Online Appendix

Table A1
Descriptive Statistics

Variable	Min.	Max.	Mean	SD
Like Leftwing Candidate	0	10	4.98	3.47
Spatial Utility (Directional)	-13.895	13.895	-0.69	4.27
Spatial Utility (Proximity)	0.084	7.797	3.03	2.05
Education	1	8	4.23	2.0
Income	1	5	2.84	1.35
Partisanship	0	3	1.11	1.20
Government Performance	1	4	2.74	0.83
Corruption	1	4	3.22	0.80
Vote in previous election	0	1	0.52	0.50

Table A2
Leftist governments (re)elected in Latin America, 1998-2016

Country	Party	President	Year
Argentina	PJ-FPV	Néstor Kirchner	2003
	PJ-FPV	Cristina Fernández	2007
	PJ-FPV	Cristina Fernández	2011
Bolivia	MAS	Evo Morales	2005
	MAS	Evo Morales	2009
	MAS	Evo Morales	2014
Brazil	PT	Lula Da Silva	2002
	PT	Lula Da Silva	2006
	PT	Dilma Rousseff	2010
	PT	Dilma Rousseff	2014
Chile	Concertación	Ricardo Lagos	2000
	Concertación	Michelle Bachelet	2006
	Nueva Mayoría	Michelle Bachelet	2013
Ecuador	PAIS	Rafael Correa	2006
	PAIS	Rafael Correa	2009
	PAIS	Rafael Correa	2013
El Salvador	FMLN	Mauricio Funes	2009
	FMLN	Salvador Sánchez	2014
Nicaragua	FSLN	Daniel Ortega	2006
	FSLN	Daniel Ortega	2011
	FSLN	Daniel Ortega	2016
Paraguay	APPC	Fernando Lugo	2008
Uruguay	FA	Tabaré Vázquez	2004
	FA	José Mujica	2009

	FA	Tabaré Vázquez	2014
Venezuela	MVR	Hugo Chávez	1998
	MVR	Hugo Chávez	2000
	MVR	Hugo Chávez	2006
	PSUV	Hugo Chávez	2012
	PSUV	Nicolás Maduro	2013

Source: updated from Levitsky and Roberts 2011:2

Table A3
Logistic Regression Models
Dependent Variable: Vote Intention
(Standardized Coefficients)

Dependent Variable:	Model 1		Model 2	
Vote Intention for the most voted Leftist Candidate	Directional	Proximity	Directional	Proximity
Spatial utility	0.607***	-0.400***	0.601***	-0.383***
Education	-0.025	-0.025	-0.037	-0.051
Partisanship	0.241***	0.288***	0.291***	0.325***
Income	-0.170***	-0.178***	-0.148***	-0.148***
Gov. performance			-0.314***	-0.356***
Incumbency			-2.859***	-3.051***
Gov. Performance x Incumbent			3.055***	3.247***
Country Dummies	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
N	12205	12205	6705	6705
Pseudo R2	0.10	0.07	0.16	0.14
Prob>F	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000

Standardized beta coefficients; * $p<0.05$, ** $p<0.01$, *** $p<0.001$

Table A4.
Explaining the electoral success of the left in Latin America
Fixed effects regression with standardized coefficients (Intrapersonal Comparisons)

Dependent Variable:	Model 1		Model 2	
Candidate Evaluation of Most Voted Leftist Candidate	Directional	Proximity	Directional	Proximity
Spatial utility	0.382***	-0.385***	0.389***	-0.375***
	(0.003)	(0.01)	(0.003)	(0.014)
Education	-0.025*	-0.038***	-0.015	-0.031*
	(0.018)	(0.018)	(0.023)	(0.023)
Closeness	0.061***	0.082***	0.088***	0.104***
	(0.025)	(0.025)	(0.032)	(0.032)
Income	-0.053***	-0.061***	-0.063***	-0.066***
	(0.025)	(0.025)	(0.033)	(0.033)
Gov. performance			-0.114***	0.129***
			(0.068)	(0.068)
Incumbency			-0.540***	-0.561***
			(0.354)	(0.355)
Gov. Performance x Incumbent			0.641***	0.669***
			(0.111)	(0.209)
Constant	6.17	8.03	7.12	9.11
N	11438	11438	6308	6308
R2	0.21	0.22	0.34	0.33
Prob>F	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000

Standardized beta coefficients; Robust Standard errors in parentheses. * $p<0.05$, ** $p<0.01$, *** $p<0.001$

Table A5
Explaining the electoral success of the left in Brazil 2002:
OLS estimates (Intrapersonal Comparisons)

Dependent Variable: Candidate Evaluation	Lula Directional	Lula Proximity	Serra Directional	Serra Proximity
Spatial Utility	0.284***	-0.255***	0.168***	-0.161***
	(0.007)	(0.031)	(0.007)	(0.029)
Education	0.044	0.038	-0.030	-0.036
	(0.053)	(0.054)	(0.051)	(0.051)
Income	-0.073*	-0.079*	0.017	0.012
	(0.084)	(0.084)	(0.08)	(0.08)
Corruption	-0.111***	-0.108***	0.001	0.005
	(0.114)	(0.115)	(0.109)	(0.11)
Gov. performance	-0.118***	-0.126***	0.203***	0.203***
	(0.115)	(0.116)	(0.112)	(0.112)
Closeness	0.167***	0.173***	0.071	0.08**
	(0.083)	(0.084)	(0.08)	(0.08)
Vote in previous election	0.222***	0.232***	-0.101**	-0.109***
	(0.225)	(0.227)	(0.221)	(0.214)
Regional dummies	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Constant	8.21	9.44	2.93	3.47
N	1114	1114	1040	1040
R sq.	0.28	0.27	0.12	0.12
Prob > F	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000

Standardized beta coefficients; Clustered Robust Standard errors in parentheses. * $p<0.05$, ** $p<0.01$, *** $p<0.001$

Table A6
Explaining the electoral success of the left in Brazil 2010:
OLS estimates (Intrapersonal Comparisons)

Dependent Variable: Candidate Evaluation	Rousseff Directional	Rousseff Proximity	Serra Directional	Serra Proximity
Spatial Utility	0.391***	-0.348***	0.455***	-0.425***
	(0.006)	(0.03)	(0.007)	(0.03)
Education	-0.068*	-0.087**	0.013	-0.010
	(0.045)	(0.046)	(0.053)	(0.053)
Income	0.015	0.012	-0.051	-0.039
	(0.070)	(0.072)	(0.083)	(0.084)
Gov. performance	0.202***	0.210***	-0.044	-0.049
	(0.15)	(0.154)	(0.176)	(0.179)
Closeness	0.079**	0.094***	-0.069*	-0.05
	(0.071)	(0.073)	(0.084)	(0.086)
Vote in previous election	0.251***	0.257***	-0.177***	-0.200***
	(0.217)	(0.224)	(0.249)	(0.251)
Regional dummies	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Constant	6.97	2.23	8.23	10.16
N	838	838	830	830
R sq.	0.49	0.47	0.33	0.30
Prob > F	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000

Standardized beta coefficients; Clustered Robust Standard errors in parentheses. * $p<0.05$, ** $p<0.01$, *** $p<0.001$

Table A7
Explaining the electoral success of the left in Latin America
Random effects regression with standardized coefficients *

Dependent Variable:	Model 1		Model 2	
Candidate Evaluation of Most Voted Leftist Candidate	Directional	Proximity	Directional	Proximity
Spatial utility	0.190***	-0.099***	0.157***	-0.051***
	(0.007)	(0.016)	(0.009)	(0.022)
Education	-0.121***	-0.118***	-0.173***	-0.169***
	(0.018)	(0.018)	(0.024)	(0.025)
Partisanship	0.081***	0.094***	0.101***	0.111***
	(0.026)	(0.026)	(0.034)	(0.035)
Income	-0.017	-0.018	0.005	0.008
	(0.026)	(0.027)	(0.034)	(0.035)
Gov. performance			-0.121***	-0.138***
			(0.066)	(0.066)
Incumbency			-0.873***	-0.970***
			(0.37)	(0.371)
Gov. Performance x Incumbent			0.981***	1.101***
			(0.122)	(0.122)
Constant	5.87	6.21	7.31	7.61
N	11945	11945	6544	6544
R2 overall	0.05	0.03	0.12	0.10
Prob>F	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000

* Standardized beta coefficients; Standard errors in parentheses. * $p<0.05$, ** $p<0.01$, *** $p<0.001$

Table A8.
Variance Inflation Factor
(Comparative Panel Data)

	Panel Data			
	Model 1		Model 2[1]	
	Directional	Proximity	Directional	Proximity
Mean VIF	5.54	5.19	12.81	13.17

[1] Model 2 (both directional and proximity) includes an interaction term (incumbent*Gov. Performance). This is the reason why the mean of VIF shows values greater than 10. Excluding the interacted variables, all VIF values are similar to those in Model 1.

Table A9.
Variance Inflation Factor
(Brazilian Data for 2002-2010)

	Brazil 2002				Brazil 2010			
	Lula Directional	Lula Proximity	Serra Directional	Serra Proximity	Rousseff Directional	Rousseff Proximity	Serra Directional	Serra Proximity
Mean VIF	2.12	2.12	2.12	2.12	2.06	2.07	2.07	2.05

Table A10.
Explaining the electoral success of the left in Latin America
Time fixed effects regressions with standardized coefficients

Dependent Variable:	Model 1		Model 2	
Candidate Evaluation of Most Voted Leftist Candidate	Directional	Proximity	Directional	Proximity
Spatial utility	0.188***	-0.113***	0.166***	-0.086***
	(0.007)	(0.015)	(0.008)	(0.02)
Education	-0.023*	-0.021	-0.022	-0.021
	(0.019)	(0.02)	(0.025)	(0.025)
Closeness	0.089***	0.101***	0.098***	0.109***
	(0.026)	(0.026)	(0.034)	(0.034)
Income	-0.075***	-0.078***	-0.089***	-0.09**
	(0.027)	(0.027)	(0.035)	(0.035)
Gov. performance			0.142***	0.157***
			(0.063)	(0.064)
Gov. Performance x Incumbent			0.873***	0.979***
			(0.117)	(0.117)
Constant	5.52	5.96	4.86	5.13
N	11945	11945	6544	6544
R2	0.05	0.03	0.11	0.09
Prob>F	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000

Standardized beta coefficients; Standard errors in parentheses. * $p<0.05$, ** $p<0.01$, *** $p<0.001$