SUPPLEMENTARY MATERIAL

SOCIAL REVOLUTION AND AUTHORITARIAN DURABILITY

By Jean Lachapelle, Steven Levitsky, Lucan A. Way, and Adam E. Casey

World Politics

doi: 10.1017/S0043887120000106

Replication data are available at:

## Appendix A

### Table A1: Correlation Table

<table>
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<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Rev</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>0.345</td>
<td>-0.155</td>
<td>-0.123</td>
<td>-0.021</td>
<td>0.218</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GDP</td>
<td>-0.014</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.176</td>
<td>0.251</td>
<td>0.599</td>
<td>-0.172</td>
<td>0.012</td>
<td>0.115</td>
<td>-0.094</td>
<td>-0.144</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Growth</td>
<td>-0.059</td>
<td>0.176</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.057</td>
<td>0.185</td>
<td>-0.055</td>
<td>-0.131</td>
<td>0.159</td>
<td>-0.023</td>
<td>-0.133</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pop</td>
<td>-0.012</td>
<td>0.251</td>
<td>0.057</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.399</td>
<td>-0.060</td>
<td>0.027</td>
<td>0.066</td>
<td>0.089</td>
<td>-0.046</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oil/Gas</td>
<td>0.005</td>
<td>0.599</td>
<td>0.185</td>
<td>0.399</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>-0.076</td>
<td>0.106</td>
<td>-0.034</td>
<td>0.017</td>
<td>-0.072</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Party</td>
<td>0.345</td>
<td>-0.172</td>
<td>-0.055</td>
<td>-0.060</td>
<td>-0.076</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>-0.228</td>
<td>-0.295</td>
<td>-0.050</td>
<td>0.346</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pers.</td>
<td>-0.155</td>
<td>0.012</td>
<td>-0.131</td>
<td>0.027</td>
<td>0.106</td>
<td>-0.228</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>-0.661</td>
<td>-0.112</td>
<td>0.010</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mil.</td>
<td>-0.123</td>
<td>0.115</td>
<td>0.159</td>
<td>0.066</td>
<td>-0.034</td>
<td>-0.295</td>
<td>-0.661</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>-0.065</td>
<td>-0.140</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mon.</td>
<td>-0.023</td>
<td>-0.094</td>
<td>-0.023</td>
<td>0.089</td>
<td>0.017</td>
<td>-0.050</td>
<td>-0.112</td>
<td>-0.065</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>-0.024</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Communist</td>
<td>0.218</td>
<td>-0.144</td>
<td>-0.133</td>
<td>-0.046</td>
<td>-0.072</td>
<td>0.346</td>
<td>0.010</td>
<td>-0.140</td>
<td>-0.024</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Foreign installed communist</td>
<td>-0.026</td>
<td>-0.162</td>
<td>-0.061</td>
<td>-0.022</td>
<td>-0.036</td>
<td>0.270</td>
<td>-0.051</td>
<td>-0.080</td>
<td>-0.013</td>
<td>0.568</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Notes:** An observation is an authoritarian regime. *Rev.* is a binary indicator for revolutionary regime. *GDP* denotes per capita GDP (logged) (source: Maddison 2018, as provided by Coppedge et al. 2019). *Growth* denotes GDP growth. *Pop.* denotes logged size of the population (source: COW NMC, v4.0, Singer 1988). *Oil/gas* denotes log(per capita value of oil and gas production +1) (Ross and Mahdavi 2015). *Party* is a binary indicator of whether the regime has a party element. *Pers.* is a binary indicator of whether the regime has a personalistic component. *Mil.* is a binary indicator of whether the regime is a pure military regime. *Mon.* is a binary indicator of whether the regime is a monarchy. *Communist* is a binary indicator of communist regime from Svolik (2012). *Foreign installed communist* (binary) denotes communist regimes installed by a foreign power.
Table A2: Cox Regressions with Time-Varying Covariates, Multiple Imputation

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Non-stratified</th>
<th>Stratified</th>
<th>Controlling for regime type (post-treatment)</th>
<th>Controlling for communism (post-treatment)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Revolution</td>
<td>−1.49***</td>
<td>−1.35***</td>
<td>−1.651***</td>
<td>−1.465***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.334)</td>
<td>(0.332)</td>
<td>(0.380)</td>
<td>(0.357)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Per Cap. GDP (log)</td>
<td>−0.119</td>
<td>−0.027</td>
<td>−0.004</td>
<td>−0.109</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.077)</td>
<td>(0.100)</td>
<td>(0.106)</td>
<td>(0.102)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GDP Growth</td>
<td>−2.029***</td>
<td>−2.076***</td>
<td>−2.387***</td>
<td>−2.541***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.738)</td>
<td>(0.759)</td>
<td>(0.832)</td>
<td>(0.875)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Population (log)</td>
<td>0.019</td>
<td>0.009</td>
<td>0.011</td>
<td>−0.036</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.043)</td>
<td>(0.045)</td>
<td>(0.049)</td>
<td>(0.050)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oil and gas prod. per cap. (log)</td>
<td>−0.051*</td>
<td>−0.026</td>
<td>−0.064**</td>
<td>−0.025</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.028)</td>
<td>(0.029)</td>
<td>(0.029)</td>
<td>(0.031)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Party</td>
<td>−0.900***</td>
<td>−0.949***</td>
<td>−0.828***</td>
<td>−0.774***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.194)</td>
<td>(0.202)</td>
<td>(0.209)</td>
<td>(0.210)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Personalist</td>
<td>−0.184</td>
<td>−0.192</td>
<td>−0.198</td>
<td>−0.208</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.205)</td>
<td>(0.213)</td>
<td>(0.210)</td>
<td>(0.211)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Military</td>
<td>0.794***</td>
<td>0.716***</td>
<td>0.689***</td>
<td>0.693***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.232)</td>
<td>(0.239)</td>
<td>(0.239)</td>
<td>(0.240)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Monarchy</td>
<td>−1.617***</td>
<td>−1.444***</td>
<td>−1.470***</td>
<td>−1.470***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.357)</td>
<td>(0.349)</td>
<td>(0.347)</td>
<td>(0.348)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Foreign installed communist</td>
<td>−0.846*</td>
<td>−0.826</td>
<td>−0.826</td>
<td>−0.826</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.056)</td>
<td>(0.052)</td>
<td>(0.052)</td>
<td>(0.052)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Communist</td>
<td>−0.629**</td>
<td>−0.230</td>
<td>−0.230</td>
<td>−0.230</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.265)</td>
<td>(0.343)</td>
<td>(0.343)</td>
<td>(0.343)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

An observation is an authoritarian regimes. Missing values were imputed using the Amelia routine (20 imputations). We used heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors for each analysis and combined the results using Rubin’s rules. Likelihood ratio tests were performed following Meng and Rubin (1992).
Table A3: Cox Regressions with Time-Varying Covariates, Listwise Deletion

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Non-stratified</th>
<th>Stratified</th>
<th>Controlling for regime type (post-treatment)</th>
<th>Controlling for communism (post-treatment)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(1)</td>
<td>(2)</td>
<td>(3)</td>
<td>(4)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Revolution</td>
<td>−1.224***</td>
<td>−1.226***</td>
<td>−1.468***</td>
<td>−1.464***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.134)</td>
<td>(0.340)</td>
<td>(0.394)</td>
<td>(0.386)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Per Cap. GDP (log)</td>
<td>−0.099</td>
<td>−0.120</td>
<td>−0.245**</td>
<td>−0.087</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.079)</td>
<td>(0.113)</td>
<td>(0.119)</td>
<td>(0.122)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GDP Growth</td>
<td>−1.882***</td>
<td>−1.483*</td>
<td>−1.037</td>
<td>−1.852**</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.721)</td>
<td>(0.772)</td>
<td>(0.899)</td>
<td>(0.840)</td>
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<td>Population (log)</td>
<td>0.016</td>
<td>0.072</td>
<td>0.104*</td>
<td>0.060</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.047)</td>
<td>(0.054)</td>
<td>(0.057)</td>
<td>(0.055)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oil and gas prod. per cap. (log)</td>
<td>−0.020</td>
<td>0.005</td>
<td>−0.037</td>
<td>0.004</td>
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<td></td>
<td>(0.032)</td>
<td>(0.033)</td>
<td>(0.014)</td>
<td>(0.014)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Party</td>
<td>−0.906***</td>
<td>−0.823***</td>
<td>−0.683**</td>
<td>−0.646**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.265)</td>
<td>(0.269)</td>
<td>(0.282)</td>
<td>(0.283)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Personalist</td>
<td>−0.353</td>
<td>−0.337</td>
<td>−0.321</td>
<td>−0.338</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.274)</td>
<td>(0.292)</td>
<td>(0.292)</td>
<td>(0.295)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Military</td>
<td>0.554*</td>
<td>0.658**</td>
<td>0.653**</td>
<td>0.647**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.316)</td>
<td>(0.322)</td>
<td>(0.326)</td>
<td>(0.328)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Monarchy</td>
<td>−1.158**</td>
<td>−1.012**</td>
<td>−1.000**</td>
<td>−1.010**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.559)</td>
<td>(0.424)</td>
<td>(0.421)</td>
<td>(0.421)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Communist</td>
<td>−0.616**</td>
<td>−0.222</td>
<td>−0.222</td>
<td>−0.307</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.307)</td>
<td>(0.305)</td>
<td>(0.305)</td>
<td>(0.305)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Foreign installed communist</td>
<td>−0.781</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.558)</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stratified by geographic region</td>
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<td>No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
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<td></td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
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<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
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<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
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<td>p-value of significance test</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>0.00</td>
</tr>
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</table>

Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

An observation is a country-year. All variables are lagged one year. We used listwise deletion to deal with missing observations.
Table A4: Robustness Tests, Cox Regressions After Discarding Longest Surviving Revolutionary Regimes

a) Without regime type controls

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
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<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Revolution</td>
<td>−1.254*** (0.344)</td>
<td>−1.283*** (0.378)</td>
<td>−1.180*** (0.366)</td>
<td>−1.043*** (0.353)</td>
<td>−0.885*** (0.334)</td>
<td>−0.762** (0.318)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Per Capita GDP (log)</td>
<td>−0.001 (0.097)</td>
<td>−0.0003 (0.096)</td>
<td>−0.004 (0.096)</td>
<td>−0.006 (0.096)</td>
<td>0.003 (0.097)</td>
<td>0.001 (0.096)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GDP Growth (pct.)</td>
<td>0.124 (0.770)</td>
<td>0.135 (0.770)</td>
<td>0.153 (0.765)</td>
<td>0.179 (0.763)</td>
<td>0.181 (0.759)</td>
<td>0.203 (0.753)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Population (log)</td>
<td>−0.026 (0.064)</td>
<td>−0.027 (0.064)</td>
<td>−0.021 (0.065)</td>
<td>−0.020 (0.064)</td>
<td>−0.021 (0.064)</td>
<td>−0.021 (0.065)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oil and gas prod. per cap. (log)</td>
<td>−0.047 (0.031)</td>
<td>−0.047 (0.030)</td>
<td>−0.048 (0.031)</td>
<td>−0.049 (0.031)</td>
<td>−0.052* (0.031)</td>
<td>−0.051 (0.031)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Stratified by geographic region: No
Stratified by event number: No
N observations: 354
N breakdowns: 299
Multiple imputation: Yes
p-value of significance test: 0.000

b) With regime type controls

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
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<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Revolution</td>
<td>−0.835** (0.387)</td>
<td>−0.865** (0.421)</td>
<td>−0.768* (0.414)</td>
<td>−0.619 (0.405)</td>
<td>−0.482 (0.411)</td>
<td>−0.345 (0.399)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Per Capita GDP (log)</td>
<td>−0.127 (0.102)</td>
<td>−0.126 (0.102)</td>
<td>−0.130 (0.102)</td>
<td>−0.133 (0.103)</td>
<td>−0.122 (0.104)</td>
<td>−0.126 (0.103)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GDP Growth (pct.)</td>
<td>−0.070 (0.783)</td>
<td>−0.061 (0.785)</td>
<td>−0.032 (0.784)</td>
<td>0.009 (0.783)</td>
<td>0.025 (0.778)</td>
<td>0.061 (0.776)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Population (log)</td>
<td>−0.079 (0.061)</td>
<td>−0.078 (0.060)</td>
<td>−0.072 (0.061)</td>
<td>−0.072 (0.061)</td>
<td>−0.073 (0.061)</td>
<td>−0.073 (0.061)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oil and gas prod. per cap. (log)</td>
<td>−0.0004 (0.035)</td>
<td>−0.00 (0.035)</td>
<td>−0.002 (0.035)</td>
<td>−0.004 (0.035)</td>
<td>−0.008 (0.036)</td>
<td>−0.006 (0.036)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Party</td>
<td>−1.015*** (0.223)</td>
<td>−1.031*** (0.222)</td>
<td>−1.032*** (0.223)</td>
<td>−1.031*** (0.223)</td>
<td>−1.007*** (0.225)</td>
<td>−1.005*** (0.225)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Military</td>
<td>0.740*** (0.262)</td>
<td>0.723*** (0.260)</td>
<td>0.720*** (0.260)</td>
<td>0.722*** (0.261)</td>
<td>0.754*** (0.264)</td>
<td>0.756*** (0.264)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Monarchy</td>
<td>−1.607*** (0.397)</td>
<td>−1.606*** (0.388)</td>
<td>−1.606*** (0.389)</td>
<td>−1.608*** (0.390)</td>
<td>−1.576*** (0.393)</td>
<td>−1.580*** (0.393)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Personalist</td>
<td>−0.191 (0.226)</td>
<td>−0.206 (0.224)</td>
<td>−0.207 (0.224)</td>
<td>−0.206 (0.224)</td>
<td>−0.168 (0.230)</td>
<td>−0.168 (0.230)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Stratified by geographic region: No
Stratified by event number: No
N observations: 354
N breakdowns: 299
Multiple imputation: Yes
p-value of significance test: 0.017

Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

An observation is an authoritarian regime. All variables except revolution are measured one year before regime onset. Model 1 shows results after discarding, Mexico (1915-2000), Model 2 is after discarding, Mexico (1915-2000) and the U.S.S.R. (1917-1991). Model 3 is after discarding, Mexico (1915-2000), the U.S.S.R. (1917-1991), and China (1949). Model 4 is after discarding Mexico (1915-2000), the U.S.S.R. (1917-1991), China (1949) and Vietnam (1954). Model 5 is after discarding Mexico (1915-2000), the U.S.S.R. (1917-1991), China (1949), Vietnam (1954) and Cuba (1959). Model 6 is after discarding Mexico (1915-2000), the U.S.S.R. (1917-1991), China (1949), Vietnam (1954), Cuba (1959), and Algeria (1962). Results are shown without (top) and with (bottom) controls for regime type. Missing values were imputed using the Amelia routine (20 imputations). We used heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors for each analysis and combined the results using Rubin’s rules.
Table A5: Robustness, Cox Regressions After Including Finland (1918) and Hungary (1919)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Non-stratified</th>
<th>Stratified</th>
<th>Controlling for regime type (post-treatment)</th>
<th>Controlling for communism (post-treatment)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Revolution</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-1.064***</td>
<td>-1.041***</td>
<td>-1.387***</td>
<td>-1.296***</td>
<td>-0.657**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.309)</td>
<td>(0.314)</td>
<td>(0.387)</td>
<td>(0.146)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Per Capita GDP (log)</td>
<td>-0.076</td>
<td>0.008</td>
<td>-0.024</td>
<td>0.025</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.081)</td>
<td>(0.097)</td>
<td>(0.103)</td>
<td>(0.100)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GDP Growth (pct.)</td>
<td>0.056</td>
<td>0.066</td>
<td>0.092</td>
<td>0.387</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.759)</td>
<td>(0.764)</td>
<td>(0.826)</td>
<td>(0.825)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Population (log)</td>
<td>-0.052</td>
<td>-0.031</td>
<td>-0.034</td>
<td>-0.014</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.062)</td>
<td>(0.061)</td>
<td>(0.065)</td>
<td>(0.060)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oil and gas prod. per cap. (log)</td>
<td>-0.050</td>
<td>-0.033</td>
<td>-0.062*</td>
<td>-0.005</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.031)</td>
<td>(0.034)</td>
<td>(0.032)</td>
<td>(0.036)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Party</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>-1.000***</td>
<td>-0.973***</td>
<td>-0.873***</td>
<td>-0.828***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.219)</td>
<td>(0.234)</td>
<td>(0.219)</td>
<td>(0.219)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Personalist</td>
<td>-0.190</td>
<td>-0.204</td>
<td>-0.208</td>
<td>-0.223</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.221)</td>
<td>(0.222)</td>
<td>(0.219)</td>
<td>(0.219)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Military</td>
<td>0.731***</td>
<td>0.644**</td>
<td>0.626**</td>
<td>0.625**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.256)</td>
<td>(0.262)</td>
<td>(0.263)</td>
<td>(0.262)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Monarchy</td>
<td>-1.633***</td>
<td>-1.476***</td>
<td>-1.489***</td>
<td>-1.491***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.398)</td>
<td>(0.393)</td>
<td>(0.397)</td>
<td>(0.398)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Foreign installed communist</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>-0.741*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(0.249)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Communist</td>
<td>-0.499**</td>
<td>-0.163</td>
<td>-0.163</td>
<td>(0.244)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.204)</td>
<td>(0.244)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Stratified by geographic region</th>
<th>No</th>
<th>No</th>
<th>Yes</th>
<th>No</th>
<th>No</th>
<th>No</th>
<th>No</th>
<th>No</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Stratified by event number</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N observations</td>
<td>357</td>
<td>357</td>
<td>357</td>
<td>357</td>
<td>357</td>
<td>357</td>
<td>357</td>
<td>357</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N breakdowns</td>
<td>302</td>
<td>302</td>
<td>302</td>
<td>302</td>
<td>302</td>
<td>302</td>
<td>302</td>
<td>302</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Multiple imputation</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>p-value of significance test</td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td>0.040</td>
<td>0.018</td>
<td>0.057</td>
<td>0.021</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

An observation is an authoritarian regime. Control variables are measured one year before the onset of the regime. The analysis includes Finland (1918-1918) and Hungary (1919-1919). These cases do not enter the dataset of authoritarian regimes in the main analysis because these governments were not in power on January of the next calendar year. Missing values were imputed using the Amelia routine (20 imputations). We used heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors for each analysis and combined the results using Rubin’s rules.
Table A6: Cox Regressions with Bootstrapped Standard Errors

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>(1)</th>
<th>(2)</th>
<th>(3)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Revolution</td>
<td>$-0.998^{**}$</td>
<td>$-0.849^*$</td>
<td>$-1.062^{**}$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.458)</td>
<td>(0.468)</td>
<td>(0.497)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Party</td>
<td>$-1.012^{***}$</td>
<td>$-0.903^{***}$</td>
<td>$-0.874^{***}$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.244)</td>
<td>(0.246)</td>
<td>(0.247)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Personalist</td>
<td>$-0.209$</td>
<td>$-0.213$</td>
<td>$-0.228$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.238)</td>
<td>(0.240)</td>
<td>(0.242)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Military</td>
<td>$0.655^{**}$</td>
<td>$0.646^{**}$</td>
<td>$0.640^{**}$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.278)</td>
<td>(0.281)</td>
<td>(0.281)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Monarchy</td>
<td>$-1.684^{***}$</td>
<td>$-1.703^{***}$</td>
<td>$-1.721^{***}$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.446)</td>
<td>(0.455)</td>
<td>(0.459)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Communist</td>
<td>$-0.533^{**}$</td>
<td>$-0.174$</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.213)</td>
<td>(0.285)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Foreign installed communist</td>
<td></td>
<td>$-0.700$</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(0.538)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>355</th>
<th>355</th>
<th>355</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>N observations</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N breakdowns</td>
<td>300</td>
<td>300</td>
<td>300</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stratified by geographic region</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stratified by event number</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$p$-value of significance test</td>
<td>0.002</td>
<td>0.011</td>
<td>0.017</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: *$p<0.1$; **$p<0.05$; ***$p<0.01$

An observation is an authoritarian regime. The standard errors were computed with the bootstrap (100,000 replicates).
### Table A7: Robustness, Stratified Cox Regressions by Country

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>(1)</th>
<th>(2)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Revolution</td>
<td>-1.539*</td>
<td>-1.538*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.635)</td>
<td>(0.636)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Per Capita GDP (log)</td>
<td>-0.017</td>
<td>-0.024</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.159)</td>
<td>(0.182)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GDP Growth (pct.)</td>
<td>0.080</td>
<td>0.066</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(1.176)</td>
<td>(1.185)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Population (log)</td>
<td>0.074</td>
<td>0.074</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.097)</td>
<td>(0.100)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oil and gas prod. per cap. (log)</td>
<td>0.005</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.050)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| Stratified by geographic region | No | No |
| Stratified by event number     | No | No |
| N observations                 | 355| 355|
| N breakdowns                   | 300| 300|
| Multiple imputation            | Yes| Yes|
| p-value of significance test   | 0.004| 0.004|

**Note:** *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Baseline hazards are stratified by country. An observation is an authoritarian regime. Control variables are measured one year before the beginning of the regime. Missing values were imputed using the Amelia routine (20 imputations). We used heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors for each analysis and combined the results using Rubin’s rules.
Table A8: Cox Regression of Coup Attempts

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Coefficient</th>
<th>Standard Error</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Revolution</td>
<td>-0.563**</td>
<td>(0.270)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Per Cap. GDP (log)</td>
<td>-0.142</td>
<td>(0.098)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GDP Growth</td>
<td>-1.381**</td>
<td>(0.630)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Population (log)</td>
<td>-0.067</td>
<td>(0.047)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oil and gas prod. per cap. (log)</td>
<td>0.021</td>
<td>(0.029)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Stratified by geographic region: No
Stratified by event number: No
N observations: 4665
N events: 270
Multiple imputation: Yes
p-value of significance test: 0.026

Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

An observation is a country-year. A failure event is any country and year during which at least one coup attempt occurred. Control variables are lagged one year. The data on coup attempts are from Powell and Thyne, v2017.11.28. The time variable is the number of years since last coup attempt or the beginning of the regime. The last row shows the p-value of a likelihood ratio test under the null hypothesis that revolution does not improve the fit of the model relative to an equivalent model that does not control for revolution. Missing values were imputed using the Amelia routine (20 imputations). We used heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors for each analysis and combined the results using Rubin’s rules.


**Sensitivity to alternative codings**

We redid the analysis after changing the codings for plausibly liminal cases. We generated 31 alternative datasets that correspond to all combinations of the following recodings: treating South Yemen (1967-1990) as revolutionary; treating Rwanda (1994-) as non-revolutionary; treating North Korea (1948-) as revolutionary; treating Zimbabwe (1980-) as revolutionary; treating the coup of 1992 as regime breakdown in Algeria; including revolutionary Finland and Hungary in the regime dataset. Figures A1, A2, and A3 show revolution coefficient estimates along with 90% (thick line) and 95% (narrow line) intervals from Cox regressions that use these 31 alternative datasets.\(^1\) Figure A1 uses the benchmark model specification (Model 2, Table 3), Figure A2 controls for regime type (Model 6, Table 3) and Figure A3 controls for regime type and communism (Model 8, Table 3).

\(^1\)In the figures below, NK refers to North Korea, SY refers to South Yemen, RW refers to Rwanda, ZM refers to Zimbabwe, HU/FI refers to Hungary and Finland. Thus the label NK+SY+RW indicates that North Korea, South Yemen, and Rwanda were recoded.
Figure A1: Cox models, alternative codings, benchmark model specification
Figure A2: Cox models, alternative codings, controlling for regime type
Figure A3: Cox models, alternative codings, controlling for regime type and communism

Effect of Revolution on Risk of Breakdown when using alternative codings
Figure A4: Covariate Balance Before and After Adjustment

GDP per capita (log)

Previous democracy

Previous party

Previous military

Previous personalist

Previous monarchy

War

Mean Differences

Sample

Range across imputations

Unadjusted

Adjusted
Figure A5: Effect of Revolution on Military Size, Synthetic Control Method