Supplemental Appendix

Supplemental Tables 1 and 2 display the results of alternative estimation strategies, using the same model specifications as models 1, 2, and 3 in the text. Table 1 presents GLS estimates with random effects and robust standard errors, and Table 2 presents OLS estimates with clustered standard errors. These alternative estimation strategies yield results that parallel the substantive findings presented in the text.

Table 1: Political Decentralization and Change in Major Party Support: GLS with random effects and robust standard errors

	(1)	(2)	(3)
Political Decentralization	−0.59	0.33	1.20
	(2.85)	(2.21)	(1.98)
Economic Growth	0.23	0.56*	0.12
	(0.34)	(0.30)	(0.33)
Decentralization*Growth		2.39***	
		(0.50)	
Ideological Differentiation	0.05	−0.54	2.18
	(3.14)	(3.15)	(3.57)
Decentralization*Differentiation			17.80***
			(5.20)
ENP_{t-1}	7.04***	7.40***	7.39***
	(0.96)	(0.97)	(1.03)
Years of Democracy	−0.04	0.02	0.02
	(0.13)	(0.14)	(0.14)
Party Age	0.02	0.05	0.03
	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.04)
Proportional System	9.39*	8.48	9.80*
	(5.59)	(5.52)	(5.43)
Constant	−26.86***	−30.71***	−29.66***
	(6.71)	(6.88)	(7.64)
Observations	87	87	87
Overall R^2	0.17	0.19	0.1

Standard errors in parentheses.
* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$
Interactions constructed using mean-centered versions variables.

Table 2: Political Decentralization and Change in Major Party Support: OLS with clustered standard errors

	(1)	(2)	(3)
Political Decentralization	−0.53	−0.11	0.46
	(1.53)	(1.62)	(1.50)
Economic Growth	0.42	0.67	0.31
	(0.44)	(0.39)	(0.44)
Decentralization*Growth		1.84***	
		(0.43)	
Ideological Differentiation	−0.45	−0.99	0.55
	(3.48)	(3.70)	(3.93)
Decentralization*Differentiation			11.31*
			(5.97)
ENP_{t-1}	3.87***	3.96***	4.08***
	(0.57)	(0.61)	(0.76)
Years of Democracy	0.09	0.13	0.13
	(0.08)	(0.09)	(0.09)
Party Age	0.01	0.02	0.02
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Proportional System	4.59	4.55	4.17
	(5.17)	(5.12)	(5.41)
Constant	−18.16**	−19.42**	−19.89***
	(4.72)	(4.99)	(6.11)
Observations	87	87	87
R^2	0.19	0.20	0.20

Standard errors in parentheses
* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$
Interactions constructed using mean-centered versions of variables.

Table 3 replicates the analysis presented in Table 1 of the text, but adds inflation and unemployment as additional indicators of economic performance. These specifications consider the possibility that other facets of economic performance might shape support for major parties. In models 1, 2 and 3, which include inflation but not unemployment, inflation has a statistically significant but substantively small effect. A standard deviation shift in inflation yields only a 2.5-point change in major party support. When controlling for unemployment, this effect disappears. But after controling for unemployment in models 4, 5 and 6, even this modest effect for inflation disappears and the effect of unemployment is likewise insignificant. Introducing these additional controls does not alter the substantive results concerning political decentralization and the interactions between decentralization and economic growth as well as decentralization and ideological differentiation. To explore whether especially poor performance is particularly detrimental, additional analysis not shown included inflation squared, but also found no effect.

Table 3: Political Decentralization and Change in Major Party Support: Controlling for Inflation and Unemployment

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Political Decentralization	−1.46	−0.12	2.05	−1.45	−0.14	2.64
	(4.68)	(4.18)	(4.07)	(5.02)	(4.44)	(4.33)
Economic Growth	0.38	0.60*	0.33	0.42	0.58	0.27
	(0.28)	(0.29)	(0.27)	(0.33)	(0.37)	(0.34)
Decentralization*Growth		1.53*			1.48*	
		(0.83)			(0.82)	
Ideological Differentiation	5.49	5.27	10.58	6.21	5.78	12.00
	(7.04)	(6.58)	(7.49)	(10.28)	(9.77)	(10.75)
Decen.*Differentiation			20.46***			22.56***
			(3.52)			(5.10)
ENP_{t-1}	11.82***	11.67***	11.53***	10.71***	10.48***	10.14***
	(1.53)	(1.69)	(1.56)	(1.70)	(1.90)	(1.70)
Years of Democracy	−0.52**	−0.45**	−0.46*	−0.53*	−0.44*	−0.42
	(0.24)	(0.21)	(0.23)	(0.30)	(0.24)	(0.27)
Party Age	−0.10	−0.05	−0.07*	−0.11	−0.06	−0.07
	(0.06)	(0.07)	(0.03)	(0.07)	(0.08)	(0.05)
Proportional System	8.82	7.23	9.12	8.87	7.49	9.06
	(6.73)	(7.15)	(5.70)	(9.04)	(9.48)	(7.65)
Inflation	0.01**	0.01*	0.01**	0.00	0.00	0.00
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Unemployment				0.04	−0.04	−0.25
				(0.37)	(0.33)	(0.47)
Constant	−29.53***	−32.72***	−30.92***	−24.84**	−27.54***	−24.06**
	(7.56)	(6.88)	(8.02)	(8.76)	(7.47)	(9.44)
Observations	86	86	86	76	76	76
Overall R^2	0.10	0.11	0.11	0.06	0.07	0.07

Standard errors in parentheses

* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

Interactions constructed using mean-centered versions variables.

Supplemental Table 4 assesses the validity of the 10-year compact decay function applied to the decentralization measure employed in the text. The models replace the transformed version of the decentralization measure with two lags for decentralization and interact growth and ideological differentiation with change in decentralization and with each lag. Because all observations on the dependent variable occur only during election years, lags occur not across years but across election cycles. In most countries, two election cycles correspond to approximately ten years, which is the length of the compact decay function. The evidence from the analysis using a series of lags coincides with the findings presented in the text using the 10-year smooth-compact decay function. Essentially, if the functional form for decentralization employed in the text is suitable, we expect that absent interactions neither decentralization nor any of its lags will have significant effects on party decay, but that when growth and ideological differentiation are low, increased decentralization will have a negative relationship with party support, with the strongest effect observed at the first election (no lag), a small effect in the second election (one lag) and little or no effect in the third election (two lags). The results comport with these expectations. As seen in column 1 of Table 4, a change in decentralization alone does not have a significant relationship with change in major party support at election$_t$, election$_{t\text{-}1}$ or election$_{t\text{-}2}$. This pattern aligns with the evidence from model 1 in the text. Columns 2 and 3 of Table 4 add the interactions with growth and ideological differentiation respectively, and Figures 1 and 2 plot the marginal effects of each decentralization lag conditioned on economic growth and ideological differentiation respectively. These figures demonstrate that the effects of lagged decentralization conditioned on growth and ideological differentiation mimic the anticipated patterns. A move toward decentralization has a large negative effect on major party support in the first election when growth or polarization is low, a weaker but still significant negative effect in the second election and no significant effect in the third election, meaning that the effect of decentralization is greatest immediately after it occurs and then declines toward zero over a period of two election cycles or about 10 years. Thus, the simpler models in the text, which employ

the measure of decentralization with the 10-year smooth-compact decay function, are consistent with this evidence concerning the nature of decentralization's functional form.

Table 4: Political Decentralization and Change in Major Party Support: Modeling the Lags of Decentralization

	(1)	(2)	(3)
Decentralization	2.07	10.74***	30.52***
	(7.22)	(1.44)	(3.13)
Decentralization$_{t-1}$	−0.80	24.57	8.69*
	(6.59)	(14.50)	(4.93)
Decentralization$_{t-2}$	−5.32	−3.65	−2.42
	(4.98)	(3.44)	(3.78)
Economic Growth	0.28	1.06**	0.23
	(0.31)	(0.42)	(0.28)
Ideological Differentiation	4.10	4.19	15.07
	(9.13)	(9.03)	(8.99)
ENP$_{t-1}$	12.33***	12.27***	12.04***
	(1.77)	(1.70)	(1.91)
Years of Democracy	−0.71**	−0.56*	−0.55**
	(0.33)	(0.28)	(0.26)
Party Age	−0.13	−0.05	−0.04
	(0.09)	(0.05)	(0.07)
Proportional System	19.63***	18.83***	18.62***
	(4.95)	(3.83)	(5.31)
Decentralization*Growth		4.58***	
		(0.56)	
Decentralization$_{t-1}$*Growth		9.11	
		(5.65)	
Decentralization$_{t-2}$*Growth		−0.70	
		(1.99)	
Decentralization*Differentiation			90.36***
			(9.43)
Decentralization$_{t-1}$*Differentiation			42.09***
			(13.72)
Decentralization$_{t-2}$*Differentiation			10.22
			(14.98)
Constant	−22.52**	−27.63***	−28.15***
	(8.73)	(7.87)	(8.22)
Observations	66	66	66
Overall R^2	0.13	0.16	0.16

Standard errors in parentheses
* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$
Interactions constructed using mean-centered versions variables.
Number of observations is reduced compared to baseline
model because of lost cases due to lagging.



(a) Conditional Effect of Decentralization$_t$



(b) Conditional Effect of Decentralization$_{t-1}$



(c) Conditional Effect of Decentralization$_{t-2}$

Figure 1: Effect of Decentralization Conditioned on Growth across Multiple Lags



(a) Conditional Effect of Decentralization$_t$ (b) Conditional Effect of Decentralization$_{t-1}$



(c) Conditional Effect of Decentralization$_{t-2}$

Figure 2: Effect of Decentralization Conditioned on Differentiation across Multiple Lags

As discussed in the text, I considered the possibility that processes of fiscal decentralization might strip centralized parties of resources and undermine their capacity to sustain public support, exacerbating the deleterious effects of political decentralization for established parties. Table 5 considers this possibility, using two different indicators of fiscal decentralization—the change in subnational expenditures as a percent of total government expenditures (columns 1 and 2) and the change in subnational expenditures as a percent of GDP (columns 3 and 4). Data are from IMFs *Government Finance Statistics* (through 1999) and ECLACs *Estudio econmico de Amrica Latina y el Caribe* (after 1999). Due to uneven coverage in the fiscal decentralization measures, the sample sizes for these models are reduced by almost half as compared to the analysis in the text. Given these small samples, together with unavoidable inconsistencies in the measures of fiscal decentralization both across countries and over time, I treat the results as primarily suggestive and requiring further exploration.

Models 1 and 3 suggest that fiscal decentralization has no significant effect on support for major parties on its own. This result aligns with the expectations articulated in the text. While parties unaccustomed to subnational political competition may be ill-prepared to make effective use of resources allocated to lower levels of government through fiscal decentralization, other parties already well-adapted to competing in decentralized political contexts may take advantage of fiscal decentralization to shore up vital subnational elements of their organizations. Given these potentially divergent implications of devolving resources to the subnational level, it is not surprising that decentralization alone does not appear to have a direct effect on party support.

However, viewing fiscal decentralization as a potential cause of resource limitations for parties navigating the challenges imposed by new subnational elections helps identify a potential mechanism through which devolving resources matters for established parties. Models 2 and 4 in Table 5 assess the possibility that fiscal decentralization might exacerbate the costs of political decentralization by removing public resources from the control of centralized party organizations and placing them in the hands of subnational govern-

ments now operating with political autonomy granted through newly established direct subnational elections. Model 2, which measures fiscal decentralization using subnational expenditures as a share of total government revenues, finds a negative but insignificant interaction between fiscal and political decentralization (also see Figure 3a). But model 4, which uses the more reliable measure of subnational expenditures as a share of GDP, points toward a significant negative interaction. Figure 3b graphs the conditional effect of political decentralization across observed values of changes in subnational government expenditures based on model 4. The figure demonstrates that when the amount of resources allocated to subnational governments increases *at the same time* that parties are grappling with the challenges associated with contesting new subnational elections, support for major parties decays. These results, while not as robust as those pertaining to the conditional effects of economic conditions, lend additional credence to the argument that the resource context matters for understanding the consequences of political decentralization.

Table 5: Political Decentralization and Change in Major Party Support: Conditioning Political Decentralization on Fiscal Decentralization

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Political Decentralization	−9.96	−10.78	−9.51	−9.15
	(5.93)	(6.61)	(5.52)	(5.57)
Economic Growth	0.17	0.18	0.22	0.21
	(0.49)	(0.50)	(0.43)	(0.45)
ΔSubnational Expenditures	−0.38	−0.41	−1.93	−1.84
	(1.52)	(1.40)	(1.98)	(1.99)
ΔFiscal*Political Decentralization		−0.87		−2.24*
		(0.90)		(1.23)
ENP_{t-1}	11.09***	11.03***	10.87***	10.91***
	(2.01)	(2.07)	(1.70)	(1.77)
Years of Democracy	−0.89*	−0.87*	−0.86*	−0.86*
	(0.47)	(0.47)	(0.43)	(0.44)
Ideological Differentiation	−5.55	−5.96	−4.23	−4.78
	(13.06)	(13.17)	(12.30)	(12.51)
Party Age	−0.04	−0.05	−0.05	−0.05
	(0.09)	(0.09)	(0.08)	(0.09)
Proportional System	3.59	5.30	4.35	5.56
	(13.20)	(13.45)	(11.63)	(10.94)
Constant	−24.68**	−24.56**	−23.16**	−23.22**
	(11.07)	(10.97)	(10.12)	(10.17)
Observations	44	44	46	46
Overall R^2	0.09	0.09	0.09	0.09

Standard errors in parentheses
* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$
Interactions constructed using mean-centered versions variables.
In columns 1 and 2, fiscal decentralization is measured using subnational expenditures as percent of all government expenditures. In columns 3 and 4, it is subnational expenditures as percent of GDP.



(a) (b)

Figure 3: Effect of Political Decentralization Conditioned on Fiscal Decentralization

Additional analysis (not shown) also considered changes in subnational revenues as a percent of total government revenues and as a percent of GDP. These results are weaker but generally parallel those for the expenditure measures. Specifically, change in subnational revenues as a share of total revenues has no significant effect directly or by conditioning political decentralization. Change in subnational revenues as a share of GDP has no direct effect, but does show some evidence of a conditional relationship with political decentralization. Although the interaction term itself is not statistically significant in this specification as it is above in model 4 where subnational expenditures as a share of GDP, graphing the conditional effect points toward a similar pattern in which political decentralization has a negative association with major party support when subnational revenues increase substantially.

The models in Table 6 assess whether changes in major party support have any effect on changes in political decentralization. These models as well as multiple alternative specifications found no evidence of reverse causality. Additional specifications of this analysis used lagged and unlagged versions of the economic variables as well as lagged and unlagged measures of major party support. I also considered alternative versions of political decentralization as the dependent variable, such as cumulated change in decentralization and decentralization operationalized as an impulse and decay, which is the measure used in the analyses in the text where decentralization is the independent variable. This approach offers a conservative test for reverse causation because when endogeneity is present coefficients are overinflated and standard errors are underestimated. Thus, this test is biased toward finding significant effects for changes in major party support on the decision to decentralize. Yet, under a wide range of specifications, there is no evidence of such a relationship. In fact, the coefficients for major party support here are not only statistically insignificant but substantively miniscule. Given these results, it is reasonable to conclude that endogeneity is not a problem in assessing the statistical effects of decentralization on major party support.

Table 6: Effect of Change in Major Party Support on Change in Political Decentralization

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
ΔMajor Party Support	0.00	0.00	0.01	0.00	0.00
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Economic Growth$_{t-1}$		0.18	0.18	0.19	0.20
		(0.13)	(0.14)	(0.13)	(0.13)
Inflation$_{t-1}$		-0.00^{**}	-0.00	-0.00^{*}	-0.00
		(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Unemployment$_{t-1}$			0.11		
			(0.13)		
Years of Democracy				0.01	-0.00
				(0.03)	(0.03)
Average Party Age					0.01
					(0.01)
Proporational System					0.20
					(1.06)
Cut-point 1	2.60^{***}	2.67^{***}	3.66^{**}	2.80^{***}	2.86^{**}
	(0.45)	(0.55)	(1.42)	(0.81)	(1.13)
Cut-point 2	3.75^{***}	3.84^{***}	4.84^{***}	3.97^{***}	4.03^{***}
	(0.69)	(0.78)	(1.34)	(1.04)	(1.42)
Observations	87	85	76	85	85
Log pseudolikelihood	-25.65	-24.33	-23.09	-24.31	-24.16
Wald (χ^2)	0.02 (1df)	9.85^{**}(3df)	11.74^{**}(4df)	11.35^{**}(4df)	17.62^{***}(6df)

Robust standard errors in parentheses
* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$
Models calculated using ordered logit with clustered standard errors.
Dependent variable is change in decentralization to test the possibility of endogeneity in which declines in major party support causes decentralization.

To consider the possibility that establishing new subnational elections is likely to impose a particularly high cost in contexts where party systems do not feature much ideological differentiation *and* resource constraints are high, I conducted analysis that incorporates a three-way interaction term between decentralization, ideological differentiation, and economic growth. The results, which are presented in Table 7, indicate that there is a significant negative interaction. Marginal effects plots (not shown) demonstrate that establishing new subnational elections has the most detrimental effects on support for established parties when the economy is performing poorly *and* the party system has low levels of ideological differentiation. This evidence lends some support to the idea that the negative effect of decentralization is most pronounced in contexts where both poor economic conditions and lack of ideological differentiation exist.

Table 7: Political Decentralization and Change in Major Party Support: Three-way Interaction

	(1)
Political Decentralization	4.22
	(4.42)
Economic Growth	0.07
	(0.38)
Ideological Differentiation	10.36
	(6.88)
Decentralization*Growth	−0.18
	(1.38)
Decentralization*Polarization	19.14*
	(9.31)
Growth*Differentiation	−1.24
	(0.92)
Decen*Growth*Differentiation	−4.76*
	(2.54)
ENP_{t-1}	11.14***
	(1.47)
Years of Democracy	−0.49*
	(0.24)
Party Age	−0.05
	(0.06)
Proportional System	6.67
	(6.83)
Constant	−29.10***
	(6.64)
Observations	87
Overall R^2	0.11

Standard errors in parentheses
* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

The analysis also draws on a series of semi-structured interviews I conducted with Venezuelan politicians during field research. The interview guide was structured in consultation with Venezuelan political scientists, translated to Spanish, and then edited by several Venezuelans, including a political scientist and a legislative aide in the National Assembly. Then to insure that the intent of the questions was preserved in the translation, a professional Venezuelan translator translated it back to English. I conducted all 89 interviews in Spanish without a recording device to encourage respondents to be forthright about how their own failings as well as those of their co-partisans and other party leaders led to the collapse of the system. The interviews generally took between 45 and 90 minutes, with the longest interview lasting over 2 hours. All interviewees were assured of the confidentiality of their responses, so no names or other identifying details are used in association with respondents comments or opinions. A list of the titles and partisan affiliations (where relevant) of all the participants as well as the code number used to cite the interviews in the text is presented in Table 8.

Table 8: List of Interviewees

Title	Party	Date	Code
Political scientist	NA	29 April 2003	1
Political scientist, advisor to LCR	NA	3 June 2003	2
Former member of Consejo Supremo Electoral	NA	17 June 2003	3
Political scientist	NA	25 June 2003	4
Head of major polling firm	NA	22 May 2003	5
Head of major polling firm	NA	19 May 2003	6
Head of major polling firm	NA	5 May 2003	7
Political scientist, advisor to COPEI	NA	28 June 2003	8
Political scientist, social policy advisor	NA	1 July 2003	9
Political scientist	NA	23 July 2003	10
Editor of major weekly news magazine	NA	20 Nov. 2003	11
Political scientist	NA	13 May 2003	12
Political scientist	NA	2 June 2006	13
Former President Fundación Raúl Leoni	AD	12 June 2006	14
Political scientist, social policy advisor	NA	13 June 2006	15
Political scientist	NA	June 2006	16
Head of major polling firm	NA	3 July 2006	17
National Assembly deputy	PV	16 July 2003	18

Continued on next page

Table 8 – continued from previous page

Title	Party	Date	Code
National Assembly deputy	PV	5 Aug. 2003	19
National Assembly deputy	MVR	6 Aug. 2003	20
National Assembly deputy	COPEI	6 Aug. 2003	21
National Assembly deputy	MVR	8 Aug. 2003	22
National Assembly deputy	MVR	8 Sept. 2003	23
National Assembly deputy	MVR	16 Sept. 2003	24
National Assembly deputy	AD	23 Sept. 2003	25
National Assembly deputy	Mi Gato	30 Sept. 2003	26
National Assembly deputy	MVR	1 Oct. 2003	27
National Assembly deputy	AD	2 Oct. 2003	28
National Assembly deputy	CONIVE	8 Oct. 2003	29
National Assembly deputy	Vamos	13 Oct. 2003	30
National Assembly deputy	MVR	29 Oct. 2003	31
National Assembly deputy	MAS	12 Nov. 2003	32
National Assembly deputy	CONIVE	16 Oct. 2003	33
National Assembly deputy	MVR	6 Nov. 2003	34
Former CEN[a] member	AD	4 Nov. 2003	35
Former CEN member, Cabinet member	AD	18 Nov. 2003	36
Former Secretary General	COPEI	20 Nov. 2003	37
Former President	AD	3 Dec. 2003	38
Former parliamentary fraction head	COPEI	9 June 2006	39
Former CEN member	AD	14 June 2006	40
Former CEN member, Cabinet member	AD	14 June 2006	41
Former CEN member	AD	20 June 2006	42
Former party President	COPEI	20 June 2006	43
Former party President	COPEI	23 June 2006	44
Former presidential candidate	AD	28 June 2006	45
Former parliamentary fraction head	COPEI	30 June 2006	46
Former party President and Secretary General	AD	8 July 2006	47
Former party Vice-president	AD	10 July 2006	48
Former CEN member	AD	13 July 2006	49
Former party President and Secretary General	AD	17 July 2006	50
Former Secretary General	AD	18 July 2006	51
Former head of Buro Sindical, CEN member	AD	18 July 2006	52
Former CEN member, Cabinet member	AD	19 July 2006	53
COPRE member	NA	20 July 2006	54
Former presidential candidate	COPEI	21 July 2006	55
Former CEN member	AD	25 July 2006	56
Party President or Secretary General	COPEI	2 Oct. 2003	57
Party President or Secretary General	COPEI	7 Oct. 2003	58
Party President or Secretary General	MAS	7 Oct. 2003	59
Party President or Secretary General	PV	22 Oct. 2003	60
Party President or Secretary General	ABP	24 Oct. 2003	61

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Title	Party	Date	Code
Major Newspaper Editor	NA	30 Oct. 2003	62
CEN member	AD	31 Oct. 2003	63
Party President or Secretary General	ABP	5 Nov. 2003	64
Coordinadora Democrática (CD)[b] leader	NA	10 Nov. 2003	65
Party President or Secretary General	MAS	12 Nov. 2003	66
Major Newspaper Editor	NA	13 Nov. 2003	67
Head of Parliamentary Fraction	PJ	14 Nov. 2003	68
Party President or Secretary General	PPT	20 Nov. 2003	69
Party President or Secretary General	LCR	3 Dec. 2003	70
Comando Táctico Nacional[c] member	MVR	4 Dec. 2003	71
Comando Táctico Nacional member	MVR	5 Dec. 2003	72
National Party Director[d]	CONV	9 Dec. 2003	73
Former Party President	PV	11 Dec. 2003	74
Mesa de Negociación[e] member on behalf of CD	NA	12 Dec. 2003	75
NGO leader	NA	12 Dec. 2003	76
Comando Táctico Nacional member	MVR	4 Aug. 2003	77
Party President or Secretary General	LCR	22 Oct. 2003	78
Party Vice-president	COPEI	14 Jun 2006	79
Party President or Secretary General	PJ	22 Jun 2006	80
CEN member	AD	13 July 2006	81
Former Parliamentary fraction head	LCR	10 May 2001	82
Party President or Secretary General	AD	10 May 2001	83
Party President or Secretary General	COPEI	9 May 2001	84
CEN member	CONV	9 May 2001	85
Party President or Secretary General	PJ	14 May 2001	86
National Assembly Deputy	PV	14 May 2001	87
CEN member	MAS	15 May 2001	88
Political adviser	AD	23 Sept. 2003	89

[a] Party national executive committee

[b] Organization coordinating efforts of opposition in 2003

[c] Equivalent to AD's CEN

[d] Equivalent to party President

[e] Group attempting to negotiate compromise between government and opposition in 2003