# Internet Appendix: Exporting Uncertainty: The Impact of Brexit on Corporate America 

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## Appendix A Model Analysis and Results

## A. 1 Disinvestment Decisions

In solving a firm's disinvestment problem, we first consider its decision at $t=1$. If the firm had disinvested any of its endowed projects at $t=0$, then it earns 0 for those projects. Among projects that were not disinvested at $t=0$ (i.e., remain alive a $t=1$ ), the firm can choose to sell any of them at $t=1$ and receive cash flows of $s_{i 2}+x_{i 2}-\delta w$ per project., Else, it can choose not to sell and receive $x_{i 2}$ per project. As in the case of the investment decision, the firm's disinvestment policy is guided by the cash flows at $t=2$ generated by project $\tilde{w}$. These cash flows can be characterized as:

$$
\pi_{i 2}(\tilde{w})=\left\{\begin{array}{lll}
0 & & \text { (Early Disinvestment), }  \tag{A.1}\\
s_{i 2}+x_{i 2}-\delta \tilde{w} & \text { if } s_{i 2}>\delta \tilde{w} & \text { (Delayed Disinvestment), } \\
x_{i 2} & \text { if } s_{i 2} \leq \delta \tilde{w} & \text { (No Disinvestment). }
\end{array}\right.
$$

Next, we consider the firm's disinvestment decision at $t=0$. The optimal level of disinvestment at $t=0$ can be expressed in terms of $w^{*}$, the breakeven project. The firm will optimally disinvest (sell) all projects in the range $\left[0, w^{*}\right.$ ), and not disinvest (choose to retain) any projects in the range [ $\left.w^{*}, W\right]$, instead of waiting until $t=1$ to decide whether or not to disinvest. The firm's cash flows from disinvesting project $\tilde{w}$ at $t=0$ is $s_{i 1}+x_{i 1}-\delta \tilde{w}$. Its expected cash flows from not disinvesting project $\tilde{w}$ at $t=0$, and choosing instead to wait till $t=1$ to decide, is $x_{i 1}+\mathbb{E}\left[\max \left(s_{i 2}+x_{i 2}-\delta \tilde{w}, x_{i 2}\right)\right]$. Simplifying these two expressions, the firm disinvests project $\tilde{w}$ at $t=0$ if:

$$
\begin{equation*}
s_{i 1}-\delta \tilde{w} \geq x_{i 2}+\mathbb{E}\left[\max \left(s_{i 2}-\delta \tilde{w}, 0\right)\right] \tag{A.2}
\end{equation*}
$$

The breakeven condition for determining the optimal disinvestment level $w^{*}$ at $t=0$ is:

$$
\begin{equation*}
s_{i 1}-\delta w^{*}=x_{i 2}+\mathbb{E}\left[\max \left(s_{i 2}-\delta w^{*}, 0\right)\right] . \tag{A.3}
\end{equation*}
$$

In Lemma 3, we prove the existence of the optimal $t=0$ investment level, $w^{*}$.
Lemma 3. The optimal disinvestment level $w^{*}$ at $t=0$ is given by equation (A.3) for sufficiently large $W$.
The breakeven condition in equation (A.3) implies that at $t=0$ the firm sells all projects up to project $w^{*}$, as the benefits of doing so, $s_{i 1}$, are expected to exceed the costs. Costs are made of two components: (1) the cost of selling the project, $\delta w$, and (2) the option value of waiting to choose whether to disinvest. The embedded optionality in the firm's disinvestment decision is key in generating a negative relation between uncertainty and disinvestment, as is the case with investment. As before, while the addition of a zero-mean spread does not change the left-hand side of equation (A.2), it increases the right-hand side of that inequality given the firm's option to forgo disinvestment in high income states. An increase in uncertainty in the distribution of $s_{i t}$ reduces the breakeven project level $w^{*}$, and correspondingly shrinks the set of projects the firm disinvests at $t=0$, namely the interval $\left[0, w^{*}\right)$. We establish this result in Proposition 3.

Proposition 3. Increased uncertainty leads to less disinvestment at $t=0$. For $r^{\prime}>r$, namely when $G\left(\cdot, r^{\prime}\right)$ is obtained by a mean-preserving spread of $G(\cdot, r), w^{*}\left(r^{\prime}\right)<w^{*}(r)$. That is, $\frac{d w^{*}}{d r}<0$.

Taken together, the results of Proposition 1 and 3 imply that by increasing the value of the option to wait, greater uncertainty leads to decreases in both investment and disinvestment.

## A. 2 The Effect of Input Irreversibility

We now address the role played by the degree of irreversibility of capital and labor, as captured by their associated fixed costs. We do so by way of two propositions.

Proposition 4. An increase in the degree of irreversibility of capital leads to less investment for higher levels of uncertainty in the first period; i.e., $\frac{d n^{*}}{d \kappa}<0$.

Proposition 5. An increase in the degree of irreversibility of labor leads to less investment for higher levels of uncertainty in the first period; i.e., $\frac{d n^{*}}{d \lambda}<0$.

Combining the last two propositions with Proposition 1, we have that for an increase in uncertainty in the MPS sense (i.e., $r^{\prime}>r$ ) and for greater degree of input irreversibility ( $\kappa^{\prime}>\kappa$ and $\lambda^{\prime}>\lambda$ ), the following conditions hold with respect to investment:

$$
\begin{align*}
& n^{*}(r, \kappa, \lambda)>n^{*}\left(r^{\prime}, \kappa, \lambda\right)>n^{*}\left(r^{\prime}, \kappa^{\prime}, \lambda\right),  \tag{A.4}\\
& n^{*}(r, \kappa, \lambda)>n^{*}\left(r^{\prime}, \kappa, \lambda\right)>n^{*}\left(r^{\prime}, \kappa, \lambda^{\prime}\right) .
\end{align*}
$$

The above conditions state that an increase in uncertainty reduces the set of projects the firm is willing to invest in at $t=0$, electing to wait until uncertainty is partially resolved at $t=1$ before deciding whether to invest. Notably, when the firm faces higher irreversible costs, it invests even less at $t=0$. Differently put, an increase in uncertainty reduces investment in the first period, and the effect is modulated by the degree of irreversibility of capital or labor.

## Appendix B Proofs

## B. 1 Proof of Lemma 1

Proof. Let us define

$$
H\left(n^{*}\right)=v_{i 1}+\mathbb{E}\left[v_{i 2}\right]-(\kappa+\lambda) n^{*}-\mathbb{E}\left[\max \left(v_{i 2}-(\kappa+\lambda) n^{*}, 0\right)\right] .
$$

To guarantee the existence of $n^{*}$ as characterized by equation (6), it suffices to show that $H\left(n^{*}\right)=0$ for some $n^{*} \in[0, N]$. Since $H(\cdot)$ is a sum of continuous functions, it is itself continuous. Since $v_{i 1}>0$ and $v_{i 2}>0$, it follows that:

$$
H(0)=v_{i 1}+\mathbb{E}\left[v_{i 2}\right]-\mathbb{E}\left[\max \left(v_{i 2}, 0\right)\right]=v_{i 1}>0 .
$$

Finally, for $N \rightarrow \infty$, we have that:

$$
\begin{aligned}
\lim _{N \rightarrow \infty} H(N) & =\lim _{N \rightarrow \infty}\left(v_{i 1}+\mathbb{E}\left[v_{i 2}\right]-(\kappa+\lambda) N\right)+\lim _{N \rightarrow \infty}\left(\mathbb{E}\left[\max \left(v_{i 2}-(\kappa+\lambda) N, 0\right)\right]\right) \\
& =-\infty+0=-\infty .
\end{aligned}
$$

Thus, there must exist an $\bar{N} \in \mathbb{R}$ such that, for $N>\bar{N}, H(\bar{N})<0$. Putting these conditions together with the continuity of $H(\cdot)$ over $[0, N]$, the Intermediate Value Theorem guarantees that there exists an $n^{*} \in[0, N]$ such that $H\left(n^{*}\right)=0$.

## B. 2 Proof of Proposition 1

Proof. Let us define

$$
H\left(n^{*} ; r\right)=v_{i 1}+\mathbb{E}\left[v_{i 2}\right]-(\kappa+\lambda) n^{*}-\mathbb{E}\left[\max \left(v_{i 2}-(\kappa+\lambda) n^{*}, 0\right) ; r\right]=0
$$

By the Implicit Function Theorem,

$$
\frac{d n^{*}}{d r}=-\frac{\partial H / \partial n^{*}}{\partial H / \partial r}
$$

Considering first the derivative of $H$ with respect to $n^{*}$, we have:

$$
\begin{aligned}
\frac{\partial H\left(n^{*} ; r\right)}{\partial n^{*}} & =-(\kappa+\lambda)-\frac{\partial}{\partial n^{*}} \mathbb{E}\left[\max \left(v_{i 2}-(\kappa+\lambda) n^{*}, 0\right) ; r\right] \\
& =-(\kappa+\lambda)-\mathbb{E}\left[\frac{\partial}{\partial n^{*}} \max \left(v_{i 2}-(\kappa+\lambda) n^{*}, 0\right) ; r\right] \\
& =-(\kappa+\lambda)-\mathbb{E}\left[\max \left(v_{i 2}-(\kappa+\lambda), 0\right) ; r\right] \\
& <0 .
\end{aligned}
$$

Next, considering the derivative of $H$ with respect to $r$, we have:

$$
\frac{\partial H\left(n^{*} ; r\right)}{\partial r}=-\frac{\partial}{\partial r} \mathbb{E}\left[\max \left(v_{i 2}-(\kappa+\lambda) n^{*}, 0\right) ; r\right] .
$$

Because $G\left(\cdot, r^{\prime}\right)$ is a MPS of $G(\cdot, r)$, for any convex function $J(\cdot)$,

$$
\begin{aligned}
\mathbb{E}\left[J\left(v_{i 2}\right) ; r^{\prime}\right] & =\int J\left(v_{i 2}\right) d G\left(v_{i 2}, r^{\prime}\right) \\
& \geq \int J\left(v_{i 2}\right) d G\left(v_{i 2}, r\right) \\
& =\mathbb{E}\left[J\left(v_{i 2}\right) ; r\right] .
\end{aligned}
$$

Since $\max \left(v_{i 2}-(\kappa+\lambda) n^{*}, 0\right)$ is convex in $v_{i 2}$, it follows that:

$$
\mathbb{E}\left[\max \left(v_{i 2}-(\kappa+\lambda) n^{*}, 0\right) ; r^{\prime}\right] \geq \mathbb{E}\left[\max \left(v_{i 2}-(\kappa+\lambda) n^{*}, 0\right) ; r\right] \forall r^{\prime}>r .
$$

This implies

$$
\frac{\partial}{\partial r} \mathbb{E}\left[\max \left(v_{i 2}-(\kappa+\lambda) n^{*}, 0\right) ; r\right] \geq 0 .
$$

Thus,

$$
\begin{aligned}
\frac{\partial H\left(n^{*} ; r\right)}{\partial r} & =-\frac{\partial}{\partial r} \mathbb{E}\left[\max \left(v_{i 2}-(\kappa+\lambda) n^{*}, 0\right) ; r\right] \\
& \leq 0 .
\end{aligned}
$$

Putting these conditions together, we have:

$$
\frac{d n^{*}}{d r}=-\frac{\partial H / \partial n^{*}}{\partial H / \partial r}<0 .
$$

## B. 3 Proof of Proposition 2

Proof. Rearranging equation (10), we get:

$$
m^{*}=\frac{1}{\alpha}\left(\overline{u_{i 1}}-d_{1}-d_{2}+u_{i 1}+\frac{\sqrt{\omega_{i}^{2}(r)+\sigma_{x}^{2}}}{1-\Phi\left(\frac{d_{2}-\overline{u_{i 1}}}{\sqrt{\omega_{i}^{2}(r)+\sigma_{x}^{2}}}\right)}\left[\phi\left(\frac{d_{2}-\overline{u_{i 1}}}{\sqrt{\omega_{i}^{2}(r)+\sigma_{x}^{2}}}\right)\right]\right)^{\frac{1}{\alpha-1}}
$$

It can be shown that $\frac{d m^{*}}{d r}>0$ as:

$$
\phi\left(\frac{d_{2}-\overline{u_{i 1}}}{\sqrt{\omega_{i}^{2}(r)+\sigma_{x}^{2}}}\right)\left[1-\frac{\left(\frac{d_{2}-\overline{u_{i 1}}}{\sqrt{\omega_{i}^{2}(r)+\sigma_{x}^{2}}}\right) \phi\left(\frac{d_{2}-\overline{u_{i 1}}}{\sqrt{\omega_{i}^{2}(r)+\sigma_{x}^{2}}}\right)}{1-\Phi\left(\frac{d_{2}-\overline{u_{i 1}}}{\sqrt{\omega_{i}^{2}(r)+\sigma_{x}^{2}}}\right)}\right]-\phi^{\prime}\left(\frac{d_{2}-\overline{u_{i 1}}}{\sqrt{\omega_{i}^{2}(r)+\sigma_{x}^{2}}}\right)\left(\frac{d_{2}-\overline{u_{i 1}}}{\sqrt{\omega_{i}^{2}(r)+\sigma_{x}^{2}}}\right)>0 .
$$

## B. 4 Proof of Proposition 4

Proof. Let us define

$$
H\left(n^{*} ; \kappa\right)=v_{i 1}+\mathbb{E}\left[v_{i 2}\right]-(\kappa+\lambda) n^{*}-\mathbb{E}\left[\max \left(v_{i 2}-(\kappa+\lambda) n^{*}, 0\right)\right]=0 .
$$

By the Implicit Function Theorem,

$$
\frac{d n^{*}}{d \kappa}=-\frac{\partial H / \partial n^{*}}{\partial H / \partial \kappa} .
$$

Considering first the numerator, we know from Proposition 1 that:

$$
\frac{\partial H}{\partial n^{*}}<0 .
$$

Next, considering the denominator,

$$
\begin{aligned}
\frac{\partial H}{\partial \kappa} & =-n^{*}-\frac{\partial}{\partial \kappa} \mathbb{E}\left[\max \left(v_{i 2}-(\kappa+\lambda) n^{*}, 0\right)\right] \\
& =-n^{*}-\mathbb{E}\left[\frac{\partial}{\partial \kappa} \max \left(v_{i 2}-(\kappa+\lambda) n^{*}, 0\right)\right] \\
& =-n^{*}-\mathbb{E}\left[\max \left(v_{i 2}-n^{*}, 0\right)\right] \\
& <0 .
\end{aligned}
$$

Putting these together, we have:

$$
\frac{d n^{*}}{d \kappa}=-\frac{\partial H / \partial n^{*}}{\partial H / \partial \kappa}<0 .
$$

## B. 5 Proof of Proposition 5

Proof. Symmetric to the case of capital.

## Appendix C Additional Results and Robustness Tests



Figure C.1. Corporate Investment Trends around Brexit-related Events. This figure displays coefficients of investment regressions for the timeline of the main events related to Brexit. The shaded area marks the beginning of Brexit-related events, with the announcement of the date of the UK-EU referendum (2016:Q1).

## Table C.2. Summary Statistics: Matched Sample

This table reports mean values for the main variables used in our empirical analyses in the matched sample. Each treated firm is matched to 3 control firms (with replacement) which are its nearest neighbors in terms of treatment propensity. The propensity score is a function of lagged STOCK_RETURNS, 1-quarter-ahead CONSENSUS_EARNINGS_FORECAST, TOBIN_Q, CASH_FLOW, SALES_GROWTH, and SIZE. Panel A shows summary statistics for the sample of treated and matched control firms as defined by $\beta_{i}^{U K}$ (top tercile of $\beta_{i}^{U K}$ ). Panel B shows summary statistics for the sample of treated and matched control firms as defined by mentions of Brexit-related words in their 2015 $10-\mathrm{K}$ filings. The table also reports the differences in means and the $p$-value associated with a test statistic for the differences.

| Firm-Level Variables | Treated | Control | Difference | $p$-value |
| :--- | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  | Panel A: Market-Based Approach |  |  |  |
|  | 0.020 |  |  |  |
|  | 0.012 | 0.008 | 0.251 |  |
| INVESTMENT | 0.083 | 0.061 | 0.022 | 0.424 |
| EMPLOYMENT_GROWTH (Annual) | 0.030 | 0.016 | 0.014 | 0.385 |
| R\&D | 0.129 | 0.088 | 0.041 | 0.404 |
| DIVESTITURES (×100) | 0.175 | 0.164 | 0.011 | 0.410 |
| CASH | 0.058 | 0.086 | -0.028 | 0.272 |
| NON_CASH_WORKING_CAPITAL | 1.948 | 1.928 | 0.020 | 0.383 |
| TOBIN_Q | 0.016 | 0.032 | -0.016 | 0.610 |
| CASH_FLOW | 6.677 | 7.205 | -0.528 | 0.528 |
| SIZE (LogAssets) | 0.195 | 0.105 | 0.090 | 0.203 |
| SALES_GROWTH | 0.023 | 0.025 | -0.002 | 0.594 |
| CONSENSUS_EARNINGS_FORECAST | 0.021 | 0.038 | -0.017 | 0.618 |
| STOCK_RETURNS |  |  |  |  |
|  | Panel B: Textual-Search-Based Approach |  |  |  |
|  | 0.013 | 0.014 | 0.000 | 0.269 |
| INVESTMENT | 0.084 | 0.078 | 0.006 | 0.429 |
| EMPLOYMENT_GROWTH (Annual) | 0.030 | 0.022 | 0.008 | 0.749 |
| R\&D | 0.062 | 0.056 | 0.006 | 0.210 |
| DIVESTITURES (×100) | 0.232 | 0.194 | 0.038 | 0.339 |
| CASH | 0.041 | 0.057 | -0.016 | 0.522 |
| NON_CASH_WORKING_CAPITAL | 2.199 | 2.037 | 0.162 | 0.166 |
| TOBIN_Q | 0.018 | 0.021 | -0.003 | 0.836 |
| CASH_FLOW | 7.059 | 6.581 | 0.478 | 0.293 |
| SIZE (LogAssets) | 0.162 | 0.167 | -0.005 | 0.605 |
| SALES_GROWTH | 0.055 | 0.023 | 0.032 | 0.137 |
| CONSENSUS_EARNINGS_FORECAST | 0.028 | 0.030 | -0.002 | 0.758 |
| STOCK_RETURNS |  |  |  |  |

Table C.1. Sample Selection
This table reports the filters applied to the original dataset obtained from COMPUSTAT, and the number of observations obtained at each step in order to generate the baseline sample described in Section IV.B.

| Filter | Firm-Quarters |
| :--- | ---: |
| Raw COMPUSTAT between 2010:Q1 and 2016:Q4 | 262,412 |
| Drop non-US firm-quarters (retain data reported in USD, with US headquarters, duplicates excluded) | 160,254 |
| Drop firm-quarters with negative fundamentals (ASSETS and SALES) | 158,312 |
| Drop financials and utilities | 112,939 |
| Drop if ASSETS or MARKET_CAPITALIZATION less than \$10 million | 93,011 |
| Drop if missing key variables (INVESTMENT, ASSETS, CASH_FLOW, TOBIN_Q, SALES_GROWTH) | 75,013 |
| Drop if non-consecutive quarters, or less than 12 quarters of non-missing data | 56,081 |
| Drop if missing Hoberg and Phillips (2016) industry classification | 49,107 |
| Drop if missing $\beta_{i}^{U K}$ | 43,025 |
| Drop if missing CRSP and I/B/E/S controls | 41,630 |

Table C.3. The Impact of the Brexit Vote on Investment, Employment, R\&D Expenditures and Divestitures: Propensity-Score Matching
This table reports output from equation (14) in a matched sample. The dependent variables are INVESTMENT, EMPLOYMENT_GROWTH, R\&D and DIVESTI-
 is a function of lagged STOCK_RETURNS, 1-quarter-ahead CONSENSUS_EARNINGS_FORECASTS, TOBIN_Q, CASH_FLOW, SALES_GROWTH, SIZE. In the first specification, the treatment group is composed by the top tercile of $\beta_{i}^{U K}$, while the control group is composed by matched firms in the bottom tercile of $\beta_{i}^{U K}$. The second specification is a textual-search-based measure of UK-exposure that sums up the number of Brexit-related words in firms' 2015 10-K forms. The treatment group is made of firms with more than five entries, whereas the control group are matched firms with zero entries. The time dimension of the DID estimator is set so as to compare the two quarters following the announcement of the Brexit referendum victory (2016:Q3-Q4) versus the two quarters preceding the announcement of the referendum vote date (2015:Q3-Q4). $T$-statistics are computed using robust standard-errors (in parentheses) double-clustered at the firm and calendar quarter levels.

|  | INVESTMENT |  | EMPLOYMENT_GROWTH |  | R\&D |  | DIVESTITURES |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  | Treatment is Top Tercile of $\beta_{i}^{U K}$ | Treatment $\text { is }>5$ <br> Brexit <br> Entries in 10-Ks 2 | Treatment is Top Tercile of $\beta_{i}^{U K}$ | Treatment <br> is $>5$ <br> Brexit <br> Entries in 10-Ks <br> 4 | Treatment is Top Tercile of $\beta_{i}^{U K}$ <br> 5 | Treatment <br> is $>5$ <br> Brexit <br> Entries in 10-Ks <br> 6 | Treatment is Top Tercile of $\beta_{i}^{U K}$ <br> 7 | Treatment $\text { is }>5$ <br> Brexit <br> Entries in 10-Ks 8 |
| $\mathrm{POST} \times \mathrm{HIGH} \_\beta_{i}^{U K}$ | $\begin{gathered} -0.151^{* * *} \\ (0.025) \end{gathered}$ |  | $\begin{gathered} -3.156^{* * *} \\ (1.129) \end{gathered}$ |  | $\begin{gathered} 0.401^{* * *} \\ (0.065) \end{gathered}$ |  | $\begin{gathered} -0.040^{* * *} \\ (0.012) \end{gathered}$ |  |
| POST $\times$ HIGH_10-K_ENTRIES |  | $\begin{gathered} -0.097^{* * *} \\ (0.012) \end{gathered}$ |  | $\begin{gathered} -3.379^{* *} \\ (1.283) \end{gathered}$ |  | $\begin{gathered} 0.183^{* * *} \\ (0.066) \end{gathered}$ |  | $\begin{gathered} -0.022^{* * *} \\ (0.008) \end{gathered}$ |
| Controls Firm | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| Fixed Effects |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Firm | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| Industry $\times$ Time | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| Observations | 12,715 | 20,919 | 2,469 | 2,480 | 3,842 | 8,895 | 12,053 | 19,500 |
| R -squared | 0.75 | 0.73 | 0.49 | 0.45 | 0.88 | 0.87 | 0.34 | 0.29 |

Table C.4. Parallel Trends: Market-Based Approach
This table reports the average INVESTMENT (Panel A), EMPLOYMENT_GROWTH (Panel B), R\&D (Panel C), and DIVESTITURES (Panel D) for firms in the treated and control groups going back different periods prior to Brexit. The treatment group is composed by the top tercile of $\beta_{i}^{U K}$, while the control group is composed by firms in the bottom tercile of $\beta_{i}^{U K}$. The table also reports the differences in means and the $p$-value associated with a test statistic for the differences.

| Periods prior to Brexit | Treated | Control | Difference | $p$-value |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  | Panel A (Quarterly Frequency): INVESTMENT |  |  |  |
| One | 1.165 | 1.027 | 0.138 | 0.156 |
| Two | 1.184 | 0.942 | 0.242 | 0.153 |
| Three | 1.362 | 1.135 | 0.227 | 0.281 |
| Four | 1.100 | 1.381 | -0.281 | 0.600 |
| Five | 1.433 | 1.115 | 0.318 | 0.369 |
| Six | 0.996 | 1.526 | -0.530 | 0.380 |
|  | Panel B (Annual Frequency): EMPLOYMENT_GROWTH |  |  |  |
| One | 3.794 | 3.906 | -0.112 | 0.951 |
| Two | 9.723 | 4.812 | 4.911 | 0.369 |
| Three | 6.434 | 5.033 | 1.401 | 0.374 |
| Four | 9.265 | 5.217 | 4.048 | 0.126 |
| Five | 10.178 | 8.083 | 2.095 | 0.223 |
| Six | 8.113 | 8.985 | -0.872 | 0.670 |
|  | Panel C (Quarterly Frequency): R\&D |  |  |  |
| One | 4.441 | 2.641 | 1.800 | 0.317 |
| Two | 2.568 | 4.369 | -1.801 | 0.311 |
| Three | 2.275 | 3.760 | -1.485 | 0.434 |
| Four | 4.150 | 2.376 | 1.774 | 0.197 |
| Five | 4.342 | 2.399 | 1.943 | 0.221 |
| Six | 4.287 | 2.465 | 1.822 | 0.229 |
|  | Panel D (Quarterly Frequency): DIVESTITURES |  |  |  |
| One | 0.076 | 0.057 | 0.019 | 0.234 |
| Two | 0.056 | 0.102 | -0.046 | 0.748 |
| Three | 0.071 | 0.077 | -0.006 | 0.710 |
| Four | 0.073 | 0.054 | 0.019 | 0.218 |
| Five | 0.071 | 0.054 | 0.017 | 0.289 |
| Six | 0.056 | 0.043 | 0.013 | 0.304 |

Table C.5. Parallel Trends: Textual-Search-Based Approach
This table reports the average INVESTMENT (Panel A), EMPLOYMENT_GROWTH (Panel B), R\&D (Panel C), and DIVESTITURES (Panel D) for firms in the treated and control groups going back different periods prior to Brexit. The treatment indicator is a textual-search-based measure of UK-exposure that sums up the number of Brexit-related words in firms' 2015 10-K forms. The treatment group is made of firms with more than five entries, whereas the control group are firms with zero entries. The table also reports the differences in means and the $p$-value associated with a test statistic for the differences.

| Periods prior to Brexit | Treated | Control | Difference | $p$-value |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  | Panel A (Quarterly Frequency): INVESTMENT |  |  |  |
| One | 0.958 | 1.064 | -0.106 | 0.202 |
| Two | 0.930 | 1.047 | -0.117 | 0.186 |
| Three | 1.124 | 1.203 | -0.079 | 0.419 |
| Four | 1.174 | 1.090 | 0.084 | 0.348 |
| Five | 1.194 | 1.140 | 0.054 | 0.570 |
| Six | 1.110 | 1.122 | -0.012 | 0.897 |
|  | Panel B (Annual Frequency): EMPLOYMENT_GROWTH |  |  |  |
| One | 9.711 | 8.881 | 0.830 | 0.678 |
| Two | 11.400 | 13.321 | -1.921 | 0.343 |
| Three | 7.600 | 6.290 | 1.310 | 0.448 |
| Four | 8.972 | 6.828 | 2.144 | 0.258 |
| Five | 10.286 | 10.076 | 0.210 | 0.914 |
| Six | 9.928 | 8.619 | 1.309 | 0.498 |
|  | Panel C (Quarterly Frequency): R\&D |  |  |  |
| One | 4.972 | 5.334 | -0.362 | 0.488 |
| Two | 4.830 | 5.054 | -0.224 | 0.653 |
| Three | 4.230 | 4.218 | 0.012 | 0.979 |
| Four | 4.246 | 4.423 | -0.177 | 0.683 |
| Five | 4.733 | 4.258 | 0.475 | 0.279 |
| Six | 4.263 | 4.419 | -0.156 | 0.729 |
|  | Panel D (Quarterly Frequency): DIVESTITURES |  |  |  |
| One | 0.051 | 0.059 | -0.008 | 0.566 |
| Two | 0.062 | 0.058 | 0.004 | 0.783 |
| Three | 0.062 | 0.076 | -0.014 | 0.297 |
| Four | 0.066 | 0.054 | 0.012 | 0.378 |
| Five | 0.055 | 0.038 | 0.017 | 0.165 |
| Six | 0.039 | 0.046 | -0.007 | 0.578 |

Table C.6. The Impact of the Brexit Vote on Investment, Employment, R\&D and Divestitures: Cash Flow News Decomposition
This table reports output from equation (14). The dependent variables are INVESTMENT, EMPLOYMENT_GROWTH, R\&D and DIVESTITURES. The treatment group is composed by the top tercile of $\beta_{i . C F}^{U K}$, while the control group is composed by firms in the bottom tercile of $\beta_{i . C F}^{U K}$. A firm's $\beta_{i C F}^{U K}$ is estimated as follows. First, we decompose volatility of monthly stock returns into cash flow and discount rate news components using the Campbell and Shiller (1988) approach as applied to individual stocks by Vuolteenaho (2002). Next, we estimate equation (13) with the cash flow component as the dependent variable, to obtain $\beta_{i, C F}^{U K}$ for each firm. The time dimension of the DID estimator is set so as to compare the two quarters following the announcement of the referendum and Brexit's victory (2016:Q3-Q4) versus the two quarters preceding the announcement (2015:Q3-Q4). $T$-statistics are computed using robust standard-errors (in parentheses) double-clustered at the firm and calendar quarter levels.

|  | INVESTMENT | EMPLOYMENT_GROWTH | R\&D | DIVESTITURES |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  | Treatment is Top Tercile of $\boldsymbol{\beta}_{i, C F}^{U K}$ 1 | $\begin{gathered} \text { Treatment is Top } \\ \text { Tercile of } \beta_{i, C F}^{U K} \\ 2 \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} \text { Treatment is Top } \\ \text { Tercile of } \beta_{i, C F}^{U K} \\ 3 \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} \text { Treatment is Top } \\ \text { Tercile of } \beta_{i, C F}^{U K} \\ 4 \end{gathered}$ |
| $\mathrm{POST} \times \mathrm{HIGH} \_\beta_{i, C F}^{U K}$ | $\begin{gathered} -0.330^{* * *} \\ (0.014) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} -5.147^{* *} \\ (1.925) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.348^{* * *} \\ (0.050) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} -0.034^{* * *} \\ (0.010) \end{gathered}$ |
| Controls Firm | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| Fixed Effects <br> Firm <br> Industry $\times$ Time | $\begin{aligned} & \text { Yes } \\ & \text { Yes } \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & \text { Yes } \\ & \text { Yes } \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & \text { Yes } \\ & \text { Yes } \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & \text { Yes } \\ & \text { Yes } \end{aligned}$ |
| Observations R-squared | $\begin{gathered} 14,709 \\ 0.75 \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 3,247 \\ 0.45 \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 5,060 \\ 0.88 \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 14,953 \\ 0.33 \end{gathered}$ |

Statistical significance levels: ${ }^{* * *} p$-value $<0.01,{ }^{* *} p$-value $<0.05$, ${ }^{*} p$-value $<0.10$.

This table reports output from equation (14). The dependent variables are INVESTMENT and EMPLOYMENT_GROWTH. INVESTMENT is defined as capital expenditures divided by lagged total assets (quarterly). EMPLOYMENT_GROWTH is the percentage change in the number of employees (annual). In the first specification, the measure of UK-exposure ( $\beta_{i}^{U K}$ ) enters the regression as a linear continuous variable. In the second specification, the treatment group is composed by the top tercile of $\beta_{i}^{U K}$, while the control group is composed by firms in the bottom tercile of $\beta_{i}^{U K}$. The third specification is a textual-search-based measure of UK-exposure that sums up the number of Brexit-related words in firms' 2015 10-K forms. The treatment group is made of firms with more than five entries, whereas the control group are firms with zero entries. The time dimension of the DID estimator is set so as to compare the two quarters following the announcement of the Brexit referendum victory (2016:Q3-Q4) versus the two quarters preceding the announcement of the vote date (2015:Q3-Q4). The specifications also include the first-moment instruments for the USD-GBP exchange rate, the price of oil, and the Treasury rate from Alfaro, Bloom, and Lin (2018). $T$-statistics are computed using robust standard-errors (in parentheses) double-clustered at the firm and calendar quarter levels.

|  | Panel A: INVESTMENT |  |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  | Linear <br> Model | Treatment is Top Tercile of $\beta_{i}^{U K}$ | Treatment <br> is $>5$ <br> Brexit <br> Entries in 10-Ks <br> 3 |
| POST | $\begin{aligned} & -0.042 \\ & (0.030) \end{aligned}$ |  |  |
| POST $\times \beta_{i}^{U K}$ | $\begin{gathered} -0.127^{* * *} \\ (0.016) \end{gathered}$ |  |  |
| $\mathrm{POST} \times$ HIGH $\beta_{i}^{U K}$ |  | $\begin{gathered} -0.182^{* * *} \\ (0.018) \end{gathered}$ |  |
| POST $\times$ HIGH_10-K_ENTRIES |  |  | $\begin{gathered} -0.063^{* * *} \\ (0.010) \end{gathered}$ |
| SIZE | $\begin{aligned} & 0.105^{* *} \\ & (0.050) \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.088 \\ (0.108) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{aligned} & 0.186^{* *} \\ & (0.081) \end{aligned}$ |
| TOBIN_Q | $\begin{gathered} 0.162^{* * *} \\ (0.018) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.108^{* * *} \\ (0.038) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.168^{* * *} \\ (0.021) \end{gathered}$ |
| CASH_FLOW | $\begin{gathered} 1.486^{* * *} \\ (0.475) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{aligned} & 1.540^{*} \\ & (0.760) \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.270 \\ (0.542) \end{gathered}$ |
| SALES_GROWTH | $\begin{aligned} & 0.059^{* *} \\ & (0.028) \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.056 \\ (0.046) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.032 \\ (0.025) \end{gathered}$ |
| CONSENSUS_EARNINGS_FORECAST | $\begin{gathered} 0.051^{* * *} \\ (0.012) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.025 \\ (0.014) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{aligned} & 0.028^{* *} \\ & (0.012) \end{aligned}$ |
| STOCK_RETURNS | $\begin{aligned} & -0.053 \\ & (0.044) \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.117 \\ (0.083) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{aligned} & -0.062 \\ & (0.048) \end{aligned}$ |
| Controls <br> Macroeconomic <br> First-Moment Instruments | $\begin{aligned} & \text { Yes } \\ & \text { Yes } \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & \text { No } \\ & \text { Yes } \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & \text { No } \\ & \text { Yes } \end{aligned}$ |
| Fixed Effects <br> Firm <br> Industry $\times$ Time | $\begin{aligned} & \text { Yes } \\ & \text { No } \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & \text { Yes } \\ & \text { Yes } \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & \text { Yes } \\ & \text { Yes } \end{aligned}$ |
| Observations R-squared | $\begin{gathered} 41,630 \\ 0.68 \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 17,199 \\ 0.75 \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 21,253 \\ 0.73 \end{gathered}$ |

Statistical significance levels: ${ }^{* * *} p$-value $<0.01$, ${ }^{* *} p$-value $<0.05$, ${ }^{*} p$-value $<0.10$.


## Appendix D Timeline of Brexit Key Events

| Jun $\cdot \mathbf{2 6} \cdot \mathbf{2 0 1 2} \cdots \cdots$. | David Cameron is elected with support of the UK Independent Party |
| :---: | :---: |
| Jan 11 - $2013 \cdot \cdots \cdots$ | PM David Cameron makes contingent promise: A referendum before 2017 if Conservatives win the 2015 general elections |
| May - $07 \cdot 2015 \cdots \cdots$ | General Elections: Cameron wins another term on tight margin of votes |
| Jun - 09-2015 | House of Commons approves the European Union Referendum Act |
| Dec $\cdot 14 \cdot 2015$ | House of Lords approves the Referendum |
| Dec $\cdot 17 \cdot 2015 \cdots \cdots$ | EU Referendum Act receives Royal Assent. A referendum is to be held on the question "Should the UK remain a member of the EU or leave?" |
| Feb - $20 \cdot 2016 \cdots \cdots$ | Announcement: Cameron announces that referendum will be held on June 232016 |
| Apr - 15-2016 $\ldots \ldots$ | Start of the referendum campaign period |
| Jun $\cdot \mathbf{2 3} \cdot \mathbf{2 0 1 6} \cdots \cdots$. | Referendum takes place, Brexit wins |
| Jun $\cdot \mathbf{2 4} \cdot \mathbf{2 0 1 6} \cdots \cdots$. | Result of the referendum is announced (Brexit wins) |
| Jul $13 \cdot 2016 \cdots \cdots$ | David Cameron resigns, Theresa May assumes as Prime Minister |
| Oct $\cdot 02 \cdot 2016 \cdots \cdots$ | PM May voices intention to trigger Article 50 (exit process) by March 2017 |
| Jan $\cdot \mathbf{2 4} \cdot \mathbf{2 0 1 7} \cdots \cdots$ | UK Supreme Court rules that the UK government must hold a vote in parliament before beginning the process of leaving EU, delaying Prime Minister May's timetable |
| Feb - 08-2017 $\ldots$. | House of Commons approves Theresa May's Article 50 bill without amendments to proceed with Brexit negotiation with the EU |
| Mar $\mathbf{2 9}$ - 2017 … | UK-EU Brexit negotiations begin |

Figure D.1. Timeline of the Brexit Referendum. This figure lists the key events preceding the referendum leading to Brexit. Events in bold blue represent two key dates used in our analysis; the Announcement of the date when the referendum would be held, and the Referendum vote itself.

## Appendix E Measures of Exposure to Automation

## E. 1 Details on Automation Exposure Measures

For more details on the geographic measure of exposure to automation for all commuting zones in the continental US, we refer the reader to Acemoglu and Restrepo (2020) and Leigh and Kraft (2018). In this appendix, we describe in more detail the procedure to construct our text-based measure of automation exposure at the firm level. We draw inspiration from an extensive literature in corporate finance that uses textual analysis (e.g., Loughran and McDonald (2011)) and define a dictionary of keywords that capture automation at the firm level. We first gather the syllabuses of many courses on "Industrial Automation and Integration" taught at top Engineering schools in North America (MIT, CalTech, University of Toronto, among others). Reading each syllabus, we identify the most frequently adopted textbook. This analysis points to Benhabib's (2003) "Manufacturing: Design, Production, Automation, and Integration" as one of the most commonly required textbooks in these universities.

With the textbook in hand, we parse its full textual content and use a standard keyword ranking algorithm ("TextRank", see Mihalcea and Tarau (2004)) to order the most distinctive keywords reflecting automation. Following the usual procedures in textual analysis (e.g., exclusion of "stop words"), we select the top 100 keywords that are closely related to automation and use them as a dictionary for parsing firms' $10-$ Ks. The list of keywords is provided in Table E.1. Finally, we define AUTOMATION ${ }_{i}$, which is a continuous variable (in logs) that measures how frequently the top 100 automation keywords appear in the firm's business description (Section 1 of the $10-\mathrm{K}$ form) and management discussion (Section 7 of the $10-\mathrm{K}$ form). To capture cases in which a firm discusses automation efforts in only one year, we average the word count across all years in our sample. AUTOMATION ${ }_{i}=\log \left(1+\right.$ AUTOMATION_KEYWORDS ${ }_{i}$ ), where AUTOMATION_KEYWORDS ${ }_{i}$ is the number of mentions of the top 100 automation-related keywords in firm $i$ 's $10-\mathrm{K}$ forms. Figure E. 1 shows a histogram with the distribution of the AUTOMATION ${ }_{i}$ variable.

## E. 2 Additional Figures and Tables



Figure E.1. Distribution of Firm-Level Measure of Automation Exposure. This figure shows the histogram of the text-based, firm-level measure of automation exposure. Specifically, the measure is constructed as AUTOMATION $_{i}=\log \left(1+\right.$ AUTOMATION_KEYWORDS $\left._{i}\right)$, where AUTOMATION_KEYWORDS ${ }_{i}$ is the number of mentions of the top 100 automation-related keywords in firm $i$ 's $10-\mathrm{K}$ forms as described in Subsection E.1. The total number of firm $i$ 's keyword mentions per year are then averaged across the pre-Brexit sample period of our baseline analysis (2010-15).

## Table E.1. List of Automation-Related Keywords

This table reports the list of top 100 automation-related keywords as identified by the procedure listed in Section E.1.

|  | Automation-Related Keywords |  |
| :--- | :--- | :--- |
| machine tool design | material removal machine | individual component designs |
| design parts | modern machine tools | lean manufacturing machines |
| industrial design processes | machine tool history | autonomous manufacturing systems |
| design processes | based manufacturing | machine vision systems |
| automated production machines | ultrasonic machine tools | process controllers |
| material removal machine tools | statistical process control | automotive parts |
| manufacturing systems | cnc machine tools | machining processes |
| statistical process control tools | based material removal | robot fabrication process |
| composite part design | engineering design models | material handling robots |
| process materials | part geometries | continuous path machining process |
| manufacturing process | orientation systems | layered parts |
| nc machine tool control | mold design techniques | cylindrical parts |
| modular product design | other large manufacturing companies | industrial manufacturing environments |
| product materials | larger design | composite parts |
| discrete parts manufacturing | experimental design procedures | thermoplastic parts |
| industrial machine tools | automatic device control | laminated parts |
| product design methods | metal cutting tools | industrial robot applications |
| aircraft parts manufacturing | robot motion control | manufacturing system modeling |
| based processes | metal forming processes | deformation processes |
| metal parts | industrial processes | parametric design |
| metal fabrication processes | discrete parts manufacturing industries | resistance welding processes |
| large sheet metal parts | integral designs |  |
| metal processes | robor motion controllers |  |
| mechanical part orienting systems | many parts | romputer integrated manufacturing |
| machine tools | small mechanical parts | integrated sensors |
| manufacturing machines | programmable manufacturing devices |  |
| multidisciplinary product design teams | other casting processes | aided design aspects |
| manufactured parts | design parameter values | microdetailed aerospace parts |
| automatic machine tools | robots | automata tools |
| part models | robot programming techniques | such playback-based robot motion techniques |
| machine tool vibrations | commercial industrial robots |  |
| large parts | automated manufacturing |  |
| automated machine tools | product assembly |  |
| robot chip formation | complex geometry parts |  |
|  |  |  |
|  |  |  |

Table E.2. The Impact of the Brexit Vote on Automation Exposure
This table reports output from equation (14). The dependent variable is AUTOMATION ${ }_{i, t}$, which is constructed from a dictionary of keywords that capture exposure to automation at the firm level, as described in Appendix E. This textbased continuous variable is the logarithm of the total number of automation-related keywords that appear in firm is business description ( $10-\mathrm{K}$ Section 1) and management discussion (10-K Section 7), at the firm-year level. In the first specification, the treatment group is composed by the top tercile of $\beta_{i}^{U K}$, while control group is composed by firms in the bottom tercile of $\beta_{i}^{U K}$. The second specification is a textual-search-based measure of UK-exposure that sums up the number of Brexit-related words in firms' 2015 10-K forms. The treatment group is made of firms with more than five entries, whereas the control group are firms with zero entries. The testing specification and estimation procedure is as per the EMPLOYMENT_GROWTH tests in Table 2.

|  | AUTOMATION $_{i, t}$ |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  | Treatment is Top Tercile of $\beta_{i}^{U K}$ | Treatment is $>5$ Brexit Entries in 10-Ks 2 |
| POST $\times$ HIGH $\beta_{i}^{\text {UK }}$ | $\begin{aligned} & 0.144^{*} \\ & (0.075) \end{aligned}$ |  |
| POST $\times$ HIGH_10-K_ENTRIES |  | $\begin{aligned} & 0.096^{*} \\ & (0.048) \end{aligned}$ |
| Controls <br> Firm | Yes | Yes |
| Fixed Effects <br> Firm <br> Industry $\times$ Time | Yes <br> Yes | Yes Yes |
| Observations R-squared | $\begin{gathered} 3,540 \\ 0.20 \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 4,173 \\ 0.28 \end{gathered}$ |


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