

Terrorism In Dictatorships

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*Replication materials and full documentation for the new data on coups is available at: http://www.princeton.edu/~dbcarter/David_B._Carter/Data.html. Emails: daksoy@princeton.edu, dbcarter@princeton.edu, josephwright@gmail.com.

Overview of Appendix

The appendix to “Terrorism and the Fate of Dictators” includes a number of robustness checks and additional results not included in the main manuscript. Specifically, we demonstrate that:

1. the results are similar if we create alternative dependent variables based on Archigos,
2. consistent with the extant literature (and our expectations), we show that personalist dictators are relatively immune to successful reshuffling coups,
3. although military regimes are more prone to reshuffling coups, they do not solely account for our key finding that terrorism increases the probability of reshuffling coup,
4. we demonstrate that while military regimes are at higher risk of reshuffling coups, they do not solely drive our finding that terrorism leads to reshuffling coups,
5. a placebo test demonstrates that attacks in $t + 1$ are not significant predictors of coups in year t ,
6. our key findings are not due to influential observations, as we drop the three reshuffling coups with the most terrorism in $t - 1$ and find similar results; we also jackknife each model by country and find our key results robust,
7. we show that models which include a count of casualties from terrorist attacks are consistent with the implications of our argument regarding regime instability and reshuffling coups,
8. we show that measuring the difference in terrorist attacks from year $t - 2$ to $t - 1$ is not a good predictor of coup activity,
9. we show that a 3 year moving average of terrorist attacks is a poor predictor of coup activity,

10. our key results are robust to the inclusion of variables measuring past coups and the level of per soldier military spending,
11. our key results are robust to the inclusion of measures of coup-proofing used in the extant literature, although our sample size is greatly reduced,
12. if we exclude terrorist attacks from the specification, the results for the remaining variables are very similar,
13. our key results are robust to estimation of a model with no country-specific effects,
14. our key results do not change if we include year fixed effects,
15. our key results are robust to estimation of a model with only the attacks variable,
16. our key results are robust to estimation of a linear probability model with country and year fixed effects, and
17. finally, we describe our coding of each relevant case for our alternative dependent variable solely based on Archigos.

For details on the coding of our reshuffling and regime change variables for both attempted coups and successful coups, see our data appendix, which details our coding rules and the details of each coded case.

Results with Archigos Dependent Variables

As we discuss in the main text, we focus on coups rather than simply using irregular leadership changes identified in Archigos to provide a more difficult test of our theory. Additionally, a coups on coups allows us to examine attempts to remove a leader, which Archigos does not. Here, we report results using variables derived from Archigos irregular leadership changes. We again analyze all changes and distinguish between irregular changes that simply “shuffled

the deck” amongst existing regime elites versus those that led to a change in regime. These dependent variables are analogous to our successful coup dependent variables. The main results regarding the relationship between terrorist attacks and reshuffles of the leadership are similar, if not stronger, using the Archigos dependent variables. The results for the other variables also exhibit few changes from the results reported in the main text.

Results with Personalist Interaction

In the main text, we report the results of a model of coup attempts in which we interact the number of terrorist attacks with whether a regime is a personalist dictatorship or not. In table 2, we report the analogous set of models of successful coups. Recall that leaders of personalist regimes are known to have fewer domestic constraints than other dictators (e.g., Weeks (2008)). Personalist dictators, almost by definition, have marginalized and eliminated potential opponents that could hold him or her accountable via a reshuffling coup. Thus, the accountability mechanism is not nearly as plausible in personalist regimes. We explore whether this is true as a robustness check on our explanation.

The results in table 2 show that personalist regimes are an exception to the accountability mechanism. Terrorist attacks still have a positive and significant influence on the probability of a reshuffling coup when the regime is not personalist, but the effect is negative when the regime is personalist. However, the negative coefficients fail to reach statistical significance in either the fixed effects or random effects specifications, i.e., models III and VI. Table 3 shows the same specifications using the Archigos irregular leadership change dependent variables. The results are quite similar to those when we analyze coups.

Table 1: Terrorism and Coups: Archigos Coding

	Model I	Model II	Model III	Model IV	Model V	Model VI
Log of Terrorist Attacks $_{t-1}$	0.46** (0.23)	0.60** (0.28)	0.05 (0.46)	0.37** (0.17)	0.48** (0.19)	-0.00 (0.30)
Log GDP per capita $_{t-1}$	-0.98 (1.40)	-0.73 (1.83)	-1.48 (2.22)	-0.51 (0.33)	-0.30 (0.38)	-0.85* (0.44)
Log Population $_{t-1}$	-7.63** (2.39)	-6.32** (3.11)	-8.84** (3.89)	-0.12 (0.22)	-0.06 (0.25)	-0.05 (0.26)
Low Intensity Civil War $_{t-1}$	0.60 (0.61)	0.10 (0.83)	0.86 (0.93)	0.56 (0.53)	0.28 (0.68)	0.80 (0.75)
High Intensity Civil War $_{t-1}$	0.50 (0.85)	0.35 (1.26)	0.65 (1.22)	-0.04 (0.73)	-0.63 (0.99)	0.69 (0.97)
Log of Protests $_{t-1}$	0.15 (0.29)	0.27 (0.36)	-0.15 (0.54)	0.26 (0.26)	0.28 (0.30)	0.38 (0.45)
Economic Growth $_{t-1}$	-2.94 (4.10)	-7.78 (5.41)	7.77 (6.47)	0.55 (3.55)	-3.23 (4.14)	8.14 (5.36)
Neighbor Coups	0.06 (0.36)	-0.37 (0.46)	0.61 (0.58)	0.29 (0.33)	-0.21 (0.42)	1.02** (0.51)
Pre-1960 Civil War				-0.05 (0.28)	-0.09 (0.32)	-0.14 (0.33)
Ethnic Fractionalization				0.23 (0.87)	0.11 (1.01)	0.43 (1.00)
Constant				-0.20 (3.41)	-2.40 (3.85)	0.43 (4.33)
Dependent Variable	Irregular Change	Reshuffling Irregular Change	Regime Change Irregular Change	Irregular Change	Reshuffling Irregular Change	Regime Change Irregular Change
Log-likelihood	-109.38	-69.32	-45.38	-209.06	-142.11	-98.69
Decade Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Country Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	No	No
Country Random Effects	No	No	No	Yes	Yes	Yes
N =	682	510	370	2721	2721	2721

Standard errors clustered by country in parentheses
 ** $p < .05$; * $p < .10$

Table 2: Terrorism and Successful Coups: Personalist Regimes

	Model I	Model II	Model III	Model IV	Model V	Model VI
Log of Terrorist Attacks $_{t-1}$	0.15 (0.17)	0.48** (0.24)	-0.41 (0.35)	0.26** (0.13)	0.51** (0.16)	-0.16 (0.27)
Personalist	-0.70 (0.51)	-0.72 (1.13)	-0.79 (0.60)	0.12 (0.36)	-0.02 (0.54)	0.34 (0.39)
Personalist x Log of Terrorist Attacks $_{t-1}$	-0.19 (0.35)	-19.97 (17.73)	-0.29 (0.48)	-0.19 (0.30)	-22.92 (41.85)	0.18 (0.37)
Log GDP per capita $_{t-1}$	-1.12 (1.05)	-0.77 (1.60)	-1.61 (1.46)	-0.83** (0.23)	-0.53* (0.28)	-1.22** (0.34)
Log Population $_{t-1}$	1.26 (1.61)	4.57* (2.51)	-0.98 (2.14)	-0.27* (0.14)	-0.25 (0.19)	-0.26 (0.17)
Low Intensity Civil War $_{t-1}$	1.07** (0.42)	0.70 (0.66)	1.36** (0.52)	0.74** (0.35)	0.26 (0.50)	1.01** (0.44)
High Intensity Civil War $_{t-1}$	0.42 (0.68)	-0.74 (1.35)	0.73 (0.80)	-0.22 (0.54)	-1.87* (1.13)	0.66 (0.60)
Log of Protests $_{t-1}$	-0.07 (0.27)	-0.03 (0.38)	-0.23 (0.43)	0.15 (0.24)	0.09 (0.31)	0.23 (0.37)
Economic Growth $_{t-1}$	-0.42 (3.14)	1.96 (5.01)	-2.25 (4.25)	0.46 (2.53)	0.80 (3.70)	0.05 (3.25)
Neighbor Coups	-0.11 (0.27)	-0.65 (0.40)	0.33 (0.38)	-0.15 (0.27)	-0.75* (0.40)	0.34 (0.36)
Pre-1960 Civil War				0.10 (0.18)	0.04 (0.24)	0.03 (0.20)
Ethnic Fractionalization				-0.08 (0.53)	-0.10 (0.72)	-0.34 (0.62)
Constant				4.94** (2.22)	2.43 (2.75)	6.60** (3.05)
Dependent Variable	Successful Coup	Successful Reshuffling Coup	Successful Regime Change Coup	Successful Coup	Successful Reshuffling Coup	Successful Regime Change Coup
Log-likelihood	-185.30	-87.88	-100.70	-297.66	-163.98	-167.72
Decade Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Country Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	No	No
Country Random Effects	No	No	No	Yes	Yes	Yes
N =	1088	640	750	2836	2836	2836

Standard errors clustered
by country in parentheses
** $p < .05$; * $p < .10$

Table 3: Terrorism and Successful Coups: Personalist Regimes with Archigos Coding

	Model I	Model II	Model III	Model IV	Model V	Model VI
Log of Terrorist Attacks $_{t-1}$	0.54** (0.26)	0.76** (0.31)	-0.59 (0.67)	0.43** (0.17)	0.54** (0.20)	-0.13 (0.40)
Personalist	-0.36 (0.73)	-0.03 (1.13)	-0.25 (0.89)	0.47 (0.53)	0.42 (0.71)	0.69 (0.59)
Personalist x Log of Terrorist Attacks $_{t-1}$	-0.35 (0.52)	-21.38 (16.54)	1.15 (0.80)	-0.45 (0.41)	-31.61 (66.03)	0.33 (0.51)
Log GDP per capita $_{t-1}$	-1.34 (1.47)	-1.50 (1.95)	-0.50 (2.35)	-0.48 (0.35)	-0.36 (0.42)	-0.66 (0.44)
Log Population $_{t-1}$	-7.29** (2.43)	-4.91 (3.12)	-10.11** (4.12)	-0.09 (0.22)	-0.01 (0.26)	-0.02 (0.26)
Low Intensity Civil War $_{t-1}$	0.66 (0.63)	0.23 (0.84)	0.79 (0.99)	0.49** (0.53)	0.33 (0.69)	0.64 (0.77)
High Intensity Civil War $_{t-1}$	0.51 (0.85)	0.31 (1.24)	0.56 (1.21)	-0.01 (0.74)	-0.51 (1.02)	0.59 (0.97)
Log of Protests $_{t-1}$	0.16 (0.29)	0.33 (0.37)	-0.03 (0.52)	0.28 (0.26)	0.32 (0.31)	0.41 (0.46)
Economic Growth $_{t-1}$	-2.49 (4.15)	-5.85 (5.57)	6.98 (6.64)	0.90 (3.57)	-3.11 (4.36)	8.18 (5.32)
Neighbor Coups	0.07 (0.36)	-0.38 (0.47)	0.43 (0.58)	0.31 (0.33)	-0.21 (0.43)	0.96* (0.51)
Pre-1960 Civil War				-0.04 (0.28)	-0.07 (0.33)	-0.17 (0.32)
Ethnic Fractionalization				0.25 (0.86)	-0.02 (1.03)	0.52 (0.97)
Constant				-0.81 (3.55)	-2.49 (4.16)	-1.30 (4.41)
Dependent Variable	Irregular Change	Reshuffling Irregular Change	Regime Change Irregular Change	Irregular Change	Reshuffling Irregular Change	Regime Change Irregular Change
Log-likelihood	-108.95	-66.67	-44.31	-208.24	-139.00	-97.34
Decade Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Country Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	No	No
Country Random Effects	No	No	No	Yes	Yes	Yes
N =	682	510	370	2721	2721	2721

Standard errors clustered by country in parentheses
 ** $p < .05$; * $p < .10$

Terrorism and Military Regimes

Tables 4 and 5 contain results that focus on coup attempts and coup successes, respectively, in military regimes. Specifically, we interact whether a dictatorship is a military regime with the terrorist attacks variable. We do this to assess whether our finding that terrorism is associated with reshuffling coups is solely attributable to military regimes having fewer institutionalized mechanisms for removing the leader than party-based regimes or monarchies. We find that our main result — that terrorism increases the risk of reshuffling coups — is not solely a product of military regimes. In fact, the interaction between military regimes and terrorist attacks is negative in both model II and model V, although it is not statistically significant. Moreover, the terrorism variable remains positive and statistically significant in all models, which indicates that terrorism is associated with reshuffling coups in non-military regimes. Interestingly, military regimes that do not experience terrorism in the prior year are more likely to experience reshuffling coups. Thus, it is true that military regimes without terrorist violence at greater risk of reshuffling coup relative to other types of dictatorships, but these regimes do not account for our main finding.

Placebo Test

Our central argument is that when dictators experience high levels of terrorism, regime insiders tend to protect the regime by removing the dictator via a reshuffling coup. Thus, we argue that attacks and instability influence the probability of a coup. The main results employ a one-year lag of attacks to assess how the build-up of terrorism in the previous year influences the risk of a coup in the current year. As a simple placebo test, we also investigate whether terrorist attacks in the year subsequent to the coup, i.e., year $t + 1$, have significant effect on the probability of a coup in the current year. It would be troubling if we found that attacks in year $t + 1$ significantly influence the probability of a coup in year t , as this would draw into question the direction of the causal arrow. Indeed, we do not find a significant

Table 4: Terrorism and Coup Attempts: Military Regimes

	Model I	Model II	Model III	Model IV	Model V	Model VI
Log of Terrorist Attacks $_{t-1}$	0.24 (0.17)	0.47** (0.24)	0.07 (0.23)	0.16 (0.13)	0.44** (0.19)	-0.11 (0.18)
Military Regime	0.61 (0.40)	1.97** (0.63)	-0.43 (0.59)	1.57** (0.29)	2.68** (0.40)	0.43 (0.42)
Military x Log of Terrorist Attacks $_{t-1}$	-0.02 (0.20)	-0.15 (0.26)	-0.33 (0.37)	-0.00 (0.16)	-0.17 (0.20)	-0.05 (0.29)
Log GDP per capita $_{t-1}$	-1.59** (0.61)	-1.62** (0.92)	-1.41 (0.86)	-0.86** (0.18)	-0.70** (0.26)	-0.98** (0.23)
Log Population $_{t-1}$	0.59 (1.06)	2.15 (1.55)	-0.61 (1.59)	-0.22* (0.12)	-0.24 (0.16)	-0.20 (0.14)
Low Intensity Civil War $_{t-1}$	0.29 (0.36)	0.28 (0.54)	0.16 (0.49)	0.38 (0.31)	0.02 (0.45)	0.67* (0.40)
High Intensity Civil War $_{t-1}$	-0.18 (0.54)	-0.46 (0.88)	0.07 (0.72)	-0.70 (0.49)	-1.47** (0.73)	-0.01 (0.60)
Log of Protests $_{t-1}$	0.28 (0.19)	0.27 (0.25)	0.31 (0.28)	0.29* (0.17)	0.15 (0.22)	0.43* (0.24)
Economic Growth $_{t-1}$	-2.59 (1.94)	0.09 (3.42)	-3.83 (2.43)	-3.95** (1.79)	-1.96 (2.99)	-4.67** (2.09)
Neighbor Coups	-0.10 (0.22)	-0.56* (0.31)	0.35 (0.30)	-0.11 (0.21)	-0.69** (0.31)	0.41 (0.29)
Pre-1960 Civil War				0.03 (0.15)	-0.05 (0.22)	0.05 (0.17)
Ethnic Fractionalization				0.22 (0.44)	0.31 (0.63)	0.04 (0.52)
Constant				4.81** (1.77)	2.82 (2.44)	4.85** (2.24)
Dependent Variable	Successful Coup	Successful Reshuffling Coup	Successful Regime Change Coup	Successful Coup	Successful Reshuffling Coup	Successful Regime Change Coup
Log-likelihood	-295.43	-144.65	-165.25	-434.09	-235.74	-261.89
Decade Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Country Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	No	No
Country Random Effects	No	No	No	Yes	Yes	Yes
N =	1384	872	966	2813	2813	2813

Standard errors clustered by country in parentheses
 ** $p < .05$; * $p < .10$

Table 5: Terrorism and Successful Coups: Military Regimes

	Model I	Model II	Model III	Model IV	Model V	Model VI
Log of Terrorist Attacks $_{t-1}$	0.33 (0.22)	0.68** (0.31)	0.06 (0.33)	0.25 (0.17)	0.57** (0.24)	-0.02 (0.25)
Military Regime	0.12 (0.51)	1.90** (0.78)	-1.70** (0.93)	1.48** (0.33)	2.83** (0.48)	-0.06 (0.60)
Military x Log of Terrorist Attacks $_{t-1}$	-0.16 (0.25)	-0.36 (0.31)	-0.21 (0.58)	-0.05 (0.19)	-0.31 (0.25)	0.06 (0.40)
Log GDP per capita $_{t-1}$	-1.29 (1.07)	-1.03 (1.57)	-1.96 (1.52)	-0.96** (0.21)	-0.57** (0.29)	-1.50** (0.35)
Log Population $_{t-1}$	0.98 (1.66)	3.34 (2.58)	0.08 (2.32)	-0.30** (0.13)	-0.43** (0.20)	-0.23 (0.17)
Low Intensity Civil War $_{t-1}$	0.28 (0.50)	-0.03 (0.78)	0.21 (0.71)	0.36 (0.39)	-0.21 (0.57)	0.78 (0.52)
High Intensity Civil War $_{t-1}$	-0.64 (0.80)	-1.21 (1.40)	-0.45 (1.02)	-1.11 (0.66)	-1.89* (1.11)	-0.08 (0.83)
Log of Protests $_{t-1}$	-0.06 (0.27)	-0.04 (0.37)	0.01 (0.43)	0.06 (0.23)	-0.09 (0.30)	0.22 (0.36)
Economic Growth $_{t-1}$	-1.37 (3.13)	3.09 (5.30)	-2.54 (3.91)	-0.81 (2.55)	0.98 (3.96)	-1.72 (3.30)
Neighbor Coups	-0.16 (0.28)	-0.65 (0.41)	0.27 (0.41)	-0.19 (0.27)	-0.77* (0.41)	0.32 (0.38)
Pre-1960 Civil War				0.15 (0.16)	0.11 (0.25)	0.16 (0.20)
Ethnic Fractionalization				-0.10 (0.47)	0.47 (0.72)	-0.61 (0.62)
Constant				5.98** (1.97)	3.06 (2.83)	8.53** (3.09)
Dependent Variable	Successful Coup	Successful Reshuffling Coup	Successful Regime Change Coup	Successful Coup	Successful Reshuffling Coup	Successful Regime Change Coup
Log-likelihood	-176.20	-85.62	-92.09	-273.79	-143.18	-157.92
Decade Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Country Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	No	No
Country Random Effects	No	No	No	Yes	Yes	Yes
N =	1022	612	710	2813	2813	2813

Standard errors clustered by country in parentheses
 ** $p < .05$; * $p < .10$

relationship between coups in year t and terrorist attacks in year $t + 1$, as reported in table 6.

Checking for Influential Observations

In this section, we ensure that our main results are not solely driven by influential observations. It would be concerning if our key results were dependent on one or a few cases. First, table 7 reports results where we jackknife our models by country. Thus, we estimate the model iteratively remove each dictatorship in the data, and then average across the results of the multiple estimates. Averaging across these different estimates allows us to see if either the coefficients greatly diminish or the standard errors become much larger when one or more of the countries is removed. Table 7 shows that the jackknifed results are essentially no different than those reported in the main text.

Second, to further probe the robustness of our main finding — that terrorism increases the risk of reshuffling coups — we remove the three reshuffling coups with the highest levels of terrorism and reestimate our models. Table 8 shows that our key result is pretty robust to this procedure, as the finding remains significant at the 0.10 level in our country fixed effect model and remains statistically significant at the 0.05 level in our random effects model.

Measuring the Severity of Terrorist Attacks

In tables 9 and 10 we address the possibility that it is not necessarily the number of terrorist attacks that matters, but rather the severity of attacks that are carried out. We argue that it is the fact that terrorist attacks are observable and costly forms of dissent that provides motivation and opportunity for regime insiders to reshuffle. Moreover, we suggest that terrorist attacks are associated with reshuffling coups by regime insiders precisely because they are not usually all that threatening to the regime. This logic suggests that the number

Table 6: Terrorism and Coups: Placebo Test

	Model I	Model II	Model III	Model IV	Model V	Model VI
Log of Terrorist Attacks $_{t+1}$	-0.08 (0.08)	0.21 (0.16)	-0.33* (0.19)	0.10 (0.17)	0.17 (0.23)	-0.14 (0.27)
Log GDP per capita $_{t-1}$	-1.07* (0.59)	-0.42 (0.97)	-1.50* (0.86)	-1.03** (1.07)	2.41 (2.00)	-2.59* (1.39)
Log Population $_{t-1}$	-0.43 (1.01)	0.61 (1.62)	-1.89 (1.49)	-4.29** (1.05)	-5.90** (1.75)	-8.75** (2.44)
Low Intensity Civil War $_{t-1}$	0.16 (0.35)	0.61 (0.52)	-0.05 (0.48)	0.13 (0.50)	-0.09 (0.81)	-0.12 (0.65)
High Intensity Civil War $_{t-1}$	0.11 (0.47)	0.62 (0.72)	-0.01 (0.64)	-0.46 (0.76)	-0.57 (1.28)	-0.87 (0.98)
Log of Protests $_{t-1}$	0.36* (0.19)	0.32 (0.25)	0.40 (0.29)	0.21 (0.28)	0.16 (0.38)	0.14 (0.57)
Economic Growth $_{t-1}$	-2.70 (1.93)	-2.30 (3.06)	-2.32 (2.38)	-3.32 (3.22)	-5.75 (5.75)	0.03 (3.90)
Neighbor Coups	-0.05 (0.21)	-0.57* (0.31)	0.45 (0.29)	-0.08 (0.29)	-0.67 (0.44)	0.38 (0.41)
Dependent Variable	Attempted Coup	Attempted Reshuffling Coup	Attempted Regime Change Coup	Successful Coup	Successful Reshuffling Coup	Successful Regime Change Coup
Log-likelihood	-321.25	-148.38	-182.42	-166.84	-74.38	-84.85
Decade Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Country Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Country Random Effects	No	No	No	No	No	No
N =	1438	900	1042	1025	591	702

Standard errors clustered
by country in parentheses
** $p < .05$; * $p < .10$

Table 7: Terrorism and Coup Attempts: Jackknife by Country

	Model I	Model II	Model III	Model IV	Model V	Model VI
Log of Terrorist Attacks $_{t-1}$	0.24 (0.16)	0.43* (0.22)	-0.04 (0.18)	0.25** (0.12)	0.47** (0.17)	-0.11 (0.13)
Log GDP per capita $_{t-1}$	-1.51** (0.65)	-1.26 (0.97)	-1.61 (1.00)	-0.89** (0.18)	-0.67** (0.26)	-0.99** (0.22)
Log Population $_{t-1}$	0.64 (1.05)	2.20 (1.40)	-0.70 (1.90)	-0.17 (0.16)	-0.12 (0.22)	-0.18 (0.20)
Low Intensity Civil War $_{t-1}$	0.29 (0.32)	0.28 (0.47)	0.25 (0.43)	0.41 (0.28)	0.20 (0.42)	0.68* (0.40)
High Intensity Civil War $_{t-1}$	-0.07 (0.58)	-0.02 (1.09)	-0.06 (0.82)	-0.35 (0.55)	-0.85 (1.27)	0.07 (0.62)
Log of Protests $_{t-1}$	0.31 (0.22)	0.30 (0.30)	0.28 (0.33)	0.35 (0.21)	0.30 (0.27)	0.46* (0.28)
Economic Growth $_{t-1}$	-2.67 (2.24)	-0.77 (4.55)	-3.75 (2.69)	-3.18 (2.04)	-1.13 (3.42)	-4.50* (2.62)
Neighbor Coups	-0.10 (0.22)	-0.58 (0.37)	0.37 (0.29)	-0.11 (0.24)	-0.64 (0.40)	0.42 (0.30)
Pre-1960 Civil War				0.04 (0.19)	-0.09 (0.25)	0.04 (0.21)
Ethnic Fractionalization				0.09 (0.58)	-0.08 (0.77)	0.02 (0.66)
Constant				4.86** (1.95)	2.16 (2.79)	4.80** (2.05)
Dependent Variable	Attempted Coup	Attempted Reshuffling Coup	Attempted Regime Change Coup	Attempted Coup	Attempted Reshuffling Coup	Attempted Regime Change Coup
Log-likelihood	-296.76	-150.37	-166.32	-449.94	-260.10	-262.43
Decade Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Country Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	No	No
Country Random Effects	No	No	No	Yes	Yes	Yes
N =	1384	872	966	2813	2813	2813

Standard errors clustered
by country in parentheses
** $p < .05$; * $p < .10$

Table 8: Terrorism and Reshuffling Coup Attempts: Remove Three Cases

	Model II	Model V
Log of Terrorist Attacks s_{t-1}	0.31* (0.18)	0.33** (0.15)
Log GDP per capita a_{t-1}	-1.52* (0.85)	-0.71** (0.30)
Log Population t_{-1}	2.06 (1.56)	-0.12 (0.21)
Low Intensity Civil War t_{-1}	0.51 (0.52)	0.34 (0.48)
High Intensity Civil War t_{-1}	0.46 (0.78)	-0.48 (0.74)
Log of Protests t_{-1}	0.37 (0.25)	0.38 (0.23)
Economic Growth t_{-1}	-0.49 (3.08)	-1.15 (2.83)
Neighbor Coups	-0.57* (0.31)	-0.64** (0.31)
Pre-1960 Civil War		-0.05 (0.27)
Ethnic Fractionalization		-0.14 (0.83)
Constant		2.34 (2.96)
Dependent Variable	Attempted Reshuffling Coup	Attempted Reshuffling Coup
Log-likelihood	-143.90	-252.76
Decade Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes
Country Fixed Effects	Yes	No
Country Random Effects	No	Yes
N =	847	2810

Standard errors clustered
by country in parentheses
** $p < .05$; * $p < .10$

of casualties that result from attacks, i.e., severity, are not necessary to spur reshuffling coups. In fact, it is reasonable to think given our argument that more severe terrorist attacks might even dampen coup activity by regime insiders, as such attacks should be more highly correlated with regime instability.

The results in tables 9 and 10 suggest that the casualties from terrorist attacks is a less robust predictor of reshuffling coup activity than the number of attacks. The log of casualties remains significant and positive in the reshuffling attempts models, although with a much smaller coefficient (the scale of the two variables is not greatly different). However, the strength of the relationship between terrorism and reshuffling coups is no longer strong enough to drive a significant relationship between all coups. Moreover, the results in table 10 demonstrate that the connection between terrorism and reshuffling coup success completely disappears when we measure attack severity rather than the volume of attacks. These results suggest that our theoretical and empirical focus on the volume of attacks is appropriate.

Trends in Terrorism: Is Violence Increasing or Decreasing?

Tables 11–14 contain results from models that measure changes in the volume of terrorism across time. In our models reported in the main text, we include the volume of attacks in year $t - 1$, which is a robust predictor of reshuffling coups. To address the possible objection that a better measure of terrorism would account for the trend in attacks, i.e., whether the level of violence is increasing or decreasing, we try two additional measures. First, tables 11 and 12 include the difference in terrorism between year $t - 2$ and $t - 1$. Thus, this variable helps us assess whether it matters to regime elites whether terrorism in year $t - 1$ is an improvement or a worsening from the prior year ($t - 2$). The results for both coup attempts and coup successes make clear that this is not a better measure, as it performs poorly in all specifications, and is never significant in any of the reshuffling models.

Table 9: Terrorism and Coup Attempts: Attack Severity

	Model I	Model II	Model III	Model IV	Model V	Model VI
Log of Terrorist Attack Casualties $_{t-1}$	0.13* (0.07)	0.20* (0.11)	0.04 (0.10)	0.13* (0.07)	0.24** (0.09)	-0.02 (0.09)
Log GDP per capita $_{t-1}$	-1.48** (0.59)	-1.21 (0.82)	-1.62* (0.85)	-0.85** (0.21)	-0.59** (0.28)	-1.01** (0.24)
Log Population $_{t-1}$	0.55 (1.05)	1.95 (1.55)	-0.67 (1.58)	-0.19 (0.15)	-0.16 (0.20)	-0.18 (0.14)
Low Intensity Civil War $_{t-1}$	0.27** (0.36)	0.30 (0.53)	0.19 (0.49)	0.42 (0.33)	0.30 (0.47)	0.62 (0.40)
High Intensity Civil War $_{t-1}$	-0.07 (0.53)	0.06 (0.78)	-0.10 (0.71)	-0.30 (0.49)	-0.65 (0.74)	-0.02 (0.60)
Log of Protests $_{t-1}$	0.33* (0.19)	0.36 (0.24)	0.27 (0.27)	0.40** (0.17)	0.41* (0.22)	0.43* (0.23)
Economic Growth $_{t-1}$	-2.71 (1.93)	-0.96 (3.11)	-3.57 (2.43)	-3.22* (1.77)	-1.39 (2.76)	-4.43** (2.09)
Neighbor Coups	-0.11 (0.21)	-0.61* (0.31)	0.39 (0.30)	-0.11 (0.21)	-0.67** (0.31)	0.42* (0.29)
Pre-1960 Civil War				0.05 (0.18)	-0.05 (0.26)	0.04 (0.17)
Ethnic Fractionalization				0.08 (0.57)	-0.11 (0.80)	0.02 (0.53)
Constant				4.69** (2.14)	1.87 (2.85)	5.00** (2.27)
Dependent Variable	Attempted Coup	Attempted Reshuffling Coup	Attempted Regime Change Coup	Attempted Coup	Attempted Reshuffling Coup	Attempted Regime Change Coup
Log-likelihood	-297.10	-151.62	-166.26	-450.74	-262.52	-262.67
Decade Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Country Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	No	No
Country Random Effects	No	No	No	Yes	Yes	Yes
N =	1384	872	966	2813	2813	2813

Standard errors clustered
by country in parentheses
** $p < .05$; * $p < .10$

Table 10: Terrorism and Successful Coups: Attack Severity

	Model I	Model II	Model III	Model IV	Model V	Model VI
Log of Terrorist Attack Casualties $_{t-1}$	0.05 (0.10)	0.07 (0.15)	0.01 (0.15)	0.09 (0.09)	0.14 (0.12)	0.03 (0.13)
Log GDP per capita $_{t-1}$	-1.27 (1.05)	0.01 (1.51)	-2.43* (1.46)	-0.82** (0.22)	-0.34 (0.27)	-1.51** (0.34)
Log Population $_{t-1}$	1.00 (1.65)	2.93 (2.49)	-0.39 (2.25)	-0.24* (0.14)	-0.27 (0.20)	-0.24 (0.17)
Low Intensity Civil War $_{t-1}$	0.42 (0.49)	0.47 (0.72)	0.44 (0.66)	0.58 (0.40)	0.45 (0.57)	0.74 (0.52)
High Intensity Civil War $_{t-1}$	-0.53 (0.79)	-0.24 (1.26)	-0.59 (1.00)	-0.53 (0.68)	-0.93 (1.13)	-0.15 (0.81)
Log of Protests $_{t-1}$	-0.00 (0.26)	0.12 (0.35)	-0.18 (0.42)	0.24 (0.23)	0.31 (0.29)	0.20 (0.36)
Economic Growth $_{t-1}$	-1.77 (3.18)	-0.12 (5.00)	-2.21 (4.05)	-0.62 (2.50)	0.77 (3.60)	-1.61 (3.28)
Neighbor Coups	-0.18 (0.28)	-0.69* (0.40)	0.32 (0.40)	-0.17 (0.27)	-0.71* (0.40)	0.32 (0.38)
Pre-1960 Civil War				0.12 (0.18)	0.04 (0.25)	0.17 (0.20)
Ethnic Fractionalization				-0.21 (0.54)	0.01 (0.75)	-0.60 (0.62)
Constant				4.77** (2.16)	1.00 (2.74)	8.63** (3.06)
Dependent Variable	Successful Coup	Successful Reshuffling Coup	Successful Regime Change Coup	Successful Coup	Successful Reshuffling Coup	Successful Regime Change Coup
Log-likelihood	-177.31	-90.31	-94.95	-286.38	-166.88	-157.90
Decade Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Country Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	No	No
Country Random Effects	No	No	No	Yes	Yes	Yes
N =	1022	612	710	2813	2813	2813

Standard errors clustered
by country in parentheses
** $p < .05$; * $p < .10$

Second, we also try moving averages of terrorism to assess the importance of time trends for coup activity. Tables 13 and 14 report results with a 3-year moving average of terrorism. Similarly to the difference measure employed in tables 11 and 12, this measure does not perform well. In particular, it does quite poorly in the reshuffling coup models relative to the measure of attacks in year $t - 1$, as it is only significant and positive in the random effects model of coup successes. We also tried 2, 4, and 5 year moving averages and found results very similar to those using a 3 year moving average.

Military Spending and Past Coups Variables

The estimated models reported in tables 15 and 16 include two additional variables not included in the models reported in the main text. Specifically, both the models of coup attempts in table 15 and the models of coup success in table 16 include each country's per soldier military spending and the number of past coups each country has experienced since 1950. Inclusion of these variables has no effect on the key results.

Measures of Coup-Proofing

Table 17 contains results that include two commonly used measures of coup-proofing by dictators: the number of effective ground organizations a dictator has in place and the ratio of paramilitary forces to regular military forces. These measures were introduced by Pilster and Böhmelt (2011) and updated in the excellent study by Powell (2012).¹ We do not employ these measures in the main text as they greatly reduce our sample size, are inconsistently significant, and do not alter our key results. We demonstrate in table 17 that our key findings that terrorist attacks are associated with reshuffling coups and low-level civil war are associated with regime change coups in the random effects models is robust to inclusion

¹All models include the same set of regressors shown in all the models in the main text, although we only report the theoretically key variables here.

Table 11: Terrorism and Coup Attempts: Differences in Terrorism from $t - 2$

	Model I	Model II	Model III	Model IV	Model V	Model VI
Terrorism $_{t-2}$ -Terrorism $_{t-1}$	-0.05 (0.12)	0.04 (0.16)	-0.16 (0.17)	-0.06 (0.12)	0.03 (0.17)	-0.13 (0.16)
Log GDP per capita $_{t-1}$	-1.74** (0.62)	-1.80** (0.86)	-1.71* (0.91)	-0.86** (0.21)	-0.62** (0.30)	-1.07** (0.24)
Log Population $_{t-1}$	0.29 (1.08)	1.68 (1.60)	-0.73 (1.65)	-0.19 (0.14)	-0.16 (0.21)	-0.21 (0.15)
Low Intensity Civil War $_{t-1}$	0.49 (0.35)	0.73 (0.48)	0.25 (0.49)	0.65** (0.31)	0.73* (0.43)	0.67* (0.39)
High Intensity Civil War $_{t-1}$	0.30 (0.54)	0.80 (0.80)	-0.00 (0.71)	0.11 (0.47)	0.14 (0.70)	0.10 (0.57)
Log of Protests $_{t-1}$	0.32 (0.20)	0.45* (0.25)	0.14 (0.29)	0.41** (0.17)	0.53** (0.22)	0.32 (0.25)
Economic Growth $_{t-1}$	-1.38 (2.05)	1.89 (3.27)	-3.02 (2.56)	-2.16 (1.91)	0.44 (3.03)	-3.83* (2.26)
Neighbor Coups	-0.18 (0.22)	-0.61** (0.31)	0.29 (0.31)	-0.18 (0.22)	-0.71** (0.31)	0.35 (0.29)
Pre-1960 Civil War				0.04 (0.18)	-0.01 (0.27)	0.01 (0.17)
Ethnic Fractionalization				0.01 (0.56)	-0.26 (0.85)	-0.01 (0.53)
Constant				4.85** (2.12)	2.10 (2.99)	5.86** (2.32)
Dependent Variable	Attempted Coup	Attempted Reshuffling Coup	Attempted Regime Change Coup	Attempted Coup	Attempted Reshuffling Coup	Attempted Regime Change Coup
Log-likelihood	-287.39	-147.57	-159.17	-437.68	-259.11	-248.90
Decade Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Country Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	No	No
Country Random Effects	No	No	No	Yes	Yes	Yes
N =	1314	818	932	2721	2721	2721

Standard errors clustered
by country in parentheses
** $p < .05$; * $p < .10$

Table 12: Terrorism and Successful Coups: Differences in Terrorism from $t - 2$

	Model I	Model II	Model III	Model IV	Model V	Model VI
Terrorism $_{t-2}$ -Terrorism $_{t-1}$	-0.14 (0.16)	0.08 (0.22)	-0.37 (0.24)	-0.18 (0.17)	0.06 (0.23)	-0.37 (0.23)
Log GDP per capita $_{t-1}$	-1.13 (1.11)	-0.16 (1.54)	-2.08 (1.62)	-0.82** (0.21)	-0.33 (0.26)	-1.64** (0.37)
Log Population $_{t-1}$	1.15 (1.71)	2.44 (2.54)	0.31 (2.37)	-0.26* (0.14)	-0.27 (0.20)	-0.29 (0.18)
Low Intensity Civil War $_{t-1}$	0.48 (0.48)	0.55 (0.66)	0.33 (2.37)	0.70* (0.38)	0.63 (0.52)	0.75 (0.53)
High Intensity Civil War $_{t-1}$	-0.42 (0.78)	-0.10 (1.25)	-0.61 (1.00)	-0.29 (0.65)	-0.54 (1.07)	-0.01 (0.78)
Log of Protests $_{t-1}$	-0.05 (0.28)	0.16 (0.36)	-0.27 (0.44)	0.24 (0.24)	0.38 (0.29)	0.08 (0.40)
Economic Growth $_{t-1}$	-2.35 (3.19)	-0.55 (4.93)	-2.18 (4.10)	-1.13 (2.52)	0.36 (3.67)	-1.76 (3.28)
Neighbor Coups	-0.30 (0.29)	-0.72* (0.41)	0.18 (0.41)	-0.29 (0.28)	-0.76* (0.40)	0.18 (0.39)
Pre-1960 Civil War				0.07 (0.17)	0.04 (0.25)	0.13 (0.22)
Ethnic Fractionalization				-0.28 (0.52)	0.01 (0.75)	-0.71 (0.64)
Constant				5.13** (2.10)	1.04 (2.71)	10.18** (3.32)
Dependent Variable	Successful Coup	Successful Reshuffling Coup	Successful Regime Change Coup	Successful Coup	Successful Reshuffling Coup	Successful Regime Change Coup
Log-likelihood	-170.62	-89.00	-88.94	-276.08	-165.39	-145.67
Decade Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Country Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	No	No
Country Random Effects	No	No	No	Yes	Yes	Yes
N =	992	595	682	2721	2721	2721

Standard errors clustered
by country in parentheses
** $p < .05$; * $p < .10$

Table 13: Terrorism and Coup Attempts: 3 Year Moving Average

	Model I	Model II	Model III	Model IV	Model V	Model VI
3-Year Terrorist Attacks MA	0.003 (0.004)	0.005 (0.005)	-0.01 (0.03)	0.002 (0.003)	0.004 (0.003)	-0.02 (0.03)
Log GDP per capita _{t-1}	-1.81** (0.70)	-1.80* (0.92)	-1.86* (1.05)	-0.97** (0.21)	-0.72** (0.29)	-1.19** (0.28)
Log Population _{t-1}	-0.17 (1.14)	1.65 (1.69)	-1.72 (1.80)	-0.14 (0.14)	-0.06 (0.20)	-0.21 (0.16)
Low Intensity Civil War _{t-1}	0.36 (0.40)	0.95* (0.53)	-0.13 (0.59)	0.66** (0.33)	0.87* (0.45)	0.69 (0.44)
High Intensity Civil War _{t-1}	0.11 (0.60)	0.99 (0.93)	-0.41 (0.80)	0.01 (0.53)	0.12 (0.76)	0.24 (0.69)
Log of Protests _{t-1}	0.08 (0.23)	0.11 (0.31)	0.06 (0.34)	0.15 (0.21)	0.14 (0.28)	0.27 (0.31)
Economic Growth _{t-1}	-0.90 (2.38)	2.02 (4.05)	-2.33 (2.93)	-1.64 (2.19)	0.78 (3.52)	-3.43 (2.62)
Neighbor Coups	-0.22 (0.23)	-0.50 (0.34)	0.06 (0.32)	-0.20 (0.23)	-0.64* (0.34)	0.23 (0.31)
Pre-1960 Civil War				-0.06 (0.18)	-0.13 (0.26)	-0.03 (0.19)
Ethnic Fractionalization				-0.12 (0.53)	-0.30 (0.79)	-0.25 (0.57)
Constant				5.42** (2.09)	2.23 (2.89)	6.76** (2.60)
Dependent Variable	Attempted Coup	Attempted Reshuffling Coup	Attempted Regime Change Coup	Attempted Coup	Attempted Reshuffling Coup	Attempted Regime Change Coup
Log-likelihood	-242.64	-120.37	-137.85	-376.38	-217.90	-218.81
Decade Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Country Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	No	No
Country Random Effects	No	No	No	Yes	Yes	Yes
N =	1077	698	763	2525	2525	2525

Standard errors clustered
by country in parentheses
** $p < .05$; * $p < .10$

Table 14: Terrorism and Successful Coups: 3 Year Moving Average

	Model I	Model II	Model III	Model IV	Model V	Model VI
3-Year Terrorist Attacks MA	0.005 (0.005)	0.006 (0.005)	-0.08 (0.10)	0.004 (0.003)	0.008** (0.003)	-0.08 (0.08)
Log GDP per capita _{t-1}	-0.98 (1.35)	1.09 (1.94)	-3.16 (1.94)	-1.03** (0.23)	-0.47* (0.28)	-1.80** (0.43)
Log Population _{t-1}	-0.22 (1.91)	-0.05 (3.17)	-0.65 (2.54)	-0.29** (0.14)	-0.27 (0.21)	-0.33* (0.19)
Low Intensity Civil War _{t-1}	0.18 (0.57)	0.52 (0.81)	0.20 (0.80)	0.72* (0.40)	0.63 (0.59)	0.93 (0.56)
High Intensity Civil War _{t-1}	-0.63 (0.86)	-0.51 (1.54)	0.56 (1.07)	-0.25 (0.71)	-1.11 (1.31)	0.71 (0.83)
Log of Protests _{t-1}	-0.27 (0.36)	-0.30 (0.49)	-0.24 (0.57)	-0.10 (0.32)	-0.08 (0.41)	-0.10 (0.52)
Economic Growth _{t-1}	-3.63 (3.63)	-1.56 (6.24)	-3.62 (4.65)	-1.66 (2.71)	0.40 (4.14)	-3.55 (3.55)
Neighbor Coups	-0.43 (0.31)	-0.83* (0.46)	-0.02 (0.43)	-0.32 (0.30)	-0.78* (0.45)	0.11 (0.40)
Pre-1960 Civil War				0.04 (0.17)	-0.01 (0.25)	0.12 (0.22)
Ethnic Fractionalization				-0.53 (0.52)	-0.06 (0.77)	-1.12* (0.67)
Constant				7.16** (2.23)	2.47 (2.86)	11.92** (3.77)
Dependent Variable	Successful Coup	Successful Reshuffling Coup	Successful Regime Change Coup	Successful Coup	Successful Reshuffling Coup	Successful Regime Change Coup
Log-likelihood	-144.13	-68.20	-81.54	-237.11	-131.57	-133.34
Decade Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Country Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	No	No
Country Random Effects	No	No	No	Yes	Yes	Yes
N =	854	488	595	2525	2525	2525

Standard errors clustered
by country in parentheses
** $p < .05$; * $p < .10$

Table 15: Terrorism and Coup Attempts: Military Spending and Past Coups

	Model I	Model II	Model III	Model IV	Model V	Model VI
Log of Terrorist Attacks $_{t-1}$	0.19 (0.12)	0.42** (0.17)	-0.12 (0.19)	0.12 (0.10)	0.27** (0.13)	-0.16 (0.16)
Log Past Coups $_{t-1}$	-1.96** (0.46)	-2.30** (0.67)	-1.66** (0.61)	0.73** (0.17)	1.28** (0.22)	0.12 (0.24)
Military Spending per Soldier $_{t-1}$	-0.03 (0.03)	-0.02 (0.04)	-0.06 (0.04)	-0.05** (0.02)	-0.02 (0.03)	-0.09** (0.04)
Log GDP per capita $_{t-1}$	-1.08* (0.62)	-1.44 (0.98)	-0.84 (0.91)	-0.57** (0.19)	-0.39 (0.25)	-0.72** (0.26)
Log Population $_{t-1}$	-0.20 (1.03)	3.67** (1.76)	-2.43 (1.50)	-0.24 (0.11)	-0.15 (0.15)	-0.25* (0.14)
Low Intensity Civil War $_{t-1}$	0.23 (0.35)	0.36 (0.54)	0.16** (0.45)	0.28 (0.30)	0.04 (0.43)	0.50 (0.39)
High Intensity Civil War $_{t-1}$	0.28 (0.47)	0.76 (0.74)	0.21 (0.64)	-0.19 (0.41)	-0.36 (0.58)	0.08 (0.55)
Log of Protests $_{t-1}$	0.32* (0.19)	0.29 (0.23)	0.32 (0.28)	0.38** (0.16)	0.32 (0.21)	0.43* (0.24)
Economic Growth $_{t-1}$	-1.93 (1.95)	0.29 (3.29)	-2.78 (2.47)	-3.07* (1.79)	-0.70 (2.90)	-4.28** (2.24)
Neighbor Coups	-0.15 (0.21)	-0.54* (0.31)	0.28 (0.28)	-0.12 (0.20)	-0.72** (0.30)	0.43 (0.27)
Pre-1960 Civil War				0.08 (0.13)	-0.17 (0.19)	0.22 (0.16)
Ethnic Fractionalization				0.51 (0.40)	0.18 (0.54)	0.63 (0.52)
Constant				3.20* (1.77)	0.49 (2.36)	3.59 (2.44)
Dependent Variable	Attempted Coup	Attempted Reshuffling Coup	Attempted Regime Change Coup	Attempted Coup	Attempted Reshuffling Coup	Attempted Regime Change Coup
Log-likelihood	-308.15	-146.59	-177.38	-464.30	-254.12	-280.19
Decade Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Country Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	No	No
Country Random Effects	No	No	No	Yes	Yes	Yes
N =	1365	851	1029	2708	2708	2708

Standard errors clustered by country in parentheses
 ** $p < .05$; * $p < .10$

Table 16: Terrorism and Coup Successes: Military Spending and Past Coups

	Model I	Model II	Model III	Model IV	Model V	Model VI
Log of Terrorist Attacks $_{t-1}$	0.29 (0.18)	0.41* (0.24)	0.12 (0.31)	0.22* (0.13)	0.35** (0.16)	-0.03 (0.24)
Log Past Coups $_{t-1}$	-3.36** (0.66)	-3.66** (0.98)	-2.83** (0.86)	0.59** (0.21)	0.91** (0.26)	0.16 (0.32)
Military Spending per Soldier $_{t-1}$	-0.002 (0.04)	0.02 (0.06)	-0.03 (0.06)	-0.05 (0.03)	-0.03 (0.04)	-0.07 (0.06)
Log GDP per capita $_{t-1}$	-1.64 (1.19)	-0.68 (1.77)	-2.32 (1.64)	-0.75** (0.24)	-0.34 (0.30)	-1.34** (0.39)
Log Population $_{t-1}$	2.54 (1.83)	7.08** (2.98)	-0.23 (2.39)	-0.28** (0.13)	-0.33* (0.19)	-0.23 (0.18)
Low Intensity Civil War $_{t-1}$	0.22 (0.51)	0.05 (0.72)	0.38 (0.68)	0.19 (0.40)	-0.11 (0.57)	0.48** (0.55)
High Intensity Civil War $_{t-1}$	-0.58 (0.79)	-0.55 (1.28)	-0.41 (0.99)	-0.89 (0.66)	-1.48 (1.12)	-0.28 (0.82)
Log of Protests $_{t-1}$	-0.003 (0.28)	0.10 (0.35)	-0.14 (0.47)	0.15 (0.24)	0.09 (0.31)	0.19 (0.39)
Economic Growth $_{t-1}$	0.98 (3.40)	1.87 (5.42)	0.42 (4.44)	0.35 (2.70)	0.87 (3.92)	0.12 (3.72)
Neighbor Coups	-0.21 (0.29)	-0.62 (0.41)	0.23 (0.40)	-0.25 (0.27)	-0.86** (0.40)	0.31 (0.37)
Pre-1960 Civil War				0.10 (0.16)	0.02 (0.23)	0.17 (0.21)
Ethnic Fractionalization				0.07 (0.46)	0.05 (0.65)	-0.11 (0.63)
Constant				4.63** (2.15)	1.63 (2.85)	7.45** (3.40)
Dependent Variable	Successful Coup	Successful Reshuffling Coup	Successful Regime Change Coup	Successful Coup	Successful Reshuffling Coup	Successful Regime Change Coup
Log-likelihood	-163.47	-81.52	-88.74	-282.19	-159.13	-158.23
Decade Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Country Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	No	No
Country Random Effects	No	No	No	Yes	Yes	Yes
N =	1009	551	672	2708	2708	2708

Standard errors clustered
by country in parentheses
** $p < .05$; * $p < .10$

of these variables. We also estimate linear probability models that allow us to include more of the sample, but restrict the observations that can be included to only observations that are included in the conditional logit models in table 2 in the main text. This adds about 130 observations to both the model of reshuffling attempts and regime change attempts. The results again look similar to those reported in the main text.

Models with No Terrorism Variables

Tables 18 and 19 contains results for the main models of coup attempts and successes reported in the paper with the terrorism measure is excluded. Excluding the terrorism variable has little effect on any of the other variables in each of the models. In particular, we excluded the terrorism variable to show that there is no change in either the civil variables or the protest indicator in our fixed effects models of coup attempts. The coup success models are also very similar when we exclude the terrorism variable.

Exclusion of Fixed Effects & Bivariate Specification

To demonstrate that the relationship between reshuffling coups and terrorist attacks is not overly dependent on model specification, we report the results of several additional models in tables 20, 21, 22, and 23. In tables 20 and 21 we report models for our three coup attempt dependent variables and three coup success dependent variables, respectively, that have no country fixed effects and include decade fixed effects, i.e., columns 1–3, as well as models for each dependent variable that have no country fixed effects and include year fixed effects, i.e., columns 4–6. In both of these specifications, the relationship between terrorist attacks and coups is unchanged, although some of the other variables that are not statistically significant in the models reported in the main text become significant in several of the specifications.

Tables 22 and 23 contain models that have no country fixed effects, no year fixed effects,

Table 17: Terrorism and Coup Attempts: Coup Proofing Measures

	Logit	LPM	Logit	LPM	Logit	LPM	Logit	LPM	Logit	LPM	Logit	LPM	Logit	LPM	Logit	LPM
Log of Terrorist Attacks _{t-1}	0.35* (0.20)	0.03** (0.01)	0.41** (0.15)	-0.001 (0.01)	0.02 (0.21)	-0.001 (0.01)	-0.08 (0.16)	0.48* (0.25)	0.04** (0.02)	0.47** (0.18)	0.15 (0.26)	0.007 (0.02)	0.09 (0.17)			
Effective # of Ground Orgs.	-0.25 (0.40)	-0.01 (0.02)	-0.62* (0.36)	0.28 (0.31)	0.23 (0.26)	0.02 (0.02)	0.23 (0.26)									
Paramilitaries																
Low Intensity Civil War _{t-1}	0.47 (0.59)	0.03 (0.04)	0.49 (0.50)	0.41 (0.51)	0.84** (0.42)	-0.09 (0.05)	0.27 (0.75)	-0.60* (0.35)	-0.03 (0.02)	-0.51** (0.23)	-0.64* (0.35)	-0.04* (0.02)	-0.27* (0.18)			
High Intensity Civil War _{t-1}	-1.03 (1.19)	-0.05 (0.05)	-1.65 (1.13)	0.15 (0.75)	0.27 (0.62)	-0.08 (0.12)	0.27 (1.44)	0.27 (1.44)	-0.07 (0.17)	0.24 (1.20)	0.43 (0.86)	0.03 (0.06)	1.03** (0.45)			
Log of Protests _{t-1}	0.26 (0.26)	0.03 (0.02)	0.31 (0.25)	0.15 (0.32)	0.30 (0.27)	0.01 (0.02)	0.26 (0.27)	0.26 (0.29)	0.037 (0.025)	0.36 (0.27)	-0.05 (0.38)	0.10 (0.02)	(0.64) (0.32)			
Dependent Variable	Attempted Reshuffling Coup	Attempted Reshuffling Coup	Attempted Reshuffling Coup	Attempted Reshuffling Coup	Attempted Reshuffling Coup	Attempted Reshuffling Coup	Attempted Reshuffling Coup	Attempted Reshuffling Coup	Attempted Reshuffling Coup	Attempted Reshuffling Coup	Attempted Reshuffling Coup	Attempted Reshuffling Coup	Attempted Reshuffling Coup			
Log-likelihood	-102.46		-195.10	-122.22	-207.76	-71.16	-154.91	-80.99	153.63							
Decade Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes			
Country Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	No			
Country Random Effects	No	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	No	Yes	No	No	Yes			
N =	528	624	2173	631	2173	701	332	468	1512	396	529	1512	1512			

Standard errors clustered
by country in parentheses
** $p < .05$; * $p < .10$

Table 18: Terrorism and Coup Attempts: No Terrorism Variables

	Model I	Model II	Model III	Model IV	Model V	Model VI
Log GDP per capita _{t-1}	-1.50** (0.59)	-1.33 (0.81)	-1.61* (0.85)	-0.83** (0.21)	-0.56** (0.28)	-1.01** (0.24)
Log Population _{t-1}	0.46 (1.07)	1.88 (1.63)	-0.69 (1.58)	-0.16** (0.15)	-0.12 (0.20)	-0.19 (0.14)
Low Intensity Civil War _{t-1}	0.44 (0.34)	0.67 (0.48)	0.23 (0.48)	0.62** (0.31)	0.72* (0.43)	0.60** (0.38)
High Intensity Civil War _{t-1}	0.10 (0.52)	0.38 (0.75)	-0.07 (0.71)	-0.03 (0.47)	-0.05 (0.69)	-0.04 (0.58)
Log of Protests _{t-1}	0.35* (0.18)	0.38 (0.24)	0.27 (0.27)	0.44** (0.17)	0.48** (0.22)	0.42* (0.23)
Economic Growth _{t-1}	-2.94 (1.93)	-1.11 (3.02)	-3.69 (2.42)	-3.45* (1.76)	-1.82 (2.73)	-4.40** (2.08)
Neighbor Coups	-0.13 (0.21)	-0.63** (0.31)	0.38 (0.30)	-0.13 (0.21)	-0.69** (0.31)	0.42* (0.29)
Pre-1960 Civil War				0.05 (0.18)	-0.05 (0.26)	0.04 (0.17)
Ethnic Fractionalization				0.07 (0.57)	-0.15 (0.81)	0.02 (0.53)
Constant				4.32** (2.12)	1.28 (2.86)	5.04** (2.26)
Dependent Variable	Attempted Coup	Attempted Reshuffling Coup	Attempted Regime Change Coup	Attempted Coup	Attempted Reshuffling Coup	Attempted Regime Change Coup
Log-likelihood	-298.60	-153.51	-166.34	-452.61	-265.72	-262.68
Decade Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Country Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	No	No
Country Random Effects	No	No	No	Yes	Yes	Yes
N =	1384	872	966	2813	2813	2813

Standard errors clustered
by country in parentheses
** $p < .05$; * $p < .10$

Table 19: Terrorism and Coup Successes: No Terrorism Variables

	Model I	Model II	Model III	Model IV	Model V	Model VI
Log GDP per capita $_{t-1}$	-0.95 (1.01)	0.27 (1.48)	-2.12 (1.38)	-0.79** (0.21)	-0.29 (0.26)	-1.46** (0.33)
Log Population $_{t-1}$	0.93 (1.58)	3.66 (2.47)	-1.02 (2.09)	-0.25* (0.14)	-0.27 (0.19)	-0.23 (0.17)
Low Intensity Civil War $_{t-1}$	0.39 (0.47)	0.61 (0.66)	0.25 (0.63)	0.63* (0.37)	0.65 (0.52)	0.69 (0.49)
High Intensity Civil War $_{t-1}$	-0.59 (0.76)	-0.09 (1.23)	-0.84 (0.95)	-0.44 (0.65)	-0.61 (1.07)	-0.21 (0.77)
Log of Protests $_{t-1}$	0.01 (0.27)	0.13 (0.35)	-0.17 (0.42)	0.26 (0.23)	0.34 (0.29)	0.21 (0.35)
Economic Growth $_{t-1}$	-0.82 (3.14)	-0.64 (4.94)	-0.33 (4.01)	0.24 (2.54)	0.67 (3.58)	-0.01 (3.38)
Neighbor Coups	-0.19 (0.27)	-0.71* (0.40)	0.30 (0.38)	-0.19 (0.26)	-0.77* (0.39)	0.32 (0.36)
Pre-1960 Civil War				0.11 (0.18)	0.04 (0.24)	0.14 (0.20)
Ethnic Fractionalization				-0.11 (0.53)	-0.09 (0.73)	-0.33 (0.60)
Constant				4.51** (2.09)	0.69 (2.64)	8.26** (2.93)
Dependent Variable	Successful Coup	Successful Reshuffling Coup	Successful Regime Change Coup	Successful Coup	Successful Reshuffling Coup	Successful Regime Change Coup
Log-likelihood	-189.47	-93.17	-104.11	-301.29	-172.17	-170.11
Decade Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Country Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	No	No
Country Random Effects	No	No	No	Yes	Yes	Yes
N =	1088	640	750	2836	2836	2836

Standard errors clustered
by country in parentheses
** $p < .05$; * $p < .10$

and no decade fixed effects. In both tables, the three models in columns 1–3 include the same variables included in the specifications reported in the main text. Again, the results for the terrorism variables are no different, although some of the other variables that were not significant in the fixed effects specifications become significant for one or more of the dependent variables, e.g., ethnic fractionalization in the regime change coup model. The three models in columns 4–6 in each table report the simplest bivariate specifications. Thus, the models in columns 4–6 only include the terrorism variable, and do not include any fixed effects, any other regressors. The relationship between terrorism and reshuffling coups is no different in this simple bivariate specification. Terrorist attacks have a significant and negative effect on the probability of a regime change coup, which is a result that obviously does not survive the inclusion of other regressors and/or fixed effects. In short, our key result, that terrorism significantly increases the probability of a reshuffling coup, are robust to virtually any variation in model specification.

Linear Probability Models

Table 24 contains the results of linear probability models with country and year fixed effects for both coup attempts and successes. To show that our terrorism finding is robust we only include the terrorism variable, although our key findings are robust if we include the other variables included in the main text as well. OLS with two-way fixed effects shows that our results are not dependent on functional form, and further shows that our key finding is not model dependent.

Table 20: Terrorism and Attempted Coups: No Fixed Effects

	Model I	Model II	Model III	Model IV	Model V	Model VI
Log of Terrorist Attacks $_{t-1}$	0.17* (0.09)	0.36** (0.12)	-0.15 (0.11)	0.21** (0.09)	0.38** (0.11)	-0.06 (0.15)
Log GDP per capita $_{t-1}$	-0.71** (0.14)	-0.49** (0.20)	-0.94** (0.17)	-0.71** (0.13)	-0.51** (0.18)	-0.93** (0.20)
Log Population $_{t-1}$	-0.19** (0.11)	-0.09 (0.17)	-0.25 (0.15)	-0.18** (0.09)	-0.10 (0.12)	-0.24* (0.12)
Low Intensity Civil War $_{t-1}$	0.47* (0.25)	0.20 (0.38)	0.66** (0.30)	0.47* (0.27)	0.19 (0.39)	0.69* (0.36)
High Intensity Civil War $_{t-1}$	-0.24 (0.44)	-0.63 (0.75)	0.13 (0.42)	-0.27 (0.39)	-0.61 (0.55)	0.11 (0.53)
Log of Protests $_{t-1}$	0.36* (0.20)	0.29 (0.23)	0.37 (0.25)	0.34** (0.15)	0.31 (0.20)	0.36 (0.23)
Economic Growth $_{t-1}$	-2.72 (1.71)	-1.54 (2.32)	-3.64 (2.36)	-2.78* (1.63)	-1.14 (2.48)	-3.84* (2.10)
Neighbor Coups	-0.06 (0.21)	-0.63* (0.35)	0.44* (0.26)	0.07 (0.21)	-0.58* (0.31)	0.63** (0.30)
Pre-1960 Civil War	0.04 (0.12)	-0.12 (0.17)	0.19 (0.25)	0.04 (0.11)	-0.11 (0.15)	0.18 (0.14)
Ethnic Fractionalization	0.23 (0.43)	0.08 (0.65)	0.31 (0.52)	0.21 (0.33)	0.03 (0.46)	0.28 (0.46)
Constant	4.10** (1.49)	1.37 (2.26)	5.06** (1.61)			
Dependent Variable	Attempted Coups	Attempted Reshuffling Coups	Attempted Regime Change Coups	Attempted Coups	Attempted Reshuffling Coups	Attempted Regime Change Coups
Log-likelihood	-511.51	-290.54	-303.60	-446.36	-234.75	-248.19
Year Fixed Effects	No	No	No	Yes	Yes	Yes
Decade Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	No	No
Country Fixed Effects	No	No	No	No	No	No
Country Random Effects	No	No	No	No	No	No
N =	2836	2836	2836	2778	2269	2324

Standard errors clustered
by country in parentheses
** $p < .05$; * $p < .10$

Table 21: Terrorism and Successful Coups: No Fixed Effects

	Model I	Model II	Model III	Model IV	Model V	Model VI
Log of Terrorist Attacks $_{t-1}$	0.26** (0.12)	0.44** (0.17)	-0.01 (0.15)	0.36** (0.12)	0.51** (0.15)	0.13 (0.22)
Log GDP per capita $_{t-1}$	-0.86** (0.17)	-0.42** (0.17)	-1.46** (0.28)	-0.91** (0.20)	-0.50** (0.25)	-1.50** (0.34)
Log Population $_{t-1}$	-0.24* (0.13)	-0.27 (0.20)	-0.23 (0.17)	-0.25** (0.12)	-0.28 (0.18)	-0.24 (0.17)
Low Intensity Civil War $_{t-1}$	0.42 (0.36)	0.12 (0.52)	0.70 (0.43)	0.40 (0.38)	0.03 (0.55)	0.81 (0.52)
High Intensity Civil War $_{t-1}$	-0.85 (0.62)	-1.60* (1.19)	-0.19 (0.69)	-1.05 (0.68)	-1.76* (1.11)	-0.31 (0.88)
Log of Protests $_{t-1}$	0.17 (0.26)	0.10 (0.30)	0.21 (0.38)	0.12 (0.23)	0.09 (0.30)	0.14 (0.37)
Economic Growth $_{t-1}$	0.53 (1.89)	1.08 (1.81)	-0.03 (3.44)	-0.01 (2.51)	1.20 (3.48)	-0.60 (3.57)
Neighbor Coups	-0.17 (0.28)	-0.75 (0.51)	0.32 (0.36)	0.01 (0.29)	-0.79* (0.44)	0.69* (0.42)
Pre-1960 Civil War	0.07 (0.14)	0.02 (0.22)	0.14 (0.15)	0.10 (0.15)	0.03 (0.22)	0.18 (0.20)
Ethnic Fractionalization	-0.15 (0.44)	-0.05 (0.64)	-0.34 (0.50)	-0.25 (0.45)	-0.08 (0.66)	-0.51 (0.61)
Constant	5.21** (1.67)	1.88 (2.15)	8.23** (2.52)			
Dependent Variable	Successful Coup	Successful Reshuffling Coup	Successful Regime Change Coup	Successful Coup	Successful Reshuffling Coup	Successful Regime Change Coup
Log-likelihood	-300.63	-168.93	-170.11	-248.44	-130.65	-127.97
Year Fixed Effects	No	No	No	Yes	Yes	Yes
Decade Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	No	No
Country Fixed Effects	No	No	No	No	No	No
Country Random Effects	No	No	No	No	No	No
N =	2836	2836	2836	2179	1939	1686

Standard errors clustered
by country in parentheses
** $p < .05$; * $p < .10$

Table 22: Terrorism and Coup Attempts: No Time Fixed Effects & Bivariate Results

	Model I	Model II	Model III	Model IV	Model V	Model VI
Log of Terrorist Attacks $_{t-1}$	0.07 (0.08)	0.26** (0.10)	-0.22 (0.15)	0.05 (0.09)	0.21** (0.09)	-0.22* (0.12)
Log GDP per capita $_{t-1}$	-0.68** (0.13)	-0.45** (0.17)	-0.94** (0.20)			
Log Population $_{t-1}$	-0.24** (0.09)	-0.19 (0.12)	-0.28** (0.12)			
Low Intensity Civil War $_{t-1}$	0.43 (0.26)	0.18 (0.37)	0.66* (0.35)			
High Intensity Civil War $_{t-1}$	-0.14 (0.38)	-0.46 (0.54)	0.17 (0.52)			
Log of Protests $_{t-1}$	0.42** (0.15)	0.40** (0.19)	0.40* (0.23)			
Economic Growth $_{t-1}$	-1.62 (1.50)	0.22 (2.24)	-3.28* (1.98)			
Neighbor Coups	0.17 (0.18)	-0.32 (0.27)	0.57** (0.25)			
Pre-1960 Civil War	0.11 (0.10)	-0.04 (0.15)	0.24* (0.14)			
Ethnic Fractionalization	0.09 (0.33)	-0.08 (0.46)	0.22 (0.46)			
Constant	3.82** (1.32)	1.20 (1.79)	4.93** (1.94)	-2.99** (0.14)	-3.87** (0.20)	-3.53** (0.16)
Dependent Variable	Attempted Coup	Attempted Reshuffling Coup	Attempted Regime Change Coup	Attempted Coup	Attempted Reshuffling Coup	Attempted Regime Change Coup
Log-likelihood	-523.30	-301.28	-306.00	-580.29	-334.92	-343.68
Year Fixed Effects	No	No	No	No	No	No
Decade Fixed Effects	No	No	No	No	No	No
Country Fixed Effects	No	No	No	No	No	No
Country Random Effects	No	No	No	No	No	No
N =	2836	2836	2836	2937	2937	2937

Standard errors clustered
by country in parentheses
** $p < .05$; * $p < .10$

Table 23: Terrorism and Coup Successes: No Time Fixed Effects & Bivariate Results

	Model I	Model II	Model III	Model IV	Model V	Model VI
Log of Terrorist Attacks $_{t-1}$	0.14 (0.12)	0.33** (0.15)	-0.18 (0.21)	0.001 (0.11)	0.15 (0.14)	-0.25* (0.14)
Log GDP per capita $_{t-1}$	-0.82** (0.18)	-0.41* (0.23)	-1.41** (0.32)			
Log Population $_{t-1}$	-0.33** (0.12)	-0.41** (0.18)	-0.27 (0.17)			
Low Intensity Civil War $_{t-1}$	0.36** (0.37)	0.12 (0.53)	0.59 (0.50)			
High Intensity Civil War $_{t-1}$	-0.72 (0.65)	-1.48 (1.10)	-0.09 (0.80)			
Log of Protests $_{t-1}$	0.29 (0.22)	0.24 (0.29)	0.27 (0.36)			
Economic Growth $_{t-1}$	1.30 (2.31)	2.62 (3.31)	0.03 (3.22)			
Neighbor Coups	0.11 (0.25)	-0.38 (0.38)	0.52 (0.35)			
Pre-1960 Civil War	0.16 (0.14)	0.15 (0.21)	0.20 (0.20)			
Ethnic Fractionalization	-0.36 (0.45)	-0.22 (0.66)	-0.56 (0.60)			
Constant	5.07** (1.82)	2.06 (2.41)	7.97** (2.93)	-3.63** (0.18)	-4.43** (0.24)	-4.22** (0.20)
Dependent Variable	Successful Coup	Successful Reshuffling Coup	Successful Regime Change Coup	Successful Coup	Successful Reshuffling Coup	Successful Regime Change Coup
Log-likelihood	-311.90	-176.54	-174.19	-352.74	-206.47	-197.50
Year Fixed Effects	No	No	No	No	No	No
Decade Fixed Effects	No	No	No	No	No	No
Country Fixed Effects	No	No	No	No	No	No
Country Random Effects	No	No	No	No	No	No
N =	2836	2836	2836	3087	3087	3087

Standard errors clustered
by country in parentheses
** $p < .05$; * $p < .10$

Table 24: Terrorism and Coups: Linear Probability Models

	Model I	Model II	Model III	Model IV	Model V	Model VI
Log of Terrorist Attacks _{t-1}	0.008 (0.005)	0.009** (0.003)	-0.001 (0.003)	0.005 (0.003)	0.0047* (0.0024)	0.0001 (0.0025)
Constant	-0.51** (0.22)	-0.43** (0.15)	-0.08 (0.16)	-0.25 (0.16)	-0.21* (0.11)	-0.04 (0.11)
Dependent Variable	Attempted Coup	Attempted Reshuffling Coup	Attempted Regime Change Coup	Successful Coup	Successful Reshuffling Coup	Successful Regime Change Coup
Year Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Decade Fixed Effects	No	No	No	No	No	No
Country Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Country Random Effects	No	No	No	No	No	No
N =	2937	2937	2937	2937	2937	2937

Standard errors clustered

by country in parentheses

** $p < .05$; * $p < .10$

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