Trust and Debt Contracting: Evidence from the Backdating Scandal

Internet Appendix

Table A. Univariate differences between backdaters and non-backdaters prior to the revelation

Table B. The impact of option backdating on corporate trust

Appendix Table A. Univariate differences between backdaters and non-backdaters prior to the revelation

This table compares means of variables related to firm characteristics between all backdaters and non-backdaters of our sample in year 2006. Tests for significance of mean differences are implemented as paired *t*-tests with standard errors clustered at the borrower level; tests of significance are two-sided. All variables are defined in Appendix. Firm characteristics of backdaters are compared to firm characteristics of non-backdaters. *, **, and *** denote statistical significance at the 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01 levels, respectively.

	Backdaters	Non-backdaters	Difference
Total assets (in \$ millions)	3,729.60	3,730.60	1.03
			(0.00)
Coverage	52.69	64.85	12.16
			(0.89)
Leverage	0.24	0.25	0.02
			(1.35)
Profitability	0.15	0.15	0.00
			(0.33)
Tobin's Q	1.90	1.85	-0.05
			(1.00)
Altman Z	1.66	1.67	0.01
			(0.12)
Observations	485	976	

Appendix Table B. The impact of option backdating on corporate trust

Table B1. Univariate analysis on firm-level trust

This table presents means of corporate trust measures for non-backdaters, backdaters that are not listed in WSJ or Glass-Lewis report, and the backdaters that are listed in WSJ or Glass-Lewis report. In column 1 and 2, The *proxy for corporate trust* is measured by adding strengths and subtracting concerns for the categories including community, diversity, employee relations, environment, human rights, and corporate governance. In column 3 and 4, *Reporting quality & accounting concern* is used as the proxy for corporate trust measured by adding the reporting quality category and subtracting the accounting concern category. Tests for significance of mean differences between groups are implemented as two-sided t-tests. *, **, and *** denote statistical significance at the 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01 levels, respectively.

	Proxy for corporate trust			Reporting quality & accounting concern				
	Obs	Pre revelation (2005)	Obs	Post revelation (2007)	Obs	Pre revelation (2005)	Obs	Post revelation (2007)
Non-backdaters	1,168	-0.251	1,012	-0.265	1,168	0.000	1,012	-0.015
Backdaters (neither WSJ nor Glass- Lewis)	446	-0.226	402	-0.277	446	0.002	402	-0.010
Backdater (WSJ or Glass-Lewis)	78	-0.316	62	-0.414	78	0.000	62	-0.258
Differences:								
Backdaters (not WSJ or Glass-		0.025		-0.012		0.002		0.005
Lewis) – Non-backdaters		(0.86)		(0.38)		(0.15)		(0.28)
Backdaters (WSJ or Glass-Lewis) -		-0.065		-0.149**		0.000		-0.243***
Non-backdaters		(1.08)		(2.19)		(0.00)		(6.13)
Backdaters (WSJ or Glass-Lewis) -		-0.090		-0.137*		-0.002		-0.248 * * *
Backdaters (neither WSJ nor Glass- Lewis)		(1.48)		(1.88)		(0.07)		(5.65)

Table B2. State level trust

This table reports results from regression analyses. The response variable is the state-wise trust on big businesses, computed as the number of individuals with high confidence on the big businesses in their own state scaled by the total number of respondents. The main variables of interest include *States with large number of backdaters* and *Number of backdaters in a state*. The respondent characteristics include *College education, High income, Male, Protestant/Jewish, Republican, White/black/Hispanic. State GDP growth* and *State stock return* are included as economic control variables. The model includes fixed effects for state and year. *t*-statistics from two-sided tests of significance are reported under the parameter estimates, in parentheses with standard errors clustered by firm. *, **, and *** denote statistical significance at the 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01 levels, respectively.

	Trust in Big Business		
State with large number of backdaters (binary) × Post revelation	-0.06**		
	(2.47)		
Number of backdaters in a state (ratio) \times Post revelation		-0.98 ***	
		(3.06)	
College education	0.06	0.06	
	(1.04)	(1.02)	
High income	-0.08	-0.08	
	(1.05)	(1.08)	
Male	0.08**	0.09	
	(1.52)	(1.60)	
Protestant/Jewish	-0.02	-0.02	
	(0.28)	(0.34)	
Republican	0.18***	0.19***	
	(3.14)	(3.33)	
White/black/hispanic	-0.28 * *	-0.29**	
	(2.25)	(2.22)	
State GDP growth	-0.29	-0.29**	
	(0.87)	(0.89)	
State stock return	0.83	0.80	
	(1.64)	(1.55)	
Intercept	Yes	Yes	
State, Year FE	Yes	Yes	
Observations	387	387	
Adjusted R ²	0.155	0.155	