

A Internet Appendix

I.A Discussion of special and Louisiana gubernatorial elections

There are four special elections during our sample period: California (2003), Utah (2010), West Virginia (2011), and Wisconsin (2012). These elections include two recall elections: California (2003) and Wisconsin (2012). We consider the circumstances and timing of each election and choose to only include the Utah election in our sample.

We choose to include the Utah special election in our sample because there was ample warning of an impending special election—effectively, the election followed the same general time line as a regularly-scheduled gubernatorial election. Additionally, the election was sufficiently early that the pre- and post-election periods are clearly defined. A special election was held in Utah in 2010 after Governor Jon Huntsman resigned in 2009 to become the U.S. Ambassador to China.¹ The special election took place on November 2, 2010. Utah then held its next regularly-scheduled gubernatorial election two years later, in November, 2012. The next gubernatorial election in that state will be in 2016.

We omit the 2011 West Virginia special gubernatorial election from our sample because it resulted in two back-to-back elections, in 2011 and 2012. Since we define pre- and post-election periods on an annual basis, this results in the definition of 2011 as both a pre-election year and an election year; 2012 is both an election year and a post-election year. Governor Joseph Manchin III resigned to become a Senator in 2010. A special election was held in November, 2011, and was followed by the regularly-scheduled gubernatorial election in 2012. In the robustness section, we also re-estimate our results omitting all observations from West Virginia in 2011 and 2012. Our results are robust to omitting both the 2011 and 2012 West Virginia gubernatorial elections.

The special elections in California in 2003 and Wisconsin in 2012 were recall elections, meaning that the constituents forced an election in which they could replace the sitting governor earlier than the regularly-scheduled gubernatorial election. One important reason we use gubernatorial elections as our source of political uncertainty is because they are pre-scheduled, so firms can observe the timing of the election and plan mergers accordingly. Because of the uncertainty surrounding the timing of the recall elections, we omit them from our sample.

In California, a formal recall petition was started on March 25, 2003.² The timing of

¹Information from the Utah historic archives, maintained by the Utah Department of Administrative Services, Division of Archives & Records Service.

²Information from the California Secretary of State web page, Statewide Special Election – FAQs About Recalls, October 7, 2003.

the recall election depended on when enough signatures (897,158 were needed to force a recall election) were collected. If the necessary signature were collected and certified by September 3, 2003, the election would have been held on October 7, 2003. If the signatures were collected and certified after September 4, 2003, the election would have been held on March 2, 2004. Even after enough signatures were collected and verified, and the election scheduled for October 7th, legal wrangling threatened to postpone the election to March. On September 15th, a federal appeals court, a three-judge panel of the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, postponed the election to March over concerns about punch-card voting machines.³ An eleven judge panel then over-turned this ruling on September 23rd, so the recall election could proceed only two weeks later. Opponents chose not to appeal the ruling to the U.S. Supreme Court.⁴ However, had opponents appealed, or threatened to appeal, the timing of the election would have become even more uncertain. Results of the 2003 California recall election were finalized by mid-November, and the election resulted in Governor Gray Davis being replaced by Governor Arnold Schwarzenegger.

The uncertainty of the timing of the 2012 Wisconsin recall election was similar to that seen in California in 2003. Controversy over the policies of Governor Scott Walker, elected in Wisconsin in 2010, erupted shortly after he took office and culminated in an effort to recall him beginning approximately one year after he was elected, in November of 2011. On March 15, 2012, a judge in Wisconsin postponed an election from May 29, 2012 to June 5, 2012 by giving the Government Accountability Board (GAB) additional time to review and verify recall petition signatures.⁵ Governor Walker won the recall election, which was held on June 5, 2012, and was subsequently re-elected in 2014.

³“Court Delays Recall Vote in California; Faulty Ballots Cited,” by Dean E. Murphy, September 15, 2003, *The New York Times*

⁴“U.S. Appeals Court Puts Recall In California Back on Schedule,” by Dean E. Murphy, September 24, 2003, *The New York Times*

⁵“Judge OKs petition review extension, June 5 recall election,” by Dee J. Hall, March 15, 2012, *Wisconsin State Journal*

I.B Alternate identification of firms' states of headquarters

To identify states of operations, we follow the methods in [García and Norli \(2012\)](#). For Q1 of each year, we collect 10-K statements for each firm in our sample for which they are available. Then, we count the number of times each state name (e.g., New York) appears in the document. We do not include abbreviations (e.g., NY) and a number of variations on state names that do not necessarily indicate state of operations. For example, Bank of *state name*, *state name* River, University of *state name*, and *state name* University are excluded from these counts.

In Figure [IA.1](#), we replace the SDC-identified state of headquarters with the most-commonly-appearing state from our 10-K analysis. For comparison, the first panel shows our results without this replacement (also in Figure [2](#)). Approximately 50% of the time, the most-commonly-appearing state in the 10-Ks is the state of headquarters. For some states, there is a tie in which state appears most frequently. To identify a state of operations, we use three different ways to break the tie: first state name alphabetically, last state name alphabetically, and a random draw of state name. These results appear in the other three panels of Figure [IA.1](#).

Results in Figure [IA.1](#) show that, if we link firms to states of operations as identified in 10-Ks instead of SDC states of headquarters, our results strengthen. Generally, results examining target counts remain fairly similar to the results in Figure [2](#). However, we see a greater increase in acquirer counts pre-election and a more pronounced decline in acquirer counts around elections.

In Figure [IA.7](#), we limit our analysis to public firms, as we only have 10-Ks for public firms. We continue to see that replacing SDC-identified states of headquarters with 10-K-identified states of operation strengthens pre-election results. Acquirer counts around elections are slightly lower with states of operations. However, the results are fairly similar to those we obtain in the first panel using SDC data. We interpret these results with caution, however, as limiting our sample to public acquirers only does cause this sample to differ from that we examine in our paper.

I.C Auxiliary tables and figures

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- Table IA.17 – regressions for percentage of deal paid for in equity for serial and

non-serial acquirers around elections.

Figure IA.1: Re-estimation of main results using 10K state count for firm location identification. Plot of discrete effects calculated using estimates from quarterly state-level acquirer and target levels. The estimation is identical to that described in the caption of Table 2, except that firms are linked to election timing in states of operation as described in Section I.B instead of states of headquarters.




Figure IA.2: Re-estimation of main results in monthly data. Plot of discrete effects calculated using estimates from monthly state-level acquirer (top) and target (bottom) levels. The estimation is identical to that described in the caption of Table 2, except that the dependent variables are calculated monthly (state-month) instead of quarterly (state-quarter).




Figure IA.3: Re-estimation of main results in only-acquirer-election or only-target-election subsamples. Plot of discrete effects (i.e., the difference in acquisitions from the baseline level predicted by the hurdle model) calculated using estimates from state-quarter acquisition observations in which the acquirer faces an election but the chosen target does not (top plot) and in which the chosen target faces an election but the acquirer does not (bottom plot). Coefficient estimates for the top plot are presented in Table IA.3, and estimates for bottom plot are presented in Table IA.4.




Figure IA.4: Re-estimation of main results using election closeness to measure uncertainty. Plot of discrete effects calculated using estimates from quarterly state-level acquirer and target levels. The estimation is identical to that described in the caption of Table 2, except that the sample is limited to election-year observations only and a binary election closeness variable is used as treatment in the DD framework.




Figure IA.5: Re-estimation of main results with public and private acquirers and targets. Plot of discrete effects (i.e., the difference in acquisitions from the baseline level predicted by the hurdle model) calculated using estimates from state-quarter acquirer and target observations for public acquirers and targets (top plots) and private acquirers and targets (bottom plots). Coefficient estimates for the plots are presented in Table IA.13.




Figure IA.6: Re-estimation of main results including additional state-level macroeconomic controls. Plot of discrete effects (i.e., the difference in acquisitions from the baseline level predicted by the hurdle model) calculated using estimates from quarterly state-level acquirer and target levels. The estimation is identical to that described in the caption of Table 2, except that two additional controls are included: change in annual state GDP and state quarterly unemployment. Inclusion of these variables limits our sample to data through 2013.




Figure IA.7: Re-estimation of results using 10K state count for firm location identification for public firms only. Plot of discrete effects calculated using estimates from quarterly state-level acquirer and target levels. The estimation is identical to that described in the caption of Table 2, except that firms are linked to election timing in states of operation as described in Section I.B instead of headquarters. The sample includes only public firms.




Table IA.1: State-level acquirer and target counts. The number of acquirers and targets per state for a sample of 36,685 deals from 1986 to 2016. Merger data are from Thomson Reuters SDC Platinum. State of headquarters data are from Thomson Reuters SDC Platinum, augmented with Heider and Ljungqvist (2015) corrections from 1989 to 2011 and 10-K filing data post-2011.

State	Total acquirers	Total targets	State	Total acquirers	Total targets
Alabama*	388	299	Montana*	58	84
Alaska*	14	41	Nebraska*	190	138
Arizona	521	632	Nevada	386	431
Arkansas*	159	148	New Hampshire	143	202
California	6436	6731	New Jersey	1396	1251
Colorado	1059	1012	New Mexico*	87	156
Connecticut	840	645	New York	3566	2520
Delaware*	263	430	North Carolina	720	804
Florida	2172	2403	North Dakota*	30	49
Georgia	1131	1167	Ohio	1113	984
Hawaii*	30	72	Oklahoma	308	399
Idaho*	72	89	Oregon	274	380
Illinois	1534	1449	Pennsylvania	1446	1327
Indiana	455	556	Rhode Island*	93	86
Iowa*	142	220	South Carolina	188	272
Kansas	182	257	South Dakota*	31	46
Kentucky	232	302	Tennessee	596	557
Louisiana	285	421	Texas	3323	3188
Maine*	64	98	Utah	362	328
Maryland	685	691	Vermont*	48	56
Massachusetts	1644	1521	Virginia	901	963
Michigan	592	677	Washington	591	722
Minnesota	697	654	West Virginia*	124	130
Mississippi	159	144	Wisconsin	365	404
Missouri	570	479	Wyoming*	20	70
			Total	36,685	36,685

*States with low variance in M&A activity that are dropped in subsamples tests.

Table IA.2: Same-state and cross-state estimation results. Estimates from a hurdle model for the sample of 4,059 state-quarter M&A observations from 1986 to 2016 from 33 states for same-state (Panel A) and cross-state (Panel B) acquisitions. Of the 34,872 deals in the sample, 23,645 are cross-state and 11,227 are same-state. The dependent variables are the number of acquirers (columns 1 to 6) and targets (columns 7 to 12) in each state-quarter. Coefficients are combined estimates on YEAR_BEFORE, ELECTION, or YEAR_AFTER and an interaction between YEAR_BEFORE, ELECTION, or YEAR_AFTER and the appropriate quarter, with the quarter interaction labeled by row. Coefficients are presented for both stages of the hurdle model. The first stage estimates the propensity of observations to be greater than zero (a negative coefficient means a variable is associated with a greater probability of no M&A activity), and the second stage estimates a count model (a negative coefficient means a lower number of acquirers per state-quarter, for example, is associated with a variable). Estimates for 6 quarters before, the quarter of (in bold), and four quarters after the election are presented. Discrete effects reported are calculated as the average predicted acquirer or target activity in election year-quarters, relative to non-election year-quarters, with control variables held at their sample averages, and are directly comparable to the sample averages reported in Table 1. We include as controls a presidential election year and quarter interaction, quarter fixed effects, state fixed effects, year fixed effects, and beginning of the period values of the VIX and baseline EPU indexes. Significance levels are: *p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001.

Dep. var:	Zero model			Acquirers			Zero model			Targets		
	(1) estimate	(2) SE	(3) estimate	(4) SE	(5) estimate	(6) SE	(7) estimate	(8) SE	(9) estimate	(10) SE	(11) estimate	(12) SE
<i>Panel A. Same-state deals</i>												
YEAR_BEFORE × Q2	0.22	0.20	0.04	0.07	0.07	0.06	0.22	0.20	0.04	0.07	0.07	0.06
YEAR_BEFORE × Q3	-0.00	0.20	0.12	0.07	0.12	0.06	-0.00	0.20	0.12	0.07	0.12	0.06
YEAR_BEFORE × Q4	-0.12	0.20	0.11	0.07	0.09	0.07	-0.12	0.20	0.11	0.07	0.09	0.07
ELECTION × Q1	0.02	0.21	0.04	0.07	0.04	0.07	0.02	0.21	0.04	0.07	0.04	0.07
ELECTION × Q2	-0.17	0.20	-0.03	0.07	-0.05	0.06	-0.17	0.20	-0.03	0.07	-0.05	0.06
ELECTION × Q3	-0.35	0.20	-0.10	0.07	-0.15*	0.06	-0.35	0.20	-0.10	0.07	-0.15*	0.06
ELECTION × Q4	-0.09	0.20	-0.10	0.07	-0.11	0.06	-0.09	0.20	-0.10	0.07	-0.11	0.06
YEAR_AFTER × Q1	-0.05	0.21	-0.11	0.07	-0.11	0.06	-0.05	0.21	-0.11	0.07	-0.11	0.06
YEAR_AFTER × Q2	-0.25	0.21	0.01	0.07	-0.03	0.07	-0.25	0.21	0.01	0.07	-0.03	0.07
YEAR_AFTER × Q3	0.07	0.21	0.04	0.07	0.05	0.07	0.07	0.21	0.04	0.07	0.05	0.07
YEAR_AFTER × Q4	-0.18	0.21	-0.01	0.07	-0.04	0.07	-0.18	0.21	-0.01	0.07	-0.04	0.07
<i>Panel B. Cross-state deals</i>												
YEAR_BEFORE × Q2	0.09	0.26	0.01	0.04	0.04	0.06	0.30	0.31	-0.03	0.04	-0.09	0.06
YEAR_BEFORE × Q3	0.21	0.28	0.06	0.04	0.19***	0.06	0.38	0.31	0.05	0.04	0.18**	0.06
YEAR_BEFORE × Q4	-0.21	0.27	0.09*	0.04	0.31***	0.06	-0.32	0.31	0.06	0.04	0.21***	0.06
ELECTION × Q1	-0.22	0.27	-0.06	0.04	-0.19**	0.06	-0.03	0.32	0.02	0.04	0.07	0.06
ELECTION × Q2	-0.14	0.27	-0.04	0.04	-0.14*	0.06	-0.34	0.31	-0.03	0.04	-0.11	0.06
ELECTION × Q3	-0.37	0.27	-0.12**	0.04	-0.38***	0.05	-0.40	0.31	-0.08*	0.04	-0.28***	0.06
ELECTION × Q4	0.23	0.29	-0.13**	0.04	-0.40***	0.05	0.00	0.34	-0.09*	0.04	-0.31***	0.06
YEAR_AFTER × Q1	-0.26	0.26	-0.12**	0.04	-0.37***	0.06	-0.14	0.30	-0.04	0.04	-0.16**	0.06
YEAR_AFTER × Q2	-0.04	0.27	-0.12**	0.04	-0.39***	0.06	-0.59*	0.30	-0.03	0.04	-0.10	0.06
YEAR_AFTER × Q3	-0.10	0.28	-0.07	0.04	-0.22***	0.06	-0.09	0.31	-0.03	0.04	-0.11	0.06
YEAR_AFTER × Q4	-0.14	0.28	-0.05	0.04	-0.18**	0.06	0.10	0.33	-0.04	0.04	-0.13*	0.06

Table IA.3: Re-estimation of main results in only-target-election subsample. Estimates from a hurdle model for the sample of 4,059 state-quarter M&A observations from 1986 to 2016 from 33 states for which there is not an election in the state of headquarters of the acquirer. The dependent variables are the number of acquirers (columns 1 to 6) and targets (columns 7 to 12) in each state-quarter. Coefficients are combined estimates on YEAR_BEFORE, ELECTION, or YEAR_AFTER and an interaction between YEAR_BEFORE, ELECTION, or YEAR_AFTER and the appropriate quarter, with the quarter interaction labeled by row. Coefficients are presented for both stages of the hurdle model. The first stage estimates the propensity of observations to be greater than zero (a negative coefficient means a variable is associated with a greater probability of no M&A activity), and the second stage estimates a count model (a negative coefficient means a lower number of acquirers per state-quarter, for example, is associated with a variable). Estimates for 6 quarters before, the quarter of (in bold), and four quarters after the election are presented. Discrete effects reported are calculated as the average predicted acquirer activity in election year-quarters, relative to non-election year-quarters, with control variables held at their sample averages, and are directly comparable to the sample averages reported in Table 1. We include as controls a presidential election year and quarter interaction, quarter fixed effects, state fixed variables, year fixed effects, and beginning of the period values of the VIX and baseline EPU indexes. Significance levels are: *p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001.

Dep. var:	Acquirers					
	Zero model		Count model		Discrete effect	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
	estimate	SE	estimate	SE	estimate	SE
YEAR_BEFORE × Q2	0.43	0.29	-0.03	0.03	-0.02	0.06
YEAR_BEFORE × Q3	0.58	0.31	0.01	0.03	0.12*	0.06
YEAR_BEFORE × Q4	0.13	0.30	0.02	0.03	0.08	0.07
ELECTION × Q1	-0.92***	0.25	-0.69***	0.06	-1.71***	0.08
ELECTION × Q2	-1.23***	0.24	-0.65***	0.06	-1.74***	0.08
ELECTION × Q3	-1.46***	0.24	-0.73***	0.06	-1.90***	0.09
ELECTION × Q4	-0.92***	0.25	-0.73***	0.06	-1.76***	0.07
YEAR_AFTER × Q1	-0.28	0.28	-0.13***	0.04	-0.38***	0.07
YEAR_AFTER × Q2	-0.04	0.28	-0.08*	0.04	-0.22**	0.07
YEAR_AFTER × Q3	-0.03	0.29	-0.06	0.04	-0.15*	0.07
YEAR_AFTER × Q4	-0.22	0.29	-0.05	0.04	-0.18*	0.08

Table IA.4: Re-estimation of main results in only-acquirer-election subsample. Estimates from a hurdle model for the sample of 4,059 state-quarter M&A observations from 1986 to 2016 from 33 states for which there is not an election in the state of headquarters of the target. The dependent variables are the number of acquirers (columns 1 to 6) and targets (columns 7 to 12) in each state-quarter. Coefficients are combined estimates on YEAR_BEFORE, ELECTION, or YEAR_AFTER and an interaction between YEAR_BEFORE, ELECTION, or YEAR_AFTER and the appropriate quarter, with the quarter interaction labeled by row. Coefficients are presented for both stages of the hurdle model. The first stage estimates the propensity of observations to be greater than zero (a negative coefficient means a variable is associated with a greater probability of no M&A activity), and the second stage estimates a count model (a negative coefficient means a lower number of acquirers per state-quarter, for example, is associated with a variable). Estimates for 6 quarters before, the quarter of (in bold), and four quarters after the election are presented. Discrete effects reported are calculated as the average predicted target activity in election year-quarters, relative to non-election year-quarters, with control variables held at their sample averages, and are directly comparable to the sample averages reported in Table 1. We include as controls a presidential election year and quarter interaction, quarter fixed effects, state fixed variables, year fixed effects, and beginning of the period values of the VIX and baseline EPU indexes. Significance levels are: *p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001.

Dep. var:	Targets					
	Zero model		Count model		Discrete effect	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
	estimate	SE	estimate	SE	estimate	SE
YEAR_BEFORE × Q2	0.59	0.32	-0.04	0.03	-0.05	0.05
YEAR_BEFORE × Q3	0.47	0.34	0.01	0.03	0.08	0.05
YEAR_BEFORE × Q4	-0.59	0.31	0.01	0.03	-0.05	0.08
ELECTION × Q1	-1.33***	0.26	-0.48***	0.06	-1.40***	0.08
ELECTION × Q2	-1.62***	0.26	-0.60***	0.06	-1.67***	0.08
ELECTION × Q3	-1.43***	0.26	-0.63***	0.06	-1.67***	0.07
ELECTION × Q4	-1.27***	0.27	-0.62***	0.06	-1.62***	0.07
YEAR_AFTER × Q1	-0.37	0.31	-0.05	0.04	-0.17**	0.07
YEAR_AFTER × Q2	-0.42	0.31	-0.00	0.04	-0.06	0.07
YEAR_AFTER × Q3	-0.70*	0.31	0.00	0.04	-0.11	0.08
YEAR_AFTER × Q4	0.26	0.37	-0.03	0.04	-0.07	0.06

Table IA.5: Effect of political uncertainty on state-quarter aggregate deal value. Estimates from a heterogeneous tobit model for the full sample of 6,150 state-quarter M&A observations from 1986 to 2016. The dependent variables are the natural logarithm of one plus the dollars spent by acquirers (columns 1 and 2) and on targets (columns 3 and 4) in each state-quarter. Coefficients are combined estimates on YEAR_BEFORE, ELECTION, or YEAR_AFTER and an interaction between YEAR_BEFORE, ELECTION, or YEAR_AFTER and the appropriate quarter, with the quarter interaction labeled by row. Estimates for 6 quarters before, the quarter of (in bold), and four quarters after the election are presented. Discrete effects reported are calculated as the average predicted natural logarithm of one plus dollar value of acquisitions by acquirer or target dollar election year-quarters, relative to non-election year-quarters, with control variables held at their sample averages. We include as controls a presidential election year and quarter interaction, quarter fixed effects, state fixed variables, year fixed effects, and beginning of the period values of the VIX and baseline EPU indexes. Significance levels are: *p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001.

Dep. var:	Acquirers		Targets	
	Discrete effect		Discrete effect	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
	estimate	SE	estimate	SE
YEAR_BEFORE × Q2	0.01	0.14	-0.09	0.12
YEAR_BEFORE × Q3	0.01	0.14	0.03	0.13
YEAR_BEFORE × Q4	-0.00	0.14	0.07	0.13
ELECTION × Q1	-0.07	0.15	-0.08	0.13
ELECTION × Q2	-0.11	0.14	-0.20	0.13
ELECTION × Q3	-0.18	0.14	-0.23	0.13
ELECTION × Q4	-0.03	0.14	-0.13	0.13
YEAR_AFTER × Q1	-0.20	0.16	-0.19	0.14
YEAR_AFTER × Q2	-0.01	0.15	-0.12	0.15
YEAR_AFTER × Q3	0.03	0.15	0.01	0.14
YEAR_AFTER × Q4	-0.07	0.15	-0.22	0.14

Table IA.6: Re-estimation of aggregate value results for small and large acquirers. Estimates from a heterogeneous tobit model for the full sample of 4,059 state-quarter M&A observations from 1986 to 2016 from 33 states for small acquirers (Panel A) and large acquirers (Panel B), in which small and large are determined by comparing the acquirer's asset value to the sample median. The dependent variables are one plus the natural logarithm of dollars spent by acquirers (columns 1 and 2) and on targets (columns 3 and 4) in each state-quarter. Coefficients are combined estimates on YEAR_BEFORE, ELECTION, or YEAR_AFTER and an interaction between YEAR_BEFORE, ELECTION, or YEAR_AFTER and the appropriate quarter, with the quarter interaction labeled by row. Estimates for 6 quarters before, the quarter of (in bold), and four quarters after the election are presented. Discrete effects reported are calculated as the average predicted natural logarithm of one plus dollar value of acquisitions by acquirer or target dollar election year-quarters, relative to non-election year-quarters, with control variables held at their sample averages. We include as controls a presidential election year and quarter interaction, quarter fixed effects, state fixed variables, year fixed effects, and beginning of the period values of the VIX and baseline EPU indexes. Significance levels are: *p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001.

Dep. var:	Acquirers		Targets	
	Discrete effect		Discrete effect	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
	estimate	SE	estimate	SE
<i>Panel A. Deals by large acquirers</i>				
YEAR_BEFORE × Q2	0.12	0.26	-0.10	0.23
YEAR_BEFORE × Q3	0.04	0.27	-0.08	0.24
YEAR_BEFORE × Q4	-0.02	0.27	-0.11	0.24
ELECTION × Q1	-0.27	0.29	-0.27	0.24
ELECTION × Q2	-0.55*	0.27	-0.32	0.23
ELECTION × Q3	-0.56*	0.27	-0.43	0.24
ELECTION × Q4	-0.45	0.28	-0.30	0.24
YEAR_AFTER × Q1	-0.45	0.27	-0.38	0.26
YEAR_AFTER × Q2	-0.17	0.28	-0.14	0.25
YEAR_AFTER × Q3	0.01	0.29	-0.10	0.25
YEAR_AFTER × Q4	-0.11	0.28	-0.26	0.24
<i>Panel B. Deals by small acquirers</i>				
YEAR_BEFORE × Q2	0.04	0.2	0.15	0.17
YEAR_BEFORE × Q3	0.1	0.18	0.32	0.16
YEAR_BEFORE × Q4	0.19	0.19	0.28	0.16
ELECTION × Q1	0.04	0.2	-0.02	0.17
ELECTION × Q2	-0.01	0.18	-0.13	0.16
ELECTION × Q3	-0.17	0.19	-0.25	0.17
ELECTION × Q4	-0.01	0.19	-0.16	0.17
YEAR_AFTER × Q1	-0.14	0.21	-0.21	0.17
YEAR_AFTER × Q2	-0.06	0.2	-0.16	0.18
YEAR_AFTER × Q3	-0.16	0.2	-0.14	0.18
YEAR_AFTER × Q4	0.09	0.19	0.05	0.17

Table IA.7: Re-estimation of main results for small and large deals. Estimates from a hurdle model for the sample of 4,059 state-quarter M&A observations from 1986 to 2016 from 33 states for small deals (Panel A) and large deals (Panel B), in which small and large are determined relative to a deal size of \$250 million (in 2016 dollars). The dependent variables are the number of acquirers (columns 1 to 6) and targets (columns 7 to 12) in each state-quarter. Coefficients are combined estimates on YEAR_BEFORE, ELECTION, or YEAR_AFTER and an interaction between YEAR_BEFORE, ELECTION, or YEAR_AFTER and the appropriate quarter, with the quarter interaction labeled by row. Coefficients are presented for both stages of the hurdle model. The first stage estimates the propensity of observations to be greater than zero (a negative coefficient means a variable is associated with a greater probability of no M&A activity), and the second stage estimates a count model (a negative coefficient means a lower number of acquirers per state-quarter, for example, is associated with a variable). Estimates for 6 quarters before, the quarter of (in bold), and four quarters after the election are presented. Discrete effects reported are calculated as the average predicted acquirer or target activity in election year-quarters, relative to non-election year-quarters, with control variables held at their sample averages, and are directly comparable to the sample averages reported in Table 1. We include as controls a presidential election year and quarter interaction, quarter fixed effects, state fixed effects, year fixed effects, and beginning of the period values of the VIX and baseline EPU indexes. Significance levels are: * p<0.05; ** p<0.01; *** p<0.001.

Dep. var:	Zero model			Acquirers			Zero model			Targets		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)
	estimate	SE	estimate	SE	estimate	SE	estimate	SE	estimate	SE	estimate	SE
<i>Panel A. Deals less than \$250 million</i>												
YEAR_BEFORE × Q2	0.21	0.29	0.01	0.03	0.04	0.06	0.19	0.32	0.00	0.03	0.02	0.06
YEAR_BEFORE × Q3	-0.19	0.28	0.07*	0.03	0.28***	0.06	0.08	0.30	0.05	0.03	0.21***	0.06
YEAR_BEFORE × Q4	-0.48	0.28	0.08*	0.03	0.34***	0.06	-0.20	0.32	0.06	0.03	0.27***	0.06
ELECTION × Q1	-0.11	0.29	-0.04	0.04	-0.16**	0.06	0.45	0.36	0.03	0.04	0.12	0.06
ELECTION × Q2	-0.14	0.29	-0.03	0.03	-0.13*	0.06	-0.00	0.33	-0.04	0.03	-0.16**	0.06
ELECTION × Q3	-0.45	0.28	-0.12***	0.04	-0.47***	0.05	-0.26	0.30	-0.10**	0.03	-0.40***	0.06
ELECTION × Q4	-0.14	0.29	-0.12***	0.04	-0.48***	0.06	-0.20	0.33	-0.12***	0.04	-0.48***	0.06
YEAR_AFTER × Q1	-0.11	0.28	-0.08*	0.04	-0.31***	0.06	-0.16	0.31	-0.04	0.04	-0.17**	0.06
YEAR_AFTER × Q2	-0.14	0.29	-0.08*	0.04	-0.32***	0.06	-0.27	0.31	-0.03	0.04	-0.12	0.06
YEAR_AFTER × Q3	0.14	0.29	-0.04	0.04	-0.14*	0.06	0.15	0.31	-0.01	0.04	-0.05	0.06
YEAR_AFTER × Q4	0.36	0.31	-0.06	0.04	-0.25***	0.06	0.15	0.34	-0.01	0.04	-0.06	0.06
<i>Panel B. Deals greater than \$250 million</i>												
YEAR_BEFORE × Q2	0.11	0.20	0.05	0.10	0.04	0.07	-0.23	0.19	0.07	0.10	-0.06	0.08
YEAR_BEFORE × Q3	-0.08	0.20	0.16	0.10	-0.00	0.07	-0.00	0.19	0.26**	0.10	0.09	0.09
YEAR_BEFORE × Q4	0.07	0.20	0.11	0.10	0.04	0.07	-0.01	0.19	0.13	0.10	0.04	0.08
ELECTION × Q1	0.02	0.21	-0.06	0.11	-0.00	0.08	-0.40*	0.20	-0.08	0.11	-0.16*	0.08
ELECTION × Q2	0.01	0.20	-0.13	0.10	-0.01	0.07	-0.13	0.19	-0.08	0.10	-0.07	0.08
ELECTION × Q3	-0.15	0.20	-0.16	0.10	-0.07	0.07	-0.18	0.19	-0.13	0.10	-0.10	0.08
ELECTION × Q4	0.08	0.20	-0.06	0.10	0.02	0.07	-0.16	0.19	0.06	0.10	-0.04	0.08
YEAR_AFTER × Q1	-0.23	0.21	-0.36**	0.11	-0.11	0.07	-0.15	0.20	-0.28*	0.11	-0.12	0.08
YEAR_AFTER × Q2	-0.17	0.21	-0.15	0.10	-0.07	0.07	-0.20	0.20	-0.09	0.10	-0.10	0.08
YEAR_AFTER × Q3	0.10	0.21	-0.11	0.10	0.01	0.08	0.03	0.20	-0.09	0.10	-0.02	0.08
YEAR_AFTER × Q4	0.05	0.21	-0.14	0.10	-0.01	0.07	-0.19	0.20	-0.22*	0.10	-0.13	0.08

Table IA.8: Re-estimation of main results for small and large deal size relative to acquirer size. Estimates from a hurdle model for the sample of 4,059 state-quarter M&A observations from 1986 to 2016 from 33 states for small deals (Panel A) and large deals (Panel B), in which small and large are determined by comparing the ratio of deal size to the acquirer's market value of equity to the sample median. The dependent variables are the number of acquirers (columns 1 to 6) and targets (columns 7 to 12) in each state-quarter. Coefficients are combined estimates on YEAR_BEFORE, ELECTION, or YEAR_AFTER and an interaction between YEAR_BEFORE, ELECTION, or YEAR_AFTER and the appropriate quarter, with the quarter interaction labeled by row. Coefficients are presented for both stages of the hurdle model. The first stage estimates the propensity of observations to be greater than zero (a negative coefficient means a variable is associated with a greater probability of no M&A activity), and the second stage estimates a count model (a negative coefficient means a lower number of acquirers per state-quarter, for example, is associated with a variable). Estimates for 6 quarters before, the quarter of (in bold), and four quarters after the election are presented. Discrete effects reported are calculated as the average predicted acquirer or target activity in election year-quarters, relative to non-election year-quarters, with control variables held at their sample averages, and are directly comparable to the sample averages reported in Table 1. We include as controls a presidential election year and quarter interaction, quarter fixed effects, state fixed variables, year fixed effects, and beginning of the period values of the VIX and baseline EPU indexes. Significance levels are: *p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001.

Dep. var:	Acquirers						Targets					
	Zero model		Count model		Discrete effect		Zero model		Count model		Discrete effect	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)
	estimate	SE	estimate	SE	estimate	SE	estimate	SE	estimate	SE	estimate	SE
<i>Panel A. Deals with below median acquisition value / market value of equity</i>												
YEAR_BEFORE × Q2	-0.07	0.20	-0.04	0.07	-0.06	0.08	0.17	0.20	-0.06	0.07	-0.01	0.07
YEAR_BEFORE × Q3	-0.15	0.20	0.04	0.06	-0.02	0.08	-0.05	0.20	0.12	0.06	0.09	0.08
YEAR_BEFORE × Q4	0.05	0.21	-0.01	0.06	0.00	0.08	-0.37	0.20	0.08	0.06	-0.05	0.08
ELECTION × Q1	-0.17	0.21	-0.05	0.07	-0.10	0.08	0.20	0.21	-0.01	0.07	0.05	0.07
ELECTION × Q2	0.04	0.21	-0.03	0.07	-0.01	0.08	-0.30	0.20	0.01	0.07	-0.08	0.08
ELECTION × Q3	-0.07	0.21	-0.17*	0.07	-0.15*	0.07	-0.39	0.20	-0.14*	0.07	-0.22**	0.08
ELECTION × Q4	-0.45*	0.21	-0.06	0.07	-0.20*	0.09	-0.18	0.21	-0.05	0.07	-0.09	0.08
YEAR_AFTER × Q1	0.16	0.21	-0.11	0.07	-0.04	0.08	-0.13	0.21	-0.05	0.07	-0.08	0.08
YEAR_AFTER × Q2	-0.19	0.21	-0.06	0.07	-0.11	0.09	-0.23	0.21	0.03	0.07	-0.04	0.08
YEAR_AFTER × Q3	0.04	0.21	-0.06	0.07	-0.04	0.08	0.02	0.21	0.06	0.07	0.05	0.08
YEAR_AFTER × Q4	0.19	0.22	-0.12	0.07	-0.04	0.08	-0.06	0.21	-0.01	0.07	-0.03	0.08
<i>Panel B. Deals with above median acquisition value / market value of equity</i>												
YEAR_BEFORE × Q2	0.20	0.20	-0.07	0.07	-0.01	0.07	-0.15	0.20	-0.11	0.07	-0.12	0.07
YEAR_BEFORE × Q3	0.45*	0.21	0.02	0.07	0.13	0.07	0.07	0.20	0.08	0.07	0.09	0.07
YEAR_BEFORE × Q4	-0.00	0.20	0.16*	0.07	0.16*	0.08	-0.10	0.20	0.14*	0.07	0.11	0.07
ELECTION × Q1	-0.10	0.21	-0.04	0.07	-0.06	0.08	-0.07	0.21	-0.05	0.07	-0.06	0.07
ELECTION × Q2	-0.04	0.20	-0.07	0.07	-0.07	0.07	-0.22	0.21	0.02	0.07	-0.03	0.07
ELECTION × Q3	-0.43*	0.20	-0.19**	0.07	-0.27***	0.08	-0.16	0.21	-0.16*	0.07	-0.17*	0.07
ELECTION × Q4	-0.10	0.20	-0.25***	0.07	-0.21**	0.07	-0.18	0.21	-0.24***	0.07	-0.22***	0.07
YEAR_AFTER × Q1	-0.00	0.21	-0.24**	0.07	-0.18**	0.07	0.31	0.22	-0.24**	0.07	-0.13*	0.06
YEAR_AFTER × Q2	-0.22	0.21	-0.12	0.07	-0.16*	0.08	-0.21	0.21	-0.10	0.07	-0.14	0.07
YEAR_AFTER × Q3	0.04	0.21	-0.14	0.07	-0.11	0.07	-0.07	0.21	-0.16*	0.07	-0.15*	0.07
YEAR_AFTER × Q4	-0.21	0.21	-0.01	0.07	-0.07	0.08	-0.22	0.21	-0.02	0.07	-0.07	0.08

Table IA-9: Re-estimation of main results for small and large acquirer size. Estimates from a hurdle model for the sample of 4,059 state-quarter M&A observations from 1986 to 2016 from 33 states for small acquirers (Panel A) and large acquirers (Panel B), in which small and large are determined by comparing the acquirer's asset value to the sample median. The dependent variables are the number of acquirers (columns 1 to 6) and targets (columns 7 to 12) in each state-quarter. Coefficients are combined estimates on YEAR_BEFORE, ELECTION, or YEAR_AFTER and an interaction between YEAR_BEFORE, ELECTION, or YEAR_AFTER and the appropriate quarter, with the quarter interaction labeled by row. Coefficients are presented for both stages of the hurdle model. The first stage estimates the propensity of observations to be greater than zero (a negative coefficient means a variable is associated with a greater probability of no M&A activity), and the second stage estimates a count model (a negative coefficient means a lower number of acquirers per state-quarter, for example, is associated with a variable). Estimates for 6 quarters before, the quarter of (in bold), and four quarters after the election are presented. Discrete effects reported are calculated as the average predicted acquirer or target activity in election year-quarters, relative to non-election year-quarters, with control variables held at their sample averages, and are directly comparable to the sample averages reported in Table 1. We include as controls a presidential election year and quarter interaction, quarter fixed effects, state fixed variables, year fixed effects, and beginning of the period values of the VIX and baseline EPU indexes. Significance levels are: * p<0.05; ** p<0.01; *** p<0.001.

Dep. var:	Zero model			Acquirers			Zero model			Targets		
	(1) estimate	(2) SE	(3) estimate	(4) SE	(5) estimate	(6) SE	(7) estimate	(8) SE	(9) estimate	(10) SE	(11) estimate	(12) SE
<i>Panel A. Deals by small acquirers</i>												
YEAR_BEFORE × Q2	0.05	0.20	-0.04	0.07	-0.01	0.07	0.18	0.20	-0.14*	0.07	-0.05	0.06
YEAR_BEFORE × Q3	0.35	0.20	0.14*	0.06	0.22**	0.07	0.37	0.20	0.07	0.06	0.14*	0.06
YEAR_BEFORE × Q4	-0.05	0.20	0.20**	0.06	0.15	0.09	0.06	0.20	0.10	0.06	0.10	0.07
ELECTION × Q1	0.20	0.21	0.00	0.07	0.06	0.08	0.45*	0.21	0.03	0.07	0.13	0.07
ELECTION × Q2	0.23	0.20	0.08	0.07	0.14	0.08	0.11	0.20	0.06	0.07	0.07	0.07
ELECTION × Q3	-0.03	0.20	-0.19**	0.07	-0.13	0.07	-0.23	0.20	-0.14*	0.07	-0.15*	0.07
ELECTION × Q4	0.46*	0.20	-0.09	0.07	0.06	0.07	-0.03	0.20	-0.11	0.07	-0.08	0.07
YEAR_AFTER × Q1	0.04	0.21	-0.15*	0.07	-0.09	0.08	0.08	0.21	-0.07	0.07	-0.03	0.07
YEAR_AFTER × Q2	0.04	0.21	-0.15*	0.07	-0.10	0.08	-0.38	0.21	0.01	0.07	-0.10	0.08
YEAR_AFTER × Q3	-0.21	0.21	-0.12	0.07	-0.15	0.08	-0.22	0.21	0.01	0.07	-0.05	0.08
YEAR_AFTER × Q4	0.02	0.21	-0.06	0.07	-0.04	0.08	-0.05	0.21	0.08	0.07	0.04	0.08
<i>Panel B. Deals by large acquirers</i>												
YEAR_BEFORE × Q2	0.18	0.21	-0.05	0.07	0.02	0.08	0.04	0.20	-0.11	0.07	-0.07	0.08
YEAR_BEFORE × Q3	0.11	0.20	-0.04	0.07	0.01	0.08	0.16	0.20	-0.01	0.07	0.04	0.08
YEAR_BEFORE × Q4	0.12	0.20	0.04	0.06	0.08	0.09	-0.08	0.20	0.03	0.07	-0.00	0.08
ELECTION × Q1	-0.30	0.21	-0.14*	0.07	-0.22*	0.09	0.25	0.22	-0.16*	0.07	-0.06	0.07
ELECTION × Q2	-0.30	0.21	-0.15*	0.06	-0.22*	0.09	-0.46*	0.21	-0.06	0.06	-0.21*	0.09
ELECTION × Q3	-0.45*	0.21	-0.17**	0.07	-0.29**	0.09	-0.26	0.21	-0.17*	0.07	-0.21**	0.08
ELECTION × Q4	-0.38	0.21	-0.26***	0.07	-0.32***	0.09	-0.41	0.21	-0.16*	0.07	-0.26**	0.09
YEAR_AFTER × Q1	0.03	0.21	-0.22**	0.07	-0.15	0.08	-0.48*	0.21	-0.12	0.07	-0.26**	0.09
YEAR_AFTER × Q2	-0.20	0.21	-0.11	0.07	-0.16	0.09	0.01	0.21	-0.06	0.07	-0.05	0.08
YEAR_AFTER × Q3	0.21	0.21	-0.11	0.07	-0.02	0.08	-0.18	0.21	-0.07	0.07	-0.11	0.09
YEAR_AFTER × Q4	-0.18	0.21	-0.12	0.07	-0.16	0.09	0.01	0.21	-0.14*	0.07	-0.11	0.08

Table IA.10: Re-estimation of main results for rated and unrated acquirers. Estimates from a hurdle model for the sample of 4,059 state-quarter M&A observations from 1986 to 2016 from 33 states for unrated acquirers (Panel A) and rated acquirers (Panel B), in which rated and unrated are determined by whether the acquirer has an S&P credit rating. The dependent variables are the number of acquirers (columns 1 to 6) and targets (columns 7 to 12) in each state-quarter. Coefficients are combined estimates on YEAR_BEFORE, ELECTION, or YEAR_AFTER and an interaction between YEAR_BEFORE, ELECTION, or YEAR_AFTER and the appropriate quarter, with the quarter interaction labeled by row. Coefficients are presented for both stages of the hurdle model. The first stage estimates the propensity of observations to be greater than zero (a negative coefficient means a variable is associated with a greater probability of no M&A activity), and the second stage estimates a count model (a negative coefficient means a lower number of acquirers per state-quarter, for example, is associated with a variable). Estimates for 6 quarters before, the quarter of (in bold), and four quarters after the election are presented. Discrete effects reported are calculated as the average predicted acquirer or target activity in election year-quarters, relative to non-election year-quarters, with control variables held at their sample averages, and are directly comparable to the sample averages reported in Table 1. We include as controls a presidential election year and quarter interaction, quarter fixed effects, state fixed variables, year fixed effects, and beginning of the period values of the VIX and baseline EPU indexes. Significance levels are: * p<0.05; ** p<0.01; *** p<0.001.

Dep. var:	Zero model			Acquirers			Targets					
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)
	estimate	SE	estimate	SE	estimate	SE	estimate	SE	estimate	SE	estimate	SE
<i>Panel A. Deals by unrated acquirers</i>												
YEAR_BEFORE × Q2	0.37	0.30	-0.00	0.04	-0.00	0.06	0.17	0.32	-0.02	0.04	-0.10	0.06
YEAR_BEFORE × Q3	-0.08	0.29	0.06	0.04	0.25***	0.06	0.10	0.32	0.03	0.04	0.15*	0.06
YEAR_BEFORE × Q4	-0.11	0.29	0.06	0.04	0.26***	0.06	0.13	0.34	0.02	0.04	0.09	0.06
ELECTION × Q1	-0.10	0.29	-0.01	0.04	-0.03	0.06	0.42	0.35	0.02	0.04	0.08	0.06
ELECTION × Q2	-0.23	0.28	-0.05	0.04	-0.20***	0.06	0.25	0.33	-0.09*	0.03	-0.36***	0.06
ELECTION × Q3	-0.39	0.27	-0.12***	0.04	-0.47***	0.05	-0.22	0.31	-0.12***	0.03	-0.50***	0.05
ELECTION × Q4	-0.13	0.28	-0.10**	0.04	-0.37***	0.06	-0.11	0.33	-0.12***	0.04	-0.49***	0.06
YEAR_AFTER × Q1	-0.37	0.28	-0.11**	0.04	-0.43***	0.06	-0.05	0.31	-0.10**	0.04	-0.41***	0.06
YEAR_AFTER × Q2	-0.00	0.28	-0.07	0.04	-0.28***	0.06	-0.19	0.30	-0.05	0.04	-0.23***	0.06
YEAR_AFTER × Q3	0.22	0.29	-0.04	0.04	-0.16**	0.06	0.20	0.31	-0.04	0.04	-0.16**	0.06
YEAR_AFTER × Q4	0.14	0.29	-0.06	0.04	-0.22***	0.06	0.31	0.34	-0.06	0.04	-0.23***	0.06
<i>Panel B. Deals by rated acquirers</i>												
YEAR_BEFORE × Q2	-0.03	0.21	-0.24*	0.11	-0.05	0.08	-0.15	0.20	-0.07	0.11	-0.08	0.09
YEAR_BEFORE × Q3	0.11	0.21	-0.27*	0.11	-0.01	0.08	0.26	0.20	-0.03	0.11	0.08	0.09
YEAR_BEFORE × Q4	0.01	0.21	-0.24*	0.11	-0.04	0.08	0.13	0.20	-0.04	0.11	0.03	0.09
ELECTION × Q1	-0.14	0.20	-0.39***	0.10	-0.11	0.07	-0.05	0.19	-0.22*	0.11	-0.08	0.08
ELECTION × Q2	0.39*	0.20	-0.22*	0.09	0.08	0.07	0.24	0.19	0.01	0.10	0.09	0.08
ELECTION × Q3	-0.16	0.20	-0.27**	0.10	-0.10	0.07	0.21	0.19	-0.16	0.11	0.02	0.08
ELECTION × Q4	0.05	0.20	-0.32**	0.10	-0.04	0.07	0.21	0.19	-0.09	0.11	0.04	0.08
YEAR_AFTER × Q1	0.09	0.21	-0.19	0.10	-0.00	0.08	-0.06	0.20	0.13	0.11	0.02	0.09
YEAR_AFTER × Q2	-0.06	0.21	-0.24*	0.10	-0.06	0.07	0.11	0.20	-0.02	0.11	0.04	0.09
YEAR_AFTER × Q3	0.18	0.20	-0.19	0.10	0.02	0.08	0.05	0.19	0.05	0.11	0.04	0.09
YEAR_AFTER × Q4	0.13	0.20	-0.22*	0.10	0.00	0.08	0.21	0.20	-0.11	0.11	0.04	0.08

Table IA.11: Re-estimation of main results for serial and non-serial acquirers. Estimates from a hurdle model for the sample of 4,059 state-quarter M&A observations from 1986 to 2016 from 33 states for deals made by non-serial acquirers (Panel A) and deals made by serial acquirers (Panel B), in which serial and non-serial status is determined by whether the acquirer has made more than five acquisitions over a three-year period. The dependent variables are the number of acquirers (columns 1 to 6) and targets (columns 7 to 12) in each state-quarter. Coefficients are combined estimates on YEAR_BEFORE, ELECTION, or YEAR_AFTER and an interaction between YEAR_BEFORE, ELECTION, or YEAR_AFTER and the appropriate quarter, with the quarter interaction labeled by row. Coefficients are presented for both stages of the hurdle model. The first stage estimates the propensity of observations to be greater than zero (a negative coefficient means a variable is associated with a greater probability of no M&A activity), and the second stage estimates a count model (a negative coefficient means a lower number of acquirers per state-quarter, for example, is associated with a variable). Estimates for 6 quarters before, the quarter of (in bold), and four quarters after the election are presented. Discrete effects reported are calculated as the average predicted acquirer or target activity in election year-quarters, relative to non-election year-quarters, with control variables held at their sample averages, and are directly comparable to the sample averages reported in Table 1. We include as controls a presidential election year and quarter interaction, quarter fixed effects, state fixed variables, year fixed effects, and beginning of the period values of the VIX and baseline EPU indexes. Significance levels are: *p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001.

Dep. var:	Acquirers						Targets					
	Zero model		Count model		Discrete effect		Zero model		Count model		Discrete effect	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)
	estimate	SE	estimate	SE	estimate	SE	estimate	SE	estimate	SE	estimate	SE
<i>Panel A. Deals by non-serial acquirers</i>												
YEAR_BEFORE × Q2	0.32	0.32	-0.04	0.04	-0.17**	0.06	0.25	0.35	-0.03	0.04	-0.12	0.06
YEAR_BEFORE × Q3	-0.10	0.32	0.04	0.04	0.16*	0.06	0.21	0.34	0.04	0.04	0.19**	0.07
YEAR_BEFORE × Q4	-0.41	0.32	0.04	0.04	0.17**	0.06	-0.21	0.35	0.05	0.04	0.25***	0.07
ELECTION × Q1	-0.03	0.32	-0.06	0.04	-0.23***	0.06	0.28	0.37	0.01	0.04	0.06	0.06
ELECTION × Q2	-0.10	0.31	-0.05	0.03	-0.19***	0.06	-0.14	0.35	-0.03	0.03	-0.12*	0.06
ELECTION × Q3	-0.44	0.30	-0.16***	0.04	-0.63***	0.05	-0.42	0.33	-0.08*	0.03	-0.35***	0.06
ELECTION × Q4	0.06	0.32	-0.09**	0.04	-0.37***	0.06	-0.34	0.35	-0.05	0.03	-0.21***	0.06
YEAR_AFTER × Q1	-0.13	0.30	-0.08*	0.04	-0.33***	0.06	-0.05	0.33	-0.04	0.04	-0.16*	0.06
YEAR_AFTER × Q2	-0.21	0.30	-0.05	0.04	-0.20**	0.06	-0.61	0.32	-0.01	0.04	-0.06	0.06
YEAR_AFTER × Q3	0.30	0.32	-0.01	0.04	-0.03	0.06	-0.11	0.33	-0.01	0.04	-0.03	0.06
YEAR_AFTER × Q4	0.18	0.33	-0.03	0.04	-0.13*	0.06	0.47	0.38	-0.06	0.04	-0.25***	0.06
<i>Panel B. Deals by serial acquirers</i>												
YEAR_BEFORE × Q2	0.02	0.23	0.06	0.10	0.02	0.09	-0.11	0.21	-0.03	0.11	-0.04	0.07
YEAR_BEFORE × Q3	-0.06	0.23	0.04	0.10	-0.01	0.08	0.01	0.21	0.06	0.11	0.02	0.08
YEAR_BEFORE × Q4	-0.06	0.24	0.10	0.11	0.00	0.08	-0.01	0.21	-0.11	0.12	-0.02	0.08
ELECTION × Q1	0.00	0.23	0.19*	0.09	0.05	0.09	-0.01	0.21	-0.01	0.10	-0.00	0.08
ELECTION × Q2	-0.21	0.22	0.17*	0.09	-0.03	0.08	-0.38	0.20	-0.09	0.10	-0.14*	0.07
ELECTION × Q3	-0.09	0.22	0.24**	0.09	0.03	0.08	-0.10	0.20	-0.22*	0.10	-0.07	0.07
ELECTION × Q4	-0.31	0.23	-0.08	0.10	-0.11	0.07	-0.51*	0.20	-0.25*	0.12	-0.19**	0.06
YEAR_AFTER × Q1	-0.23	0.23	-0.29**	0.11	-0.12	0.07	-0.56**	0.21	-0.16	0.11	-0.19**	0.06
YEAR_AFTER × Q2	-0.10	0.23	-0.27*	0.11	-0.08	0.07	-0.15	0.21	-0.06	0.11	-0.06	0.07
YEAR_AFTER × Q3	-0.16	0.23	-0.20	0.11	-0.09	0.07	-0.18	0.20	0.01	0.11	-0.06	0.07
YEAR_AFTER × Q4	-0.09	0.23	-0.18	0.11	-0.07	0.08	0.04	0.21	0.04	0.11	0.02	0.08

Table IA.12: Re-estimation of main results for deals paid in all cash or all stock. Estimates from a hurdle model for the sample of 4,059 state-quarter M&A observations from 1986 to 2016 from 33 states for deals in which 100% of the deal is paid for using common stock (Panel A) and deals in which 100% of the deal is paid for using cash (Panel B). The dependent variables are the number of acquirers (columns 1 to 6) and targets (columns 7 to 12) in each state-quarter. Coefficients are combined estimates on YEAR_BEFORE, ELECTION, or YEAR_AFTER, and an interaction between YEAR_BEFORE, ELECTION, or YEAR_AFTER and the appropriate quarter, with the quarter interaction labeled by row. Coefficients are presented for both stages of the hurdle model. The first stage estimates the propensity of observations to be greater than zero (a negative coefficient means a variable is associated with a greater probability of no M&A activity), and the second stage estimates a count model (a negative coefficient means a lower number of acquirers per state-quarter, for example, is associated with a variable). Estimates for 6 quarters before, the quarter of (in bold), and four quarters after the election are presented. Discrete effects reported are calculated as the average predicted acquirer or target activity in election year-quarters, relative to non-election year-quarters, with control variables held at their sample averages, and are directly comparable to the sample averages reported in Table 1. We include as controls a presidential election year and quarter interaction, quarter fixed effects, state fixed variables, year fixed effects, and beginning of the period values of the VIX and baseline EPU indexes. Significance levels are: *p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001.

Dep. var:	Zero model			Acquirers			Zero model			Targets								
	(1)	(2)	SE	(3)	(4)	SE	(5)	(6)	SE	(7)	(8)	SE	(9)	(10)	SE	(11)	(12)	
	estimate	estimate	estimate	estimate	estimate	estimate	estimate	estimate	estimate	estimate	estimate	estimate	estimate	estimate	estimate	estimate	estimate	
<i>Panel A. All stock deals</i>																		
YEAR_BEFORE × Q2	-0.04	0.20	0.07	-0.09	0.07	0.07	-0.06	0.08	0.08	0.14	0.20	0.07	0.01	0.07	0.05	0.07	0.07	
YEAR_BEFORE × Q3	0.28	0.20	0.07	-0.01	0.07	0.07	0.08	0.07	0.07	0.04	0.20	0.07	0.15*	0.07	0.10	0.08	0.08	
YEAR_BEFORE × Q4	0.08	0.20	0.07	0.13	0.07	0.07	0.10	0.08	0.08	0.35	0.20	0.07	0.20**	0.07	0.23**	0.07	0.07	
ELECTION × Q1	0.22	0.21	0.08	-0.13	0.08	0.08	0.00	0.08	0.08	0.06	0.21	0.08	0.05	0.08	0.04	0.08	0.08	
ELECTION × Q2	0.10	0.20	0.07	0.05	0.07	0.07	0.06	0.08	0.08	0.18	0.20	0.07	0.07	0.07	0.09	0.08	0.08	
ELECTION × Q3	-0.24	0.20	0.07	-0.14	0.07	0.07	-0.15	0.08	0.08	0.26	0.20	0.08	-0.10	0.08	0.03	0.07	0.07	
ELECTION × Q4	-0.46*	0.21	0.08	-0.33***	0.08	0.08	-0.30***	0.08	0.08	-0.31	0.20	0.08	-0.27***	0.08	-0.22**	0.08	0.08	
YEAR_AFTER × Q1	-0.24	0.21	0.08	-0.17*	0.08	0.08	-0.16*	0.08	0.08	0.15	0.21	0.08	-0.20*	0.08	-0.05	0.07	0.07	
YEAR_AFTER × Q2	-0.19	0.21	0.08	-0.26***	0.08	0.08	-0.18*	0.08	0.08	-0.20	0.21	0.08	-0.13	0.08	-0.12	0.08	0.08	
YEAR_AFTER × Q3	-0.25	0.21	0.08	-0.01	0.08	0.08	-0.09	0.09	0.09	-0.17	0.21	0.08	-0.03	0.08	-0.07	0.08	0.08	
YEAR_AFTER × Q4	-0.06	0.21	0.08	0.04	0.08	0.08	0.00	0.09	0.09	-0.01	0.21	0.08	0.11	0.08	0.06	0.08	0.08	
<i>Panel B. All cash deals</i>																		
YEAR_BEFORE × Q2	-0.07	0.20	0.08	0.20**	0.08	0.08	0.10	0.09	0.09	0.21	0.20	0.08	-0.00	0.08	0.06	0.08	0.08	
YEAR_BEFORE × Q3	0.07	0.20	0.08	0.09	0.08	0.08	0.08	0.08	0.08	-0.21	0.19	0.08	0.08	0.08	-0.02	0.09	0.09	
YEAR_BEFORE × Q4	-0.21	0.20	0.08	0.09	0.08	0.08	-0.02	0.09	0.09	-0.23	0.20	0.08	-0.01	0.08	-0.09	0.09	0.09	
ELECTION × Q1	0.20	0.21	0.08	-0.01	0.08	0.08	0.06	0.08	0.08	-0.16	0.21	0.08	0.12	0.08	0.03	0.09	0.09	
ELECTION × Q2	0.16	0.20	0.08	-0.07	0.08	0.08	0.01	0.08	0.08	-0.29	0.20	0.08	0.02	0.08	-0.09	0.09	0.09	
ELECTION × Q3	-0.01	0.20	0.08	-0.04	0.08	0.08	-0.03	0.08	0.08	-0.13	0.20	0.08	-0.07	0.08	-0.09	0.08	0.08	
ELECTION × Q4	0.07	0.20	0.08	0.05	0.08	0.08	0.05	0.08	0.08	-0.02	0.21	0.08	0.12	0.08	0.09	0.09	0.09	
YEAR_AFTER × Q1	-0.33	0.21	0.08	-0.02	0.08	0.08	-0.13	0.09	0.09	-0.17	0.21	0.08	0.08	0.08	0.01	0.09	0.09	
YEAR_AFTER × Q2	-0.12	0.21	0.08	-0.09	0.08	0.08	-0.09	0.09	0.09	-0.20	0.21	0.08	0.07	0.08	-0.02	0.09	0.09	
YEAR_AFTER × Q3	-0.07	0.21	0.08	-0.08	0.08	0.08	-0.07	0.09	0.09	-0.00	0.21	0.08	0.05	0.08	0.04	0.09	0.09	
YEAR_AFTER × Q4	-0.29	0.21	0.08	-0.12	0.08	0.08	-0.17	0.09	0.09	-0.13	0.21	0.08	-0.11	0.08	-0.11	0.08	0.08	

Table IA.13: Re-estimation of main results for public and private targets and acquirers. Estimates from a hurdle model for the sample of 4,059 state-quarter M&A observations from 1986 to 2016 from 33 states. The dependent variables are the number of public acquirers (columns 1 to 6 of the top panel), public targets (columns 7 to 12 of the top panel), private acquirers (columns 1 to 6 of the bottom panel), and private targets (columns 7 to 12 of the bottom panel) in each state-quarter. Coefficients are combined estimates on YEAR_BEFORE, ELECTION, or YEAR_AFTER and an interaction between YEAR_BEFORE, ELECTION, or YEAR_AFTER and the appropriate quarter, with the quarter interaction labeled by row. Coefficients are presented for both stages of the hurdle model. The first stage estimates the propensity of observations to be greater than zero (a negative coefficient means a variable is associated with a greater probability of no M&A activity), and the second stage estimates a count model (a negative coefficient means a lower number of acquirers per state-quarter, for example, is associated with a variable). Estimates for 6 quarters before, the quarter of (in bold), and four quarters after the election are presented. Discrete effects reported are calculated as the average predicted acquirer or target activity in election year-quarters, relative to non-election year-quarters, with control variables held at their sample averages, and are directly comparable to the sample averages reported in Table 1. We include as controls a presidential election year and quarter interaction, quarter fixed effects, state fixed variables, year fixed effects, and beginning of the period values of the VIX and baseline EPU indexes. Significance levels are: *p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001.

Dep. var.	Public acquirers						Public targets					
	Zero model		Count model	Discrete effect		Zero model		Count model	Discrete effect		Zero model	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)
	estimate	SE	estimate	SE	estimate	SE	estimate	SE	estimate	SE	estimate	SE
YEAR_BEFORE × Q2	0.12	0.29	0.02	0.03	0.09	0.06	0.07	0.20	0.10	0.07	0.11	0.07
YEAR_BEFORE × Q3	0.07	0.29	0.05	0.03	0.21***	0.06	0.13	0.20	0.19**	0.07	0.22**	0.07
YEAR_BEFORE × Q4	-0.13	0.30	0.10**	0.03	0.41***	0.06	0.33	0.21	0.10	0.07	0.16*	0.06
ELECTION × Q1	-0.28	0.29	-0.02	0.04	-0.08	0.06	0.30	0.21	0.06	0.08	0.11	0.07
ELECTION × Q2	-0.08	0.29	-0.04	0.03	-0.14*	0.06	-0.08	0.20	0.08	0.07	0.06	0.07
ELECTION × Q3	-0.36	0.29	-0.11**	0.03	-0.44***	0.05	-0.03	0.20	0.09	0.07	0.08	0.07
ELECTION × Q4	-0.15	0.30	-0.13***	0.04	-0.51***	0.05	-0.25	0.20	0.11	0.07	0.06	0.07
YEAR_AFTER × Q1	0.06	0.29	-0.13***	0.04	-0.49***	0.06	0.06	0.21	0.03	0.07	0.04	0.07
YEAR_AFTER × Q2	-0.05	0.29	-0.10**	0.04	-0.39***	0.06	-0.23	0.21	0.10	0.07	0.05	0.07
YEAR_AFTER × Q3	0.14	0.30	-0.04	0.04	-0.17**	0.06	0.03	0.21	0.05	0.07	0.05	0.07
YEAR_AFTER × Q4	0.02	0.31	-0.03	0.04	-0.11	0.06	-0.20	0.21	0.01	0.07	-0.02	0.07
Dep. var.	Private acquirers						Private targets					
	Zero model		Count model	Discrete effect		Zero model		Count model	Discrete effect		Zero model	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)
	estimate	SE	estimate	SE	estimate	SE	estimate	SE	estimate	SE	estimate	SE
YEAR_BEFORE × Q2	-0.14	0.19	0.48***	0.13	0.04	0.08	0.39	0.29	-0.03	0.04	-0.10	0.05
YEAR_BEFORE × Q3	0.09	0.19	0.57***	0.13	0.14	0.09	0.08	0.27	0.02	0.04	0.09	0.06
YEAR_BEFORE × Q4	-0.34	0.19	0.42**	0.14	-0.04	0.08	-0.37	0.27	0.05	0.04	0.14*	0.06
ELECTION × Q1	-0.02	0.19	-0.26*	0.13	-0.04	0.08	-0.01	0.30	0.01	0.04	0.02	0.06
ELECTION × Q2	0.15	0.19	-0.32**	0.12	-0.00	0.07	-0.15	0.29	-0.07	0.04	-0.23***	0.05
ELECTION × Q3	-0.33	0.19	-0.31*	0.13	-0.14	0.07	-0.21	0.28	-0.15***	0.04	-0.48***	0.05
ELECTION × Q4	0.05	0.19	-0.10	0.12	-0.00	0.08	0.10	0.29	-0.16***	0.04	-0.48***	0.05
YEAR_AFTER × Q1	-0.26	0.20	-0.03	0.14	-0.08	0.08	-0.00	0.28	-0.11**	0.04	-0.34***	0.06
YEAR_AFTER × Q2	-0.34	0.20	0.05	0.14	-0.09	0.08	-0.38	0.28	-0.06	0.04	-0.22***	0.06
YEAR_AFTER × Q3	-0.01	0.20	-0.04	0.14	-0.01	0.08	0.06	0.28	-0.03	0.04	-0.08	0.06
YEAR_AFTER × Q4	-0.23	0.20	-0.21	0.14	-0.10	0.08	0.15	0.29	-0.04	0.04	-0.12*	0.06

Table IA.14: Auxiliary summary statistics for deals without missing payment type data. This table presents summary statistics for deal characteristics for each of the subsamples in the three quarters surrounding the election (election) and in the calendar year two years before an election (non-election). Deal size is the a mean dollar amount of the acquisition, same state is the percent of deals in which the acquirer and target are headquartered in the same state, all stock is the percent of deals funded entirely using common stock, all cash is the percent of deals funded entirely using cash, and stock used is the mean dollar amount of stock used in deals scaled by deal size presented as a percent. Summary statistics are computed for the 26,018 deals that use nonzero amounts of either stock or cash, except for the large and small acquirer statistics that use the 14,976 deals for which we have asset data.

Variable	Election		Non election	
	Large		Small	
Deal Size (\$)	1,049.42	1,076.63	56.57	77.49
Same State (%)	52.24	56.27	47.76	43.73
All Stock (%)	27.61	32.35	26.18	34.52
All Cash (%)	41.52	38.72	28.07	23.81
Stock Used (%)	38.99	43.72	40.03	48.30
	Rated		Unrated	
Deal Size (\$)	1,507.85	1,414.01	413.26	451.47
Same State (%)	11.04	11.69	88.96	88.31
All Stock (%)	24.72	31.01	30.88	35.68
All Cash (%)	44.29	39.20	34.23	31.84
Stock Used (%)	35.07	40.98	42.22	47.42
	Serial		Non-serial	
Deal Size (\$)	425.73	760.25	616.86	588.19
Same State (%)	10.14	9.06	89.86	90.94
All Stock (%)	36.47	47.26	28.91	33.24
All Cash (%)	33.71	27.13	36.19	33.85
Stock Used (%)	46.43	56.87	40.27	44.94

Table IA.15: Re-estimation of main results for 1990 to 2016 data. Estimates from a hurdle model for the full sample of 5,400 state-quarter M&A observations from 1990 to 2016. The dependent variables are the number of acquirers (columns 1 to 6) and targets (columns 7 to 12) in each state-quarter. Coefficients are combined estimates on YEAR_BEFORE, ELECTION, or YEAR_AFTER and an interaction between YEAR_BEFORE, ELECTION, or YEAR_AFTER and the appropriate quarter, with the quarter interaction labeled by row. Coefficients are presented for both stages of the hurdle model. The first stage estimates the propensity of observations to be greater than zero (a negative coefficient means a variable is associated with a greater probability of no M&A activity), and the second stage estimates a count model (a negative coefficient means a lower number of acquirers per state-quarter, for example, is associated with a variable). Estimates for 6 quarters before, the quarter of (in bold), and four quarters after the election are presented. Discrete effects reported are calculated as the average predicted acquirer or target activity in election year-quarters, relative to non-election year-quarters, with control variables held at their sample averages, and are directly comparable to the sample averages reported in Table 1. We include as controls a presidential election year and quarter interaction, quarter fixed effects, state fixed variables, year fixed effects, and beginning of the period values of the VIX and baseline EPU indexes. Significance levels are: *p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001.

Dep. var.	Acquirers						Targets					
	Zero model		Count model		Discrete effect		Zero model		Count model		Discrete effect	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)
	estimate	SE	estimate	SE	estimate	SE	estimate	SE	estimate	SE	estimate	SE
YEAR_BEFORE × Q2	0.07	0.21	0.02	0.03	0.04	0.03	0.07	0.23	-0.01	0.03	-0.03	0.04
YEAR_BEFORE × Q3	0.03	0.21	0.07*	0.03	0.12***	0.03	0.25	0.22	0.06	0.03	0.16***	0.04
YEAR_BEFORE × Q4	0.17	0.22	0.09**	0.03	0.16***	0.03	0.21	0.23	0.06*	0.03	0.18***	0.04
ELECTION × Q1	-0.06	0.21	-0.06	0.03	-0.10**	0.03	0.46*	0.22	-0.03	0.03	-0.07	0.04
ELECTION × Q2	0.05	0.21	-0.07*	0.03	-0.11***	0.03	-0.24	0.22	-0.06	0.03	-0.16***	0.04
ELECTION × Q3	-0.05	0.21	-0.13***	0.03	-0.20***	0.03	-0.08	0.22	-0.11***	0.03	-0.28***	0.04
ELECTION × Q4	0.13	0.22	-0.14***	0.03	-0.22***	0.03	-0.28	0.22	-0.10**	0.03	-0.26***	0.04
YEAR_AFTER × Q1	-0.00	0.23	-0.11**	0.03	-0.18***	0.04	-0.32	0.24	-0.07*	0.03	-0.19***	0.04
YEAR_AFTER × Q2	0.14	0.23	-0.10**	0.03	-0.17***	0.03	0.12	0.25	-0.05	0.03	-0.12**	0.04
YEAR_AFTER × Q3	0.16	0.23	-0.06	0.03	-0.09**	0.04	-0.21	0.24	-0.04	0.03	-0.10*	0.04
YEAR_AFTER × Q4	-0.25	0.23	-0.07*	0.03	-0.12***	0.04	0.05	0.25	-0.07*	0.03	-0.19***	0.04

Table IA.16: Results from regressions for payment type variables. Regressions of common stock (panel A) or cash (panel B) used as a percentage of total deal value for the 20,444 deals for which Compustat data is available. Deal size scaled by market value of equity is winsorized at the 1% level because of outliers. Standard errors are clustered by state. Significance levels are: *p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001.

<i>Panel A. Common stock use (%)</i>							
log(DEAL_SIZE)	2.336***			4.120***		4.605***	
	(0.362)			(1.026)		(0.783)	
DEAL_SIZE / MVE		7.439***			7.704***		7.951***
		(1.233)			(0.971)		(0.917)
log(ASSETS)			-0.078	-2.454*	0.296	-2.062*	0.985
			(0.664)	(1.201)	(0.685)	(0.980)	(0.595)
State Fixed Effects	N	N	N	N	N	Y	Y
Year Fixed Effects	N	N	N	N	N	Y	Y
Quarter Fixed Effects	N	N	N	N	N	Y	Y
Observations	20,444	19,917	20,444	20,444	19,917	20,444	19,917
R ²	0.012	0.006	<0.001	0.021	0.006	0.134	0.117
<i>Panel B. Cash use (%)</i>							
log(DEAL_SIZE)	1.522***			0.699		0.465	
	(0.227)			(0.483)		(0.334)	
DEAL_SIZE / MVE		-2.760**			-1.509		-1.561
		(1.034)			(0.949)		(0.933)
log(ASSETS)			1.535***	1.131	1.395***	0.828	0.972**
			(0.375)	(0.605)	(0.388)	(0.445)	(0.308)
State Fixed Effects	N	N	N	N	N	Y	Y
Year Fixed Effects	N	N	N	N	N	Y	Y
Quarter Fixed Effects	N	N	N	N	N	Y	Y
Observations	20,444	19,917	20,444	20,444	19,917	20,444	19,917
R ²	0.005	0.001	0.006	0.007	0.006	0.082	0.083

Table IA.17: Regressions for percentage of deal paid for in equity for serial and non-serial acquirers around elections. Regressions of the percentage of acquisition value paid for using common stock for a sample of acquisitions between 1986 and 2016. Results are presented based on whether the acquirer is a serial acquirer (Panels A and C) or a non-serial acquirer (B and D), with a firm being labeled a serial acquirer if it has done more than five acquisitions in the previous three years. Results are also split based on whether the political uncertainty comes from an election in the acquirer's state of headquarters (Panels A and B) or the target's (Panels C and D). All regressions include fixed effects at the quarter, year, and state level, firm-level controls (the ratio of deal size and acquirer market capitalization and the natural logarithm of assets), a presidential election dummy, and macroeconomic controls (VIX and baseline EPU as of the beginning of the quarter). Only the coefficients estimated for *quarter interaction* are presented. Standard errors are clustered at the state-level.

	-6	-5	-4	-3	-2	-1	election	+1	+2	+3	+4
<i>Panel A: Serial acquirers facing acquirer-state elections</i>											
Coefficient	-3.265	6.045	1.529	4.334	2.616	-6.899	0.312	-4.800	0.479	-0.222	4.639
SE	(3.057)	(3.769)	(3.735)	(3.316)	(3.605)	(3.864)	(3.577)	(3.530)	(3.425)	(3.672)	(4.158)
R-squared	0.312	0.313	0.312	0.313	0.312	0.312	0.311	0.312	0.312	0.313	0.312
N	2,421	2,421	2,421	2,421	2,421	2,421	2,421	2,421	2,421	2,421	2,421
<i>Panel B: Non-serial acquirers facing acquirer-state elections</i>											
Coefficient	-2.021	0.548	1.496	-0.195	1.643	2.422	-3.924***	-1.785	-0.897	0.043	2.310
SE	(1.447)	(1.122)	(1.485)	(1.502)	(1.602)	(1.623)	(1.192)	(1.684)	(1.976)	(1.367)	(1.985)
R-squared	0.104	0.104	0.105	0.104	0.104	0.104	0.105	0.104	0.104	0.104	0.104
N	17,436	17,436	17,436	17,436	17,436	17,436	17,436	17,436	17,436	17,436	17,436
<i>Panel C: Serial acquirers facing target-state elections</i>											
Coefficient	-0.351	5.022	-2.622	0.669	0.272	-1.321	0.501	-8.846*	-0.034	3.308	4.998
SE	(5.040)	(5.187)	(3.492)	(3.522)	(3.145)	(4.158)	(4.189)	(3.728)	(4.362)	(4.730)	(3.960)
R-squared	0.260	0.260	0.260	0.261	0.261	0.260	0.260	0.261	0.260	0.261	0.260
N	2,421	2,421	2,421	2,421	2,421	2,421	2,421	2,421	2,421	2,421	2,421
<i>Panel D: Non-serial acquirers facing target-state elections</i>											
Coefficient	-2.910*	0.298	2.380	2.874*	0.625	3.487	-6.737***	-2.827	0.443	-2.549	4.514*
SE	(1.450)	(1.497)	(1.357)	(1.441)	(1.665)	(1.860)	(1.467)	(1.512)	(1.955)	(1.749)	(2.207)
R-squared	0.096	0.096	0.097	0.096	0.096	0.096	0.097	0.096	0.096	0.096	0.096
N	17,436	17,436	17,436	17,436	17,436	17,436	17,436	17,436	17,436	17,436	17,436

Note: *p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001