**ONLINE APPENDICES**

**Appendix 1. Data Sources**

*Public Opinion Data*

Data for opinion on immigration come from a Gallup survey of 3,536 respondents across 38 states and Washington DC. The face-to-face survey was carried out on June 24-29 1965, using the stratification methodology used by all Gallup surveys starting in 1950. The data was obtained from the Roper Public Opinion Research Center as survey number AIPO 713. The means and standard deviations of the explanatory variables used in the regressions are as follows:

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
| Individual characteristics of respondents | Mean | S.D.  |
| Civic generation: age < 55 | 0.672 | 0.469 |
| High education: some college or university, complete or incomplete | 0.191 | 0.394 |
| Income: banded household income, midpoints of 11 bands ($000 p.a.) | 6.245 | 4.203 |
| Protestant: alternatives are Jewish, Catholic, other and none.  | 0.656 | 0.475 |
| White: alternatives are Negro and other.  | 0.877 | 0.328 |
| Male | 0.471 | 0.499 |
| Urban: living in city or urban area with population of at least 10,000 | 0.665 | 0.472 |
| Democrat: alternatives are Republican, other, undecided, none.  | 0.538 | 0.499 |
| South: computed from state of residence | 0.260 | 0.439 |

Data for opinion on civil rights legislation comes from two Gallup/Potomac surveys taken in September 1964 (1611 observations) and October 1964 (1564 observations), which asked exactly the same question about opinion on the Civil Rights Act. The sampling method was the same as for the 1965 survey that was used for opinion on immigration policy. The two surveys also contain the same demographic variables as the 1965 survey and so they were merged into one file. The data was obtained from the Roper Public Opinion Research Center as survey numbers 1964-633POS and 1864-637POS.

*District/State Characteristics*

Variables for district populations, the number living in urban areas and income were taken from Adler (2013) “Congressional District Data File”. These are based on counts in the 1960 census and are derived from the U.S. Census’s Congressional District Databooks. For immigrant origins at the state level we used data from the National Historical Geographic Information System (NHGIS). Those with immigrant origins are either foreign born or have one or both parents foreign born. Western Hemisphere immigrants originate from: Canada, Mexico and other American countries. The means and standard deviations of these variables for the set of states used in our regression analysis for the original House vote and for the Senate vote are as follows:

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
|  | House | Senate |
| District/State characteristics | Mean | S.D.  | Mean | S.D.  |
| South: Calculated from state | 0.260 | 0.439 | 0.289 | 0.457 |
| Urban: share in areas > 10,000 population | 0.687 | 0.250 | 0.622 | 0.147 |
| Median income: median family income ($000) | 5.587 | 984.8 | 5.194 | 993.2 |
| Western Hemisphere: share of immigrants | 0.195 | 0.169 | 0.204 | 0.171 |
| Number of members included | 400 |  | 76 |  |

*Note*: The South is defined as the original eleven secession states: Alabama, Arkansas, Florida, Georgia, Louisiana, Mississippi, North Carolina, South Carolina, Tennessee, Texas and Virginia.

*Personal characteristics of members of Congress*

These characteristics are from Swift et al. (2009) obtained as a computer file from the ICPSR as study number ICPSR03371-v2. The variable for whether the member was from an ethnic minority or was foreign-born or had foreign-born parentage was constructed using detailed information from MyHeritage.com.The DW-NOMINATE score comes from Lewis et al. (2021). The means and standard deviations of the variables used (across the districts in the 38 states used in estimation) are as follows:

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
|  | House | Senate |
| Individual characteristic of member | Mean | S.D.  | Mean | S.D.  |
| Civic generation: age < 55 | 0.610 | 0.488 | 0.368 | 0.487 |
| Business background | 0.181 | 0.386 | 0.092 | 0.291 |
| Previous political office | 0.487 | 0.500 | 0.605 | 0.492 |
| Ethnic or immigrant background  | 0.233 | 0.433 | 0.131 | 0.340 |
| Democrat | 0.677 | 0.499 | 0.697 | 0.462 |
| DW-NOMINATE score | -0.097 | 0.300 | -0.130 | 0.330 |
| Number of members included | 400 |  | 76 |  |

*References*

Adler, E. S. (2013), “Congressional District Data File,” [congressional term],” University of Colorado, Boulder, CO.

Lewis, J. B., Poole, K., Rosenthal, H., Boche, A., Rudkin, A. and Sonnet, L. (2021), “Voteview: Congressional Roll-Call Votes Database,” <https://voteview.com/>.

Swift, E. K., Brookshire, R. G., Canon, D. T., Fink, E. C., Hibbing, J. R., Humes, B. D., Malbin, M. J. and Martis. K. C. (2009), “Database of [United States] Congressional Historical Statistics, 1789-1989,” Ann Arbor, MI: Inter-university Consortium for Political and Social Research.

**Appendix 2. Multilevel Regression and Post-stratification (MRP)**

Multi-level regression and post-stratification (MRP) is a well-established method in the social sciences to estimate public opinion at subnational levels using large national samples (Hanretty 2020). Prominent examples of applications for the US are the work of Lax and Philipps (2009), Canes-Wrone et al. (2014) and Goldstein and Wiedemann (2021), which use MRP to estimate state-level opinions. The basic idea of MRP is to group individuals into different types based on their socio-demographic and geographic characteristics and to make predictions for each of the groups using a statistical model. These predictions are then used to generate estimates for a given region by using information from the full population on how many individuals live in a certain region. The estimation of subnational opinion via MRP can be divided into five stages (Kastellec et al. 2019; Hanretty 2020):

1. Make use of survey data including variables measuring the opinion and sociodemographic characteristics of respondents as well as the regional area the respondents live in.

2. Collect relevant information about the regional area of interest.

3. Estimate a multi-level regression model using the data and variables from the first two stages.

4. Construct a post-stratification framework which provides the population count for each demographic-geographic respondent type (cell).

5. Use estimates from stage 3 to create a prediction for each demographic-geographic cell and post-stratify (weight) these by the actual population frequency of that cell, and aggregate these predictions to the regional area of interest.

In our specific case, we are interested in opinions towards migration policy and civil rights at the level of US states. For this purpose, we use survey data from three nation-wide Gallup polls. With respect to opinions towards migration we use data from the Gallup Poll # 713, which covers 38 states. For our measure of attitudes towards civil rights, we rely on two Gallup Polls from 1964 (#633 and #637) which cover a total of 40 states (stage 1).

In stage 2, we compile information on the share and change of foreign-born, religiosity and presidential vote share from the Census, the Association of Religion Data Archives (ARDA) and the US Election Atlas.

In stage 3, we use the individual- and state-level information collected and compiled in the first two stages to estimate a multi-level regression model of opinion on migration policy and civil rights and treat each individual's response as a function of his or her demographics and state. Our three outcomes of interest are modeled as followed: “Abolish Quota” is a dummy variable coded as 1 if respondents are in favor of abolishing the existing quota system, and 0 for opponents and those with no opinion. In other words, in the baseline analysis we treat those with no opinion as being in favor of the status quo. Not dropping the ones with no opinion is also consistent with of our poststratification in which we use Census data which considers all persons, not just those with an opinion (see Kastellec et al. 2019). However, we show that our main results are not affected if we drop those without an opinion (see Appendix Table A5.5). Our second migration policy measure, “Decrease Immigration”, is a dummy coded as 1 if the respondent thinks that immigration should be decreased and 0 otherwise. Our measure of civil right attitudes “Civil Rights Approve” is a dummy coded as 1 if the respondent approves the 1964 Civil Rights Act that was passed by Congress and signed by the President and 0 otherwise.

Building on Butz and Kehrberg (2016) we use the following individual level variables: Gender (male or female), race (White or Black), age (two categories: 21-39, 39+) and education (four categories: less than high school, high school graduate, some college, college graduate). We code respondents with certificates or diplomas from vocational, technical, trade, or business schools as having "some college". We combine race and gender into a single variable with four possible categories (male-white, male-black, female-white, female-black). The model also includes state level effects which are themselves modeled as a function of region (Midwest, Northeast, South, and West), the share of residents identifying themselves as Catholics, the state level share of foreign-born, the state-level change of foreign-born between 1950 and 1960 and the Presidential vote for Johnson in 1964.

In the fourth stage, we collect census data that corresponds to all of the individual-level demographic variables included in the model in the previous stage. Given the structure of MRP, we need to calculate population counts for each demographic-state cell (e.g. the number of White females younger than 39 who are college graduates in California). We do this using the 5% Public Use Microdata Sample from the 1960 Census (Ruggles et al. 2022).

In the fifth and final stage, we predict for each demographic-state cell support for our outcome of interest. We then weight (post-stratify) each prediction by the actual population frequency of that cell, collected in the previous stage to correct for over- or under-sampling of demographic categories. Finally, we calculate the average response over each cell in a given state. Figure A2.1 provides a comparison between average state opinion towards abolishing quotas and predictions from MRP. The pattern shows a strong association between the two measures, which is in particular driven by states with a large number of respondents in the Gallup poll such as California/CA (N=365). For states with relative few respondents such as Maine/ME (N=25) the difference between the raw percentage and MRP prediction is, as expected, larger. Similar results are found in Figure A2.2 for the comparison between average state opinion towards decreasing immigration and predictions from MRP. The R2 of regressions of predicted on mean values is 0.92 and 0.97 respectively. Figure A2.3 reports a similar scatter plot for opinion on approval of the civil rights law (R2= 0.74).

**Figure A2.1: State Means and MRP Predictions for the Proportion Wishing to Abolish the Country-of-origin Quotas**

**Figure A2.2: State Means and MRP Predictions for the Proportion Wishing to Decrease Immigration**

**Figure A2.3: State Means and MRP Predictions for the Proportion who Approved of the 1964 Civil Rights Act**

For our main results the MRP prediction includes the percentage foreign-born the decade rate of change of foreign-born and the presidential vote share in each state, variables that are seen as drivers of public opinion by Goldin (1994) and Tabellini (2020). As we do not have an indicator of place of birth in the public opinion data it is possible that the prediction from MRP is picking up an additional effect if foreign born voters behave differently from the native born. The presidential vote share in the 1964 election could lead to endogeneity to the extent that this vote reflected preferences for proposed policy on immigration. In order to address these issues we construct the MRP prediction excluding the foreign-born percentage, the rate of change of foreign-born and the presidential vote share. In Tables A2.1 below we use the MRP predictions excluding these three variables in regressions otherwise the same as those in Tables 4. Not surprisingly, given the closeness of the predictions, the size and significance of the coefficients are very little changed.

*References not cited in the main text*

Canes-Wrone, Brandice, Tom S. Clark and Jason P. Kelly. “Judicial Selection and Death Penalty Decisions.” *American Political Science Review* 108, no. 1 (2014): 23-39.

Goldstein, Daniel and Johannes Wiedemann, J. “Who Do You Trust? The Consequences of Partisanship and Trust for Public Responsiveness to COVID-19 Orders.” *Perspectives on Politics* 20, no. 2 (2022): 412-38.

Ruggles, Steven, Sarah Flood, Ronald Goeken, Megan Schouweiler, and Matthew Sobek. “IPUMS USA: Version 12.0 [dataset].” Minneapolis, MN: IPUMS, 2022. <https://doi.org/10.18128/D010.V1>.

**Table A2.1: House Votes on the Original Passage with modified MRP Opinion Prediction**

(Marginal effects; dependent variable: Yea = 1, Nay = 0)

|  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) |
| *Opinion (MRP predicted)* |  |  |  |  |
| Abolish quotas | 1.68\*\*\* | 0.64\*\*\* | 0.62\*\*\* | 0.54\*\*\* |
| (0.32) | (0.24) | (0.23) | (0.19) |
| Decrease immigration | 0.16 | 0.04 | 0.06 | 0.09 |
| (0.27) | (0.14) | (0.13) | (0.12) |
| *District/State characteristics* |  |  |  |  |
| South |  | -0.43\*\*\* | -0.42\*\*\* | -0.26\*\*\* |
|  | (0.12) | (0.10) | (0.07) |
| Share of population urban |  | 0.31\*\*\* | 0.27\*\*\* | 0.21\*\*\* |
|  | (0.07) | (0.06) | (0.06) |
| Log median income  |  | -0.01 | -0.03 | 0.15 |
|  | (0.23) | (0.19) | (0.15) |
| Western Hemisphere immigrant share |  | 0.06 | 0.07 | -0.03 |
|  | (0.06) | (0.06) | (0.07) |
| *Representative characteristics* |  |  |  |  |
| Civic generation (age <55) |  |  | 0.07\*\* | 0.06\*\* |
|  |  | (0.03) | (0.03) |
| Business background |  |  | 0.05\* | 0.05\* |
|  |  | (0.03) | (0.03) |
| Previous political office |  |  | -0.07\*\* | -0.04\* |
|  |  | (0.03) | (0.03) |
| Migrant/ethnic background |  |  | 0.13\*\*\* | 0.10\*\* |
|  |  | (0.05) | (0.05) |
| Democrat |  |  | 0.07 |  |
|  |  | (0.05) |  |
| DW-NOMINATE score |  |  |  | -0.35\*\*\* |
|  |  |  | (0.08) |
| Pseudo-R2 | 0.225 | 0.504 | 0.561 | 0.637 |
| Wald χ2 (2,6,11,12) | 20.78 | 86.38 | 232.4 | 173.4 |
| Observations | 400 | 400 | 400 | 400 |

Notes: The coefficients are marginal probabilities from probit regressions;robust standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the state level; \*\*\* p<0.01, \*\* p<0.05, \* p<0.1.

**Appendix 3. Eligibility for Immigration from the Western Hemisphere.**

For immigration purposes, the Western Hemisphere in 1965 comprised independent countries of the Americas plus the Panama Canal Zone, as follows:

**Table A3.1: Western Hemisphere**

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Canada | Trinidad and Tobago | Nicaragua | Columbia |
| Mexico | Costa Rica | Panama Canal Zone | Ecuador |
| Cuba | El Salvador | Argentina | Paraguay |
| Dominican Republic | Guatemala | Bolivia | Peru |
| Haiti | Honduras | Brazil | Uruguay |
| Jamaica | Panama | Chile | Venezuela |

Immigrants from colonies of Eastern Hemisphere countries came under the quota of the colonial power. So Jamaica and Trinidad and Tobago were not included under the Western Hemisphere until they became independent in 1962. Apart from the Bracero Program, which ended in 1964, and some other exceptions, Western Hemisphere immigrants (accompanied by spouses and children) were admitted under a labour certification system. For the Western Hemisphere, until 1968 there were no quotas and, until 1976, no preferences for non-immediate relatives such as those for the Eastern Hemisphere under the fourth preference of the 1952 Act and the fourth and fifth preferences of the 1965 Act.

Under the 1952 Act an immigrant could not enter for employment if the Secretary of Labor certified that there were sufficient American workers available at the applicant’s destination or that their wages and labour conditions would be adversely affected. Under the system introduced in 1965 immigrants could be admitted *only* if the Secretary of Labor certified that that there were insufficient workers and that wages and working conditions would not be affected. This reversed the burden of proof of no adverse effect, placing it upon the applicant. Occupations were classified under three schedules; for unskilled workers (schedule B) applicants could only be admitted with a job offer from a US employer. This applied to third, sixth, and non-preference Eastern Hemisphere immigrants and to all Western Hemisphere immigrants except for parents, spouses and children of U.S. citizens or resident aliens (Keely 1975, p. 8-9).

Prior to the 1952 Act, adjustment of status (for those with non-immigrant status present in the US) to lawful permanent resident required ‘pre-examination’ by an immigration officer, reclassification as a quota immigrant (if such a visa was available), and then re-entry to the US. The re-entry requirement was relaxed in the 1952 Act but in the absence of a system of quotas, Western Hemisphere immigrants still could only qualify for adjustment as a parent, spouse or child of a US citizen or permanent resident. This restriction was liberalised in 1958 to include those classifiable as non-quota immigrants, except for natives of contiguous countries, but it was reversed again in the 1965 Act. In the absence of alternatives, one route for Western Hemisphere natives was to enter as a non-immigrant, seek employment and then acquire a letter from their employer in order to seek permanent residence status (US Select Commission, 1968 pp. 139-146).

*References*

Keely, Charles B. “United States Immigration Legislation: The Development of Present Policies.” *International Migration Review* 9, no. 1 (Supplement) (1975): 1-10 & 73-78.

United States (1968), Report of the Select Commission on Western Hemisphere Immigration, Washington US GPO.

**Appendix 4. Members of the House who switched their votes.**

In the main text we note that 59 members of the House of Representatives switched their vote between the original passage of HR 2580 and the conference report. Table A4.1 provides details of the individuals who switched their vote, what they switched from and to, their party and region and whether they were foreign-born, had a foreign-born parent, or were from an ethnic minority.

**Table A4.1: Members of the House who switched their vote between the first passage and the conference report on HR 2580**

|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Name | State | District | Party | South | Ethnic/Immig background |
| ***Nay to Yea*** |
| Adair E. | Indiana | 4 | Rep | N | N |
| Belcher P. | Oklahoma | 1 | Rep | N | N |
| Bray W.  | Indiana | 7 | Rep | N | N |
| Broyhill J. | N. Carolina | 9 | Rep | Y | N |
| Callaway H.  | Georgia | 3 | Rep | Y | N |
| Chelf F.  | Kentucky | 4 | Dem | N | N |
| Cramer W.  | Florida | 12 | Rep | Y | Y |
| Davis G. | Wisconsin | 9 | Rep | N | N |
| Dickinson W. | Alabama | 2 | Rep | Y | N |
| Gurney E.  | Florida | 11 | Rep | Y | N |
| Hall D.  | Missouri | 7 | Rep | N | N |
| Hansen G. | Idaho | 2 | Rep | N | N |
| Harris O.  | Arkansas | 4 | Dem | Y | N |
| Harsha W.  | Ohio | 6 | Rep | N | N |
| Harvey R. | Indiana | 10 | Rep | N | N |
| Ichord R. | Missouri | 8 | Dem | N | N |
| Jennings W. | Virginia | 9 | Dem | Y | N |
| Jonas C.  | N. Carolina | 8 | Rep | Y | N |
| Jones R. | Alabama | 8 | Dem | Y | N |
| Kornegay H. | N. Carolina | 6 | Dem | Y | N |
| Lipscomb G. | California | 24 | Rep | N | N |
| Murray T.  | Tennessee | 7 | Dem | Y | N |
| Roudebush R.  | Indiana | 6 | Rep | N | N |
| Smith H. | Califor | 20 | Rep | N | N |
| Steed T.  | Oklahoma | 4 | Dem | N | N |
| Taylor R. | N. Carolina | 11 | Dem | Y | N |
| Watts J. | Kentucky | 6 | Dem | N | N |
| ***Abstain To Yea*** |
| Harvey J. | Michigan | 8 | Rep | N | Y |
| Kee J. | West Virginia | 5 | Dem | N | N |
| O'brien L.  | New York | 29 | Dem | N | Y |
| Rumsfeld D. | Illinois | 13 | Rep | N | N |
| Sisk B.  | California | 16 | Dem | N | N |
| ***Yea To Nay*** |
| Gonzalez H. | Texas | 20 | Dem | Y | Y |
| Goodell C. | New York | 38 | Rep | N | N |
| Nix R. | Pennsylvania | 2 | Dem | N | Y |
| Young J. | Texas | 14 | Dem | Y | N |
| ***Yea To Abstain*** |
| Anderson J. | Illinois | 16 | Rep | N | Y |
| Aspinall W. | Colorado | 4 | Dem | N | N |
| Bolton F.  | Ohio | 22 | Rep | N | N |
| Carter T. | Kentucky | 5 | Rep | N | N |
| Dawson W.  | Illinois | 1 | Dem | N | Y |
| Diggs C. | Michigan | 13 | Dem | N | Y |
| Duncan R. | Oregon | 4 | Dem | N | N |
| Edwards D. | California | 9 | Dem | N | N |
| Frelinghuysen P.  | New Jersey | 5 | Rep | N | N |
| Hansen J. | Iowa | 7 | Dem | N | Y |
| Hosmer C.  | California | 32 | Rep | N | N |
| Johnson J. | Oklahoma | 6 | Dem | N | N |
| Lindsay J. | New York | 17 | Rep | N | N |
| Michel R. | Illinois | 18 | Rep | N | Y |
| Mize C. | Kansas | 2 | Rep | N | N |
| O'hara B. | Illinois | 2 | Dem | N | Y |
| Robison H.  | New York | 33 | Rep | N | N |
| Roncalio T. | Wyoming | 1 | Dem | N | Y |
| Roybal E.  | California | 30 | Dem | N | Y |
| Thomas A. | Texas | 8 | Dem | Y | N |
| Thompson C. | Texas | 9 | Dem | Y | N |
| Wilson B. | California | 36 | Rep | N | Y |
| ***Abstain To Nay*** |
| Andrews G. | Alabama | 4 | Rep | Y | N |

*Note*: Roosevelt, J. (D-CA) voted yea in the first passage but resigned on being appointed as a delegate to UNESCO before the vote on the conference report took place, and so he is not classified as a switcher.

The summary of these switchers is provided in Table 9 in the main text. In Table A4.2 below we report regressions in which switchers take the value 1 against the base of non-switchers = 0. Columns (1) and (2) show that members from states where public opinion was more strongly in favour of abolishing the quotas were less likely to switch out of voting for the bill, suggesting that for them non-discrimination was uppermost. Notably also, those from states with a relatively high presence of Western Hemisphere immigrants were more likely to switch out of supporting the conference report, which unlike the earlier version included a cap on immigration from the Western Hemisphere. As noted by Gimpel and Edwards (1999) there is also some evidence that members with immigrant or ethnic minority backgrounds were more likely to switch out of voting in favour.

It is interesting to note that those with more experience of political office were less likely to withdraw their support perhaps due to more entrenched partly loyalty, something that is also suggested by the negative coefficient on Democrat in column (1). Fewer variables are significant for switching from nay or abstain into yea. The strong negative coefficient on Democrat somewhat tempers the idea that those who initially demurred were persuaded to fall into line but that some Republicans were brought on board.

**Table A4.2: Switchers between House votes relative to non-switchers**

|  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) |
|  | Switch out of yea = 1 | Switch into yea = 1 |
| *Opinion (MRP predicted)* |  |  |  |  |
| Abolish quotas | -0.26\* | -0.27\*\* | 0.02 | 0.06 |
| (0.14) | (0.13) | (0.15) | (0.16) |
| Decrease immigration | -0.06 | -0.07 | 0.17 | 0.18 |
| (0.12) | (0.11) | (0.12) | (0.13) |
| *District/State characteristics* |  |  |  |  |
| South | -0.04 | -0.05 | -0.00 | -0.03 |
| (0.04) | (0.04) | (0.04) | (0.04) |
| Share of population urban | -0.01 | -0.02 | -0.07 | -0.05 |
| (0.06) | (0.06) | (0.06) | (0.06) |
| Log median income  | 0.08 | 0.11 | -0.19 | -0.20 |
| (0.13) | (0.13) | (0.14) | (0.14) |
| Western Hemisphere immigrant share | 0.22\*\*\* | 0.22\*\*\* | -0.01 | -0.01 |
| (0.08) | (0.07) | (0.10) | (0.10) |
| *Representative characteristics* |  |  |  |  |
| Civic generation (age <55) | -0.01 | -0.00 | -0.03 | -0.02 |
| (0.02) | (0.02) | (0.03) | (0.03) |
| Business background | -0.01 | -0.01 | 0.00 | 0.01 |
| (0.04) | (0.04) | (0.03) | (0.03) |
| Previous political office | -0.06\*\* | -0.07\*\* | -0.04 | -0.04\* |
| (0.03) | (0.03) | (0.02) | (0.02) |
| Migrant/ethnic background | 0.09\* | 0.09\* | -0.02 | -0.01 |
| (0.05) | (0.05) | (0.04) | (0.04) |
| Democrat | -0.06\* |  | -0.12\*\*\* |  |
| (0.03) |  | (0.04) |  |
| DW Nominate |  | 0.02 |  | 0.17\*\*\* |
|  |  | (0.04) |  | (0.06) |
| Pseudo-R2 | 0.114 | 0.0964 | 0.151 | 0.148 |
| Wald χ2 (2,6,10,11) | 28.13 | 30.31 | 35.41 | 34.21 |
| Observations | 374 | 374 | 378 | 378 |

Notes: The coefficients are marginal probabilities from probit regressions;robust standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the state level; \*\*\* p<0.01, \*\* p<0.05, \* p<0.1.

**Appendix 5. Robustness checks**

***The 1965 Gallup Poll: Further results*:**

Table A5.1 below shows the correlation matrix between the responses to all the questions on immigration in the 1965 Gallup poll. As noted in the text (and Table 2), the first two questions, which are our main focus, are directly related to policy whereas the other four questions (cols. (3) to (6) below) ask about desirable characteristics of immigrants and are therefore best interpreted as intermediate attitudes which inform opinion on policy. Interestingly, those who wanted to abolish the quotas were less likely to think that country-of-origin is important and more likely to be positive towards immigrants who were skilled, relatives or refugees. Those who favored decreasing immigration were more likely to think that origin country was important, as well as skills and relatives, but less likely to favor refugees. Note also that that the correlation between abolish the quotas and decrease is insignificant, so these are distinctly different dimensions of opinion. This is consistent with our narrative: those who wish to abolish the quotas are inspired by civil rights and not by a desire to increase immigration.

**Table A5.1: Correlation Matrix of Immigration Opinion**

|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) |
|  | Abolish quota system (Yes = 1) | Decrease immigra-tion (Yes = 1) | Country very important(Yes = 1) | Skills very important(Yes = 1) | Relativesvery important (Yes = 1) | Provide for refugees(Yes = 1) |
| Abolish quota system (Yes = 1) | 1.0000  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Decrease immigration (Yes = 1) | -0.0256 | 1.0000  |  |  |  |  |
| Country very important (Yes = 1) | -0.0479\* | 0.2048\* | 1.0000  |  |  |  |
| Skills very important (Yes = 1) | 0.3214\* | 0.0619\* | 0.1198\* | 1.0000  |  |  |
| Relatives very important (Yes = 1) | 0.0480\* | 0.1499\* | 0.2164\* | 0.1474\* | 1.0000  |  |
| Provide for refugees (Yes = 1) | 0.1119\* | -0.0560\* | 0.0183 | 0.1268\* | 0.0183 | 1.0000 |

Note: Significance level \* p<0.05.

Table A5.2 reproduces Table 3 in the main text but not including the response ‘no opinion’. Although there are some differences in the coefficients and significance levels the results overall are similar to those reported in Table 3 of the main paper.

**Table A5.2: Public Opinion on Immigration and Individual Characteristics (exc “no opinion”)**

|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) |
|  | Abolish quota system (Yes = 1) | Decrease immigra-tion (Yes = 1) | Country very important(Yes = 1) | Skills very important(Yes = 1) | Relativesvery important (Yes = 1) | Provide for refugees(Yes = 1) |
| Civic generation (age <55) | -0.012 | 0.014 | -0.053\* | -0.035 | -0.125\*\*\* | 0.020 |
| (0.034) | (0.034) | (0.030) | (0.030) | (0.032) | (0.039) |
| High education (college) | 0.096\*\* | -0.089\*\* | -0.076\* | 0.032 | -0.186\*\*\* | 0.062 |
| (0.039) | (0.043) | (0.040) | (0.022) | (0.036) | (0.043) |
| Log household income (000s) | -0.012 | -0.028 | -0.061\*\* | 0.038\*\* | -0.112\*\*\* | 0.054\*\* |
| (0.027) | (0.022) | (0.024) | (0.017) | (0.024) | (0.023) |
| Protestant | -0.059 | 0.130\*\*\* | 0.070\*\* | 0.031 | -0.005 | 0.018 |
| (0.047) | (0.044) | (0.033) | (0.024) | (0.032) | (0.033) |
| White | -0.162\*\*\* | 0.118\* | 0.058 | -0.071\*\* | -0.142\*\* | 0.056 |
| (0.048) | (0.064) | (0.056) | (0.031) | (0.067) | (0.054) |
| Male | -0.004 | 0.044 | -0.051\* | 0.004 | -0.022 | -0.036 |
| (0.029) | (0.036) | (0.028) | (0.028) | (0.033) | (0.030) |
| Urban (>10,000 population) | 0.001 | -0.086\* | -0.096\*\*\* | -0.071\*\* | 0.041 | 0.096\*\*\* |
| (0.041) | (0.045) | (0.034) | (0.030) | (0.049) | (0.030) |
| Democrat | -0.025 | 0.009 | -0.023 | -0.052 | -0.019 | 0.045\* |
| (0.027) | (0.029) | (0.030) | (0.033) | (0.030) | (0.025) |
| South | -0.088\*\* | 0.045 | 0.053 | 0.009 | -0.051 | 0.081\*\* |
| (0.037) | (0.044) | (0.043) | (0.034) | (0.042) | (0.038) |
| Wald χ2(9) | 30.25 | 27.63 | 94.04 | 45.43 | 274.01 | 46.51 |
| Pseudo-R2 | 0.020 | 0.035 | 0.044 | 0.017 | 0.073 | 0.033 |
| Observations | 2,864 | 2,726 | 3,045 | 3,157 | 3,198 | 2,972 |

Note: The coefficients are marginal probabilities from probit regressions; standard errors in parentheses clustered at the state level. \*\*\* p<0.01, \*\* p<0.05, \* p<0.1.

Table A5.3 presents the marginal effects from estimating logit regression rather than from probit as in Table 3. Not surprisingly, the coefficients and significance levels are very close to those in Table 3.

**Table A5.3: Public Opinion on Immigration and Individual Characteristics (Logit)**

|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) |
|  | Abolish quota system (Yes = 1) | Decrease immigra-tion (Yes = 1) | Country very important(Yes = 1) | Skills very important(Yes = 1) | Relativesvery important (Yes = 1) | Provide for refugees(Yes = 1) |
| Civic generation (age <55) | 0.026 | 0.003 | -0.024 | -0.001 | -0.088\*\*\* | 0.052 |
| (0.031) | (0.030) | (0.029) | (0.022) | (0.027) | (0.036) |
| High education (college) | 0.094\*\* | -0.081\* | -0.064 | 0.057\*\* | -0.198\*\*\* | 0.126\*\*\* |
| (0.041) | (0.044) | (0.041) | (0.027) | (0.037) | (0.044) |
| Log household income (000s) | 0.028 | -0.014 | -0.029 | 0.079\*\*\* | -0.059\*\* | 0.070\*\*\* |
| (0.022) | (0.022) | (0.024) | (0.021) | (0.028) | (0.024) |
| Protestant | -0.025 | 0.117\*\*\* | 0.059\* | 0.038 | -0.006 | 0.010 |
| (0.040) | (0.039) | (0.031) | (0.026) | (0.032) | (0.027) |
| White | -0.085\* | 0.171\*\* | 0.105\*\* | -0.025 | -0.065 | 0.126\*\* |
| (0.048) | (0.072) | (0.053) | (0.049) | (0.077) | (0.051) |
| Male | 0.031 | 0.058\* | -0.036 | 0.013 | -0.016 | 0.001 |
| (0.023) | (0.033) | (0.029) | (0.026) | (0.032) | (0.025) |
| Urban (>10,000 population) | 0.054 | -0.042 | -0.049 | -0.007 | 0.073 | 0.143\*\*\* |
| (0.044) | (0.042) | (0.032) | (0.030) | (0.053) | (0.037) |
| Democrat | -0.026 | 0.012 | -0.020 | -0.042 | -0.014 | 0.075\*\*\* |
| (0.028) | (0.025) | (0.027) | (0.033) | (0.031) | (0.025) |
| South | -0.096\*\*\* | 0.030 | 0.042 | -0.012 | -0.094\*\* | 0.067\* |
| (0.033) | (0.044) | (0.041) | (0.039) | (0.046) | (0.037) |
| Pseudo-R2 | 0.023 | 0.030 | 0.023 | 0.024 | 0.043 | 0.059 |
| Observations | 3,432 | 3,432 | 3,432 | 3,432 | 3,432 | 3,432 |

Note: The coefficients are marginal probabilities from logit regressions; standard errors in parentheses clustered at the state level. \*\*\* p<0.01, \*\* p<0.05, \* p<0.1.

Table A5.4 presents the results from estimating using linear probability (OLS) regressions rather than the marginal effects from probit regression as in Table 3. Again, the coefficients and significance levels are very close to those in Table 3.

**Table A5.4: Public Opinion on Immigration and Individual Characteristics (Linear Probability)**

|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) |
|  | Abolish quota system (Yes = 1) | Decrease immigra-tion (Yes = 1) | Country very important(Yes = 1) | Skills very important(Yes = 1) | Relativesvery important (Yes = 1) | Provide for refugees(Yes = 1) |
| Civic generation (age <55) | 0.026 | 0.003 | -0.024 | 0.001 | -0.083\*\*\* | 0.052 |
| (0.030) | (0.029) | (0.029) | (0.023) | (0.025) | (0.035) |
| High education (college) | 0.091\*\* | -0.075\* | -0.058 | 0.047\* | -0.193\*\*\* | 0.105\*\*\* |
| (0.038) | (0.039) | (0.036) | (0.024) | (0.035) | (0.036) |
| Log household income (000s) | 0.027 | -0.014 | -0.030 | 0.082\*\*\* | -0.055\*\* | 0.069\*\*\* |
| (0.021) | (0.022) | (0.025) | (0.022) | (0.026) | (0.023) |
| Protestant | -0.025 | 0.113\*\*\* | 0.056\* | 0.037 | -0.006 | 0.009 |
| (0.039) | (0.036) | (0.029) | (0.025) | (0.031) | (0.025) |
| White | -0.082\* | 0.157\*\* | 0.098\*\* | -0.026 | -0.061 | 0.124\*\* |
| (0.046) | (0.060) | (0.047) | (0.050) | (0.071) | (0.051) |
| Male | 0.030 | 0.057\* | -0.035 | 0.012 | -0.015 | 0.001 |
| (0.022) | (0.032) | (0.028) | (0.025) | (0.031) | (0.023) |
| Urban (>10,000 population) | 0.053 | -0.043 | -0.051 | -0.007 | 0.069 | 0.141\*\*\* |
| (0.043) | (0.043) | (0.033) | (0.030) | (0.051) | (0.036) |
| Democrat | -0.025 | 0.012 | -0.020 | -0.041 | -0.013 | 0.071\*\*\* |
| (0.028) | (0.025) | (0.027) | (0.032) | (0.029) | (0.024) |
| South | -0.093\*\*\* | 0.030 | 0.042 | -0.013 | -0.089\*\* | 0.059\* |
| (0.032) | (0.045) | (0.043) | (0.040) | (0.044) | (0.034) |
| R2 | 0.031 | 0.037 | 0.028 | 0.029 | 0.057 | 0.075 |
| Observations | 3,432 | 3,432 | 3,432 | 3,432 | 3,432 | 3,432 |

Note: OLS regressions; standard errors in parentheses clustered at the state level. \*\*\* p<0.01, \*\* p<0.05, \* p<0.1.

***Congressional Votes: Further Results***

Here we present some alternative specifications of the regressions for voting in Congress that appear as Table 4 in the main text. Table A5.5 shows that the size and significance of the Table 4 coefficients for the original House vote are very little affected if we exclude respondents with no opinion. Table A5.6 provides evidence that our results are robust if we bootstrap standard errors or if we use alternative estimation methodologies.

**Table A5.5: Excluding respondents who answer “do not know”**

|  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) |
| *Opinion (MRP predicted)* |  |  |  |  |
| Abolish quotas | 1.31\*\*\* | 0.52\*\*\* | 0.50\*\*\* | 0.40\*\*\* |
| (0.40) | (0.17) | (0.15) | (0.13) |
| Decrease immigration | -0.03 | 0.19 | 0.23 | 0.23 |
| (0.45) | (0.18) | (0.16) | (0.15) |
| *District/State characteristics* |  |  |  |  |
| South |  | -0.38\*\*\* | -0.37\*\*\* | -0.23\*\*\* |
|  | (0.12) | (0.10) | (0.07) |
| Share of population urban |  | 0.30\*\*\* | 0.26\*\*\* | 0.20\*\*\* |
|  | (0.08) | (0.06) | (0.06) |
| Log median income  |  | 0.17 | 0.15 | 0.30\*\* |
|  | (0.19) | (0.14) | (0.13) |
| Western Hemisphere immigrant share |  | 0.04 | 0.06 | -0.04 |
|  | (0.06) | (0.06) | (0.07) |
| *Representative characteristics* |  |  |  |  |
| Civic generation (age <55) |  |  | 0.08\*\*\* | 0.07\*\* |
|  |  | (0.03) | (0.03) |
| Business background |  |  | 0.04 | 0.04 |
|  |  | (0.03) | (0.03) |
| Previous political office |  |  | -0.06\*\* | -0.04\* |
|  |  | (0.03) | (0.03) |
| Migrant/ethnic background |  |  | 0.13\*\*\* | 0.10\*\* |
|  |  | (0.05) | (0.05) |
| Democrat |  |  | 0.07 |  |
|  |  | (0.05) |  |
| DW-NOMINATE score |  |  |  | -0.33\*\*\* |
|  |  |  | (0.08) |
| Pseudo-R2 | 0.155 | 0.506 | 0.564 | 0.636 |
| Wald χ2 (2,6,11,11) | 14.61 | 88.50 | 203.5 | 149.5 |
| Observations | 400 | 400 | 400 | 400 |

Notes: The coefficients are marginal probabilities from probit regressions; standard errors in parentheses clustered at the state level. \*\*\* p<0.01, \*\* p<0.05, \* p<0.1.

**Table A5.6: Alternative models and adjustment of standard errors**

|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) |
|  | Probit | Logit | LPM |
| Abolish quotas | 0.53\*\*\* | 0.53\*\*\* | 0.56\*\*\* | 0.56\*\*\* | 0.43\* | 0.43\*\*\* |
| (0.20) | (0.17) | (0.21) | (0.17) | (0.23) | (0.14) |
| Decrease immigration | 0.09 | 0.09 | 0.07 | 0.07 | 0.23 | 0.23\* |
| (0.12) | (0.12) | (0.13) | (0.12) | (0.15) | (0.12) |
| *District/State characteristics* |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| South | -0.26\*\*\* | -0.26\*\*\* | -0.26\*\*\* | -0.26\*\*\* | -0.45\*\*\* | -0.45\*\*\* |
| (0.07) | (0.08) | (0.08) | (0.09) | (0.09) | (0.07) |
| Share of population urban | 0.21\*\*\* | 0.21\*\*\* | 0.22\*\*\* | 0.22\*\*\* | 0.22\*\* | 0.22\*\*\* |
| (0.06) | (0.06) | (0.06) | (0.07) | (0.10) | (0.07) |
| Log median income  | 0.15 | 0.15 | 0.14 | 0.14 | 0.20 | 0.20 |
| (0.15) | (0.16) | (0.17) | (0.17) | (0.24) | (0.16) |
| Western Hemisphere immigrant share of popn. | -0.03 | -0.03 | -0.03 | -0.03 | 0.09 | 0.09 |
| (0.07) | (0.08) | (0.07) | (0.08) | (0.10) | (0.12) |
| *Representative characteristics* |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Civic generation (age <55) | 0.06\*\* | 0.06\*\* | 0.06\* | 0.06\*\* | 0.09\*\* | 0.09\*\*\* |
| (0.03) | (0.03) | (0.03) | (0.03) | (0.03) | (0.03) |
| Business background | 0.05\* | 0.05 | 0.05\* | 0.05 | 0.05 | 0.05 |
| (0.03) | (0.04) | (0.03) | (0.04) | (0.03) | (0.03) |
| Previous political office | -0.04\* | -0.04\* | -0.05 | -0.05\* | -0.04 | -0.04 |
| (0.03) | (0.03) | (0.03) | (0.03) | (0.03) | (0.03) |
| Migrant/ethnic background | 0.10\*\* | 0.10\*\* | 0.09\* | 0.09\*\* | 0.04 | 0.04\* |
| (0.05) | (0.04) | (0.05) | (0.04) | (0.03) | (0.02) |
| DW-NOMINATE score | -0.35\*\*\* | -0.35\*\*\* | -0.34\*\*\* | -0.34\*\*\* | -0.24\*\*\* | -0.24\*\*\* |
| (0.08) | (0.06) | (0.09) | (0.06) | (0.08) | (0.05) |
| Pseudo-R2 | 0.636 | 0.636 | 0.632 | 0.632 |  |  |
| R2 |  |  |  |  | 0.57 | 0.57 |
| Wald χ2 (11) | 169.5 | 106.7 | 145.8 | 87.42 |  |  |
| Observations | 400 | 400 | 400 | 400 | 400 | 400 |

Notes: Columns 1 and 2 report marginal effects of probit regressions. In column 1, robust standard errors clustered by state are presented in parentheses, whereas in column 2 standard errors are bootstrapped. Columns 3 and 4 report marginal effects of logit regressions. In column 3, robust standard errors clustered by state are presented in parentheses, whereas in column 4 standard errors are bootstrapped. Columns 5 and 6 are estimates from a linear probability model. In column 5, robust standard errors clustered by state are presented in parentheses, whereas in column 6 standard errors are bootstrapped. \*\*\* p<0.01, \*\* p<0.05, \* p<0.1.

**Appendix 6: House Votes on Immigration from 1915 to 1965**

An interesting question is whether voting on what became the Hart-Celler Act followed a fundamentally different pattern from votes on earlier major immigration acts. Goldin (1994 pp. 235, 251) examined voting in the House in 1913 and 1915 on the introduction of a literacy test, which was not passed on either occasion. She found that the higher share of foreign born in a state population, the higher the percentage urban and the lower the growth of immigration in the preceding decade the less likely its representatives would vote for restriction. Similarly, for votes on the country of origin quotas in 1924 (the Johnson-Reed Act), Tabellini (2020, p. 473) found that votes in favour were positively related to the preceding increase in the share of foreign born in the population. Goldin focused on states and cities as the unit of observation, and used votes to override the presidential veto as the dependent variable, while Tabellini took cities as the unit of observation used votes on the conference report as the dependent variable.

In order to be consistent across the different votes we regress the votes of individual representatives on a few state-level variables. As there was no override vote in 1965 we focus on the initial passage votes taken from the Voteview database (Poole and Rosenthal 1997; 2007). Thus we have to exclude the McCarran Walter Act of 1952 as the only available roll call vote is for the presidential override. And we take the dependent variable as 1 for voting in favour of restriction in the earlier years and 1 for voting *against* the 1965 bill. The state-level regressors are for the census year preceding congressional vote: 1910 for votes in 1915 and 1917 (which passed the literacy test), 1920 for that of 1924 (the quota act), and 1960 for that of 1965. The growth rates of the foreign born population are from 1900 to 1910, 1910 to 1920 and 1950 to 1960 respectively. The only individual-level variable is a dummy equal to 1 for Democrat.

**Table A6.1: Original House Votes in Favor of Restriction in 1915, 1917, 1924 and 1965**

|  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Year | 1915 | 1917 | 1924 | 1965 |
| Congress | 63rd  | 64th  | 68th  | 89th  |
| Immigration growth  | 0.68\*\*\* | 0.44\*\*\* | 0.22 | 0.18\*\* |
| (0.19) | (0.14) | (0.14) | (0.08) |
| Proportion foreign-born  | -2.63\*\*\* | -1.83\*\*\* | -1.30\*\*\* | -4.55\*\*\* |
| (0.53) | (0.62) | (0.47) | (0.92) |
| Proportion urban  | -0.52\*\* | -0.52\*\* | -0.46\*\*\* | 0.00 |
| (0.27) | (0.23) | (0.15) | (0.17) |
| South = 1 | -0.08 | -0.14 | -0.06 | 0.18\*\* |
| (0.14) | (0.11) | (0.10) | (0.09) |
| Democrat = 1 | -0.19\*\* | -0.21\*\*\* | -0.14\*\*\* | -0.07 |
| (0.07) | (0.06) | (0.05) | (0.06) |
| Pseudo-R2 | 0.304 | 0.297 | 0.434 | 0.479 |
| Wald χ2(5) | 120.17 | 101.94 | 157.50 | 92.34 |
| Observations | 401 | 421 | 404 | 422 |

*Notes*: The coefficients are marginal probabilities from probit regressions;robust standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the state level; \*\*\* p<0.01, \*\* p<0.05, \* p<0.1.

Table A6.1 reports the results for the initial vote in 1915, 1917, 1924 and 1965. For 1915 and 1917, the positive coefficients on the preceding decade’s growth in immigrant numbers and the negative coefficients on the proportion of foreign born are consistent with Goldin’s results on votes for the literacy test. But coefficients on the growth of immigration are sharply diminished size in 1924 and 1965 while that on the immigrant share is much larger in 1965 than in earlier years. This suggests that foreign-born communities, well established by 1965, exerted more pro-immigration influence than previously. Consistent with Goldin, the urban share of state population is significantly negative in the first three years but it becomes insignificant in 1965. On the other hand, the South dummy is only significant and positive in 1965, in contrast to our results in Table 4, which include public opinion and other controls. Finally, the coefficient on Democrat (the individual representative) is negative in the earlier years but, consistent with the Table 4 result, is insignificant in 1965.