Fair is Fair:
Supplementary Appendix

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May 9, 2014

Contents

1 Measuring social preferences

1.1 Instrumentation

We measure social preferences using the Triple-Dominance Measure of Van Lange et al. (1997).

> *In this part of the survey we ask you to imagine that you have been randomly paired with another person, whom we will refer to simply as the "Other." This other person is someone you do not know and that you will not knowingly meet in the future. Both you and the "Other" person will be making choices by circling either the letter A, B, or C. Your own choices will produce points for both yourself and the "Other" person. Likewise, the other's choice will produce points for him/her and for you.*

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Every point has value: the more points you receive, the better for you, and the more points the "Other" receives, the better for him/her. Here's an example of how this task works:

	A	B	C
You get	500	500	550
Other gets	100	500	300

In this example, if you chose A you would receive 500 points and the other would receive 100 points; if you chose B, you would receive 500 points and the other 500; and if you chose C, you would receive 550 points and the other 300. So, you see that your choice influences both the number of points you receive and the number of points the other receives.

Before you begin making choices, please keep in mind that there are no right or wrong answers?choose the option that you, for whatever reason, prefer most. Also, remember that the points have value; the more of them you accumulate, the better for you. Likewise, from the "other's" point of view, the more points s/he accumulates, the better for him/her. Your answers here won't affect any other part of the survey.

For each of the nine choice situations, circle A, B, or C, depending on which column you prefer most:

1.	A	B	C
You get	480	540	480
Other gets	80	280	480

2.	A	B	C
You get	560	500	500
Other gets	300	500	100

3.	A	B	C
You get	520	520	580
Other gets	520	120	320

4.	A	B	C
You get	500	560	490
Other gets	100	300	490

5.	A	B	C
You get	560	500	490
Other gets	300	500	90

6.	A	B	C
You get	500	500	570
Other gets	500	100	300

7.	A	B	C
You get	510	560	510
Other gets	510	300	110

8.	A	B	C
You get	550	500	500
Other gets	300	100	500

9.	A	B	C
You get	480	490	540
Other gets	100	490	300

For each choice situation, one of these response options represents a *prosocial* choice (responses 1c, 2b, 3a, 4c, 5b, 6a, 7a, 8c, and 9b), an *individualistic* choice (responses 1b, 2a, 3c, 4b, 5a, 6c, 7b, 8a, and 9c) and a

competitive choice (responses 1a, 2c, 3b, 4a, 5c, 6b, 7c, 8b, and 9a). Both individualistic and competitive orientations are forms of proself orientations, but individualistic orientations maximize what political scientists would call "absolute gains", and competitive orientations maximize "relative gains": subjects with a competitive social value orientation would rather receive a smaller payoff (e.g. 500 rather than 570) if it meant their opponent received even less (e.g. 100 rather than 300).[3] Van Lange et al. (1997) classify participants' social value orientations if at least six of their responses are of the same type. We deviate from this approach in two respects. First, following Kuhlman and Marshello (1975), Kuhlman and Wimberley (1976), and McClintock and Liebrand (1988), we lump together competitive and individualistic responses into one proself category, since these two types of proselfs tend to display very similar behavior, and we have little theoretical riding on the distinction between absolute and relative gains. Second, to avoid missing data, we classify a participant as prosocial or proself if a simple majority of its response options falls into one of these camps. One might be concerned about adopting a dichotomous measure of social value orientation rather than employing continuous scores (since such an approach treats strong prosocials, for example, as equivalent to moderately strong prosocials), but we note three considerations. First, in as much as this modeling decision dilutes our social value orientation measures, it produces more conservative tests. Second, the distribution of each of these social value orientation scores are highly bimodal: most respondents either provided nine proself responses, or zero. Finally, we replicate the analyses using continuous measures of social value orientations in the section below, and find the results hold.

1.2 Results using continuous measure of social preferences

First, to replicate the finding that prosocials make more generous offers than proselfs when in positions of strength, but using a continuous measure of social preferences, we estimate 1000 clustered bootstrapped regression models in which we regress offer size on the number of prosocial responses chosen in the decomposed games, such that higher values indicate stronger levels of prosocial preferences. As in the main text, we estimate separate models for first round offers (when the proposer is in a position of weakness) and subsequent offers (when the proposer is in a position of strength), for both the first and second half of the matches. Figure 1 shows results analogous to Figure 1 in the main text: social preferences have no significant impact on offer size when the proposer is in a position of weakness, but participants with higher prosocial preferences make

[3] On absolute versus relative gains, see Grieco (1993).

more generous offers when in a position of strength, particularly in the first half ($p < 0.002$) of the matches; as was the case with a dichotomous measure of social preferences, the effect is less stark in the second half of matches ($p < 0.13$).

Figure 1: Prosocials give more generous offers in positions of strength (continuous measure of social preferences)



Note: Distributions derived from 1000 clustered bootstrapped regression models on the impact of social preferences on offer size.

Second, to replicate the finding that prosocials are more generous in accepting offers in positions of strength, we estimate 1000 clustered bootstrapped logistic regression models in which we regress offer acceptance on the same continuous measure of social preferences described above, also controlling for the size of the offer. Figure 2 shows results analogous to Figure 2 in the main text: even controlling for offer size, when in positions of strength individuals with higher levels of prosocial preferences are more likely to accept offers than individuals with lower levels of prosocial preferences.[4] This is true both in the first ($p < 0.018$) and the second half ($p < 0.07$) of matches. When in positions of weakness, however, prosocials strongly resemble proselfs in the first half of matches, and actually become less generous than proselfs in the second half. Thus, we find the same pattern at work with continuous measures of social preferences than we do with dichotomous ones.

Finally, Table 1 replicates Table 1 from the main text for a series of mixed effect logic models modeling

[4]For presentational purposes, we show the distribution of coefficient estimates rather than predicted probabilities, since doing so would require us to specify particular cutpoints determining high and low levels of prosocial preferences, thereby defeating the purpose of a continuous measure. Nonetheless, because of the heavily bimodal distribution of social preferences in our sample, plots depicting predicted probabilities of acceptance strongly resemble Figure 2 from the main text.

Figure 2: Prosocials are more generous in accepting offers in positions of strength (continuous measure of social preferences)



Note: Distributions derived from 1000 clustered bootstrapped logistic regression models on the impact of social preferences on offer acceptance, controlling for offer size.

the probability of bargaining failure as a function of each player's characteristics, but this time using the same continuous measure of social preferences described above.[5] Once again, the results hold.

[5]Tables are generated using the `stargazer` package in `R` (Hlavac, 2013).

Table 1: Dyadic determinants of bargaining failure (continuous measure of social preferences)

	Round 1 (1)	Rounds 2+ (2)	Round 1 (3)	Rounds 2+ (4)	Round 1 (5)	Rounds 2+ (6)
Player A characteristics						
Prosocial	−0.033	−0.030	−0.033	−0.031	−0.063	−0.042
	(0.021)	(0.029)	(0.022)	(0.036)	(0.049)	(0.079)
Cognition	−0.878**	0.692	−0.874**	0.724	−0.866**	0.800
	(0.432)	(0.647)	(0.435)	(0.692)	(0.436)	(0.657)
Male	−0.391**	0.033	−0.386**	0.031	−0.390**	0.052
	(0.165)	(0.219)	(0.166)	(0.239)	(0.166)	(0.223)
Age	0.070	−0.027	0.067	−0.028	0.067	−0.018
	(0.043)	(0.060)	(0.043)	(0.065)	(0.043)	(0.061)
White	0.443***	−0.318	0.454***	−0.362	0.451***	−0.360
	(0.171)	(0.248)	(0.172)	(0.264)	(0.173)	(0.252)
Taken Economics	−0.381**	−0.278	−0.371**	−0.290	−0.369**	−0.278
	(0.165)	(0.237)	(0.166)	(0.254)	(0.167)	(0.239)
Prosocial opponents					0.592	1.078
					(0.617)	(0.975)
Prosocial × opponents					0.076	0.035
					(0.111)	(0.180)
Player B characteristics						
Prosocial	−0.061**	0.003	−0.059**	0.010	−0.132**	0.151*
	(0.025)	(0.034)	(0.025)	(0.034)	(0.055)	(0.081)
Cognition	−0.114	−1.082	−0.074	−1.259*	−0.097	−1.199*
	(0.495)	(0.685)	(0.501)	(0.684)	(0.509)	(0.689)
Male	0.631***	−0.036	0.637***	−0.014	0.643***	−0.030
	(0.191)	(0.271)	(0.193)	(0.271)	(0.196)	(0.271)
Age	0.009	−0.046	0.012	−0.048	0.006	−0.033
	(0.049)	(0.071)	(0.050)	(0.071)	(0.051)	(0.072)
White	−0.189	0.407	−0.199	0.516**	−0.177	0.403
	(0.195)	(0.261)	(0.197)	(0.263)	(0.199)	(0.262)
Taken Economics	0.155	−0.399	0.151	−0.431*	0.153	−0.473*
	(0.193)	(0.257)	(0.195)	(0.258)	(0.198)	(0.258)
Prosocial opponents					−1.015	0.536
					(0.639)	(0.891)
Prosocial × opponents					0.188	−0.370*
					(0.121)	(0.190)
Second Half	−0.253**	−0.095				
	(0.119)	(0.211)				
Constant	−0.569	1.528	−0.741	1.586	−0.466	0.452
	(1.226)	(1.768)	(1.237)	(1.839)	(1.269)	(1.842)
N	1,443	520	1,443	520	1,443	520
AIC	1,881.626	673.272	1,894.242	683.776	1,897.203	684.624
BIC	1,966.018	737.079	2,005.006	773.107	2,029.065	786.715

*p < .1; **p < .05; ***p < .01. Coefficient estimates from mixed effects logit models.

2 *Prosocials are less likely to exploit positions of strength*

Figure 3: Prosocials are less likely to exploit their increase in bargaining power



Note: Probability distributions derived from 1000 clustered bootstraps.

As shown in Figure 3, prosocials (measured here using the standard dichotomous measure of social preferences employed in the text) decrease their offer size by an average of 3.6 points across both half of the matches, compared to proselfs' 4.1 point decrease ($p < 0.053$). In positions of weakness, players with different social value orientations converge, as predicted in H2. For the first half of the matches, proselfs in a position of weakness offer an average of 5.46 points to their opponent, while prosocials in the same position offer an average of 5.75 points. Thus, in positions of weakness in the first half of the matches, prosocials are actually slightly more generous than proselfs ($p < 0.071$).

3 *Specifying the dyadic model*

3.1 Oneway ANOVAs and likelihood ratio tests

Because of the complex structure of the data — in which we have rounds nested in players nested in dyads nested in experimental sessions — before estimating the mixed effect logistic regressions in the main text we first estimate a series of oneway ANOVA models to partition the variance across these different factors, to explore how much of the variation in bargaining failure exists at the round level versus the player level, and so

on. Because of the shift in bargaining power between the first round of each match (when player B is in position of strength) and any subsequent rounds (when player A is in a position of strength), we estimate two different oneway ANOVAs for first round and subsequent round observations, respectively, with random effects for each player, dyad, and experimental session. The variance components, depicted in Table 2, show no evidence of session or dyad-level effects, but considerable variation at the level of individual players themselves.[6] The player-level intraclass correlation ($\rho_0 = \frac{\tau_{0A}+\tau_{0B}}{\sigma^2+\tau^2_{0A}+\tau^2_{0B}+\tau^2_1+\tau^2_2}$) shows that 60.5% of the variance in bargaining failure in the first round, and 37.9% of the variance in bargaining failure in the second round, stems from player-level characteristics. Attributes of Player B — the recipient choosing whether to accept or reject the offer — accounts for nearly two-thirds of the player-level variation in first round offers ($\frac{\tau^2_{0B}}{\tau^2_{0A}+\tau^2_{0B}} = 0.647$), and almost all of the player-level variation in second round offers $\frac{\tau^2_{0B}}{\tau^2_{0A}+\tau^2_{0B}} = 0.953$), showing that regardless of bargaining power, the characteristics of the recipient of the offer looms the largest in predicting bargaining failure. As a result, the mixed effect logit models estimated for round 1 in the main text only include random effects for player A and player B, and the models estimated for rounds 2+ in the main text only include random effects for player B, the omitted random effects deemed to fail to improve model fit by a series of likelihood ratio tests.[7]

Table 2: Variance components from oneway ANOVAs

	Round 1	Rounds 2+
Residual variance (σ^2)	1.000	1.000
Player A (τ^2_{0A})	0.539	0.030
Player B (τ^2_{0B})	0.990	0.618
Dyad (τ^2_1)	0.000	0.000
Session (τ^2_2)	0.000	0.064

3.2 Social preferences have an additive rather than multiplicative effect

The absence of significant dyadic variance components previews the extent to which the effect of social preferences have an additive rather than multiplicative effect, as discussed in the main text. Indeed, when supplementary models to Table 1 in the main text are estimated with interaction effects between each side's social

[6] Note that the `lme4` package fixes the residual variance for mixed logit models to 1.

[7] For first-round offers, dropping the random effect on player B significantly reduces model fit ($\chi^2 = 81.271, p < 0.000$), as does removing the random effect on player A ($\chi^2 = 32.924, p < 0.000$), while adding a dyadic random effect offers no improvement whatsoever ($\chi^2 = 0, p < 1$). For second-round-and-up offers, dropping the random effect on player B once again significantly reduces model fit ($\chi^2 = 8.754, p < 0.003$), but neither a random effect on player A ($\chi^2 = 0.019, p < 0.892$) nor on each dyad ($\chi^2 = 0, p < 1$) improve fit at all.

preference, the interaction term fails to reach statistical significance, as shown in Table 3. Prosocial dyads thus experience lower rates of bargaining failure than proself ones, but not because prosocials play differently when they are faced up against proselfs — indeed, as we show below, the behavioral change we see in prosocials accrues through time rather than occurring instantaneously — but rather simply due to additive effects across each member of the dyad. The absence of significant dyadic differences is not surprising given the brief nature of players' interactions: the modal dyad experiences just one round of the game together, since a match only continues onto a second round if the first round offer is accepted, and the probabilistic stopping rule means that even when an offer is accepted, there is a 50% change the match will terminate rather than continue to another round.

Table 3: Interactive determinants of bargaining failure

	Round 1 (1)	Rounds 2+ (2)	Round 1 (3)	Rounds 2+ (4)	Round 1 (5)	Rounds 2+ (6)
Player A characteristics						
Prosocial	−0.231	−0.207	−0.135	−0.212	0.012	−0.340
	(0.164)	(0.229)	(0.188)	(0.277)	(0.255)	(0.420)
Cognition	−0.861**	0.702	−0.865**	0.693	−0.862**	0.815
	(0.433)	(0.646)	(0.434)	(0.648)	(0.434)	(0.660)
Male	−0.399**	0.026	−0.394**	0.023	−0.389**	0.024
	(0.165)	(0.218)	(0.165)	(0.218)	(0.166)	(0.220)
Age	0.067	−0.027	0.068	−0.026	0.072*	−0.029
	(0.043)	(0.060)	(0.043)	(0.060)	(0.043)	(0.061)
White	0.445***	−0.314	0.442**	−0.313	0.444***	−0.293
	(0.171)	(0.249)	(0.172)	(0.249)	(0.172)	(0.252)
Taken Economics	−0.372**	−0.269	−0.381**	−0.269	−0.386**	−0.264
	(0.165)	(0.234)	(0.165)	(0.235)	(0.166)	(0.238)
Prosocial × Second Half					−0.267	0.221
					(0.313)	(0.560)
Player B characteristics						
Prosocial	−0.425**	−0.014	−0.328	−0.018	−0.375	−0.284
	(0.193)	(0.262)	(0.219)	(0.309)	(0.275)	(0.435)
Cognition	−0.062	−1.074	−0.084	−1.083	−0.085	−1.008
	(0.497)	(0.684)	(0.500)	(0.683)	(0.499)	(0.696)
Male	0.620***	−0.034	0.618***	−0.037	0.612***	−0.049
	(0.191)	(0.271)	(0.192)	(0.271)	(0.192)	(0.276)
Age	0.005	−0.044	0.006	−0.044	0.008	−0.044
	(0.049)	(0.071)	(0.050)	(0.071)	(0.050)	(0.072)
White	−0.189	0.401	−0.182	0.400	−0.186	0.393
	(0.195)	(0.261)	(0.197)	(0.261)	(0.196)	(0.266)
Taken Economics	0.167	−0.404	0.166	−0.407	0.171	−0.404
	(0.194)	(0.257)	(0.195)	(0.257)	(0.195)	(0.264)
Prosocial × Second Half					0.083	0.448
					(0.321)	(0.550)
Second Half	−0.250**	−0.104	−0.256**	−0.105	−0.261	−0.435
Prosocial A × Prosocial B			−0.277	0.007	−0.590	−0.167
			(0.269)	(0.451)	(0.389)	(0.654)
Prosocial A × Prosocial B					0.600	0.533
× Second Half					(0.531)	(0.912)
	(0.119)	(0.211)	(0.119)	(0.211)	(0.189)	(0.349)
Constant	−0.525	1.482	−0.585	1.469	−0.694	1.609
	(1.229)	(1.767)	(1.236)	(1.776)	(1.241)	(1.820)
N	1,443	520	1,443	520	1,443	520
AIC	1,882.927	673.535	1,884.017	675.534	1,887.459	678.462
BIC	1,967.318	737.343	1,973.683	743.596	1,992.949	759.285

*p < .1; **p < .05; ***p < .01. Coefficient estimates from mixed effects logit models.

4 *Conservatives as Foreign Policy Proselfs*

We have more reasons to expect the right to have a proself value orientation in foreign policy than just its weaker commitment to the prosocial values of equality and fairness. The right, in contrast, should be more proself in the international system because it is oriented towards solidarity, cohesion and stability to protect the in-group, what Jost et al. call the right's "existential motive." This leads to a distinct set of political attitudes. The right generally resolves the tradeoff between personal autonomy and social order in favor of the latter (Feldman, 2003; Feldman and Stenner, 1997). The right is more wary of freedoms of speech, press and assembly as they may undermine social solidarity and order. This explains the stronger support of the right for more stringent policies in the areas of civil liberties and criminal justice (Inglehart and Flanagan, 1987; Kitschelt, 1988, 1994; Kitschelt and McGann, 1995). The right believes in a strong state not primarily to materially provide for its citizens but to protect them from threats (Janoff-Bulman, Sheikh, and Baldacci, 2007). The right embraces the moral foundations of in-group/loyalty and authority/respect. Authority/respect concerns the maintenance of social hierarchies to maintain social order. This moral foundation highlights the values of obedience, respect, and role fulfillment. In-group/loyalty stresses individuals' obligations to their group to preserve its cohesion, particularly against out-groups (Graham, Haidt, and Nosek, 2009; Haidt, Graham, and Joseph, 2009; Haidt and Joseph, 2004). Those on the right score higher on Schwartz's "conservation" values of conformity, tradition and security, all of which promote social order, stability, and predictability by suppressing the individual, binding him or her to the in-group (Schwartz, Caprara, and Vecchione, 2010; Barnea and Schwartz, 1998; Piurko, Schwartz, and Davidov, 2011; Caprara et al., 2006; Duriez and Van Hiel, 2002; Cohrs et al., 2005). As a consequence of this desire for stability and cohesion, conservatives tend to be more nationalistic and hawkish in their foreign policy preferences as they are more concerned about protecting the group from outside threats (Holsti and Rosenau, 1988; Rathbun, 2007).

5 *Proself Behavior by Labour: The Exception to the Rule*

There was one major exception to the prosocial character of Labour's foreign policy during its two periods in government in the interwar years. Before meeting in the Netherlands in 1929 to negotiation reparations and the evacuation of the Rhineland, the Chancellor of the Exchequer, Philip Snowden, revisited the numbers of the Young Plan, which were supposed to serve as the basis for the negotiation of the financial settlement. The

Young Committee was composed of financial experts and had issued a report of recommendations prior to the conference on the issue of reparations. Snowden objected to the distribution of the total reparations receipts, particular the percentage of the "unprotected" annuities that Britain would receive, as compared to France. These were the financial payments that the German government could not suspend even in the case of a crisis of the mark and capital flight out of Germany.

The British finance minister had received the endorsement of the cabinet prior to the conference to try and gain a larger share of the reparation pie. However, if he encountered resistance, he was obliged to report back to the Cabinet. It would then advise him about the "degree of rigidity" to be taken, that is how egoistic a line to take. Snowden disobeyed these guidelines (Carlton, 1970, 39). He was rebuked by MacDonald in a telegram to the delegation: "I am relying…on you before break occurs to get into touch with me and perhaps we could arrange to meet before any action for adjournment is taken or if you prefer that one of you should meet me in London" (Carlton, 1970, 44). However, the message was mistakenly sent non-secretly so that the entire conference learned of its content. This forced the Prime Minister to transmit a statement unequivocally backing the finance minister to restore his standing and credibility at the conference, making it subsequently impossible to rein him in (Carlton, 1970, 45).

For his hard bargaining, Snowden earned the acclaim of the permanent foreign office bureaucrats who accompanied him to The Hague. Maurice Hankey wrote: "The Chancellor the Exchequer is amazing. Never for one moment has he budged from his 100% demand, in public, in meetings with his colleagues, in private or (I ask myself) to himself!...One cannot but admire such fortitude, with all the great politicians in Europe…If you were to ask me what the Chancellor would take, frankly I could not tell you ? but I think it would be difficult to refuse 75% of our demand, if we ever got such an offer" (Carlton, 1970, 48).

However, in keeping with our argument, his Labour colleagues were upset at him for his proself and nationally egoistic behavior. Lord Parmoor, Lord President of the Council, threatened to resign. Cabinet member Beatrice Webb complained that the finance minister approached diplomacy like a conservative. Snowden was "playing up to the vulgar international individualism of Chamberlain, the Jingo Press — with the object of superseding J.R.M[8]" (Carlton, 1970, 45). The main supporters of the finance minister's negotiating style were outside the Labour government — the "right wing press" and Conservatives (Carlton, 1970, 51). The Foreign Secretary, Arthur Henderson, objected as well. As his aide Hugh Dalton later complained, "a few millions are

[8]James Ramsay MacDonald, the Prime Minister.

dust in the balance, compared with the gains of the early and complete evacuation which will also certainly follow swiftly on a general acceptance of the Young Plan" (Carlton, 1970, 40,48).

Memoranda from the previous summer indicate that Henderson foresaw such a problem far in advance. He cautioned that if the Hague conference failed due to Britain's position on reparations, the British "would find themselves isolated and held up in the United States as the Powers who for *petty and selfish* financial motives had sacrificed the interests of Europe and kept alive the discredited system whereby Europe is still divided into the two camps of victors and vanquished" (DBFP Ia, Vol. 6, No. 182 (emphasis added)). In other words, he thought Labour should pursue a more prosocial foreign policy. The "financial reasons for such a rejection must be absolutely overwhelming to justify a course fraught with so many dangers to the future success of Great Britain's foreign policy of reconciliation and co-operation," wrote Henderson (DBFP Ia, Vol. 6, No. 182). It is unclear why Snowden took such a line. Scholars have pointed to the difficult financial circumstances in Britain, in particular the unemployment level and the need for a minority government to attract the votes of other parties. Reparations agreements also have distributive implications at home in a way that security arrangements do not. And of course Snowden's bureaucratic interest was in protecting the British budget, not Britain's overall foreign policy. All of these factors likely mattered. However it does appear that the Chancellor was the exception to the rule. "[N]o other incident of this sort marred the government's behavior," writes Gordon (1969, 60). And Snowden's policies triggered major objections, just as French foreign minister Aristide Briand's more prosocial policies had done when he occupied his post in a conservative government.

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