Christian Houle. 2015 "Ethnic Inequality and the Dismantling of Democracy: A Global Analysis" *World Politics* 67(3).

Supplementary Material

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1 Description of the Data Set

This paper uses a number of surveys to construct indicators of inequality between and within ethnic groups. The main survey on which it relies is the Demographic and Health Survey (DHS). The Measure DHS Project has conducted over 260 surveys in more than 90 developing countries since the 1980s. The Measure DHS Project is financed by the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID). In each country, the sample contains between 5,000 and 30,000 households and is nationally representative. The surveys mainly ask questions about health issues, including AIDS/HIV. Unfortunately, there is no question on income. However, there are questions about the ownership of certain goods (television, fridge, radio, car and bicycle), and access to services (electricity). I use that information to construct an asset-based wealth indicator varying between 0 and 6 that gives the number of goods (services) that each respondent possess (has access to). Many surveys include the ethnicity of the respondent. In those cases, I use this information to construct indicators of BGI and WGI based on asset ownership.

Many democracies that are ethnically heterogeneous are not covered by the DHS. In many other countries while the DHS has conducted surveys, questions on the ethnicity of the respondents have not been asked. I also use five additional surveys to calculate BGI and WGI for countries for which I could not rely on the DHS. First, I use the Afrobarometer. Only one observation included in the main analysis is only covered by the Afrobarometer (Burundi). However, as shown in Table A13, section 6, of the supplementary material, results are robust when I only rely on the Afrobarometer. Like the DHS, the Afrobarometer asks questions on asset ownership (radio, television and motor vehicle). I again use this information to calculate BGI/WGI.

Many of my observations are drawn from the World Values Survey (WVS). I use a question in which respondents are asked to place themselves on a scale from 1 to 10,

Table A1: List of Countries Covered by the Analysis

	<i>u</i>	0
Albania (DHS, WVS)	Liberia (DHS)	Turkey (DHS, ISSP)
Argentina (Latinobarometro)	Lithuania (WVS)	Uganda (DHS, WVS, Afrobarometer)
Armenia (DHS)	Macedonia (WVS)	Ukraine (WVS)
Australia (WVS)	Madagascar (DHS, Afrobarometer)	United Kingdom (WVS)
Bangladesh (DHS, WVS)	Malawi (DHS, Afrobarometer)	United States of America (WVS)
*Belarus (WVS)	Mali (DHS, WVS, Afrobarometer)	Uruguay (WVS)
Belgium (ISSP)	Mexico (Latinobarometro)	Venezuela (Latinobarometro)
Benin (DHS, Afrobarometer)	Moldova (DHS, WVS)	
Bolivia (DHS)	*Mozambique (DHS, Afrobarometer)	
Brazil (DHS, WVS)	Nepal (DHS)	
Bulgaria (WVS)	Netherlands (WVS)	
Burundi (Afrobarometer)	New Zealand (WVS)	
Canada (WVS)	Nicaragua (Latinobarometro)	
Central African Republic (DHS)	Niger (DHS, Afrobarometer)	
Chile (Latinobarometro)	Nigeria (DHS, WVS, Afrobarometer)	
Colombia (DHS, WVS)	Pakistan (DHS, WVS)	
Congo, Republic (DHS)	Panama (Latinobarometro)	
Costa Rica (Latinobarometro)	Paraguay (WVS)	
Croatia (ISSP)	Peru (DHS, WVS)	
Czech Republic (ISSP)	Philippines (DHS, WVS)	
Ecuador (WVS)	Romania (WVS)	
Estonia (WVS)	*Russia (WVS)	
Finland (ISSP)	Senegal (DHS, Afrobarometer)	
Georgia (WVS)	Sierra Leone (DHS, Afrobarometer)	
Ghana (DHS, WVS, Afrobarometer)	Slovakia (WVS)	
Greece (CSES)	Slovenia (WVS)	
Guatemala (DHS, WVS)	*South Africa (DHS, WVS, Afrobarometer)	
Honduras (DHS, Latinobarometro)	Spain (WVS)	
Hungary (WVS)	Sri Lanka (DHS)	
India (DHS, WVS)	**Sudan (DHS)	
Indonesia (WVS)	Switzerland (WVS)	
Kenya (DHS, Afrobarometer)	Taiwan (WVS)	
Kyrgyzstan (DHS, WVS)	Thailand (WVS)	
Latvia (WVS)	Trinidad and Tobago (DHS, WVS)	

Note: Surveys in parentheses. DHS refers to the Demographic and Health Surveys; WVS to the World Value Surveys; ISSP to the International Social Survey Program; and CSES to the Comparative Study of the Electoral Systems. * Only included in the analysis that uses the measure of democracy of Boix et al. (2013) (Table A14 of the supplementary material).

** Measures inequality between and within religious rather than ethnic groups. All results are robust to the exclusion of Sudan (available upon request).

where 1 indicate the lowest income group and 10 the highest.¹ I also use the Latinobarometro, which has a similar question. Like the DHS and Afrobarometer, the WVS and Latinobarometro often ask the ethnicity of the respondents.

The two other surveys that I used are the International Social Survey Program (ISSP) and the Comparative Study of the Electoral Systems (CSES). These are used for only four

¹In the 6th wave of the WVS this is question V239: "On this card is an income scale on which 1 indicates the lowest income group and 10 the highest income group in your country. We would like to know in what group your household is. Please, specify the appropriate number, counting all wages, salaries, pensions and other incomes that come in." (Belgium, Croatia, Czech Republic and Finland) and one (Greece) countries respectively.² The ISSP and CSES directly ask questions on the income of the respondents.³ I used this information to create ten income groups (as in the WVS and Latinobarometro).

In the main analysis, I merge data from different sources by taking advantage of the fact that many countries are covered by multiple surveys. When it is available, I rely on the DHS. I proceed as follow. First, I calculate the systematic difference between BGI/WGI calculated based on the DHS and Afrobarometer using the countries covered by both survey. I then adjust the BGI/WGI values on Burundi (the only country available from the Afrobarometer but not the DHS) so that they are comparable to the observations based on the DHS.

Second, I use the 19 countries that are covered by surveys using both asset-based wealth questions (DHS or Afrobarometer) and income questions (WVS, Latinobarometro, ISSP or CSES): Albania, Bangladesh, Brazil, Colombia, Ghana, Guatemala, Honduras, India, Kyrgyzstan, Mali, Moldova, Nigeria, Pakistan, Peru, the Philippines, South Africa, Trinidad and Tobago, Turkey and Uganda. In the main text, I use these countries to calculate the systematic difference in BGI and WGI in the use of these two types of questions, and adjust the values calculated with income questions to render them comparable to those constructed from asset-based wealth questions.⁴

²The ISSP also covers Turkey, but I use data from the DHS rather than the ISSP to calculate BGI/WGI in the main estimations. The observations on Turkey are used, however, when I calculate the systematic differences between surveys (in order to merge the data from different sources).

³For example, the ISSP in Croatia asks "Please state your family monthly income (incomes of all family members together) - including salaries, pensions, child benefits, income from rents and all other sources of income (after deduction)."

⁴Because there are few countries that are covered by the ISSP, CSES and Latino-

In section 3 of the supplementary material, I show that the results are robust to the use of different means to standardize the observations across data sources and when I only use data from the DHS.

Surveys that ask asset ownership questions tend to cover the poorest countries (DHS and Afrobarometer) whereas those that ask questions more directly related to income cover richer countries (WVS, ISSP, CSES, and to a lesser degree Latinobarometro). Monetize income is simply not as relevant in poor countries because most of the population has little access to cash income and does not monetize its income (Baldwin and Huber 2010). For example, the Afrobarometer does not ask questions on income simply because such information would be unreliable in Africa (Bratton 2008). The authors that use the Afrobarometer to study income/poverty typically instead use asset ownership questions as I have done in this paper (e.g., Dionne, Inman and Montinola 2014).

Table A1 lists the 75 countries included in the analysis as well as the surveys used to calculate the BGI/WGI values.⁵ Only eighth countries that have been democratic during at least one year during the period covered and that are ethnically heterogeneous (and thus that can be used to study the effect of ethnic inequality on democratic consolidation)

barometro, and because the questions they ask are similar to those of the WVS, I only calculate the systematic difference between the DHS and Afrobarometer, on the one hand, and DHS and WVS, ISSP, CSES and Latinobarometro, on the other hand. In other words, I treat observations emanating from the WVS, ISSP, CSES and Latinobarometro in the same way. Results are robust to the exclusion of the observations from the WVS, ISSP, CSES or Latinobarometro (available upon request).

⁵In the case of Sudan, the ethnicity of the respondents is not available. Since religion is a salient cleavage in Sudan (Emizet 1999), I instead calculate inequality within and between religious groups. All results are unchanged if Sudan is omitted from the analysis (available upon request). are missing from the data set: the Dominican Republic, France, the Gambia, Guinea-Bissau, Israel, Lebanon, Myanmar, and Mongolia. Table A2 ranks all countries from the one with the highest to lowest BGI.



Figure A1: Density Distribution of the Group-Level BGI₁



Figure A2: Density Distribution of the Group-Level BGI₂

Note: The group-level BGI2 includes only politically excluded groups, and measures inequality between that group and its country's dominant group(s) (defined as all politically included groups).

Note: For all ethnic groups, the group-level BGI_1 gives inequality between that group and its country's average.





Note: The group-level WGI1 refers to inequality within each ethnic group and covers all ethnic groups.

Figure A4: Density Distribution of the Group-Level WGI₂

Note: The group-level WGI_2 refers to inequality within each ethnic group and covers only excluded groups.

Next, Table A3 gives summary statistics of the group-level BGI and WGI as well as the other group-level variables. In addition to the usual summary statistics (mean, median, etc.) Table A1 gives the standard deviation within ethnic groups. As shown in the table, the probability that an ethnic group initiates a breakdown is only 0.8 percent per year.

Figures A1-A4 give the density distribution of the group-level BGI_1 , BGI_2 , WGI_1 and WGI_2 . As seen in the figures, there are a number of outliers. In section 7 of the supplementary material, I demonstrate that the results are robust to the exclusion of outliers. In particular, I show that the results reported in column 1 of Table 1 in the main text are robust to the exclusion of BGI_1 values above about 16. Similarly, results reported in column 3 of Table 1 remain unchanged when BGI_2 values above 8 are excluded (available upon request).

Figure A5: Density Distribution of the Country-Level BGI₁

Note: The country-level BGI_1 refers to the average inequality level between all ethnic groups of a country and the country's average (i.e. it is the weighted average of all the group-level BGI_1 of a country).

Table A4 presents summary statistics for the country-level indicators. Figures A5-A8 give density distributions. The likelihood that a democracy collapses within any given year is 2.4 percent.

Figure A6: Density Distribution of the Country-Level BGI₂

Note: The country-level BGI₂ refers to the average inequality level between politically excluded ethnic groups and the dominant ethnic groups (defined as all politically included groups) (i.e. it is the weighted average of all the group-level BGI₂ of a country).

Figure A7: Density Distribution of the Country-Level WGI_1

Note: The country-level WGI₁ refers to the average inequality level within all ethnic groups of a country (i.e. it is the weighted average of all the group-level WGI₁ of a country).

	Tuble 112. Running of Countries by DOI	
1. Peru		67. Kyrgyzstan
2 Uganda		68 Colombia
2. Ceana		60 Polivic
5. Sierra Leone		09. DOIIVIA
4. Mozambique		70. Benin
5. Guatemala		71. Trinidad and Tobago
6. Sri Lanka		72. Malawi
7 Madagascar		73 Honduras
9 Courth Africa		74 Albania
8. South Africa		74. Albania
9. Nigeria		75. Armenia
10. Central African Republic		
11. Mali		
12 India		
13. Niger		
14. Romania		
15. Bangladesh		
16. Slovakia		
17 Hungary		
19. Sonogal		
19. Bulgaria		
20. Liberia		
21. Canada		
22. Ecuador		
23. Czech Republic		
24. Coorgia		
25. Macedonia		
26. New Zealand		
27. Greece		
28. Taiwan		
29. Australia		
30 Netherlands		
21 United Vinadam		
32. Mexico		
33. United States of America		
34. Latvia		
35. Panama		
36 Slovenia		
37. Finland		
38. Venezuela		
39. Paraguay		
40. Belarus		
41. Nicaragua		
42 Belgium		
42. Dergrund		
45. Switzerland		
44. Spain		
45. Russia		
46. Estonia		
47. Indonesia		
48. Uruguay		
49 Argentina		
50 Croatia		
52. Lithuania		
53. Chile		
54. Ukraine		
55. Costa Rica		
56 Nepal		
57 Philippines		
so. sudan		
59. Kenya		
60. Burundi		
61. Pakistan		
62. Ghana		
63 Moldova		
64 Brazil		
04. Drazil		
65. Congo, Kepublic		
66. lurkey		

Table A2: Ranking of Countries by BGI

Note: Ranks countries from highest to lowest BGI.

	Mean	Median	St. Dev.	St. Dev. w/in Groups	Min.	Max.
Breakdown	0.008	0	0.091	0.086	0	1
BGI_1	1.296	0.467	5.146	1.174	2.90e-07	82.123
WGI_1	0.319	0.305	0.095	0.016	0.115	0.758
BGI_2	2.108	0.779	4.7	0.108	0.00029	31.808
WGI_2	0.321	0.303	0.106	0.018	0.115	0.758
Size	0.286	0.12	0.314	0	0.01	0.979
Excluded	0.405	0	0.491	0.13	0	1
Poor	0.531	1	0.499	0	0	1

Table A3: Summary Statistics: Group-Level Indicators

Note: The group-level BGI_1 refers to inequality between all ethnic groups and the country's average. The group-level WGI_1 refers to inequality within all ethnic groups. The group-level BGI_2 refers to inequality between politically excluded groups and dominant group(s) (defined as all politically included groups). The group-level WGI_2 refers to inequality within politically excluded groups and dominant group(s) (defined as all politically included groups). The group-level WGI_2 refers to inequality within politically excluded ethnic groups.

Table A4: Summary Statistics: Country-Level Indicators						
	Mean	Median	St. Dev.	St. Dev. w/in Countries	Min.	Max.
Breakdown	0.024	0	0.154	0.147	0	1
BGI_1	0.605	0.462	0.794	0.249	0.000169	6.53
WGI_1	0.31	0.302	0.089	0.015	0.136	0.693
BGI_2	1.993	0.825	3.65	1.32	0.0009624	31.101
WGI_2	0.321	0.306	0.094	0.021	0.116	0.739
$GDP \ pc$	8.514	8.599	1.015	0.249	6.126	10.342
Growth	1.756	2.267	4.621	4.398	-40.781	26.887
Oil	0.182	0.006	0.553	0.351	0	6.638
$Ethnic \ frac.$	31.105	31	21.037	0	1	82
Muslim	10.74	0	25.836	0	0	99.2
Western	0.302	0	0.459	0	0	1
% World Dem.	0.466	0.519	0.114	0.096	0.271	0.597
Age	31.444	15	35.219	9.625	1	137
Geo. Disp.	0.666	0.667	0.211	0.085	0	0.926
Size Dom.	0.801	0.845	0.171	0.06	0.1	1
Power Sharing	0.39	0	0.488	0.193	0	1

Note: The country-level BGI_1 refers to the average inequality level between all ethnic groups of a country and the country's average (i.e. it is the weighted average of all the group-level BGI_1 of a country). The country-level WGI_1 refers to the average inequality level within all ethnic groups of a country (i.e. it is the weighted average of all the group-level WGI_1 of a country). The country-level BGI_2 refers to the average inequality level between politically excluded ethnic groups and the dominant ethnic groups (defined as all politically included groups) (i.e. it is the weighted average of all the group-level BGI_2 of a country). The country-level BGI_2 refers to the average inequality level between politically excluded ethnic groups and the dominant ethnic groups (defined as all politically included groups) (i.e. it is the weighted average of all the group-level BGI_2 of a country). The country-level WGI_2 refers to the average inequality level within all politically excluded ethnic groups of a country (i.e. it is the weighted average of all the group-level WGI_2 of a country).

Figure A8: Density Distribution of the Country-Level WGI_2

Note: The country-level WGI_2 refers to the average inequality level within all politically excluded ethnic groups of a country (i.e. it is the weighted average of all the group-level WGI_2 of a country).

2 Geographical Dispersion Variables

To measure the extent to which ethnic groups are geographical dispersed, I rely on the ethnic-geographical cross-cuttingness (EGC) measure of Selway (2011). The EGC takes the value one if there is complete dispersion of ethnic groups (i.e. geography and ethnicity completely cross-cut each other) and zero if there is perfect concentration (i.e. geography and ethnicity completely reinforce each other).

Oses an Anternative Measure of Geographical Dispersi	
$\overline{BGI_{1,t-1}}$.333 (.091)***
$WGI_{1,t-1}$	1.684 (.773)**
$BGI_{1,t-1} * WGI_{1,t-1}$	927 (.286)***
$Size_{t-1}$	1.064 (.361)***
$Excluded_{t-1}$	523 (.230)**
$Poor_{t-1}$	308 (.179)*
$GDP \ pc_{t-1}$	151 (.164)
$Growth_{t-1}$.030 (.020)
Oil_{t-1}	154 (.307)
$Ethnic frac{t-1}$.002 (.005)
$Muslim_{t-1}$	001 (.002)
$Western_{t-1}$	681 (.211)***
% World Dem. _{t-1}	-4.275 (.852)***
Age_{t-1}	063 (.021)***
Geo. $Disp_{\cdot t-1}$.028 (.152)
# Countries # Ethnic Groups	58 203
N Log-pseudolik.	4524 -151.14

Table A5: Group-Level Probit Analysis of the Effect of BGI on Democratic Breakdowns – Uses an Alternative Measure of Geographical Dispersion

Note: Redoes model 2 of Table 1 with the measure of geographical dispersion of ethnic groups of the Minority at Risk (MAR) Project. Robust standard errors clustered by country in parentheses. For all ethnic groups, the group-level BGI_1 gives inequality between that group and its country's average. The group-level WGI_1 refers to inequality within each ethnic group and covers all ethnic groups. ***p < .01, **p < .05 and *p < .1.

Unfortunately, EGC has many missing values. Therefore, I also construct another measure of geographical dispersion, MAR, from the Minorities at Risk (MAR) Project. For each minority at risk, the MAR codes a variable GROUPCON ranging from 0 to 3,

where 0 indicates that an ethnic group is widely dispersed and 3 that it is concentrated in one region. Since there are few groups that are directly captured by the MAR, for each country, I construct an aggregated measure of the spatial distribution of groups, MAR, by averaging each of the GROUPCON scores. I reverse the index, to make it more easily comparable to the EGC (i.e. higher values indicate more dispersion). I then use the countries for which both indicators are available to estimate the systematic difference between the two indicators and predict the missing values for the EGC. In Table A5, I redo the estimation presented in model 2 of Table 1 but with the MAR rather than the EGC.⁶

⁶This regression includes only observations available from the Minority at Risk project (i.e. I do not use the EGC to predict missing values of the MAR variable).

3 Standardization of Observations Across Data Sources

The main analysis uses observations from different surveys. As explained above, I used countries that are covered by multiple surveys to account for the systematic differences between surveys. Here, I show that my results are robust to several alternative means to account for the issue. First, in Table A6, I demonstrate that my results remain when I only use democracies for which DHS data is available. This enables us to be confident that my results are not driven by differences across data sources.

$\overline{BGI_{1,t-1}}$.165 (.055)***
$WGI_{1,t-1}$.702 (.885)
$BGI_{1,t-1} * WGI_{1,t-1}$	- <u>.324</u> (.146)**
$Size_{t-1}$	1.033 (.363)***
$Excluded_{t-1}$	560 (.233)**
$Poor_{t-1}$	446 (.183)**
$GDP \ pc_{t-1}$	315 (.183)*
$Growth_{t-1}$.007 (.016)
Oil_{t-1}	.087 (.208)
$Ethnic frac{t-1}$.002 (.004)
$Muslim_{t-1}$	002 (.002)
% World Dem. _{t-1}	-3.990 (.875)***
Age_{t-1}	069 (.028)**
# Countries	37
# Ethnic Groups	113
N	1833
Log-pseudolik.	-113.232

Table A6: Group-Level Probit Analysis of the Effect of BGI on Democratic Breakdowns – Uses only Data from the DHS

Note: Redoes model 1 of Table 1 using only data from the DHS. Robust standard errors clustered by ethnic group in parentheses. For all ethnic groups, the group-level BGI_1 gives inequality between that group and its country's average. The group-level WGI_1 refers to inequality within each ethnic group and covers all ethnic groups. ***p < .05 and *p < .1.

Moreover, Table A7 redoes model 1 of Table 1 using different ways to adjust observations drawn from different sources. Column 1 uses observations from the WVS, Afrobarometer, CSES, ISSP and Latinobarometro to impute values that are missing in the DHS. Next, I ran regressions with BGI/WGI as the dependent variable, and the different con-

	Multiple Imputation	Adds Constants	Without Adjustment
	(1)	(2)	(3)
$\overline{BGI_{1,t-1}}$.285	.242	.188
	(.072)***	(.081)***	(.056)***
$BGI_{1,t-1}$	1.124	1.243	1.255
	(.629)*	(.669)*	(.642)*
$BGI_{1,t-1} * WGI_{1,t-1}$	731	622	452
	(.250)***	(.258)**	(.189)**
$Size_{t-1}$	$\frac{1.062}{(.313)^{***}}$	1.094 (.319)***	1.134 (.316)***
$Excluded_{t-1}$	563	549	572
	(.219)**	(.217)**	(.219)***
$Poor_{t-1}$	361	368	377
	(.161)**	(.165)**	(.171)**
$GDP \ pc_{t-1}$	259	249	217
	(.124)**	(.125)**	(.122)*
$Growth_{t-1}$.027	.027	.028
	(.017)	(.016)	(.017)
Oil_{t-1}	144	137	120
	(.275)	(.271)	(.255)
$Ethnic frac{t-1}$.003	.003	.003
	(.005)	(.005)	(.005)
$Muslim_{t-1}$	002	002	002
	(.002)	(.002)	(.002)
$Western_{t-1}$	602	617	639
	(.230)***	(.218)***	(.240)***
$\% World \ Dem{t-1}$	-3.912	-3.935	-3.989
	(.752)***	(.765)***	(.767)***
Age_{t-1}	062	062	060
	(.018)***	(.019)***	(.019)***
DHS			077 (.177)
# Countries	71	71	71
# Ethnic Groups	241	241	241
N	5208	5208	5208
Log-pseudolik.	-168.515	-168.814	-168.806

Table A7: Group-Level Probit Analysis of the Effect of BGI on Democratic Breakdowns – Uses Alternative Standardization Methods

Note: Redoes model 1 of Table 1 using different ways to adjust observations drawn from different sources. Column 1 uses observations from the WVS, Afrobarometer, CSES and Latinobarometro to impute values that are missing in the DHS. Next, I ran regressions with BGI/WGI as the dependent variable, and the different controls used in the analysis and dummy variables for the different surveys as independent variables (available upon request). I then use the estimated coefficients to standardize the data. Results using this procedure are presented in column 2. Column 3 simply uses the unadjusted values with a dummy variable for observations taken from the DHS. Robust standard errors clustered by ethnic group in parentheses. For all ethnic groups, the group-level BGI_1 gives inequality between that group and its country's average. The group-level WGI_1 refers to inequality within each ethnic group and covers all ethnic groups. ***p < .01, **p < .05 and *p < .1.

trols used in the analysis and dummy variables for the different surveys as independent variables (available upon request). I then use the estimated coefficients on the dummy variables to standardize the data. Results using this procedure are presented in column 2. This method differs from the one used in the main text in that it employs all observations to calculate the difference across surveys (rather than only those that are covered by different surveys as in the main analysis).⁷ One disadvantage with the method used in

⁷In the main analysis, I proceed as follow. First, I calculate the systematic difference between BGI/WGI calculated based on the DHS and Afrobarometer using the countries covered by both survey. I then adjust

column 2 is that contrary to that used in the main text it implicitly assumes that there are no systematic differences between the samples covered by the different surveys, which is clearly not the case. For example, countries covered by the DHS and Afrobarometer are clearly on average poorer than those covered by the WVS, CSES and ISSP.

Column 3 of Table A7 simply uses the unadjusted values with a dummy variable for observations taken from the DHS (*DHS*). Finally, in Table A8, I redo the analysis using the same standardization procedure as in the main text but with the *DHS* dummy variable. In all cases, the findings support my analysis. Table A13, section 6, of the supplementary material also shows that the results are robust when I only include values from the Afrobarometer.

the BGI/WGI values on Burundi (the only country available from the Afrobarometer but not the DHS) so that they are comparable to the observations based on the DHS. Second, I use the 19 countries that are covered by surveys using both asset-based wealth questions (DHS or Afrobarometer) and income questions (WVS, Latinobarometro, ISSP or CSES): Albania, Bangladesh, Brazil, Colombia, Ghana, Guatemala, Honduras, India, Kyrgyzstan, Mali, Moldova, Nigeria, Pakistan, Peru, the Philippines, South Africa, Trinidad and Tobago, Turkey and Uganda. In the main text, I use these countries to calculate the systematic difference in BGI and WGI in the use of these two types of questions, and adjust the values calculated with income questions to render them comparable to those constructed from asset-based wealth questions.

$\overline{BGI}_{1,t-1}$.266 (.065)***
$WGI_{1,t-1}$	1.493 (.665)**
$BGI_{1,t-1} * WGI_{1,t-1}$	662 (.225)***
$Size_{t-1}$	1.095 (.315)***
$Excluded_{t-1}$	577 (.219)***
$Poor_{t-1}$	369 (.167)**
$GDP \ pc_{t-1}$	201 (.132)
$Growth_{t-1}$.026 (.017)
Oil_{t-1}	144 (.264)
$Ethnic frac{t-1}$.003 (.005)
$Muslim_{t-1}$	002 (.002)
$Western_{t-1}$	549 (.222)**
% World Dem_{t-1}	-3.951 (.748)***
Age_{t-1}	060 (.019)***
DHS	.065 (.164)
# Countries	71
# Ethnic Groups	241
N	5208
Log-pseudolik.	-168.091

Table A8: Group-Level Probit Analysis of the Effect of BGI on Democratic Breakdowns- Includes a Dummy Variable for Observations Taken from the DHS

Note: Redoes model 1 of Table 1 with a dummy variable for observations taken from the DHS. Robust standard errors clustered by ethnic group in parentheses. For all ethnic groups, the group-level BGI_1 gives inequality between that group and its country's average. The group-level WGI_1 refers to inequality within each ethnic group and covers all ethnic groups. ***p < .01, **p < .05 and *p < .1.

4 Linear Models

Table A9 and A10 show that BGI has little (unconditional) effect on democratic breakdown in the group-level and country-level models, respectively.

$\overline{BGI}_{1,t-1}$.002 (.009)
$Size_{t-1}$	1.086 (.321)***
$Excluded_{t-1}$	548 (.217)**
$Poor_{t-1}$	363 (.165)**
$GDP \ pct-1$	-330 (.111)***
$Growth_{t-1}$.029 (.016)*
Oil_{t-1}	117 (.264)
$Ethnic frac{t-1}$.003 (.005)
$Muslim_{t-1}$	002 (.001)*
% World Dem. _{t-1}	-3.754 (.726)***
$Western_{t-1}$	480 (.202)**
Age_{t-1}	063 (.019)***
# Countries	71
# Ethnic Groups	241
N	5208
Log-pseudolik.	-170.572

Table A9: Group-Level Probit Analysis of the Effect of BGI on Democratic Breakdowns – Linear Model

Note: Robust standard errors clustered by country in parentheses. For all ethnic groups, the group-level BGI_1 gives inequality between that group and its country's average. ***p < .01, **p < .05 and *p < .1.

Table A10: Country-Level Probit Analysis of the Effect of BGI on Democratic Breakdowns – Linear Model

$BGI_{1,t-1}$.022 (.045)
$GDP \ pc_{t-1}$	339 (.130)***
$Growth_{t-1}$.025 (.019)
Oil_{t-1}	247 (.223)
$Ethnic frac{t-1}$	009 (.007)
$Muslim_{t-1}$	0008 (.003)
$Western_{t-1}$	511 (.419)
% World Dem. _{t-1}	-3.544 (.820)***
Age_{t-1}	009 (.008)
Size Dom_{t-1}	-1.405 (.503)***
Power $Sharing_{t-1}$.071 (.220)
# Countries	71
N	1607
Log-pseudolik.	-143.821

Note: Robust standard errors clustered by country in parentheses. The country-level BGI_1 refers to the average inequality level between all ethnic groups of a country and the country's average (i.e. it is the weighted average of all the group-level BGI_1 of a country). ***p < .05 and *p < .1.

5 Effect of BGI on Coups and Rebellions Against Democracies

In this section, I test the effect of BGI on coups and rebellions against democracies. There are two reasons why I extend the analysis to coups and rebellions. First, most democratic breakdowns occur as the results of coups (including self-coups) and/or rebellions; which is reflected by the fact that many authors model democratic breakdowns as coups (e.g., Acemoglu and Robinson 2006; Boix 2003; Dunning 2008). Yet there is nothing in my argument that implies that coups or rebellions that are unsuccessful are driven by different motives than those that succeed.

	Successful Coups	All Coups	All Coups and Rebellions
	(1)	(2)	(3)
$BGI_{1,t-1}$	1.385	1.026	1.086
	(.284)***	(.423)**	(.401)***
$WGI_{1,t-1}$	4.347	3.524	2.678
	(1.068)***	(.946)***	(.904)***
$BGI_{1,t-1} * WGI_{1,t-1}$	-3.800	-2.867	-2.821
	(.795)***	(1.183)**	(1.132)**
$GDP \ pc_{t-1}$	103	169	240
	(.173)	(.142)	(.126)*
$Growth_{t-1}$.022	.006	.006
	(.019)	(.013)	(.012)
Oil_{t-1}	448	123	113
	(.320)	(.104)	(.101)
$Ethnic frac{t-1}$	007	006	009
	(.006)	(.005)	(.005)*
$Muslim_{t-1}$.002	.001	.001
	(.002)	(.002)	(.002)
$Western_{t-1}$	802	597	595
	(.490)	(.257)**	(.294)**
$\% World Dem_{t-1}$	-4.690 $(.789)^{***}$	-3.670 (.865)***	-3.660 (.750)***
Age_{t-1}	007	014	004
	(.006)	(.008)*	(.005)
Size Dom_{t-1}	-1.803 (.433)****	$^{-1.178}_{(.405)^{***}}$	-1.263 (.390)***
Power $Sharing_{t-1}$	123	458	090
	(.239)	(.203)**	(.196)
# Countries	70	67	67
N	1547	1427	1427
Log-pseudolik.	-142.236	-208.644	-251.02

Table A11: Country-Level Probit Analysis of the Effect of BGI on Coups and Rebel-lions Against Democracies

Note: Robust standard errors clustered by country in parentheses. The country-level BGI_1 refers to the average inequality level between all ethnic groups of a country and the country's average (i.e. it is the weighted average of all the group-level BGI_1 of a country). The country-level WGI_1 refers to the average inequality level within all ethnic groups of a country (i.e. it is the weighted average of all the group-level WGI_1 of a country). ***p < .01, **p < .05 and *p < .1.

Second, looking at the conditions leading to coups and rebellions in democracies has

intrinsic value. Although many studies on coups and rebellions control for the regime type, most do not consider whether they are caused by distinct factors in different regimes (e.g., Roessler 2011; Powell 2012). Since the rules of the political game differ across regimes, we should expect players that opt to overthrow these sets of rules to have different motives in different regimes. Østby (2008), one of the few authors to have examined the question, has in fact demonstrated that inter-group inequality has a stronger effect on civil wars in democracies than in autocracies. Further, the previous literature has shown that inequality increases the likelihood that democracy breaks down but has no discernable effect on the likelihood that an autocracy democratizes; supporting the idea that inequality has different effects under different regimes (Houle 2009). Moreover, to my knowledge, there is no empirical studies looking at the effect of ethnic inequality on coups either in democracies or autocracies.

I use the civil war data of the Peace Research Institute Oslo (PRIO) and the coup data of Powell and Thyne (2011), which includes both failed and successful coups. To qualify as a civil war a conflict must oppose the government and a politically organized group and cause at least 1,000 battle-related deaths. Theoretically coups and rebellions may be caused by different factors. Since most breakdowns are caused by coups (including self-coups), I first test the effect of BGI on successful coups (including self-coups) in column 1.⁸ Column 2 adds failed coups, and column 3 civil wars. In all instances, results suggest that BGI increases the likelihood that a coup or rebellion is initiated within a given year, but only when WGI is low.⁹

⁸Self-coups are defined as cases in which democracy broke down without a military coup or rebellion being at the origin of the transition (although they may have occurred amid conflicts) (e.g., Peru 1990).

⁹I did not perform this analysis at the group-level because of the lack of information on the ethnicity of the coup leaders (outside sub-Saharan Africa). However, in section 6 of the supplementary material I do perform this analysis at the group-level using only sub-Saharan African democracies.

6 Effect of BGI on Democratic Consolidation in Sub-Saharan Africa

One potential problem with the analysis presented in the main text is that not all democratic breakdowns are driven by ethnic tensions. In this section, I thus reproduce the analysis with only sub-Saharan African countries. I use the data set of Roessler (2011) which indicates, for each coup and rebellion in sub-Saharan Africa between independence and 2005, whether ethnicity was relevant to the coup/rebellion as well as the ethnicity of its leader(s).

Column 1 of Table A12 tests the effect of BGI on the likelihood that an ethnic group initiates a democratic breakdown using BGI_1/WGI_1 . Since breakdowns almost always take the form of coups or rebellions, I use the data set of Roessler (2011) to determine whether ethnicity played a key role during the breakdown.¹⁰ Column 2 replicates the analysis using BGI_2/WGI_2 . As in the main analysis, the sample decreases substantially when I use BGI_2/WGI_2 (by about 76 percent). Therefore, I had to drop all control variables other than GDP per capita (the log-likelihood function does not converge otherwise). In both instance, results support my hypothesis.

As in section 5 of the supplementary material, I now look at the effect of BGI on coups/rebellions against democracies. As argued in section 5, most transitions to autocracy take the form of coups (including executive coups) or civil wars. This analysis thus enables us to gain further understanding of the conditions encouraging groups to challenge democracy (even when unsuccessful). Moreover, studying the effect of BGI/WGI on coups/rebellions has also intrinsic value. Note that I did not perform this analysis at the group-level outside sub-Saharan Africa because of the lack of information on the ethnicity of the coup/rebellion leaders (i.e. the data set of Rosseler (2011) only covers

¹⁰Since the data set of Roessler (2011) ends in 2005, some observations on sub-Saharan Africa that are included in the main analysis (e.g., observations on Liberia) are not included in Table A12.

	Democratic Breakdown		Succ. Coups	Succ. Coups All Coups		All Coups and Rebellions	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	
$BGI_{1,t-1}$.492 (.124)***		.737 (.185)***	.343 (.085)***	.349 (.081)***		
$WGI_{1,t-1}$	6.799 (1.826)***		6.023 (2.058)***	.673 (1.485)	.615 (1.285)		
$BGI_{1,t-1} * WGI_{1,t-1}$	932 (.298)***		-1.865 (.486)***	597 (.196)***	631 (.187)***		
$BGI_{2,t-1}$.199 (.080)**				.215 (.064)***	
$WGI_{2,t-1}$		1.580 (3.223)				.421 (1.898)	
$BGI_{2,t-1} * WGI_{2,t-1}$		004 (.002)**				003 (.001)***	
$Size_{t-1}$	1.287 (.514)**		.861 (.520)*	.703 (.430)	.760 (.407)*		
$Excluded_{t-1}$	780 (.436)*		585 (.467)	893 (.458)*	643 (.322)**		
$Poor_{t-1}$	384 (.296)		.185 (.275)	.349 (.174)**	.480 (.192)**		
$GDP \ pc_{t-1}$	-1.513 (.577)***	234 (.551)	-1.972 (.474)***	-1.337 (.257)***	-1.328 (.278)***	-1.390 (.370)***	
$Growth_{t-1}$	022 (.028)		016 (.030)	016 (.024)	018 (.024)		
Oil_{t-1}	.0009 (.0006)		.0007 (.0005)	0004 (.0004)	0005 (.0003)*		
$Ethnic frac{t-1}$	035 (.014)**		022 (.016)	011 (.011)	004 (.008)		
$Muslim_{t-1}$.003 (.005)		.006 (.006)	.0007 (.004)	002 (.003)		
% World Dem. _{t-1}	-15.495 (2.631)***		-15.480 (3.371)***	-8.610 (1.883)***	-7.994 (1.625)***		
Age_{t-1}	.362 (.081)***		.364 (.095)***	.127 (.068)*	.099 (.063)		
# Countries	15	10	15	15	15	10	
# Ethnic Groups	60 472	20	60 472	60 472	60 472	20	
Log-pseudolik.	473 -43.678	-11.755	-39.262	473 -56.24	473 -60.496	-17.732	

Table A12: Group-Level Probit Analysis of the Effect of BGI on Democratic Breakdowns, Coups and Rebellions in Sub-Saharan Africa

Note: Restricted to sub-Saharan Africa. Robust standard errors clustered by country in parentheses. For all ethnic groups, the group-level BGI_1 gives inequality between that group and its country's average. The group-level WGI_1 refers to inequality within each ethnic group and covers all ethnic groups. The group-level BGI_2 includes only politically excluded groups, and measures inequality between that group and its country's dominant group(s) (defined as all politically included groups). The group-level WGI_2 refers to inequality within each ethnic group and covers only excluded groups. ***p < .01, **p < .05 and *p < .1.

sub-Saharan Africa. Column 3 does the analysis with only successful coups. The idea is that unsuccessful coups may have failed because of a lack of support from the masses.¹¹ Column 4 adds failed coups. Model 5 includes all coups and rebellions. Model 6 redoes model 5 with BGI_2/WGI_2 . My findings are consistent with my hypothesis.

¹¹The results are exactly the same for BGI_2/WGI_2 as those reported in column 2. The same is true when I include failed coups (as in model 4). So, these estimations are omitted from the table. This is because all breakdowns covered by column 2 have been driven by coups (rather than civil wars) and all coups covered by column 2 have been successful.

downo observations from the fillobulometer	
$\overline{BGI_{1,t-1}}$	11.682 (4.975)**
$WGI_{1,t-1}$	18.156 (9.678)*
$BGI_{1,t-1} * WGI_{1,t-1}$	-39.536 (17.346)**
$Size_{t-1}$	2.240 (.909)**
$Excluded_{t-1}$	-1.057 (.706)
$Poor_{t-1}$.461 (.338)
$GDP \ pc_{t-1}$	-6.005 (1.232)***
$Growth_{t-1}$	100 (.018)***
Oil_{t-1}	0004 (.0008)
$Ethnic frac{t-1}$	142 (.027)***
$Muslim_{t-1}$.043 (.014)***
$\% World Dem_{\cdot t-1}$	-55.197 (13.330)***
Age_{t-1}	.772 (.191)***
# Countries	10
# Ethnic Groups	43
N Log pegudolik	407
	-20.303

Table A13: Group-Level Probit Analysis of the Effect of BGI on Democratic Breakdowns – Uses Only Observations from the Afrobarometer

Note: Redoes model 1 of Table 1 only observations taken from the Afrobarometer. Robust standard errors clustered by country in parentheses. For all ethnic groups, the group-level BGI_1 gives inequality between that group and its country's average. The group-level WGI_1 refers to inequality within each ethnic group and covers all ethnic groups. ***p < .01, **p < .05 and *p < .1.

Table A13 redoes the analysis with only observations from the Afrobarometer. The analysis presented in the main text uses only the Afrobarometer to construct BGI/WGI for Burundi, since all other countries covered by the Afrobarometer are also covered by the DHS. Table A13 shows that the results are unchanged when I instead rely on the Afrobarometer.

7 Additional Robustness Tests

This section presents additional robustness tests. Table A14 uses the measure of democracy of Boix et al. (2013) rather than that of Cheibub et al. (2010). Using Boix et al. (2013) enables me to cover four additional countries that have been coded as nondemocratic during the full period by Cheibub et al. (2010): Belarus, Mozambique, Russia and South Africa. The main difference between the measures of Cheibub et al. (2010) and Boix et al. (2013) is that the latter but not the former has a suffrage requirement. Moreover, in order to qualify as a democracy a regime needs to have experienced at least one incumbent party needs to have lost an election for the former but not the latter. Results again support my hypothesis.

Table A14: Group-Level Probit Analys	sis of the Effect of BGI on Democratic Break-
downs - Uses the Measure of Democrac	cy of Boix et al. (2013)

$\overline{BGI_{1,t-1}}$.221
$WGI_{1,t-1}$	(19) 1.964 (827)**
$BGI_{1,t-1} * WGI_{1,t-1}$	-480 (.215)**
$Size_{t-1}$	1.435 (.397)***
$Excluded_{t-1}$	612 (.248)**
$Poor_{t-1}$	217 (.170)
$GDP \ pc_{t-1}$	025 (.143)
$Growth_{t-1}$.005 (.017)
Oil_{t-1}	158 (.116)
$Ethnic \ frac{t-1}$.008 (.005)*
$Muslim_{t-1}$.002 (.002)
$Western_{t-1}$	564 (.269)**
% World Dem. _{t-1}	$^{-3.164}_{(.801)^{***}}$
Age_{t-1}	017 (.008)**
# Countries	72
# Etnnic Groups N	247 5105
Log-pseudolik.	-197.388

Note: Redoes model 1 of Table 1 with the measure of democracy of Boix et al. (2013). Robust standard errors clustered by country in parentheses. For all ethnic groups, the group-level BGI_1 gives inequality between that group and its country's average. The group-level WGI_1 refers to inequality within each ethnic group and covers all ethnic groups, ***p < .01, **p < .05 and *p < .1.

In order to account for the possibility that country-specific unobservable factors explain both why BGI is high and democracy unstable, Table A15 replicates model 1 of Table 1 with country and year fixed effects. The number of observations drops drastically because countries and years that did not experience democratic reversals are dropped. Results are again consistent with my argument.

•	
$\overline{BGI_{1,t-1}}$.326 (.147)**
$WGI_{1,t-1}$	2.084 (1.512)
$BGI_{1,t-1} * WGI_{1,t-1}$	804 (.393)**
$Size_{t-1}$	2.653 (.935)***
$Excluded_{t-1}$	688 (.316)**
$Poor_{t-1}$	814 (.282)***
$GDP \ pc_{t-1}$.683 (.622)
$Growth_{t-1}$.0009 (.024)
Oil_{t-1}	-1.135 (1.110)
Age_{t-1}	042 (.022)*
# Countries	25
# Ethnic Groups	86 993
Log-pseudolik.	-117.08

Table A15: Group-Level Probit Analysis of the Effect of BGI on Democratic Breakdowns – Includes Country and Year Fixed Effects

Note: Redoes model 1 of Table 1 with country and year fixed effects. Robust standard errors clustered by country in parentheses. For all ethnic groups, the group-level BGI_1 gives inequality between that group and its country's average. The group-level WGI_1 refers to inequality within each ethnic group and covers all ethnic groups. ***p < .01, **p < .05 and *p < .1.

In Table A16, I include an additional set of control variables: a dummy variable for former British colonies (Przeworski et al. 2000), religious fractionization, a dummy variable for countries that did not exist prior to 1946 (Przeworski et al. 2000), and the number of previous democratic breakdowns. My findings remain.

In Table A17 I show that my results are not driven by outliers. Column 1 excludes observations with *BGI* values below the 1st percentile (0.00006); column 2 those with *BGI* above the 99th percentile (16.2052); column 3 those with *WGI* below the 1st percentile (0.138); and column 4 those with *WGI* above the 99th percentile (0.6). This is particularly important because as shown in section 1 of the supplementary material, there is a few

auvilis – Auditional Control valiabics	
$\overline{BGI_{1,t-1}}$.307 (.063)***
$WGI_{1,t-1}$	$ \begin{array}{c} 1.676 \\ (.664)^{**} \end{array} $
$BGI_{1,t-1} * WGI_{1,t-1}$	769 (.199)***
$Size_{t-1}$.936 (.328)***
$Excluded_{t-1}$	621 (.230)***
$Poor_{t-1}$	343 (.155)**
$GDP \ pc_{t-1}$	216 (.121)*
$Growth_{t-1}$.028 (.018)
Oil_{t-1}	144 (.263)
$Ethnic frac{t-1}$.005 (.005)
$Religious \ frac_{\cdot t-1}$.006 (.006)
$Muslim_{t-1}$	002 (.002)
$Western_{t-1}$	627 (.226)***
% World Dem. _{t-1}	-4.221 (.907)***
Brit. $Col{t-1}$	248 (.228)
$New \ country_{t-1}$.074 (.172)
# $Prev. break{t-1}$	011 (.062)
Age_{t-1}	061 (.020)***
# Countries	71
# Ethnic Groups N	241 5208
Log-pseudolik.	-166.603

Table A16: Group-Level Probit Analysis of the Effect of BGI on Democratic Breakdowns – Additional Control Variables

Note: Redoes model 1 of Table 1 with additional control variables. Robust standard errors clustered by country in parentheses. For all ethnic groups, the group-level BGI_1 gives inequality between that group and its country's average. The group-level WGI_1 refers to inequality within each ethnic group and covers all ethnic groups. ***p < .01, **p < .05 and *p < .1.

outliers that may highly influence the estimations. I also reran the analysis while excluding outliers with the group-level BGI_2/WGI_2 as well as the country-level BGI_1/WGI_1 and BGI_2/WGI_2 . Results are unchanged (available upon request).

Since most of the surveys used to calculate the BGI/WGI indicators come were conducted after 1980, in Table A18, I redo the analysis with only data from the post-1980 period.

Finally, Table A19 redoes model 3 of Table 1 but includes groups that are politically

	BGI>1st perc.	BGI<99th perc.	WGI>1st perc.	WGI<99th perc.
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
$\overline{BGI_{1,t-1}}$.254	.285	.255	.276
	(.064)***	(.071)***	(.063)***	(.072)***
$WGI_{1,t-1}$	$1.414 \\ (.685)^{**}$	1.533 (.664)**	1.435 (.675)**	$ \begin{array}{r} 1.796 \\ (.841)^{**} \end{array} $
$BGI_{1,t-1} * WGI_{1,t-1}$	631	694	630	676
	(.218)***	(.241)***	(.216)***	(.248)***
$Size_{t-1}$	1.099	1.089	1.102	1.085
	(.313)***	(.314)***	(.315)***	(.329)***
$Excluded_{t-1}$	576	576	574	703
	(.217)***	(.220)***	(.219)***	(.226)***
$Poor_{t-1}$	376	365	377	304
	(.167)**	(.169)**	(.168)**	(.174)*
$GDP \ pc_{t-1}$	220	209	219	217
	(.125)*	(.125)*	(.126)*	(.126)*
$Growth_{t-1}$.027	.026	.027	.029
	(.017)	(.017)	(.017)	(.017)*
Oil_{t-1}	144	146	141	120
	(.267)	(.266)	(.266)	(.254)
$Ethnic frac{t-1}$.003	.003	.003	.002
	(.005)	(.005)	(.005)	(.005)
$Muslim_{t-1}$	001	001	001	0009
	(.002)	(.002)	(.002)	(.002)
$Western_{t-1}$	576	576	571	605
	(.204)***	(.208)***	(.206)***	(.215)***
% World Dem. _{t-1}	-3.870	-3.945	-3.930	-4.083
	(.757)***	(.753)***	(.758)***	(.785)***
Age_{t-1}	061	060	061	060
	(.019)***	(.019)***	(.019)***	(.018)***
# Countries	71	71	70	71
# Ethnic Groups	237	238	235	236
N	5135	5131	5140	5128
Log-pseudolik.	-167.556	-168.025	-167.951	-160.258

 Table A17: Group-Level Probit Analysis of the Effect of BGI on Democratic Breakdowns – Excludes Outliers

Note: Redoes model 1 of Table 1 without outliers. Robust standard errors clustered by country in parentheses. Column 1 excludes observations with BGI_1 values below the 1st percentile; column 2 those with BGI_1 above the 99th percentile; column 3 those with WGI_1 below the 1st percentile; and column 4 those with WGI_1 above the 99th percentile. Robust standard errors clustered by ethnic groups, the group-level BGI_1 gives inequality between that group and its country's average. The group-level WGI_1 refers to inequality within each ethnic group and covers all ethnic groups. ***p < .01, **p < .05 and *p < .1.

dominant but share power with other groups. Of course, I cannot include groups that are the only politically dominant group of their country because in such instances BGI_2 is zero by construction. Even though the interaction term is now only significant at the ten percent level, we still have that the effect of BGI is significant at the five percent level when WGI is zero, but that its effect diminishes as WGI increases.

$\overline{BGI_{1,t-1}}$.180 (.080)**
$WGI_{1,t-1}$	1.301 (.995)
$BGI_{1,t-1} * WGI_{1,t-1}$	456 (.203)**
$Size_{t-1}$.547 (.367)
$Excluded_{t-1}$	609 (.348)*
$Poor_{t-1}$	247 (.185)
$GDP \ pc_{t-1}$	107 (.181)
$Growth_{t-1}$	001 (.018)
Oil_{t-1}	002 (.207)
$Ethnic frac{t-1}$.007 (.006)
$Muslim_{t-1}$.002 (.003)
% World $Dem_{\cdot t-1}$	-2.888 (1.208)**
Age_{t-1}	045 (.023)*
# Countries	71
# Ethnic Groups	235
N	3959
Log-pseudolik.	-94.394

Table A18: Group-Level Probit Analysis of the Effect of BGI on Democratic Breakdowns – Post-1980

Note: Redoes model 1 of Table 1 with only post-1980 data. Robust standard errors clustered by country in parentheses. For all ethnic groups, the group-level BGI_1 gives inequality between that group and its country's average. The group-level WGI_1 refers to inequality within each ethnic group and covers all ethnic groups. ***p < .01, **p < .05 and *p < .1.

$\overline{BGI_{2,t-1}}$.167 (.069)**
$WGI_{2,t-1}$.710 (.683)
$BGI_{2,t-1} * WGI_{2,t-1}$	391 (.224)*
$Size_{t-1}$	1.416 (.381)***
$Excluded_{t-1}$	600 (.208)***
$Poor_{t-1}$	313 (.161)*
$GDP \ pc_{t-1}$	341 (.187)*
$Growth_{t-1}$.032 (.018)*
Oil_{t-1}	.183 (.192)
$Ethnic frac{t-1}$.007
$Muslim_{t-1}$	002 (.002)
$Western_{t-1}$	404 (.245)*
% World Dem. _{t-1}	-3.852 (.955)***
Age_{t-1}	080 (.039)**
	()
# Countries	68
# Ethnic Groups	206
N	3954
Log-pseudolik.	-104.716

Table A19: Group-Level Probit Analysis of the Effect of BGI on Democratic Breakdowns

Note: Redoes model 3 of Table 1 but includes politically dominant groups that share the executive with other groups. Robust standard errors clustered by country in parentheses. The group-level BGI_2 includes measures inequality between that group and its country's dominant group(s) (defined as all politically included groups). The group-level WGI_2 refers to inequality within each ethnic group. ***p < .01, **p < .05 and *p < .1.

8 Additional Marginal Effect Figures

Figure A9: Marginal Effect of BGI on Democratic Breakdowns Across WGI Levels – Group-Level Analysis

Note: Based on estimates from model 2 of Table 1. Dashed lines are 95 percent confidence intervals. For all ethnic groups, the group-level *BGI*₁ gives inequality between that group and its country's average. The group-level *WGI*₁ refers to inequality within each ethnic group and covers all ethnic groups.

Figure A10: Marginal Effect of BGI on Democratic Breakdowns Across WGI Levels – Group-Level Analysis

Note: Based on estimates from model 3 of Table 1. Dashed lines are 95 percent confidence intervals. The group-level *BGI*₂ includes only politically excluded groups, and measures inequality between that group and its country's dominant group(s) (defined as all politically included groups). The group-level *WGI*₂ refers to inequality within each ethnic group and covers only excluded groups.

Figure A11: Marginal Effect of BGI on Democratic Breakdowns Across WGI Levels – Group-Level Analysis

Note: Based on estimates from model 4 of Table 1. Dashed lines are 95 percent confidence intervals. The group-level BGI₂ includes only politically excluded groups, and measures inequality between that group and its country's dominant group(s) (defined as all politically included groups). The group-level WGI₂ refers to inequality within each ethnic group and covers only excluded groups.

Figure A12: Marginal Effect of BGI on Democratic Breakdowns Across WGI Levels – Country-Level Analysis

Note: Based on estimates from model 2 of Table 2. Dashed lines are 95 percent confidence intervals. The country-level *BGI*₁ refers to the average inequality level between all ethnic groups of a country and the country's average (i.e. it is the weighted average of all the group-level *BGI*₁ of a country). The country-level *WGI*₁ refers to the average inequality level within all ethnic groups of a country (i.e. it is the weighted average of all the group-level *WGI*₁ of a country).

Figure A13: Marginal Effect of BGI on Democratic Breakdowns Across WGI Levels – Country-Level Analysis

Note: Based on estimates from model 3 of Table 2. Dashed lines are 95 percent confidence intervals. The country-level BGI₂ refers to the average inequality level between politically excluded ethnic groups and the dominant ethnic groups (defined as all politically included groups) (i.e. it is the weighted average of all the group-level BGI₂ of a country). The country-level WGI₂ refers to the average inequality level within all politically excluded ethnic groups of a country (i.e. it is the weighted average of all the group-level WGI₂ of a country).

Figure A14: Marginal Effect of BGI on Democratic Breakdowns Across WGI Levels – Country-Level Analysis

Note: Based on estimates from model 4 of Table 2. Dashed lines are 95 percent confidence intervals. The country-level BGI₂ refers to the average inequality level between politically excluded ethnic groups and the dominant ethnic groups (defined as all politically included groups) (i.e. it is the weighted average of all the group-level BGI₂ of a country). The country-level WGI₂ refers to the average inequality level within all politically excluded ethnic groups of a country (i.e. it is the weighted average of all the group-level WGI₂ of a country).

9 Additional References

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