001) | 0.068*** (0.005) | 0.060*** (0.005) | -0.006*** (0.001) | 0.067*** (0.005) |
| Observations | 76932 | 76932 | 76932 | 75196 | 75196 | 75196 |
| R ² | 0.244 | 0.247 | 0.246 | 0.247 | 0.249 | 0.248 |
| Adjusted R ² | 0.244 | 0.247 | 0.246 | 0.247 | 0.249 | 0.248 |
| Residual Std. Error | 0.112 | 0.112 | 0.112 | 0.112 | 0.112 | 0.112 |

* p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01
(Country-Technology-Clustered Standard Errors in Parenthesis)

(b) Lagged Dependent Variable Analysis: Systemic

| | <i>Dependent variable:</i> Change in Technology Adoption Level | | | | | |
|---------------------------------------|---|---------------------|----------------------|---------------------|---------------------|----------------------|
| | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) |
| Syscon, World Average | -0.066** (0.031) | | | -0.071** (0.028) | | |
| Viable Great Power Coalitions | | 0.000 (0.000) | | | -0.000 (0.000) | |
| C4 | | | -0.052*** (0.015) | | | -0.054*** (0.014) |
| Polity2 score | | | | 0.002*** (0.001) | 0.001** (0.001) | 0.001*** (0.001) |
| Change in Technology Adoption, Lagged | 0.809*** (0.042) | 0.867*** (0.043) | 0.746*** (0.048) | 0.682*** (0.061) | 0.771*** (0.067) | 0.624*** (0.069) |
| Constant | 0.026*** (0.010) | 0.002 (0.001) | 0.037*** (0.009) | 0.032*** (0.009) | 0.008** (0.003) | 0.042*** (0.009) |
| Observations | 186 | 186 | 186 | 186 | 186 | 186 |
| R ² | 0.787 | 0.780 | 0.795 | 0.802 | 0.792 | 0.809 |
| Adjusted R ² | 0.785 | 0.778 | 0.793 | 0.799 | 0.789 | 0.806 |
| Residual Std. Error | 0.010 | 0.011 | 0.010 | 0.010 | 0.010 | 0.010 |

* p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01
(Robust Standard Errors in Parenthesis)

8 Generalized Method of Moments Estimations

In addition to the Granger causality tests, we address potential endogeneity by use of the “internal instruments” used in Generalized Method of Moments (GMM) estimation. For the GMM analysis on the country-technology-year data, we used two lags of the dependent variable as instruments to address endogeneity. Arellano-Bond tests for first difference autocorrelation yielded no evidence of autocorrelation beyond AR(1). We “collapse” the instrument set into a $(T - 1 \times 1)$ column, rather than a $(T - 1) \times (T - 1)$ matrix to avoid misspecification errors from too many instruments (Roodman, 2009). There still exist some concerns regarding potential overidentification due to the number of instruments stemming from the large time variable (188 years). While the Hansen J-statistic implies a properly identified model, the high number of instruments may reduce the efficacy of the Hansen test to properly measure the elimination of all aspects of endogeneity from the modeled equation.

Using a one-step difference GMM analysis, the coefficients on the potentially endogenous variable have largely maintained their specificity in terms of statistical significance ($p < 0.01$).

The GMM Dynamic Panel Data first differences analysis reflects that, even accounting and adjusting for endogeneity concerns, the Systemic Concentration explanatory variable maintains its coefficient magnitude and statistical significance across multiple specifications and multiple measures of system concentration.

Extending this analysis to the systemic tests yields similar results. As this is not panel data, a 1:1 replication of the country-technology-year data GMM analysis would be inappropriate. With that, we ran a Continuously-Updating Generalized Method of Moments Estimator (CUE-GMM) to address potential endogeneity. Using the mean of the Change in Technology Adoption level (by year) as the dependent variable and instrumenting with the number of lags of the dependent variable (by year) at which evidence of autocorrelation was potentially present to address endogeneity, the magnitude of the coefficient of the Systemic Concentration variable increases in magnitude and remains statistically significant at the $p < 0.01$ level for all models without additional covariates. Inclusion of the Polity2 (World Average) Score covariate to control for political change yields largely similar results.

In order to ensure that our models are properly specified, we included a series of checks on our analyses, including a GMM-CUE endogeneity test (difference of Sargan-Hansen statistics), Anderson-Rubin Wald test for weak instruments, and reported the Kleibergen-Paap rk Wald F Statistic. Further, we constructed augmented confidence sets addressing potential coverage distortions if there exists weak instrument identification to ensure that our instrument strength is not misreported (stemming from heteroskedasticity or autocorrelation). Even given these conservative confidence sets, our systemic concentration variable coefficient maintained statistical significance at the $p < 0.01$ level. Measuring systemic concentration through the number of viable great power coalitions reflects weak instrument identification when including the Polity2 World Average covariate, as shown in the low Kleibergen-Paap rk Wald F Statistic and the unbounded Two-Step Identification Robust Confidence Set. With that, both the maintained negative and statistically significant coefficient on the measure of systemic concentration in nearly all model combinations and the additional checks to ensure proper model specification should address any endogeneity concerns.

Table S11: Generalized Method of Moments Estimations

(a) GMM Dynamic Panel Data One Step Difference

| Country-Technology-Year Tests | | Dependent Variable: Δ Technology Adoption Level | |
|---|----------------------|--|----------------------|
| Syscon (Singer 1972) | -0.283*** (0.059) | -0.181*** (0.038) | -0.116*** (0.025) |
| C4 | | | |
| Viable Great Power Coalitions | | 0.000 (0.000) | 0.000 (0.000) |
| Spatial Distance to Technology | -0.022*** (0.006) | -0.023*** (0.006) | -0.012 (0.009) |
| Polity2 Score | 0.002*** (0.001) | 0.002*** (0.001) | 0.003*** (0.000) |
| War (Lagged 1 year) | -0.009*** (0.003) | -0.008*** (0.003) | -0.011*** (0.003) |
| Civil War (Lagged 1 year) | -0.010*** (0.004) | -0.009*** (0.004) | -0.007* (0.004) |
| Δ Neighboring Countries' Military Spending | -0.000* (0.000) | -0.000* (0.000) | -0.000* (0.000) |
| Log(GDP per capita) | 0.007 (0.006) | 0.005 (0.006) | 0.007 (0.006) |
| N | 76488 | 72067 | 76488 |
| Hansen J-Statistic p-value | 0.627 | 0.997 | 0.612 |
| Arellano-Bond Test for AR(1) | -13.358*** | -13.079*** | -13.449*** |
| Arellano-Bond Test for AR(2) | 1.187 | 1.053 | 1.331 |
| Arellano-Bond Test for AR(3) | 0.666 | 0.696 | 0.678 |

Note: (Country-Technology-Clustered Standard Errors in Parentheses) *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

(b) Continuously Updating Generalized Method of Moments Estimator

| Systemic Tests | | Dependent Variable: Δ Technology Adoption Level | | | |
|--|--|--|----------------------|----------------------|----------------------|
| Syscon (Singer 1972) | | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) |
| | | -0.751*** (0.041) | | | -0.618*** (0.066) |
| C4 | | | -0.335*** (0.016) | | -0.291*** (0.025) |
| Viable Great Power Coalitions | | | | 0.009*** (0.001) | |
| Polity2 Score (World Average) | | | | | 0.001** (0.001) |
| Constant | | 0.258*** (0.013) | 0.221*** (0.010) | -0.041*** (0.006) | 0.218*** (0.019) |
| N | | 179 | 183 | 179 | 183 |
| Endogeneity Test p-value (H_0 = Variable is exogenous) | | 0.000 | 0.000 | 0.000 | 0.000 |
| Hansen J-Statistic p-value (H_0 = Orthog. restrictions are valid) | | 0.891 | 0.561 | 0.972 | 0.528 |
| Kleibergen-Paap rk Wald F-Statistic | | 29.100 | 67.732 | 16.236 | 10.991 |
| Anderson-Rubin Wald test p-value (H_0 = Coef. of the endog. regressors = 0) | | 0.000 | 0.000 | 0.000 | 0.000 |
| Two-Step Identification Robust Confidence Sets | | [-0.885, -0.661] | [-0.388, -0.300] | [0.008, 0.012] | [-0.854, -0.488] |

Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01 (Robust Standard Errors in Parentheses)

9 Error Correction Model

Country-Technology-Year To address concerns regarding the spurious correlation associated with large-T time series analyses, we delineated the effects of transitory vs sustained changes in system concentration, adding a more substantial foundation to the initial Granger Causality results. To achieve this, we ran panel ARDL estimates with dynamic fixed effects as an Error Correction Model using our imputed dataset to avoid misspecification due to dropped panels stemming from missingness. Given the model in Equation 12, the reparameterized ARDL(p, q) error correction model is specified as:

$$\Delta Y_t = \theta[Y_{t-1} - \lambda' X_{t-1}] + \zeta \Delta \Gamma_t + \varphi + \epsilon_t \quad (1)$$

where θ is the speed of adjustment to equilibrium, λ' is a vector of long-run coefficients, X is a vector of variables integrated of the order $I(1)$, ζ is a vector of short-run dynamic coefficients, Γ is a vector of variables integrated of the order $I(0)$, φ is a constant, and ϵ is an error term. Running Fisher-style Dickey-Fuller Unit Root tests to test for stationarity in our data, we find non-stationarity in the Systemic Concentration variable in levels and stationarity in differences, and stationarity in all other included variables in levels.

Estimating optimal lag length by obtaining Schwartz Information Criteria for the non-stationary variables in each panel in our sample, the results suggest an ARDL(1,0) lag selection for each measurement of systemic concentration. We use a dynamic fixed-effects estimator for the error correction model results. The negative coefficient of the speed of adjustment to equilibrium implies an appropriate application of an ECM. The results, as detailed in Table S12, suggest that a permanent change in system concentration has an inverse effect on the equilibrium level of technology adoption, with its effect felt over multiple periods. This long-run causal impact of each measurement of Systemic Concentration is shown in the top panel, and the Error Correction Term in the bottom panel suggests a long-run convergence at a speed of roughly 61% in each case. In the short run, our model results suggest that there is no statistically significant effect of transitory, single period shocks to system concentration on technology adoption at the country-technology-year level. Given that the Systemic Concentration variable is negative and significant in both the long run and speed of adjustment to equilibrium, this suggests that there does not exist spurious long-run correlation.

Systemic Tests Extending the Error Correction Model analysis to the systemic level, and using the same general error correction model given in Equation 1 yields similar results. Again, the negative coefficient of the speed of adjustment to equilibrium implies an appropriate application of an ECM. Running Augmented Dickey Fuller Unit Root tests, we find unit root in levels and stationarity in differences with regards to Systemic Concentration.

Estimating optimal lag length by obtaining Schwartz Information Criteria for each variable, the results suggest an ARDL(4,0), ARDL(1,0), & ARDL(1,0) lag selection for Syscon, Viable Great Power Coalitions, & C4 as the measure of systemic concentration, respectively. Estimating the autoregressive distributed lag regression with the first difference of the dependent variable suggests a short run causal impact of System Concentration for each of our measures. To elaborate, given a one period shock negative shock to system concentration (i.e. a more competitive system) which would dissipate immediately in the subsequent period, we anticipate an inverse change in the rate of technology adoption at the systemic level. In the case of prolonged changes to system concentration, our results suggest that there too exists an inverse relationship with technology adoption. Although the speed of adjustment to equilibrium coefficient implies a long-run oscillating equilibrium level, the results imply that these permanent changes to system concentration still cause a shift in the equilibrium level of the rate of technology adoption. To further tease out a more meaningful understanding of the long-run coefficient, we run a set of bounds tests, as recommended by Pesaran, Shin, and Smith(5). The results suggest that our results implying a long-run causal effect are foundationally sound, as shown in the statistically significant F- and t-statistics.

Table S12: Error Correction Models

| Explanatory Variable | <i>Dependent Variable</i> Change in Technology Adoption | | | |
|--|--|----------------------------------|-------------------------|----------------------------------|
| | Country-Technology-Year | | Systemic | |
| | Syscon (Singer 1972) | Viable Great Power Coalitions | Syscon (Singer 1972) | Viable Great Power Coalitions |
| Long-Run | | | | |
| Systemic Concentration | -7.154*** (0.920) | 0.040*** (0.004) | -0.340** (0.159) | 0.003* (0.002) |
| | | -4.636*** (0.597) | | -0.169* (0.096) |
| Short-Run | | | | |
| Speed of Adjustment to Equilibrium | -0.610*** (0.019) | -0.608*** (0.019) | -1.718*** (0.268) | -1.399*** (0.083) |
| ΔSystemic Concentration | 0.411 (0.823) | 0.003 (0.005) | -0.586** (0.289) | 0.004* (0.002) |
| ΔSpatial Distance to Technology Adoption, lagged | -1.226*** (0.059) | -1.254*** (0.060) | -1.219*** (0.060) | |
| ΔPolity2 Score | 0.009** (0.005) | 0.013*** (0.005) | 0.008* (0.005) | |
| ΔWar (Lagged One Year) | -0.028 (0.050) | -0.025 (0.051) | -0.018 (0.050) | |
| ΔCivil War (Lagged One Year) | -0.048 (0.043) | -0.045 (0.042) | -0.045 (0.042) | |
| Constant | 2.281*** (0.123) | 0.809*** (0.036) | 0.193** (0.123) | 0.147* (0.079) |
| | | 2.561*** (0.148) | | |
| Pesaran, Shin, & Smith (2001) Bounds Test | | | | |
| F Statistic | | | 34.69*** | 210.10*** |
| t-statistic | | | -8.306*** | -20.55*** |

*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

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